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Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 20 Filed 06/29/17 Page 1 of 47

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

LATOYA BROWN; LAWRENCE BLACKMON


HERBERT ANTHONY GREEN; KHADAFY MANNING;
QUINETTA MANNING; MARVIN MCFIELD; NICHOLAS
SINGLETON; STEVEN SMITH; BESSIE THOMAS; and
BETTY JEAN WILLIAMS TUCKER, individually and on
Behalf of a class of all other similarly situated, PLAINTIFFS

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-347-WHB-LRA

MADISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI;


SHERIFF RANDALL S. TUCKER, in his official capacity; and
MADISON COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPUTIES JOHN
DOES #1 through #6, in their individual capacities, DEFENDANTS

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF DEFENDANTS, MADISON COUNTY,


MISSISSIPPI AND SHERIFF RANDALL C. TUCKER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

COME NOW defendants Madison County, Mississippi and Sheriff Randall Tucker, in his

official capacity (Defendants), by and through the undersigned counsel, and file this Answer and

Affirmative Defenses to the Complaint filed in this matter. (ECF #1).

DEFENSES AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Defendants allege the following defenses and affirmative defenses with respect to the

claims alleged in the Complaint, without assuming the burden of proof where the burden of proof

rests on plaintiffs. Defendants are still investigating the allegations and are without knowledge

or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether other affirmative defenses are available at

this time. Further, defendants cannot fully anticipate all affirmative defenses that may be

applicable to this action based on the characterizations used in the Complaint. Defendants are

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether other affirmative

defenses are available in this matter. Defendants hereby give notice that they intend to rely upon
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such other and further defenses as may become available or apparent during pretrial proceedings

and reserve the right to assert additional defenses if, and to the extent, such become applicable.

FIRST DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims against defendants fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted

and should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6).

SECOND DEFENSE

Defendants assert all defenses available to them as set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1)

through 12(b) (7).

THIRD DEFENSE

Although it does not appear that plaintiffs have brought any state law claims against them,

defendants assert all substantive, immunity, and procedural defenses available to them pursuant to

Miss. Code Ann. 11-46-1 et seq., including those found in 11-46-5, 11-46-7, 11-46-9, 11-46-

11, 11-46-13, 11-46-15, and 11-46-17. To the extent that the Complaint may seek a jury trial

where such is unavailable under state or federal law, defendants move to strike any such demand.

FOURTH DEFENSE

All claims made by plaintiffs against defendants are barred by their claims of absolute

immunity.

FIFTH DEFENSE

Each cause of action in the Complaint is barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable

statute of limitations, including Miss. Code Ann. 15-1-35 and 15-1-49, as applied by 42 U.S.C.

1988 and Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), or 28 U.S.C. 1658.

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SIXTH DEFENSE

Defendants invoke all remedies and defenses available to them pursuant to the Tort Reform

Acts of 2002 and 2004, including, but not limited to, Miss. Code Ann. 11-1-60, 11-1-65, 11-1-

69, and 85-5-7.

SEVENTH DEFENSE

Defendants invoke the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. 85-5-7, and assert all defenses,

rights, privileges, and immunities they can assert under that Section.

EIGHTH DEFENSE

Any alleged injuries, constitutional or otherwise, plaintiffs claim they suffered, which

defendants specifically deny, were caused solely by the acts or omissions of another or others for

whose conduct defendants are not responsible and for whose conduct defendants had no reason to

foresee or anticipate.

NINTH DEFENSE
Acts or omissions of other persons and/or entities who are not parties to this cause were a

superseding or intervening cause of any injuries or damages claimed by plaintiffs in this cause.

TENTH DEFENSE

Some or all of plaintiffs allegations should be stricken under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) as

impertinent and/or immaterial to their claims.

ELEVENTH DEFENSE

Defendants affirmatively assert all the equitable defenses of laches, waiver, estoppel,

contributory negligence, unclean hands, and all other defenses available to them under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(c).

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TWELFTH DEFENSE

Without limiting any causes of action that may be subject to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6), defendants state that all claims that they violated any federal right held by plaintiffs

or putative class, including the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted and should be dismissed with

prejudice.

THIRTEENTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs are not entitled to seek any punitive damages or extra-contractual relief against

defendants under federal or state law. In addition to this denial, defendants affirmatively state:

1. An award of punitive damages in this civil action would amount to a deprivation of

property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution and 14 of the Mississippi Constitution;

2. No legislation has been enacted waiving immunity from punitive damages or

otherwise authorizing punitive damages in a civil action such as this or placing any limit on the

amount of punitive damages awardable and/or, in the alternative, the provisions and procedures of

Miss. Code Ann. 11-1-65 are hereby invoked;

3. An award of punitive damages in this civil action would violate the due process

provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and of 14

of the Mississippi Constitution;

4. The criteria used for determining whether and in what amount punitive damages

may be awarded are impermissibly vague, imprecise and inconsistent and are, therefore, in

violation of the due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution

of the United States;

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5. An award of punitive damages in this civil action would amount to an excessive

fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and

of 28 of the Mississippi Constitution.

6. Punitive damages are not available against defendants under City of Newport v.

Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).

FOURTEENTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs are not entitled to equitable relief or actual, compensatory, consequential, or

punitive damages because such relief is not available for some or all of the causes of action alleged

against some or all defendants.

FIFTEENTH DEFENSE

Each cause of action in the Complaint is, in whole or in part, not attributable or otherwise

arising from the enforcement of a policy, practice or custom of defendant Madison County,

defendant Sheriff Tucker, or the Madison County Sheriffs Department (MCSD).

SIXTEENTH DEFENSE

The Complaint does not appear to seek to make Sheriff Tucker individually liable for

alleged deprivations of federal rights. Should plaintiffs contend that Sheriff Tucker, or any other

individual in a supervisory role with defendant Madison County or the MCSD, is personally or

individually liable, the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009) and Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2005).

SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE

Although it does not appear that defendants have been sued in their individual capacities,

to the extent there are or will be defendants sued in their individual capacities, these defendants

assert they are entitled to qualified immunity. Likewise, in the event any action of defendants

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deprived or caused a deprivation of plaintiffs federally protected rights, which defendants deny,

then all such actions by defendants were taken in good faith and with a reasonable belief that such

actions were lawful and in compliance with then-existing law.

EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs, by their own conduct and/or admissions, are estopped from bringing some or all

of the purported causes of action in the Complaint or recovering any damages or injunctive relief

sought therein.

NINETEENTH DEFENSE

Each cause of action is barred, in whole or in part, because plaintiffs lack standing and/or

do not have a private right of action to pursue the claims or the particular various relief alleged in

the Complaint.

TWENTIETH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims are barred because plaintiffs have failed to state facts sufficient to

constitute a claim against defendants.

TWENTY-FIRST DEFENSE

The Complaint, and each and every claim for relief contained therein, is barred, in whole

or in part, to the extent that damages, if any, resulted from the acts and/or omissions of plaintiffs.

TWENTY-SECOND DEFENSE

Plaintiffs cannot establish that any of their claims are appropriate for class action treatment

or representative action treatment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

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TWENTY-THIRD DEFENSE

The purported claims made by plaintiffs and the putative class on whose behalf plaintiffs

purport to sue are precluded because the alleged conduct would have affected, if anyone, only an

insubstantial number of putative class members.

TWENTY-FOURTH DEFENSE

The claims should be severed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.

TWENTY-FIFTH DEFENSE

Neither the Causes of Action alleged in the Complaint, nor any part of the allegations, may

be certified as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2). Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,

564 U.S. 338 (2011).

TWENTY-SIXTH DEFENSE

The purported class cannot be certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 because, inter alia, the

purported class, class representatives and/or class counsel fail to meet the numerosity, typicality,

commonality, adequate representation, superiority, and predominance requirements for class

actions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Plaintiffs cannot establish all the elements necessary for class

certification in that, among other things: common issues of fact or law do not predominate, to the

contrary, individual issues predominate; plaintiffs claims are not representative or typical of the

claims of the putative class; plaintiffs are not proper class representatives; and plaintiffs and

alleged putative class counsel are not adequate representatives for the alleged putative class; there

does not exist a well-defined community of interest as to the questions of law and fact involved.

Id. The putative class is sufficiently manageable without implementing the class action

mechanism and, therefore, it is not the superior method for adjudicating this dispute; and, the

alleged putative class is not ascertainable, nor are its members identifiable.

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TWENTY-SEVENTH DEFENSE

The purported claims made by plaintiffs and the putative class on whose behalf plaintiffs

purport to sue are precluded or limited because plaintiffs and members the putative class failed to

exhaust other available remedies or administrative procedures.

TWENTY-EIGHTH DEFENSE
This action is not properly maintainable as a class action because plaintiffs claims are

unique to plaintiffs, so they are incapable of adequately representing the putative class.

TWENTY-NINTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, including those of the putative class, are barred or limited, in whole or

in part, because defendants committed no violation of law. Thus, there are no underlying violations

of a federal right held by the individual plaintiffs or putative class giving rise to liability under 42

U.S.C. 1983.

THIRTIETH DEFENSE

At all times mentioned in the Complaint, defendants acted in self-defense and in defense

of others.

THIRTY-FIRST DEFENSE

At all times mentioned in the Complaint, defendants acted with probable cause or had

reasonable suspicion supporting their actions. In all other acts not requiring probable cause or

reasonable suspicion, defendants had a legal basis for their actions.

THIRTY-SECOND DEFENSE

Defendants contend that plaintiffs willingly, voluntarily, and knowingly assumed each and

every and all the risks and hazards involved in the activities referred to in the Complaint.

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THIRTY-THIRD DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel or res

judicata.

THIRTY-FOURTH DEFENSE
Defendants assert that if they are adjudged, decreed or otherwise determined to be liable to

plaintiffs, then in that event, defendants will be entitled to apportion the degree of their fault or

responsibility for the described incident attributable to plaintiffs or other entities or persons,

whether a party to the lawsuit or not. The amount of damages attributable to these answering

defendants is to be abated, reduced or eliminated to the extent that plaintiffs own negligence, or

the negligence of any other entities or persons, whether party to the lawsuit or not, contributed to

plaintiffs claimed damages, if any there were. This apportionment of damages is to be

administered in accordance with the principles of equity and pursuant to the doctrine of

comparative negligence and pursuant to state law.

THIRTY-FIFTH DEFENSE

Defendants assert that plaintiffs were given, or had available to them, due process for each

of the alleged deprivations and have therefore failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted

under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

THIRTY-SIXTH DEFENSE

Defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to mitigate their damages, assuming they

were damaged at all.

THIRTY-SEVENTH DEFENSE

There is no causal relationship or connection between defendants alleged actions and the

alleged injuries, including alleged deprivation of plaintiffs federal rights. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs

of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 39 (1997).

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THIRTY-EIGHTH DEFENSE

Defendants assert that they are immune from liability under the common law, United States

statutes, and the opinions of the state and federal courts interpreting these laws.

THIRTY-NINTH DEFENSE

Defendants contend that they are not vicariously liable for any act or omission of another

person by way of respondeat superior or otherwise.

FORTIETH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs do not have standing for prospective or injunctive relief. City of Los Angeles v.

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). Likewise, in the event that plaintiffs, including the putative class, are

found to be entitled to any remedy, there is an adequate remedy at law. Id.

FORTY-FIRST DEFENSE

Plaintiffs do not have a private right of action to bring any disparate-impact or effect-based

claims. This includes any such claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see Alexander

v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), or any other federal constitutional provision or statute. To the

extent they are found to have a private right of action for such claims, such right is unconstitutional.

FORTY-SECOND DEFENSE

The allegations in Complaint, at best, illustrate episodic deprivation of federal rights and

do not give rise to pattern-or-practice violations. Intl Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431

U.S. 324 (1977); Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); Puffer v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709 (7th 2012).

FORTY-THIRD DEFENSE

Defendants affirmatively plead the defense of assumption of the risk.

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FORTY-FOURTH DEFENSE

Defendants affirmatively plead the defense of contributory negligence.

FORTY-FIFTH DEFENSE

To the extent it applies, defendants affirmatively plead the decision in Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994).

FORTY-SIXTH DEFENSE

Defendants adopt any and all defenses of, or claimed by, its co-defendants, which are

applicable to defendants and that are subsequently be asserted.

FORTY-SEVENTH DEFENSE

To the extent applicable, defendants assert all applicable abstention doctrines, including

Younger abstention set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Complaint. Defendants

would show that the deputies hired by Sheriff Tucker during his tenure as Sheriff of Madison

County have all been trained to apply the laws of the State of Mississippi and the United States of

America equally to all and have attended mandatory training teaching them the proper treatment

of citizens for the purpose of protecting their civil rights.

2. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Complaint.

3. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Complaint. Defendants

would show that since Sheriff Tucker was elected Sheriff of Madison County, Mississippi, he has

implemented and conducted community programs in the schools to make sure the students are well

informed about what his office does to protect all citizens, Black or White, and to ensure that his

office establishes a good relationship with these students. Upon entry to office, Sheriff Tucker

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also created a Madison County Community Advisory Group comprised of citizens, business

owners, homeowners and others, both Black and White, to meet together and to discuss any and

all concerns all citizens have in regard to the activities of the Madison County Sheriffs

Department. One of the purposes for his creating this Group was to improve race relations in

Madison County, which has been one of his main objectives since being elected to office.

Sheriff Tucker has also received multiple requests since taking office from the Canton,

Mississippi Police Department, managers of various apartment complexes and housing projects in

predominately Black neighborhoods in both Madison County and the City of Canton, and many

businesses asking that the Madison County Sheriffs Department conduct roadblocks near their

neighborhoods and businesses. The Sheriffs Department has also been asked by these same

entities, as well as schools within the Madison County School District, to patrol their streets,

neighborhoods or schools in an effort to control criminal activity and to control the distribution

and use of drugs and contraband. Sheriff Tucker has honored these requests and has been thanked

for his service to these areas, businesses, and schools.

4. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Complaint. According to

information obtained by Sheriff Tucker since this action was filed, roadblocks set up by the

Madison County Sheriffs Department during the last three years were almost equally located in

the southern part of Madison County, which would have included the cities of Ridgeland, Madison,

and Gluckstadt, and the northern part of Madison County, which would have included the City of

Canton. Further, the Sheriffs Department does not set up pedestrian checkpoints, does not

conduct warrantless searches of the homes of Black residents, and does not conduct jump out

patrols. Instead, the Sheriffs Department utilizes patrols known as the NET or Neighborhood

Enhancement Team. These teams do not concentrate their patrols to Black neighborhoods; instead,

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they are used in all facets of law enforcement in Madison County and are conducted throughout

the County, regardless of the racial make-up of an areas. For example, they are disbursed at night

in neighborhoods to combat crimes such as automobile break-ins, vandalism, and burglaries when

these crimes are reported on a regular basis. They are also used in apartment complexes and on

streets and highways for the purpose of combating crime and protecting residents from criminal

activities.

5. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint.

6. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Complaint.

7. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 7 of the Complaint.

8. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 8 of the Complaint. Sheriff Tucker

cannot respond to the allegations in this paragraph concerning his predecessors in office, but, as

set forth in defendants answer to paragraph 3, supra, Sheriff Tucker has taken many steps to

ensure that the Black community has input into the daily operations of the Madison County

Sheriffs Department through various means since he was elected Sheriff in 2012.

9. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Complaint. First, according

to the 2010 Census data referred to by plaintiffs, the racial make-up of the unincorporated areas of

Madison County should be examined rather than that of the entire County since the Madison

County Sheriffs Department is primarily responsible for serving these unincorporated areas with

law enforcement. According to a review of the 2010 Census data, the racial make-up in these

unincorporated areas is essentially the same insofar as Black residents versus White residents.

Further, even though the Sherriffs Department is frequently asked by the cities of Canton and

Flora for help due to the lack of manpower in their police departments, the addition of the

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population in these cities to the unincorporated areas within Madison County only shows a small

percentage difference in the racial make-up of these combined areas.

10. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 10. First, the Madison County

Sheriffs Department does not conduct pedestrian stops. Second, defendants refer to their response

to paragraph 4 and deny that the roadblocks conducted by the Madison County Sheriffs

Department target one neighborhood over the other, Black or White. The roadblocks conducted

by the Sheriffs Department over the last three years show that they were evenly disbursed

throughout Madison County. Further, according to Sheriffs Department policies, each vehicle

was stopped and certain information was uniformly obtained during these roadblocks. Normally,

every vehicle was stopped, but when traffic became backed-up, every second, third or fourth

vehicle was uniformly stopped in order to accommodate motorists having to wait at these

roadblocks. Any differences in the number of Black individuals and White individuals arrested

during these roadblocks is irrelevant to the location of these roadblocks. Instead, these arrests

were based on each individual arrested and whether probable cause existed for their arrest or

whether a warrant was outstanding for their arrest.

11. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 11 of the Complaint. The arrest of

any individual during any roadblock conducted by the Madison County Sheriffs Department is

based on the officers determination of probable cause or on an existing warrant for that arrest.

As to certain vehicle infractions noted by the officers during these roadblocks, only citations are

given, not arrest warrants, and these are given based on the officers observation of each vehicle

and its driver, not on the basis of the drivers race or any amount of income obtained through the

courts, over which the Sheriffs Department has no control.

12. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 12 of the Complaint.

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13. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Complaint.

14. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Complaint.

15. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, including sub-

parts (1) through (4). Defendants would show that the Madison County Sheriffs Department has

investigated all complaints of misconduct by any personnel of the Madison County Sheriffs

Department and has screened all applicants for work with the Department. The Sheriffs

Department has also dismissed any deputy who has exhibited the propensity to use excessive force

or who does not exhibit the necessary prerequisites to being a deputy with the Department. Further,

the Department regularly posts the locations of roadblocks for the public to view prior to those

roadblocks being enforced.

16. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint. Madison

County through the Madison County Board of Supervisors has held itself out to receive any and

all complaints about any constitutional violation claimed by an individual or group of individuals

and makes its meetings open to the public to hear any such complaints.

17. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Complaint, including sub-

parts (a) through (d).

18. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 18 of the Complaint. Madison

County expressly denies that any systematic targeting of Black citizens in Madison County exists

through the Madison County Sheriffs Department.

19. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint. Defendants

deny that any of the named plaintiffs in the Complaint have suffered any violation of their

constitutional rights through any actions of the Madison County Sheriffs Department, including

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any unconstitutional searches and seizures, and deny that any class of plaintiffs exists for the

certification of a class in this action.

20. Other than admitting that Madison County, Mississippi and Sheriff Tucker, in his

official capacity, have been named defendants to the Complaint, defendants deny the allegations

in paragraph 20 of the Complaint.

21. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Complaint.

22. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 22 of the Complaint.

23. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Complaint and specifically

deny that any named plaintiff is entitled to damages against them.

24. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 24 of the Complaint.

JURISDICTION & VENUE

25. Admitted to the extent this action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Defendants deny that this action qualifies to be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 12132, which is a

provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.

26. Admitted.

27. Admitted.

28. Admitted to the extent that 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) grants federal courts discretion to

award attorneys fees in certain, qualified instances. Otherwise, all remaining allegations

contained in paragraph 28 are denied.

29. Admitted.

JURY DEMAND

30. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Complaint.

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PARTIES

Plaintiffs

31. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph 31

of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

32. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph 32

of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

33. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph 33

of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

34. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph 34

of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

35. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph 35

of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

36. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph 36

of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

37. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph 37

of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

38. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph 38

of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

39. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph 39

of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

40. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph 40

of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

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Defendants

41. Other than admitting that Madison County, Mississippi is a political subdivision of

the State of Mississippi, that Madison County receives some federal funding, that the Madison

County Board of Supervisors is comprised of five members, and each members is elected from a

specific district within the County, defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 41 of Complaint.

