D Poole Nuevas Cronicas Del Peru PDF

The New Chroniclers of Peru: US Scholars and Their 'Shining Path' of Peasant Rebellion
Author(s): Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique

Source: Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1991), pp. 133-191
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Society for Latin American Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3338175
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Bull. LatinAm. Res., Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 133-191, 1991. 0261-3050/91S3.00 + .00
Printedin GreatBritain. Society for LatinAmericanStudies
PergamonPress plc
The New Chroniclersof Peru:US Scholarsand

their'ShiningPath'of PeasantRebellion
DEBORAH POOLE
New Schoolfor SocialResearch,New York,USA
and
GERARDO RENIQUE
CityCollegeof New York,USA
'Elpapelaguantatodo'-(Peruvian proverb)
INTRODUCTION
On 19 April 1980, Abimael Guzmain,secretarygeneral of the Partido
Comunistadel Peru 'SenderoLuminoso'(PCP-SL)gave a speech in the
closing session of the party'sfirst militaryschool. The school had been
createdfollowingthe 1978 NinthCentralCommitteePlenaryin whichPCP-
SL leadersdeclaredthat theirpartyhad completeda process of consolida-
tion andwas thereforereadyto assumeits role as the revolutionaryvanguard
for the Peruvianworkingclass.Guzman's1980 speechmarkedthe beginning
of yet anotherstagein whichthe partywouldnow initiatethe armedstruggle:
Somoslos iniciadores.Comenzamosdiciendosomos los iniciadores,ter-
minamos diciendo somos los iniciadores.gIniciadoresde que? De la
guerrapopular,de la luchaarmada,que estden nuestrasmanos,brillaen
nuestramente,palpitaen nuestrocorazon,se agitaincontenibleen nuest-
ras voluntades.Eso es lo que somos. Unpuhado de hombres,de comu-
nistas,acatandoel mandatodelpartido,delproletariadoy delpueblo.1
One month later, membersof the PCP-SL burnt presidentialelectoral
ballotsin the ruraltownof Chuschi(Cangalloprovince,departmentof Ayac-
ucho). The followingday other PCP-SLmilitantssabotagedthe air control
towerin the departmentalcapitalof Ayacucho.A monthlater,theyattacked
the police infirmary,a government-sponsoredtouristhotel and the political
headquartersof the then governingparty(Acci6n Popular)in the samecity.
Laterthatmonth,in theirmostspectacularattack,theyburntdownthe muni-
cipalbuildingin the working-classdistrictof SanMartinde Porras,halfa mile
fromthe Plazade Armasand seat of governmentin the Peruviancapitalcity
of Lima.In the next months,they targettedminingcamps,governmentand
municipaloffices,electricaland communicationsoffices and the tombof the
formerPresidentJuanVelascoAlvarado.These actionsweremeantto mark
the co-ordinatedand interdependentnatureof the PCP-SL'stwo theatresof
militaryoperation:the sparselypopulatedand impoverishedAndean coun-
trysideand the urbanpoliticaland economicpowercentressituated,for the
134 BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH
mostpart,on Peru'sPacificcoast.Theobjectiveof the armedactscarriedout
in these two arenaswas to destroythe Peruvianstateand constructa 'New
Democracy'.2
Unbeknownto the membersof thisPeruvianpoliticalparty,theiractions
also gave birthto anothergroupof politicalideologueswhose careers,like
those of Sendero'smilitants,would come to dependon both the unfolding
politicalstrugglein PeruandUS foreignpolicy.Thisnewgroupwasformed
of US scholars,trainedin the disciplinesof politicalscience,sociologyand
anthropology,but now specialisingin the study of Sendero'splace in the
Peruvianpoliticalarena.As US foreignpolicy regroupsaroundthe newly
emergentevilsof terrorismandthe ThirdWorldnarcoticstrade,thepolitical
positions and academic,or 'scientific',authorityof these self-annointed
Senderoexpertsacquiredan even more importantstatusin the 'post-Cold
War'ideologicalmachineryof Americanimperialism.It is this fact which
gives cause for concernthat the US Senderologists'dogma-unlike that of
Sendero-focuses on only one 'theatreof operations'and one type of social
agent:the Andean ruralcountrysideand the Quechuaor Aymara'Indian'
peasant.
In this article,we examinethe traditionsof scholarlyrepresentationand
the constructionof scientifictruthin the workof thisgroupof US academic
specialists,whomwe shallreferto as 'Senderologists'. Firstwe look at the
scholarlyapparatusupon whichearlySenderologistsmountedtheirclaims
that the PCP-SLconstitutesa 'mystery'or 'enigma'.We suggestthat this
imageof Senderohas been constructedthroughan intentionedpatternof
bibliographicelision and historicalfalsification,and throughthe mystifica-
tionof bothpeasantandThirdWorldpoliticalrationalities. In thissectionwe
also look at the ways in which the 'enigmatic'statusof Senderohas been
canonisedin theliteratureandusedto validatethe authorityof anintellectual
expertisewhichclaimsto decipherthe mystery.
In the followingtwo sections,we look at how a seriesof relatedassump-
tions aboutthe natureof peasantpoliticalculture,ThirdWorld'extremism'
and Maoist'dogma'shapethe earlyworkof two US Senderologists.These
assumptionsare based in received theoreticaldoctrine about: (1) the
processes of modernisation;(2) the essentialisedcultural'otherness'of
peasants;(3) the parochialnatureof peasantpoliticalmovements;(4) the
irrationalityof Thirdworldpoliticalprocesses;(5) the uniformityof Maoist
thought;and (6) the assimilationof Maoist militarystrategyto Western
historicistallegoriesaboutthe strugglebetweenbarbarismandcivilisation.
Inthefollowingsectionswe examinethehardeningof thepeasantmodelin
latertexts by the same and other authors.We focus in particularon the fit
between senderologicalmodels and the shiftingdiscursiveand political
terrainof the post Cold War era. The absorptionof the senderological
paradigmintothenewliteratureon terrorismandnarcoterrorism reflectsnot
only the risingdominanceof thesenew fieldsof ideologicalproduction,but
the easy correspondencebetween the polarized modernisationmodels
informingearly senderologyand the 'new' emphasis on the terroristic
irrationality of ThirdWorldpoliticalviolence.
We concludewithsomealternativesuggestionsforhowa moreproductive
THE NEW CHRONICLERSOF PERU 135
visionof Senderomightbe approached.We suggestthatan understandingof

the last decade of politicalviolence in Peru requiresdetailedhistoricaland
regional analysis of local and state power, class structuresand the con-
structionof ethnicand culturaldifference.In particular,any accountof the
origins, importance and future of the PCP 'Sendero Luminoso' must
necessarilytakeinto accountthe broad-basedgrass-rootssocialmovements,
popular political organisationsand Leftist parties not affiliatedwith or
supportiveof the PCP-SL'sactions.By focusingnarrowlyon the PCP-SLas
the sole oppositional political actor in Peru, US Senderologyhas both
privilegedand exaggerated-and thereforeendorsed-Sendero's claims to
representthe Peruvianpeasantand workingclasses.
SCHOLARLYMETHODAND FACTUAL ENIGMA
I believethat if you'reteachin'history,fill it with straightup facts not
mystery-KRSONE3
The authorsof the earliestworkin Englishon SenderoLuminosoare David
Scott Palmer and Cynthia McClintock.Because the work of these two
politicalscientistshas,in manyways,shapedthe field of US Senderology,we
begin our discussion with a close look at their published materialsand
scholarly method. In this section we will be particularlyinterested in
examiningthe techniquesof bibliographicreferencingand citationthrough
whichboth authorssituatetheirpublishedworkon Senderowith respectto
the broaderfield of knowledgeaboutPeruin generalandSenderoLuminoso
in particular.As the groundworkof academicmethod,citationand biblio-
graphic referencingprovide useful entry points for understandinghow
'scholarly'authorityhas been assembledin US senderologicaldiscourse,and
why the 'mysterious'or 'enigmatic'ascriptionplaced on SenderoLuminoso
in thesetwo scholars'earlyworkhas come to be so crucialto the enterpriseof
US Senderology.
CynthiaMcClintock,an associateprofessorin the Departmentof Political
Science at George WashingtonUniversity,began her work on Peru with
research in the early 1970s on the agriculturaleconomy and the co-
operatives set up by Peru's militarygovernment.4Her work on Sendero
draws on economic statistics, on survey questionnairesconducted on
agriculturalco-operativesduringher earlierresearch,interviewswith Lima
intellectuals, and 'informal interviews with peasant leaders (not from
Ayacucho)duringvariousperiodsin the early 1980s'.5
David Scott Palmer, professor of Political Science and International
Relationsat Boston University,also beganhis academiccareerwithworkon
the 1970s Peruvianmilitarygovernment.At the time of his originalSendero
publications,however, Palmer was Associate Dean for Programmesand
Chairmanof LatinAmericanand CaribbeanStudiesat the ForeignService
Instituteof the US Departmentof State.His analysesof Senderoarebasedin
parton the timehe spentin Ayacuchoas a Peace Corpvolunteerfrom 1962
to 1964.6 During these years, which predate Sendero'sconsolidationas a
politicalparty,Palmerclaimsto havemetmanyindividualswho werelaterto
become senderistas,includingAbimaelGuzman.7
Palmer returnedto Ayacucho 10 years later to carryout dissertation
researchon the effects of militarygovernmentpolicy on agriculturalco-
operativesand peasantcommunities.8 He returnedagainduringthe period
1977-1979, as a visitinglecturerfor the US InformationServiceand the
StateDepartment'sSchool of Area Studies.In 1980 he publisheda critical
evaluationand studyof militaryreformismentitledPeru:theAuthoritarian
Tradition.9
BothPalmer'sandMcClintock'searlyworkdrawsheavilyon the modern-
isationbreakdownmodels of the US politicalscientists,JamesDavies and
SamuelHuntington.10 These theoreticiansshiftedthe emphasisin modern-
isationtheoryfromeconomicsto politics.In particular,they predictedthat
the populardesiresandmobilisationsstimulatedby modernisationin Third
World countries,would lead inevitablyto disruptionof orderlypolitical
processin thoseareaswhereculturallyor sociallymarginalpopulations-for
example,peasants-had not yet made the transitionfrom 'traditional'to
'moder'. Huntington,in particular,saw the gap between traditionand
modernity-whichhe mappedconvenientlyonto thatsupposedlyprevailing
between the countrysideand the city-as the primarysource of political
instabilityin ThirdWorldcountries. 1 Becausehe consideredThirdWorld,
andparticularly LatinAmerican,societiesto be constitutionally incapableof
reproducingEuropean and US models of economic and politicaldevelop-
ment,Huntington,whose influenceboth Palmerand McClintockacknow-
ledge,wenton to arguethatpoliticalscientistsshouldabandonthe Parsonian
assumptionsof both scientificobjectivityandneutrality,andengageinstead
in politicalengineering.12 He personallyappliedthisdoctrineas a memberof
the NationalSecurityCouncil,and as a leadingarchitectof the urbanisation
andforcedresettlementprogrammesin Vietnam.'3His argumentsin favour
of suchdrasticcounterinsurgency measureswerebolstered,on the one hand,
by his belief(or 'theory')thatwhatThirdWorldcountriesneededwasa large
dose of authoritarian and, on the other,by his predic-
'institutionalisation',
tion that both modernityand politicalinstitutionalisation would only be
achievedonce the gapbetweencityandcountrysidehadbeenforciblyelimi-
nated.
This ideologicallyinformedconstructionof the oppositionbetweenrural
andurban,traditionaland modern,constitutesone of the principallegacies
of Huntington'scounterinsurgency theoryto the Senderologists'analysesof
Peruvian'insurgency'in the 1980s. Like Huntington,the Senderologists,as
we will see, attemptto explainthe peasantry'srole in Sendero's'insurgency'
by mythologisingtheirpresumablyambivalentpositionin whatHuntington
has spatialised(and engendered)as 'the no-man'sland of change'where
neither'tradition'nor 'modernity'prevails.14 They also uncriticallyassume
his hypothesesregardingthe necessarily'fundamentalist' characterof Third
World 'ruralmovements',the 'tribal'characteristicsof Latin American
political cultures,and the casual relation between universitiesand the
'destabilisingbehaviour'of an educatedThirdWorldintelligentsia.15
Anothersubjectprivilegedby politicaldevelopmenttheorywasthe Third
Worldmilitary,whoHuntingtonandothertheoristsconsideredto be the last
hopefor orderlymodernisation.'6 Thereformistmilitaryregimewhichruled
Perufrom 1968 to 1975 underGeneralJuanVelascoAlvaradoprovidedan

opportunecase study with which to test these theories.Both Palmerand
McClintockbegan their careers,as we have seen, with studiesof Velasco's
militarygovernment.Their later analysesof Senderobuild upon the same
dichotomisedand highly authoritarianmodels of political modernisation
thatshapedearlyinterestin studyingmilitaryreform.For example,Palmer's
emphasis on what he sees as the inevitabilityof Sendero's(pre-modern)
political fundamentalismis clearly informed by Huntington'sominous
prediction that, when the military fails to successfully modernise and
institutionalisepopularpoliticaldemands,
the broadeningof participationtransformsthe society into a mass
praetoriansystem.In such a systemthe opportunityto create political
institutionspasses from the military,the apostles of order, to ... the
apostlesof revolution.17
In McClintock'scase,the influenceof thisbrandof politicalmodernisation
(and counterinsurgency)theoryis seen most clearlyin her approachto the
'politics'of both peasantsand Sendero Luminoso.For McClintock,as for
otherpoliticaldevelopmenttheorists,politicsarenot waysof doingthingsor
organisingpeople. Rather, politics and political actions are taken to be
expressionsof collective mentalitiesor modes of feeling that necessarily
reflectsocietalvaluesand beliefs.This epiphenomenalapproachto explain-
ing politicalactivityignoressuch questionsas interestsand powerin favour
of whatMichaelShaferhas calleda 'de-odorisedpolitics'purgedof 'thecigar
smoke and stink of fear that accompany the vulgar understandingof
politics'.18As we will see, it is by virtueof this epiphenomenaldefinitionof
'politics'that McClintockis able, on the one hand, to ignore the role of
competingPeruvianLeftistpoliticaland peasantorganisations,and, on the
other, to extrapolategeneralitiesabout 'peasantperceptions'of crisis or
'peasantattitudes'towardsthe governmentinto proof of generalisedpeasant
'politicalsupport'for Sendero Luminoso. As we will suggest later, such
essentialisingequationsbetweenpeasantvalues and extremistpolitics have
ominousimplicationsfor the typesof counterinsurgency doctrinenow being
applied in the Peruvian highlands.
Such equationsare renderedeven more dubious by the empiricalbase
upon which both these authors validate their conclusions about peasant
attitudes and beliefs. Although both rely to some extent on the textual
authorityconferredby the fact that they once lived in or visitedPeru,their
specificstatementsaboutwhatpeasantsthinkrelyatbest on surveyquestion-
nairesand, at worst,on impressionisticobservationsand racistassumptions
abouthow 'traditionalIndians'reasonand think.
The bulk of both theiranalyses,however,dependson neithersurveysnor
observations,but on secondary sources and, most importantly,on each
other. McClintock's influential 1984 World Politics article, which all
subsequentUS Senderologycites, refersto Palmer's1983 manuscriptas the
principalsourcefor the PCP-SL'spoliticalhistory.19 Palmer's1985 articlein
turncites McClintock's1983 publications.20
Thispatternof reciprocalcitationis used to createthe impressionthatlittle
is knownaboutSenderobeyondthe workof thesetwoUS politicalscientists.
This imageof a mysteriousterroristgroupis reinforcedby a bibliography
whichsystematicallyelides or silencesboth the substantivecontentand the
politicallysituatednature of their Peruviansources.For informationon
humanrightsabuses,for example,Palmerreliesnot on the easilyaccessible
reportsof organisationssuchas AmericasWatchor AmnestyInternational,
buton journalismin the centre-rightPeruvianweekly,Caretas,andon Mario
VargasLlosa'swidelydiscreditedand avowedlypro-governmentcover-up
of the Uchuraccay massacre.21McClintock also cites Vargas Llosa's
Uchuraccayarticle in the New York Times Magazineand-even more
surprising-the right-wingmercenarymagazine Soldier of Fortune, for
estimatesof Sendero'sstrengthand organisationalstructure.22 Neithershe
nor Palmermentionsthat reliableand sophisticatedanalysesof Sendero's
ideology,goalsandpartyorganisationwereavailableat the time.23
When Peruviansocial scientificpublicationsare cited in Palmer'sand
McClintock'stexts, they are selectivelyreferencedas sourcesof empirical
information,ratherthanfor the analyses,theoriesor politicalperspectives
offeredby theirauthors.The only Peruviansocial scientistswhomPalmer
cites are referencedas sourcesof statisticalinformationor as supportfor
highlygeneralisedobservationsaboutthe lack of state-sponsoreddevelop-
mentin Ayacucho.The contentsof otherPeruvianworksare falselyrepre-
sentedas referencesforPalmer'stotallyfallaciousassertionsaboutSendero's
'messianism' and'primitivecommunism'(see p. 158).Althoughhe footnotes
such importantscholarshipas Hector Bejar'sbook on the 1965 guerrilla,
RauilGonzalez'schronologiesandanalysesof Sendero'sactivitiesandpoliti-
cal-militarystrategiesin thePeruvianjournalQuehacer,andFrenchanthro-
pologist Henri Favre'simportantanalysisof Sendero'sclass and ethnic
origins,in no case does he attemptto incorporatethe facts or insightscon-
tainedin these analysesinto his own portraitof the PCP-SL.24Similarly,
althoughMcClintockcitesworkby the BritishpoliticalscientistColinHard-
ingandthePeruviansociologistRaiilGonzalez,shegivesno indicationof the
contentof eitherHarding'sor Gonzilez'sanalyses,bothof whichfocusexpli-
citlyand even somewhatemphaticallyon SenderoLuminosonot as a 'peas-
ant rebellion' but rather as a secular, urban-basedpolitical-military
organisation.25
Finally,althoughbothPalmerandMcClintockacknowledgethe existence
of positionpapersandpoliticaldocumentswrittenby the PCP-SL,not once
do theyeitheranalyseor referto the actualcontentsof theseprimarysource
documents on party ideology, military strategy and political goals.26
Similarly,althoughbothauthorsclaimto be writingabouta 'dogmaticMaoist
party',neither refers to Mao's own writingsnor attemptsto distinguish
betweenthe manyvarietiesof internationaland PeruvianMaoism.Rather
thanlookingmoreclosely at such primarysourcematerialsor at studiesof
PeruvianMaoism,theyinsteadrelyon categoricalstatementsabout'Maoist
dogma'andon secondaryand/orjournalisticaccounts.27
Similarobfuscationsare used to supportboth authors'categoricalstate-
mentsregardingthe differencesbetweenSenderoandotherPeruvianLeftist
of the peasantryandthe undocumentednature
groups,the indecipherability
of Ayacuchano social reality.For example, McClintock'sanalysis of the

Peruvianguerrillasin the 1960s andthe Peruvianpeasantmovement-out of
whichshe claimsSenderoemergesand of whichshe claimsit formsa part-
relies on general secondary sources and edited volumes by US political
scientists.She does not cite any of the availableanalysesof the Peruvian
guerrilla;nor does she use any of the multitudeof availablepolitical and
statisticaldocumentsput togetherby the independentopposition peasant
organisation,the Confederaci6nCampesinadel Peru (CCP).28These docu-
ments contain explicit statements regarding the CCP's political and
ideological rejection of Sendero's tactics and document the adversarial
marginalityof Sendero to the popular peasant social movementin Peru.
Finally, missing from both her and Palmer's analyses are substantive
references to any of the theses, field reports, statisticalstudies, peasant
communitysurveys,or intellectualand politicaljournalsproduced at the
Universityof Huamangaandelsewherein Peru,duringthe 1960s, 1970s and
early 1980s.29
McCLINTOCK'SPEASANT REBELLION
No tenemos retaguardiaal comienzo o la tendremospequeha, debil,
frdgily variable-Abimael Guzmain(1980)30
When the subject is a political and militaryorganisationas importantas
Sendero Luminoso, such misrepresentationsof sources as those outlined
above have important consequences which go beyond the domain of
scholarlyaccuracyand ethics.For example,McClintock'sfailureto consult
or to cite major, readily available documents in which the CCP, CNA
(NationalAgrarianConfederation)and otherregionaland nationalpeasant
organisationsdenounceSendero'sauthoritarian andterroristpolitics,relates
directly to her claimsto mount an authoritative
theoryof Sendero'srole and
centralityin the Peruvianpeasantmovement.It is this statedintentionof the
authorwhich transformsher bibliographic'omissions'into overt political
statements about what she believes to be the origins and direction of
Peruvian peasant politics, and, equally important, her opinions about
Peruvianpeasants',scholars'and politicians'abilityto speak for their own
politicaland socialreality.
McClintock's objective of representing Sendero as a rural peasant
rebellionshapesnot only her bibliographicchoices,but also the mannerand
order in which she presents the facts about Sendero. McClintock'sfirst
publishedanalysesof Senderoappearin September1983.31We will focus
here,however,on hermoreambitiousarticlepublishedin 1984 in thejournal
WorldPolitics, because it is this articlewhich is most frequentlycited by
subsequentSenderologistsand which has, therefore,most influencedthe
field of US Senderology.32 In this article,McClintockproposes to 'examine
the originsof a majorruralrevolutionarymovement,SenderoLuminoso',to
evaluatethe natureof its 'considerablepeasantsupportin Peru'ssouthern
highlands',and 'to shed new light on ... the prevailingtheoriesof peasant
revolution'(McClintock,1984: 49).
In the followinganalysisof the WorldPolitics article,we suggestthat the
authorfailsto examinecarefullywhatmightbe meantby theterm'support'in
the Peruviancase and that she insteadassumesthe de facto existenceof a
generalisedand historicallynon-specificpeasantsupportnetwork.33 In the
political developmentmodel which she employs, this de facto support
networkis assumedas necessaryfor Senderoto have emergedat all since
politicsare takento be an epiphenomenalmanifestationof societalvalues
and 'mentalities'(see p. 137). This a priori assumptionis necessaryfor
McClintockto mould Sendero'sextremistpolitical-militaryorganisation
into a suitablecase with which to intervenein 'varioustheoreticalcon-
troversiesin the scholarshipon peasant revolution'(ibid., p. 48). These
controversiesare:(1) the importanceof subsistencecrisesin the determina-
tionof peasantrebellion;(2) 'thetypeof agrarianstructuremostconduciveto
[peasant]revolutionaryactivity';(3) the way in whichgovernmentagrarian
policies shape peasant political perceptions;and (4) 'geopolitics'(ibid.,
p. 49). These questionsarise out of the literatureon comparativepeasant
revolutionsby BarringtonMoore, Eric Wolf, JamesScott,Theda Skocpol
andJefferyPaige.34 Ratherthanconsideringthe specificpoliticalstructuring
and raison d'tre of the PCP-SL as a political-militaryorganisation,
McClintockexplicitlystructuresher questionsto addressthis literatureon
comparativepeasantandagrarianrebellionsandrevolutions.The PCP-SL's
relevanceto thisliterature,and thereforeits statusas a 'peasantrebellion',is
therebypresentedas an a prioriassumptionratherthan as a historicalor
sociologicalproblemwhichmustbe firstproven,and thenaddressed.
McClintockbeginsher 1984 articlewitha schematicaccountof theorigins
of the PCP-SL.Shefirsttellsthe readerthattheUniversityof Huamangawas
'theprofessionalhomeof variousextremelyradicalgroupsuntil1978' (ibid.,
pp. 50-51) andthattherewas considerablefactionalism.She nextmentions
thatthe PCP-SLwas 'foundedin 1968 [sic]by AbimaelGuzman',who she
describessimplyas a 'philosophyprofessor'fromArequipa.She thenlabels
Sendero's ideology and political position as 'Gang-of-FourMaoist',
'classicallyMaoist','unusuallysectarian'and as 'stridentlycriticalof the
currentSovietand Chinesegovernments,as well as of [thePeruvianLeftist
coalition]IzquierdaUnida' (ibid.,p. 51).35 She claimsthey are 'extremely
taciturnabout[their]strategiesandprograms'andthendismissesthecontent
of their publisheddocumentsas 'very slim' and 'dealingprimarilywith
guerrillawarfare'(ibid.,p. 51). Shegivesno summaryof the actualcontentof
these documents;nor does she explain why documentsprimarilyabout
guerrillawarfareshould be consideredirrelevantto analysisof what she
herself describes as a 'guerrillamovement'.Instead, she dismisses the
questionby typologisingSendero's'ideology'as 'classicallyMaoist',a phrase
whichshe assumesincorrectlyto meanthat'revolutionis to be achievedby a
prolongedpopularwarthatwill firstgathersupportin the countrysideand
thenfinallyencirclethe cities'(ibid.,p. 51, emphasisours).
McClintock concludes her overview of Sendero's party history by
insinuatinga culturalor ideologicalcontinuitybetweenAndeanpeasantsand
Sendero'sMaoism.'Sendero',she claimsat the close of herparagraphabout
theparty'sorigins,'hasincorporatedsymbolsfromtheIncaninsurrectionary
traditioninto its posture'(ibid.,p. 51). She opens the next paragraphby
statingsimplythat'Themovementgrewgradually'.This'growth',she claims,
occurred at meetings held in the home of the 'charismaticGuzman'and
throughan obscure process in which 'studentsfrom peasant families ...
actuallylived for long periodsin Indiancommunities... learnedthe Indian
language... marriedinto the communities-and preachedpolitics' (ibid.,
p. 50).
McClintock'sfour short paragraphson Sendero'sparty'history'are not
only riddledwitherror,they are intentionallystructuredto insinuatea set of
theoretical assumptions around which McClintock will structure the
remainderof her article.These suppositionsare:(1) the notionthatthe PCP-
SL spontaneouslyemergedout of a factionalistradicalismendemic to the
University of Huamanga;(2) the notion that peasant social movements
require organic cultural (or ethnic) links between their leaders, their
repertoireof motivatingsymbols, and their followers;(3) the notion that
peasant political culture is irrational and pre-modern (or even pre-
Columbian)becauseof its isolationfromnationalpoliticaldiscourse;(4) the
assumptionthat peasantpoliticalcultureis regionallyuniform;and (5) the
ideathatSendero'sMaoistdoctrinepreachesan'encircling'of the citiesanda
consequent polarisationof Peru's urban and rural populations.Let us
examinethe factualbases of these suppositionsone-by-one.
First, the PCP 'SenderoLuminoso'was not one of 'variousextremely
radicalgroups'at the Universityof Huamanga,much less the creationof a
philosophyprofessor.It was andis a politicalpartyandmilitaryorganisation
which is known and identified by its contested and far from hegemonic
position withinthe Peruvianleft. In 1964, the PeruvianCommunistParty
splitinto the PartidoComunistaPeruano-'Unidad' (PCP-U)andthe Partido
Comunista del Peru 'BanderaRoja' (PCP-BR). This split reflected the
divisionin the internationalcommunistmovementbetweenthe SovietUnion
and China.At that time Abimael Guzmainwas a militantof the Peruvian
CommunistPartyand sided with the pro-ChinesePCP-BR.One year later,
the youthbranchof BanderaRoja splitfor internalpoliticaldifferencesinto
the Partido Comunista del Peru 'PatriaRoja' (PC del P-PR). Guzman
remainedas the leaderof PCP-BR'sSpecialWorkCommissionin chargeof
militaryaffairs(Comisionde TrabajoEspecial).At the heightof the Cultural
Revolution,Guzmantravelledto Chinato attenda cadre school. Upon his
returnto Ayacucho,he led a factionwithinthe PCP-BR('Fracci6nRoja').
This faction was committedto armed insurrection.In 1969 the political
positionsput forwardby Guzman'sfactionwere defeatedin the congressof
the peasantfederationcontrolledby PCP-BR,the FederacionDepartmental
de Campesinosy Comunidadesde Ancash (FEDCCA), as well as in the
Universityof Huamangastudentfront,the Frente EstudiantilRevolucion-
ario (FER). In these circumstances,havingdecided to privilegeclandestine
organisationand armedstruggle,Guzman'sFracci6nRoja consolidatedin
1970 to become the PCP 'SenderoLuminoso'.
At the timeMcClintockwroteher earlyarticles,the generaloutlinesof this
partygenealogywas publicknowledgein Peruvianpoliticaland intellectual
circles, and was published in numerous Peruvian party newspapers,
magazinesandpamphlets.36 In fact,the name'SenderoLuminoso'comes off
the mastheadof a newspaperpublishedby the factionof Ayacucho'sFrente
EstudiantilRevolucionario(FER)controlledby Guzman's'Fracci6nRoja'.
It is, perhaps,understandable thatMcClintockdidnot knowor didnot tell
her readersthe completedetailsof this complexpartyhistory.It is equally
comprehensiblethatshe wouldnot havehad readyaccess to, or wouldnot
choose to cite, all of the early documentsand polemicssurroundingSen-
dero'searlypartyhistory.Whatis not acceptable,however,is to presenta
politicallymotivatedarmedsplintergroupof thePeruvianCommunistParty
as anisolatedor spontaneouslygenerated'movement'whichsprangup in the
radical incubatorof the Universityof Huamangaor in the home of a
charismaticphilosophyprofessor.
We canbeginto understandwhyMcClintockmighthavechosento repre-
sent Senderoin such a fashionby examininga second theoreticalpremise
embeddedin her accountof Sendero:the concept of a politicalor social
'movement'. Inher 1984 textsheemploystheterm'peasantmovement'inter-
with
changeably the terms'peasantrevolt'and'peasantrebellion'to describe
SenderoLuminoso(pp. 48-50, passim).Moreover,althoughshe claimsthat
SenderoLuminosois 'notPeru'sfirstradicalpeasantmovement'(p. 77), she
givesno examplesof whatshe considersto havebeenthe circumstances, de-
mandsor natureof previouspeasantmovementsin Peru,nor does she men-
tion the existenceof a broad peasantmovementcontemporarywith and
opposedto Sendero.Instead,Sendero's'peasantmovement'is definednegat-
ively by oppositionto the 'guerrillamovement'which precededit in the
1960s. Accordingto McClintock,this earlierguerrillamovementdiffered
from Sendero's'peasantrevolt' on several counts. Unlike Sendero, she
claims,'Peru'srevolutionaryactivistsof the early1960s were ... of middle-
to upper-classoriginsandfromthe cities'(pp. 77-78). Theywerenot 'ableto
gain the peasants'trustor to organiseeffectivemovements'(p. 78). They
were,she continues,
almosttotallyunsuccessfulin recruitinghighlands(sic)peasantsto their
cause. They did not preparefor a struggle.Nor did they establisha
politicalbase... In particular,theyoverlookedthe differencesbetween
the Cubansierramaestraandthe Peruvianhighlands(p. 78).
Moreover, she continues, they were 'roving, undisguised,unprotected
guerrillabands'who,whentheymovedinto the lowlandareas,were'quickly
detected,as theirphysicalappearancewasradicallydifferentfromthatof the
junglepeoples'(p. 78). As an exampleof the alienatedurbanrevolutionary
leader,she citesthe case of HugoBlanco.
In pointof fact,HugoBlanco,who speaksfluentQuechua,is a university-
trainedagronomistfromthe ruralagricultural districtcapitalof Huanoquite
in the Cusqueiioprovinceof Paruro.In the early 1960s he moved to the
lowland Cusqueiiovalley of La Convenci6nwhere he became a share-
cropper (aparcero) working along with the other peasant sharecroppers and
tenantfarmersto build the Federaci6nProvincialde Campesinosde La
Convenciony Lares.He laterbecamethesecretarygeneralof thisfederation,
and it was in this capacitythat he led the peasants'five-yearstruggleto
recovertheirland.It wasonly at the end of thisfive-yearperiodthatBlanco
and the peasant organisationhe headed created an armed self-defence

