SPS. ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA AND ERNESTO DE MESA vs. SPS. CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR.

AND MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012, J. Reyes

It is incumbent upon the debtor to invoke and prove that the subject property is his family
home within the prescribed period, otherwise laches will set in.

Facts:

Claudio D. Acero Jr., being the highest bidder, acquired the ownership of a parcel of land
formerly owned by petitioners Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa (Spouses De Mesa).
The property was sold at a public auction after Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan they secured
from Acero. Thereafter, respondents Acero and his wife Rufina (Spouses Acero) leased the subject
property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect the
rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
against Spouses De Mesa. The MTC ruled in Spouses Aceros favor.

In their defense, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
seeking to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) on the basis that the subject property is a family home
which is exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not been validly
levied upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan. However, the RTC dismissed their
complaint. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs Decision.

Issue:

Whether the family home is exempted from execution.

Ruling:

The general rule is that the family home is exempted from execution. However, this is
subject to exceptions in certain special cases such as this.

Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during ones lifetime. It is likewise without dispute that the family home, from
the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.

The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment.
It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. However, this right can be waived
or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home
at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.

For all intents and purposes, the negligence of Petitioners De Mesa or their omission to
assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned,
waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal right, it is incumbent upon the De Mesa to invoke and prove the same within the
prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status of the subject
property as a family home.
ANTONIA R. DELA PENA and ALVIN JOHN B. DELA PENA vs. GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA
and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO.
G.R. No. 187490, February 8, 2012, J. Carpio

The phrase married to is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be
interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible that
the property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and registered only after her marriage,
neither would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was acquired during
the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature.

Facts:

The suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, together with the
improvements thereon, situated in Marikina City and previously registered in the name of
petitioner Antonia R. Dela Pea (Antonia), married to Antegono A. Dela Pea (Antegono) under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-32315 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. On 7 May 1996,
Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of P250,000.00. On the
very same day, Antonia also executed in favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the property, for the purpose of securing the payment of said loan obligation.

On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the
property in favor of respondent Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma), for the stated consideration
of P600,000.00. Utilizing the document, Gemma caused the cancellation of TCT No. N-32315 as well
as the issuance of TCT No. 337834 of the Marikina City Registry of Deeds, naming her as the owner
of the subject realty.

On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin John B. Dela Pea (Alvin), filed
against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale docketed before Branch 272 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City. Claiming that the subject realty was conjugal
property, the Dela Peas alleged, among other matters, that the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who had, by then,
already died.

Issue:

Whether the subject property is considered a conjugal property so that the

mortgaged entered into by petitioner is void because of lack of consent from petitioners
husband.

Ruling:

The subject property cannot be considered a conjugal property.

Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for
the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.

Not having established the time of acquisition of the property, the Dela Peas insist that the
registration thereof in the name of Antonia R. Dela Pea, of legal age, Filipino, married to
Antegono A. Dela Pea should have already sufficiently established its conjugal
nature. Confronted with the same issue in the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled,
however, that the phrase married to is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot
be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible
that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and registered only after her
marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was
acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. Since there
is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name
of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said
spouse.