42. Other than admitting that Randall Tucker has been the Sheriff of Madison County,

Mississippi since January 2012, and that he is responsible for hiring the personnel of the Madison

County Sheriffs Department, defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 42 of the Complaint.

43. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 43 of the Complaint.

44. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 44 of the Complaint.

45. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 45 of the Complaint.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

I. A Brief Overview of Madison County, Mississippi

46. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 46 of the Complaint. Defendants

would show that the total racial make-up of Madison County is irrelevant to the issues in this

matter since the Madison County Sheriffs Department is charged with providing law enforcement

services to the unincorporated areas of Madison County, which are comprised equally of Black

citizens and White citizens.

47. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 47 of the Complaint. Defendants

would show that any comment by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals about the student population

found in Madison County Schools more than 10 years ago is irrelevant to the general population

of the citizens of the unincorporated areas of Madison County at the present time where the

Madison County Sheriffs Department provides law enforcement.

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48. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 48 of the Complaint. Defendants

would show that the racial make-up of the cities of Madison and Ridgeland, Mississippi are

irrelevant to the law enforcement services offered by the Madison County Sheriffs Department

since these cities are not provided law enforcement by the Sheriffs Department except under

special and/or limited circumstances upon request. Defendants would further show that plaintiffs

references to the racial make-up of the cities of Canton and Flora are irrelevant to the law

enforcement services offered by the Sheriffs Department that are at issue in this action. While

the Sheriffs Department, at the request of both these cities police departments, provides some

law enforcement services to Canton and Flora because of their inability to provide those services

effectively at times, the racial make-up of the entire areas serviced by the Sheriffs Department

does not indicate the racial differences alleged in this paragraph.

49. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 49 of the Complaint.

50. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 50 of the Complaint.

II. The MCSDs Policing Program

51. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 51 of the Complaint. Defendants

would further show that the information contained in this paragraph is irrelevant to the law

enforcement services provided by the Madison County Sheriffs Department since its services are

not based on the income of any resident who is a recipient of its services.

52. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 52 of the Complaint.

53. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 53 of the Complaint.

54. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Complaint.

55. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 55 of the Complaint.

56. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 56 of the Complaint.

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A. Pretextual and Highly Intrusive Vehicular Roadblocks

57. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 57 of the Complaint.

58. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Complaint.

59. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 59 of the Complaint. As averred by

defendants in their response to paragraph 10, each roadblock conducted by the Madison County

Sheriffs Department is conducted in the same uniform way without regard to race.

60. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 60 of the Complaint.

61. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Complaint.

62. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 62 of the Complaint. Defendants

would show that the Madison County Sheriffs Department, while sometimes assisting the cities

of Ridgeland and Madison in conducting roadblocks, is rarely requested to assist these cities

police departments because they have sufficient personnel and manpower to conduct their own

roadblocks.

63. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 63 of the Complaint. Defendants

would show that all personnel who conduct roadblocks for the Madison County Sheriffs

Department are required to wear reflective or other identifying vests and to use certain lighting for

their safety and the safety of the drivers who are stopped during these roadblocks.

64. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in paragraph

64 of the Complaint and, therefore, they deny those allegations. Defendants would show that had

this isolated incident occurred, the deputy in question was not acting according to the policies of

the Madison County Sheriffs Department.

65. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Complaint.

66. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 66 of the Complaint.

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67. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 67 of the Complaint.

68. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 68 of the Complaint.

69. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 69 of the Complaint.

70. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 70 of the Complaint. Defendants

would show that the Roadblock Notice referenced in this paragraph was taken down the same day

it was posted once the Sheriffs Department was alerted to its content.

71. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 71 of the Complaint.

72. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Complaint.

73. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 73 of the Complaint.

74. Defendants lack sufficient information as to the existence of some private Facebook

page referenced in paragraph 74 of the Complaint and, therefore, deny the allegations in the first

three sentences of this paragraph. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 74.

75. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 75 of the Complaint.

1. The Primary Purpose of the MCSDs System of Roadblocks Is to Target Black


Motorists for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

76. To the extent that the first sentence of paragraph 76 of the Complaint seeks to

interpret the decision found in Edmond, defendants deny any allegation that is inconsistent with

that decision. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 76.

77. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 77 of the Complaint.

78. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 78 of the Complaint.

79. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 79 of the Complaint.

80. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 80 of the Complaint.

B. Suspicionless Searches and Seizures of Black Pedestrians

81. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 81 of the Complaint.

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82. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 82 of the Complaint.

83. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 83 of the Complaint.

84. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 84 of the Complaint.

85. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 85 of the Complaint.

86. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 86 of the Complaint.

87. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 87 of the Complaint.

88. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 88 of the Complaint.

89. Other than admitting that the plaintiff, Steven Smith, was arrested in January 2017

on outstanding warrants for his arrest while walking inside Canton Estates Apartments by deputies

with the Madison County Sheriffs Department who were performing a foot or walk-through patrol

at the request of its manager, defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 89 of the Complaint.

Defendants would show that Mr. Smith was walking with another individual at the time he was

stopped, and that both Mr. Smith and that individual had their hands in their pockets. When both

were asked to remove their hands from their pockets by a deputy for safety reasons, the individual

with Mr. Smith admitted that he had a concealed weapon on him. After checking whether the

individual had a conceal-carry weapon permit and learning that no record existed showing a valid

permit, that individual was arrested. After checking Mr. Smiths identification and running a

warrants check, the deputies discovered that he had two outstanding warrants for his arrest. As

required by Mississippi law, Mr. Smith, along with the individual who was illegally carrying a

concealed weapon, were arrested.

90. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 90 of the Complaint.

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C. Warrantless and Consentless Searches of the Homes of Black Residents

91. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 91 of the Complaint. Defendants

specifically deny that they conduct pedestrian checkpoints.

92. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 92 of the Complaint.

93. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 93 of the Complaint, including sub-

paragraphs a) through d). As to the allegations in subparagraph (a), Mr. Manning was asked to

write a witness statement concerning a burglary that he, as well as his wife, had been observed

witnessing. Mr. Manning was told that if he did not cooperate and provide the statement, he would

be arrested for being accomplice in the crime. Mr. Manning was handcuffed after he was detained,

but no unreasonable force was exercised against him while he was being detained.

As to the circumstances surrounding Mr. Blackmons detainment referenced in

subparagraph (b), the deputies who came to Mr. Blackmons home had an outstanding warrant in

their hands for the arrest of the plaintiff, Anthony Green, for failure to pay child support. The

address on that warrant was Mr. Greens correct address and, in fact, he was arrested at that address

pursuant to this same warrant one month later. After a deputy knocked on Mr. Blackmons door,

Mr. Blackmon opened the door and, after seeing the deputy, slammed the door shut. The deputy

in question concluded by Mr. Blackmons actions that he was Anthony Green, proceeded to place

the written warrant up against the front window of the house, and again asked the individual he

thought was Green to open the door. After Mr. Blackmon refused to open door, the deputy kicked

the door open. Mr. Blackmon then ran into another room, which resulted in that deputys pulling

his gun and ordering Blackmon to lie on the floor. That deputy then proceeded to place handcuffs

on Mr. Blackmon for both his and Mr. Blackmons safety. Mr. Blackmon continued to refuse to

give the deputies his name, and suddenly, another man walked into the room holding a loaded gun.

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After disarming that man, the deputies attempted to remove the handcuffs from Blackmon, but the

keys they had did not work, so they had to have another deputy come to the scene with another set

of keys. While still handcuffed, Mr. Blackmon told the deputy who had handcuffed him that he

was going to sue [my] white cracker ass like he did my bitch ass boss Randy Tucker. Mr.

Blackmon was not arrested during the incident.

As to the allegations concerning Mr. Smith in subparagraph (c), defendants have no record

whatsoever of the incident and deny those allegations. Finally, as to the allegations concerning

Mrs. Tucker about an incident that occurred several years ago, defendants have no record

whatsoever of that incident and deny those allegations.

94. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 94 of the Complaint.

95. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 95 of the Complaint.

96. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 96 of the Complaint.

D. Jump Out Patrols

97. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 97 of the Complaint.

98. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 98 of the Complaint.

99. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 99 of the Complaint.

100. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 100 of the Complaint.

101. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 101 of the Complaint, including sub-

paragraphs a) through b).

102. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 102 of the Complaint.

103. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 103 of the Complaint.

104. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 104 of the Complaint.

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III. Race-Based Statistical Disparities in Policing Outcomes Provide Compelling


Evidence of the MCSDs Policing Program

105. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 105 of the Complaint.

106. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 106 of the Complaint.

107. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 107 of the Complaint.

108. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 108 of the Complaint.

109. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 109 of the Complaint.

110. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 110 of the Complaint.

111. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 111 of the Complaint.

IV. The MCSDs Policing Program Is Longstanding and Deeply-Entrenched

112. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 112 of the Complaint. Defendants

would show that Sheriff Tucker became Sheriff of Madison County in January 2012 and,

afterward, took great efforts to communicate and coordinate with both the Black and White

communities regarding the services of the Madison County Sheriff Department. They deny that

any services offered and performed by the Madison County Sheriffs Department are

unconstitutional or racially-based.

113. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 113 of the Complaint. Defendants

submit that any actions taken by Sheriff Tuckers predecessors in office during the Civil Rights

Era have absolutely nothing to do with how Sheriff Tucker has performed his duties since being

elected in 2012.

114. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 114 of the Complaint. Defendants

submit that any actions taken by Sheriff Noble or any consent judgment entered against him

regarding the operation of the former Madison County Jail are irrelevant to the issues in this matter

and are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

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115. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 115 of the Complaint. Defendants

submit that any actions taken by former Sheriff Trowbridge are irrelevant to the issues in this

matter and are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

116. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 116 of the Complaint. Defendants

submit that any actions taken by former Sheriff Trowbridge are irrelevant to the issues in this

matter and are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

117. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 117 of the Complaint. Defendants

submit that any actions taken by former Sheriff Trowbridge are irrelevant to the issues in this

matter and are time barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

118. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 118 of the Complaint. Defendants

submit that any actions taken by former Sheriff Trowbridge are irrelevant to the issues in this

matter and are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

119. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 119 of the Complaint. Defendants

submit that any actions taken by former Sheriff Trowbridge are irrelevant to the issues in this

matter and are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

120. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 120 of the Complaint.

121. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 121 of the Complaint. Defendants

submit that any actions taken by former Sheriff Trowbridge are irrelevant to the issues in this

matter and are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

122. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 122 of the Complaint. Defendants

submit that any actions taken by former Sheriff Trowbridge are irrelevant to the issues in this

matter and are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

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123. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 123 of the Complaint. Defendants

submit that any actions taken by former Sheriff Trowbridge are irrelevant to the issues in this

matter and are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

124. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 124 of the Complaint. Defendants

submit that any actions taken by former Sheriff Trowbridge are irrelevant to the issues in this

matter and are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

125. Other than admitting that the Madison County Board of Supervisors authorized the

Madison County Sheriffs Department to use State of Mississippi Grant money for roadblocks,

defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 125 of the Complaint.

126. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 126 of the Complaint.

127. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in the first

sentence of paragraph 127, and, therefore they deny those allegations. Defendants deny the

remaining allegations in paragraph 127 of the Complaint. Defendants submit that any actions

taken by former Sheriff Trowbridge are irrelevant to the issues in this matter and are time-barred

by the applicable statute of limitations.

128. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in the first

sentence of paragraph 128, and, therefore they deny those allegations. Defendants deny the

remaining allegations in paragraph 128 of the Complaint. Defendants submit that any actions

taken by former Sheriff Trowbridge are irrelevant to the issues in this matter and are time-barred

by the applicable statute of limitations.

129. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in the first

sentence of paragraph 129, and, therefore they deny those allegations. Defendants deny the

remaining allegations in paragraph 129 of the Complaint. Defendants submit that any actions

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taken by former Sheriff Trowbridge are irrelevant to the issues in this matter and are time-barred

by the applicable statute of limitations.

130. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 130 of the Complaint.

131. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 131 of the Complaint.

132. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 132 of the Complaint.

133. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 133 of the Complaint.

V. Sheriff Tucker Has Adopted, Implemented, and Expanded the Policing Program

134. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 134 of the Complaint.

135. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 135 of the Complaint.

136. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 136 of the Complaint.

137. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 137 of the Complaint.

A. Sheriff Tucker Has Entered a Written Roadblock Policy That Sanctions


Unconstitutional Racially Discriminatory Roadblocks

138. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 138 of the Complaint.

139. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 139 of the Complaint.

140. Other than admitting that the language found in subparagraphs a. through c. can be

found in the General Roadblocks subsection of the existing policies for conducting roadblocks

for the Madison County Sheriffs Department, defendants deny the remaining allegations in

paragraph 140 of the Complaint. Defendants would show that all roadblocks conducted by the

Madison County Sheriffs Department are conducted pursuant to the Departments Sobriety

Checkpoint Guidelines. Defendants would further show that the Sheriffs Department was

required to include the more detailed language in the sobriety portion of the policies by the State

of Mississippi after receiving grant monies. Despite the differences of certain language in the

Departments roadblock policies, all roadblocks executed in Madison County by the Madison

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County Sheriffs Department are conducted under the guidelines of the Sobriety Checkpoint

Guidelines.

141. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 141 of the Complaint and refer

plaintiffs to their response to paragraph 140 above.

142. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 142 of the Complaint.

143. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 143 of the Complaint.

144. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 144 of the Complaint.

145. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 145 of the Complaint.

VI. Sheriff Tucker Has Been Deliberately Indifferent to the Constitutional Violations
Caused by the Policing Program

146. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 146 of the Complaint.

147. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 147 of the Complaint, including sub-

parts (1) through (5) of that paragraph.

A. On Information and Belief, Sheriff Tucker Failed to Investigate an MCSD


Deputys Claim of Unconstitutional Racially Discriminatory Policing
Practices

148. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 148 of the Complaint.

149. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 149 of the Complaint.

150. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 150 of the Complaint and would show

that the claims asserted by Mr. Gibson in his lawsuit are best determined by a review of his

complaint filed in that action.

151. Defendants have denied Mr. Gibsons allegations against them in his lawsuit filed

against them and now deny those same allegations as set forth in paragraph 151 of the Complaint.

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B. Sheriff Tucker Hired a Deputy with a Documented History of


Misconduct Involving Excessive Use of Force

152. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 152 of the Complaint.

153. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 153 of the Complaint.

154. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 154 of the Complaint.

155. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 155 of the Complaint.

156. Other than admitting that Deputy Moore is a deputy with the Madison County

Sheriffs Department, defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 156 of Complaint.

157. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 157 of the Complaint.

C. Sheriff Tucker Has Not Established any Rules or Regulations


Prohibiting Racial Bias in Policing

158. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 158 of the Complaint.

159. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 159 of the Complaint.

160. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 160 of the Complaint.

D. Sheriff Tucker Does Not Maintain Even Basic Data on the MCSDs
Policing Practices or Municipal Crime Statistics

161. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 161 of the Complaint. Defendants

would show that Sheriff Tucker is not required under existing law to create the data addressed by

plaintiffs in this paragraph, but the Sheriffs Department does report certain crime statistics to the

FBI pursuant to its request.

162. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 162 of the Complaint.

163. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 163 of the Complaint. The Madison

County Sheriffs Department gives notice to the public of each roadblock it conducts, but it is not

required under any existing law to keep records on these locations. Since the Complaint was filed

in this action, Sheriff Tucker has obtained information on the location of all roadblocks conducted

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by the Madison County Sheriffs Department for three years prior to the filing of the Complaint.

The percentages of roadblocks located in certain parts of Madison County are provided in its

response to paragraph 4 of the Complaint.

164. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 164 of the Complaint.

165. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 165 of the Complaint.

E. Sheriff Tucker Has Stopped Keeping Records of Complaints Against MCSD


Deputies

166. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 166 of the Complaint. The complaint

form referred to in paragraph 166, which Sheriff Tucker does not use, was never a form used by

citizens while lodging a complaint against a deputy. Under Sheriff Tuckers tenure as Sheriff of

Madison County, citizens are encouraged and instructed to report any complaints directly to the

Sheriffs Department, and once received either in writing or orally, each complaint is reviewed by

the same individual, who, in turn, investigates the complaint.

167. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 167 of the Complaint. Sheriff Tucker

does receive and review complaints made against his officers. If a complaint is acted upon by the

Sheriffs Department, investigatory or internal narrative reports or memos are placed in the

officers personnel file, which is exempt under the Mississippi Public Records Act. Therefore,

the Sheriffs statement in response to a public records request by the ACLU-MS that he does not

maintain a file for these complaints was correct. He does not maintain a general file for all

complaints made against his officers.

168. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 168 of the Complaint.

VII. The Board of Supervisors Has Been Deliberately Indifferent to the Constitutional
Violations Caused by the Policing Program

169. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 169 of the Complaint.

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170. Other than admitting that the Madison County Board of Supervisors is comprised

of five members, who are elected from their respective districts within the County, defendants

deny the allegations in paragraph 170 of the Complaint.

171. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 171 of the Complaint, including sub-

parts a) through c).

172. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 172 of the Complaint.

173. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 173 of the Complaint, including sub-

parts (a) through (d).

174. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 174 of the Complaint.

VIII. The Policing Program Has Caused Thousands of Constitutional Violations

175. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 175 of the Complaint.

176. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 176 of the Complaint.

177. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 177 of the Complaint.

ALLEGATIONS OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVES

178. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 178 of the Complaint.

179. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 179 of the Complaint.

180. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 180 of the Complaint.

Latoya Brown

181. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph

181 of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

182. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 182 of the Complaint, and specifically

deny that the Madison County Sheriffs Department conducts pedestrian checkpoints.

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a. Pedestrian Checkpoints

183. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 183 of the Complaint.

184. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 184 of the Complaint.

b. Suspicionless Pedestrian Stop

185. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph

185 of the Complaint and, therefore, deny those allegations. Defendants would show that in the

past year, Ms. Brown has called the Sheriffs Department on three (3) separate occasions to

complain of suspicious activity in Madison County, Mississippi. In April 2017, she complained

of seeing black males walking in an area of rural Madison County while drinking beer and smoking

marijuana. The Sheriffs Department responded to her call and made arrests. During that same

month, Ms. Brown reported to the Sheriffs Department that the plaintiff, Steven Smith, had taken

personal property from her apartment and choked her. The Sheriffs Department responded to her

call. Further, in November 2014, Ms. Brown called the Sheriffs Department to report a suspicious

vehicle in her housing complex, and in June 2011, she called the Sheriffs Department to complain

of men gambling in front of her apartment. In February 2011, Ms. Brown called to report that she

had heard gunshots in her housing complex, and the Sheriffs Department responded to her call.

Ms. Brown made additional calls for help to the Sheriffs Department in July 2010, when she

complained that a group of black males were shooting at each other in her apartment complex and

identified one of the shooters. Her call resulted in an arrest of the shooter and his brother. Finally,

Ms. Brown called the Sheriffs Department in December 2009 and reported that her mother was

fighting with her at her housing project. The Sheriffs Department also responded to this call.

Defendants find it ironic that Ms. Brown has asked for help from the Sheriffs Department on six

different occasions because of suspicious activities or crimes that were occurring in the same

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housing complex where she is now complaining that she was stopped once and asked for

identification by a deputy patrolling the complex at the request of its manager.

186. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 186 of the Complaint.

187. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 187 of the Complaint.

c. Roadblocks

188. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 188 of the Complaint.

189. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 189 of the Complaint.

190. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 190 of the Complaint.

Lawrence Blackmon

191. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in paragraph

191 of the Complaint, and, therefore, deny them.

192. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 192 of the Complaint. Defendants

adopt their response to paragraph 93 in response to this paragraph and the subsequent paragraphs

describing the incident involving Mr. Blackmon.

a. Home Search; Use of Force

193. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 193 of the Complaint.

194. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 194 of the Complaint.

195. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 195 of the Complaint.

196. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 196 of the Complaint.

197. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 197 of the Complaint.

198. Other than agreeing that the deputies who had initially handcuffed Mr. Blackmon

while executing their arrest warrant could not unlock the handcuffs, and that they had to call

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another deputy to bring a different key, defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 198 of the

Complaint.

199. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 199 of the Complaint.

200. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 200 of the Complaint.

b. Roadblocks

201. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in paragraph

201 of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

202. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 202 of the Complaint.

203. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 203 of the Complaint.

204. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 204 of the Complaint.

Herbert Anthony Green

205. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in paragraph

205 of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

206. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 206 of the Complaint.

a. Jump Out Patrol

207. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 207 of the Complaint, and specifically

deny that the Madison County Sheriffs Department conducts jump out patrols.

208. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 208 of the Complaint.

209. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 209 of the Complaint.

Khadafy and Quinnetta Manning

210. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations in paragraph

210 of the Complaint and, therefore, they deny those allegations. Although the Mannings do not

reveal in this paragraph where they live in Canton, defendants would show that they live at Canton

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Estates Apartments, one of the housing complexes in Madison County where the Sheriffs

Department, at the request of the manager of the apartments, performs foot patrols. According to

a lawsuit filed by Mr. Manning, the apartments are subject to regular criminal activities which

pose a danger to their residents and their invited guests, and present an atmosphere of criminal

activity. As to criminal activity, Mr. Manning has been arrested by law enforcement over 20

times in the State of Mississippi and has had criminal charges lodged against him in the State of

Missouri.

211. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 211of the Complaint. An accurate

description of the incident involving Mr. Manning is set forth in defendants response to paragraph

93 of their Answer. They adopt that response in response to this paragraph.

a. Home Invasion; Use of Force

212. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 212 of the Complaint.

213. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 213 of the Complaint.

214. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 214 of the Complaint. The deputies

who entered the Mannings apartment were pursuing Mr. and Mrs. Manning because both of them

were observed helping another individual break into an apartment below them.

215. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 215 of the Complaint.

216. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 216 of the Complaint.

217. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 217 of the Complaint.

218. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 218 of the Complaint.

219. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 219 of the Complaint.

220. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 220 of the Complaint.

221. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 221 of the Complaint.

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222. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 222 of the Complaint.

223. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 223 of the Complaint.

224. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 224 of the Complaint.

225. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 225 of the Complaint.

226. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 226 of the Complaint.

227. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 227 of the Complaint.

228. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 228 of the Complaint.

229. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 229 of the Complaint.

230. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 230 of the Complaint.

231. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 231 of the Complaint.

232. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 232 of the Complaint.

233. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 233 of the Complaint.

234. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 234 of the Complaint.

235. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 235 of the Complaint.

236. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 236 of the Complaint.

b. Baseless Arrest; Retaliation

237. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 237 of the Complaint. The incident

in question occurred after Mr. Manning was stopped while driving a vehicle within the Canton

Estates Apartments. The deputy, who performing foot patrol at the apartments, observed Mr.

Manning make an abrupt turn to try and avoid the deputy. Mr. Manning stopped and was arrested

for driving with a suspended license and driving without insurance.

238. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 238 of the Complaint.

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Marvin McField

239. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in paragraph

239 of the Complaint, and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

240. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 240 of the Complaint.

241. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 241 of the Complaint.

242. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 242 of the Complaint.

243. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 243 of the Complaint.

a. Roadblocks; Use of Force; Incarceration without Charge or Due Process


244. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 244 of the Complaint.

245. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 245 of the Complaint.

246. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 246 of the Complaint.

247. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 247 of the Complaint.

248. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 248 of the Complaint.

249. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 249 of the Complaint.

250. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 250 of the Complaint.

251. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 251 of the Complaint. Mr. McField

was arrested by the Madison County Sheriffs Department on three Capias for the sale of cocaine

and/or marijuana on May 5, 2006. Mr. McField was booked into the Madison County Detention

Center that same date and released on May 9, 2006, after posting bond. Mr. McField was arrested

again by the Madison County Sheriffs Department on May 28, 2006, for no proof of insurance

and possession of marijuana in his vehicle. He was taken to Justice Court for arraignment on May

30, 2006, but was denied bond because of his previous arrest and indictments for drug charges.

He was then released from the Detention Center on June 15, 2006, pursuant to a Justice Court

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order. The Madison County Sheriffs Department played no role in the court decisions regarding

Mr. McFields being given a bond or being released.

252. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 252 of the Complaint.

253. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in the first

sentence of paragraph 253 of the Complaint. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in

paragraph 253.

254. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 254 of the Complaint.

b. Suspicionless Traffic Stop

255. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 255 of the Complaint.

256. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 256 of the Complaint.

257. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 257 of the Complaint.

258. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 258 of the Complaint.

259. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 259 of the Complaint.

260. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 260 of the Complaint.

Nick Singleton

261. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in paragraph

261 of the Complaint and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

262. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in paragraph

262 of the Complaint and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

263. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 263 of the Complaint. Mr. Singleton

was arrested in March 2011 for possession of marijuana while in the possession of a firearm and

booked into the Madison County Detention Center after a package, which was addressed to his

residence pursuant to a controlled delivery was found to contain drugs.

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a. Roadblocks

264. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 264 of the Complaint.

265. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 265 of the Complaint.

266. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 266 of the Complaint.

267. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 267 of the Complaint.

268. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 268 of the Complaint.

Steven Smith

269. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in paragraph

269 of the Complaint and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

270. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 270 of the Complaint.

a. Pedestrian Checkpoint

271. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 271 of the Complaint and specifically

deny that the Madison County Sheriffs Department conducts pedestrian checkpoints. The details

of the January 2017 incident involving Mr. Smith are more fully described by defendants in their

response to paragraph 89 of the Complaint. Defendants adopt their response to that paragraph in

response to this paragraph, as well as while responding to subsequent paragraphs 272 through 273.

272. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 272 of the Complaint.

273. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 273 of the Complaint.

274. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 274 of the Complaint.

275. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 275 of the Complaint.

b. Home Search

276. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in paragraph

276 of the Complaint and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

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277. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 277 of the Complaint.

278. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 278 of the Complaint.

279. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 279 of the Complaint.

280. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 280 of the Complaint.

281. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 281 of the Complaint.

Bessie Thomas

282. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in paragraph

282 of the Complaint and, therefore, they deny those allegations.

283. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 283 of the Complaint.

284. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 284 of the Complaint. According to

defendants records, Ms. Thomas, in February 2016, called to report that someone had broken into

her store. The Madison County Sheriffs Department responded to her call, but no arrests were

made.

a. Home Invasion

285. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 285 of the Complaint.

286. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 286 of the Complaint.

b. Roadblocks

287. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 287 of the Complaint.

288. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 288 of the Complaint.

289. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 289 of the Complaint.

290. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 290 of the Complaint.

Betty Jean Williams Tucker

41
Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 20 Filed 06/29/17 Page 42 of 47

291. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in paragraph

291 of the Complaint and, therefore, they deny them.

292. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 292 of the Complaint.

293. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 293 of the Complaint.

294. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 294 of the Complaint.

a. Roadblocks
295. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 295 of the Complaint.

296. Defendants lack sufficient information to respond to the allegations in the first

sentence of paragraph 296 of the Complaint. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in

paragraph 296.

297. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 297 of the Complaint.

298. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 298 of the Complaint.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

299. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 299 of the Complaint and specifically

deny that plaintiffs are entitled to bring a class against defendants.

300. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 300 of the Complaint.

301. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 301 of the Complaint.

302. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 302 of the Complaint.

303. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 303 of the Complaint.

304. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 304 of the Complaint.

305. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 305 of the Complaint.

306. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 306 of the Complaint.

307. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 307 of the Complaint.

308. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 308 of the Complaint.

42
Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 20 Filed 06/29/17 Page 43 of 47

309. Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 309 of the Complaint.

CAUSES OF ACTION
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Claims of Named Plaintiffs and Class Members Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983


Against All Defendants for Violations of the Fourth Amendment)

310. Defendants incorporate and adopt by reference each and every response they have

made to paragraphs 1 through 309 above in response to paragraph 310 of the Complaint.

311. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 311 of the Complaint.

312. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 312 of the Complaint.

313. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 313 of the Complaint.

314. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 314 of the Complaint.

315. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 315 of the Complaint.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Claims of Named Plaintiffs and Class Members Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983


Against All Defendants for Violations of the Equal Protection Clause)

316. Defendants incorporate and adopt by reference each and every response they have

made to paragraphs 1 through 315 above in response to paragraph 316 of the Complaint.

317. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 317 of the Complaint.

318. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 318 of the Complaint.

319. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 319 of the Complaint.

320. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 320 of the Complaint.

43
Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 20 Filed 06/29/17 Page 44 of 47

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Claims of Named Plaintiffs and Class Members Pursuant to Title VI of the


Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000(d), et seq., Against the County)

321. Defendants incorporate and adopt by reference each and every response they have

made to paragraphs 1 through 320 above in response to paragraph 321 of the Complaint.

322. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 322 of the Complaint.

323. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 323 of the Complaint.

324. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 324 of the Complaint.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Individual Claims of Khadafy Manning Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983


Against John Does #1 through #6)

325. Defendants incorporate and adopt by reference each and every response they have

made to paragraphs 1 through 324 above in response to paragraph 325 of the Complaint.

326. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 326 of the Complaint.

327. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 327 of the Complaint.

328. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 328 of the Complaint.

329. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 329 of the Complaint.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Individual Claims of Quinnetta Manning Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983


Against John Does #1 through #6)

330. Defendants incorporate and adopt by reference each and every response they have

made to paragraphs 1 through 329 above in response to paragraph 330 of the Complaint.

331. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 331 of the Complaint.

332. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 332 of the Complaint.

333. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 333 of the Complaint.

44
Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 20 Filed 06/29/17 Page 45 of 47

334. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 334 of the Complaint.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION


(Individual Claims of Khadafy Manning and Quinnetta Manning
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 Against the County)

335. Defendants incorporate and adopt by reference each and every response they have

made to paragraphs 1 through 334 above in response to paragraph 335 of the Complaint.

336. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 336 of the Complaint.

337. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 337 of the Complaint.

Defendants deny the allegations in the last unnumbered paragraph of the Complaint,

entitled PRAYER FOR RELIEF, including sub-paragraphs A. through H. and their sub-parts.

AND NOW having fully answered the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants demand

to be dismissed with their costs.

THIS the 29th day of June, 2017.

Respectfully submitted:

MADISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI and


SHERIFF RANDALL C. TUCKER, IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

BY: /s/ Michael B. Wallace


Michael B. Wallace (MSB #6904)
Charles E. Ross (MSB #5683)
James E. Graves (MSB #102252)
Charles E. Cowan (MSB #104478)
WISE CARTER CHILD & CARAWAY, P.A.
Post Office Box 651
Jackson, Mississippi 39205-0651
Telephone: 601-968-5534
Facsimile: 601- 944-7738
mbw@wisecarter.com
cer@wisecarter.com
jeg@wisecarter.com
cec@wisecarter.com

45
Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 20 Filed 06/29/17 Page 46 of 47

and

T. Russell Nobile (MSB #100682)


WISE CARTER CHILD & CARAWAY, P.A.
2510 14th Street, Suite 1125
Gulfport, Mississippi 39501
Telephone: 228-867-7141
Facsimile: 228-867-7142
trn@wisecarter.com

OF COUNSEL:
Rebecca B. Cowan #7735
CURRIE JOHNSON & MEYERS, P.A.
1044 River Oaks Dr.
Jackson, MS 39232
P.O. Box 750
Jackson, Mississippi 39205-0750
Telephone: 601-969-1010
Facsimile: 601-969-5120
bcowan@curriejohsnon.com

46
Case 3:17-cv-00347-WHB-LRA Document 20 Filed 06/29/17 Page 47 of 47

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Michael B. Wallace, hereby certify that I have this day, electronically filed the above and

foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the ECF system which will automatically provide e-mail

notification of said filing upon the following:

Joshua Tom, Esq.


Paloma Wu, Esq.
American Civil Liberties Union of Mississippi Foundation
233 E. Capitol Street
Jackson, MS 39201
PWu@aclu-ms.org
JTom@aclu-ms.org

Jonathan K. Youngwood, Esq.


Janet A. Gochman, Esq.
Isaac Rethy, Esq.
Nihara K. Choudhri, Esq.
Yukiu Chan, Esq.
Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett, LLP
425 Lexington A Venue
New York, NY 10017
jyoungblood@stblaw.com
jgochman@stblaw.com
irethy@stblaw.com
nchoudhri@stblaw.com
monica.chan@stblaw.com

Ezekiel Edwards, Esq.


Jeffery Robinson, Esq.
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004
eedwards@aclu.org
jrobinson@aclu.org

This the 29th day of June, 2017.


/s/ Michael B. Wallace
Michael B. Wallace

47
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION

LATOYA BROWN; LAWRENCE


BLACKMON; HERBERT ANTHONY
GREEN; KHADAFY MANNING;
QUINNETTA MANNING; MARVIN
MCFIELD; NICHOLAS SINGLETON;
STEVEN SMITH; BESSIE THOMAS; and Civil Action No. _______________
BETTY JEAN WILLIAMS TUCKER,
individually and on behalf of a class of all
others similarly situated, CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY AND
Plaintiffs, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND
INDIVIDUAL DAMAGES
v.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
MADISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI;
SHERIFF RANDALL S. TUCKER, in his
official capacity; and MADISON COUNTY
SHERIFFS DEPUTIES JOHN DOES #1
through #6, in their individual capacities,

Defendants.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. The Sheriffs Department of Madison County, Mississippi (MCSD) implements

a coordinated top-down program of methodically targeting Black individuals for suspicionless

searches and seizures while they are driving their cars, walking in their neighborhoods, or even

just spending time in their own homes (the Policing Program). MCSD deputies frequently use

unjustified and excessive force in conducting these searches and seizures.

2. The MCSDs Policing Program impacts virtually every aspect of Black residents

lives. Simple daily activitiessuch as commuting to work, grocery shopping, visiting friends

and family, attending church, or even sitting on the steps outside ones own homepresent the

1
very real possibility of unlawful and humiliating searches and seizures, as well as the attendant

prospect of arrest and jail time for unpaid fines and fees. 1

3. As a result, many Black residents of Madison County experience chronic fear and

anxiety, disruptions to their everyday activities, restrictions on travel within their own

neighborhoods and towns, and a tremendous reluctance to contact law enforcement officials for

assistance when necessary. Some Black community members go so far as to avoid leaving their

homes to limit the risk of encountering one of the MCSDs many illegal roadblocks or pedestrian

checkpoints described below. In effect, the Policing Program has placed the Black community

of Madison County under a permanent state of siege.

4. The hallmark tactics of the MCSDs longstanding and deeply-entrenched Policing

Program include:

vehicular roadblocks designed and placed to target Black individuals for highly
intrusive, pretextual, and suspicionless searches and seizures in Madison Countys
majority-Black towns, residential neighborhoods, and business districts;

pedestrian checkpoints designed to target Black individuals for suspicionless


searches and seizures, including while entering or exiting predominantly-Black
housing complexes;

warrantless and consentless searches of the homes of Black residents,


sometimes accompanied by suspicionless searches and seizures of all persons
within; and

Jump Out patrols of plainclothes deputies deployed in unmarked cars in


Black communities to stealthily and aggressively target Black individuals for
unreasonable searches and seizures.

1
Whenever an MCSD deputy stops a Black individual, the deputy typically checks that individuals
identification to determine whether he or she owes outstanding fines to the County. These fines often
stem from traffic violations or other minor infractions. Black individuals are more likely than white
individuals in Madison County to lack the resources to pay these fines, as well as the added court fees, in
full on their scheduled court dates. When an individual fails to pay the required amount, the court will
issue a warrant for his/her arrest to compel collection.

2
The MCSD also relies on a broad range of other methodsincluding suspicionless traffic stops

and suspicionless frisks of pedestriansto target Black community members for illegal searches

and seizures.

5. The MCSD has deployed the unconstitutional racially discriminatory policing

tactics described above pursuant to a single overarching policy, custom, and/or practice of

systematically conducting unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, homes, cars, and

property on the basis of race.

6. The Policing Program is so persistent and widespread as to practically have

the force of law in Madison County.

7. Like many policing policies, practices, and customs deemed unconstitutional by

federal courts and the United States Department of Justice, 2 each of the policing practices

conducted pursuant to the MCSDs Policing Program independently violates both the Fourth

Amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures and the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

8. The Policing Program is rooted in Madison Countys infamous history of racial

animus. The wealthiest county in Mississippi, Madison County is now and has always been

acutely racially segregated. Past Madison County Sheriffs have violently opposed racial

integration, led white supremacist organizations, 3 and willfully turned a blind eye to racially

2
See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department (2016),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download; U.S. Department of Justice, Investigation of the
Ferguson Police Department (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1.pdf.
3
See, e.g., Officer Memorials, Sheriff Randy Tucker, http://www.sheriffrandytucker.com/officer-
memorials/ (last visited May 5, 2017) (reprinting September 10, 1959 Madison County Herald article
stating that former Madison County Sheriff Marion F. Simpson was one of the organizers of the local
Citizens Council and remained as one of its most active leaders, also serving on the Executive Committee
of the state association of Citizens Councils.). The Citizens Council was formed in opposition to

3
discriminatory conditions of confinement. These sheriffs used many of the same unconstitutional

racially discriminatory policing tactics employed in the Policing Program. For example, during

the Civil Rights era, Madison County Sheriff Billy Noble regularly established roadblocks to

conduct unconstitutional searches and seizures of Black motorists.

9. The MCSDs Policing Program has resulted in stark racial disparities in policing

outcomes that cannot be explained by alternative non-race-based factors. Although only 38% of

Madison County residents are Black, 4 approximately 73% of arrests in Madison County

between May and September of 2016 were of Black individuals. Only 23% arrests during

this time period were of white individuals, even though Madison County is 57% white. 5

These statistics suggest that the arrest rate for Black individuals is nearly five times the arrest

rate for white individuals in Madison County.6

10. Because the MCSD targets Black communities for roadblocks and suspicionless

pedestrian stops, the vast majority of individuals arrested at roadblocks and pedestrian stops in

Madison County are Black. Between May and September 2016, 81% of arrests at roadblocks and

82% of arrests at pedestrian stops in Madison County were of Black individuals.

desegregation and gr[e]w to be the most powerful opponent of civil rights activism in Mississippi. The
Citizens Council, AMERICAN RADIOWORKS,
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/mississippi/c1.html (last visited May 5, 2017).
4
Based on 2010 Census data. See Quickfacts: Madison County, Mississippi, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/28089,28 (last visited May 5, 2017).
5
Based on 2010 Census data. See Quickfacts: Madison County, Mississippi, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/28089,28 (last visited May 5, 2017).
6
If the MCSDs arrest rates were proportional to the population, then approximately 38% of arrests
would be of Black individuals and approximately 57% of arrests would be of white individuals. The rate
of arrests of Black individuals in Madison County is roughly double this expected percentage (73%, or
approximately 2 times the percentage of Madison Countys population that is Black). The rate of arrests
of white individuals is less than half the expected percentage (23%, or approximately 0.4 times the
expected percentage). In other words, the arrest rate for Black individuals is nearly five times the arrest
rate for white individuals in Madison County.

