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ARNE KISLENKO
Assistant Professor of History, Ryerson University, and instructor in the International Relation
Programme, University of Toronto. The author would like to thank Margaret MacMillan,
Robert Accinelli, and At Wargofor their input and observations on various versions of this art
cle.
i William J. Klausner, Reflections on Thai Culture (Bangkok: Siam Society 1981), 79-
80.
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ArneKislenko
2 National Identity Board, Office of the Prime Minister, Thailand into the2ooo*s
(Bangkok: National Identity Board, Kingdom of Thailand, 2000), 168-95.
3 David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (New Haven a: Yale University Press
1982), chs 2-4 passim. See also, Rong Syamananda, A History of Thailand (5th ed;
Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University /Thai Watana Panich 1986), chs 5-7 passim.
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Thai foreign policy
fact, the Chakri dynasty that founded the empire (and from which the
current Thai royal family is descended) consolidated most of the Thai
kingdoms and gave rise to the modern Siamese state.4 Moreover,
despite numerous difficulties with European rivals for control of the
region, Siam emerged in the 20th century as the only country in
Southeast Asia never to have been colonized, undoubtedly in large part
because of its ability to play off European adversaries through skilful
diplomacy.
Opportunism has also been a hallmark of Thai foreign policy. For
example, the Anglo-French entente in 1904 effectively ended the rival-
ry between the two largest imperial powers in Southeast Asia. That put
Siam in a very difficult spot, sandwiched between the British in Malaya
and Burma and the French in Indochina. No longer able to play one
off against the other, as they had done so well for so long, the Siamese
were unable to stave off European demands. Between 1904 and 1909,
Siam was forced to cede claims to provinces in Laos, Cambodia, and
the northern states in Malaya.5
Desperate to counter-balance the English and the French, Siam
tried to woo Germany and Russia to take a stake in the region.
However, the real opportunity to check Britain and France came with
World War I, which severely undermined European colonialism and
helped to transform the United States into a global power. Aware of the
American opposition to imperialism, the Siamese hoped that the
United States would discourage renewed British and French demands
on their territory. Fearing that their neutrality might further European
claims, the Siamese seized the opportunity to be on the winning side,
which American entry in the war ensured. In July 1917, just three
months after the United States entered the conflict, Siam declared war
on the Central Powers. Although the declaration expressed only moral
4 John S. Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press
1981), ch 1; Wyatt, Thailand, chs 5- 7 passim.
5 Virginia Thompson, Thailand: The New Siam (New York: Paragon 1941), 40-4. This
followed nearly two decades of debate and conflict over the disputed lands, includ-
ing a brief war with France in 1893 in which Siam was defeated. Anglo-French co-
operation in Southeast Asia predates the 1904 entente cordiale and led to a host of
agreements that impinged on Siamese independence. By 1909, Siam had ceded
456,000 square kilometres of territory - roughly half of the Thai empire -with
severe economic consequences. The death of King Chulalongkorn in 1910, after 42
years overseeing Siam's expansion and modernization, and the dismemberment of
the empire contributed to political unrest and in many ways marked the beginning
of the end for the absolute monarchy.
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Arne Kislenko
7 Craig J. Reynolds in Craig J. Reynolds, ed, National Identity and its Defenders in
Thailand, 1939-1989 (Clayton, Australia: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies,
Monash University, 1991), 11-31. For an interesting biography of Phibun, see B.J.
Terwiel, Field Marshal Plaek Phibun Songkhram (St Lucia, Australia: University of
Queensland Press 1980).
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Thai foreign policy
9 John B. Haseman, The Thai Resistance Movement During World Warn (Chiang Mai:
Silkworm 2002).
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Arne Kislenko
n R. Sean Randolph, The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985
(Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California Berkeley, 1986),
19-35.
12 Arne Kislenko, 'The Vietnam War, Thailand and the U.S./ in Yone Sugita, Jon
Thares Davidann, and Richard Jensen, eds, Trans-Pacific Modernity: An America Asia
in the Pacific Century (Westport a: Greenwood, forthcoming 2003).