committee(Comite de Auto Defensa Campesina).As McClintockherself
acknowledges(p. 78) Blanco,who was a Trotskyistmilitant,was ideologic-
ally opposed to launchingguerrillawarfarewithouthavingfirst built up a
socialbase and revolutionaryparty.It is preciselybecauseof his ruralback-
ground,fluencyin Quechuaandexperienceworkingwiththe peasantfedera-
tionin La ConvencionthatBlancobecame,andhasremained,a verypopular
politicalfigureamongpeasantsin the southernPeruvianhighlandsof Cusco,
ApurfmacandAyacucho.
ClearlyMcClintock-who cites no literaturewhatsoeverto supporther
descriptionof Blanco-chose the wrongexampleto prove her thesis about
the alienatedstatus and non-ruraloriginsof the 1960s guerrillaleaders.37
Had she chosen any of a numberof otherguerrillaleadersfromthis period,
however,she wouldhavebeen equallywrong.38Thereis an extensivebiblio-
graphyon the 1960s Peruvianguerrillawhich containsthis information.39
Nevertheless,she neither cites this literature,presentshistoricalevidence
aboutthe 1960s guerrilla,nor considersthe fact thatSendero'sown evalua-
tionof the 1960s guerrillafocuseson totallydifferentaspectsof ideologyand
militarystrategy.40Instead, McClintockpresents a superficialand totally
undocumentedreadingof the 1960s guerrillaexperiencein orderto support
her hypothesisthat the 1960s movementdifferedqualitativelyfrom that of
Senderobecauseits leadersdidnot shareorganicculturalandclassties to the
peasantryfor whomtheyfought.
What then is the positive evidence she presentsto prove that Sendero-
whose principalideologue and militaryleader is a middle-class,Spanish-
speaking,Kantianphilosopherfrom Arequipa-does have a more organic
relationship to the peasantry? Here we come to McClintock's third
supposition-the necessarily unmediated or organic nature of peasant
politicalculture.As we have seen, in her introductionto Sendero'spolitical
history,she insinuatesthat the PCP-SLsharesan ideologicalor 'symbolic'
universewith the peasantry,and that they invoke this universethroughthe
use of 'Incan[sic]insurrectionarysymbols'.She does not give her readers
examplesof these symbols.Nor does she ventureto explainwhy peasants
might be spurred to insurrectionby some vague set of pre-Columbian
symbolswithlittle or no specificrelationshipto theirdailylives.Insteadshe
simply footnotes the PCP-SL document, 'Develop Guerrilla Warfare'
(hereafter referred to as 'Desarrollemos'),thereby implying that such
symbolsare containedin thatdocument(p. 51, fn 9).
This, however, is not the case. 'Desarrollemos'is Sendero'sfirst major
publicassessmentof the successanddirectionof its militarycampaign.In this
document,they claim responsibilityfor over 2900 armedactions between
1980 and 1982. Theylist the locationandnatureof these actions-well over
half of which were in urbanlocations-in detail and clearlystate that these
actions are part of the initialstage of a long-termmilitarystrategyto over-
throwthe 'old order'.They assess the responseof the governmentand other
'reactionaryforces'in Peruviansociety to theirinitialstage.They offer their
interpretationof the politicalsituation,the economiccrisisandthe Belaiinde
government.Nowhere does the documentcontain the slightestallusionto
'Incaninsurrectionarysymbols'.Nowhere does it-or any other Sendero
party document-privilege ethnic, racial or culturalfactors as elements
shapingthe historicalvision,politicalphilosophyandmilitarystrategyof the
PCP-SenderoLuminoso.41
In fact,in those documentswherePCP-SLspokespersonsandleadersdo
mention 'Andeanculture'they disparagesuch 'folklore'as 'nacionalismo
mdgico-quejumbroso'('magical-whiningnationalism')and as archaic
survivalswhichmustbe eliminatedin the constructionof thePCP-SL's'New
Democracy'.42 In responseto an interviewer'squeryregardingthe 'funda-
mentalisttendencies'of SenderoLuminosoandtherolethatthepartyassigns
to religionin Peruviansociety,LuisArce Borjarespondedthat'thePC does
not proposeto go backto an Incaregimeor to any otherirrationalities....
[R]eligionand the PC are two opponents'.For Arce, as for other Sendero
spokespersons,the 'magicof stars, of animals,of the Sun and the soul'
constitute'aculturalbeliefin magic[which]continuesto haveinfluenceover
the mostbackwardinhabitantsof Peru.... [T]his[Andean]culturaltradition
hasabsolutelynothingto do withthe warandthe revolutionarystruggle'.43
Evena summaryreviewof thehistoricalliteratureon peasantpoliticaland
socialmovementsin the PeruvianAndes wouldshowthatthe 'insurrection-
ary'traditionsandsymbolswhichMcClintockwishesto attributeto Sendero,
formpartof a muchmore complexpoliticalcultureof resistance/rebellion
forgedin responseto and as partof the broaderclass,ethnicandnationalist
discoursesandexperiencesof colonialandrepublicanPeru.44Thiscultureis
the productof overfourcenturiesof exchangeof ideasbetweenthe Andean
and the Europeanworlds.The singlemost importantfoundingbasisof this
hybridpoliticalcultureupon which Senderobuilds is an insurrectionary
traditionof rebellionand bloodshedinheritedfrom the bourgeoisrevolu-
tionaryand nationalisttraditionsof the Frenchrevolution.45
Anotheris the
Christian,and later socialistand anarchist,traditionof messianicutopian
thought.46
McClintock'sunsupportedassumptionthat Sendero's symbols must
necessarilybe 'Incan'in nature,negates the PCP-SL'splace within this
European-and now international-traditionof revolutionaryutopian
discourse.It also, however,reflectsher ignoranceaboutthe waysin which
both political discourseand political symbols are constructed,used and
interpetedin twentieth-century Peru.'Inca'symbolsin Peru are no longer
simple tokens of a natural 'Indian'culture,but are rathermediatedby
Peruvians'and Peruvianpeasants'experienceswiththe indigenistarhetoric
andiconographyemployedby nearlyeverytwentieth-century politicalparty
andleader.Thecondorfromthepre-Incastatecentredin Chavinde Huantar
is includedin APRA'spartyemblem.PresidentBelauindedonnedponchos
andotherindigenouscostumeson his travelsthroughthe provincesof Peru.
The slogan of GeneralJuanVelasco Alvaradowas the Quechuaphrase,
'kausachumcampesinuruna'('longlive the peasants'),and the hat of the
eighteenth-century Indian rebel leader Tupac Amaru was the pervasive
symbolof the agrarianreformwhichMcClintockherselfstudied.Thenames
of the 1960s guerrillafrontswerePachacutec(CentralSierra),TupacAmaru
(frontin La Convenci6n),IllariqChaska(commandbasein La Convencion)
and Manco Inca (northernsierra).Limeiio activistintellectualsfrequently

choose such quechuizedpseudonymsas SilvestreCondorunaand Americo
Pumaruna.The US DEA and Peruvianmilitaryanti-drugoperationwas
called 'OperacionCondor'and the US-trainedspecial counter-insurgency
forces in Peru are called 'Sinchis'and 'LlapanAtiqs'.47Indeed, given the
prominenceand importanceof Andean,Indian,Quechuaand Inca symbols
in Peruviannationalistdiscourse,it is singularlynoteworthythat Sendero
uses none of the usualrepertoireof 'Incansymbols',thatAbimaelGuzman
has chosen the names of Spanish conquistadoresfor his noms de guerre
(Alvaro and Gonzalo), and that Guzmanreads excerptsfrom the texts of
Shakespeare (Macbeth, Julius Caesar) and Washington Irving in his
'charismatic'incitementsto armedstruggle.48
As a provincial,Peruvianpolitical-militaryorganisation,the PCP-SL
undoubtedlyforms a part of and builds upon aspects of both Peruvian
nationalpoliticalculture-includingits 'Incansymbols'-and the subset of
thatculturewhichwe mightthinkof as Andeanpeasantpoliticalculture.This
commonalityis determinedby the fact that these Andean 'traditions'and
peasantpoliticalcultureshave been shaped by the same set of forces that
have shaped the thinkingof PCP-SL militantsand leaders.These 'forces'
includethe broaderpoliticaltraditionsand discoursesof Marxistand non-
Marxist political parties, NGOs and internationaldevelopmentprojects,
progressive church organisations,peasant federations, mining unions,
indigenist cultural movements and regionalistmovements.Peasants are
moved to act politically-and to lend political'support'-by their reasoned
reflection on their prior historical and personal experiences with such
organisationsand by their understandingsof what economic and political
benefitssuch organisationsas SenderoLuminosohave to offer them.They
are not spurredto action by vague (or, in this case, non-existent)Incan
symbolsor by charismaticuniversityprofessors.
In earlier work, McClintock describes peasant participation in
government-managedco-operativesand gives credence to the extent and
importanceof organisedpeasant political activityin the form of national
strikes,peasantfederationsand organisingby the CCP and CNA.49In her
1984 article, by comparison, McClintock systematicallyexcludes all
referenceto the existenceof such peasantpoliticalexperience,as well as all
referenceto popularopposition politics in Ayacucho not associatedwith
Sendero Luminoso. She claims that Sendero has privileged ties to the
peasantrybecausethey sentpartymembersto workin the countrysidein the
1970s (p. 51). Yet she fails to mention that this was common practicefor
manyleftistpartiesin Peruthroughoutthe 1970s. Of these,the PCP-SLwas
probablythe group with the least presence in the countrysideoutside of
Ayacucho.50Moreover,judgingby the topics of its fliers and publications
duringthe early 1970s, even in Ayacucho, it was the partywith the least
activeinterestin agrarianissues andthe peasantcause.5'
Divergingsharplyfromher own pastworkon the co-operativesformedby
the Velasco government,McClintockfurthersimplifiesthe political and
ethnicsettingin whichSenderoemergedby claimingthat'theVelascoregime
failed to establishnew politicalinstitutionsin the countryside'(p. 79), and
that'no significantnewencroachmenton the livesof the highlandspeasantry
were apparentduringthe 1970s (p. 76).52Repeatedlythroughoutthe text
(p. 49, passim) she statesthatAyacucho-and thereforeits peasants-were
isolated from the capitalistmarket and had very little experiencewith
nationalsociety.She even goes so far as to claimthat'Ayacuchois the only
one of the five southern [Peruvian]highlandsdepartmentsthat is in-
accessible,withouta mainroadfromthe coast'(p. 76).53 Infact,Ayacuchois
the departmentwith the highestmigrationrateto Limaand migrantsthere
maintainactive ties with their relativesin Ayacucho's'isolated'peasant
communities.54 Moreover,the road to Cusco and Apurimacfrom Lima
passes throughAyacucho and Ayacuchohas an airportwith flightsfrom
LimaandCuscoenteringseveraltimesweekly.
Whydoes McClintockfindit necessaryto falsifyPeruviangeographyand
historyin this manner?Why does she systematicallyelide the history of
political and social movements in the Peruvianhighlandsin order to
representSendero as a 'ruralpeasantmovement'?The answersto these
questions lie, in part, in the fourth suppositioninformingMcClintock's
analysis.Thissupposition,whichis drawndirectlyfromJamesScott'smuch
disputedmodelof peasantrebellion,positsthatthe PCP-SL'spoliticallyand
partisanmotivatedarmedstruggleoriginatesin, andis an organicexpression
of, the economicneedsof 'thepeasantry'.
McClintockbegins her analysisof the 'subsistence'causes of Sendero
Luminoso's'peasantrebellion'by convincinglycertifying,withstatistics,the
severeeconomiccrisisafflictingPeruandespeciallythePeruviansierrain the
late 1970s andearly1980s. She also correctlydocumentsanddescribesthe
failuresof Velasco'sagrarianreformprogramme. Herproblemsarise,on the
one hand, in her assumptions that the economic crisis necessarily
correspondedto a 'subsistencecrisis',and,on the other,in thewaysin which
she attemptsto translatethe alleged economic and biologicalcrisis into
peasantsupportfor Sendero.
An exampleof thissomewhatconvolutedinterpretiveprocessis heruse of
surveysto measurepeasantpoliticalsupportfor Sendero.As a measureof
'thepeasants'subjectiveexperienceof economiccrisisshe citesthe resultsof
a surveyquestionshe asked in 1980 to 25 peasantsin 'Varya',a peasant
communityassociatedwitha governmentformedco-operativeenterpriseor
SAIS (SociedadAgricolade Inter6sSocial)in Huancavelica.The resultsof
thissurvey,shereports,werethat'84 percentof 25 respondentssaidin 1980
thatthe community'sprogresshadbeenbad'(ibid.).Shethenjumpsto 1984
at whichtimeVaryawas 'allegedto be a pro-Senderistacommunity'(ibid.).
The only proof she offersof the Varyapeasants'supportfor Senderois the
fact that the village had been occupied by the Peruvianarmedforces.55
Acceptingarmyallegationsof the village's'terrorist'links,McClintockthen
contraststhe 'possiblepro-Senderistasympathies'and pessimisticattitudes
of Varyawiththe 'morepositiveviewsandnon-Senderistainclinations'of a
coastal co-operativeand a 'prosperouscentral highlandspeasant com-
munity'where she asked the same questions(ibid.).These peasants,she
claims,were betteroff afterthe agrarianreformand, as a result,'wereno
longerconcernedwithsubsistence,butwithsecondary-schooleducationfor
their children'(p. 66). Her conclusionsare that peasantswith subsistence

crises and 'bad' economic conditions are prone to look to Sendero as a
solutionto theirproblems.Of these poor peasants,those in Ayacuchowere
the poorestandmoreisolated.Theyweretherefore,presumably,those most
apt to turnto the PCP-SL(pp. 59-62).
In this 'analysis'McClintockhas carefullycraftedher depiction of the
politicalspace withinwhichSenderooperates.The fact that 'peasantswere
perceiving a crisis' (p. 62) relies on McClintock'somission of crucial
informationregardingthe quite differentpoliticaland regionalcontexts-
and therefore the quite differentpeasantries-existing in a Huancavelica
SAIS formed duringa government-sponsoredagrarianreformand in the
impoverishedand (by her own characterisation)isolated provincesof the
department(Ayacucho)which, in McClintock'sown words, was 'the least
benefitedagrarianzone' (1984: 66) in Peru's1969 agrarianreform.56
These radicallydifferentexperienceswith the agrarianreform, among
other things, make the political and economic factors informinga Varya
peasant'sunderstandingof what such (inherentlyvague) words as 'bad',
'crisis'and 'progress'meanquitedistinctfromthe interpretationsplaced on
suchwordsby, for example,an Ayacuchanoor Apurimeiiopeasant.Indeed,
in McClintock's1982 articleon agrarianpoliticsin Peru,she cites the same
surveyin a very differentway. In this earlierpublication,she tells us that
'84 per cent of the Varyarespondentssaid that,sincethe inaugurationof the
SAIS, Varya'sprogresshadbeen "bad".'57 Clearly,in the originalsurvey,the
peasants were not asked about 'crisis'in general, but rather about their
perceptionsof a poorly managed,government-ownedSAIS and its corrupt
government-appointed administrators.
By the late 1970s, the peasantsthem-
selves had proposedto reorganise(reestructurar) the SAISundertheirown
political and managerial initiative.58Similar manipulations occur in
McClintock'sfailure either to mention Velasco's sweeping educational
reformsas a contextaffectingthe 'better-offco-operativepeasants'interest
in educationover subsistence,or to mentionthe fact thatthe largestpopular
socialmovementin defenceof freeeducationoccurredinAyacuchoin 1969.
Deprivedin thiswayof the socialandpoliticalcontextin whichsurveyswere
conducted,such statementsby peasantsclearlyprovideno evidence what-
soever of a causallinkbetweena worseningeconomicsituationand peasant
supportfor Sendero.59
We do not wishto denythefactthatSenderodidanddoes havethe support
of certainsectorsof the Andeanpeasantryin Peru.Thisis particularlytrueof
Ayacucho, where Sendero's community of political sympathisersand
militantsis greatlyexpandedby networksof kinship,compadrazgoandpaisa-
naje, as well as by the undeniablyauthoritarianand violent persuasion
methods throughwhich they 'influence'both voting behaviourand gain
'support'.60 The nature of the 'support'offered to Sendero by differently
situatedactorswithinthesenetworksis,however,neitheruniformnorconsist-
ently'political'.Thisis even moretrueof the 'support'and'sympathy'offered
to Senderoby peasantsin differentprovincesof Ayacuchoand in different
regionsof Peru.Thesepeasants'perceptionsof Sendero'smilitaryandpoliti-
calagendaareconditionedby thequitespecificlocalandregionalexperiences
with,andknowledgesof, thePeruvianstate,nationalpoliticalpartiesandthe
capitalisteconomy.McClintock'sanalysissystematicallyglosses both the
complexityof theseregionallyspecificAndeanpeasantpoliticalcultures,and
the importantgenerationaldifferencesbetweenSendero'syouthfulsuppor-
tersand'thepeasantry'as a whole.61
originsandbackground
By elidingthe non-peasant(thatis, 'non-organic')
of manyof Sendero'smilitantsandleaders,by deletingthe historicalcontext
in whichpeasantpoliticaldecision-making occurs,by omittingcrucialfactual
informationon the politicalgeneaologyof both the PCP-SLand its leader,
Abimael Guzmain,and by ignoring the coercive impact of Sendero's
authoritarian militaryideology,McClintockconstructsan imageof Sendero
Luminosoas anorganicallyruralpeasantmovementwhichspeaksforthefelt
economic or 'subsistence'needs of the Peruvianpeasantry.'Sendero's
primarypeasantbase',she concludes,are 'ruralsmallholderswho are not
particularlyactivein the market'(1984: 82).
The tenuoushistoricaldocumentationforthisassumptionaboutSendero's
exclusivelyruralbase and strategyis deniedby the sequenceandpatterning
of Sendero'smilitaryactionsand by the texts of PCP-SLpartydocuments.
McClintock'somission of this factualinformationon PCP-SL'smilitary
campaignrelatesto her fifth,and for our purposesfinal, supposition:the
'encircling'strategy of 'classic Maoism'. Building upon Mao Zedong's
militarytheories,the PCP-SLseeks to developarmedstrugglein two inter-
related theatresof operations:the countrysideand the city.62However,
whereasMao, who elaboratedhis theoriesaroundthe particularsocial and
politicalconditionsof China,privilegedruralactions and saw the urban
insurrectionas a final step in the overthrowof the old regime,Guzman,
whose party seeks to attainpower in the quite differentcontext of Peru,
conceivesof militaryactionsin the city and the countrysideas paralleland
simultaneousarenasof militarymanoeuvre.63 In Guzman'sown words,'Es
una especificacionde la guerrapopularen el Peruihacerdel campoel teatro
principal de las acciones y de las ciudades complemento necesario'64
According to this vision of complementarytheatres of operations,the
peasantrycan only be an effectivepoliticalactorin alliancewiththe urban
proletariatandcanonlyactundertheleadershipof the revoutionary partyas
the ideologicalandpoliticalvanguardof the proletariat:
The CommunistPartyof Peru,a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Partyof a
newtype,loyalto its principlesandprogramme,consciousof its historic
mission as the organisedvanguardof the Peruvianproletariat,has
assumedits responsibilityto launchthe armedstruggleto fightfor the
seizureof powerby the workingclassand thepeople, andis developing
guerrillawarfare,learningfrom advancesand setbacks,fanningmore
widelythelivingflamesof armedconflictandrootingthemmoredeeply
amongthe poor peasants,principally,and will lead in buildingrevolu-
tionarybase areasthatwillfinallygive concreteformto the triumphant
roadof people'swar.65
This strategyof guerrillawarfareis based on Mao Zedong'stheoryof the
cadrepartyas 'theconductorof all revolutionaryclassesand all revolution-
arygroups'.66The implicationsof this Maoistprinciplefor the PCP-SLis, in