4
11. At roadblocks and pedestrian stops, the MCSD overwhelmingly arrests Black

individuals. However, white arrestees are 1.4 times more likely than Black arrestees to be

charged with driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. They are 1.1 times more likely to

be charged with a drug crime. In contrast, Black arrestees face over 3.2 times the odds for white

individuals of being charged only with a petty revenue-generating vehicle infraction, like having

a burned out headlight or no seat belt. This data suggests a pattern of population-targeted as

opposed to public safety-motivated policing.

12. Over the years, the MCSDs Policing Program has led to thousands of violations

of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The Policing

Program is unquestionably . . . the moving force behind these constitutional violations within

the meaning of the Supreme Courts decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City

of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978).

13. Since taking office in January 2012, Sheriff Randall S. Tucker (Sheriff

Tucker) has adopted and implemented the Policing Program in its entirety.

14. Sheriff Tucker has not only enforced the Policing Program but also expanded its

scope. Among other actions, he has enacted or maintained a written roadblock policy that

sanctions unconstitutional racially discriminatory roadblocks. In essence, Sheriff Tucker has

empowered MCSD deputies with enhanced authority and implicit encouragement to target the

members of Madison Countys Black community for unreasonable searches and seizures.

15. Sheriff Tucker has been deliberately indifferent to the constitutional violations

caused by the Policing Program. Among other actions and inactions, he has: (1) on information

and belief, failed to investigate a Black MCSD deputys complaint of racially discriminatory

policing practices and the unjustified use of physical force against Black community members;

5
(2) hired a deputy with a documented history of misconduct involving the excessive use of force;

(3) chosen not to establish any rules or regulations prohibiting racial bias in policing; (4) decided

not to maintain basic data on the MCSDs policing practices, such as the dates and locations of

roadblocks; and (5) stopped keeping records of complaints against MCSD deputies.

16. For at least a decade, the Madison County Board of Supervisors has known that

the MCSD systematically targets the Black community for unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Madison County Board of Supervisors has also been aware of a pattern of constitutional

violations suffered by the Black residents of Madison County as a direct result of the MCSDs

Policing Program.

17. However, the Madison County Board of Supervisors has been deliberately

indifferent to these constitutional violations by failing to investigate the MCSDs racially

discriminatory policing practices and/or its pattern of conducting unreasonable searches and

seizures, and by failing to require the MCSD to take any actions to: (a) establish policies that

prohibit racially discriminatory policing practices and/or unreasonable searches and seizures; (b)

screen, train, and supervise MCSD deputies, employees, and agents to prevent MCSD personnel

from employing unconstitutional racially discriminatory policing practices and/or conducting

unreasonable searches and seizures; (c) monitor MCSD deputies, employees, and agents to

ensure that their policing practices comply with constitutional requirements; and/or (d) discipline

MCSD deputies, employees, and agents who employ racially discriminatory policing practices

and/or conduct unreasonable searches and seizures.

18. This policy of inaction by the Madison County Board of Supervisors is the

functional equivalent of a decision by Madison County itself to violate the Constitution. By

failing to take any steps to investigate or remedy the MCSDs systematic targeting of Black

6
residents for unreasonable searches and seizures, the Board of Supervisors has implicitly

sanctioned and endorsed the Policing Program.

19. Plaintiffs Latoya Brown, Lawrence Blackmon, Herbert Anthony Green, Khadafy

Manning, Quinnetta Manning, Marvin McField, Nicholas Singleton, Steven Smith, Bessie

Thomas, and Betty Jean Williams Tucker (collectively, the named Plaintiffs) are among the

thousands of victims of Madison Countys Policing Program. Most of the named Plaintiffs have

been subjected to the MCSDs unreasonable race-based searches and seizures multiple times in

recent months and years. The named Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of similarly

situated Black individuals who have been, are now, or will be subject to the MCSDs racially

discriminatory Policing Program described herein (the Class or Class members).

20. The defendants in this action are Madison County, acting by and through the

Madison County Board of Supervisors; Sheriff Tucker, personally and as the policymaking

official of the Madison County Sheriffs Department; and Madison County Sheriffs Department

Deputies John Does #1 through #6 (collectively, Defendants).

21. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class members, seek relief for

Defendants violations of their rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Civil Rights Act

of 1971, 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983), the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000(d), et

seq. (Title VI).

22. The named Plaintiffs seek to represent a certified class for the purpose of

obtaining injunctive and declaratory relief only. They seek a class-wide judgment declaring that

the policies, practices, and/or customs described herein violate the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments, and a class-wide injunction enjoining Defendants from continuing to implement

7
these policies, practices, and/or customs. Unless such declaratory and injunctive relief is

obtained, the named Plaintiffs and Class members will continue to face a substantial threat that

they will again be subject to the unconstitutional racially discriminatory policing practices

described herein.

23. In addition, certain named Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages

only for themselves.

24. Plaintiffs also seek an award of attorneys fees and costs and such other relief as

this Court deems equitable and just.

JURISDICTION & VENUE

25. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 12132.

26. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction).

27. This Court is authorized to grant declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 2201 and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

28. This Court is authorized to award attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b).

29. Venue is properly set within the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Mississippi pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391.

JURY DEMAND

30. Plaintiffs demand trial by jury in this action on each and every one of their claims.

PARTIES

Plaintiffs

31. Plaintiff LATOYA BROWN (Ms. Brown) is a 28-year-old Black woman who

has spent her entire life in Canton, Mississippi. She lives with named Plaintiff STEVEN SMITH

8
and their three daughters in a predominantly-Black affordable housing complex. Ms. Brown is a

stay-at-home mother.

32. Plaintiff LAWRENCE BLACKMON (Mr. Blackmon) is a 31-year-old Black

man who has resided in Canton, Mississippi since 1998. Mr. Blackmon is currently enrolled in a

Masters of Law program at George Washington University Law School in Washington D.C., but

his permanent place of residence is at his grandmothers home in Canton, Mississippi. Mr.

Blackmon intends to return to Madison County on a full-time basis after completing his studies.

33. Plaintiff HERBERT ANTHONY GREEN (Mr. Green) is a 30-year-old black

man who resides in Canton, Mississippi. Mr. Green is a veteran of the United States Army. He

has lived in Canton for most of his life.

34. Plaintiff KHADAFY MANNING (Mr. Manning) is a 35-year-old physically

disabled Black man who resides in Canton, Mississippi. He has lived in Canton for over 20

years. Mr. Manning suffers from a painful nerve condition that makes it difficult for him to walk

without a cane. He is married to named Plaintiff QUINNETTA MANNING, and they are raising

three sons together. Mr. Manning volunteers his time as an assistant coach for a youth T-Ball

team in Canton.

35. Plaintiff QUINNETTA MANNING (Mrs. Manning) is a 29-year-old Black

woman who was born and raised in Canton, Mississippi, where she still resides. She is married to

named Plaintiff Mr. Manning, and the couple has three young sons together. Mrs. Manning is

enrolled in a cosmetology program, and she also volunteers her time with a youth dance troupe.

36. Plaintiff MARVIN MCFIELD (Mr. McField) is a 37-year-old Black man who

was born, raised, and currently resides in Flora, Mississippi. Mr. McField has a pacemaker

9
because he suffers from a serious heart condition. Mr. McField is a carpenter. He is married with

children.

37. Plaintiff NICK SINGLETON (Mr. Singleton) is a 35-year-old Black man who

has lived in Canton, Mississippi since 2004. Until recently, Mr. Singleton worked in information

technology at a data center. He is the father of two young boys.

38. Plaintiff STEVEN SMITH (Mr. Smith) is a 27-year-old Black man who has

spent his entire life in Canton, Mississippi. He lives with named Plaintiff Ms. Brown and their

three young daughters in a predominantly-Black affordable housing complex. Mr. Smith

currently works at a Chinese restaurant as a wok cook.

39. Plaintiff BESSIE THOMAS (Mrs. Thomas) is a 59-year-old Black woman who

has lived in Canton, Mississippi for the past five decades. Mrs. Thomas serves as a minister at

two local churches, and she is involved in taking care of her young grandchildren. For three

years, Mrs. Thomas operated a corner store in Canton.

40. Plaintiff BETTY JEAN WILLIAMS TUCKER (Mrs. Tucker) is a 62-year-old

Black woman who was born, raised, and currently resides in Canton, Mississippi. For over a

decade, Mrs. Tucker worked as a welder in a Canton manufacturing warehouse. She has five

children, twelve grandchildren, and two great grand-children. Mrs. Tucker is among the longest-

lived residents in her Canton neighborhood.

Defendants

41. Defendant MADISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI (Madison County or the

County) is a political subdivision of the State of Mississippi that can sue and be sued in its own

name. Upon information and belief, Madison County programs and activities, including

10
programs and activities of the MCSD, receive federal financial assistance. 7 The County and its

departments are therefore required under federal law to conduct their programs and activities in a

racially and ethnically non-discriminatory manner. The chief policy making and administrative

body of the County is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, the Madison County Board of

Supervisors (the Board of Supervisors or the Board), which describes itself as the one body

which supervises almost everything that goes on in county government. 8 The Board of

Supervisors is comprised of five elected Supervisors, one from each of the five districts in

Madison County. For at least a decade, Defendant Madison County has had actual knowledge of

a longstanding pattern of constitutional violations inflicted on the Black community by the

MCSD pursuant to the Policing Program. By both its action and inaction, Defendant Madison

County has either sanctioned, or been deliberately indifferent to, the MCSDs policy of

systematically executing unreasonable searches and seizures on the basis of race.

42. Defendant RANDALL S. TUCKER is, and has been since January 2012, the

Sheriff of Madison County, Mississippi. Under Mississippi law, sheriffs are final policymakers

with respect to all law enforcement decisions made within their counties. 9 Sheriff Tucker is and

was responsible for each of the unconstitutional racially discriminatory practices that comprises

the Policing Program. He is either the chief architect of, or has adopted and endorsed, every one

of the illegal policing tactics described herein. Sheriff Tucker is, and has been since January

7
See, e.g., Office of the State Auditor, Mississippi, Madison County, Mississippi: Audited Financial
Statements and Special Reports For the Year Ended September 30, 2015, at 57 (Schedule of Expenditures
of Federal Awards), http://www.osa.ms.gov/documents/counties/2015/15cMadison%20County-cpa.pdf.
8
Board of Supervisors, Madison County, Mississippi, http://madison-co.com/elected-offices/board-of-
supervisors (last visited May 5, 2017).
9
Brooks v. George Cty, Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Huddleston v. Shirley, 787 F.
Supp. 109, 112 (N.D. Miss. 1992) and Miss. Code 19-25-1, et seq.).

11
2012, responsible for the hiring, screening, training, retention, supervision, discipline,

counseling, and control of the MCSDs deputies, and other personnel who are or were employed

by the MCSD, including the John Doe Defendants named herein. He is sued in his official

capacity.

43. Defendants JOHN DOES #1 through #6 are, and/or were, at all times relevant

herein, deputies, employees, and agents of the MCSD, a department of Madison County. John

Does #1 through #6 are sued in their individual capacities. The true names and total number of

John Does #1 through #6 are unknown to Plaintiffs, and therefore Plaintiffs sue these Defendants

by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will amend their complaint to state the true names of John

Does #1 through #6 after such information has been identified.

44. At all times relevant herein, John Does #1 through #6 have acted under color of

State law in the course and scope of their duties and functions as agents, employees, and officers

of Madison County in engaging in the actions and inactions described herein. At all times

relevant herein, the Board of Supervisors, Sheriff Tucker, and John Does #1 through #6 have

acted for and on behalf of the County with the power and authority vested in them as officers,

agents, and employees of the County and incidental to the lawful pursuit of their duties as

officers, employees, and agents of the County.

45. At all times relevant herein, John Does #1 through #6 have violated clearly

established constitutional standards under the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of which a reasonable person would have known.

12
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

I. A Brief Overview of Madison County, Mississippi

46. Madison County is a majority-white county. According to the 2010 census,

approximately 58% of Madison County residents are white and 38% are Black.10 The County is

now and has always been acutely racially segregated.

47. More than a decade ago, now-Chief Judge Carl. E. Stewart of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the confluence of . . . geography and

demography in Madison County.11 He stated that the resulting racial isolation in Madison

County was foreboding and potentially deleterious.12 Chief Judge Stewarts description of

10
Quickfacts: Madison County, Mississippi, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/28089,28 (last visited May 5, 2017).
11
Anderson v. School Bd. of Madison Cty, 517 F.3d 292, 305 (5th Cir. 2008) (Stewart, J.) (concurring in
the majoritys affirmance of the district courts grant of the Madison County School Districts motion for
unitary status).
12
Id.

13
segregation in Madison County still rings true today. Madison County remains divided into

predominantly Black towns, neighborhoods, and business districts and predominantly white

towns, neighborhoods, and business districts.

48. The Countys two largest cities are majority-white: the City of Madison (85%

white; 10% Black; population 24,000)13 and Ridgeland (59% white; 33% Black; population

24,000).14 Madison Countys two largest majority-Black municipalities are the city of Canton

(75% Black; 20% white; 6% Latino; population 13,000)15 and the town of Flora (51% Black;

47% white; population 1,800).16

13
Quickfacts: Madison City, Mississippi, U.S. Census Bureau,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/2844520 (last visited May 5, 2017).
14
Quickfacts: Ridgeland City, Mississippi, U.S. Census Bureau,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/2862520 (last visited May 5, 2017).
15
Quickfacts: Canton City, Mississippi, U.S. Census Bureau,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/2811100 (last visited May 5, 2017).
16
Flora, Mississippi Population, CensusViewer, http://censusviewer.com/city/MS/Flora (last visited May
5, 2017).

14
49. Madison County is the wealthiest county in Mississippi, 17 and its wealth is

heavily concentrated among its white citizens. For example, the average household income in the

City of Madison is more than double that in Canton ($97,000 vs. $40,000); residents of the City

of Madison own the homes in which they live at nearly double the rate of Canton residents (92%

vs. 56%); and the poverty rate in the City of Madison is a small fraction of the rate in Canton

(3.5% vs. 27%).18

50. Madison Countys pervasive racial segregation has facilitated the MCSDs

racially discriminatory policing practices by enabling MCSD deputies to use geographic criteria

to isolate and target Black residents of Madison County for unconstitutional searches and

seizures.

II. The MCSDs Policing Program

51. For at least two decades, if not longer, the MCSD has implemented a coordinated

top-down program of methodically targeting Black individuals for suspicionless searches and

seizures.

52. Pursuant to the Policing Program, the MCSD employs a series of integrated

tactics to systematically conduct unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, homes, cars, and

property on the basis of race. During the course of these illegal searches and seizures, MCSD

deputies routinely detain members of the Black community without probable cause, and often

issue citations and make arrests either without legal justification or to recover outstanding fines

and fees, typically for minor infractions.

17
Mississippi Per Capita Income by County 2015, Mississippi Department of Employment Security,
http://mdes.ms.gov/media/8639/pci.pdf (last visited May 5, 2017).
18
Quickfacts: Canton City, Mississippi and Madison City, Mississippi, U.S. Census Bureau,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/INC110215/2811100,2844520 (last visited May 5, 2017).

15
53. The various unconstitutional racially discriminatory policing practices that

comprise the Policing Program range in scope and severity, but they are all conducted pursuant

to the MCSDs single overarching policy, custom, and/or practice of systematically conducting

unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, homes, cars, and property on the basis of race.

This policy, custom, and/or practice is so persistent and widespread as to practically have the

force of law in Madison County.

54. Like many policing policies, practices, and customs deemed unconstitutional by

federal courts and the United States Department of Justice, 19 the MCSDs Policing Program

combines unlawful methods of searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment with

an impermissible race-based classification in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

55. The MCSDs Policing Program also violates the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment because race-based suspicion is integral to its functioning. The MCSDs

Policing Program in fact depends on the use of race to determine which individuals to target for

unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As such, the MCSDs

Policing Program is a government program with an express racial classification; it is subject to,

and fails, strict scrutiny.

56. The most frequently-used illegal policing tactics of the MCSDs Policing Program

are described below, and substantiated by the allegations of the named Plaintiffs in paragraphs

178 through 298 below. In addition, the MCSD also engages in a broad range of other

19
See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department (2016),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download; U.S. Department of Justice, Investigation of the
Ferguson Police Department (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1.pdf.

16
unconstitutional racially discriminatory policing practicesincluding suspicionless traffic stops

and suspicionless frisks of pedestriansthat impermissibly target Black community members for

unlawful searches and seizures. Taken together, these policing methods have effectively placed

the Black community of Madison County under a permanent state of siege.

A. Pretextual and Highly Intrusive Vehicular Roadblocks

57. The MCSD operates a network of pretextual and highly intrusive vehicular

roadblocks concentrated in and around the majority Black cities and neighborhoods of Madison

County. These roadblocks are typically located on roadways close to Black homes, employers of

Black residents, Black-owned businesses, and civic institutions frequented by the Black

community.

58. Because the MCSD targets Black communities for roadblocks, the vast majority

of individuals arrested at Madison Countys roadblocks are Black. Almost 81% of roadblock

arrests in Madison County between May and September of 2016 were of Black individuals.

17
59. The MCSD maintains a formal written policy (the General Roadblocks Policy)

that expressly authorizes [a]ll [d]eputies to conduct random roadblocks for all traffic

violations, escapees, or wanted subjects.20 The General Roadblocks Policy places no restrictions

on how and when MCSD deputies may conduct these roadblocks. Significantly, the General

Roadblocks Policy does not require deputies to use race-neutral criteria when selecting roadblock

locations. A copy of the MCSDs Roadblocks Policy is attached as Exhibit A.

60. The MCSD regularly establishes roadblocks in Canton, the county seat and the

largest majority-Black city within Madison County. Most of the Canton neighborhoods targeted

for roadblocks are lined by quiet, residential streets, not busy highways or thoroughfares. A map

depicting recent representative roadblock locations appears below.

20
General Roadblocks, in POLICY AND PROCEDURE, Office of the Sheriff, Madison County, Mississippi.

18
61. The MCSD sometimes sets up more than one vehicular roadblock in the Canton

area within a single day; multiple vehicular roadblocks within a single week are not uncommon.

62. The MCSD rarely, if ever, locates roadblocks in the predominantly white

neighborhoods and business districts of Madison County.

63. On information and belief, the MCSD does not select roadblock locations for

safety and visibility. Instead, the MCSD often sets up roadblocks in poorly-lit, difficult-to-see

locations. These roadblocks and checkpoints are usually manned by plainclothes MCSD deputies

19
who drive unmarked vehicles. While these deputies may wear tactical body armor over their

plain clothes, the deputies are not otherwise identifiable as law enforcement officers.

64. In one instance in 2015, a Black individual (the driver) was stopped at a

roadblock by an MCSD deputy who waved him down with a flashlight while standing in the

middle of a dark and isolated road. There were no other law enforcement vehicles or any other

signs of a roadblock. The driver reported that if he had not been paying close attention, he could

have struck the MCSD deputy because the deputy was barely visible. The MCSD deputy asked

the driver to get out of the car, even though there was no basis for reasonable suspicion. Only

after searching the driver unlawfully did the MCSD deputy permit the driver to proceed.

65. Often, the MCSDs roadblocks are roving in nature. Deputies will sometimes

drive away after a short time to set up a roadblock at another location nearby. At other times,

plainclothes deputies will park their vehicles in one location and walk to a different street corner

to flag down motorists with flashlights.