13 Between 1950 and 1975 Thailand received approximately US$650 million in eco-
nomic assistance; a further $940 million for Thai defence and security; $760 million
in operating costs, including the purchase of military equipment; and $250 million
to construct six major air bases in Thailand. American servicemen stationed in the
country and those on leave from Vietnam pumped another US$850 million into the
economy. With over two billion dollars in total assistance between 1965 and 1975,
Thailand was the second largest recipient of American aid in Southeast Asia next to
Vietnam. See Robert J. McMahon, 'What difference did it make? Assessing the
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Thai foreign policy
polity was obsessed with the relationship with the United States, and
the military government depended on it for its legitimacy. Although
the communist insurgency in Thailand never seriously threatened the
stability of the country, the success of communist forces in Laos and
Cambodia definitely did. A large, closely knit, and affluent ethnic
Chinese community in Thailand only added to the fear that Beijing
was acting out an ancient impulse to dominate the region.14 In this
view, although communism was a dangerous commodity on its own, it
was also a 'banner' behind which the old Chinese dragon could spread
its wings. Moreover, by helping the Americans to prosecute their war,
Thailand risked alienating itself from virtually all of its neighbours. As
the old sage of Thai politics (and twice prime minister), Seni Pramoj,
warned in 1969: 'we have let the U.S. forces use our country to bomb
Hanoi. When the Americans go away, they won't take that little bit of
history with them/15
Many Thai scholars point out that the close relationship between
Thailand and the United States during the Vietnam War era was not
such a radical departure from traditional foreign policy paradigms. In
its advocacy of violence, revolution, and atheism, communism was the
antithesis of Thai cultural traditions and therefore a fundamental
threat to the country.16 The United States was willing and able to try to
prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, and thus the rela-
tionship was a convergence of interests, entirely in keeping with the prin-
ciple of flexibility. This contention is supported by the course of
Thailand's external relations after the Vietnam War. Richard Nixon's
rapprochement with China in 1972 and the American withdrawal from
Vietnam in 1973 were catalysts for major political developments in
Thailand. In October 1973, a groundswell of public opposition toppled
Vietnam War's impact on Southeast Asia/ in Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds,
International Perspectives on Vietnam (College Station: Texas a&m University Press
2000), 202; and Robert J. Muscat, Thailand and the United States: Development,
Security, and Foreign Aid (New York: Columbia University Press 1990).
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Arne Kislenko
17 Surachart Bamrungsuk, United States Foreign Policy and Thai Military Rule 1947-
1977 (Bangkok: Editions Duangkamol 1988), 170-6.
18 As early as 1966 the government anticipated American disengagement. Shortly
after Lyndon Johnson's decision not to run for president in 1968, the Thai foreign
minister, Thanat Khoman, made it clear that his government might seek an accom-
modation with China. Similar statements became increasingly familiar as the
American commitment in Vietnam waned. See R.K. Jain, China and Thailand 1949-
1983 (New Delhi: Radiant 1984), 155.
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Thai foreign policy
21 Michael Haas, Cambodia, Pol Pot and the United States: The Faustian Pact (New
York: Praeger 1991), 79-120.
22 Ibid, 64-5.
23 Kusuma Snitwongse, 'Thai foreign policy in the global age: principle or profit?'
Contemporary Southeast Asia 23(August 2001), 189-92; and Leszek Buszynski,
Thailand's foreign policy: management of a regional vision,' Asian Survey
34(August 1994), 730-2.
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Arne Kislenko
Since the end of the Cambodian crisis in the early 1990s, Thai for-
eign policy has been decisively more balanced. The United Nations
intervention in Cambodia and international efforts to broker a peace
between rival factions drew some attention to Thailand's security con-
cerns. As well, Thai officials were instrumental and constructive in
negotiations. More importantly, the peace process in Cambodia coin-
cided with the tumultuous politics in Thailand in 1992, which forced
the military from government and began the country's current period
of reform. The 1 992 coup helped take control over the ideological con-
tent and direction of foreign policy away from the Thai army, which
was preoccupied with the Vietnamese threat from Cambodia.26 One of
the most important developments accompanying this change has been
Bangkok's rapprochement with Vietnam, which paralleled China's
de'tente with Hanoi.27 Prior to the Vietnamese withdrawal from
Cambodia, dialogue with Hanoi was impossible for the Thai govern-
ment. It would have severely undermined Bangkok's diplomatic efforts
with China, and, at least before the administration of Bill Clinton re-
established relations with Vietnam in 1995, would have alienated the
United States as well.