Guzman'swords,that'elpartidotienecaracterde masaspero no es de masas.
... Nuestropartidoes unpartidode militantes,de dirigentes,unamaquinade
guerra.7
This concept of the cadre party, which is clearly articulatedin all of
Sendero's party documents, renders problematic the very concept of
'support'aroundwhich McClintockconstructsher model of Senderoas a
spontaneouslygeneratedpopular 'peasantrebellion'.It likewise calls into
questionher assertionsthat Sendero'spoliticaland militaryactivitieshave
been exclusivelycentredin the ruralhighlands.Fromthe verybeginningof its
self-proclaimedarmedstruggle,the PCP-SLhas equallydividedits armed
actions between strategicallylinked militaryfronts located in both the
southern Andean highlandsand the central coast.68In the first year of
Sendero'sarmed struggle,their armed propagandaand sabotage actions
coveredall but five of Peru's24 departments.69By 1981, theyhad escalated
their militaryactions to include attackson police headquarters,embassies,
banks and telecommunicationsinstallations.This geographicdistribution
and rural-urbanspread of Sendero's own activities clearly contradicts
McClintock's assertions that Sendero followed the 'classically Maoist'
doctrineof peasantmasses'encircling'the cities.70
Far from conforming to the 'classic Maoist' barbarianencirclement
fantasised by counter-insurgencytheorists, the integratingmilitary and
politicallogic behindSendero'sarmedactionsis insteaddeterminedby the
party'sstrategicassessmentof a nationalpoliticalandeconomicconjuncture
in which the partyhas to compete for peasantand workersupportwith a
broad range of well-establishedpeasant organisations,labour unions and
leftist parties.In McClintock'sarticleswe are told of the existenceof these
organisations,yet the dynamics determiningboth peasant support for
SenderoandSendero'sown militarystrategyareconsistentlyseen to operate
independently of these forces. For McClintock, peasant political
consciousnessis insteadmechanisticallydeterminedby biologicallydefined
'subsistenceneeds'(hunger)and by the peasantry'spresumedisolationfrom
nationalpoliticalinstitutions.Sendero'sstrategyis meanwhileinterpretedas
reflectingthe simplisticdivision of Peruvianpoliticalspace into the urban
and ruralspheres which McClintockimaginesinforms(or indeed causes)
hunger,isolationand violentpeasantrebellion.
We do not wish to dispute either the fact that Andean peasants have
economic needs and worries,or the fact that Guzmanbuilds upon Maoist
militarystrategy.Senderounquestionablyhas some popularsupportin both
the highlandpeasant communitiesand coastal cities in which it operates.
Whatwe wishto disputeis the scholarlyandpoliticalethicsof constructinga
poorly documented,unevenand episodic peasant'support'for the PCP-SL
as Maoistpeasant'rebellion'framedin the languageof counter-insurgency's
barbariannightmares.In order to make this equation,McClintockmani-
pulates the historicalfacts about the Peruvianpolitical and social context
from which Sendero emergedin two overlappingforms:(1) selection and
elisionof historicalfacts aboutboth anti-Senderopeasantsocialmovements
and the political-militarystructureand authoritarianideology of Sendero
Luminoso,in order to arguethat the PCP-SLis in essence a rural-based
peasantpopularrebellion;and (2) mystificationof peasantpoliticalration-
ality in order to segregatepeasantpoliticalculturefrom nationalpolitical
discourse.As we will suggestlater,this processof elisionand mystification
has seriouspoliticalrepercussionsfor the waysin whichMcClintock'swork
has been used in both Americanacademeand Americanjournalismas an
authoritativerepresentationof peasantpolitics in Peru.It has even more
disturbingimplicationsfor the image of a Peruvianpeasantrywhich is
comingincreasinglyunderthe scrutinyof US counter-insurgency specialists.
PALMER'SPARABLEOF PROGRESS
Manythingsmaybecomebaggage,maybecomeencumbrances if wecling
to themblindlyand uncritically-MaoZedong(1974)71
Theworkof DavidScottPalmer,the othermajorUS Senderologistdiscloses
just this link betweenacademictheoriesof peasantrebellionand counter-
insurgencydoctrine.Like McClintock,Palmerpublishesfor both an acad-
emic audienceand for foreignpolicy specialists.His articlesare routinely
citedby McClintockandothersas the mainauthoritative sourceof informa-
tion about the PCP-SL'spoliticalevolution.72 Althoughhe has writtenfor
suchdiversepublicationsas the ChristianScienceMonitor,CurrentHistory,
and LatinAmericanand CaribbeanRecord,Palmer'smostfrequentlycited
articleis 'Rebellionin RuralPeru.The Originsand Evolutionof Sendero
Luminoso',publishedin thejournalComparative Politicsin 1986. Thispiece
is a slightlymodifiedversion of Palmer'searlierpublicationin an edited
volumepublishedby the US Defense Department'sNationalDefense Uni-
versityandthe GeorgetownCenterfor StrategicandInternational Studies.73
Giventhe politicallycompromisedmissionof thisvolume,academicsprefer
to cite insteadPalmer'scontextuallyneutralised,yet substantively(and for
the most part,textually)identicalarticlein ComparativePolitics.7 In this
academicpiece, Palmer,like McClintock,is primarilyconcernedto situate
Sendero'sinsurgencywithrespectto a largerbodyof scientifictheorywhich
claims to be able to predict politicalbehaviour.75 While he agrees with
McClintock'sassessmentof thePCP-SLas a 'peasantrebellion',he disagrees
withheremphasison the subsistencecrisisas a centralfactor.Ratherhe pos-
its that'thecentreperipheryrelationshipsweremoreimportantthana threat
to peasant subsistencein explainingthe rise of Sendero'(Palmer,1986,
p. 143, fn. 1). In this respect,he considersJamesDavies''J-curve'theoryto
be 'moreuseful'in explainingSendero'semergencethanthe 'subsistencecri-
sis'theorywhichinformsMcClintock'swork(ibid.).76
We havealreadyoutlinedabovesomeof the difficultiesanddiscrepancies
in Palmer'ssourcesfor the historyand politicsof the PCP-SL.Reviewing
briefly,these problemsare his failureto considerseriouslythe contextof
PCP-SLpolitical-military documentsandhis defacto dismissalof Peruvian
scholars'analysesof the PCP-SLand of Peruviannationalpolitics.Like
McClintock,his obfuscation of alternativeinterpretationsof Sendero
functionsto authoriseand validatehis own expertiseon the subject.In his
disclaimerwhichprefacesboth articles,Palmercomments,'Wedon't really

knowa greatdealaboutSenderoLuminosobeyondthe visibleexternalsigns'
and the 'verypartialpublicevidence available'(Palmer,1985: 91, fn. 1). In
Palmer'scase this mystificationof Sendero and its 'penchantfor secrecy'
(Palmer 1985:91; 1986:143) is complemented by his reliance on
'occasional'and anonymousinterviewswithinformantswho Palmerneither
places sociallynor cites textuallyin his writing.We are insteadaskedto rely
on what Palmer'infers'from his 'previousexperience'in Ayacucho. The
voices of specific Ayacuchanos-who do not have to be named to be
quoted-are neverheardin Palmer'stexts.Nor does Palmergiveus grounds
to trusthis 'inferences'whenhe gets so manyfactswrongaboutthe evolution
of PeruvianLeftistpoliticalpartiesandaboutthe politicalandsocialenviron-
mentat the universitywherehe claimsto havesharedan officewithAbimael
Guzman.77
The importanceof suchlocal knowledgeis pointedout by Palmerhimself
who beginsboth his articleswitha cautionarystatementaboutthe suigeneris
natureof Senderoand the 'unique'characteristicsof the 'localenvironment
out of whichSenderoeventuallyemerged'(1986: 127; cf. 1985 :67).In both
articles,however, Palmer'sgoal is to make sense out of this 'sui generis'
experienceby utilisingthe universalisinglanguageand constructsof political
scientific'theoriesof revolution'(1986: 127).78Thisgoal of generalising-or
theorising-a 'suigenerisphenomenon'meansthatPalmerhas to adjudicate
a fit between the Peruviandata and the two main theories he wishes to
employ:on the one hand, the centre-peripheryconstructcentral to both
politicaldevelopmenttheory and counter-insurgencydoctrineand, on the
other, Davies's sociological 'J-curve' of 'rising expectations'.To fit the
Peruviancase, PalmerrendersDavies's analyticalcategoriesof 'increasing
expectations'and'decreasingcapacity'to conformwiththe polarconceptsof
peripheryand centre,respectively:increasingexpectationsalwaysoccur on
the peripheryand anger for the state's declining capacity to deliver are
always,therefore,directed towards'the centre'.To increasethe tautology
even further,Palmerspatialisesthe term'centre'and 'periphery'to conform
roughlyto the opposition of Andean ('Indian'or peasant)highlandsand
coastal ('Spanish'or mestizo) coast.79The constantconflictbetween these
two groups is, for Palmer, the motor force driving Peruvianhistorical
development:
The Sendero Luminoso movementis in some ways the most recent
manifestationof a historicpatternof periphery-centreconflict.Indian
groups opposed Incan hegemony imposed from Cuzco before the
Spanishconquest,and Incanand Quechuadissidentsopposed Spanish
ruleemanatingfromLimaforalmost100 yearsaftertheConquest.Local
IndianrebellionsfrequentlychallengedSpanishrule in the seventeeth
and eighteenthcenturies,culminatingin a massiveuprisingled by Incan
descendentTupac Amaru againstcorruptlocal officialsin the 1780s.
Sinceindependence,vicissitudesin the centre'scapacityto influenceits
peripheryhavefrequentlyrequiredlocal resolutionof grievances,often
by violence(Palmer1985: 87; cf.Palmer,1986:140-141).
Whilethe oppositionandmutualsuspicionbetweenPeru'scoastandhigh-
lands, and betweenits indigenouspeasantand rulingcreole classes,have
indeedbeen importantfactorsin the developmentof Peruviansocietyand
culture,reducingthe entirecourse of Peruvianhistoryto a series of con-
frontationsbetweenthesetwo poles tellsus verylittleaboutthe motivations
leadingPeruviansto 'rebel'in the differentcases Palmerrefersto here. It
merelysucceedsin settingup Palmer'sbasicanalyticalcategoriesof 'centre'
and'periphery'as universalandunfalsifiable.Indeed,Palmerhimselfbegins
the next paragraphby tellinghis readersthat Sendero'deviatesfrom the
historicpattern'he hasjustdescribed(1985: 87; 1986: 141):
[Sendero's]leadersare fighting,not for systemadjustmentsto benefit
grievantsattheperiphery,butforthetotaloverthrowof thesystemitself.
It is also distinctivein thatit is the firstfull-blownruralrebellionin Peru
guidedby communistprinciples.In its ideologyand in its strategyfor
takingpower,it consciouslyandquiteproudlyfollowstheprinciplesand
practicesof Mao.In its planfor Peruviansocietyaftervictoryis won, it
resemblesthe Indianmillenarianmovementsand,mostparticularly, the
of
precepts primitive and pure Indian communism presentedby Jos6
CarlosMariategui.Senderois also differentin that its leadershipwas
willingto takea longerviewof the revolutionary processandwasready
to worksideby sidewiththeIndianpeasantsandto educatetheirleaders
for manyyearsbeforeproceedingwiththe moreviolentstagesof their
programfor taking power. In the Peruviancontext, then, Sendero
Luminosois in some waysthe latestmanifestationof a richtraditionof
local rebellionat the peripheryagainstreal and allegedabusesof the
centre.In other ways,however,Senderois breakingnew groundas a
Peruvianrevolutionarymovement(1986: 141:cf. 1985:87).
Here Palmermakes several claims for the sociologically'unique'or 'sui
generis'qualitiesof Sendero.It is, he claims,the first revolutionarymove-
mentto seek totalchangein the systemratherthanreforms('systemsadjust-
ments')whichmightbetterintegratethe periphery('thegrievants')into the
centre.Second,it is the firstmovementto adhereto communist,specifically
Maoist,principles.Third,its programmeinvokesmillenarianaspirationsand
indigenousconceptsof primitivecommunism.Finally,it is the firstmove-
mentwhoseleadershiphasworkedwithpeasantsandeducateditselfso as to
preparefor the violenttake-overof power.Thesefour'distinctive' character-
isticsare,accordingto Palmer,bothnovelandtraditional.Theybothemerge
fromandthreatenthenaturalevolutionof Peruvianhistoryandculture.This
evolutionis, for Palmer,determinedby the orderlyandcentrifugalmodern-
isation of Peruviansociety:as the centre (the urbanindustrialcoast, and
especiallyLima)becomesmore modem, the ruralpeasantperipheryreaps
the benefitsof thatmoderisation. If thingsprogressin an orderlyfashion,
the peripherywill eventuallybe incorporatedinto the centre,andrebellions
by 'grievantsat the periphery'will cease.Sendero'sMaoistprinciples,how-
ever,threatento upsetthatorderby invertingthe naturalorderof historical
progress:the ruralperiphery,drivenby Sendero'scommunistprinciples,will
'encircle'andeventually'engulfthe urbancentre.
In its broadoutlines,then,Palmer'sschemeof Peruvianhistoryconforms

to the basic tenets of Huntington'sclassic politicaldevelopmenttheory,as
wellas to the simplifiedcounter-insurgency versionof Maoismwhichwe also
saw at work in McClintock'sanalysis.Along with the universalisingand
systematisingaspectsof thispolitical-intellectualheritage,it bringswithit the
ahistoricity,the lack of supportingdetail and disinterestin 'the oddities of
reality'whichcharacterisepoliticaldevelopmenttheory.80 Whatis of interest
for understandingthe particularimplicationsof thistheoryas it is appliedto
the Peruviancase, however,is the way in whichPalmerconstructshis argu-
ments about the continuitiesbetweenPeru'scentre-peripherydynamicand
whathe claimsto be the 'novel'Maoist-communismof SenderoLuminoso.
Unlike McClintock,who is interested,as we have seen, in establishinga
continuity between Sendero and its bases by suggestingthat Sendero's
leaders share organic class and culturallinks with the peasantry,Palmer
wishes to arguefor an essentiallyunfalsifiablecontinuitybetweenthe tradi-
tions of 'aperiphery'definedlargelyby virtueof its oppositionto 'thecentre'
and Sendero'srevolutionarymovement,whichis opposed to 'thecentre'and
is thereforeof 'the periphery'.Because of this definitionof 'the periphery',
Palmeris largelyunconcernedwith the ethnic essentialisingof the peasant
versusnon-peasantoppositioninformingMcClintock'sanalysis.Indeed,he
notes that:'Mostof [Sendero's]leaderscameoriginallyfromoutsidethe area,
usuallyfromverydifferentcoastalurbansettings'(1986: 138; 1985: 83):
Theysawthemselvesas the truevanguardof the peasantproletariat[sic]
clearly superior to their fellow teachers, students,and even Marxist
colleagueswho had not temperedtheirprinciplesin the fire of peasant
reality(ibid.).
Palmersees this increasingproximityto the peasantperipheryas the reason
for Guzmanand his followers''expulsion'fromthe PCP-BR.In this respect,
he also interpretsthe mutualsplit between the nationalleadershipof the
party and the Fraccion Roja which Guzman led throughthe lens of his
centre-peripherymodel:'Therelationshipbetweenthe centreandperiphery
in the party was an uneasy one, with the withdrawalor expulsion of the
"countrybumpkins"of Huamangaoccurring between 1968 and 1970'
[1985: 68; 1986: 128].81
Infact,thissplitwasdue not to anysimple'centre-periphery'schism,butto
a personaland ideologicalrivalrybetweenGuzmanand Saturnino('Pavlov')
Paredes,the GeneralSecretaryof the PCP-BR.82 Paredes,anAncashino,was
not from 'the centre' and his base was in the highlandprovinces of the
Departments of Ancash and Pasco. The few peasant communities in
Ayacuchoandelsewherein whichthe PCP-BRwasatthattimeworkingwere
controlledby Paredes'majorityfaction within the party.Guzmain'sgroup
(which, for Palmer, was 'peripheral'and therefore presumably rural)
controlled only one minor peasant base (the Provincial Federation of
Peasantsof Huamanga)and theirprincipalbase of supportin the fightwith
Paredes was the urbanDefense Front of the city of Ayacucho (Frente de
Defensadel Pueblo).83The factsof Sendero'spoliticalevolutionclearlypoint
towardsa scenariomorecomplexthanthatof the simplepolaroppositionsof
urban-rural,centre-periphery,proletariat-peasant.Nevertheless,Palmer
carefullytailorsthe 'sharpcontrastsandgreatcomplexity'(1985: 71) of Peru
to fit the moreparsimoniousandunfalsifiablecategoriesof centreandperi-
phery.
For Palmer, the first point of 'continuity'between Sendero and the
rebellioustraditionsof 'theperiphery'is, then,one of exclusion('withdrawal'
or 'expulsion')fromthe centre.The secondpointof continuitywhichPalmer
wishesto argueis thatSendero,likethe peasantsof the periphery,has'taken
root and grown' (1986:142) in the disruptiveenvironmentof failed
modernisation.The scenario,as envisionedby Palmer,is that, duringthe
periodimmediatelyprecedingthe coup d'etatof 1968, modernisationwas
moving along smoothlyin Ayacucho.Accordingto Palmer,'therewas a
sense of progressand development,alongwith a perceptionamongmany
that the centrewas concernedwith the periphery'(1985: 79). The institu-
tional impetusfor this process of modernisationand well-beingwas the
Universityof Huamanga,a colonialuniversitywhichwasre-openedin 1959
(ibid.).At the time Palmerwas there,the Universityservedas sponsorto
various extension programmesrun under the auspices of the Summer
Instituteof Linguistics,the Peace Corps, the FulbrightCommission,the
United Nations, the Danish, Dutch and Swiss governments,and 'the full
rangeof Peru'spoliticalparties'(1985: 80). Disputesarose,however,over
the'typesof change,its ends,andits organisers'(ibid.).Againstthebestinten-
tionsof the university'srector,the
pluralisticmelangeof initiativesgraduallysuccumbedto increasingly
radical political criteria by which the universitywas perceived as
fulfillingits responsibilitiesonly if it was a committedinstitution('la
universidadcomprometida'),that is, committedto Marxistprinciples
(ibid.).
Aroundthe sametime,the economiccrisisof 1966-1967 led to fundingcuts,
the withdrawalof 'the more moderatefaculty',the eliminationof 'some
programmes',and the transformationof the Universityof Huamangainto
'yetanotherradicaluniversityalongLatinAmericanlines'(1985: 80).
ForPalmer,however,the coupdegracewasdeliveredby the 1968 military
takeoverof GeneralVelascoandthe resultingcutbacksin US economicaid.
Theseeventsled to the terminationof such'modernising' programmesas the
Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps and the Summer Institute of
Linguistics(WycliffeBibleTranslators)(1986: 81). To makemattersworse,
the'tolerantreformistmilitarygovernment...wastryingto buildallieson the
left.. .justwhencontrolof theuniversityshiftedto the radicals'(1986: 141-
142). This isolationof the Universityand its ruralextensionprogrammes
fromthe rationalising influencesof US sponsoreddevelopmentprogrammes
coincidedwith Guzman'sisolationfrom the rationalisinginfluencesof a
central party. Sendero, Palmer claims, was free to 'combinetheir own
emergingconceptionsof theoryand praxisratherthanthose of theirerst-
while comradesat the centre'(1985: 81). The resultwas a coalescenceof
forcespushingGuzmanand his grouptowardsan evercloseridentification
withthe peasantsof Ayacucho:
Senderoactivities,whetheras partof the universityextensionprograms

or not, became the one continuingand positive outside contact many
peasantshad.Sendero'sdevelopingideologyand commitmentlogically
led it to concentrateits effortsin areaswhereIndiancommunitieswere
most numerous.Hence the points of greatest contact between the
peasantryand Senderotended to be those of least contactbetweenthe
peasantryandthe government(1985: 83, emphasisours).
Palmer goes on to mention that senderistasspoke or learned 'the local
language of Quechua', married into communitiesand 'gained both the
confidence and support of many Indian communityresidents'(ibid.).He
gives no examples of which communitiesconstitutedSendero's'bases of
support',andrefersonly to 'someof the Indiancommunitiesof Cangallo'and
to an incidentin the areaof Vischongo-Vilcashuaman(Cangallo)wheretwo
employeesof the Ministryof Agriculture'hadbeen shot'(1985: 81).
Palmer'sparableof failed political modernisationdepends on a certain
selective vision of the histories of both Peru and Ayacucho. In selecting
which events to narrate and which to delete from his experiences and
observationsin Ayacucho,Palmersets out to renderthe complexinteraction
of political party formation,capitalistdevelopmentand provincialsocial
movementsto fit the set of universalisingand ideologicallyinformedcate-
gories which both constituteand supporthis centre-peripherymodel. The
first,and in manywaysmost importantof these categories,is the University.
As an institutionalisedpoint of contact between Third World elites and
Westernnotionsof modernityand culture,the universityoccupiesa special
place in the political developmenttheory which informsPalmer'swork.84
Whenled by a Western-educatedelite-as PalmerclaimsHuamangawas in
the 1960s-it is seen to fulfilthefunctionof a modernisingagentwhichbrings
progress,and thereforeorder,to the periphery.Whenit escapesthe control
of this elite, it becomes a potentialsource of disorderor, in Palmer's(and
McClintock's)vision, an incubatorfor radicalcommunistideology.85As a
resultof the military'sinterventioninto the orderlysecularprocess of (US-
led) modernisation,the totalitarianor authoritarianinclinationsof the Left
bonded with the authoritariantraditionsof the military.86This link then
provided Sendero with a naturalchannel towards the pre-modern(and
thereforesupposedly,authoritarian) traditionsof the peasants.
While such linkagesmake for good theoreticalclosure,they do less well
whenconfrontedwiththe realitytheyclaimto explain.For example,Palmer's
argumentdependsat its base on his idiosyncraticdefinitionof la universidad
comprometidaas a university'committedto Marxistprinciples'andas prone
(therefore)to totalitarianandnon-democraticruleby 'committedradicals'.In
fact,theprincipleof the universidadcomprometidais rootedinalongtradition
of universityeducation throughoutLatin America since the 1920s and
1930s.87As it is used in this phrase,the word comprometidarefersto the
university'scommitmentto the bettermentof society as a whole, and its
concurrentrejectionof the oligarchicalelite culturewhich had dominated
Latin American universities throughout the colonial period and the
nineteenthcentury.Consciouslypatterningthemselveson thecareer-oriented
curriculumand structureof US universities,Latin Americanuniversities
sought to counter this elite dominationby replacingtheir antiquated
philosophyand theologycourseswith coursesin agronomy,anthropology,
physics,engineeringandmodemphilosophy.
Most Peruvianuniversitiesunderwentthese reformsin the 1920s and
1930s. Huamanga,when it reopenedin 1959, followedin theirfootsteps.
Neitherthe institutionnortheprinciplehasanythingto do with'commitment
to Communist principles'.88Precisely because the universities were
communistsand otherleftistsparticipatedboth as studentsand
'pluralistic',
as facultyin universitydecision-makingbodies. When leftist studentsand
faculty gained ascendencein the governingbodies of the Universityof
Huamangait was because they were the electoral majority.After their
election, non-leftist students and faculty continued to participate in
universitypoliticsas the minority.As the dulyelectedrepresentatives of the
university and as Marxists, the principles to which the majority were
'committed'wereindeedMarxist.By generalisingthisparticularsequenceof
events at the Universityof Huamangato concludethat the concept of 'la
universidadcomprometida' involves'commitmentto Marxistprinciples'and
that this 'commitment'somehow produces an atmosphereconducive to
increasing radicalisationand eventual armed struggle (a la Sendero
Luminoso),Palmer both falsifies the history of Sendero Luminoso and
pervertsthe Universityof Huamangainto a moralallegoryfor US counter-
insurgencydoctrine.
SimilargeneralisationsoccurwithPalmer's'inferences'aboutthe military
government'stolerance-or affinity-for the Left.WhiletheVelascogovern-
ment,like all governments,did attemptto buildallianceswiththeiropposi-
Nor did the militaryfavourin any way
tion parties,it did so selectively.89
leftist organisingin any Peruvianuniversity.90 In the case of Huamanga,
althoughAbimaelGuzmandid becomeProvost(Directorde Personal)and
Antonio Diaz Martinezbecame Dean of Student Affairs (Director de
BienestarEstudiantil)duringthe early years of the militarygovernment
(1968-1969), they attained their positions through political processes
internalto the University.
SimilarproblemsoccurwithPalmer'sinformationand 'inferences'about
the PCP-SL'sideologicaland organisationalworkwith 'the peasantry'.As
mentionedabove,Senderohadveryfew peasantbasesduringthe 1960s and
1970s. From 1969 to 1979 they were, however,the hegemonicpolitical
forcein the Universityof Huamanga.Theyalso hada significantpresencein
the Frente de Defensa del Pueblo, a multi-class,non-partisanregionalist
movementthatcoalescedaroundpopularoppositionto the militarygovern-
ment'sabolitionof guaranteedfree high school education.91 Duringthese
years in which Sendero effectivelycontrolled the student organisationand
universitycouncil,theyentrenchedthemselvesin the universityandactively
criticisedthe other leftist partiesfor organisingthe masses.In Sendero's
reasoning,these parties'swork with the masses constitutedcollaboration
withthe 'fascist'militarygovernment.
Sendero'seventualdecisionto workwiththe massescameonly as a result
of theirlaterisolationin theuniversity.Between1972 and 1973 the PCP-SL
lost control of both the Frente de Defensa del Pueblo and the student
organisationat Huamanga(FUSCH).In 1973 they were defeatedin special
electionscalledby a broadcoalitionof anti-Senderogroupsin the university.
The one divisionof the universityoverwhichSenderomaintainedhegemony
was the EducationProgramme.The only popularorganisation('organiza-
cion de masas')over whichthey retainedcontrolwas the local branchof the
nationalteachers'union (SindicatoUnico de Trabajadoresde la Educacion,
SUTE-Huamanga).As a resultof their declininginfluenceover the Frente
and the FUSCH, the III PlenarySession of the CentralCommitteeof the
PCP-SL,held in 1973, moved to form organismosgenerados.These were
definedby the partyas 'naturalmovementsgeneratedby the proletariat(that
is, the PCP-SL)in the differentorganisingfronts'.92
The conceptoffrentesde trabajodoes not,however,meanthatthesefronts
in fact constituted demographicallyor politically significant 'bases of
support'. In fact Sendero's fronts, which were intentionallycreated to
penetratethe politicalspace alreadyoccupiedby those popularworkerand
peasantorganisationsled by differentleftist and non-leftistpartiesand by
governmentalorganisationssuch as SINAMOS, had only a very limited
success.For example,in 1975 the PCP-SLconvokeda congressof peasant
bases to createtheirown nationalpeasantorganisationto competewith the
already existing national peasant federations (CCP and CNA). This
congress,whichwas held not in the countrysidebutin the hallsof the Educa-
tion Programmeof the Universityof Huamanga,failedmiserablybecauseno
peasants attended. Sendero was unable to convoke a single significant
peasantbase to supportits peasantcongress.The significanceof this failed
congress was, according to a contemporaryobserver of these events in
Ayacucho,that'SenderoLuminosodesaparecede la organizaciongremialdel
campesinado'.93
NeitherMcClintocknor Palmermentionsthe PCP-SL'sfailedattemptsto
penetratethe politicalspace occupied by the CCP and CNA. Nor do they
mentionthatthe principalearlybase of popularsupportfor the PCP-SLwas
a broad-basedurban defence front whichheld large,publicand extremely
visible assembliesand marchesin the Plaza de Armas of Ayacucho,just
across the street from the Universitywhere Palmerworked.McClintock
never mentionsthe importanceof the EducationProgrammeas the bastion
for Sendero'ssupportin the Universityor thefactthatSUTE-Huamanga was
the majorvehiclefor their'workin the countryside'duringthese earlyyears.
Bothinsteadinsiston the exclusivelyruralnatureof Sendero'sbase,andboth
naturaliseSendero'slinkages to the peasantryas organic ties defined by
sharedpolitical'mentalities'.As we have seen, McClintockconstructsthese
organicties (or sharedmentalities)by falsifyingthe ethnicandclassoriginsof
the PCP-SL'sleadership.Palmer-who admits the mestizo and vanguard
natureof Senderoas a politicalparty,and the importanceof the teachers-
envisions a 'logical' drifting of Sendero towards a sympatheticorganic
relationshipwiththe 'peripheral'peasantry.
Palmerimaginesthis 'drifting'as a reciprocalprocess of culturalcontact
between two worlds: the Marxistuniversityand the Indian countryside.
Those Sendero cadres who were from urbanor non-peasantbackgrounds
intermarried withthepeasantry,learnedthe'locallanguage',andwentnative.
Those cadreswho were from 'peasantbackgroundsand had grownup in
Indiancommunities'were 'exposed(in the Marxistuniversity)to a world
viewthatexaltedtheirclassorigins'(1985: 84; 1986: 138). NeitherMarxist
nor Indian,Westernnor Andean,Senderoand its peasantcadresbrought
togetherthe worstof 'twoworlds':on the one hand,Maoism,withits violent
programmeof 'encircling'the cities,and,on the other,the AndeanIndians'
historicalheritageof layingviolentsiegeto 'thecentre'.In Palmer'sview,the
merger of these two 'world views' reinforcesthe authoritarianism and
of
irrationality both Maoism and the disappointed'prepolitical'peasant
masses:
[Sendero's]movement emerged during a period when social and

economic circumstanceswere worseningin the area in which their
operationswere centred.Due both to governmentneglect (declining
budgets and programs)and to governmentactions (especially the
agrarianreform).Thiscontributedto theperceptionon thepartof many
Indiancomuneros(peasantcommunitymembers)that their situation
was worseningand that the centralgovernmentwas less concerned
aboutthem.At the microlevel at least, a sense of relativedeprivation
reinforcedby a declinein systemcapacityas expectationswere rising
made the peasantpopulationsusceptibleto radicalappeals(Palmer,
1986: 141).
Reciprocally,becauseof its 'peripheralisation'