66. The MCSD also sets up semi-concealed roadblocks within the parking lots of

Madison Countys majority-Black housing complexes. These roadblocks are usually located at

the sole operational entry and exit to the complexes. A map depicting recent representative

roadblock locations appears below. These roadblocks unreasonably violate Black residents

legitimate expectations of privacy in and around their own homes, and unconstitutionally restrict

their freedom to leave and return to their homes unimpeded by government intrusion.

20
67. Once an MCSD deputy stops a vehicle at a roadblock, the deputy typically

requires both the driver of the vehicle and any passengers riding in the vehicle to provide a

drivers license or another form of identification. The MCSD deputy usually runs these

identifications against police databases to determine whether the detained individuals can be

arrested to collect unpaid fines and fees owed to the County.

21
68. In the experience of named Plaintiff Mrs. Tucker, who has been repeatedly

stopped at the MCSDs roadblocks, MCSD deputies do not follow a standard operating

procedure in conducting these roadblocks. MCSD deputies have sometimes asked Mrs. Tucker to

produce her drivers license and proof of her insurance, but at other times they have only asked

for her license. MCSD deputies have usually taken Mrs. Tuckers license and checked it for

unpaid fines, but sometimes the MCSD deputy running the roadblock has just glanced at her

license and waved her through.

69. Traveling through the MCSDs roadblocks can take 10 to 20 minutes per vehicle,

even when MCSD deputies do nothing more than check identification. These delays are

sometimes compounded when MCSD deputies conduct suspicionless searches of Black

motorists, their passengers, and their vehicles during these stops.

70. The MCSD does not generally provide any advance notice of its roadblocks.

However, the MCSD recently published a notice of planned roadblocks (the Roadblock

Notice) that was posted on social media. The Roadblock Notice stated that the MCSD will

have a roadblock at one or more of of dozens of listed locations between January 19, 2017

and January 22, 2017.21 The Roadblock Notice was so overbroad that it effectively provided no

notice at all. A copy of the Roadblock Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

71. For members of the Black community, the MCSDs roadblocks are much more

than an inconvenience. Passing through these unconstitutionally intrusive roadblocks is fraught

with the potential for harassment, intimidation, demeaning searches, baseless citations, and

possibly even arrest and subsequent incarceration.

21
The Roadblock Notice refers to checkpoints rather than roadblocks. However, please note the
MCSD uses the terms roadblock and checkpoint interchangeably when referring to the type of
roadblocks described herein.

22
72. Black community members therefore go to great lengths to avoid the MCSDs

roadblocks. They rely on an informal system of warnings communicated by friends and family

through social media, texts, and phone calls. Black individuals often change their travel and

personal plans based on the presence of these roadblocks.

73. For example, one of the named Plaintiffs in this action, Mrs. Tucker, devotes a

great deal of time and effort to finding out the locations of MCSDs roadblocks. She uses phone

calling trees, Facebook pages, smart phone apps, and texting lists to get news of the roadblocks.

Although Mrs. Tucker has a valid license, registration, and insurance, she frequently rearranges

her life to avoid the MCSDs roadblocks, typically by cancelling her plans and not leaving the

house to see family or friends.

74. One private Facebook group page that regularly warns of roadblocks in Madison

County (the Facebook Warning Page) has nearly 1,800 members, the vast majority of whom

are Black. The Facebook Warning Page features messages such as Madison County is pulling

people over on bikes and everything and Roadblock on maple by the tracks! They got their

lights off. According to recent posts, the MCSD has set up roadblocks outside of churches, the

Madison County Department of Human Services office (which issues food stamps), and fast food

restaurants.

75. Many of the named Plaintiffs in this actionincluding Mr. McField, Mrs.

Manning, Mrs. Tucker, and Mrs. Thomashave been repeatedly stopped at the MCSDs

roadblocks. One of the named Plaintiffs, Mr. Singleton, has been stopped at the MCSDs

roadblocks at least 20 times in the past year.

23
1. The Primary Purpose of the MCSDs System of Roadblocks Is to Target
Black Motorists for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

76. Under the Supreme Courts decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.

32 (2000), the constitutionality of a roadblock turns on its primary purpose. The primary purpose

of the MCSDs system of roadblocks is now and has always been to target Black motorists, their

passengers, and their vehicles for unreasonable searches and seizures. The MCSDs

concentration of roadblocks in predominantly-Black areas, as well as at the entry and exit points

of majority-Black apartment complexes, is compelling evidence of this patently unconstitutional

primary purpose.

77. An additional or alternative primary purpose of the MCSDs system of roadblocks

is the sort of general interest in crime control held unconstitutional in Edmond. A recent notice

of roadblock activity promulgated by the MCSD (the Roadblock Notice) illustrates this

impermissible purpose. The Roadblock Notice lists the locations of dozens of potential

roadblocks and expressly states that the purpose of these roadblocks will be to check for

Drivers licenses, warrants and whatever else we encounter (emphasis added).22

78. On information and belief, MCSD deputies often use roadblock stops as a means

of looking for contraband. Deputies regularly question Black motorists and Black passengers at

roadblock stops in an effort to gain probable cause for conducting searches based on the

individuals expressions or answers, or the supposed odor of marijuana in the vehicle or on one

of the detained individuals.

79. Another additional or alternative primary purpose of the MCSDs system of

roadblocks is to enrich the County by generating municipal revenue through the collection of

22
Please note the MCSD uses the terms roadblock and checkpoint interchangeably when referring to
roadblocks.

24
unpaid fees and fines from the Countys disempowered minority populations. This purpose is

clearly impermissible under both the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

80. The MCSD has refused to produce any policies and protocols describing the

purpose for its roadblocks, or any records documenting either [t]he criteria used in

determining the location[s] of [these] roadblocks or the [p]rotocol enforced for determining

which cars to stop.23 However, to the extent that the MCSD attempts to claim that the primary

purpose of its roadblocks is to check for valid drivers licenses and up-to-date vehicle

registrations, or for any other traffic safety purpose, any such stated purpose is plainly pretextual.

The operation of roadblocks at the entry and exit points of majority-Black apartment complexes

in quiet residential neighborhoods, rather than on heavily-trafficked open roadways or locations

with a history of traffic hazards, clearly demonstrates that the primary purpose of the MCSD

roadblocks is not traffic safety. The absence of such roadblocks in majority-white

neighborhoods, where traffic safety is of equal importance, further lays bare the pretextual

purpose of the MCSDs roadblocks. Any claimed purpose of traffic safety is also belied by the

fact that MCSD deputies regularly require passengers, as well as pedestrians passing by

roadblocks, to produce identification and submit to searches, as discussed in paragraphs 81

through 90.

23
See ACLU Public Records Request (Sept. 15, 2016), Items 3(a), 4(f), and 4(n); see also Letter from
Sheriff Tucker to the ACLU (Oct. 31, 2016) (stating that the records requested in Items 3(a), 4(f), and
4(n) are deemed exempt from the Public Records Act on the grounds that any policies that contain
information that would impede the Madison County Sheriffs Department in its enforcement of the law or
reveal investigatory procedures used by the Department that are necessary to detect and prosecute certain
criminal behavior are exempt from production).

25
B. Suspicionless Searches and Seizures of Black Pedestrians

81. One of the MCSDs most flagrantly unconstitutional racially discriminatory

policing tactics is its implementation of pedestrian checkpoints.

82. MCSD deputies regularly require Black pedestrians to stop at the vehicular

roadblocks described above. In other words, a vehicular roadblock can at any time also serve as a

pedestrian checkpoint. On information and belief, Sheriff Tucker has authorized MCSD

deputies to implement pedestrian checkpoints whenever and wherever they are conducting

vehicular roadblocks.

83. Because the MCSD typically enforces these pedestrian checkpoints at the same

locations as its vehicular roadblocks, the MCSDs pedestrian checkpoints are also concentrated

in and around the majority Black cities and neighborhoods of Madison County.

84. As a consequence, the vast majority of individuals arrested at pedestrian stops in

Madison County are Black. Approximately 82% of arrests at pedestrian stops in Madison

County between May and September of 2016 were of Black individuals.

26
85. Frequently, the MCSD enforces semi-concealed pedestrian checkpoints

concurrently with vehicular roadblocks at the sole operational entry and exit to majority-Black

housing complexes. These checkpoints violate Black residents legitimate expectations of

privacy in and around their own homes, and unconstitutionally restrict their freedom to leave and

return to their homes unimpeded by government intrusion.

86. On information and belief, MCSD deputies do not establish pedestrian

checkpoints in predominantly-white towns, residential neighborhoods or business districts.

87. Once an MCSD deputy stops a Black pedestrian at a checkpoint, the deputy

typically requires the pedestrian provide a drivers license or another form of identification. The

MCSD deputy usually runs the pedestrians identification against police databases to determine

whether the detained individual can be arrested to collect unpaid fines and fees. In addition,

MCSD deputies often subject pedestrians passing through these checkpoints to demeaning and

unconstitutional searches.

88. On information and belief, the purpose of these pedestrian checkpoints is to

conduct a fishing expedition to find any possible basis, no matter how tenuous, for issuing

citations to and/or arresting members of the Black community.

89. For example, in January 2017, one of the named Plaintiffs in this actionMr.

Smithwas arrested after being detained and illegally searched at a pedestrian checkpoint at

the entrance to the predominantly-Black affordable housing complex where he resides. Mr.

Smith was arrested after a check of his identification revealed that he had outstanding fines and

fees.

27
90. There is clearly no constitutional basis for MCSD deputies to require Black

pedestrians to pass through checkpoints as they are coming in and out of their homes or going

about their daily activities. Forcing citizens of the United States to show their papers in this

fashion runs afoul of the law as well as the most basic norms of decency in domestic policing.

C. Warrantless and Consentless Searches of the Homes of Black Residents

91. In the course of investigating potential offenses, searching for missing persons, or

canvasing for individuals with outstanding arrest warrants, MCSD deputies frequently enter the

homes of Black residents of Madison County without search warrants and without consent.

92. While they are in Black residents homes, MCSD deputies routinely engage in

searches and seizures that further violate the Fourth Amendment. These unconstitutional

practices include the detention and restraint of Black individuals not suspected of any

wrongdoing, and are often accompanied by the use of force.

93. For example:

a) In June 2016, six white male MCSD deputies forcibly entered the family

home of Mr. and Mrs. Manning, two named Plaintiffs in this action. The deputies did not

have a search warrant. The deputies attempted to coerce Mr. Manning to write a false witness

statement against a neighbors boyfriend. When Mr. Manning refused, one of the deputies

handcuffed him, choked him, and beat him in the back seat of an MCSD law enforcement

vehicle.

b) In March 2016, two MCSD deputies forcibly entered the home of Mr.

Blackmon, one of the named Plaintiffs in this action. The MCSD deputies claimed they had a

warrant for the arrest of one of Mr. Blackmons relatives, but the deputies refused to provide

Mr. Blackmon with an opportunity to review the warrant. One of the deputies forced Mr.

28
Blackmon to the ground at gunpoint, and handcuffed his wrists behind his back. The deputies

then proceeded to search Mr. Blackmons entire residence, ostensibly for the purpose of

finding the person named in the warrant. The MCSD deputies searched inside Mr.

Blackmons dresser drawers and other small closed compartments that could not possibly

conceal an adult man.

c) In October 2015, MCSD deputies forcibly entered the home of Mr. Smith,

a named Plaintiff in this action. The deputies did not provide Mr. Smith with a search

warrant, but they claimed to be looking for a missing person. Without Mr. Smiths consent,

the deputies conducted a search of Mr. Smiths home, including examining inside bureau

drawers and other small closed compartments that could not reasonably contain a person.

One of the deputies even woke up Mr. Smiths daughter, who was only three years old at the

time, to ask her if she knew anything about the missing person.

d) Several years ago, MCSD deputies stormed into a celebratory barbecue

hosted by Mrs. Tucker, one of the named plaintiffs in this action, at her home in Canton.

Without a warrant or any reason for suspecting criminal activity, the MCSD deputies

conducted searches of Mrs. Tuckers guests, including by digging into their pockets. The

MCSD deputies also got down on their hands and knees to search Mrs. Tuckers patio.

Finding nothing, they left without explanation.

94. It is common for MCSD deputies to harass Black residents while they are walking

on the grounds of their apartment complexes, sitting on their patios, or spending time in their

own yards, particularly after the sun has set. MCSD deputies often interrupt Black community

members leisure and family time with demands for identification, intrusive questioning and

29
suspicionless searches. MCSD deputies also regularly instruct Black community members to

disperse or return indoors, and threaten arrest and jail time for noncompliance.

95. The MCSDs unconstitutional policing practices in and around Black community

members homes discourage Black residents from spending time outdoors, and from gathering

outside with friends and family. These tactics effectively impose a curfew pursuant to which

being outside of ones own home after dark is reason enough to be detained or arrested. The

MCSDs hostile and unreasonable approach to policing the Black community violates Black

residents reasonable expectations of privacy in their own homes, and greatly diminishes their

sense of personal security.

96. On information and belief, the MCSD does not engage in these unconstitutional

policing practices in the homes, yards, and neighborhoods of Madison Countys white residents.

D. Jump Out Patrols

97. The MCSD also engages in systematic illegal searches and seizures of Black

community members through Jump Out patrols that aim to take Black community members by

surprise for suspicionless searches and seizures. These patrols are conducted by plainclothes

MCSD deputies driving unmarked vehicles.

98. The Jump-Out deputies often target groups of young Black men walking or

riding bicycles together.

99. On information and belief, the Jump Out deputies select their targets purely on

the basis of race and without any reasonable suspicion or probable cause; MCSD deputies do not

target white residents for Jump Out patrols.

30
100. When the Jump Out deputies encounter their intended targets, the deputies

rapidly exit their vehicles and proceed to conduct unreasonable and extensive searches of every

individual.

101. For example:

a) In October 2015, named Plaintiff Mr. Green and two Black male friends

were stopped by a Jump Out patrol when they were walking down the street. A

plainclothes MCSD deputy emerged from an unmarked vehicle and searched the men, even

though he had no reasonable suspicion to do so. On information and belief, when the deputy

found some cash in one of Mr. Greens friends pants pocket, the deputy demanded to know

how that individual obtained the funds, repeatedly referring to him as a Black dope boy.

The deputy released Mr. Green and his friends after finding no illegal drugs or other grounds

for arrest.

b) Approximately five years ago, named Plaintiff Mrs. Tucker witnessed two

Jump Out patrol deputies tackle her teenage grandson to the ground. The deputies

conducted an aggressive search of her grandsons pockets. They left abruptly after finding

nothing. Before the deputies descended upon Mrs. Tuckers grandson, he had been fixing his

brothers bicycle in his front yard.

102. Often, the Jump Out deputies handcuff Black individuals while they conduct

their searches, and threaten arrest and jail time for failing to comply with their demands. The

Jump Out deputies also threaten onlookers and passers-by with arrest if they do not

immediately leave the scene or return to their homes.

31
103. Jump Out patrols frequently take place outside of Black-owned businesses,

causing customers to flee. On information and belief, the MCSD does not employ Jump Out

patrols in the vicinity of white-owned businesses.

104. On information and belief, the MCSD uses these Jump Out patrols to deter

customers from patronizing Black-owned businesses. The Jump Out patrols, together with the

MCSDs other discriminatory policing tactics, have dramatically affected the profitability of

Black-owned businesses.

III. Race-Based Statistical Disparities in Policing Outcomes Provide Compelling


Evidence of the MCSDs Policing Program

105. The MCSDs Policing Program has resulted in stark racial disparities in policing

outcomes that cannot be explained by alternative non-race-based factors.

106. For example, although only 38% of Madison County residents are Black, 24

approximately 73% of arrests Madison County between May and September of 2016 were

of Black individuals. Only 23% of arrests during this time period were of white individuals,

even though Madison County is 57% white.25 These statistics suggest that the arrest rate for

Black individuals is nearly five times the arrest rate for white individuals in Madison

County.26

24
Based on 2010 Census data. See Quickfacts: Madison County, Mississippi, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/28089,28 (last visited May 5, 2017).
25
Based on 2010 Census data. See Quickfacts: Madison County, Mississippi, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/28089,28 (last visited May 5, 2017).
26
If the MCSDs arrest rates were proportional to the population, then approximately 38% of arrests
would be of Black individuals and approximately 57% of arrests would be of white individuals. The rate
of arrests of Black individuals in Madison County is roughly double this expected percentage (73%, or
approximately 2 times the percentage of Madison Countys population that is Black). The rate of arrests
of white individuals is less than half the expected percentage (23%, or approximately 0.4 times the
expected percentage). In other words, the arrest rate for Black individuals is nearly five times the arrest
rate for white individuals in Madison County.

32
107. Moreover, a disproportionate number of the MCSDs arrests are made in

majority-Black towns. For example, the majority-Black city of Canton represents approximately

14% of Madison Countys population, but accounted for nearly 47% of arrests made in Madison

County between May and September 2016.

33
108. Because the MCSD targets Black communities for roadblocks and suspicionless

pedestrian stops, the vast majority of individuals arrested at roadblocks and pedestrian stops in

Madison County are Black. Between May and September 2016, 81% of arrests at roadblocks and

82% of arrests at pedestrian stops in Madison County were of Black individuals.

34
109. These dramatic racial disparities in policing outcomes have existed for years. A

2014 article in The Clarion-Ledger reported that while only 34% of Madison Countys

35
population was Black at the time, 78% of those arrested in Madison County were Blackamong

the largest disparity of the Mississippi counties cited. 27

110. Similarly, an investigation conducted by USA Today revealed that the MCSDs

2011-2012 arrest rates were 92.4 per 1000 for Black residents, as opposed to only 15.9 per 1000

for non-Black residents.28

111. These statistical disparities serve as compelling evidence that the MCSDs

Policing Program violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

IV. The MCSDs Policing Program Is Longstanding and Deeply-Entrenched

112. The MCSDs Policing Program is a deeply-entrenched policy, custom, and/or

practice that has been in existence for years. The program has its roots in Madison Countys long

history of unconstitutional, racially discriminatory policing practices.

113. During the Civil Rights era, Madison County Sheriff Billy Noble (Sheriff

Noble) was known for his infamous road blocks,29 and his practice of often arrest[ing] and

jail[ing] black folk because he felt like it.30

114. Billy Noble remained Sheriff through the 1980s. He and other Madison County

officials were subject to a consent judgment regarding jail conditions in Madison County,

including racially discriminatory practices. 31 Sheriff Nobles successor, Sheriff Jessie Hopkins,

27
Therese Apel, Mississippi Race, arrest rates examined, THE CLARION-LEDGER (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2014/11/19/race-arrest-rates-examined/19307959/.
28
Brad Heath, Racial gap in U.S. arrest rates: Staggering disparity, USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/18/ferguson-black-arrest-rates/19043207/.
29
Hunter Gray, Ghosts of Madison County (Mississippi), BEARWTHOUTBORDERS (Oct. 7, 2011),
https://lists.mayfirst.org/pipermail/bearwithoutborders/2011-October/004854.html.
30
Socrates Garrett, My Mississippi History, MISSISSIPPI LINK (April 27, 2006), 2006 WLNR 27688973.
31
See, e.g., Cooper v. Noble, 33 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1994).

36
was held in contempt for violations of this consent judgment,32 and complaints regarding the

MCSDs racially discriminatory practices in connection with its management of the Madison

County Detention Center have continued to the present day. 33

115. Sheriff Tuckers immediate predecessor, Toby Trowbridge (Sheriff

Trowbridge), served as the Sheriff of Madison County from 1999 until 2011. Sheriff

Trowbridge was one of the key architects and most ardent enforcers of the Policing Program.

