Inding v. SB (Main)
1606, the RTC
On January 27, 1999, an Information was
filed with the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of DapitanCity,
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019,[2] committed as follows:
That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9
August 1997 and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Dapitan City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused Ricardo S.
Inding, a high-ranking public officer, being a
Councilor of Dapitan City and as such, while
in the performance of his official functions,
particularly in the operation against drug abuse,
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, faked buy-bust operations against
alleged pushers or users to enable him to
claim or collect from the coffers of the city
government a total amount of P30,500.00, as
reimbursement for actual expenses incurred
during the alleged buy-bust operations, knowing
fully well that he had no participation in the
said police operations against drugs but
enabling him to collect from the coffers of the
city government a total amount of P30,500.00,
thereby causing undue injury to the government
as well as the public interest.[3]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 25116 and raffled to the Second Division
of the Sandiganbayan.
The Petitioner filed a motion for the dismissal of
the case for the lack of jurisdiction and for the
referral of the case to the RTC or the MTC.
The Petitioner alleges that under
Administrative Order No. 270, he is he is a
member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City with Salary Grade
(SG) 25.
Inding asserted that under RA 7975, the
Sandiganbayan exercises original jurisdiction
to try cases involving crimes committed by
officials of local government units only if such
officials occupy positions with SG 27 or
higher.
Otherwise, under PD No.
not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor asserted
that the petitioner was, at the time of the
commission of the crime, a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte, one of those public
officers who, by express provision of Section 4
a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 7975,[5] is classified as SG 27. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, has original
jurisdiction over the case, regardless of his salary
grade under Adm. Order No. 270.
Issue:
W/N the Sandiganbayan has original
jurisdiction over Petitioner, a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City,
who was charged with violation of Section 3(e)
of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Held:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
case of Inding, the Petitioner.
GR: Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal case is to be determined by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the
crime.
XPN: However, Rep. Act No. 7975, as well as
Rep. Act No. 8249, constitutes an exception
thereto as it expressly states that to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the
reckoning period is the time of the commission
of the offense.
Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled An Act to Strengthen
the Functional and Structural Organization of the
Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1606, took effect
on May 16, 1995.
Rep. Act. No. 8249 took effect on February 23,
1997.
In this case, as gleaned from the
Information filed in the Sandiganbayan, the
crime charged was committed from the period
of January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997.The
applicable law, therefore, is Rep. Act No.
7975.
 Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975 expanded
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined
in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, thus:
xxxxx
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:[18]
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code,[19] where one or more of
the principal accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;[20]
xxxxxx
In cases where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher,
or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129
xxxx
It can be gleaned upon from the
aforementioned provision that any violation of
Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by officials in the
executive branch with SG 27 or higher, and the
officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of
Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, regardless
of their salary grades, likewise fall within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory
construction that the intent of the legislature is
the controlling factor in the interpretation of a
statute.[37] From the congressional records and
the text of Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294, the
legislature undoubtedly intended the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by the aforesaid
subsequent laws, to be included within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
In this case, there is no dispute that the
petitioner is a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City and he is charged
with violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep. Act No.
3019. Members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod are specifically included as among
those within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
7975,[41] or even Section 4 of Rep. Act No.
8249[42] for that matter. The Sandiganbayan,
therefore, has original jurisdiction over the
petitioners case docketed as Criminal Case No.
25116.
Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan (Back-up)
Two (2) employees of the Central Bank
[Government employees] Manuel Valentino
and Jesus Estacio and nine (9) private
individuals, were charged with several felonies
of estafa thru falsification of public
documents in three (3) separate informations
filed by the Tanodbayan with the Sandiganbayan
on April 15, 1982. The actions were docketed as
Criminal Cases Numbered 5949 to 5951. They
were assigned to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
Before the prosecution rested its case, the
Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan on
August 23, 1984, another set of three (3)
indictments, this time against Carlito P.
Bondoc (Assistant Manager of the Greenhills
Branch of CITIBANK) and Rogelio Vicente,
also a private individual, charging them with
the same crimes involved in Cases No. 5949 to
5951 as principals by indispensable
cooperation. The actions against Bondoc and
Vicente were docketed as Criminal Cases
Numbered 9349 to 9351. They were assigned to
the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Bondoc moved to quash the informations on
January 3, 1985 on the basic theory that as a
private individual charged as co-principal with
government employees, he should be tried
jointly with the latter pursuant to Section 4
(paragraph 3) of PD 1606, as amended, supra;
hence, the separate proceedings commenced
against him were invalid, for lack of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the
offenses and his person.
The Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denied
Bondocs motion. However, in order to obviate
his objection to a separate trial, , the Third
Division, in the same resolution, referred
Bondoc's cases (No. 9349 to 9351) to the Second
Division for consolidation with Cases Numbered
5949 to 5951.
The Second Division denied the consolidation
and returned the Criminal Case to the third
division.
The Third Division set the case for arraignment
and trial.
The Solicitor General, asserts that Section 4 (3),
PD 1606 merely prescribes the procedure when a
private individual is charged with a public officer
or employee; once jurisdiction is acquired, it is
not lost by procedural error (Ramos, et al., v. CB,
41 SCRA 565; Dioquino v. Cruz, et al., 116
SCRA 451).
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 vests
the Sandigan-bayan with exclusive original
jurisdiction over specific crimes and, as the
Sandiganbayan has pointed out, supra, provides
against split jurisdiction as regards the civil
liability arising from the crime. It declares that
the Sandiganbayan shall have
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.
Now, the crime with which Bondoc is charged
as co-principal by indispensable
cooperation with the Central Bank employees
above mentioned (Valentino and Estacio)in
each of the three (3) indictments against him is
the complex felony of estafa thru falsification
of public documents under Article 171 7 in
relation to Articles 315 8 and 48 9of the
Revised Penal Code.
The crimes are "offenses or felonies committed
by public officers and employees in relation to
their office," in confabulation and conspiracy
with him (Bondoc) and other private persons.
The penalty prescribed by law for each of the
three offenses is higher than the penalty set out
in Section 4 of PD 1606 above cited, i.e., prision
correccional or six years, or a fine of
P6,000.00. 10 Each offense is therefore within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Held:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case
of the Petitioner.
It is indisputable that the Sandiganbayan
acquired jurisdiction of the offenses charged in
the informations against Bondoc and his co-
accused, based on the nature of the crimes as
described in the indictments and the penalty
prescribed therefor by law. Also
incontrovertible is that the Sandiganbayan
acquired jurisdiction of the persons of the
accused through their arrest by virtue of a
warrant, or voluntary submission to the
Court's authority.
It must at once be evident that the seeming
impossibility of a joint trial cannot and does
not alter the essential nature of the crimes in
question, as felonies perpetrated by public
officers or employees in confabulation with
private persons. It should be as obvious, too,
that assuming it is correct to construe the law in a
strictly literal sense, the indicated course of
action would be to insist on holding a joint trial
regardless of whatever circumstances may
appear to make such a joint trial inappropriate,
inconvenient, unfeasible.