Today Thai-Cambodian relations are at a crossroad. The historical
animosity between the two countries cannot be erased, and tension
clearly exists, particularly over border control, which is still disputed in
some areas. Illegal logging, mining, and other illicit businesses are at
the heart of the problem, although in the past few years some Thai gov-
ernments have made efforts to curtail such activity.28 On the whole,
however, relations between the two countries have been steadily
improving. The best example is the fact that Thailand sponsored
Cambodia for admission to the Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) as early as 1995. Although the coup d'etat by
Cambodian strongman Hun Sen in 1997 delayed the process,
Thailand maintained its support for admission, which was finally
achieved in April 1999.29 In June 2000, Thai Prime Minister Chuan
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Thai foreign policy
32 By 1990, many Thais saw the Chatichai government as thoroughly corrupt, and
Chatichai was removed in a military coup in February 1991. See Kevin Hewson, 'Of
regimes, state and pluralities: Thai politics enters the 1990s,' in Kevin Hewson,
Richard Robison, and Garry Rodan, eds, Southeast Asia in the 1990s:
Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism (St Leonards, Australia: Allen and
Unwin 1993), ch 7.
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Arne Kislenko
33 Paul Battersby, 'Border politics and the broader politics of Thailand's internation-
al relations in the 1990s: from communism to capitalism/ Pacific Affairs 7i(winter
1998), 473-9.
34 Ibid. See also, Khatarya Urn, 'Thailand and the dynamics of economic and securi-
ty complexes in mainland Southeast Asia/ Contemporary Southeast Asia
13 (December 1991), 245-70.
35 Kusuma Snitwongse, 'Thai foreign policy in the global age/ 193-5.
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Thai foreign policy
sad fifty-five year legacy of revolt, insurgency, and war has significantly
undermined its potential threat to Thailand. However, tensions between
the two have remained consistently high. During the 1950s and early
1960s, Thailand gave safe haven to irregular forces of the Chinese
Kuomintang, many of whom joined rebellious ethnic minorities in their
war against the Burmese government after the communist revolution in
China. By the mid-1960s, Kuomintang soldiers were also deeply
involved with the lucrative opium trade and arms smuggling, so much so
that they exercised considerable power in the volatile 'Golden Triangle'
border region of Laos, Burma, and Thailand.38 Even more troubling
from Burma's point of view is Thailand's long support for non-commu-
nist ethnic insurgents operating along the border. For nearly the entire
duration of the Burmese crisis Thailand has given sanctuary to Karen,
Shan, Mon, and other minorities. Because it is home to sizeable popula-
tions of these groups, Thailand is cautious not to alienate them. During
much of the cold war, the Thai government quietly supported the
groups, largely out of a desire to keep Burma destabilized. Several promi-
nent Thai leaders also accumulated enormous personal wealth through
connections with insurgents involved in the drug trade.39
38 Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity with the Global Drug Trade
(New York: Lawrence Hill 1991), 349-60.
39 Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948 (Bangkok:
Silkworm 1999), 305-22.
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Arne Kislenko
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Thai foreign policy
More likely is the dire effect a collapse would have on the 2400 kilo-
metre Thai border with Burma, of which only 58 kilometres is legally
demarcated.42
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ArneKislenko
46 Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 June 2002, 19. For an interesting study on the
Thai military and its role in government, see Suchit Bunbongkarn, The military and
democracy in Thailand/ in R.J. May and Viberto Selochan, eds, The Military and
Democracy in Asia and the Pacific (London: C. Hurst 1998), ch 3. See also, James
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Thai foreign policy
Thai military has also been angered by revelations that Bangkok may
have unknowingly helped the Burmese air force to buy ten MiG-29
fighters from Russia, worth an estimated US$130 million. The down-
payment likely came from royalties paid to Rangoon by the govern-
ment-owned Petroleum Authority of Thailand for gas piped ashore
from the Gulf of Martaban.47
48 Kusuma Snitwongse, Thai foreign policy in the global age/ 201. See also, Syed
Serajul Islam, 'The Islamic independence movements in Patani of Thailand and
Mindanao of the Philippines/ Asian Survey 38(May 1998), 441-53.
49 Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 August 2002, 8; ibid, 27 September 2001, 21-2.
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Arne Kislenko
50 John Gershman, 'In focus: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (apec),' policy brief
for Foreign Policy in Focus s(November 2000), Columbia International Affairs
Online, http://www.ciaonet.org
51 'Asia 2001 Yearbook/ Far Eastern Economic Review, 211.