Under his leadership, the MCSD executed thousands of unreasonable searches and seizures of

Black motorists, pedestrians, homes, and vehicles.

116. Sheriff Trowbridges unconstitutional, racially discriminatory policing practices

were widely known throughout Madison County.

117. In 2004, the community activist group Citizens Against Racial Profiling spoke out

against Sheriff Trowbridges racial profiling and targeting of Black community members in

Madison County.34

118. In 2006, a group of Canton residents (Concerned Citizens of Canton) presented

the Madison County Board of Supervisors with a petition bearing 664 signatures demanding an

end to frequent roadblocks in the predominantly black neighborhoods, the excessive force

and brutality administered by police officers, and racial profiling. 35

32
See id. at 545.
33
See, e.g., Letter Regarding Federal Inmates in Madison County Detention Center, FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN DISTRICTS OF MISSISSIPPI (April 11, 2008),
http://ms.fd.org/index_files/index_files/Madison%20Jail%20letter.pdf.
34
Adam Lynch, Crossing the Line?, JACKSON FREE PRESS (Sept. 8, 2004),
http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2004/sep/08/crossing-the-line/.
35
Roadblocks questioned in Canton, THE CLARION-LEDGER (July 18, 2006) (2006 WLNR 25321982).

37
119. In July 2006, Canton resident Lauren Elaine attended a Madison County Board of

Supervisors meeting on behalf of the Concerned Citizens of Canton. Sheriff Trowbridge was

present at the meeting, but he refused to meet with representatives from the Concerned Citizens

of Canton. Sheriff Trowbridge denied the use of racial profiling, and stated that the MCSD

would continue using roadblocks as a policing practice.

120. On information and belief, the Madison County Board of Supervisors took no

action to investigate or address the Concerned Citizens of Cantons claims. However, for a

period of time after the petition was submitted, there was a noticeable decrease in roadblocks in

Canton, but a corresponding uptick in Flora roadblocks.36

121. According to a July 2007 article in The Clarion-Ledger, District 5 Supervisor

Paul Griffin (Supervisor Griffin), who is Black, said that many people in Madison County

were aware that the MCSD was perceived as targeting Black community members, and had tried

to get Sheriff Trowbridge to meet with his critics. 37 However, Supervisor Griffin stated that

[t]here is a limit to what the Board of Supervisors can do because the [S]heriff is elected by the

people to do his job.38

122. In October 2007, a group of Flora residents (Concerned Citizens II of Flora)

claimed to have video evidence demonstrating that that the MCSD had been setting up

roadblocks in predominantly Black neighborhoods, such as Magnolia Heights, while not doing

36
Elizabeth Crisp, Flora group targets Madison Co. deputies, THE CLARION-LEDGER (October 29, 2007)
2007 WLNR 27805955.
37
Is system fair?, THE CLARION-LEDGER (July 22, 2007) (2007 WLNR 27765629).
38
Id.

38
the same in predominantly white neighborhoods.39 The group demanded documentation

concerning Sheriff Trowbridges roadblock policies and practices. Sheriff Trowbridge refused

either to provide any such documentation or to meet with representatives of the Concerned

Citizens II of Flora.40

123. According to a January 2008 article in the Madison County Journal, Sheriff

Trowbridge generally receive[d] very high marks from [the Madison County Board of

Supervisors].41 The article noted that Sheriff Trowbridge has been the subject of complaints

from African-Americans living in Canton and Flora who say he practices racial profiling.

124. In November 2007, Sheriff Trowbridge denied charges of racial profiling at a

meeting of the Madison County Board of Supervisors.42 Three white members of the Board of

Supervisors expressed their support for Sheriff Trowbridge during the meeting. However, former

District 4 Supervisor Karl Banks (Supervisor Banks), who is Black, expressed his

disappointment at the way the Board of Supervisors had addressed the issue of racial profiling.

Then-Supervisor Banks stated that he routinely fielded complaints about the MCSD, and said

that Sheriff Trowbridge should work with people to change the departments image. The

conversation today was about a feeling in the community. . . . I know, as an African American,

39
Muslim group could enter the fray in Flora, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL (Oct. 25, 2007),
http://www.onlinemadison.com/Content/NEWS/Local-News/Article/Muslim-group-could-enter-the-fray-
in-Flora/1/1/19402.
40
Id.
41
New supervisors take office Friday, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL (Jan. 2, 2008),
http://www.onlinemadison.com/Content/Default/Local-News/Article/New-supervisors-take-office-
Friday/-3/1/19701.
42
Elizabeth Crisp, Racial profiling accusations thrown at Madison sheriff in board meeting, THE
CLARION-LEDGER (Nov. 6, 2007), 2007 WLNR 27805274.

39
that there is a real feeling in the community that the [Sheriffs] department is discriminating

against people. 43

125. None of the minutes for the Board of Supervisors meetings reference claims or

discussions of racial profiling.44 However, minutes from the November 19, 2007 Board of

Supervisors meeting indicates that the Board authorized Sheriff Trowbridge to use $50,000 in

grant funds for public safety checkpoints.45 Because the MCSD uses the terms roadblock

and checkpoint interchangeably, these public safety checkpoints may have encompassed the

racially discriminatory roadblocks described herein.

126. The Clarion Ledger reported that of the 92 official MCSD roadblocks conducted

in 2007, many were set up in areas that have higher concentrations of Black or Hispanic

residents. 46 The Clarion Ledger also reported that more roadblocks were conducted in Canton

and in unincorporated areas north of Canton than in any other area in 2007, and that roadblocks

were often conducted in the same places multiple times throughout the year. 47

127. In 2008, a number of civil liberties groups, including the American Civil Liberties

Union, the Mississippi Immigrant Rights Alliance, and Citizens Against Racial Profiling, called

43
Id.
44
The Madison County Governments website contains a functionality that allows the user to search an
electronic archive of the Board of Supervisors meeting minutes by keyword. Keyword-searching this
archive revealed no references to racial profiling or synonymous terms in the Board of Supervisors
meeting minutes. See Board Minutes: Searching Minutes by Keyword, MADISON COUNTY
MISSISSIPPI, http://www.madison-co.com/elected-offices/board-of-supervisors/board-
minutes.php?search_type=keyword.
45
Minutes of the Board of Supervisors of Madison County, Mississippi (November 19, 2007),
http://www.madison-co.com/images/admin/pdfs/465_47418_Minutes_11-19-07_(Final).pdf.
46
Elizabeth Crisp, A show of frustration, THE CLARION-LEDGER (March 28, 2008) (2008 WLNR
26594510).
47
Id.

40
for the resignation of Sheriff Trowbridge for unfairly targeting Blacks and Latinos through racial

profiling and roadblocks.48 Once again, Sheriff Trowbridge denied engaging in racial profiling

and refused to meet with his critics. 49

128. On March 27, 2008, protestors conducted a march in opposition to Sheriff

Trowbridges racial profiling practices. 50 Protest organizer David Archie issued a press release

stating that: Over the years since the election of Toby Trowbridge as sheriff of Madison

County, numerous individuals have brought forth claims of harassment, intimidation,

discrimination and outright brutality by the Madison County sheriffs department. . . . Racial

profiling and deputy misconduct are widespread and well known. 51

129. In 2009, Sheriff Trowbridge expressed his opposition to a proposed bill to outlaw

racial profiling in Mississippi. However, the police chiefs of two Madison County cities, Canton

and Ridgeland, both testified that racial profiling is a problem in Mississippi. 52 The Canton

police chief is Black; the Ridgeland police chief is white.

130. From 2000 until January 2012, current Madison County Sheriff Tucker served as

an MCSD deputy under Sheriff Trowbridge. In 2002, Sheriff Tucker became Captain of the

MCSDs Narcotics Division. Then-Deputy Tucker had full knowledge of the Policing Program,

48
Julie Straw, Groups Accuse Sheriff of Racial Profiling, WS NEWS NOW,
http://www.msnewsnow.com/Global/story.asp?S=8068507. See also Julie Straw, Civil Liberties Groups
Want Madison County Sheriff Gone, AMERICANS FOR LEGAL IMMIGRATION PAC (March 26, 2008),
https://www.alipac.us/f12/ms-civil-liberties-groups-want-madison-county-sheriff-gone-102656-print/.
49
WS NEWS NOW, infra note 44.
50
Adam Lynch, Canton Police Arrest Protesters, JACKSON FREE PRESS (March 27, 2008),
http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2008/mar/27/canton-police-arrest-protesters/.
51
Id.
52
Elizabeth Crisp, House panel considers bill to outlaw racial profiling, THE CLARION-LEDGER (Jan. 14,
2009) (2009 WLNR 19779141).

41
and he personally implemented many of the unconstitutional racially discriminatory policing

practices that comprise the Policing Program.

131. For example, around six years ago, then-Deputy Tucker and other MCSD

deputies stormed into the home of named Plaintiff Mr. Singleton just minutes after Deputy

Tucker personally delivered a package to Mr. Singletons home. The package was addressed to a

relative who did not reside with Mr. Singleton and was not at Mr. Singletons home at the time.

Mr. Singletons brother-in-law, who was at Mr. Singletons home, picked up the package and

brought it inside. As soon as he did so, Tucker and his team barged into Mr. Singletons home.

They forced Mr. Singleton, his brother-in-law, and his sister to lay on the floor while they

searched Mr. Singletons home. Mr. Singletons three-year-old son was present in the home at

the time. When Mr. Singletons sister asked then-Deputy Tucker whether they had a search

warrant, Tucker pointed to the box and said: I dont need a search warrant. That box is my

search warrant.

132. In 2011, then-Deputy Tucker ran for Sheriff. During his campaign, then-Deputy

Tucker stated that he want[ed] to maintain the quality of law enforcement that we have under

Sheriff Trowbridge.53 He also said: [a]s Madison County Sheriff, I will continue the high level

of law enforcement and justice Madison County residents expect and have enjoyed under Sheriff

Toby Trowbridge.54 On information and belief, these statements were coded promises to

continue the Policing Program.

53
Lacey McLaughlin, Making Amends, JACKSON FREE PRESS, (Aug. 17, 2011),
http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2011/aug/17/making-amends/.
54
Madison County Sheriffs Deputy Captain Randy Tucker to Run for Madison County Sheriff, YALL
POLITICS, Jan. 19, 2011, http://www.yallpolitics.com/index.php/yp/post/
madison_county_sheriffs_deputy_captain_randy_tucker_to_run_for_madison_coun/.

42
133. On November 8, 2011, then-Deputy Tucker was elected Sheriff of Madison

County. He took office in January 2012.

V. Sheriff Tucker Has Adopted, Implemented, and Expanded the Policing Program

134. Upon taking office, Sheriff Tucker immediately adopted the Policing Program in

its entirety. In a memo to all MCSD deputies and employees dated January 3, 2012, Sheriff

Tucker stated that [t]he policies and procedures under the administration of Sheriff Toby

Trowbridge shall remain in place and effective as the policies and procedures for the

administration of Sheriff Randy Tucker.55

135. Since then, Sheriff Tucker has not only implemented the Policing Program but

expanded its scope by, among other actions, enacting or maintaining a written roadblock policy

that sanctions unconstitutional racially discriminatory roadblocks.

136. In essence, Sheriff Tucker has empowered MCSD deputies with enhanced

authority and implicit encouragement to target the members of Madison Countys Black

community for unreasonable searches and seizures.

137. One of the named Plaintiffs in this action, Mr. Blackmon, reports that the

MCSDs deputies have become even more disrespectful towards Black community members

since Tucker became Sheriff. According to Mr. Blackmon, MCSD deputies now terrorize the

community like a gang would.

55
Memo from Sheriff Tucker to all MCSD deputies and employees (Jan. 3, 2012). The memo stated that
[v]ariations to these policies and procedures may be made at the discretion of the Sheriff. As discussed
herein, Sheriff Tucker subsequently changed a few of Sheriff Trowbridges policies and procedures. On
information and belief, these changes were made to implement, enforce, and expand the Policing
Program.

43
A. Sheriff Tucker Has Enacted a Written Roadblock Policy That Sanctions
Unconstitutional Racially Discriminatory Roadblocks

138. Sheriff Tucker has enacted or maintained a written policy (the General

Roadblocks Policy) that expressly allows MCSD deputies to conduct random roadblocks

without specifying any restrictions on how and when MCSD deputies may conduct these

roadblocks.56

139. The General Roadblocks Policy fails to set forth any explicit, neutral limitations

on the conduct of individual officers as required under Supreme Court precedent.57 Notably, the

policy does not require MCSD deputies to use race-neutral criteria in selecting locations for

roadblocks.

140. In its entirety, the General Roadblocks Policy is only three sentences long. One of

these sentences clarifies that the procedural safeguards that govern sobriety checkpoints (see

below) do not apply to roadblocks. The complete text of the General Roadblocks Policy is as

follows:

a. This section allows officers to conduct random roadblocks for all traffic
violations, escapees or wanted subjects.

b. The requirements of this section shall not be confused with the policy set
out above on the methods to be used for sobriety checkpoints.

c. All Deputies may conduct general roadblocks when necessary to check for traffic
violations, escapees, or wanted subjects upon the public streets, highways and
right-of-ways within this county.

141. In stark contrast to his bare-bones General Roadblocks Policy, Sheriff Tuckers

policy on sobriety checkpoints (the Sobriety Checkpoint Policy) is carefully-crafted and

56
General Roadblocks, in POLICY AND PROCEDURE, Office of the Sheriff, Madison County, Mississippi,
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
57
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 49 (2000) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)).

44
establishes clear limits on the authority of MCSD deputies to establish such checkpoints. Among

other procedural safeguards, the Sobriety Checkpoint Policy requires MCSD deputies to:

[s]atisfy federal, state and local requirements in establishing and conducting


sobriety checkpoints;

[c]onduct [sobriety] checkpoints with a minimal amount of intrusion or motorist


inconvenience;

use [s]pecial care to warn approaching motorist[s] of the sobriety checkpoint;

specify objective criteria for selecting which motorists to stop at any given
sobriety checkpoint; and

specify the dialogue and educational material to be used by [sobriety] checkpoint


[p]ersonnel.58

A copy of this Sobriety Checkpoint Policy is attached as Exhibit C.

142. On information and belief, Sheriff Tuckers different approaches to sobriety

checkpoints and general roadblocks reflect his racially discriminatory approach to policing the

residents of Madison County. The Sobriety Checkpoint Policy is designed to protect the rights of

white residents of Madison County, who may be stopped at sobriety checkpoints but who almost

never encounter general roadblocks. The General Roadblocks Policy, on the other hand, is

structured to give MCSD deputies complete authority to establish roadblocks targeting Black

residents as and when they see fit.

143. Under color of this unconstitutionally vague and permissive General Roadblock

Policy, and with the tacit support of Sheriff Tucker, MCSD deputies regularly establish illegal

roadblocks to harass Black individuals in Madison County with unconstitutional searches and

seizures.

58
Sobriety Checkpoint Guidelines, in POLICY AND PROCEDURE, Office of the Sheriff, Madison County,
Mississippi.

45
144. To the extent Defendants contend that the General Roadblocks Policy is

constitutional, which it is plainly not, the MCSD has a pattern or practice of noncompliance with

its own policy. As discussed herein, the MCSD conducts roadblocks for impermissible purposes

unrelated to the need to check for traffic violations, escapees, or wanted subjects.

145. Insofar as Defendants claim that the roadblocks complained of herein are

established pursuant to the Sobriety Checkpoint Policy, the MCSD has a pattern and practice of

noncompliance with this policy as well.

VI. Sheriff Tucker Has Been Deliberately Indifferent to the Constitutional Violations
Caused by the Policing Program

146. Sheriff Tucker has long known of the constitutional violations suffered by the

Black residents of Madison County as a result of the Policing Program. On information and

belief, these harms are in fact the intended purpose and result of Sheriff Tuckers own policies,

practices, and customs.

147. Sheriff Tucker has been deliberately indifferent to the constitutional violations

caused by the Policing Program. Among other actions and inactions, he has: (1) on information

and belief, failed to investigate a Black MCSD deputys complaint of racially discriminatory

policing practices and the unjustified use of physical force against Black community members;

(2) hired a deputy with a documented history of misconduct involving the excessive use of force;

(3) chosen not to establish any rules or regulations prohibiting racial bias in policing; (4) decided

not to maintain basic data on the MCSDs policing practices or Madison Countys municipal

crime statistics; and (5) stopped maintaining records of complaints against MCSD deputies.

46
A. On Information and Belief, Sheriff Tucker Failed to Investigate an MCSD
Deputys Claim of Unconstitutional Racially Discriminatory Policing
Practices

148. In or around February 2013, one of Sheriff Tuckers own deputies, Robert

Gibson, raised concerns about the MCSDs pattern of targeting the Black residents of Madison

County for searches and seizures at roadblocks, as well as the MCSDs unjustified use of

physical force against Black community members.

149. On information and belief, Sheriff Tucker failed to conduct any investigation into

Mr. Gibsons claims of unconstitutional racially discriminatory policing practices. Instead,

Sheriff Tucker terminated Mr. Gibsons employment in February 2013.

150. In August 2016, Mr. Gibson filed suit against the MCSD asserting claims of racial

discrimination and retaliation.59

151. According to the complaint, Mr. Gibson specifically expressed his concerns

about racially discriminatory practices that affected both the [MCSD] employees and the

community. Mr. Gibson addressed what he found to be a pattern of white officers using

excessive force and beating black individuals as well as the MCSDs practice of setting up

roadblocks primarily in the minority neighborhoods.60 Mr. Gibsons claims remain pending.

59
Jimmie E. Gates, Former Madison deputy files discrimination lawsuit, THE CLARION-LEDGER, (Aug.
31, 2016), http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2016/08/31/former-madison-deputy-files-
discrimination-lawsuit/89650260/; see also Second Amended Complaint, Gibson v. Madison County at
37-39, No. 16 Civ. 633 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 25, 2016).
60
See Second Amended Complaint, Gibson v. Madison County at 37-39, No. 16 Civ. 633 (S.D. Miss.
Oct. 25, 2016). Mr. Gibsons suit was brought following a determination by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission that the evidence obtained in the investigation established reasonable cause to
believe that [Mr. Gibson] was discriminated against in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
as amended; that [c]reditable evidence disclosed that the [MCSDs] promotional policy and practices
were not uniformly applied to both races and were subjective at best; and that [t]he evidence also
showed that shortly after [Mr. Gibsons] protest, he was singled out for criticism and discharged. See id.
at Ex. B (EEOC Determination).

47
B. Sheriff Tucker Hired a Deputy with a Documented History of Misconduct
Involving the Excessive Use of Force

152. Sheriff Tucker not only fails to screen his deputies, but he has on at least one

occasion intentionally hired a deputy with a documented history of misconduct involving the

excessive use of force.

153. In 1997, Slade Moore, an officer with the Jackson Police Department, shoved an

arrestees face into a concrete floor, pressed his fingers into the arrestees eyes, and rolled the

arrestees face back and forth across the concrete floor.61

154. The arrestee subsequently sued the City of Jackson. The Mississippi Court of

Appeals held that the City of Jackson was not immune from suit because of the egregious and

unreasonable nature of Deputy Moores conduct, and awarded the arrestee $25,000 in damages. 62

155. The Jackson Police Department fired Moore for his use of excessive force in

arresting the plaintiff, as well as his history of using excessive force in making arrests. 63

156. Despite Moores record of misconduct, Sheriff Tucker hired Moore as an MCSD

deputy. Deputy Moore continues to serve as a member of the MCSDs force.