The provision in question should thus be read as

requiring that private individuals accused in the
Sandiganbayan, together with public officers or
employees, must be tried jointly with the latter
unless the attendant circumstances have made
impossible or impracticable such a joint trial, as
in the cases at bar, in which event the trial of
said private persons may proceed separately
from the public officers or employees whose
own trials have been concluded.

Firaza v. People (Main)

Petitioner, appointed as a confidential agent of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Caraga Regional Office on August 18, 1999, was
issued a firearm and a mission to gather and
report to the NBI such information as may be
relevant to investigations undertaken by it.
In his private capacity, petitioner served as
manager for RF Communications in connection
with which he dealt with Christopher Rivas,
Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Sur, for the
establishment of a Public Calling Office in the
Municipality of Lianga, Surigao del Sur.
On August 11, 2000, in the course of a meeting
between petitioner and Rivas at the latters
restaurant regarding the delivery of a defective
machine for the Public Calling Office, a heated
exchange ensued during which petitioner is
alleged to have pointed a gun at Rivas. Petitioner
was thereupon accosted by P/Insp. Alberto A.
Mullanida, Acting Chief of Police of Lianga,
Surigao del Sur and PO2 Nilo Ronquillo, who
discovered that his permit to carry firearm
outside residence had expired more than a month
earlier or on July 5, 2000.
Hence, a criminal complaint was filed against
petitioner before the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Barobo-Lianga, Barobo,
Surigao del Sur for UNATHORIZED
CARRYING OF LICENCE [sic] FIREARM
OUTSIDE RESIDENCE.
That on or about the 11th day of August
2000 at about 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon more or less in Poblacion,
Municipality of Lianga, Province of
Surigao del Sur Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
the above named accused, willfully,
unlawfully, and
feloniously possess [sic] one (1) unit
Pistol Caliber 45 with serial number
670320 entered inside the residence of
Christopher Rivas at Lianga, Surigao
del Sur with expired license or permit
to carry outside residence
renewed [sic] from the government
authority concerned.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Violation of
RA 8294 as amended)
RA 8294AN ACT AMENDING THE
PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 1866, AS AMENDED, ENTITLED
"CODIFYING THE LAWS ON
ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION,
MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN,
ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION OF
FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR
EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN
THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS,
AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND
IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR
CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND
FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES."
By Decision of February 20, 2003, the MCTC
convicted petitioner.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court upheld
petitioners conviction.
On petition for review, the Court of Appeals, by
Decision of April 20, 2007,[3] affirmed
petitioners conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner can
be convicted of an offense different
from that charged in the Complaint.
Held:
Petitioner prefaces his arguments in
support of his appeal by claiming that the
Complaint charged him with illegal possession
of firearms, hence, he cannot be convicted
of carrying firearms outside of residence, the
phrase in the Complaint reading with expired
license or permit to carry outside residence . .
.being merely descriptive of the alleged
unlicensed nature of the firearm.
Petitioner concludes that since he had
authority to carry firearm, it was error to
convict him. This was based on the
disquisition of the appellate court
crediting his defense.
Petitioners argument fails.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or
information. A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was
committed.