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Thai foreign policy
countries' long military stand-off. After the Cambodian crisis was largely
resolved, Thailand and Vietnam enjoyed a flurry of diplomatic activity,
signing numerous economic agreements and dramatically increasing bilat-
eral trade.54 Economic and political reforms in Vietnam over the course of
the 1990s have helped further relations with Thailand, and encouraged
Thai investment. Hanoi's efforts to improve Vietnam's relations with other
countries also alleviated Thai concerns about security threats to regional
stability. In this regard, the enormous downsizing of the Vietnamese mili-
tary over the past fifteen years has been particularly important.55
Perhaps the greatest success for Thai foreign relations recently is
with China. Like Vietnam, China was very interested in Thailand's
efforts to develop Indochina economically during the 1990s. The reso-
lution of the Cambodian crisis and improved relations with Hanoi
eliminated Beijing's chief concerns in the region. Chinas ties to
Bangkok had been predicated on Cambodia since 1978, but the tran-
sition from a military and security convergence to a mutual economic
focus proved to be rather straightforward. Moreover, Thailand was a
faithful friend to Beijing after the Tiananmen Square incident in June
1989. The Thai government issued no response to the massacre of
Chinese students and in fact continued to pursue an open dialogue
with China. Chatichai Choonhavan was one of the first foreign leaders
to return to Beijing, visiting less than four months later.56 During the
54 Surin Maisrikrod, '"The peace dividend" in Southeast Asia: the political econo-
my of new Thai-Vietnamese relations/ Contemporary Southeast Asia 6(june 1994),
49-66. Since the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1976, Thailand and
Vietnam have signed 11 memoranda of understanding, six of them after 1991. Trade
between the two countries after 1991 was similarly brisk. The total value of bilateral
trade that year was 3.5 million Thai baht, only about us$i million. In 992, the total
value increased 234 per cent.
55 Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, 'Post-cold war us military expenditure in the
context of world spending trends/ policy brief for The Project on Defense
Alternatives, January 1997, Columbia International Affairs Online,
http://www.ciaonet.org. In 1986 Vietnam spent a record US$3.1 billion on its armed
forces. By the end of 1994, military spending had decreased by 85 per cent. Perhaps
surprisingly, military spending also dramatically decreased in China and North
Korea during this period. Combined, the three communist countries allocated US$62
billion in 1986, but just $58.7 billion in 1994. By contrast, Western -oriented Asian
nations, including Thailand, spent $67.5 billion in 1986 and increased their com-
bined total to $89.5 billion by 1994.
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Arne Kislenko
58 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand's Boom and Bust (Chiang Mai:
Silkworm 1998), 33-7. See also, Surachai Sirikrai, Thai perceptions of China and
Japan/ Contemporary Southeast Asia i2(December 1990), 247-65.
59 Kusuma Snitwongse, Thai foreign policy in the global age/ 202.
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Thai foreign policy
the cold war, but so too have continued joint military co-operation and
narcotic interdiction efforts.60 On balance, then, United States-Thai
relations are notable for their consistency. However, as Thailand devel-
ops even greater autonomy in its foreign affairs and builds upon its
friendship with China, the relationship with the United States may go
through significant changes.
Part of the reason for Thailand s decreased foreign policy dependen-
cy on the American connection is the rehabilitation of ASEAN as a
diplomatic vehicle. Formed in 1967, ASEAN originally included just
five countries - Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and
Singapore. At the time, Thailand did not consider ASEAN a diplomatic
priority. However, with the withdrawal of United States power from
Southeast Asia in the mid- 1 970s, Thailand began to focus more on the
organization and its potential as a regional security forum. Since then
ASEAN has emerged as an important player in Southeast Asia, and
Thailand has become one of its leading members. Somewhat pre-
dictably, the Thais spearheaded ASEAN s condemnation of the 1978
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and championed its role in helping
to broker the 1991-2 negotiations on Cambodia. Perhaps less pre-
dictably, Thailand was the leading advocate of broadening ASEAN's
membership to include all Southeast Asian nations.61 As discussed pre-
viously, Thailand's has been the leading voice in extending the number
of ASEAN dialogue partners, particularly China.