157. On information and belief, Deputy Moore has played an integral role in

implementing the MCSDs Policing Program.

C. Sheriff Tucker Has Not Established any Rules or Regulations Prohibiting


Racial Bias in Policing

158. For years, Sheriff Tucker and the MCSD have fielded complaints of racial

profiling.

61
City of Jackson v. Calcote, 910 So.2d 1103, 1107-1108 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
62
Calcote, 910 So.2d at 1107-1108, 1113.
63
City of Jackson v. Moore, 97 So. 3d 1238, 1239-40 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).

48
159. Nevertheless, Sheriff Tucker has failed to establish any rules or regulations

prohibiting racial bias in policing. 64

160. On information and belief, Sheriff Tucker does not train his deputies to avoid

racial bias in their policing practices; instead, he explicitly authorizes them to target Black

community members.

D. Sheriff Tucker Does Not Maintain Even Basic Data on the MCSDs Policing
Practices or Municipal Crime Statistics

161. Sheriff Tucker fails to maintain basic data on the MCSDs policing practices 65 or

aggregated crime statistics for municipalities in Madison County. 66

162. On information and belief, Sheriff Tucker does not require MCSD deputies to

keep records on the number of roadblocks established in any given week or month, the locations

of these roadblocks, the number of individuals stopped at these roadblocks, the number of arrests

made at each roadblock, or the race, gender, and/or age of each individual stopped and/or

arrested at each roadblock. 67

64
See ACLU Public Records Request (Sept. 15, 2016) (requesting [a]ll policies, protocols, or training
material describing how to address issues of racial bias in policing.); see also Letter from Sheriff Tucker
to the ACLU (Oct. 31, 2016) (stating that [n]o public records exist in response to this subparagraph
[requesting such policies].)
65
See ACLU Public Records Request (Sept. 15, 2016) (requesting data on the MCSDs roadblocks, traffic
stops, and stop and frisk searches); see also Letter from Sheriff Tucker to the ACLU (Oct. 31, 2016).
66
See ACLU Public Records Request (Mar. 3, 2017) (requesting, inter alia, [a]ll records regarding
Madison County crime rates, including but not limited to . . . the locations (including cities or
neighborhood[s]) considered to be high crime areas); see also Letter from Sheriff Tucker to the ACLU
(March 14, 2017) (stating that the only records the Madison County Sheriffs Department has regarding
crime rates or crime statistics are the Uniform Crime Reports as submitted to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
67
Letter from Sheriff Tucker to the ACLU (Oct. 31, 2016) (stating that [n]o public records exist with
respect to the MCSDs roadblocks and/or checkpoints documenting their number, frequency, location,
and/or duration; the number of stops initiated; the race, gender, and/or age of each individual stopped; the
race, gender, and/or age of each individual whose drivers license was run against the MCSDs databases;
the number of searches resulting in citations, and the reasons for these citations; the race, gender, and/or

49
163. On information and belief, Sheriff Tucker also does not require MCSD deputies

to document traffic stops, or essential information such as whether searches were conducted or

arrests were made incident to traffic stops.68 In addition, Sheriff Tucker does not maintain any

records concerning stop and frisk searches of pedestrians. 69

164. Moreover, Sheriff Tucker does not track aggregated crime statistics by town or

neighborhood.70 For example, on information and belief, Sheriff Tucker does not maintain

statistics on the number of arrests made in majority-Black Canton as compared to majority-white

Madison in any given time period.

165. On information and belief, Sheriff Tucker has chosen not to keep such data,

statistics and records because they would collectively provide unmistakable proof of the

existence and widespread implementation of the MCSDs Policing Program.

E. Sheriff Tucker Has Stopped Keeping Records of Complaints


Against MCSD Deputies

166. During Sheriff Trowbridges tenure, Section 17 of the official MCSD policy

handbook stated that the Sheriff will record all complaints against MCSD employees in a

age of each individual cited; the number of arrests made and for what charges; or the race, gender, and/or
age of each individual arrested.)
68
Letter from Sheriff Tucker to the ACLU (Oct. 31, 2016) (stating that [n]o public records exist with
respect to traffic stops conducted; traffic tickets issued at these stops; traffic stops which resulted in the
search of the drivers vehicle; traffic stop searches which resulted in the recovery of contraband; and/or
traffic stops which resulted in arrests.)
69
Id. (stating that [n]o public records exist with respect to stops, frisks, and/or searches conducted by
MCSD deputies, including the race, gender, and/or age of the individual(s) stopped; the basis for the stop;
whether any search was conducted and the basis for the search; and/or whether the stop resulted in an
arrest or citation, and the basis for this arrest or citation).
70
See supra note 64.

50
permanent record.71 Section 17 included a sample standard citizen complaint form, and

provided that each complaint report will include the name of the complainant, the name of the

accused, the date the complaint was received, the type of complaint that was made, the internal

affairs report number for the complaint, and the final disposition of the complaint.

167. Since taking office, Sheriff Tucker has, on information and belief, made it official

MCSD policy not to keep track of complaints against himself, his deputies, or any other MCSD

employees. By his own admission, Sheriff Tucker no longer uses the standard citizen

complaint form for recording complaints. 72 Sheriff Tucker has also expressly stated that the

MCSD does not have any public records of complaints against himself, his deputies, or any

other MCSD employees because the MCSD does not maintain a file for these complaints. 73

168. On information and belief, Sheriff Tucker has stopped maintaining records of

citizen complaints in order to provide MCSD deputies with greater authority to target Black

residents for unreasonable searches and seizures, with as little monitoring and oversight as

possible.

71
Section 17, Investigations: Internal Affairs, in POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, Office of the Sheriff,
Madison County, Mississippi, Section 17, Investigations: Internal Affairs.
72
Letter from Sheriff Tucker to the ACLU (May 1, 2017) (stating, inter alia, that the sample standard
citizen complaint form is no longer used by the [MCSD]).
73
See ACLU Public Records Request (Mar. 3, 2017), Item 1 (requesting, inter alia, [a]ll records
regarding complaints, formal or informal against any [MCSD] employees, including the Sheriff, whether
or not currently employed); Letter from Sheriff Tucker (Mar. 14, 2017) (stating, in response to Item 1,
that the MCSD does not have any public records sought in this item since it does not maintain a file for
these complaints and also stating that any such records that are generated as the result of an internal
affairs investigation are exempt as investigatory reports).

51
VII. The Board of Supervisors Has Been Deliberately Indifferent to the Constitutional
Violations Caused by the Policing Program

169. The Board of Supervisors serves as the chief policy making and administrative

body of Madison County. By its own description, the Board of Supervisors is the one body

which supervises almost everything that goes on in county government. 74

170. The Board of Supervisors is comprised of five elected Supervisors, one from each

of the five districts in Madison County. [T]ogether the members set policy for Madison

County and are expected to look after the good of the county as a whole. 75

171. For at least a decade, the Madison County Board of Supervisors has known that

the MCSD systematically targets the Black community for unreasonable searches and seizures:

a) In 2006, the Concerned Citizens of Canton presented the Board of Supervisors

with a petition bearing 664 signatures demanding an end to frequent roadblocks in the

predominantly black neighborhoods, the excessive force and brutality administered by

police officers, and racial profiling.76

b) In July 2006, representatives of the Concerned Citizens of Canton attended a

Board of Supervisors meeting to raise these concerns. Sheriff Trowbridge was present at the

meeting but refused to meet with the Concerned Citizens of Canton. Significantly, Sheriff

Trowbridge stated that the MCSD would not end the use of roadblocks. 77

74
Board of Supervisors, Madison County, Mississippi, http://madison-co.com/elected-offices/board-of-
supervisors.
75
Id.
76
Sylvain Metz, Roadblocks questioned in Canton, THE CLARION-LEDGER (July 18, 2006), 2006 WLNR
25321982.
77
Id.

52
c) In November 2007, Sheriff Trowbridge addressed charges of racial profiling

during a Board of Supervisors meeting. 78 He claimed that the MCSD did not engage in racial

profiling.79

172. The Board of Supervisors is also presumed to have knowledge of the allegations

of Mr. Gibsons complaint, and the commonly-known harms suffered by the Black residents of

Madison County as a result of these practices. 80

173. Although the Board of Supervisors has been aware of a pattern of constitutional

violations suffered by the Black residents of Madison County, the Board of Supervisors has been

deliberately indifferent to these violations. The Board of Supervisors has failed to investigate the

MCSDs racially discriminatory policing practices and/or its pattern of conducting unreasonable

searches and seizures, and has also failed to require the MCSD to take any actions to: (a)

establish policies that prohibit racially discriminatory policing practices and/or unreasonable

searches and seizures; (b) screen, train, and supervise MCSD deputies, employees, and agents to

prevent MCSD personnel from employing unconstitutional racially discriminatory policing

practices and/or conducting unreasonable searches and seizures; (c) monitor MCSD deputies,

employees, and agents to ensure that their policing practices comply with constitutional

requirements; and/or (d) discipline MCSD deputies, employees, and agents who employ racially

discriminatory policing practices and/or conduct unreasonable searches and seizures.

174. This policy of inaction by the Madison County Board of Supervisors is the

functional equivalent of a decision by Madison County itself to violate the Constitution. By

78
Madison sheriff denies racial discrimination charges during supervisors meeting, AP Alert
(November 6, 2007).
79
Crisp, supra note 42.
80
See supra 148 through 151.

53
failing to take any steps to investigate or remedy the MCSDs systematic targeting of Black

residents for unreasonable searches and seizures, the Board of Supervisors has implicitly

sanctioned and endorsed the Policing Program.

VIII. The Policing Program Has Caused Thousands of Constitutional Violations

175. The MCSDs systematic targeting of Black community members for unreasonable

searches and seizures has resulted in thousands of violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution. The Policing Program is unquestionably . . . the

moving force behind these constitutional violations within the meaning of the Supreme Courts

decision in Monell, 436 U.S. 658.

176. Sheriff Tucker has adopted, enforced, and expanded the Policing Program.

Madison County, by and through its Board of Supervisors, has been deliberately indifferent to

the pattern of constitutional violations that the Policing Program has caused. There can be no

question that the Policing Program is the officialbut unwrittenpolicy, practice, and/or

custom of both Sheriff Tucker and Madison County.

177. Without the declaratory and injunctive relief sought herein, thousands of Black

individuals in Madison County will continue to be subjected to unconstitutional racially

discriminatory policing practices pursuant to the Policing Program.

ALLEGATIONS OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVES

178. Each of the named Plaintiffs has suffered egregious constitutional violations as a

direct result of the MCSDs Policing Program. Most of the named Plaintiffs have been targeted

by the MCSD for unreasonable race-based searches and seizures at multiple times and in

multiple ways.

54
179. The events described below demonstrate that the Policing Program is pervasive,

widespread, and has the force of law. These events also illustrate the extremely high likelihood

that the named Plaintiffs will be subject to unreasonable race-based searches and seizures by the

MCSD in the future.

180. Named Plaintiffs assert, however, that only those events occurring within the past

three years entitle them to legal and equitable relief.

Latoya Brown

181. Ms. Brown is a 28-year old Black woman who has spent her entire life in Canton,

Mississippi. She lives with named Plaintiff Steven Smith and their three daughters in a

predominantly-Black affordable housing complex. Ms. Brown is a stay-at-home mother.

182. In the past three years, Ms. Brown has been stopped repeatedly at the MCSDs

pedestrian checkpoints and roadblocks. She was also once detained during a suspicionless

pedestrian stop.

a. Pedestrian Checkpoints

183. Ms. Brown has been detained at the MCSDs pedestrian checkpoints while

entering and exiting her own home on at least three occasions in the last three years. The

checkpoints have typically been located at the only access point to her housing complex.

184. Each time Ms. Brown has been stopped, she has been required to provide the

MCSD deputy with her identification.

b. Suspicionless Pedestrian Stop

185. In the summer of 2014, an MCSD deputy detained Ms. Brown while she was

walking on the sidewalk in or around the predominantly-Black affordable housing complex

where she resides. Ms. Brown was on her way to work at the time.

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186. The MCSD deputy had no reasonable suspicion, but demanded to see Ms.

Browns identification and find out where she was going.

187. The deputy detained Ms. Brown for approximately ten minutes before allowing

her to proceed.

c. Roadblocks

188. In the past three years, Ms. Brown has been stopped at the MCSDs roadblocks

multiple times while she was a passenger in someone elses vehicle.

189. At each roadblock stop, Ms. Brown has been required to provide the MCSD

deputy with her identification.

190. Ms. Brown is at risk that the MCSDs deputies will again stop her without

reasonable suspicion at a pedestrian checkpoint, on the street, or at a roadblock.

Lawrence Blackmon

191. Mr. Blackmon is a 31-year-old Black man who has resided in Canton, Mississippi

since 1998. Mr. Blackmon is currently enrolled in a Masters of Law program at George

Washington University Law School in Washington D.C., but his permanent place of residence is

at his grandmothers home. Mr. Blackmon intends to return to Madison County on a full-time

basis after completing his studies.

192. MCSD deputies held Mr. Blackmon at gunpoint while they conducted a search of

his home slightly over one year ago. The deputies claimed to have a warrant, but refused to

provide Mr. Blackmon with an opportunity to review it. Mr. Blackmon has also been stopped at

roadblocks in Canton multiple times in the past three years. These incidents are described in

further detail below.

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a. Home Search; Use of Force

193. Slightly over one year ago, Mr. Blackmon was at his home in Canton when he

heard a banging at the front door. He opened the door to find two MCSD deputies who claimed

to have a warrant for the arrest of one of Mr. Blackmons relatives. Mr. Blackmons cousin was

not in the house at the time.

194. Mr. Blackmon asked the deputies to show him the warrant. When the deputies

refused to provide him with an opportunity to review the warrant, Mr. Blackmon did not allow

the deputies to enter.

195. The MCSD deputies then began kicking on the door and shouted that if Mr.

Blackmon did not let them in, they would break down the door. Concerned that the MCSD

deputies would damage the house, Mr. Blackmon opened the door. The door is still dented from

the deputies efforts to kick it in.

196. The two MCSD deputies entered Mr. Blackmons home with their weapons

drawn. One deputy immediately pointed his gun at Mr. Blackmon, forced Mr. Blackmon to the

ground, and handcuffed his wrists behind his back.

197. The MCSD deputies then proceeded to search Mr. Blackmons entire residence,

ostensibly for the purpose of finding Mr. Blackmons relative. The MCSD deputies searched

inside dresser drawers and other closed compartments that could not possibly conceal an adult

man.

198. Finding nothing, the deputies attempted to uncuff Mr. Blackmon. However, they

could not release him because they did not have the correct key for the handcuffs. The deputies

then had to call another deputy to locate the key. Mr. Blackmon remained handcuffed for an

additional fifteen minutes until the deputies obtained the proper key to unlock the handcuffs.

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199. Eventually, the deputies uncuffed Mr. Blackmon and left his home.

200. Mr. Blackmon is at risk that the MCSDs deputies will again enter and search his

home unlawfully once he returns to Canton.

b. Roadblocks

201. During the past three years, Mr. Blackmon has been stopped at roadblocks

multiple times near his home in Canton.

202. In Mr. Blackmons experience, MCSD deputies sometimes stop all vehicles

passing through a roadblock. At other times, MCSD deputies only stop certain vehicles.

203. Mr. Blackmon travels frequently throughout Canton, which is divided by railroad

tracks. On one-side of the tracks is the impoverished and majority-Black section of Canton; on

the other side is the more affluent section of Canton where most of Cantons white citizens live.

Mr. Blackmon has never seen a roadblock on the other side of the tracks in Canton.

204. Mr. Blackmon is at risk that the MCSDs deputies will again stop him at a

roadblock without reasonable suspicion when he visits or returns to live in Canton.

Herbert Anthony Green

205. Mr. Green is a 30-year-old Black man, and a veteran of the United States Army.

He currently resides in Canton, where he has spent most of his life. Mr. Green currently works at

a local Chinese restaurant.

206. Within the past three years, Mr. Green has been subjected to a suspicionless

search by a Jump Out patrol. This incident is described below.

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a. Jump Out Patrol

207. In October 2015, Mr. Green was walking with two Black male friends when an

unmarked MCSD vehicle drove close to them. A plainclothes MCSD deputy rapidly exited the

vehicle and stopped both men.

208. The MCSD deputy proceeded to search Mr. Green and his friends, even though

there was no reasonable suspicion to do so.

209. The deputy released Mr. Green and his friends after finding no illegal drugs or

other grounds for the arrest.

Khadafy and Quinnetta Manning

210. Mr. and Mrs. Manning live in Canton, Mississippi. Mr. Manning is 35 years old.

He suffers from a painful nerve condition that makes it difficult for him to walk without a cane.

Mrs. Manning is 29 years old. Together they are raising three young sons.

211. Last June, six MCSD deputies stormed into the Manning familys home

demanding that they execute false witness statements. One of the MCSD deputies severely beat

Mr. Manning and threatened him with jail time for his refusal to write a statement. A few months

ago, Mr. Manning was falsely arrested by an MCSD deputy in retaliation for Mr. Mannings

efforts to seek legal redress for the injuries he suffered during the June 2016 incident. These

events are described in further detail below.

a. Home Invasion; Use of Force

212. On June 26, 2016, at approximately 7 am in the morning, Mrs. Manning heard a

loud banging on her front door. Mrs. Manning asked who was at the door at least twice before

she heard a male voice answer that it was the police.

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213. Mrs. Manning opened the door slightly and saw six white male MCSD deputies

standing at her doorstep. She asked the deputies what questions they had for her. MCSD Deputy

John Doe #1 (Deputy #1) asked, with no basis or justification: Oh, yall smoking weed in

there? Mrs. Manning responded that she did not smoke marijuana or use other illegal drugs.

Disregarding her response, Deputy #1 pushed past Mrs. Manning and barged into the Mannings

home without any mention of a search warrant. The other deputies followed.

214. None of the deputies inquired about or searched for illegal drugs once they were

inside the Mannings family home.

215. The Mannings three sonsthe youngest of whom was then only five years old

were all at home that morning, as was the Mannings eighteen-year-old niece.

216. Upon entering the Manning familys home, Deputy #1 shouted: I know yall

seen what went on downstairs, so are you going to be witnesses or are you going to be suspects?

217. Mrs. Manning surmised that Deputy #1 was referring to a dispute between her

neighbor and her neighbors boyfriend (the boyfriend) that had taken place earlier that

morning. Mrs. Manning realized that the deputies were trying to find a basis for charging the

boyfriend with a property crimeeven though Mrs. Manning had not witnessed any such crime.

218. Deputy #1 demanded that Mrs. Manning write a witness statement confirming

that she had seen the boyfriend reach his hand through the broken window of her neighbors

apartment. Mrs. Manning attempted to tell the deputy that she had only seen the boyfriend

removing pieces of broken glass from her neighbors apartment window. Mrs. Manning told

Deputy #1 that she had not seen the boyfriend reach his hand through the broken window.

219. Deputy #1 told Mrs. Manning that he knew she had seen the boyfriend reaching

into her neighbors window, and told Mrs. Manning to stop lying to us. The deputy repeatedly

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told Mrs. Manning that she could either write the witness statement he demanded, or she could

be treated as a suspect herself.

220. At around this time, Mr. Manningwho had just woken uphobbled out of his

bedroom wearing only his underwear. Mr. Manning told his wife that she did not have to provide

the deputies with the false witness statement they requested. Mr. Manning told the deputies that

he knew his rights.