When an offense is committed by more

than one person, all of them shall be
included in the complaint or
information. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The allegations in a Complaint or Information

determine what offense is charged. The alleged
acts or omissions complained of constituting the
offense need not be in the terms of the statute
determining the offense, but in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.

The earlier-quoted Complaint alleged that the

accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
possess [sic] one (1) unit Pistol Cal. 45 with
serial number 670320 [and] entered . . . the
residence of Christopher Rivas at Lianga,
Surigao del Sur with expired license or permit to
carry outside residence.[6] The words used to
indicate or describe the offense charged that
petitioner unlawfully carried his
firearm outside his residence because he had no
permit for the purpose are clear. They are self-
explanatory.

Sanrio v. Edgar Lim (Back-up)


Petitioner Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese
corporation, owns the copyright of various
animated characters such as "Hello Kitty," "Little
Twin Stars," "My Melody," "Tuxedo Sam" and
"Zashikibuta" among others.4 While it is not
engaged in business in the Philippines, its
products are sold locally by its exclusive
distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated (GGI).5
As such exclusive distributor, GGI entered into
licensing agreements with JC Lucas Creative
Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and
Melawares Manufacturing Corporation.6 These
local entities were allowed to manufacture
certain products (bearing petitioner's copyrighted
animated characters) for the local market.
Sometime in 2001, due to the deluge of
counterfeit Sanrio products, GGI asked IP
Manila Associates (IPMA) to conduct a market
research. The research's objective was to identify
those factories, department stores and retail
outlets manufacturing and/or selling fake Sanrio
items.7
After conducting several test-buys in various
commercial areas, IPMA confirmed that
respondent's Orignamura Trading in Tutuban
Center, Manila was selling imitations of
petitioner's products.8
Agents of the NBI searched the premises of
Orignamura Trading. As a result thereof, they
were able to seize various Sanrio products.
Petitioner, through its attorney-in-fact Teodoro
Y. Kalaw IV of the Quisumbing Torres law firm,
filed a complaint-affidavit13 with the Task-Force
on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) against
respondent for violation of Section 217 (in
relation to Sections 17714 and 17815) of the
Intellectual Property Code (IPC)
Respondent asserted in his counter-
affidavit16 that he committed no violation of the
provisions of the IPC because he was only a
retailer.17 Respondent neither reproduced nor
manufactured any of petitioner's copyrighted
item; thus, he did not transgress the economic
rights of petitioner.18 Moreover, he obtained his
merchandise from authorized manufacturers of
petitioner's products.
Evidence on record shows that respondent
bought his merchandise from legitimate sources,
as shown by official receipts issued by JC Lucas
Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics,
Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation.
While it appears that some of the items seized
during the search are not among those
products which [GGI] authorized these
establishments to produce, the fact remains
that respondent bought these from the
abovecited legitimate sources. At this juncture,
it bears stressing that respondent relied on the
representations of these manufacturers and
distributors that the items they sold were
genuine.
Thus, as far as respondent is concerned, the
items in his possession are not infringing
copies of the original [petitioner's] products.
Therefore, the Task Force on Anti-Intellectual
Rights Piracy (TAPP) dismissed the Petitioners
complaint.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.22 Hence, it filed a petition for review in
the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the
DOJ.23 In a resolution dated August 29,
2003,24 the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor
affirmed the TAPP resolution. The petition was
dismissed for lack of reversible error.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA. On May 3, 2005, the
appellate court dismissed the petition on the
ground of prescription.
It based its action on Act 3326 which states:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts
shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
(a) after a year for offenses punished only by a
fine or by imprisonment for not more than one
month, or both; (b) after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more than one
month, but less than two years; (c) after eight
years for those punished by imprisonment for
two years or more, but less than six years; and
(d) after twelve years for any other offense
punished by imprisonment for six years or more,
except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe
after twenty years; Provided, however, That all
offenses against any law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
shall prescribe after five years. Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall
prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from
the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same may not be known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. (emphasis supplied)
According to the CA, because no complaint was
filed in court within two years after the
commission of the alleged violation, the offense
had already prescribed.
Issue:
W/N the CA erred in concluding that the alleged
violations of the IPC had prescribed.
Held:
Although we do not agree wholly with the CA,
we deny the petition.
Filing Of The Complaint In the DOJ Tolled
The Prescriptive Period
Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the
prescriptive period for violation of special laws
starts on the day such offense was committed and
is interrupted by the institution of proceedings
against respondent (i.e., the accused).
Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-
affidavit on April 4, 2002 or one year, ten
months and four days after the NBI searched
respondent's premises and seized Sanrio
merchandise therefrom. Although no information
was immediately filed in court, respondent's
alleged violation had not yet prescribed.30
In the recent case of Brillantes v. Court of
Appeals,31 we affirmed that the filing of the
complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation interrupts the period of prescription
of criminal responsibility.32 Thus, the
prescriptive period for the prosecution of the
alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by
petitioner's timely filing of the complaint-
affidavit before the TAPP.
In The Absence Of Grave Abuse Of
Discretion, The Factual Findings Of The DOJ
In Preliminary Investigations Will Not Be
Disturbed
In a preliminary investigation, a public
prosecutor determines whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause
that the accused is guilty thereof.33 Probable
cause is defined as such facts and circumstances
that will engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should
be held for trial.34 Because a public prosecutor is
the one conducting a preliminary investigation,
he determines the existence of probable
cause.35 Consequently, the decision to file a
criminal information in court or to dismiss a
complaint depends on his sound discretion.36
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded
a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. For this reason, courts
generally do not interfere with the results of such
proceedings. A prosecutor alone determines the
sufficiency of evidence that will establish
probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal
information against the respondent.37 By way of
exception, however, judicial review is allowed
where respondent has clearly established that the
prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion.38 Otherwise stated, such review is
appropriate only when the prosecutor has
exercised his discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and
gross enough to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law.
Samson Ching v. CA (Main)
On October 21, 1997, petitioner Ching, a
Chinese national, instituted criminal complaints
for eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22
against respondent Nicdao. Consequently, eleven
(11) Informations were filed with the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of Bataan.
At about the same time, fourteen (14) other
criminal complaints, also for violation of BP 22,
were filed against respondent Nicdao by Emma
Nuguid, said to be the common law spouse of
petitioner Ching. Allegedly fourteen (14) checks,
amounting to P1,150,000.00, were issued by
respondent Nicdao to Nuguid but were
dishonored for lack of sufficient funds.
At her arraignment, respondent Nicdao entered
the plea of "not guilty" to all the charges.
Petitioner Ching averred that the checks were
issued to him by respondent Nicdao as security
for the loans that she obtained from him. Their
transaction began sometime in October 1995
when respondent Nicdao, proprietor/manager of
Vignette Superstore, together with her husband,
approached him to borrow money in order for
them to settle their financial obligations. They
agreed that respondent Nicdao would leave the
checks undated and that she would pay the loans
within one year. However, when petitioner Ching
went to see her after the lapse of one year to ask
for payment, respondent Nicdao allegedly said
that she had no cash.
After a number of demands by Ching, Nicdao
was not able to pay the full amount of
P20,000,000. All she could muster was
P2,000,000 and P5,000,000 from her daughter
because that was the amount she told the latter.
Ching proceeded with depositing the blank
checks with the bank, but realized such was
DAIF.
On direct-examination,17 respondent Nicdao
stated that she only dealt with Nuguid. She
vehemently denied the allegation that she had
borrowed money from both petitioner Ching and
Nuguid in the total amount of P22,950,000.00.
Respondent Nicdao admitted, however, that she
had obtained a loan from Nuguid but only
for P2,100,000.00 and the same was already fully
paid. As proof of such payment, she presented a
Planters Bank demand draft dated August 13,
1996 in the amount of P1,200,000.00. The