Senderois seen by Palmeras
being susceptibleto the pre-moder traditionalismof the Indians.Palmer
claimsthatSendero,whichbeganas a politicalorganisationin the university
andthecity,assumesthe'prepolitical'discourseandposturesof'millenarian-
ism'and 'primitivecommunism'.LikeMcClintockwhenshe insinuatesInca
symbolsinto a PCP-SLdocument,Palmeroffers no concreteevidenceor
citationsas to how Senderomanifestsin words or actionsits supposedly
millenarianandprimitive-communistic beliefs.94
This increasingentrenchmentin the pre-politicaltraditionsof the Indian
peripheryis seen to furtherhardenSendero'spoliticalisolationfrom the
centre,'even[from]organisationssharingat least the core elementsof their
own ideological perspective'(1985: 75). As a result Sendero'spolitical
programmeandbasebecameexclusivelyrural:
Sendero'scommitmentto the Indianpeasantryappearsto inhibitany
expansionof its supportwithinthe urbanproletariat,except perhaps
among the more recent migrantsfrom Indianareas who retainboth
family and economic ties to their communitiesof origin.With rare
exceptions,Senderohas shown little interestin pursuingany kind of
publicrelationscampaignto gaineithersympathyor supportfromthe
centre. Rather, its announced program involves the progressive
isolationof the centreto be followedby frontalattacks(1985: 75).
Here even Sendero's real urban proletariat bases-whose existence
McClintocksimplydenies-are transformedmagicallyinto 'peripheral'or
'Indian'bases by virtueof theirsharedcommunityand culturalties withthe

ruralhighlands.95 (Presumablythe same process occurswith Sendero'sUS,
UK, Belgian,French,SpanishandIranianaffiliatepartiesthroughwhomthe
PCP-SL does indeed wage a concerted and well orchestrated'public
relations campaign'.)As a result of this alleged polarisation,Sendero,
accordingto Palmer,loses interestin the centreand, togetherwith its rural
peasantsand 'urbanpeasant-proletariat' prepareto isolate and lay siege to
'thecentre'.
This visionrecallsthe encirclingimageryof Maoismused by McClintock.
UnlikeMcClintock,however,Palmermakesno attemptto defineMaoismas
either a political ideology or militarystrategy.Nor does he refer to any
specific elements or documents that might explain Sendero's political-
militarystrategy.He simply asserts that Sendero 'consciouslyand quite
proudly follows the principles and practices of Mao' (1985: 87). Unlike
McClintockwho writesprimarilyfor an academicpublic,Palmer'svision of
Sendero is doctrinal rather than theoretical. His descriptions and
explanationsof Sendero'srise to power are articulatedin ideologicalterms
and employ the language and universalisingconcepts of Huntington's
political developmenttheory and Foreign Service Instituteand Defense
Department counter-insurgencydiscourse. In this doctrinal discourse,
'Maoism'is never actuallydefined,but rathertakenas a monolithicform of
thoughtwhichvariesneitherhistoricallynor accordingto differentnational
contexts.As such,it is usedto constructanimageof traditional,authoritarian
barbarians'encircling'the modern, democratic(and urban) centre. This
imageryis then extended metaphoricallyso as to insert differentsets of
historicaldata into the centre-peripheryparadigmthat is centralto both
politicaldevelopmenttheoryand counter-insurgency doctrine.96
This barbarianimageryinformsnot only Palmer'sallusionsto Sendero's
'frontalattacks'on the centre.It also informshis ethnohistoricalimagination,
his understandingof the Peruviannationalcontext,andhis systematicrefusal
to consideranyof the greyareasbetweenwhathe imaginesto be prepolitical
millenarianviolence and a modernisedurban democraticsystem.97Only
Senderoand the government,who occupythe two poles of illegitimacyand
legitimacy, respectively, are pictured as active forces on the Peruvian
politicalscene.Othersocialactorsare drawninto theirrespectivespheresof
influence,dependingon theiraccess to the benefitsof modernisation.Thus,
for Palmer,the rest of the PeruvianLeft has been deprivedof theirrevolu-
tionary or oppositionalpotential because of their 'legitimation... within
rather than outside the established political and economic system'
(1985: 73). Similarly,Palmerdescribesthe unionsas 'committedto Marxist
principlesbutwithinratherthanoutsideexistingsystems'(ibid.).He saysthat
migrantsto Lima have been 'absorbedin economicallyproductiveactivity'
and that their relativeeconomic success-which Palmerclaims'maybe as
much as 45 per cent above officialfigures'-makes them contentedpartici-
pantsin the moderncentre(Palmer,1985: 73; 1986: 131). The channelling
of 'popular discontent'-expressed in strikes and protests-through the
legitimateoppositionpartieshas preventedLima'ssocial movementsfrom
succumbingto 'a generalisedwillingnessto overthrowthe currentsystem'
(Palmer,1985: 76). On the whole,Palmertellsus, the citizensof the demo-

craticmodernisedcentreare contentand 'willingto sufferadversityrather
thanriseup againstits government'(1985: 75; 1986: 133).
This mechanisticand universalisingmodel leaves out all 'grey areas'
between the essentialisedpoles of violence and democracy,illegitimate
radicalsand legitimatepower.In this, Palmer'smodel coincidesboth with
McClintock'ssanitised vision of Peruvianpolitics and with the racist
essentialisationsof ethnicitywhich fuel Peru's'dirtywar'.No mentionis
made of the popular democraticmovementswhich are critical of both
Senderoandthedemocraticgovernment.No mentionis madeof theviolence
perpetratedby a 'democratic'governmentwhichfields counter-insurgency
operationsand practicesa politics of hunger.Democracy/legitimacyand
violence/illegitimacybecomeequatedfinallyandabsolutelywiththeopposi-
tions of centre-periphery,Spanish-Indian,and urban-rural.Accordingto
this calculus, as long as Peru remains divided between 'Indians'and
'Spaniards','traditional'and 'modern',the nation will never become a
modern'legitimate'state.98
SENDEROLOGYCOMESOF AGE
For academicsand policymakersalike, brandrecognitionoffersthe same
benefitsit offerssoap manufacturers, benefitswhich accrueirrespectiveof
productquality-Michael Shafer99
Policy-makers, journalists,businessanalystsand internationallaw enforce-
ment agenciesrequireaccessibleand easily digestableexplanationsof the
world aroundthem.Throughoutthe Cold War era, modernisationtheory,
withits familiarandunquestionedcategoriesof us andthem,civilisationand
barbarism,the West and the Rest, providedpreciselythe commoditythey
sought.100
Senderology,however,has come of age at a momentof paradigmshift.
ColdWarwarriorshavesupposedlygivenwayto 'post-ColdWar'modesof
thought.While the old period was based on a clear-cutvision of 'classic'
guerrillasandcommunistconspiraciesorchestratedfromeitherCubaor the
'EvilEmpire',the new post-ColdWarerabringswithit a worldmadeup of
sui generismadmenand terrorists,warlordsand drugbarons,charismatic
leaders,andfundamentalist massmovements.
Althoughthe transitionfromColdWarto 'post-ColdWar'economiesand
politicsdoes reflect,on somelevel,realchangesin the world,the ideological
revolution which is often supposed to accompanythese political and
economicchanges,has been riddledwith contradiction.A singular,mono-
lithicenemy(the SovietUnion)has been replacedby a panoplyof systemic
disordersincluding'endemicdisease, drug addiction,Third World debt,
developmentand governability'.101 Whereasthe earlierCommunistthreat
was seen to resultfroman orchestrated,and thereforerational,conspiracy
emanatingfrom the Soviet Union, these new enemies are constructedas
systemic,internationalpathologies.102The contradictionsof post-ColdWar
discoursearisefromthe waysin whichthese contagious'pathologies',once
constructed,mustthenbe madeto appearnon-systemic.Forto acquiesceto
a systemicdiagnosisof globalills wouldbe to unveilthe unutterableconnec-

tions (or 'linkages')betweencentreand periphery,betweendrugeconomies
andthe internationalcapitalisteconomy,betweenThirdWorlddebt,metro-
politanbanksand financialinstitutions,betweenThirdWorlddictatorslike
SaddamHusseinand the militaryindustrialcomplex.Instead,the polarising
schemes of Cold War modernisationtheory are invoked as a form of
discursivecontainmentwhereby such irrationalpathologiesas 'terrorism'
and the 'narcoticstrade' are traced to and situatedin an alien Periphery
separatefrom,andopposed to, a rational,andhence curative,Centre.
The contradictionsof post-ColdWardiscourseemergefromthe ensuing
clashbetweenthese inherentlydiscrepantnotionsof pathologyandpolarity.
They are simultaneouslyworsenedand institutionalisedby a foreignpolicy
and intelligenceestablishmentwhichgeneratesthe marketdemandfor new
ideological(and academic)production,as it simultaneouslydependsfor its
very existenceon the oppositionaland discursivepolaritieswhichthe post-
Cold-Warera has supposedlydisplaced.103
The senderologicalparadigminternalisesthe contradictionsinherentto
post-ColdWarforeignpolicy discourseon both the conceptualand institu-
tionallevels of discursiveproduction.Institutionally,senderologicalmodels
supportthe modernisationparadigmsunderwritingboth the foreignpolicy
and politicalscience establishments,as well as Bush's'New World Order'.
Yet conceptually,their subject, the PCP-SL, can be convenientlytrans-
formedinto a modal 'terroristmovement'preciselybecause of the ways its
historyas a politicalpartyhas been firsterased,and then reinscribedin the
sphereof irrationalpeasantpoliticalaction.IndeedSendero,withits 'charis-
matic'philosopher,'dogmatic'fundamentalism,'mysterious'cell structure,
'senseless terrorism','primitiveIncan communism',and epiphenomenal
isolation from any visible foreign sponsor, would seem to present a case
studyof the perilsof thisnew type of ThirdWorldpoliticaldanger.As stated
in the introductionto one recentCSISpublicationon Sendero:
Sendero'sterroristand guerrillaactiviescan serve as a blueprintof one
typeof violencethatpolicymakerswillmostlikelybe forcedto dealwith
in the years ahead. ... The West will be ill prepared to deal with
[Sendero's] kind of violence... .104
Sendero'sfar-offviolence thus not only presagesan urgentarea of new US
policy needs, its very importanceand existenceare constitutedin the post-
Cold War discourse of terrorism by an unquestioned or essentialised
differencebetween the rationalitiesinformingWestern and non-Western
'kindsof violence'.
Paradoxically,as the trueefficacyof Sendero's'kindof violence'becomes
increasinglyapparentin the historicalrecordof the PCP-SL'sown actions,
the earlySenderologistsbecome increasinglymiredin the staticdichotomies
of explanatorymodels formulatedto answerdifferentpolicy needs. Rather
thanadjusttheiranalysesto accommodatethe escalatingquantityof factual
informationaboutSendero'smilitarystrategy,its expandingurbanpresence,
its petitebourgeoisleadershipandyouthfulmilitancy,andits vanguardistor
cadre characteristics, the Senderologists instead retreat behind the
barricadesof an increasinglyuntenable-but easily marketed-peasant
rebellionmodelof centre-peripheryrelations.
McClintock's1989 reappraisalof Sendero's 'origins and trajectory'
providesperhapsthemoststrikingexampleof thisdetermination to salvagea
modelof 'peasantrebellion'whichhas becomeincreasinglyuntenablein the
face of both mountingempiricalevidence and the growingbody of sub-
stantivecriticalanalysesby Peruviansocialscientists,politiciansandhuman
rightsorganisations.Followingin the footsteps of her 1983 publication,
McClintock'sauthorisingframeworkof bibliographiccitation becomes
increasinglystrained.Makinguse of the techniquesof partialcitation,fal-
sificationand omissionwhichwe have seen at workin the earlierpublica-
tions,McClintock's1989 analysispushesthe peasantrebellionmodelto the
pointof absurdity.For example,McClintockreduceda lengthysummaryof
interviewsby Rail Gonzalezto twopointsindicatingsupportfor Senderoby
'theyoungestpeasants'andresignationon thepartof theoldergeneration.105
Elided from McClintock'scitation is any mention of Gonzalez'smore
lengthyand substantialinterviewswithinformedindividuals,one of whom
respondedto the interviewer'squerywhetherSendero'is only a peasant
movement':
No! iQue va! [not at all].They have politicalwork with the peasantry
[trabajocampesino];butalso a largecomponentof its membershiphave
gone throughthe universityor have studiedin Lima.Don't forgetthat
for a longtimeSenderoalsohad[apresence]in [theLimauniversitiesof]
San Marcos,La Cantuta,and even in San Martinde PorrasUniver-
sity. .. 106
As in McClintock'searlierarticle,the crucialdistinctionspointedout in
this citation (and reiteratedthroughoutthe rest of Gonzalez's article)
betweena politicalparty'strabajocampesino,a 'peasantmovement',and a
movement supportedby universitystudents of peasant origins, are not
broughtto bearon McClintock'sunderlyinghypothesisregardingthe rural,
peasantnatureof Sendero's'rebellion'.Insteadsheclaimsthat'Sendero'scall
for a newgovernmentrunby andfor Indianswasindubitablyveryappealing'
(McClintock,1989: 82). Elsewhere,she arguesthat Sendero'sterritorial
reachand emphasison urbanactions-in short,all the facts whichdo not
accordwiththemodelof anAyacucho-basedruralrebellionpresentedin her
1984 publication-reflect the subsequentemergenceof 'more than one
Sendero'(ibid.,64). Laterin the articleshe specifiesthat 'Especiallysince
1982, it has seemed possiblethat thereis more thanone Senderoand the
variousnew organisationshave distinctiveorientations'(ibid.,83). One of
these 'organisations'she locates in Puno, anotherin the coca-producing
HuallagaValley,and a third'in the cities ... especiallyin Lima'(ibid.,64).
McClintockcites no evidenceto supportthese ersatz'Senderos',phrasing
their existenceinstead as a logical possibilitypremisedon the lack of fit
between the PCP-SL'spoliticalmilitarytrajectoryand her own previous
categorical assertions about its rural Ayacuchano peasant base. Her
pronouncementregardingthe 'three Senderos',moreover,not only runs
counterto all otherpublishedanalysesandinformationaboutthe PCP-SL.It

is also totally unsubstantiatedby the political statements,documentsand
actionsof Senderoitself.
McClintockcircumventsthe necessityof givingserious considerationto
eitherthese analysesor the factualhistoricalrecordon whichtheyarebased,
by simplyreiteratingher previousstatementsregardingthe impenetrability
of Sendero'sbehaviourand thought.She claimsthey use 'esotericsymbols'
(ibid.,83) to communicatetheirideologyto the masses,that'peasantsseem
to haveinterpretedSendero... in theirownway,withouta greatdealof basis
in fact',and that Senderohas distributedonly a 'fewpamphlets'(ibid.).She
cites only two of the numerousdocumentsproducedby the PCP-SL.(She
excludes as well the PCP-SL documentsexcerptedor summarisedin the
sameGonzalezarticlesshe selectivelyminesfor otherinformation.)Shefails
to mentionthat,by 1986, Senderohad its own Lima-basednewspaper,El
Diario, whichwas widelyand legallydistributedthroughoutPeru.Nor does
she referto the 40-page interviewwithAbimaelGuzmainpublishedby that
newspaperin July 1988. Finally,she silencesby omissionthe voices of the
peasantorganisationswho not only interpretSenderoon the basis of facts,
but also adamantlyoppose Sendero'sassassinationsof peasantleadersand
their other authoritarianattemptsto take-overthe space of Peru'spopular
peasantmovement.
By now such tacticswill be familarfrom our more lengthydiscussionof
McClintock'searlierwork.The point to be made here is, in this respect,a
muchbrieferone:it is not just thatMcClintockhas learnedverylittle about
Senderosince 1984, but thatshe continuesto obscureinformationin order
to defend a paradigmof peasantrebellionwhose validityhad become even
less defensiblethanit wasin 1984. The difficultyof accomplishingthistaskis
revealedin the high numberof contradictorystatementsin McClintock's
1989 text. Contraryto her own claimsthat therewas a decreasein support
for Senderoafter 1983 when the economic crisisdeepened,she retainsthe
thesis that Senderois a popularmovementarisingfrom a subsistencecrisis
(1989: 67-70). Contraryto her own assertionsthat'organisationalstrategy'
is a fundamentalreasonfor Sendero'ssuccess(ibid.,76-79), she continuesto
treat the PCP-SL'srelation to the peasantryas either a form of shared
mentalityor as a public relationscampaign(ibid., 96), ratherthan as an
authoritarianpolitical-militarystrategy.Ignoringthe wealthof materialon
peasant economy produced by both Peruvianand foreign scholars, she
continuesto claimthat it is empiricallyimpossibleto define the differences
betweenregionalpeasantries(ibid.,73).107 Contraryto the contentof all the
Peruvian sources she selectively cites, she continues to argue for the
parochial nature of peasant political culture, to claim that no political
organisingtook placein Ayacuchopriorto the 1980s (ibid.,70-71), andthat
'no majorstudy'exists of Peruvianpeasantfederations(ibid.,75). Contrary
to her own assertionthat'migrationratesout of Ayacucho... havetradition-
allybeen amongthe highestin the country'(ibid.,72), she continuesto claim
that'peasantsand towns people rarelytravelout of the region'(ibid.,71) in
orderto stressthe role of geographicisolationas a factorpromotingpeasant
rebellion.
WhereasMcClintock'sattemptto accountfor newinformationleadherto
a contradictorydefence of her previous hypotheses,the totalisingand
unfalsifiabledichotomiesof Palmer'stheory leave no room for even the
limited, and ultimately confusing, forms of rethinkingthrough which
McClintocksets out to update her model. For Palmer, the polarised
categoriesof traditionalamdmoder, Indianand Spanish,ruralandurban,
highlandsand coast, are effectivelydivorcedfrom the real people and real
places which McClintock'smodel attempts,however unsuccessfully,to
describe.The locus of truthin Palmer'srarefiedformof analysisresides,by
comparison,neither in Peru nor in the record of real historicalevents.
Because'centre'and'periphery'arediscursivelyconstructedas oppositional
categories,definedonlyin relationto eachother,theycanbe madeto fit any
body of empiricalevidence, any geopoliticalmap, any set of historical
circumstances.
A recent (1989) articleby Palmerprovidesan exampleof the ways in
whichnewevidenceis usedto fillout,andthusharden,theoppositionallogic
of the centre-peripheryparadigm.In this article,Palmer,who continuesto
relyon a limitednumberof sourcesby US Senderologists,givesan extended
discussion of Sendero's military actions and the Peruvian military's
response.108 His goalis to 'understand
betterthe spiralof violencewhichhas
affectedmuch of Peru' (Palmer,1989: 130). To do this, he claims, it is
necessaryto 'distinguishbetweenterroristorganisationsand revolutionary
organisations'(ibid.).Whereasthe latter have clearly defined goals and
strategies,the former accomplishtheir purpose simply by perpetrating
'terrifyingact[s]whichbreakthe rules of civil society'(ibid.).Sendero,he
claims,occupiesan ambiguouspositionwithrespectto thesetwo categories.
It is 'an organisationwith revolutionarygoals which often uses terrorist
meansin its questto achievethem'(ibid.).
ThisdistinctionallowsPalmerto isolateviolencefromthe political,social
and historicalcontext in which it occurs and to assign it an ontological
rationalityof its own.RatherthantreatingSendero'sactionsas a politicaland
military strategy, which might then be discussed through reference to a
precise chronology of military manoeuvres,geographicand territorial
objectives,and political gains, Palmerinstead concentrateson only one
aspect of Sendero'sstrategy-that of 'terrorism'and its use to 'intimidate,
immobiliseor neutralise'(ibid., 140). Abstractedin this way from the
politicalandhistoricalcontextin whichtheyoccur,actsof politicallytargeted
violencebecomepartof a 'spiralof violence'whichis seen to takeon a life of
its own. Subjectto this imposedrationality,Peru'sgovernmentis forcedto
reactto Sendero'sviolencewith similarmeans.Its statusas an elected,and
therefore 'legitimate',governmentis thus rendered 'paradoxical'by its
participationin a cycle of violence initiatedby Sendero(ibid., 151-152).
Conversely,all other'revolutionary such as the MRTA,are
organisations',
'encouraged'by the 'legitimacy'thataccruesto Sendero'sviolenceas a mode
of politicalaction(ibid.,147, 147). Definedonly throughreferenceto their
confrontationalpositionswithinthe logic of attackand counter-attack, the
governmentand'revolutionary organisations'areeffectivelyseparatedfrom
thepolitical-economic historieswhichengenderedthem,andareassimilated
to the all-encompassingahistoricalcategoriesof Palmer'scentre-periphery

model.
Thus defined, the confrontationbetween Sendero and the government
becomesreadilytranslatableinto all the othersets of oppositionalcharacter-
istics constitutiveof modernisationtheoryand its accompanyingbarbarian
metaphorsof 'Maoist'encirclement.It becomes the justifyingbasis upon
which Palmercan then argueback into historyfor the determingforce of
such oppositions as Indian versus Spaniard,highlandversus coast, rural
versusurban,and traditionalversusmodern:
The modernization challenge ... strained, over a long period of time,
more traditionalways of viewing and dealing with citizen-system
relationshipsand put increasingpressureon both Spanishand Indian
core values.
From this context and into this dynamic emerged the radical
alternativeof developmentby revolutionand,in due course,of revolu-
tion by terrorism(ibid.,130).
Becausethe oppositionof 'Indian'versus'Spanish'is constructedby encasing
historicaldevelopmentwithina set of categoriesderivedfroman ideological
readingof late-twentiethcenturypoliticalviolence,the content ascribedto
these presumablyracialor ethnicclassificationsis effectivelydivorcedfrom
history.109 Capitalism,togetherwith all post-conquestformsof civilgovern-
ment are simplydescribedas 'Spanishto the core' (ibid., 29). Conversely,
Palmerclaimsthat'outsidethe systema differentrealityhas prevailed'.This
realityis 'sometimesindividualisticand entrepreneurial,often communitar-
ian and collective,frequentlyIndian'(ibid., 129-130). In orderto arguefor
this connection,Palmerfirstconflatesthe juridicalinstitutionof the peasant
community (comunidad campesina)- which sometimes, but not always,
hold legallyrecognisedcommunallands-with the ethnicallybounded and
juridicallynon-existentconcept of the highland'Indiancommunity'(ibid.,
141). He then proceeds to interpretSendero's violence as a 'conscious
strategy'to 'restore"true"Indiancommunismto Peru'by eliminatingthose
Indianswho own privateproperty,and thus mediatebetweenthe two poles
of his imaginedcentre-peripherystructure(ibid.).
The hardeningof Palmer'smodel is thus,on the one hand,a productof a
tautologicalmode of analysisin which social causationis explained as a
productof the mutualinteractionof two dichotomouspoles. On the other
hand, however,it is also a response to the marketdemandfor handy con-
ceptual toolkits which can be applied to complex, Third World political
scenarios.The demandfor this producthas been set by the post-ColdWar
discourseof 'terrorists','druglords','madmen'and'fundamentalists'. At least
two of Palmer'sproductimprovementswould seem to reflectthis changing
marketdemand.These are:(1) his newly addedemphasison terror;and (2)
his stress on the spiralingnature of a (terrorist)violence to which the
Peruviangovernmentmerely'reacts'."0
A brief survey of the other major authors writing on the problem of
violencein Peruwouldseem to showthatPalmer'sandMcClintock'smodels
have indeed had considerable success on the academic market-place.
DavidP. Werlich,a historianwho also writeson Perufor the international
affairsjournalCurrentHistory,expandsuponthefundamental thesesof both
Palmer'sandMcClintock'sparadigms. 11 Likethem,he authoriseshis state-
ments about Sendero by citing only other US Senderologists(primarily
PalmerandMcClintock),by elidingallmentionof existingPeruviansources,
and by ignoring Sendero's own statements of their political-military
objectives.He traces the 'cause' of Sendero's'mysteriousrevolutionary
group' to a combinationof isolation and poverty (Werlich, 1984:78).
Subscribingto the polarisedmodel of politicaldevelopmentadvocatedby
Palmer,he describesa Peruvianpoliticalscenariooccupiedby only two
actors: Sendero and the government.Finally, he elaborates upon the
assertionscontainedin both Palmer'sand McClintock'smodels regarding
theirrationality of politicson 'theperiphery'.Sendero'spoliticswereborn,he
claims,from the proto-Maoisttexts of Jose CarlosMariategui-whomhe
describesas 'thepatronsaintof Peruvianradicalism'-andfrom'traditionsof
rebellionandmessianism[which]weredeeplyrootedin theregion'sfolklore'
(ibid.,80). From this 'fertileground'sprangan 'Ayatollahor Pol-Pot like'
leader (ibid., 80-81). This leader was, of course, Abimael Guzman,who
Werlichdescribesas advocatinga 'radicalandextremelysectarian'ideology
(ibid.).So radicalwasGuzman'sdoctrinethat,accordingto Werlich:
the nationalorganisationformallyexpelledGuzmanin 1970, accused
the professorof severalheresies,including'occultism'.Thelattercharge
apparentlyreferredto Guzman'suse of local customsand messianic
traditionsto buildsupportamongthe peasantry(ibid.).
Guzmanwas indeed subjectedto such chargesfrom SaturninoParedes
sometimebeforehis groupsplitfromthe PCP-BRin 1970. The 'occultism'
with which Paredes charged Guzmdn,however, referred to Guzman's
emphasison clandestinepoliticalwork and his consequentdisregardfor
open workwiththe masses.The termoccultism,andthe practiceto whichit
refers,havebeencommoncurrencyin revolutionary politicaldiscoursesince
In his ridiculousattributionof an
at leastthe time of the FirstInternational.
'Andean'or 'peasant'contentto Paredes'accusation,Werlichexposes the
limitsof a model in whichthe centre-peripheryoppositionis polarisedto
suchan extentthatit becomesimpossibleto considerSendero'sconnections
to any other than a totally 'traditional','Indian',or 'peripheral'mode of
political(ir)rationality.
The all-encompassingpolaritiesof modernisationtheory encountera
similarfate in the workof anothersenderologist,SandraWoy-Hazelton.12
Like Palmer,she sees Sendero'semergencein a 'democratic'countryas a
paradoxwhich 'challengesconventionalwisdom'and assumesthroughout
her articlethat 'violence'and 'democracy'are somehowmutuallyexclusive
(Woy-Hazelton,1990:21). She similarlyreproducesthefundamentaltheses
of isolation,Maoistencirclementand'nativeagrariancommunism'(ibid.,22,
29). Shealsoarguesfortheexclusivelyurbanbaseof Peru'selectoralLeftand
the MRTA,and the reciprocallyruralor peripheralbase of Sendero(ibid.,
25-26). Finally,alone amongthe Senderologists,she stretchesthe centre-
peripheryclaimsto assertthatSendero's'mission'amongthecocacultivators
of the HuallagaValley was that of 'protectingthe indigenouscultureand