The past few years have definitely strained ASEAN s effectiveness as a
regional organization. The 1997 financial collapse of many member
states dealt a decisively difficult blow. ASEAN s critics point out that it
has done little to help remedy economic problems in Southeast Asia,
while defenders note the tremendous difficulty of dealing with the
wide range of opinions over what to do. ASEAN has also been divided
on the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of member
6o Leszek Buszynski, 'Thailand's foreign policy/ 732-4. 'Cobra Gold' exercises are
held annually in Thailand between the two countries' armed forces. It is interesting
to note that in a show of autonomy the Thai government refused a request by the
United States military to conduct over-flights in gathering intelligence on Cambodia
in 1992.
61 Peter Eng, 'Transforming asean,' 51. Asean now has ten members - Brunei joined in
1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Burma in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999 encom-
passing nearly 500 million people over 4.5 million square kilometres and a com-
bined gross domestic product (gdp) of US$737 billion. See also, Economist, 12
February 2000, 3-4.
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Arne Kislenko
states. In 1 996, with Burma clearly in mind, Thailand tried to shift the
emphasis to 'flexible engagement/ implying that although non-inter-
ference remained ASEAN s official policy, member states could take their
own initiative. Under pressure from Malaysia and Indonesia, the Thai
proposal was dropped, and ASEAN members eventually decided on
'enhanced interaction' as a solution.62
Despite these problems, ASEAN remains an integral part of interna-
tional relations in Southeast Asia. There is renewed faith amongst its
members as the economic and political climate of the region slowly
improves. ASEAN has also proven that it is still relevant by stimulating
discussion on a regional free trade zone and by orchestrating the meet-
ing between the United States secretary of state, Colin Powell, and
North Koreas foreign minister, Paek Nam Sun, in the summer of
2002.63 Critical to ASEAN s resurgence is Washington's fear that Chinese
influence in ASEAN will grow. A strategic re-evaluation of American for-
eign policy in this respect would likely enhance ASEAN s credibility.
Moreover, ASEAN is very likely to remain a major component of Thai
foreign policy in the years to come, particularly if it facilitates good
relations with both China and the United States.
Alongside its emphasis on ASEAN, Thailand has attempted to expand
its participation in other international organizations. In 1999, the
Thai military contributed 1500 troops - the largest number next to
Australia - to help stabilize East Timor prior to the arrival of United
Nations peacekeepers. A Thai major-general was second in command
of overall forces. Also in 1999, the deputy prime minister of Thailand,
Supachai Panitchpakdi, was named co-director general of the WTO.64
The events of 1 1 September 2001 affected Thailand's external relations
by focusing attention on both the country's Muslim insurgency and its
notoriously lax immigration procedures. Bangkok is a well-established
centre of international organized crime and terrorist activity. In the
past, Thai authorities have been disinterested in clamping down,
62 Peter Eng, 'Transforming asean,' 54; Tobias Nischalke, 'Does asean measure up?
Post-cold war diplomacy and the idea of regional community/ Pacific Review
15(2002), 89-117; and Robin Ramcharan, 'Asean and non-interference: a principle
maintained/ Contemporary Southeast Asia 22(April 2000), 60-88.
63 Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 August 2002, 22. On asean's role in Asian-Pacific
security, see Sheldon W. Simon, 'Security prospects in Southeast Asia: collaborative
efforts and the asean Regional Forum/ Pacific Review 11(1998), 195-212.
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Thai foreign policy
which has earned them the ire of the United States, Britain, and other
Western countries interested in co-operative, global interdiction
against such groups. Recent revelations about Al-Qaeda affiliates oper-
ating in Thailand have helped change things. So too did a rash of police
killings in southern Thailand and the April 2001 bombings of Hat Yai
railway station and a hotel in Yala province.65 Under pressure from the
United States, Thailand will have to address its border security and
improve its intelligence gathering capabilities.