annotation at the back of the said demand draft
showed that it was endorsed and negotiated to
the account of petitioner Ching.
Respondent Nicdao was surprised to be notified
by HSLB that her check in the amount
of P20,000,000.00 was just presented to the bank
for payment. She claimed that it was only then
that she remembered that sometime in 1995, she
was informed by her employee that one of her
checks was missing. At that time, she did not let
it bother her thinking that it would eventually
surface when presented to the bank.
Respondent Nicdao could not explain how the
said check came into petitioner Chings
possession. She explained that she kept her
checks in an ordinary cash box together with a
stapler and the cigarette wrappers that contained
Nuguids computations. Her saleslady had access
to this box.
The MCTC found Nicdao guilty of violation of
BP22.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in separate
Decisions both dated May 10, 1999, affirmed in
toto the decisions of the MCTC convicting
respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) and fourteen
(14) counts of violation of BP 22 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and 9458-9471,
respectively.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and
acquitted Nicdao.
The CA gave credence to the testimony of
respondent Nicdao that when she had fully paid
her loans to Nuguid, she tried to retrieve her
checks. Nuguid, however, refused to return the
checks to respondent Nicdao. Instead, Nuguid
and petitioner Ching filled up the said checks to
make it appear that: (a) petitioner Ching was the
payee in five checks; (b) the six checks were
payable to cash; (c) Nuguid was the payee in
fourteen (14) checks. Petitioner Ching and
Nuguid then put the date October 6, 1997 on all
these checks and deposited them the following
day. On October 8, 1997, through a joint demand
letter, they informed respondent Nicdao that her
checks were dishonored by HSLB and gave her
three days to settle her indebtedness or else face
prosecution for violation of BP 22.
With the finding that respondent Nicdao had
fully paid her loan obligations to Nuguid, the CA
declared that she could no longer be held liable
for violation of BP 22. It was explained that to be
held liable under BP 22, it must be established,
inter alia, that the check was made or drawn and
issued to apply on account or for value.
According to the CA, the word "account" refers
to a pre-existing obligation, while "for value"
means an obligation incurred simultaneously
with the issuance of the check. In the case of
respondent Nicdaos checks, the pre-existing
obligations secured by them were already
extinguished after full payment had been made
by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid. Obligations are
extinguished by, among others, payment.30 The
CA believed that when petitioner Ching and
Nuguid refused to return respondent Nicdaos
checks despite her total payment
of P6,980,000.00 for the loans secured by the
checks, petitioner Ching and Nuguid were using
BP 22 to coerce respondent Nicdao to pay a debt
which she no longer owed them.
Check No. 002524 and cannot assert any cause
of action founded on said check," 41 and that
respondent Nicdao "has no obligation to make
good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be
held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22." 42
With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA
established that the loans secured by these
checks had already been extinguished after full
payment had been made by respondent Nicdao.
In this connection, the second element for the
crime under BP 22, i.e., "that the check is made
or drawn and issued to apply on account or for
value," is not present.
Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA
did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to
petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated
that she had already fully paid her obligations.

On the other hand, its finding relative to

the P20,000,000.00 check that it was a stolen
Issue: check necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao of
any civil liability thereon as well.
W/N despite the acquittal of Respondent Nicdao
of the violation of BP 22, she is still liable for the
P20,000,000 to the Petitioner?

Held:

No.

The Court holds that respondent Nicdao cannot

be held civilly liable to petitioner Ching.

The acquittal of respondent Nicdao likewise

effectively extinguished her civil liability

A painstaking review of the case leads to the

conclusion that respondent Nicdaos acquittal
likewise carried with it the extinction of the
action to enforce her civil liability. There is
simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao
civilly liable to petitioner Ching.

First, the CAs acquittal of respondent Nicdao is

not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it
is based on the finding that she did not commit
the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the
CA found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a
stolen check which was never issued nor
delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner
Ching. As such, according to the CA, petitioner
Ching "did not acquire any right or interest over