livelihood'(ibid.,27).
Like the othersenderologists,Woy-Hazeltonalso sees politicalrationality
on the peripheryas both irrationaland unmediated.Sendero is said to be
'attractiveto marginal sectors of the population' (ibid., 23). For this
peripheralpopulation,she claims,'Sendero'sdogmatismand brutaltactics
have not underminedits appeal'(ibid.,21). Yet nowheredoes she-or any
other US Senderologist-mention the role of authoritarianism,violence,
racism and intimidation in the legitimation and reproduction of the
hegemonic political culture which has sustained both elected and non-
elected governmentsin twentieth-centuryPeru.Perhapsit is for this reason
that she, like Palmer, attributesthe 'escalationof political violence' to a
singularagency-that of Sendero Luminoso-and describes the 'spiralof
violence'whichensues as a patternof actionand reaction.In these descrip-
tions, the Peruvianmilitary'sSpanish,German and US advised counter-
insurgencycampaignis reduced to a dynamicin which a frustratedand
essentiallypassive militarysimply reacts to a series of provocations.Such
strategiccounter-insurgency goals as detentions,disappearances,massacres
andgeneralisedterrorismagainstan ethnicallyand raciallydefined'peasant'
or cholo population,are then describedas 'overreactions'on the partof the
militaryto the 'elusivenessof those responsiblefor guerrillaactions'(ibid.,
29-30).
A recent article by Susan Bourque and Kay Warrensuggest that such
simplisticapproachesto the studyof violence could benefitby a considera-
tion of what they call the 'culturalpolitics of terrorin Peru'.113
Theirarticle
aims to examinethe 'interplaybetweendemocraticpoliticsand violence'by
looking at how 'contested understandingsof terrorismand violence' are
constructedin the Peruvianmass media (Bourqueand Warren,1988: 7).
However, despite their initial and well stated intention of studying the
contestednature of political culture and discourse in Peru, Bourque and
Warrensoon fall back on the, by now easily recognisable,polaritiesof a
genericsenderologymodel:
Sendero'sdevelopmentand emergenceon the nationalpoliticalscene
can be understood as a reflection of the unresolvedconflicts in the
relations between Lima and the hinterlandsand the significanceof
ethnicdifference(ibid.,15).
Despite theirassertionsregardingthe significanceof'ethnicdifference'-a
subject which they cover in some detail in another co-authoredarticle-
BourqueandWarren'sanalysisof 'terror'neveronce refersto concreteclass
or ethnicsectorsof the Peruvianpopulation.114 Nor does it ever referto the
politicalgeneaology(andthusrationality)of the PCP-SL.Politicalopinionis
insteadseen to be producedin a social and discursivevacuum.The authors
repeatedlyreferto what 'Peruviansthink',to what 'some Peruviansfeel', to
what 'other Peruviansbelieve' and to what unnamed'Peruvianjournalists
argue'.Such mythicalvoices are never situatedwith respect to the specific
class, ethnic,political,gender or ideologicallocation of the manydifferent
individualslivingin Peruviansociety.
Most surprisinglyof all, the authorstreat ideologicallyand politically
diversetexts and imagesas a single discoursewhichis reproducedin the
photojournalismof a 'sensationalistpress'."5As 'typicalexamples'of this
monolithic'culturalimagery'they cite a centre-leftdaily newspaper(La
Republica)knownfor its rathersensationalistphotojournalism, the reports
of a left-wing member of a congressionalhuman rights investigatory
commission(JavierDiez Canseco),anda New YorkTimesarticlewrittenby
a right-wingnovelist-politician(VargasLlosa) (ibid., 20). In this way, a
politically,sociallyand ethnicallydiversePeruvianpopulationis assigneda
single 'collectivepoliticalmemory'(ibid., 27). At the same time, the only
activepoliticalforceswithinthisnewlyhomogeneisedPeruareportrayedas
Sendero and the government.Based on this by now familiarmodel of
polarisedpoliticalagency,and on the presumablymonolithicnatureof a
'Peruvianpoliticalmemory'which-by virtueof its incorporationinto this
model-has been effectivelydeprivedof any oppositionalor alternative
political vision, Bourque and Warrencompare the current'intractable'
situationof Peruto a Hobbesian'stateof nature'(ibid.,26-27).
The totalisingdichotomieswithwhichSenderohas been inscribedin US
Senderologyhave also placed limits on anthropologists'assessmentsof
contemporarypolitical violence, and in some cases, on their ability to
assimilatetheir own first-handobservations.Billie Jean Isbell, an anthro-
pologistwho workedin the 1960s and 1970s in Chuschi,Ayacucho,has
recentlywrittenon peasantresponsesto Sendero.Her analysisis based on
interviewswith Chuschinos,on her personalknowledgeof the community
and region, and on secondarysources by both Peruvianand US social
scientists."16Isbell'slocal knowledgeof such relevantfactorsas Chuschi's
intercommunitydisputes(Isbell, 1988: 11-12), class differentiation(ibid.,
7-8), political factions, and political and agrarianhistory (ibid., 5-8),
however,quicklybecome subsumedto the senderologicalparadigmswhich
ascribe parochialnessand irrationalityto a 'peripheral'pole of political
activity. As an anthropologist,Isbell slightly modifies this scheme by
'periphery'to an
subsumingthe 'irrational'attributesof a political-scientific
organicnotion of culturederived from Americanculturalanthropology.
Peasantsare said to supportSenderobecause of the unspecifiedcultural
traditionsof rebellionwhich they share with all peasantsof the southern
Andes (ibid.,6-7). 'Classconflict'is said to be 'keptalive'in annualrituals
(ibid.,6). Ratherthandescribethe specificformsof politicalculture,political
activity and political rationality which Isbell must have observed in Chuschi,
she represents peasant political culture as parochial and unmediated.
Sendero'smilitarystrategy,politicalorganisationandhistoricallycontingent
networkof sympathisers,militantsand relatives,is meanwhilereducedto
somethingpeculiarlyreminiscentof an anthropologist's questfor the perfect
field site. 'Chuschi',Isbell claims, 'was chosen (by Sendero)in order to
experimentwithpeasantcommunitiesthathad strongcommunalstructure,
autonomyover their resources,and whose experienceswith capitalistic
marketpenetrationswereminimal'(ibid.,3).
The useful particularsof local history, regional class structure,and
communitylife which in fact determinedwhen and why the PCP-SL
'appeared'in communitieslike Chuschi,are thus suggestivelyhintedat, yet

finally submerged,in Isbell's anthropologicalanalysis.This particularistic
detail-precisely the type of detail which one would hope to find in an
anthropologicalwork-is, fortunately,salvagedin the work of anotherUS
anthropologist,RonaldBerg.117 Berg workedin the communityof Pacucha,
in Apurimac,in 1981-1982 and 1985. In his analysisof Sendero'sactivities
in the region, Berg departs radicallyfrom the dominant senderological
tradition.Unlike the senderologists,he is carefulto point out thatSendero's
programmeandactionsare not generalisableoutsideof the specificregional
contexts in which they transpire(Berg, 1986: 169). Peasantriesand local
histories differ widely, and so too do the specific strategiesand tactics of
Sendero.Berg,who speaksonlyforPacucha,thusprovidesthe localperspec-
tive whichis requiredto counterUS Senderology'sglobalconcepts of sub-
sistence crisis, universityradicalism,'messianicpromises',and economic
marginalisation(ibid.,168-169).
Second,Bergis also carefulto point out that'itis importantto distinguish
...between sympathy,active supportand passive support'(ibid., 186). He
arguesthatthe Pacuchapeasants'havea greatdealof sympathyfor whatthey
perceiveas the goals of SenderoLuminoso,and this is expressedin passive
support'(ibid.). Their 'active support is limited',however, 'to attacks on
unpopularindividuals'(ibid.). He also points out that 'Sendero has not
mobilised a "people'sarmy"in any sense of the term' (ibid.).These con-
clusions about peasant support are based on Berg's conversationswith
peasantsand on his knowledgeof the complexitiesof local class and ethnic
politics.Of the literaturereviewedhere,for example,Berg'sarticleis the only
one which attemptsto define what such inherentlyambiguousclass and
ethnicclassifiersas 'campesino','mestizo'and 'misti'mightmeanin practice
(ibid., 187-188). Similarly,he alone has taken the trouble to speak to
provincial peasant political activists and supporters from the left-wing
partieswho activelyoppose the PCP-SL(ibid.,190). By acknowledgingthe
existenceof suchindividualsand organisations,Bergeffectivelyundermines
Palmer'sand McClintock'snotions of a parochialor unmediatedpeasant
political consciousness.Finally, Berg rejects the isolationisttheses which
accompany these notions of parochial provincial culture, by clearly
delineatingthe interplayof suchglobaleconomicforces as the WorldBank,
and the local agrarianeconomies on which the Pacuchapeasantsdepend
(ibid.,173-174).
In connectingruralpeasant society with the nationaland international
economies,Berg'sunderstandingof Senderogoes a longwayfromthebeaten
path of US Senderology.What is so amazing,however,is not the fact that
Berg has successfullyescaped from the restrictingparadigmsof outmoded
theory,as the fact that the Senderologistscould actuallymanufactureand
market a model which ignores so much of what is most obvious about
Peruvianpolitics,society and history.This abilityto block out whole arenas
of politicalstruggleis crucialto the successof a modeldestinedfor a market-
place whichhas itselfbeen shapedby certainpoliticalandideologicalneeds.
If the academicmodels of McClintockand Palmerofferedthe prototype
for a convenientand marketablecommodity,some morerecentuses of their
senderologicalmodeldemonstratehow a productbecomescustomisedto fit

the emergingideologicalandpoliticalneedsof its post-ColdWarconsumers.
Exploitingthe xenophobictraditionto blameforeignersfor the crisis and
decay in the imperialurbancentresand recurringto the well-established
Westernimaginaryof the barbariansiege,the expertshavecreatedthe term
andconceptof 'narcoterrorism' as a new'mechanismof fear'.18An example
of this type of improvedproductpackagingis providedby the work of
GabrielaTarazona-Sevillano and GordonH. McCormick.Tarazona,who
holds a law degree from the Universityof Trujilloin Peru,was a visiting
scholarat the HooverInstitutionin 1989. Sheis the authorof severalpapers
on Senderoandon terrorism,and most recentlyhas publisheda book with
JohnReuterentitledSenderoLuminosoandtheThreatof Narcoterrorism .119
GordonMcCormickhas writtenon 'PeruvianTerrorism'andmost recently
has authoreda Rand CorporationReporton Senderofor the Officeof the
US Secretaryof Defense.120Both authorsemploy the same strategiesof
bibliographiccitationand referencingwhich we have alreadyseen in the
work of the other senderologists.They rely on Palmer'sand McClintock's
earlyarticlesfor theirinformationon thehistoryandpoliticalcharacteristics
of Sendero.Theycite Peruvianacademicworkon Senderoonlyinfrequently
and neveras sourcesof concepts,analysisor interpretations. They employ
partialcitations.They falsely representthe content and opinion of other
authors.Theyonly rarelyreferto primarysourcematerialandneverengage
in any seriousway with the PCP-SL'sown texts and politicalstatements.
They repeatedlyrefer to Sendero as an 'elusive'or 'mysterious'terrorist
organisationaboutwhich'littleis known'.l21
McCormickand Tarazonaalso coincidewiththe othersenderologistsin
their emphasison the 'peripheral'roots of Senderoin Ayacucho,which
Tarazonadescribesas 'anidealbreedinggroundfor a Maoist-typeinsurrec-
tion'.122Senderois seen to grow naturallyin an environmentof poverty,
marginalisation and a universityradicalismwhichfavouredthe spreadof
communism.123Buildingon this base, they present a model of Peruvian
societywhichis, if anything,even morepolarisedalongracial,culturaland
geographicallines than in the works of the pioneer Senderologists.For
example,McCormick-who throughouthis articlerefers to the home of
Senderoas 'Ayachucho'(sic)-claims that Sendero's'pool of recruitswas
drawnfromthe non-Spanishspeakingpeoplesof the highlands,andIndian
slum-dwellers in the areaof Lima'.'24
Tarazonawho,as a Peruvian,mayhave
had greaterempiricaldifficultyequatingPeru'sdiversehighlandpeasantry
witha uniform'Indian'population,insteadrelieson a vaguenotionof a 'rural
and urbanunderclass'and a 'lumpenintelligentsia'to explainthe ways in
whichsuchmarginalisedsectors'becomeattachedto Senderoideologically
andemotionally'.'25 Eventhe prominentLimaintellectual,Jos6CarlosMar-
iategui,becomes marginalisedin Tarazona'sscheme.As a mestizo'caught
betweenPeru'stwo mutuallyantagonisticworlds-the Indianandthe Euro-
pean.'"26Maridteguiwas,accordingto Tarazona:
alwayson the peripheryof the circleof educatedintellectualsin Lima.
... As a well read,perceptive,and sometimesaloof intellectual,he was
not acceptedas an equalby the man-on-the-street.His life and writings

may be viewed as a struggleto replace his alienation... with accept-
ance.127
Following this line of reasoning,Tarazona claims that it was not only

Mariategui'sideas, but his deviant social status which would inspire the
founderof SenderoLuminoso:
Guzmain,also a mestizowithan irregularfamilybackground,mustshare
thesefeelingsandthehostilitythataccompaniesthem.Castinghimselfin
the role of Mariaitegui'sideologicalheir, he decided to carry out the
revolutionthe writerhad envisionedsome 40 years before.It became
his goal to unite the marginalclasses in a violent,vindictiverevolt that
would destroy EurocentricPeru and build a new nation groundedin
indigenousinstitutions.128
By now the far-fetched simplicity of such statements about Peru's
polarisedethniclandscapewill be apparent,as will the assumptionsregard-
ing the necessarilyshared mentalityof 'mestizos'.The statementsabout
Mariateguinot onlyfalsifyhis life andwritingsanddisregardthe voluminous
historiographyon Mariategui.They insinuatethat Mariategui'sworks-the
most importantof which has gone through43 popularpaperbackeditions
since its publicationin 1928-were marginalto Peruvianpolitical culture
until they were 'reborn some 40 years later as the theoreticalbase for
Sendero Luminoso'.129
One reason which perhaps explains Tarazona'senthusiasticmisrepre-
sentation of Mariategui'spersonalityand intellectualachievementsis the
pivotalrole assignedto irrationality,fanaticismand spiritualityin both her
and McCormick'sparadigmsof 'terrorism'.l30 Because of the particular
image of Sendero Luminoso which these two, more overtly ideological,
authorswishto manufacture,thisfactoris emphasisedeven morethanin the
originalsenderologicalmodels.McCormick,for example,describesSendero
as a 'religiouscult',and Mariateguias its 'spiritualleader'.'13Citingsocio-
logicalandmedicalliteratureon cult-likeorganisations,McCormickfurther
extendsthe by now familiar'charismaticleader'syndrometo describehow
Guzmdnhas 'cultivatedan image of genius and omnipresenceamong his
followers'.Guzman'sphotographicimage, he claims, 'is presented(to the
highlandpeasantry)in an almost religiousmanner,an image designed to
appealto local superstitionand custom.. .'132
This mystificationof Guzman'sundeniablycharismaticappeal and the
disciplinary(as opposedto 'cult-like')natureof the senderistaespritde corps,
allows McCormickand Tarazonato insert Sendero into the essentialised
demonology of 'internationalterrorism'.133 In the preface to Tarazona's
book, David E. Long of the US Coast Guard Academy lumps Sendero
together with other terrorist organisationsin Northern Ireland and the
Middle East. These groups, he claims, use 'universalistrevolutionary
doctrinessuchas communismandreligiousfundamentalism...to justifyacts
of violence'.Heraldingterrorism'sprivilegedstatusin the new post-Cold-
War ideologicalformation,Long points out that such terrorists'activities
'havenot beenfundamentally affectedby the thawin globaltensions'.134 It is
this emphasison a particularideologicalconstructionof 'Terrorism'which
distinguishesMcCormick'sand Tarazona'ssenderologyfrom that of their
moretraditionalprecedecessors.WhereasPalmer'sandMcClintock'sbrand
of modernisationtheorydepictedSendero'spoliticsas a 'spiralof violence'
containedwithin the polarisedboundariesof a not-yet-modernPeruvian
state,McCormickandTarazonaenvisiona 'terroristviolence'whichspreads
fromits particularPeruvianperipheryto encompassother'barbarian' fringes
and, eventually,to threatenthe very centre of world civilisation.Thus,
McCormick,who writesfor a book on 'terroristorganisations', claimsthat
'Sendero'sgoal ... is not simplythe overthrowof the governmentin Lima,
but a largerLatinAmericanrevolutionunitingthe Quechuanationin a new
socialiststate'.135
Tarazona,whose interestslie not in describingterroristorganisationper
se, but in demonstratingthe connectionbetweenterrorismand the drug
trade,uses a differentargumentto sustainher claimsregardingSendero's
internationalambitions:
Sendero Luminoso seeks to unify the entire 'Andean nation'....
CountriesthatneighborPerucouldwelllendthemselvesto the Sendero
approach.... Boliviais particularlyripefor infiltration:
in Bolivia,as in
Peru, some sectors of the populationnow depend almost entirelyupon
coca production for their livelihood. Sendero has penetrated in
Northern Argentina ... [and] may also be seeking to expand into
Ecuador.136
Forgettingfor the momentthe extremelyshakyempiricalbasisuponwhich
Tarazonabases these assertionsregardingSendero'sinterationalisation-
and the waysin whichTarazona'sandMcCormick'spronouncements about
an 'Andeannation'contradictthe PCP-SL'sown dismissalof suchbeliefsas
'magicalwhiningnationalisms'(see p. 144)-we want insteadto focus on
Tarazona's motives for so adamantlyinsisting on the singularityof
'narcoterrorism'.'37By insistingon the necessaryconnectionsbetweentwo
differentphenomena,one political(Sendero)andthe othereconomic(coca),
Tarazonaconstructsan imageof a Senderowhichnecessarilysurpassesits
naturalboundariesin orderto threatenthe very countryfor whose foreign
policyestablishmentandterrorismexpertsshe writes.'38
Because of its prescriptiveand ideologicalutility, Tarazona'swork is
becomingverypopularwithinthenewlycreatednarcoterrorist branchof the
terrorismindustry.RachelEhrenfeld,an emerginghigh-priestessof 'narco-
terrorism',quotes extensivelyfrom Tarazona-who is her sole source on
SenderoLuminosoandPeru-in her recentandhighlypoliticisedscreedon
the linkagesbetween narcoticstraffic,terrorismand the 'marxist-leninist
allies'of the SovietUnion.139 Ehrenfeldaffirmsthat,of all the countriesin
which'narcoterrorism' hasemerged,it is in Peruwherethis'deadlysymbiosis
that tears at the vitals of Western civilisation',has reached 'regime-
threateningproportions'(ibid.,pp. xx, 118).
CONCLUSIONS
The texts which become central to the productionof any one brand of
academicdiscourseare selected, or 'authorised'accordingto two criteria.
First, they are usually the earliest texts written on a particularsubject.
Second,theyaretextswhichhavea close, yet flexible,fit withthe demandsof
both the academicand foreignpolicymarket-place.These requirementsare
parsimony,familiarity,explanatoryutility, prescriptiveutility, and ideo-
Ourclose readingsof Palmer'sandMcClintock'swork,and
logicalutility.140
theirinfluenceon otherSenderologists,revealsthe extentto whichtheirtexts
satisfythese criteria.Their models are parsimoniousin that they leave out
complicatingdetails of historicalcausality.They are familiarin that they
subscribefaithfullyto the tenets of politicaldevelopmenttheory.They have
explanatoryutility in that their categoriesare universaland unfalsifiable.
Their discourseof Maoist encirclement,the peasant'other'and politics as
contagiousmentalitieshave prescriptiveutilityin thatthey virtuallyoverlap
withthe fundamentalpremisesof counter-insurgency doctrine.Finally,their
recourse to the ethnocentric,and ultimatelyracist, dichotomisationof a
rationalcentreversusan irrationaland traditionalperipherylends them an
obviousideologicalutilityin an age of both xenophobicforeignpolicy,and a
domestic situation of class and racial polarisationwhose structuraland
discursivefeaturesmimicthose of imperialcentreand colonialperiphery.
While the centralityof both Sendero and the Andean drug-producing
nationsto thepost-ColdWarforeignand domesticpolicymarket-placemay
be new, the discursiveand academic traditionswhich the Senderologists
bringto theiranalysesof Peruarenot. Sincethe timeof the Spanishconquest,
Andean peoples-particularly those in the Inca state-controlledareas of
what would later be Peru-have been subject to Western academic and
intellectualscrutiny.The SpanishCrownandreligiousorderscommissioned
social and geographic surveys, economic and demographic censuses,
political and social histories,ethnographicreports and geneaologiesfrom
both government functionaries and independent intellectuals.141 These
reports and chronicles,like the work of today'sSenderologists,answered to
the specificpoliticalneeds of the colonial(andecclesiastical)administrations
they served.
Like the Senderologiststoo, this politicalencodingof the earlyAndean
chronicles and reports was complementedby a process of inter-textual
authorisation.Although the earliest Spanish chroniclersoften recorded
valuable first-handtestimonies of Inca society and customs, their final
accounts were inevitably shaped not by historical explanations,but by
Spanishand Christianideas of social and moral order.Later writersoften
copied verbatimfrom these earlier chronicles and thereby incorporated
wholesale the moral assumptionsand interpretivestereotypeswhich had
structuredtheir predecessors'accounts.In this way, the specificmoraland
politicalbiaseswithwhichthe earliestchroniclershadfilledthe tabularasaof
Andean social history, became incorporatedinto both concrete colonial
policies and the general body of European knowledge about Spain's
Peruviansubjects.
By the seventeenthand eighteenthcenturies,manyhistoriansno longer
botheredwith the task of talkingto informants-or in some cases, of even
visitingPeru.Insteadthey simplycited the authoritativetexts of theirpre-
decessors. With the passing of yet more time, the institutionalisation of
colonial and ecclesiasticalpolicies based on this body of knowledgecon-
firmed the 'truth'of what the Spanishchroniclershad said about Peru.
Sufficientuntoitself,theimagesandconstructsof Andeanpeoplescontained
in the Spanishchronicleswere the authoritativereferenceupon whichboth
nineteenth-century romantichistoriansandtwentieth-century scientistsand
archaeologistsbased theirstudiesof Peruvianhistoryand culture.142 While
the politicalsystemsand economicintereststhey servedwere qualitatively
differentthanthose of theircolonialpredecessors,the relationshipbetween
ninteenth-and twentieth-century Westernintellectualknowledgeand the
Peruvianpeople remainedthe same:truthwas producedby outsiders,who
bolsteredtheirclaimsto scientificauthorityby citingeach others'texts and
theories.
Both the imperiousrelationshipof Andeanistscholarshipto its subjectof
inquiryand the discursivetraditionof creatingacademicauthoritythrough
citation,have been carriedforwardby post-WorldWarII social scientists.
As we haveseen,thesenew chroniclers'findingsfrequentlyhavemoreto do
with confirmingabstractand ideologicallyinformedtheoriesthanwith the
realitiesof Peruvianpoliticaland social experience.Their texts rarelycite
Peruvianintellectualor scientificsources.Whena Peruvianvoiceis heard,its
messageis embeddedin a narrativeframeworkdesignedto confirmthe truth
of a particularpoliticalsciencemodel or sociologicaltheory.Authorityfor
the conclusionswhichindividualauthorsmakeaboutboth Peruviansocial
realityand the remediesfor Peruviansocialills are insteadreferredto texts
writtenby the author'scolleaguesin other US universitiesand research
centres.
Thecavalierattitudetowardsthehistoricalintegrityof theirobjectof study
could perhapsbe dismissedas mere academicquackerywere it not for the
explicitlypoliticaland inherentlymoral natureof the events they seek to
explain.A politicalorganisationwhose authoritarian strategiesand violent
militarismhavecontributedto a dirtywarin whichmorethan17,000 people
have died, cannot be confined within the domain of objectivescientific
inquiry.In one yearalone (1989), the PCP-SLwas responsiblefor approxi-
mately 1298 assassinationsand the Peruvianarmed forces killed 1116
'presumedsubversives'and 'disappeared'450. Even more strikingthanthe
numbersof dead,is thefactthat,overthe sameperiodof time,the armytook
only 56 prisonersand 3 wounded.143 Despitethe obvioushorrorfor which
suchfiguresspeak,not one of the Senderologistsherereviewedhas allowed
the presumedobjectivityof theirscientificexplanationsto be temperedby
the languageof moraloutrage.Most do not evenmentionthe formsof racist
violence, military counter-insurgency,collective punishment and no
prisonerspolicysponsoredby whattheyconsideronly as Peru's'legitimate'
democraticgovernment.None of themmentionPeruvianpublicoutrageat
the riseof deathsquadsandright-wingparamilitary groups.
Humanrightsabusesin Peruaretreatedin US senderologyas a statistical
indexof certainsocial phenomenawhose natureit is the senderologist'stask