No discussion on the course of Thai foreign policy would be com-
plete without mention of bureaucratic and political factors that influ-
ence decision-making. One of the most important is the organization
and leadership of the foreign ministry. Historically, the diplomatic
corps in Thailand was subject to the king and, after the 1932 coup, to
the military, which dominated the country for nearly 60 years. There
were some brilliant foreign ministers, who certainly made their mark,
such as Prince Devawongse following World War I orThanat Khoman
during much of the cold war. However, for the most part foreign poli-
cy in the 20th century was the domain of royalty or military govern-
ments. During the 1980s this began to change. The foreign ministry
enjoyed considerable latitude and prominence in the formulation of
various policies, particularly during Chatichai s tenure as prime minis-
ter. During Chuan Leekpais time in office (1992-5, and 1997-2000),
the foreign ministry was considerably more restrained and conserva-
tive, but it retained some of its influence over policy initiatives.66
Perhaps most significant from a bureaucratic perspective is the fact that
between 1988 and 1997 there were eleven foreign ministers, a clear
illustration of Thailand's volatile domestic politics. Such rapid transi-
tions in leadership have decreased the prestige of the portfolio and made
policy formulation very difficult. The foreign ministry has also been
affected by demographic change. During Thailand's economic boom,
the foreign ministry found it difficult to attract new recruits, given its
comparatively modest financial incentives.67 In addtion, today an
increasing number of department staff are young and middle class and
tend to have different views on international affairs than their elders.
66 John Funston, 'Thai foreign policy: seeking influence,' Southeast Asian Affairs
(1998)1292-306.
67 Ibid.
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Arne Kislenko
The economic crisis that began in 1997 has also impinged on Thai
foreign policy. The collapse of the Thai 'boom' undermined attempts
to develop Indochina into a marketplace with Thailand at its centre. It
also diminished Thailand's capacity to remedy its problems with
neighbour states through financial inducements. However, from both
an economic and a foreign policy perspective, the Asian crisis may well
be overstated. One of the top academics in Thai studies, Duncan
McCargo, points out that 'crisis' is in fact normal for Thailand. From
1932 to 1992 military authoritarianism dominated the country. In the
transition to greater democracy, there were nine governments between
1991 and 2000. In total Thailand has had sixteen different constitu-
tions.68 All of these factors belie the contention that the events of 1997
were somehow cataclysmic. It is more likely that such crises will con-
tinue to accompany economic growth, political reform, and the devel-
opment of an increasingly pluralistic society.
In fact, the economic crisis may in some ways have had a positive
effect on Thailand and its foreign policy formulation. Prior to 1997,
decisions about foreign affairs were made without much consideration
for public sentiment. The crisis changed that by increasing public
awareness of and interest in a wide range of issues from the environ-
ment to human rights.69 Although recovering and maintaining eco-
nomic growth are still the most important determinants in Thai for-
eign policy, the spectrum of other influences is increasingly broad. This
change parallels the effects of political reform, which since the 1992
coup have undermined the military's control of government and, con-
sequently, the focus on defence and security issues.
Having just come to power in February 2001, it is too early to tell
how Thailand's current prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, will affect
the course of Thai foreign policy. He is clearly in favour of 'construc-
tive engagement' with Burma and is likely to develop the friendship
with Vietnam and China. As the country struggles to recover econom-
ically, Thaksin's background as Thailand's wealthiest tycoon is sure to
68 Duncan McCargo, 'Thailand: crisis or reform?' Asian Affairs 3i(June 2000), 131-7.
See also, Duncan McCargo, 'Security, development and political participation in
Thailand: alternative currencies of legitimacy,' Contemporary Southeast Asia
24(April 2002), 51-60.
69 Kusuma Snitwongse, 'Thai foreign policy in the global age,' 190-1. See also,
Barry K. Gills, 'The crisis of post-war east Asian capitalism: American power, democ-
racy and the vicissitudes of globalization,' Review of International Studies
26(2000), 381-403.
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Thai foreign policy
71 'Asia 2002 Yearbook/ Far Eastern Economic Review, 208. Thaksin and his newly
created Thai Rak Thai (Thai Loves Thai) party won the January 2001 elections with
70 per cent public approval, even though he was already under indictment by the
National Counter-Corruption Commission for allegedly not disclosing all his person-
al assets. With victory in hand, but still facing the Constitutional Court's resolution
on the charges, Thaksin publicly berated the Commission and a host of political
reforms. In August 2001, the Court narrowly ruled in Thaksin's favour amidst
rumours of his tampering with the process. Such allegations, along with continuing
economic lethargy, have significantly reduced his popularity. Moreover, in a rare
public statement on politics by the revered king in December 2001, Thaksin was
chastised for his 'double standards and egoism/ A poll taken shortly thereafter
showed Thaksin's popular support at just 48 per cent. See also William F. Case,
Thai democracy, 2001/ Asian Survey 41 (May 2001), 525-37.
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