to uncover. Clearly, in accomplishingthis task, most consider dismay,
outrageor moralcondemnationas idiomsforeignto thelanguageof scientific
objectivitywithinwhichacademicauthoritymustnecessarilybe cast.Yet the
very languagewhich senderologyuses to constructits field of expertiseis
itself derived from a discourse of moral rectitudestructuredaround the
oppositional notions of normality, deviance, stability, disorder and
legitimacy.This normalisingdiscourse-whose most recentmanifestationis
Bush's'New World Order'-has its historicalroots in, and is complicitous
with,certainformsof veryrealpoliticalpower.Coincidentwiththishistorical
moment, the disciplineof political science-which was forged in the post
WorldWarII rushto carvea nichefor socialscientistsin the intelligenceand
foreign policy sector-took shape as the privileged site from which the
scientisation of moral discourse would occur. Through their objective,
'scientific'analysesof ThirdWorldinsurgencies,communistregimesand'the
modernisationprocess', the group of intellectualswhom Chomsky has
appropriatelylabelled as the 'New Mandarins',acquiredunprecedented
powerfor theirstrategicmediationof the fields of academicand ideological
production.144 Clearlythe Senderologistsrepresentsimplyone of the latest
manifestationsof this trahisondes clercs.
A more honestapproachto the studyof Senderowouldinvolvenot only a
critical uncoveringand rejection of these historicallinks between intel-
lectuals and power, but also a thoroughand reasonedexaminationof the
historicalbases of political and economic power in Peru. This endeavour
would demand,in the first place, doing a good deal more history than is
involvedin any of the senderologicaltracts.It would also requirea funda-
mentalrethinkingof the veryobjectof inquiry.It wouldrequiresituatingSen-
dero with respect to those contingent forms of political power, ethnic
identity,classstructureand culturaldiscoursethatshapePeruviansocietyas
a whole. By way of concludingour reviewof US senderology,therefore,we
would like briefly to survey those factors which we consider crucial to a
historical,politicaland moralunderstandingof Peruvianpoliticalviolence,
includingthatof the PCP-SL.
First,as we havepointedout in ourdiscussionof the Senderologists'work,
the PCP-SLis a politicalpartywhichmustbe treatedas such.It is neithera
'movement'nor a mystery,but ratheran organisationwitha specificpolitical
and military rationality.This rationalitycan be understood by careful
analysisof the PCP-SL'sdocumentsand their militaryactions,and by not
mystifyingthemas an 'exotic'(or muchless, Indian)other.Muchof thiswork
of political interpretationhas been done by Peruvianscholarsand by the
populardemocraticorganisationswho occupy the frontlinein the political
confrontationwith Sendero.'45Any honest analysisof Senderomust begin
withthisliteratureand the moralpositionsit contains.
Second, any analysis of politics and violence in Peru must take into
account the complex natureof ethnic and class identityin Peru, and the
existence of both institutionalracismand racistdiscourse.Simplydividing
Peruinto neatlycarvedslices of 'Indian','Spanish'and 'mestizo'populations
essentialisesthe fluid and overlappingnature of ethnic practicesin Peru.
Throughoutthe Peruvianhighlandsindividualsfrequentlyand routinely

assume the markersof different'ethnicidentities'as part of the complex
negotiationsof positionalpowerthatcharacteriseeverydaylife.146 Farfrom
reflectingany realphenotypicalor culturalboundarieswithinthe Peruvian
population,the assignationof fixed,andthereforeracialised,ethniclabelsto
sectorsof the highlandpopulationis insteada productof the polarisedand
extremelydivisiveclassstructureof Peruviancapitalism.Longdeniedby the
dominant culture of Lima, the racist implicationsof this discourse of
polarisedandethnicisedclassidentitieshascome tragicallyto thefore in the
patternof collectivepunishmentutilisedby the Peruvianarmyin its anti-
terroristcampaigns.Random massacresof 'Indian'peasantsby 'mestizo'
armypersonnelandthe massdetentionof 'cholos'in Lima'sterrorist'round-
ups'clearlyrevealthe racismlatentin Peruviansociety.By essentialisingthe
racialand culturalattributesof 'peasants','urbanslumdwellers','migrants'
and 'senderistas',US Senderologistsadvocatethe sameracistessentialisms
thatfuel counter-insurgency campaigns.
Third,an understandingof Peruvianpoliticalhistorymust considerthe
regionalfragmentationof Peruand the variationsin politicalculturewhich
occur in these differentregions.As a resultof the unevendevelopmentof
capitalismin Peru, differentregionalelites have establishedqualitatively
differentformsof politicaland culturalhegemony.Ayacucho,for example,
has had an agrarianhistoryand thereforean agrarianelite,whichis funda-
mentallydistinctfromthe historyandeliteof, for example,Cusco.Sendero's
territorialand politicalstrategiesare cognisantof theseregionaldifferences
and can only be understoodby referenceto them. One such factor, for
example,is the authoritarianculture of gamonalismo,a form of highly
coerciveandtheatricalised localpowerassociatedwiththepersonaldomains
of a particulartype of highlandlandlordknownas gamonales.Unlikeother
hacendados,the gamonaleswere residentlandlordswho lived with 'their
Indians',who spoke Quechua,andwho sharedmanyculturaltraitswiththe
peasantry.In addition,they were flamboyantpersonalitieswho built their
personalpoweraroundthe use of physicalviolence,a cultof masculinityand
a traditionof anti-staterebellion.Theyconstructedtheirdomainsof power
boththroughillegalactivitiesandby holdingstateofficeon boththelocaland
nationallevel.147Even afterthe agrarianreform,the valuesand idioms of
gamonalismocontinue to inform the political culture of local elites in
preciselythosedepartmentswhereSenderohasbeenmostactive(Ayacucho,
Cusco,Apurimac,HuancavelicaandPuno).
The connectionbetweenSenderoandthephenomenonof gamonalismois
twofold. On the one hand, many of Sendero'smilitantsare sons and
daughtersof localelitesfromthesedepartments,or arestudentsor graduates
fromuniversitiesdominatedby the culturalvaluesof these elites.For these
provincial youth, the proud tradition of independence and anti-state
rebellionfosteredby theirregionalcultureof gamonalismoclashedwiththe
racismand discriminationthey faced as 'provincianos'and 'cholos' in the
capitalcityof Lima.148 On the otherhand,fromthe pointof viewof thePCP-
SL'sruralstrategies,gamonalismoandauthoritarian militarismsharecertain
basic understandingsof the natureof politicalpower.A politicalculture
formedwithinthe centuriesold authoritarian traditionsof gamonalcoercion

and intimidationhas developed both an understandingof the efficacy of
authoritarian violenceand a cultureof resistance.
Fourth, alongside these authoritarian traditions associated with
gamonalismo,Perualso has a long traditionof populardemocraticcultural
practices.Nationallyand regionallybased labour unions, peasant federa-
tions, and regionalistmovements,as well as the populisttraditionof early
Apristapolitics,weresome of the forceswhichhelpedto shapethistradition.
Another equally,if not more, importantsite for the developmentand con-
solidationof popularparticipatorydemocracyhas been the Andeanpeasant
community. Throughout most of the Peruvian highlands, the peasant
communityis the base from which communaldecisions about production,
land tenure, and collective political action are made. Many peasant com-
munitiesstill control communallands, organisecommunalwork projects,
andmaintainfiesta and ritualcalendarswiththeirroots in colonialand even
pre-ColumbianAndean history. Mariateguiand other indigenistascon-
sciously romanticisethese collective aspects of Peru's indigenous com-
munities as a metaphor with which to imagine new forms of political
community.To equate,as do the Senderologists,the contemporaryinstitu-
tion of the peasantcommunitywiththisheavilyidealisedindigenistaconcept
of 'primitiveagrariancommunism',however, is to miss completely the
intendedmessage of Mariategui'stexts, as well as the realityof ruralPeru.
Sucha satanisationof Mariategui'swordsprovides,however,an easy chan-
nel throughwhichto naturalisethe sharedpoliticalmentalitywhichSender-
ology then proposes unites Mariategui,'the Indians'and a Maoist guerrilla
group.
Finally,in additionto the peasantcommunity,any analysisof Sendero's
politicalimpact must take into account the other forms of grassrootsand
local-level democraticorganisationsexisting in Peru today. As we have
pointed out elsewhere,these peasantfederations,neighbourhoodassocia-
tions, popularurbanfronts,unions and churchgroups have courageously
opposed the authoritarianviolence of both Sendero and the state.149 As a
result,in recentyearstheyhave also been the majorvictimsof both PCP-SL
assassinationsand governmentrepression.150 These organisationsand the
Leftistpoliticalparties withwhich they are affiliatedplayan activerole in the
struggle to definethe futureof Peru.For a large cross-sectionof the Peruvian
population,they provide hands-on experience with the forms
institutional
and politicalpracticesof directdemocracy.Both the social impactof these
grassrootsorganisationsand the electoralimportanceof the Leftistparties,
particularlyin the highland provinces, reveals the existence of popular
politicalprogrammesthatprovidean alternativeto boththe authoritarianism
of Sendero'sviolenceandthe inefficiencyof the government'sparliamentary
democracy.
Acknowledgements-Thisarticlehas benefitedgreatlyfromthe criticalcomments,encourage-
mentandsubstantiveinputof manyfriendsandcolleagues.Amongthemwe wouldliketo thank
particularlythe editors, Nicolis Lynch,Ernesto Mora, BenjaminOrlove,Linda Seligmann,
LawrenceKaplan,ShellyManaster,KarenSpalding,FrankSalomonandMichaelJimenez.The
usualdisclaimersapply.
178 BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH
NOTES
1. AbimaelGuzman(1985), 'Iniciode la luchaarmada(ILA-80)',in RoggerMercado,Los
PartidosPoliticosen el Peri, p. 89. Fondode Cultura(Lima).
2. For the PCP-SL'smilitaryprogramme,see ComiteCentralPartidoComunistadel Peru
(SL),Desarrollemos la Guerrade Guerrillas, Lima:BanderaRoja(Lima)(1982);andLuis
Arce Borja and Janet Talavera,'PresidenteGonzalo [AbimaelGuzman]Rompe el
Silencio.Entrevistaen la clandestinidad. Reportajedel Siglo',El Diario (Lima),24 July
1988 [reprintedas Entrevistaal PresidenteGonzalo,EdicionesBanderaRoja (Lima),
1989];andLuisArce Borja(ed.), GuerraPopularen el Peru:El PensamientoGonzalo,
LuisArce Borja(Brussels),1989. For a completechronologyof Sendero'sactions,see
Violenciapoliticaen elPeri, 1980-1988,DESCO(Lima),2 vols.,1989.
3. From'YouMustLearn',by KRS-OneforBoogieDownProductions,GhettoMusic,BMG
& RCARecords(1989).
4. See CynthiaMcClintock,PeasantCooperatives andPoliticalChangein Peru,Princeton
UniversityPress (Princeton),1981; 'Post-revolutionary AgrarianPoliticsin Peru',in
StephenM. Gorman(ed.), Post-revolutionary Peru. The Politics of Transformation,
WestviewPress (Boulder),1982, pp. 135-156; and 'Velasco,officersand citizens:the
politicsof stealth',in AbrahamLowenthalandCynthiaMcClintock(eds), ThePeruvian
Experiment Re-considered, PrincetonUniversityPress(Princeton),1983, pp. 275-308.
5. McClintock,'Peru'sSendero Luminosorebellion:origins and trajectory',in Susan
Eckstein(ed.), Powerand PopularProtest,Universityof CaliforniaPress (Berkeley),
1989, pp. 61-101, p. 63, fn 2.
6. At thattime,PeaceCorpsvolunteerswereinvolvedin variousextensionprogrammes and
in teachingat the Universityof Huamanga.In October 1963, duringa period when
Huamangastudentswere protestingthe Kennedyadministration's blockadeof Cuba,
Palmerandtwo othervolunteerswho wereteachingEnglishat Huamanga wereexpelled
fromthe University.See DavidScottPalmer,'Expulsionfroma PeruvianUniversity',in
RobertB. Textor (ed.), CulturalFrontiersof the Peace Corps,MIT UniversityPress
(Cambridge), 1966, pp. 243-270.
7. DavidScottPalmer,'Terrorism as a revolutionary Peru'sSenderoLuminoso',in
strategy:
BarryRubin(ed.), The Politicsof Terrorism,JohnsHopkinsForeignPolicyInstitute,
Schoolof AdvancedInternational Studies(Washington), 1989, p. 133, fn 5; DavidScott
Palmer,'TheSenderoLuminosorebellionin ruralPeru',in GeorgesFauriol(ed.),Latin
AmericanInsurgencies,GeorgetownUniversityCenterfor Strategicand International
StudiesandtheNationalDefenseUniversity(Washington), 1985,p. 91.
8. David Scott Palmer, 'Revolutionfrom Above', MilitaryGovernmentand Popular
Participationin Peru,1968-1972,LatinAmericanStudiesProgram,CornellUniversity
(Ithaca),1973;see alsoDavidScottPalmer,MilitaryGovernment andPoliticalDevelop-
ment:Lessons from Peru,Sage(BeverlyHills),1975.
9. DavidScottPalmer,Peru:theAuthoritarian Tradition,Praeger(NewYork),1980.
10. JamesDavies(1962),'Towarda theoryof revolution', AmericanSociologicalReview,27:
5-19; SamuelHuntington,PoliticalOrderin ChangingSocieties,Yale UniversityPress
(NewHaven),1968.
11. Huntington,PoliticalOrder,pp.73 ss.
12. John Trumpbour,'Harvard,the Cold War, and the National Liberal State', in
J. Trumpbour(ed.), How HarvardRules, South End Press (Boston), 1989, pp. 107-
108.
13. NoamChomsky,AmericanPowerand the New Mandarins,Vintage(NewYork)1969,
pp. 21,42-43; andTrumpbour, Harvard,pp. 78-79.
14. Huntington,PoliticalOrder,p. 35.
15. Huntington,PoliticalOrder,pp. 8,48, 77-78.
16. See D. MichaelShafer,DeadlyParadigms.TheFailureof US Counterinsurgency Policy,
PrincetonUniversityPress(Princeton),1988, pp.60-62.
17. Huntington,PoliticalOrder,p. 262.
18. Shafer,DeadlyParadigms,p. 55.
19. McClintock,'Whypeasantsrebel.The case of Peru'sSenderoLuminoso',WorldPolitics
37:48-84, p. 50, fn 8. McClintock's othersourcesfor thehistoryof Senderoareherown
THE NEW CHRONICLERS OF PERU 179
previousarticlesandVargasLlosa's1983 New YorkTimesapologyfor the Uchuraccay

massacre.See note 21 below.
20. Palmer,'The Sendero',p. 92, fn 4. His othersourceson the politicalhistoryof Sendero
includethe WallStreetJournal,AtlanticMonthly,anduncreditedarticlesin La Cr6nica,
La Reptblica, La Prensa, Equis X and Caretas.Palmer'ssourcesfor economic and
politicalstatisticsincludeLatinAmericanRegionalReport,the CIA WorldFactBook,
and AmnestyInternational. For figureson Peruvianlabourunionmembershiphe relies
not on Peruviansources,buton an articleon PeruvianCommunismin the Braziliannews-
paperO Globode SdoPaulo (ibid.),p. 93, fn 14.
21. VargasLlosa was commissionedby the Belauindegovernmentto head a commissionto
investigatethe murderof eight journalistson 27 January1983, in the Ayacuchano
communityof Uchuraccay.The commission'sreportfoundthepeasantsto be guiltyof the
murders.See Mario Vargas Llosa, Luis Millones et al., Informe de la Comision
Investigadorade los sucesos de Uchuraccay,Editora Peri (Lima), 1983; and Mario
VargasLlosa,'Inquestin the Andes',New YorkTimesMagazine,31 July 1983, pp. 18-
23. Laterjudicialinvestigationsand hearings,however,revealedthatthe armyhad been
complicitous-if not directlyresponsiblefor-the killingsand thatVargasLlosa'scom-
missionhadcoveredup informationpointingtowardsthe armedforcescomplicity.Many
of the witnessesto the killingswere 'disappeared'or murderedduringthe courseof the
trial.VargasLlosa's1983 New YorkTimesarticleportraysthepeasantsof Uchuraccayas
primitive'Indians'whose 'archaicculture'supposedlymade it impossiblefor them to
understandthe legalandpoliticalrepercussionsof theiracts.For alternativeanalysesand
accountsof the Uchuraccaymassacreand of VargasLlosa'sinvolvementin the govern-
mentcommission,see HenryPeaseGarcia(1983), 'Urchuraccay, Lucanamarca y muchos
mis', Quehacer22:48-57; RodrigoMontoya,'Ayacucho:los campesinosno son salvajes',
La Reptiblica,5 February1983; Luis Lumbreras,'Asi es Uchuraccay',CaballoRojo,
22 January1984.
22. McClintock,'Whypeasantsrebel',p. 52, n 14.
23. See, for example,PatricioRickettsRey de Castro(1980), 'BimBarnBumen Ayacucho',
Caretas629: 28-32; (1981), 'Zonas Liberadas',Caretas631: 22-23, (1981); 'Lucha
Armada',Caretas636: 20-21 (1981); and (1981), 'Comotomarel poder',Caretas651:
31-32; RauilGonzilez (1982), 'Ayacucho:Por los caminosde Sendero',Quehacer,19:
36-77; (1983), 'Cr6nicainconclusa:Las batallasde Ayacucho',Quehacer21: 14-27;
(1984), ',Qu6 pasacon SenderoLuminoso?',Quehacer29:34-38; (1984), 'Ayacuchoen
el Afio de Noel', Quehacer27: 16-31; and(1984), 'EspecialsobreSendero.el Terroren
Ayacucho,El TerrorSenderista.Sendero:El Maoismoy una revolucionparaexportar',
Quechacer,30: 6-29; CarlosIvanDegregori(1981), 'RebeldesPrimitivosy Modernos
Gamonales',CaballoRojo 76: 3; (1983),'CuandoAyacuchoNos Alcance',CaballoRojo
16:4-5; (1983), 'ApocalysisMAO.Lasraicesde Sendero',CaballoRojo 176:6-7; Henry
Favre (1981), SentierLumineux;GustavoGorriti(1981), 'La Blisquedade Sendero',
Caretas670: 22-25; 'Violenciay terrorismoen el Peru',Caretas,edici6nespecial,March
1982, pp. 34-47; (1983), ',Como se encendi6 la mecha?Entrevistaa EfrainMorote
Best', Caretas733: 20-24; (1983), 'El ataquede Senderoal pueblode Lucanamarca',
Caretas743: 10-17; and (1984), 'Operade sangre.Segundasesi6n Plenariadel Comit6
Centralde Sendero Luminoso',Caretas 814: 18-19, 72. Monographson Peruvian
politicalpartyhistoriesandgeneologiesavailableat the timeincludedRoggerMercado's
PartidosPoliticos,PartidoComunista,and Algo Mds, and Rojas Samanez'sPartidos
Politicos (see note 26 below).Left Maoist partypublicationsand newspaperssuch as
PatriaRoja and BanderaRoja alsocirculatednationwide.
Morerecenthistoriesand analysesof SenderoincludeV. Gianottenet al., 'Theimpact
of SenderoLuminosoon regionalandnationalpoliticsin Peru',in DavidSlater(ed.),New
SocialMovementsandtheStatein LatinAmerica,CEDLA(Amsterdam),1985, pp. 171-
202; Lewis Taylor, Maoism in the Andes: SenderoLuminosoand the Contemporary
GuerrillaMovementin Peru, WorkingPaper 2, Centre for Latin AmericanStudies
(Liverpool),1983; CarlosIvanDegregori,SenderoLuminoso;I. Los Hondosy mortales
desencuentros. II. Luchaarmaday utopiaautoritaria(1985), 4th Ed, IEP (Lima),1986;
QueDificiles ser Dios:Ideologiay violenciapoliticaen SenderoLuminoso, Edic.Zorro
de Abajo(Lima),1989, andAyacucho,1969-1979.El Surgimiento de SenderoLuminoso,
IEP (Lima), 1990; Gustavo GorritiE., Sendero Luminoso. Historia de la Guerra
Milenariaen el Peru, Vol. 1, EditorialApoyo (Lima),1990; Nelson Manrique,'La
Decadade la Violencia',Mdrgenes5/6:137-182; andAlbertoFlores-Galindo,'La guerra
silenciosa',in BuscandoUn Inca.Identidady utopiaen los Andes, Institutode Apoyo
Agrario(Lima),1987, pp.339-356.
24. Hector Bejar(1969), Peru 1965:Notes on a GuerrillaExperience,tr. WilliamRose,
MonthlyReview(NewYork),1970;HenriFavre,'Perou:SentierLumineuxet horizons
oscurs',Problemesd'Amerique Latine,No. 72 (1984).Palmer(1986:146, fn 44) citesthe
Spanishtranslationof two chaptersfromthisworkpublishedin Quehacer31: (October
1984) 25-35. RauilGonzalezpublishedanalysesof Sendero'spolitical-military strategies
andactions,andtranscripts of PCPdocumentson a regularbasisin thePeruvianmonthly
Quehacer(see note 23).
25. ColinHarding(1984), 'Noteson SenderoLuminoso',Communist Affairs3:45-61.
26. See,forexample,ComiteCentralPartidoComunistadelPeril,iDesarrollemos La Guerra
de Guerrillas!(1982), Berkeley:Committeeto Supportthe Revolutionin Peru, 1984
(translation)-DevelopGuerrillaWarfare,Berkeley:Committeeto Supportthe Revolu-
tion in Peru,1985);Declarationof the Revolutionary Movement(RIM),
Internationalist
London:RIM,March1984;Revolutionary Movement(RIM),Textof the
Internationalist
London Press Conference,London:RIM, April 1984. PCP-SLdocumentsare also
regularlypublishedin both Spanishand Englishin the RevolutionaryInternationalist
Movement'sA WorldTo Win,in the US Revolutionary CommunistParty'snewspapers,
Revolutionary WorkerandObreroRevoucionario, andbytheBerkeley-based Committee
to Supportthe Revoutionin Peru.Translationsof excerptsfromotherPCP-SLdocu-
ments, as well as interviewswith Senderoleadersand militants,have been published
regularlyin the AndeanRegionalReport.Completedocumentswere transcribedand
publishedin PiedadParejaPflucker(Lima),1981, and in RauilGonzalez'sarticlesin
Quehacer(see note 23 above).WhilePalmerandMcClintockbothreferenceGonzalez,
andPalmerusesPareja,neithermentionthedocumentsreproducedin theirpublications,
preferringinsteadto maintainthatthePCP-SLwasa mysteriousandineluctable'enigma'.
OtherPCP-SLdocumentswereavailablein RoggerMercado,Los PartidosPoliticosen el
Peni, Ediciones de CulturaPopular (Lima), 1982; Rogger Mercado, El Partido
Comunistadel Peru:SenderoLuminoso,Edicionesde CulturaPopular(Lima),1982;
RoggerMercado,Algo Mas SobreSendero:Teoriay Tdctica,Violencia,Represi6ny
Desaparecidos. Documentos,Edicionesde CulturaPopular(Lima),1983;andin Alvaro
Rojas Samanez, Partidos, Politicos en el Peri. Manual y Registro, Centro de
Documentaci6ne Informaci6n Andina(Lima),1982 (2ndEdn, 1983).
27. TheirjournalismsourcesincludeCaretasandthe WallStreetJournal,aswellas suchpress
summariesas LatinAmericanWeeklyReport,LatinAmericanRegionalReport,Andean
Report,andResumenSemanal.ResumenSemanalis a weeklysummaryof thePeruvian
presspublishedbyDESCOin Lima.NeitherPalmernorMcClintockrefer,forexample,to
LewisTaylor'sthoroughandinsightfulaccountof Sendero'spoliticalformation,Maoism
in the Andes, or to JamesAnderson'sPeru'sMaoistGuerrillas,ControlRisks Ltd.
(London),1983.
28. analysesand first-handaccountsof the 1960s guerrillasnot citedby
Political-historical
McClintockincludeBejar,Notes;HugoBlanco,Landor Death,Pathfinder(NewYork),
1972;EricHobsbawm,'A caseof neo-feudalism: La Convenci6n,Peru',Journalof Latin
AmericanStudies1:(May1969),31-50; RoggerMercado,LaguerrillasdelPeri:MIR,de
lapredicaa la acci6narmada,Lima,1967;HugoNeira,LosAndes:Tierrao Muerte,Ed.
XYZ (Madrid), 1968; and Sara Beatriz Guardia, Proceso a los campesinos de la guerrilla
TupacAmaru,CIP(Lima),1972. An excellentcomprehensive is includedin
bibliography
Leon Campbell, 'The historiography of the Peruvian guerrilla movement, 1960-1965',
Latin American Research Review 8: (Spring 1973) 45-70. Available sources on Peruvian
peasant movements from the late 1950s to the late 1970s include Alberto Flores Galindo
(1978), 'Apuntes sobre las ocupaciones de tierras y el sindicalismo agrario, 1945-1964',
Allpanchis 11-12:175-185; Giorgio Alberti (1976), 'Rupturade laestructura del poder
urbano provincial y surgimiento de movimientos campesinos', in Jose Matos Mar (ed.),
Hacienda, comunidad y campesinado en el Peru, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (Lima);
1:3;
campesinosen la regioncentral',Churmichasum
GavinSmith(1976), 'Movimientos
Victor Caballero (1981), Imperialismo y campesinado en la sierra central, Instituto de
Estudios Andinos (Huancayo); Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales (CEPES) (1980),
Historiade un luchadorcampesino.AndresLuna Vargas,secretariogeneralde la Con-

federaci6nCampesinadel Peri (Lima);RicardoClaverias(1970), 'El mercadointernoy
la espontaneidadde los movimientoscampesinos.Puno,1950-1968', Allpanchis11-12;
Confederaci6nCampesinadel Peni (1974), InformeCentralIV CongresoCampesino,
CCP(Lima);JulioCotlerandFelipePortocarrero(1976), 'Organizaciones campesinasen
el Peru',in Jose Matos Mar (ed.), Hacienda,comunidady campesinado,Institutode
Estudios Peruanos (Lima);Tom Brass, 'Class formationand class struggle in La
Convenci6n,Peru',Journalof PeasantStudies7: 4 (1980):427-457.
29. See, for example,Jose Coronel,Mistise indiosen Huanta:1870-1915,Tesis paraoptarel
titulo de Antrop6logo Social, UNSCH, Ayacucho;Carlos Ivan Degregori,Realidad
socioecon6micade Ayacuchoa travesde los censosnacionalesy otrasfuentesestadisticas:
1961-1981.Tesis paraoptarel titulode antrop6logoSocial,UNSCH,Ayacucho,1983;
Carlos Ivan Degregori,JurgenGolte, et al. (1973), 'Cambioseconomicos y cambios
ideol6gicos en Ayacucho', Ideologia 3: 14-41; Antonio Diaz Martinez (1969),
Ayacucho,hambrey esperanza,EdicionesWamanPuma(Ayacucho);ModestoGalvez
and LuciaCano(1974), El sistemalatifundista en Huamanaga,Tesis paraoptarel grado
de Bachilleren Antropologia,Universidadde San Marcos (Lima);RodrigoMontoya
(1990), Capitalismo y no capitalismoen el Peru,MoscaAzul (Lima);EfrainMoroteBest
(ed.) (1974), Huamanga: Una Larga Historia, CONUP (Lima); Dionisio Ortiz,
Pomacocha:del latifundioa la comunidad,Tesis paraoptarel titulode IngenieroRural,
UNSCH, Ayacucho, 1968; Factor Ramos and Jorge Loli, Historia del movimento
popularen Huamanga,Tesis paraoptarel gradode Bachilleren Antropologia,UNSCH,
Ayachucho,1979; CarlosTapia, El Latifundioen Socos Vinchos,Tesis paraoptar el
titulo de IngenieroRural,UNSCH, Ayacucho,1968; JaimeUrrutia,'Evoluci6nde las
comunidadesen la region de Huamanga',Ideologia 7: 49-58. See also Institutode
Estudios RegionalesJose MariaArguedas, ComunidadesCampesinasde Ayacucho.
Economia,ideologiay organizaci6nsocial,AyacuchoandCusco:Imp.Bartolom6de La
Casas;BillieJeanIsbell, ToDefendOurselves:EcologyandRitualin an Andean Village,
University of Texas Press (Austin), 1978; Salvador Palomino, 'Dualidad en la
organizaci6nsocio-culturalde algunaspoblacionesandinas',Revistadel MuseoNacional
37:231-260.
Rather than citing these studies produced by Ayacuchano,Peruvianand foreign
scholarsworkingin the Ayacuchocountrysideduringthe 1970s and 1980s, McClintock
claims that Palmer's1973 doctoraldissertationis 'the only widely respectedstudyof
agrarianstructurein Ayacucho',andcites JohnMurra'sstudyof Inca socialorganisation
as evidence for the typical productiveand ecological organisationof 'most highland
communities'in 1980s Ayacucho(McClintock,'WhyPeasantsRebel',p. 54).
Nor do eitherMcClintockor Palmerreferto any of the publicationsof the numerous
researchcentres(suchas CEPES,DESCO,CIPCA),politicalpartiesandchurchorgan-
isationswhichworkeddirectlywith Peruvianpeasantorganisationsand in the Andean
countryside.
30. 'Iniciode la luchaarmada(ILA80)', in RoggerMercado,PartidosPoliticos,p. 88.
31. CynthiaMcClintock(1983), 'Democraciesandguerrillas: thePeruvianexperience',Inter-
national Policy Report, September 1983, and 'Sendero Luminoso:Peru's Maoist
guerrillas',Problemsof Communism32: 15-34. These two articleswere writtenfor
quite differentconstituenciesand, as a result,presentconflictinganalysesof Sendero's
politicalconfiguration.The firstarticle,writtenfor a liberalaudience,arguesagainstthe
Reagan doctrine, discusses human rights violations at length and says that most
Peruviansquestionedthe government'shandlingof such massacresas the one which
occurred in the Ayacuchanocommunityof Uchuraccayon 27 January1983. Her
concernwith humanrightsabusesis, however,considerablytoned down in the second
articlewhich appearsin an anti-communistpublicationput out by the US Information
Agency.In it she claimsthatSendero's'sensationalistrecentescapades'resultfrom'the
combinationof widespreadpoverty, ethnic and regionaltensions and radicalLeftist
ideologyin the ThirdWorld'('Sendero',p. 19); thatSendero'ssuccessin Ayacuchowas
due to 'the personalitycult,','virtualworshipof [Sendero'sleaderAbimael]Guzman',
and the 'almostmessianiccharacterof SenderoLuminoso'(ibid.,22); and thatSendero
will 'takeon more and more of a criminalnature',to eventuallymergewith something
called the 'thugleft'(ibid.,33).
32. CynthiaMcClintock(1984), 'Whypeasantsrebel:thecaseof Peru'sSenderoLuminoso',
WorldPolitics37:48-84. Pagereferencesincludedin thetextimmediately followingrefer
to thisarticle.
33. SimilarsemanticproblemsarisewithMcClintock's use of suchpotentiallycontradictory
termsas 'extremistorganisation','majorrevolutionarymovement','peasantrebellion',
'endemicunrest','ruralmovement'and 'guerrillamovement'-alltermswhich appear
alreadyon thefirstpageof heranalysis.
34. The workswhichMcClintockcites fromthisliteratureare BarringtonMooreJr, Social
Originsof Dictatorship andDemocracy,BeaconPress(Boston)(1966);JefferyM. Paige,
AgrarianRevolution:SocialMovementsand ExportAgriculturein the Underdeveloped
World,The Free Press (New York) (1976); JamesScott, TheMoralEconomyof the
Peasant:Rebellionand Subsistencein SoutheastAsia, Yale UniversityPress, (New
Haven) (1976); Theda Skocpol (1982), 'Whatmakes peasantsrevolutionary',Com-
parativePolitics 14 (1982): 351-375; and EricR. Wolf (1969), PeasantWarsof the
Twentieth Century,HarperandRow(NewYork).
35. In a laterarticleshe refersto themas 'lunatic'('Peru'sSendero',p. 62).
36. See Rojas Samanez,PartidosPoliticos;for other early accountsof PCP history,see
note 23 above. Leftist newspapersavailable at the time included El Proletario
(Vanguardia Revolucionaria), Unidad(PCP-Unidad),VozRebelde(MIR),Amauta,El
Diariode Marka(IU),BanderaRoja(PCP-BR),andPartriaRoja(PCP-PR).
37. In a laterarticleon Sendero,McClintockappearsto haverecognisedherearliererrorand
omitsmentionof Blancoin her analysisof the 1960s guerrillamovement(McClintock
(1989), 'Peru'sSendero',p. 76). Whatis most strikingabouther laterself-correction,
however,is thatthe remainderof McClintock'sanalysisof the 1960s guerrillais exactly
(andat timesverbatim)the sameas in her 1984 article.Blancois omittedas an example,
yet herinterpretation of the ethnicandclasscompositionof the 1960sguerrilla(whichin
1984 hingedupon the case of Blanco)is not revisedor rethoughton the basis of this
correction.
38. Althoughnot themselves'peasants', Luisde la Puente,founderof MIRandmilitaryleader
of the TupacAmaruguerrillafrontin La Convenci6n,andGuillermoLobat6n,military
leader of MIR's Pachacutecfront in the centralhighlands,both had had years of
experienceworkingwith peasantorganisationsprior to their engagementin armed
struggle.To distinguishthese peasantorganisersor guerrillaleaderscategoricallyfrom
'peasants'accordingto theirphenotypicaldifferencesfrom highlandpeasants,as does
McClintock,is to resort to essentialisedracialequationswhollyinappropriateto the
complexethnicrealityof the Peruvianhighlands.Otherguerrillafighters,particularly
thosein the PachacutecFront,werethemselvespeasantsandpeasantleaders.Yet others
werefromtheindigenousgroupsof Satipo.
McClintock'sfailureto acknowledgethe existenceandimportanceof peasantleaders
andmilitantsin the 1960s guerrillarelatesto her reciprocalomissionof important'non-
peasant'leadersof Sendero'sguerrillasuchas JulioCesarMezzich,theleaderof thenon-
Senderistaled Andahuaylasland recoverieswhichMcClintockdescribesonly as 'land
invasions'led by 'theMarxistCCP'(McClintock, 'Why',pp. 52, 80).McClintock'sinterest
in theApurimacpeasantmovementis becauseof thelaterSenderoaffiliationof thefaction
ledbyMezzichandLinoQuintanilla. BothMezzichandQuintanilla wererecentuniversity
graduatesandwerenot'organic'peasantleadersfromApurimac.(Mezzich,infact,is blue-
eyed and blond.)Nevertheless,they becamepopularand respectedleadersbecauseof
theirorganising skillsandcommitment to thepeasantcause.Mezzich'sdecisionto affiliate
withSenderowasa productof an ideologicaldebatewithinVanguardia Revolucionaria,
the partywithmajoritypresencein the CCPin the early1970s. WhenMezzichleft the
CCPandVanguardia to join firstVR-PCandthenSendero,the majorityof the peasant
movementof Andahuaylasremainedin the anti-SenderoCCP.McClintockreducesthis
complexprocessof politicalfissioningto an exampleof how Sendero'sarmed'attacks
impressedandattractedotherrevolutionary groups'(ibid.,523).
39. See note 28.
40. ForSendero'sanalysisof the 1960s,see PCP-SL,Bases,pp. 61-62; Guzman,Entrevista,
pp. 50-51; Gorriti,Sendero,pp. 55-56.
41. For analysesof Sendero'sdisinterestin ethnicity,see Degregori,Ayacucho, p. 205;
Manrique,'La Decada',pp. 162-163.
42. 'IU con la perestroikay la utopiaandina:Residuosde la moribundaideologiaburguesa',

CrestaRoja./Suplemento dominicialdeElDiario (Lima),Afio II,No. 62, julio 1988, p. iii;
see alsoJCF,'Editorial',El Diario (Lima),9 June1988, p. 12, citedin Degregori,Ayacu-
cho, p. 206.
43. NorthAmericanCongresson LatinAmerica,'AnitaPokkemainterviewwithLuisArce
Borja',1990 (emphasisours).Excerptsfrom this interviewwere publishedin NACLA
Reporton theAmericas,Vol. XXIV,(December/January 1990-1991). LuisArceBorjais
the formereditor of El Diario (Lima)and currenteditor of El Diario Internacional,
Senderoaffiliatednewspaperslocatedin Limaand Brussels,respectively.He is also the
editorof the collectedwritingsof AbimaelGuzman(see note 2 above).
44. See,for example,ManuelBurga(1988), El nacimientode unautopia,Institutode Apoyo
Agrario (Lima);Alberto Flores-Galindo,Buscandoun Inca; Alberto Flores-Galindo,
'Las Sociedades andinas:Pasado y futuro',in Confederaci6nCampesinadel Peril,
Movilizaci6nCampesina:RespuestaDemocrdtica,Voz Campesina(Lima),1989, pp. 4-
9; Wilfredo Kapsoli, Ayllus del Sol, Tarea (Lima) 1984; ScarlettO'PhelanGodoy,
Rebellionsand Revoltsin EighteenthCenturyPeru and UpperPeru (Cologne/Vienna)
1985; KarenSpalding,Huarochiri.An Andean SocietyUnderInca and SpanishRule,
StanfordUniversityPress (Stanford),1984; Steve Stern,Peru'sIndianPeoplesand the
Challengeof Spanish Conquest.Huamangato 1640, Universityof WisconsinPress
(Madison), 1982; Steve Stern (ed.), Resistance,Rebellion,and Consciousnessin the
AndeanPeasantWorld.18thto 20thCenturies,Universityof WisconsinPress(Madison),
1987.
45. See Eric J. Hobsbawm,Nations and Nationalismsince 1780. Programme,Myth and
Reality,CambridgeUniversityPress(Cambridge),1990; EricJ. Hobsbawm,TheAge of
Revolution,Penguin(London),1990; andJamesH. Billington,Firein the Mindsof Men.
Originsof the Revolutionary Faith,BasicBooks (NewYork),1980.
46. Flores-Galindo,Buscandoun Inca.
47. Fromthe Quechuafor 'excess'(sinchi)and'thosewho cando it all'(llapanatiq).
48. Gorriti,SenderoLuminoso,pp. 54-58.
49. McClintock,'Post-revolutionary', pp. 146-147, and'Democracies',pp. 2 and5.
50. See Degregori,Ayacucho,pp. 168-169, passim;andRojasSamanez,PartidosPoliticos,
2nd Edn (1983), pp. 269-278.
51. Between1971 and 1972 the PCP-SLissuedclose to 200 communiquesandfliers(Rojas,
PartidosPoliticos, pp. 275-276). Of these only two were directedagainstthe military
government'sagrarianreform and none directly addressed peasant problems and
demands.The topicscoveredby the otherfliersclearlyrevealthatSendero'seffortswere
directedagainstthe state and competingpoliticalparties.These topics were as follows:
againstSINAMOS(18), againstthe bourgeoisstate (26), againstAPRA (2), againstthe
ChristianDemocrats(18), against'therevisionists'of the PCP-Unidad(7), againstthe PC
del P-PatriaRoja(29), againstthe leftistpartiesMovimientode IzquierdaRevolucionaria
andVanguardiaRevolucionaria(13), againstthe government'seducationalreforms(24),
againstotherstudentorganisationsat the Universityof Huamanga(20);in supportof the
Universityof Huamangain general(52), in supportof thenationalpopularmovement(6),
in supportof the teacher'sunion SUTE-Huamanga(2), and in supportof Ayacucho's
urbanFrentede Defensadel Pueblo(7). In1974, Sendero'sflierscoveredthe following
topics:againstgovernmenteducationalreform(9), againstthebourgeoisstate(82), against
SINAMOS(184), againstimperialism(5), againstthe dominantclasses (2), againstthe
executive council of the Universityof Huamanga(110), againstthe non-Senderista
teachers'unionat the Universityof HuamangaSUTE-UNSCHMayoria(47), againstthe
anti-Senderistaleft-wingstudent coalition Frente de Unidad Estudiantil-FUE(234),
againstMIR(40), in supportof the Frentede Defensadel Pueblo(11), in supportof the
Senderocontrolledteachers'unionSUTE-UNSCHMinoria(48), andin supportof local
'necesidadespopulares'(6).
52. She later(p. 79) contradictsherselfby statingthat'Boththe CCPand the CNA became
largeandvigorousduringthe 1970s'.
53. As 'evidence'for thisoutrageousstatementshe cites an (undated)mapof the continentof
SouthAmerica.McClintock,'Why',p. 76, fn 79.
54. See Montoya, Capitalismo;Degregori,Ayacucho, p. 32; Isbell, To Defend, pp. 179-
195.
55. As partof theircounter-insurgency strategy,thePeruvianmilitary-followingtheexample
of theUS in Vietnam-designateswholevillagesas 'terrorist'. Thisideologicallyinformed
labellingof entirepopulationsinformsMcClintock's characterisation of Varyaas wellas
herlaterclaimsthatthe'Poorrecordof thegovernment's intelligencepersonnelis another
indicationof supportforSendero'andthatthe'Primary factoringovernment's intelligence
failureis likelyto be peasant'sreadinessto protectSenderistas' (McClintock, 'Why',p. 55).
56. Shedoes not saythatit wasthe 'leastbenefited'because,by the timethe agrarianreform
wasimplemented, mostof Ayacucho'shaciendaswerein a stateof abandon.Thenorthern
provincesof Ayacuchohad veryfew large(i.e. expropriable)haciendasand the largest
haciendain thedepartment(Pomacocha)hadalreadybeenexpropriated by thepeasants
themselvesin thelate 1960s.
57. McClintock,'Post-revolutionary', p. 146;emphasisours.
58. See Confederaci6nCampesinadel Peri (CCP),CuartoCongresoNacionalCampesino.
InformeCentral,CCP (Lima),1974; RodrigoMontoya,et al., La SAIS Cahuidey sus
contradicciones, Universidadde SanMarcos(Lima),1972;GavinSmith,Livelihoodand
Resistance.Peasantsand the Politicsof Land in Peru, Universityof CaliforniaPress
(Berkeley),1989;RodrigoSanchez(1989), 'LasSAISde Juniny la alternativa comunal',
DebateAgrario7: 85-102; Diego GarciaSayan,Tomasde Tierrasen el Peru, Desco
(Lima),1982.
59. A similarformof argumentis usedto analysethesignificance of Peruvianelectoralpolitics
for Sendero's'peasantmovement'in Ayacucho.Here, McClintockclaims:(1) that
'Electoraldatain the areaattestto politicalbackingfor Sendero.. .';(2) thatin 1980, 'the
Marxistvotewasgreaterin Ayacuchothanin anyotherdepartment of thecountry.. .';(3)
thatthe 'bestevidenceof Senderoinfluencein the region'was the 'extraordinarily large
nullandblankvote';and(4) thatby 1983 therewas'massivedisaffectionfromtheelectoral
processin Huamanga' (McClintock, 'Why',pp. 55-56).
Shedoes not,however,tellherreaderswhothe 'Marxist' partiesin 1980 wereor howa
vote for these anti-Senderopartiesmightbe used to evaluatesupportfor Sendero.Nor
does sheindicatethatHugoBlanco-the guerrillaleadershecitesas anexampleof a leader
with no popularsupport-was an extremelypopularpresidentialcandidate,whose
defectionfromthe UnitedLeftexplainsin parttheirpoor showingin provincialregions
suchas Ayacucho.
Neither does McClintocktell her readers about the markeddifferencebetween
presidentialandparliamentary results.Finallyshe failsto definethedifferencebetweena
'null'anda'blank'vote,or to indicatethatrelativepercentagesof nullandblankvoteswere
fairlyeven throughoutthe Peruviansierra.See Republicadel Peril,JuradoNacionalde
Elecciones,Resultadosde Las EleccionesPoliticasGeneralesde 1980, 2 Vols, Imp.del
Ministeriode Guerra(Lima),1982;Whileblankvotes in Ayacuchomaywellhavebeen
votes 'for'Sendero,who calledfor an electoralboycottanddid not appearon the ballot,
theycouldalso indicatevoterdisillusionwiththeelectoralprocessin generalor withthe
splitin theUnitedLeftfront.Nullvotes,on theotherhand,includedthosevotescounted
as illegible,unclearor improperlyplaced.Manynullvotesappearedin peasantprovinces
throughoutthe countryas a resultof the factthatilliteratevoterswere,for thefirsttime,
requiredto writeor markin theirvote on an extremelycomplexprintedballot.Indeed,
accordingto McClintock'sown data-which give only percentagesand not absolute
numbersof totalvoters-the rise in nullandblankvotes was slightlyhighernationwide
(11 percent)thanit wasin Ayacucho(10 percent).McClintock,'Why',table1, p. 56.
Finally,althoughMcClintockdoes mentionthatfearof Senderoretaliationwasa factor
in the highabstentionrate(ibid.,55), she failsto correlatethe 1983 electionresultswith
the massivemigrationof peasantsout of Ayacuchofollowingthe 1982-1983 counter-
insurgencycampaignandwiththe factthat,in Peru,theseterrifiedvotersarerequiredto
returnto theirhometownsto vote.
60. Theauthoritarian characterof SLis playeddownby McClintockin general.Forexample,
she omits the fact of coercion in her descriptionof Ayacuchanos''support'for the
'considerablenumberof strikes'calledby Sendero.McClintock,'WhyPeasants',p. 55.
WhatMcClintockdoesnot mentionis thatthese'strikes'werein factarmedstrikes(paros
armados)in whichSenderothreatenedto killwhoeverdoes not adhereto the strike.As
such they were vociferiouslyopposed by the departmentaland national peasant
federations,labourunions,andregionalandneighbourhood organisations.
61. Althoughshe notes thatit is primarily'youth'who supportSendero(McClintock,'Why

Peasants',p. 54, passim), thoughouther texts 'youth'is consistentlyconflatedwith 'the
peasantry'.In fact, the 'youth'who supportSenderoand who become Senderomilitants
arefromprovincialtownsor arethesons anddaughtersof peasants,butarethemselvesno
longer'peasants'in termsof eithertheirprofessionalaspirationsor actualoccupations.
The vast majorityof them have high school or universityeducations.Theireducation,
social aspirationsand occupationplace thembeyondthe scope of simple'peasants'.See
Denis Chavezde Paz, Juventudy Terrorismo.Caracteristicas socialesde los condenados
por terrorismo y otrosdelitos,Institutode EstudiosPeruanos(Lima),1989.
62. See especially, Comite Central PCP-SL, 'Desarrollemos',op. cit., and Guzmdn,
'Entrevista',op. cit. See also Rail Gonzalez,'PorLos Caminosde Sendero'and'Especial
sobreSendero'.
63. Mao Zedong, 'Problemsof strategyin China'srevolutionarywar' (1936), and 'On
protractedwar' (1938) in Six Essays on MilitaryAffairs, Foreign LanguagesPress
(Peking),1972, pp. 1-122, 195-329.
64. Abimael Guzmanin PCP-SLComite Central,Bases de discusi6n,EdicionesBandera
Roja(Lima),September1987, p. 67.
65. PCP-SLComiteCentral,DevelopGuerrillaWarfare,p. 21, emphasisours.
66. Mao Zedong, 'On the people's democraticdictatorship'(1949), in Selected Works,
Vol. IV, ForeignLanguagesPress(Peking),1969, p. 422.
67. Guzman,'Entrevista',p. 41, emphasisours. See also PCP-SLComiteCentral,Bases de
discusi6n,pp. 94-95.
68. BetweenMay1980 andMay1981, theyrealised83 actionsin Ayacucho,81 in Lima,48 in
Cusco,46 inJunin,26 inArequipa,20 in Ancash,15 in Cajamarca and14 in Lambayeque.
See SilviaMatos and Pablo Vega Centeno,Informesobre el accionary el impactode
Sendero Luminoso en la sociedad civil, pp. 5-6; see also PCP-SL Comite Central,
DevelopGuerrillaWarfare, pp. 2-3.
69. The departmentsnot affectedby Sendero'sactionsin 1980 wereHuanuco,Tumbes,San
Martin,Madrede Dios andAmazonas.Figurescompiledby Caretasandcited in Matos
andVega-Centeno,Informe..., 1980-1985, CEPES(Lima),1987, pp. 3-5.
70. Nor does McClintock'sruralhypothesishold for Ayacuchowheretherewere 45 armed
actionsin thedepartmentbetweenMay1980 andJanuary1981. Of these,24 tookplacein
the cityof Ayacuchoandonlythree(HaciendaAyrabamba,FundoAyarzaandHacienda
SanAgustin)weredirectedat whatmightbe consideredruraltargets.The resttook place
in provincialcapitalsand were directedat mines,roads,bridges,and symbolsof state
power (towncouncils,drinkingwaterinstallations,ballotboxes, etc.).See PiedadPareja
Pflucker, Terrorismoy Sindicalismo, pp. 88-89. See also DESCO, Decada de la
Violencia,T.I.,andMatosandVega-Centeno,Informe.
Moreover,internaldebate within the party itself duringthe early years of armed
struggle,involvedthe disputebetweenGuzmanand some othermembersof the central
committeewho accusedGuzmanof givingtoo much emphasisto urbanactionsat the
expense of the ruralfront. See Gonzalez,'Por Los Caminos',p. 69. See also Gorriti,
Sendero,pp. 109-115, andPCP-SL,Basesde discusi6n,pp. 64-65.
71. Mao Zedong, 'Our study and the currentsituation',(1984). Selected Works,Vol. III,
p. 133, ForeignLanguagesPress(Peking),1960.
72. See Ronald H. Berg (1986), 'SenderoLuminosoand the peasantryof Andahuaylas',
Journalof Interamerican Studiesand WorldAffairs28:165-196; SusanBourqueandKay
Warren(1988), 'Democracywithoutpeace:the culturalpoliticsof terrorin Peru',Latin
AmericanResearchReview7-34; Billie-JeanIsbell,'Theemergingpatternsof peasants'
responsesto SenderoLuminoso',Columbia-NewYork University(New York), Latin
American,Caribbeanand IberianOccasionalPapers,No. 7 (1988); McClintock,'Why',
'Democracies','SenderoLuminoso'and'Peru'sSendero';TimothyP. Wickham-Crowley,
'Winners,losers, and also-rans:toward a comparativesociology of Latin American
guerrillamovements',in SusanEckstein(ed.),PowerandPopularProtest.LatinAmerican
Social Movements,Universityof CaliforniaPress (Berkeley),1989, pp. 132-181; and
SandraWoy-Hazeltonand WilliamA. Hazleton,'SenderoLuminosoand the futureof
Peruviandemocracy',ThirdWorldQuarterly12:21-35. See also GaryHawes,'Theories
of peasantrevolution.A critiqueand contributionfromthe Philippines',WorldPolitics
XLII: 260-298; and WilliamRatliff,'Revolutionarywarfare',in MichaelRadu (ed.),
ViolenceandtheLatinAmericanRevolutionaries, Transaction Books(NewBrunswick),
1988, pp. 25-26.
73. 'TheSenderoLuminosorebellionin ruralPeru',in GeorgesFauriol(ed.),LatinAmerican
Insurgencies,Georgetown University CSIS and the National Defense University
(Washington),1985, pp. 67-96. The core of Palmer'sanalysisis identical-andat times
verbatimthesame-in the twopublications.
74. In his forewordto the GeorgetownCSIS volume,US Army Lt. GeneralRichardD.
Lawrence,outlinesthe importanceand purposeof this volume.After alludingto the
'involvement' of such'powers'as the SovietUnion,Libya,and the PalestineLiberation
Organisation in recentLatinAmericaninsurgencies, Gen.Lawrencepraisesthe analyses
containedin thevolumeas anaidto understanding'how bestto contain'suchinsurgencies
and how to 'betterformulateUS policy towardthe generalregion'.Fauriol,Latin
AmericanInsurgencies, p. vi.
75. In his 1985 article by comparison,Palmer'sinterest in predictionis couched in
ideologicalrather than scientificlanguage.These differencessurface in minor, yet
revealing,ways.For example,Palmerchangesthe subtitlesof the fourmajorsectionsof
the work. Section2, which is entitled 'The National Context:Socio-economicand
PoliticalEnvironments'in the academicpublication,becomes'The NationalContext:
Socio-economicand PoliticalTurbulence'in the piece writtenfor foreignpolicy and
militaryexperts.On a similarnote, his academic'Conclusions'assumea morepractical
tone as 'Perspectivesfor The Future'for his CSIS/DefenseDepartmentaudience.
Analogousrevisionssurfaceat variouspointsin his texts.In theconcludingparagraph of
his first section of the 'Developmentof Sendero Luminoso',for example,Palmer
concludesdramatically with'Sendero'sunwavering commitment to thearmedstrugglefor
the gloryof Marx,Mao,andMariategui'. Palmer,'TheSendero',p. 71. Thisideologically
stirringsentence,andotherslike it, disappearin his moresober,yet otherwiseidentical,
Comparative Politicstext.Palmer,'Rebellion',p. 129.
76. Davies'J-curverelates'decliningcapacityto increasingexpectationsanda resultinglossof
legitimacyfor theestablishedgovernment'. Palmer,'Rebellion', p. 143,fn 1.SeeJ. Davies,
'Towarda theoryof revolution'.The centre-periphery model employedby Palmeris
drawnfrompoliticaldevelopmentand modernisation theory.See EdwardShils,Center
and Periphery,Universityof Chicago Press (Chicago),1975; and Shafer, Deadly
Paradigms,pp. 57-78.
77. DavidScottPalmer,'Terrorismas a revolutionary strategy:Peru'sSenderoLuminoso',in
BarryRubin(ed.),ThePoliticsof Terrorism, TheJohnsHopkinsForeignPolicyInstitute,
Schoolof AdvancedInternational Studies(Washington, D.C.), 1989, pp. 129-152 and
p. 133,fn 5.
78. Thephrase'theoriesof revolution'whichappearsin Palmer'sComparative Politicstextis
replacedby 'thetheoryof revolution'in his DefenseDepartmentandCSISpublication.
Palmer,1985, p. 67.
79. Palmer'suse of racialor ethnicterms,suchas mestizoandIndianto definecoastaland
highlandpopulations,misrepresent completelythecomplexethnicandculturalcomposi-
tion of Peru. This forced impositionof essentialisedracialor culturalcategorieson
Peruviangeographyreachesan extremein Palmer'slaterpublicationswherehe focuses
specificallyon theproblemof 'terrorism'.
80. Shafter,DeadlyParadigms,p. 71.
81. Forthe'countrybumpkins' PalmercitesParejaPflucker,Terrorismo.
interpretation, What
Palmerdoes nottellthereader,however,is thatPareja'sbookwaswrittenas anallegation
of 'outsideinfluences'in theunionstrikeattheCanariasMiningCompanyin Ayacuchoin
1980. At the time, the author,who was trainedas a labourhistorian,was the general
managerof the familyowned CanariasMiningCompany.While her book provides
valuabledocumentary information on thepoliticalatmospherein Ayacucho,its analysisis
heavilybiasedtowardsthePfluckerfamilyinterests.
82. For Guzmanand Sendero,BanderaRoja was a 'grupoliquidacionistade derecha'.
Senderowas opposed to Bandera'srecognitionof the military'sagrarianreform,their
effortsto organisepeasantswithintheCCP,andtheireffortsto organiseworkerswithouta
properrevolutionary perspective.SeePCP-SLComit6Central,Bases,pp.62-63; see also
Degregori,Ayacucho,pp. 167-170.
For ParedesandBandera,Guzminandhis factionwere'oportunistas liquidacionistas
de izquierda... defensoresde la prdcticadel ilegalismoy clandestinismototal'. Later,

Banderawould become anti-Maoistand would instead subscribeto the line of the
AlbanianCommunistleaderHoxha.See PCP-BRCuartoCongreso,La situacidnactualy
lasperspectivasde la revolucionperuana,2nd Edn,BanderaRoja(Lima),1983.
83. Regardingcontradictionsand splinterswithinthe CCP, see CCP, InformeCentralIV
Congreso,CCP(Lima),1974;CarlosMonge(1989), 'LaReformaagrariay el movimiento
campesino',DebateAgrario7: 63-84; GarciaSayan,Tomasde Tierras;and Degregori,
Ayacucho,pp. 168-169. For the minorityposition,see CCP,Conclusionsy resoluciones
V Congreso'Justiniano MinayaSosa',Pomacocha,October1978.
84. Huntington, Political Order, pp. 288-291, pp. 369-374 passim; see also Deadly
Paradigms,p. 57.
85. Hereit is importantto rememberthatPalmerwaspartof thePeaceCorpsmissionthatwas
'expelled'fromthe Universityof Huamangain 1964. See note 6.
86. For Palmer'smodel of militaryauthoritarism, see Palmer,'Post-revolutionary
Political
Economy',andPeru.
87. See JuanCarlosPortantiero,Estudiantesy Politica en AmericaLatina, 1918-1938.El
Procesode la reformauniversitaria,Siglo XXI (Mexico),1978; and ManuelBurgaand
AlbertoFlores-Galindo,Apogeoy Crisisde la ReptblicaAristocrdtica(1980), 4th Edn,
Ed. RikchayPeri (Lima),1987, pp 162-166; Jose CarlosMariategui,'El Procesode la
instrucci6npiblica', Siete Ensayos de Interpretacidn de la RealidadPeruana (1928),
Amauta(Lima),1980, pp. 105-161.
88. In fact the universityof Cusco, which was an early model for the 'universidadcom-
prometida'in Peru,wasset up by AlbertGiesecke,a US educatorcontractedby the anti-
communistgovernmentof Leguia.See Jos6 TamayoHerrera,HistoriaSocial del Cuzco
Republicano,EditorialUniverso(Lima),1981, pp. 116-128.
89. The Moscow-orientedPCP-Unidadwas the only left-wingparty that supportedthe
militarygovernment.The otherleft-wingpartiesactivelyopposedthemilitarygovernment
andtheirleadersweresubjectto deportationandimprisonment.
90. The Velasco government'sfear of the universitieswas consolidatedin Law No. 17437,
popularlyknownas the 'LeyGorila'.This repressivelaw wasdesignedto controlstudent
politicalactivityandorganisationsin theuniversities.
91. Narraci6n,No. 12, July 1971 (Lima);AracelioCastillo,El Movimientopopulardejunio
1969(Huantay Huamanga,Ayacucho),Tesisparaoptarel gradode doctoren sociologia,
Universidadde SanMarcos,1972. See also,Degregori,Ayacucho,pp. 51-90.
92. These organismosgeneradosincludedthe MovimentoClasistaBarrial(a neighbourhood
movement),the MovimientoFemenino Popular (PopularWomens Movement),the
Movimientode Obrerosy TrabajadoresClasistas(proletariatand workersmovement),
and the Movimientode CampesinosPobres (poor peasants'movement).See PCP-SL
ComiteCentral,Bases,p. 125;see alsoDegregori,Ayacucho,p. 193.
93. Degregori,Ayacucho,p. 195.
94. Instead,he miscitesPeruviananthropologistJuan Ossio's edited volumeon messianic
ideologyin the Andes andJos6CarlosMariategui's essayson 'ElProblemadel Indio','El
FactorReligioso'andliteraryindigenism(Palmer,'Rebellion',p. 146, fn 43; Palmer,'The
Sendero',p. 87, fn 40).
Ossio'svolume,whichcontainsstudiesby Peruvianand foreignanthropologistsabout
differentformsof messianicthoughtin pre-Columbian, colonialandmodern-dayAndean
cultures,nowhererefersto SenderoLuminoso,andgivesno hintas to howSenderomight
embodysuchnotions.In fact,eachof the articlesarguesfor the cyclicalnatureof Andean
temporalthoughtand,in his introductionto the volume,Ossio arguesthatthiscyclicalor
messianicelementrendersAndeanculturepeculiarlyresistantto suchfuture-oriented and
revolutionaryforms of thoughtand action as Marxism.See JuanOssio, 'Introducci6n',
IdeologiaMesidnicaen el MundoAndino, EdicionesIgnacioPradoPastor(Lima),1973,
pp. xi-xxxi.In fact,the occasionalmillenarianelementsfoundin bothAndeanmythology
and Sendero'sdiscourseof world revolutionpertainmuch more closely to Christian
Europeanforms of utopian thoughtthan to indigenous'Andean'culturalforms. See
HenriqueUrbano (1986), 'La Invenci6nAndina del Hombre,de la Culturaly de la
Sociedad y los Ciclos Miticos Judeocristianos',Boletin de Lima 46: 51-60; Alberto
Flores-Galindo, Buscando Un Inca. Nor does Mariategui'sreferral to 'agrarian
communism'in anywaysustainPalmer'sassertionsabout'pureIndiancommunism'.
95. Migrantcommunitiesandclubsin Limaarecertainlyan importantnexusof communica-
tionbetweenthe highlandsandthe coast.Palmer,however,offersno empiricalevidence
thatthisis a nexusparticularlyimportantto Senderoandsuggestsinsteadthathis hypo-
thesisis made'plausible'by the historicalimportanceof suchties.Hereit is importantto
note thatAyacuchois the departmentwiththe highestnumberof migrantsresidentin
Lima.Despitethefactthattherehasbeena veritableexplosionof publicationsandstudies
of rural-urbanmigrationin Peruin the 1970s and 1980s,someof it focusingspecifically
on Ayacucho,Palmer('TheSendero',p. 94, fn 21) onlycites studiesdone in the earlyto
mid-1960sbeforeSenderoexisted.
96. See Shafer, 'Mao minus Marx: American counterinsurgency doctrine',in Deadly
Paradigms,pp. 104-132.
97. PalmerclaimsthatAyacuchois namedfor 'themanybattlesfoughtin the areaamong
warringIndiangroupsbeforethe SpanishConquest'.('TheSendero',p. 77.) As such,its
currentconflictis but a traditionalextensionof the barbarianpast.In fact, before the
Spanish conquest and throughoutthe colonial period, Ayacucho was known as
Huamanga,whichderivesfromhuamanor falcon.
98. See Huntington,PoliticalOrder,p. 73.
99. Shafer,DeadlyParadigms,p. 45.
100. See Shafer,DeadlyParadigms;A. GunderFrank,Sociologyof Development,PlutoPress
(London),1971; David Apter, RethinkingDevelopment:Modernization, Dependency,
andPost-modemPolitics,SagePublications(BeverlyHills),1987;RobertNisbet,Social
Changeand History:Aspectsof the WesternTheoryof Development,OxfordUniversity
Press(NewYork),1969;D. Harrison,TheSociologyofModernization andDevelopment,
Unwin Hyman(London),1988; and JamesPetrasand MorrisMorley,US Hegemony
UnderSiege.Class,Politicsand Developmentin LatinAmerica,Verso(London),1990,
pp. 32 ss.
101. WilliamJ. Olson (1989), 'Lowintensityconflict:the challengeto the nationalinterest',
Terrorism XII:75.
102. See, for example,OliverB. Revel(1989), 'Terrorism:a reviewof 1989 andtheprospects
for 1990', TerrorismXII:379-382; KathleenBuck(1989), 'Superterrorism: biological,
chemicalandnuclear',Terrorism XII:133-135; andMaryV. Mochary(1989), 'Narco-
terrorism: thenextphase?',Terrorism XII:438-439. Thesethreearticlesaresummaries of
paperspresentedat a GeorgeWashingtonUniversity'Terrorism' seminarcomposedof
academicsand governmentexperts.They presentviewsfrom,respectively,the Federal
Bureauof Investigation(Revell),the US Departmentof Defense (Buck),and the US
Departmentof Defense(Mochary).
103. See MaryKaldor,GerardHoldenandRichardFalk(eds), TheNewDetente.Rethinking
East-WestRelations,Verso (London),1989; FredHalliday(1990), 'Theends of Cold
War',NewLeftReview180:5-23; andJorgeCastafieda(1990), 'LatinAmericaandthe
end of theColdWar',WorldPoliticsVII:469-492.
104. DavidE Long(US CoastGuardAcademy),'Foreword',to GabrielaTarazona-Sevillano
with JohnB. Reuter,SenderoLuminosoand the Threatof Narcoterrorism, CSIS and
Praeger(Washington andNewYork),1990, p. vii.
105. McClintock,'Peru'sSendero',p. 62.
106. RauilGonzalez,'Por los caminos',p. 51. Two of the individualsinterviewedwere a
professorand the president(rector)of the Universityof Huamanga.The professor-
whose commentis cited here-was a formersympathiserof Senderoand had close
personalknowledgeof theiractivities.
107. Thiselisionis allthemorestrikingbecauseMcClintockherselfhadreviewedtheliterature
on PeruvianpeasantriesforseveralUSjournals.See,forexample,C. McClintock(1987),
'Capitalistexpansionand the Andeanpeasantry',in LatinAmericanResearchReview
XXII:235-244. In this reviewarticle,McClintockdiscussesmonographsby Florencia
Mallon,JeanPiel,FernandoFuenzalidaandRobinShoemaker, in additionto threeedited
volumeson Peruvianpeasanteconomiesand agrarianhistories.Togetherthese studies
providea comprehensive historyandsociologyof the peasantmovement,the provincial
and gamonal elites, the indigenistaintellectualmovement,the peasantcommunity,
peasantsocialdifferentiation,and the regionalbases of capitalistdevelopmentin Peru.
AlthoughMcClintockherselfpraisesthe 'unusuallycohesive'(ibid.,236) natureof this
body of workand'thevitalityof Peruviansocialsciencein the last two decades'(ibid.),
none of the informationor analyticalperspectivescontainedin these studiesare incor-

porated,discussedor citedin herown interpretations of Sendero's'peasantrebellion'.
108. Palmer,'Peru'sSenderoLuminoso',Palmer'ssourcesfor Sendero'shistory,ideologyand
organisationare his own previousarticles,McClintock,Lewis Taylor (Maoismin the
Andes), andunpublishedpapersby HenryDietz andGabrielaTarazona-Sevillano.
109. Palmerneverdefineswhathe meansby 'Indian',andcites as an indexof 'Indianness' only
the factorof illiteracy.('Peru'sSenderoLuminoso',p. 133.)
110. EdwardHermanandGerryO'Sullivan,The'Terrorism'Industry. TheExpertsandInstitu-
tions that Shape our Viewof Terror,Pantheon(New York), 1989. See especiallytheir
chapter'Thewesternmodelandthe semanticsof terrorism',pp. 37-52.
111. See DavidP. Werlich(1981), 'Encorefor Belatindein Peru',CurrentHistory66-69, 85-
86; 'Peru:the shadowof the shiningpath',CurrentHistory(February1984), pp. 78-82,
90; 'Debt, democracyand terrorismin Peru', CurrentHistory(January1987); 'Peru:
Garcialoses his charm',CurrentHistory(January1988), pp. 13-16, 36-37.
112. Woy-Hazeltonis professorof politicalscienceat MiamiUniversityin Ohio.LikePalmer
andMcClintock,she beganher workon PeruduringVelasco'smilitarygovernment.See
SandraWoy-Hazelton,'Infrastructure in Peru:SINAMOS',in JohnBooth
of participation
andMitchellSeligson(eds), PoliticalParticipationin LatinAmerica,Vol. I, Holmesand
Meir (New York), 1978, pp. 189-208; and 'The returnof partisanpoliticsin Peru',in
StephenM. Gorman(ed.),Post-revolutionary Peru.ThePoliticsof Transformation, West-
viewPress(Boulder),1982, pp. 33-72.
Woy-Hazeltonis also the author(since 1985) of the 'Peru'entryin the HooverInstitu-
tion'sinfluential(andheavilyideological)sourcebookYearbookon InternationalCom-
munistAffairs,a positionsheinheritedfromPalmerwhowrotethe Yearbookentriesfrom
1982 to 1983 whileat the StateDepartment'sForeignServiceInstitute.See Yearbookon
InternationalCommunistAffairs:PartiesandRevolutionary Movements,HooverInstitu-
tion Press(Stanford)(publishedannually).McClintock,PalmerandWoy-Hazeltonhave
also writtenthe Peruentryin a standardreferencevolumeon LatinAmericanpolitics,
economy and foreign relations.See Latin American and CaribbeanContemporary
Record, VolsI-VI, Holmes and Meir (New York and London), 1983-1989. Palmer
wrotethePeruentriesforVols I andII (1983 and 1984);McClintockwrotetheentriesfor
Vols. III,V, andVI (1985, 1987, 1988);andWoy-Hazeltonwrotethe entrywithWilliam
Hazeltonfor Vol. IV (1986).
113. BourqueandWarren,'Democracywithoutpeace'.See note 72 above.
114. Susan Bourqueand Kay Warren(1980), 'Multiplearenasfor state expansion:class,
ethnicityand sex in ruralPeru',Ethnic and Racial Studies 11: 264-280. This article
documentsthe shiftingand multivocalcharacterof ethnicmarkersin Peru,and argues
thatboth ethnicityandpeasantcollectiveactionaredeterminedby complex'rural-urban
networks'andprocessesof nationalintegration.Ignoringthehistoricalstrengthanddepth
of class-basedpeasantpoliticalorganisationsin Peru,they also arguethat the lack of
explicitethnicpolarisationhas somehowrestricted'collectiveactionto end subordina-
tion'(p. 266). At leastin thecasesof thetwoLatinAmericancountriesstudiedby Warren
and Bourque,however,'ethnic'polarisationhas more readilylent itself to the genocidal
politics of dirty wars than to successful peasant liberation.See Kay Warren, The
Symbolismof Subordination: IndianIdentityin a GuatemalanTown,Universityof Texas
Press(Austin),1978.
115. The subtextrunningthroughBourqueandWarren'sargumenthereis thatthe 'sensation-
alistic'Peruvianpresshas its opposingoppositein the rationalmetropolitan(US) press.
See, for example,BourqueandWarren,'Democracywithoutpeace',p. 31, fn 42.
116. Isbellrefersto a broadergroupof Peruviananthropological andhistoricalliteraturethan
do any of the otherUS Senderologists.This literatureis, however,neitherreflected,nor
directlyreferredto, in her analysis.
117. Berg,'SenderoLuminoso'(see note 72 above).
118. Regarding'mechanismsof fear',see EdwardJay Epstein,Agencyof Fear. Opiatesand
PoliticalPowerin America,Verso (London),1990; for narcoterrorism, see W. Olson,
'Low-intensity conflict'and0. Revell,'Terrorism: reviewof 1989' (note 102 above).
119. GabrielaTarazona-Sevillano withJohnB. Reuter,SenderoLuminosoand the Threatof
Narcoterrorism, PraegerandCSIS(NewYorkandWashington),1990.
120. GordonH. McCormick,'TheshiningpathandPeruvianterrorism',in DavidRappaport
(ed.), Inside TerroristOrganizations,ColumbiaUniversityPress (New York), 1988,

pp. 109-126; and TheShiningPath and the Futureof Peru, RandCorporation(Santa
Monica),1990. McCormickalsoauthoreda RandCorporation reporton Nicaragua.See
NicaraguanSecurityPolicy.TrendsandProjections,RandCorporation(SantaMonica),
1988.
121. For example,McCormick,'The shiningpath and Peruvianterrorism',pp. 109-111;
McCormick,TheShiningPathandtheFutureof Peru,p 6;Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero,
pp. xiv.
122. Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero,p. 4.
123. Tarazona-Sevillano,Sendero, pp. 6-7; McCormick,'Peruvianterrorism',p. 110;
McCormick,Future,pp. 5-6.
124. McCormick,'Peruvianterrorism', p. 111.
125. Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero,pp.xvi,74-76.
126. JohnBaines,Revolutionin Peru:Maridtegui andtheMyth,Universityof AlabamaPress
(Tuscaloosa),1972, quotedin Tarazona,Sendero,p. 13.
127. Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero,p. 13. Between 1911 and 1930 Mariateguipublished
almost3000 articles,essays,reviews,fictionandplays.He wasalsotheeditorof Amauta,
a culturalmagazine,and Labor,a working-class periodical.See AlbertoFloresGalindo
(ed.), Invitaci6na La VidaHeroica.Antologiade J. C. Maridtegui,Institutode Apoyo
Agrario(Lima),1989.Mariategui's collectedworksarepublishedas EdicionesPopulares
de la ObrasCompletas,20 Vols, 13thEdn,EditoraAmauta(Lima),1985.
128. Ibid.,p. 19.
129. Ibid.,p. 17. Jose C. Maridtegui, SieteEnsayosde Interpretaci6n de la RealidadPeruana,
43th Edn, EditorialAmauta(Lima),1980. RegardingMariategui's life and work,see
Alberto Flores-Galindo,La Agonia de Mariategui3ra edici6n, Institutode Apoyo
Agrario(Lima),1989;AmibalQuijano,Introducci6n a Maridtegui,ERA(Mexico),1982;
andJos6Aric6 (ed.),Mariategui y los origenesdel marxismolatinoamericano, Pasadoy
Presente(Mexico),1980.
130. HermanandO'Sullivan,Terrorism Industry,pp. 37-52.
131. McCormick,'Peruvianterrorism', p. 119.
132. Ibid.,p. 112; McCormick,Future,p. 7; cf. Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero,pp. 5, 19, 21
passim.
133. Fordescriptionsof thePCP-SL'sdisciplinary 'espritde corps',see Gorriti,Sendero.
134. Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero,p. viii.
135. McCormick,p. 113.
136. Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero,pp. 134-135.
137. Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero,pp. 134-135, fn 5.
138. Forherargumenton theconnectionsbetweenSenderoandthedrugtraffickers, Tarazona
relies almostexclusivelyon RauilGonzalez'sarticle'Cocay subversi6nen el Huallaga',
Quehacer 48: 58-72. Following the by now familiarrepertoireof senderological
techniques,she consistentlymiscites and falsifiesthe contentsof Gonzalez'sarticle.
Gonzalezfocuses on the complexinterplaybetweenthe drugtraffickers,the political
militaryorganisations of SenderoandtheMRTA,thelegalleftistparties,andthepopular
peasantorganisations. Eachof theseactors,Gonzalezspecifies,'hasitsownrationality and
playsits own game'(p. 59). Moreover,he pointsout thatit is difficultto generaliseabout
the relationshipsbetweenanyof theseactorsdue to the pragmatism of Senderoandthe
MRTA (pp.69-70). In some areas of the Huallaga,Senderoworks with the drug
traffickersandin othersit fightsagainstthem.InyetotherareastheMRTAplaysa critical
role. Tarazonasimplyelides all of Gonzalez'sargumentsand data in orderto makea
simpleassertionof Sendero'spoliticalandeconomicidentitywiththedrugtrade.
139. RachelEhrenfeld,Narcoterrorism, BasicBooks(NewYork),1990, pp. 113-135.
140. Shafer,DeadlyParadigms,pp.45-47.
141. For generalhistoriesand overviewsof the early Spanishchronicles,see Rail Porras
Barrenechea,Los Cronistasdel Penr (1528-1650),Sanmartiy Cia.(Lima),1962;Frank
Salomon(1985),'Thehistoricaldevelopmentof Andeanethnology',MountainResearch
and Development5: 79-85; R. T. Zuidema,The CequeSystemof Cuzco, E. J. Brill
(Leiden),1964, pp. 30-35; andPierreDuviols,La Luttecontreles religionsautochtones
dansle Peroucolonial,InstitutFrancaisd'EtudesAndines(Paris),1971.
142. See PenelopeHarveyandDeborahPoole, TheHistoryof AndeanStudiesin the United
StatesandEngland.17thto 20thCenturies,Universityof ManchesterandNew Schoolfor

SocialResearch,1991;andPabloMacera,La ImagenfrancesadelPeru.SiglosXVI-XIX,
LimaInstitutoNacionalde Cultura(Lima),1976.
143. AmnestyInternational,HumanRightsin Peru. 1988-1990:Resolutionof the Tribunal
Permanentede Los PueblosContrala Impunidaden AmericaLatina(Lima)7 July1990,
reprintedin Informativo,Grupode Apoyo Peruano(NewYork),No. 10 (October1990),
pp. 9-10.
144. Chomsky,AmericanPower.
145. See, for exaple, Manrique,'La Decada';Manriqueand Flores Galindo, Violenciay
campesinado;Degregori,Sendero;and Rail Wiener(ed.), Guerrae Ideologia.Debate
entreel PUMy Sendero,EdicionesAmauta(Lima),1989.
146. See Penelope Harvey (1987), 'Lenguajey Relaciones de Poder', Allpanchis 29-30:
pp. 105-131; Smith,LivelihoodandResistance.
147. See DeborahPoole (1988), 'Landscapesof powerin a cattlerustlingcultureof southern
AndeanPeru',DialecticalAnthropology12: 367-398; Nelson Manrique,YawarMayu.
SociedadesTerratenientesSerranas,1879-1910,DESCO(Lima),1988.
148. Luis Lumbreras(1986), 'De Como LumbrerasEntiendeal Peri de Sendero',Quehacer
42: 34-43; NicoldsLynch,Los JovenesRojos de San Marcos,Zorro de Abajo (Lima),
1990.
149. See, for example,Wiener,Guerrae Ideologia.
150. See WorkingGroupof the NationalHumanRightsCo-ordinatingCommitteeAgainst
Disappearances and Political Murders in Peru (APRODEH, CEAPAZ, IDL,
COMISEDH),Bulletin1-10, 1990 (Lima).

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The New Chroniclers of Peru: US Scholars and Their 'Shining Path' of Peasant Rebellion

Author(s): Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique

The New Chroniclersof Peru:US Scholarsand

visionof Senderomightbe approached.We suggestthatan understandingof

Perufrom 1968 to 1975 underGeneralJuanVelascoAlvaradoprovidedan

of Ayacuchano social reality.For example, McClintock'sanalysis of the

and the peasant organisationhe headed created an armed self-defence

and Manco Inca (northernsierra).Limeiio activistintellectualsfrequently

their children'(p. 66). Her conclusionsare that peasantswith subsistence

arygroups'.66The implicationsof this Maoistprinciplefor the PCP-SLis, in

disclaimerwhichprefacesboth articles,Palmercomments,'Wedon't really

In its broadoutlines,then,Palmer'sschemeof Peruvianhistoryconforms

Senderoactivities,whetheras partof the universityextensionprograms

[Sendero's]movement emerged during a period when social and

Reciprocally,becauseof its 'peripheralisation'

'Indian'bases by virtueof theirsharedcommunityand culturalties withthe

(Palmer,1985: 76). On the whole,Palmertellsus, the citizensof the demo-

a systemicdiagnosisof globalills wouldbe to unveilthe unutterableconnec-

counterto all otherpublishedanalysesandinformationaboutthe PCP-SL.It

to the all-encompassingahistoricalcategoriesof Palmer'scentre-periphery

of the HuallagaValley was that of 'protectingthe indigenouscultureand

'appeared'in communitieslike Chuschi,are thus suggestivelyhintedat, yet

senderologicalmodeldemonstratehow a productbecomescustomisedto fit

not acceptedas an equalby the man-on-the-street.His life and writings

Following this line of reasoning,Tarazona claims that it was not only

indexof certainsocial phenomenawhose natureit is the senderologist'stask

Throughoutthe Peruvianhighlandsindividualsfrequentlyand routinely

formedwithinthe centuriesold authoritarian traditionsof gamonalcoercion

previousarticlesandVargasLlosa's1983 New YorkTimesapologyfor the Uchuraccay

Historiade un luchadorcampesino.AndresLuna Vargas,secretariogeneralde la Con-

42. 'IU con la perestroikay la utopiaandina:Residuosde la moribundaideologiaburguesa',

61. Althoughshe notes thatit is primarily'youth'who supportSendero(McClintock,'Why

de izquierda... defensoresde la prdcticadel ilegalismoy clandestinismototal'. Later,

none of the informationor analyticalperspectivescontainedin these studiesare incor-

(ed.), Inside TerroristOrganizations,ColumbiaUniversityPress (New York), 1988,

StatesandEngland.17thto 20thCenturies,Universityof ManchesterandNew Schoolfor

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