221. The deputies then flew into a rage. One of the MCSD deputies (Deputy #2)

grabbed Mrs. Manning by the arm, while Deputy #1 dragged Mr. Manning across the room and

put him in handcuffs. Deputy #1 started cursing at Mr. Manning, and told him that he had smart

ass mouth. Deputy #1 then proceeded to choke Mr. Manning with both of his hands.

Terrified, Mrs. Manning began recording the incident on her cellular phone.

222. When Deputy #1 finally stopped choking Mr. Manning, he started to shout that he

would jail the Mannings if they refused to write the witness statements he wanted.

223. The Mannings tried to tell Deputy #1 that Mr. Manning is physically disabled.

From that point forward, Deputy #1 referred to Mr. Manning as Crip or Mr. Cripple.

224. Deputy #1 then demanded to see identification for Mr. Manning, who was still in

handcuffs. (Mrs. Manning was also compelled to provide her identification to one of the deputies

during the incident.) When Mrs. Manning went to her bedroom to get Mr. Mannings

identification, she left her phone on the counter. One of the deputies (Deputy #3) then stood in

front of the counter to prevent Mrs. Manning from retrieving her phone.

225. Deputy #1 informed Mrs. Manning that if she did not write the witness statement

he requested, he would jail Mr. Manning and set his bond at $50,000a sum that the Mannings

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would never be able to pay. A petrified Mrs. Manning finally said that she would write whatever

witness statement the deputies wanted.

226. Deputy #1 then told Mrs. Manning that he was going to take her husband to jail

anyway, and started hauling Mr. Manning towards the front door. Mrs. Manning pleaded with

Deputy #1 to at least allow her to give Mr. Manning his cane, pants, and shoes, since her

husband was still wearing nothing but his underpants. Deputy #1 refused, and told Mrs. Manning

that there was no need for clothes since Mr. Manning would get a jumpsuit at jail.

227. As Deputy #1 headed out of the doorway with Mr. Manning in tow, Mrs.

Manning managed to grab her cellphone from the counter and begin recording the incident again.

One of the deputies knocked the phone out of Mrs. Mannings hand, and a third deputy

physically blocked Mrs. Manning from following Deputy #1 outside.

228. Several of the Mannings neighbors heard the commotion and rushed outside to

see what was happening. These neighbors shouted to Deputy #1 that Mr. Manning could not

move as quickly as he was being dragged due to his disability. The Mannings neighbors also

tried to tell Deputy #1 that Mr. Manning had no involvement with that mornings burglary.

Deputy #1 ignored the neighbors and shoved Mr. Manning into his vehicle.

229. Mr. Manning was humiliated that his neighbors saw him being forcibly taken out

of his familys home while wearing only his underwear.

230. One of the deputies who was still in the Manning family home asked Deputy #1

what he should do with Mrs. Manning. Deputy #1 said that Mrs. Manning could either write a

statement or go to County. Knowing that she could not leave her children alone, with both of

their parents in jail, Mrs. Manning scribbled out the witness statement the deputies demanded.

She can hardly remember what she wrote.

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231. Once Mr. Manning was inside the deputys vehicle, Deputy #1 hit Mr. Mannings

head repeatedly with his fists, and struck him multiple times in the chest with a hard, black

object that Mr. Manning could not identify. Mr. Manning was in so much pain that he finally

agreed, while weeping, to write a witness statement incriminating the boyfriend. Still, Deputy #1

continued beating Mr. Manning. Deputy #1 told Mr. Manning that his wife would be better off

with him dead.

232. Finally, after what seemed like an eternity to Mr. Manning, Deputy #1 uncuffed

him. Mr. Manning then wrote a statement with his hands shaking and tears rolling down his face.

Only when the statement was complete did Deputy #1 release Mr. Manning, who then stumbled

barefoot in his underwear back into his home as his neighbors watched.

233. Mr. Mannings face was swollen and bruised from the assault, and his wrists were

cut and black and blue from the tight handcuffs. He went to the hospital to seek medical

treatment the following day. Hospital records show that Mr. Manning suffered both a sprained

wrist and chest contusions.

234. Mr. Manning continues to feel deep shame at his inability to protect his family, as

well as his public humiliation in full view of his neighbors. He still experiences intense feelings

of sadness and depression about the incident.

235. Mrs. Manning was extremely shaken up by the incident. She is very scared of

what might happen the next time she is stopped at one of the many roadblocks and checkpoints

that the MCSD regularly sets up in and around the predominantly-Black affordable housing

complex where she resides.

236. Both Mr. Manning and Mrs. Manning are at risk that the MCSDs deputies will

again illegally enter their family home and detain them without reasonable suspicion.

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b. Baseless Arrest; Retaliation

237. On February 14, 2017, a deputy threatened Mr. Manning while Mr. Manning was

talking with a neighbor in the parking lot of his familys apartment complex. The deputy told Mr.

Manning that he knew Mr. Manning had been causing trouble by having people come

around here asking questions.

238. The deputy handcuffed Mr. Manning and restrained him in the backseat of the

deputys vehicle. The deputy then searched Mr. Mannings vehicle, which was parked in the lot.

Finding nothing objectionable in the vehicle, the deputy charged Mr. Manning with driving

while his license was suspended.

Marvin McField

239. Mr. McField is a 37-year-old Black man who was born, raised, and currently

resides in Flora. Mr. McField has a pacemaker because he suffers from a serious heart condition.

Mr. McField is a carpenter. He is married with children.

240. Several years ago, during a routine roadblock stop, Mr. McField was searched,

beaten until he could not breathe, and incarcerated for nineteen days without ever being charged

with a crime.

241. Ever since that incident, Mr. McField has been deeply afraid of encounters with

the MCSDs deputies. He does everything he can to avoid passing through roadblocks.

242. Despite these efforts, Mr. McField has been stopped at roadblocks several times

within the past three years. He was also pulled over in a suspicionless traffic stop after

attempting to circumvent a roadblock. These incidents are described in more detail below.

243. Mr. McField wants the MCSD to change its policing practices because he does

not ever want his young children to suffer the way that he has.

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a. Roadblocks; Use of Force; Incarceration without Charge or Due Process

244. Within the past three or four years, Mr. McField was detained at a roadblock

while driving his brand new Chevy Cobalt.

245. The MCSD deputies manning the roadblock asked Mr. McField to pull over.

There were approximately six or seven male deputies, all but one of whom was white.

246. One of the deputies said to Mr. McField You a baller, aint you? On

information and belief, the deputy was referring to the fact that Mr. McField was driving a new

car.

247. The MCSD deputies told Mr. McField to exit the vehicle. When Mr. McField got

out of his car, the deputies handcuffed his hands behind his back and searched his person,

including his pockets. The deputies then lifted Mr. McField up and threw him onto the hood of

the Chevy Cobalt. Because it was a warm summer day, the hood was extremely hot. Mr. McField

protested that there was no need for the deputies to treat him this way.

248. A few minutes later, the deputies pulled Mr. McField off the hood of the Chevy

Cobalt, shoved Mr. McField into one of the deputies vehicles, and locked the doors. The

deputies left Mr. McField trapped in the stifling heat of the confined car with the windows rolled

up for 15 to 20 minutes.

249. The deputies then got into the vehicle and drove off, with Mr. McField still in the

backseat. After a few minutes of driving, the deputies pulled over and yanked Mr. McField out

of the backseat by his legs. They then began beating him in the chest. The beating continued

until Mr. McField told the deputies that he could not breathe.

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250. The deputies then forced Mr. McField back into their vehicle, and took him to the

Madison County Detention Center, where the deputies beat him againthis time hitting him in

the head instead of in his chest.

251. Mr. McField was held in the Madison County Detention Center for more than two

weeks without being charged with any crime. During this time, he was not permitted to make any

phone calls or let anyone know of his whereabouts. After nineteen days, Mr. McField was

brought before a judge without any legal counsel. Mr. McField was informed that he had served

his time, and was subsequently released.

252. Mr. McField has since lived in fear that he will again be stopped at one of the

MCSDs roadblocks. He does everything in his power to avoid having to pass through these

roadblocks. However, steering clear of roadblocks is no easy task because the MCSD establishes

roadblocks throughout the minority neighborhoods of Flora, where Mr. McField resides, multiple

times a week.

253. In the course of the past three years, Mr. McField has been stopped at roadblocks

on several occasions. Each time, Mr. McField has been gripped with fear that he may be beaten

or incarcerated by the MCSDs deputies.

254. Mr. McField is at risk that the MCSDs deputies will again stop him at a

roadblock without reasonable suspicion.

b. Suspicionless Traffic Stop

255. Approximately two years ago, Mr. McField was pulled over by MCSD deputies

while he was driving home in his cousins car with three of his relatives, all of whom were also

Black men. It was about 1 am in the morning. Mr. McField was not speeding, and there was no

reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the MCSD deputies to stop Mr. McField

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256. One of the MCSD deputies asked Mr. McField for his drivers license. Mr.

McField responded that he did not have his license with him, but provided the deputy with his

Social Security number. The deputy then instructed Mr. McField and his passengers to exit the

vehicle.

257. One of the deputies handcuffed Mr. McField and searched his pockets. The

deputy then put Mr. McField in the backseat of his patrol car.

258. Mr. McFields passengers later told him that while he was in the patrol car, the

deputies asked the passengers for their identification. The deputies also inquired whether there

were any illegal drugs in the vehicle. The passengers said no. The deputies then searched Mr.

McFields cousins vehicle and did not find any illegal drugs.

259. After running everyones identifications against police databases, the MCSD

deputies released Mr. McField and his passengers.

260. Mr. McField is at risk that the MCSDs deputies will again pull him over while he

is driving without reasonable suspicion.

Nick Singleton

261. Nick Singleton is a 35-year-old Black man who has lived in Canton, Mississippi

since 2004. Until recently, Mr. Singleton worked in information technology at a data center. He

is the father of two young boys.

262. In the past three years, Mr. Singleton has repeatedly been stopped at the MCSDs

roadblocks, as described below.

263. Several years ago, Mr. Singleton was subjected to a warrantless and consentless

home search by then-Deputy Tucker and other MCSD deputies just minutes after Deputy Tucker

personally delivered a package to Mr. Singletons home. The package was addressed to a relative

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who did not reside with Mr. Singleton. As soon as Mr. Singletons brother-in-law picked up the

package and brought it inside, a team of MCSD deputiesincluding then-Deputy Tucker

stormed into Mr. Singletons home. They forced Mr. Singleton, his brother-in-law, and his sister

to lay on the floor while they searched the family home. Mr. Singletons son, who was then only

three years old, was present in the home at the time. When Mr. Singletons sister asked then-

Deputy Tucker whether they had a search warrant, Tucker pointed to the box and said: I dont

need a search warrant. That box is my search warrant.

a. Roadblocks

264. Mr. Singleton lives on a quiet residential street in a majority-Black neighborhood

in Canton. MCSD deputies regularly establish roadblocks on the intersection right outside of his

home, particularly on holidays.

265. In the last year alone, Mr. Singleton has been stopped at the MCSDs roadblocks

a minimum of 20 times. He has been detained at dozens of roadblocks without reasonable

suspicion in the past three years.

266. On numerous occasions he has seen MCSD deputies set up a roadblock at one

location and then move it down the street to a different corner. Mr. Singleton has often been

required to show his license and insurance to the same MCSD deputy twice in the same day

while driving through these roving roadblocks.

267. Mr. Singleton often spends time in majority-white areas of Madison County. He

has never seen a roadblock in these predominantly white neighborhoods.

268. Mr. Singleton is at risk that the MCSDs deputies will again stop him at a

roadblock without reasonable suspicion.

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Steven Smith

269. Mr. Smith is a 27-year-old Black man who has spent his entire life in Canton,

Mississippi. He lives with named Plaintiff Ms. Brown and their three young daughters in a

predominantly-Black affordable housing complex. Mr. Smith currently works at a Chinese

restaurant as a wok cook.

270. During the past three years, Mr. Smith has been arrested and incarcerated

following a suspicionless stop at a pedestrian checkpoint outside of his own apartment

complex. He has also been subject to a warrantless and suspicionless search of his home. These

incidents are described below.

a. Pedestrian Checkpoint

271. In January 2017, Mr. Smith was stopped at a pedestrian checkpoint as he was

walking into the predominantly-Black affordable housing complex where he resides.

272. The MCSD deputies demanded to see Mr. Smiths identification, and searched his

person. On information and belief, the deputies had no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to

search him.

273. Mr. Smith was arrested after a check of his identification revealed that he had

overdue fines and court fees. Because he could not afford to pay the County, Mr. Smith was

subsequently incarcerated for 29 days at the Madison County Detention Center.

274. During this time, Mr. Smith could not go to work. The lost income was an

economic hardship for his family, particularly because his partner, named Plaintiff Ms. Brown, is

a stay-at-home mother who cares for their young daughters.

275. Mr. Smith is at risk that the MCSDs deputies will again stop him at a pedestrian

checkpoint without reasonable suspicion.

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b. Home Search

276. On the evening of October 31, 2015, two MCSD deputies came to Mr. Smiths

door after midnight and demanded to be let inside.

277. The deputies claimed they were searching for a missing person, but they did not

provide Mr. Smith with a warrant.

278. Mr. Smith told the deputies that they did not have his permission to enter his

home. Over Mr. Smiths objections, the deputies pushed right past Mr. Smith and proceeded to

search his apartment.

279. The deputies conducted a thorough search of Mr. Smiths home, including

examining inside bureau drawers and other small closed compartments that could not reasonably

contain a person.

280. One of the deputies even woke up Mr. Smiths daughter, who was only three

years old at the time, to ask her if she knew anything about the missing person.

281. Mr. Smith is at risk that the MCSDs deputies will again enter and search his

home unlawfully.

Bessie Thomas

282. Mrs. Thomas is a 59-year-old Black woman who has lived in Canton, Mississippi

for the last five decades. Mrs. Thomas serves as a minister at two local churches, and she is

involved in taking care of her young grandchildren. For three years, Mrs. Thomas operated a

corner store in Canton.

283. Within the past three years, Mrs. Thomas has been subjected to a warrantless and

consentless home invasion. She has also been stopped at the MCSDs roadblocks multiple times.

These incidents are described below.

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284. In Mrs. Thomass experience, MCSD deputies inflict violence rather than protect

Black community members from violence. On several occasions, Mrs. Thomas called the MCSD

for help after break-ins at her corner store in which thieves took almost all of her inventory.

Following a break-in that took place in October 2016, one MCSD deputy told Mrs. Thomas: If

they break in, just shoot them. Mrs. Thomas ultimately had no choice but to shut down the store

later that year.

a. Home Invasion

285. In the summer of 2014, Mrs. Thomas was sitting outside her home, under the

carport, when two MCSD deputies pulled in, ran right past her and began kicking in the door to

the carport, which was unlocked. Mrs. Thomas attempted to ask the deputies why they were

there, but they continued to kick in the door until the door frame split apart and the door opened.

The MCSD deputies then barged into Mrs. Thomass home and arrested her son. The deputies

never showed Mrs. Thomas a warrant.

286. The entire length of the frame of Mrs. Thomass carport door still remains

cracked as a result of the MCSDs forcible entry, despite attempts to repair it.

b. Roadblocks

287. Mrs. Thomas has been detained at roadblocks in Canton a number of times during

the last three years.

288. In Mrs. Thomass experience, the roadblocks end where the white people start

at the east end of Canton. Mrs. Thomas has frequently encountered roadblocks on King Ranch

Road, a predominantly-Black area.

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289. Mrs. Thomas feels demeaned and degraded every time she has to pass through a

roadblock because she believes that this is something only Black residents of Madison County

are forced to do.

290. Mrs. Thomas is at risk that the MCSDs deputies will again stop her at a

roadblock without reasonable suspicion.

Betty Jean Williams Tucker

291. Mrs. Tucker is a 62-year-old Black woman who was born, raised, and currently

resides in Canton, Mississippi. For over a decade, Mrs. Tucker worked as a welder in a Canton

manufacturing warehouse. She has five children, twelve grandchildren, and two great grand-

children. Mrs. Tucker is among the longest-lived residents in her Canton neighborhood.

292. During the past three years, Mrs. Tucker has been stopped several times at the

MCSDs roadblocks. These incidents are described below.

293. About three or four years ago, Mrs. Tucker was hosting a celebratory barbeque

when two plainclothes deputies pulled up in an unmarked vehicle. Without a warrant or Mrs.

Tuckers consent, the deputies walked right into Mrs. Tuckers yard and began searching every

person at the party, right down to the contents of their pockets. Finding nothing, the MCSD

deputies also got down on their hands and knees to search Mrs. Tuckers patio. They eventually

left without any explanation.

294. About five years ago, Mrs. Tucker was in her front yard when she saw a Jump

Out patrol target her teenage grandson, who lived across the street. Her grandson had been

fixing his brothers bicycle in his own front yard. It was a hot day, and her grandson was

shirtless. All of a sudden, an unmarked truck went speeding towards Mrs. Tuckers grandson,

and out jumped two white plainclothes deputies. The deputies tackled her grandson to the ground

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and began aggressively searching through his pockets. Petrified, Mrs. Tucker shouted to the

deputies that he was her grandson and asked what he had done wrong. The deputies abruptly got

up after finding nothing in her grandsons pockets. As they went back to their truck, one of the

deputies said to Mrs. Tucker: Tell your grandson to wear a shirt next time.

a. Roadblocks

295. Mrs. Tucker has a valid license, registration, and insurance. Nevertheless, because

of her prior experiences with the MCSD, she devotes a great deal of time and effort to finding

out the locations of the MCSDs roadblocks through phone calling trees, Facebook pages, smart

phone apps, and texting lists. Mrs. Tucker often rearranges her life to avoid the MCSDs

roadblocks, typically by cancelling her plans and not leaving the house to see family or friends.

296. Despite these extensive efforts, Mrs. Tucker was still subjected to two roadblock

stops over the past two years. During both stops, Mrs. Tucker was required to provide her license

and her passengers were required to provide their identifications before the deputies allowed

Mrs. Tucker and her passengers to proceed. Each stop delayed her by approximately ten minutes.

297. In Mrs. Tuckers decades of living and traveling in Madison County, she has

rarelyif everseen a roadblock in a predominantly-white neighborhood. She has also found

that roadblocks typically take place on low-traffic streets where accidents rarely occur. She has

also observed a pattern of increased roadblock activity during major events in the Black

community, such as Martin Luther King Jr. weekend. Mrs. Tucker feels that the MCSDs

roadblocks have become more frequent since Randy Tucker became Sheriff.

298. Mrs. Tucker is at risk that the MCSDs deputies will again stop her at a roadblock

without reasonable suspicion.

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CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

299. Plaintiffs seek to bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of

those similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

300. The proposed Class is defined as: People who (1) are, or who appear to be, Black

and those in their company, and (2) were, are, or will be in Madison County, and (3) were, are,

or will be, subject to the MCSDs policy, custom, and/or practice of systematically executing

unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, homes, cars, and property on the basis of race.

301. The Class meets all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

302. The members of the Class are so numerous as to render joinder impracticable.

Although the exact size of the class is unknown, as of the 2010 census, over 36,000 Black

persons reside in Madison County. 81 The unlawful law enforcement activities described herein,

and the resulting violations of Black individuals constitutional rights, have occurred, and will

continue to occur, on a routine basis and for the foreseeable future unless such conduct is

enjoined by this Court.

303. In addition, joinder is impracticable because, upon information and belief, many

members of the Class are not aware of the fact that their constitutional rights have been violated

and that they have the right to seek redress in court. Many members of the Class are without the

means to retain an attorney to represent them in a civil rights lawsuit. Moreover, many Class

members who have been victimized by Defendants unconstitutional practices do not bring

individual claims for fear of retaliation and reprisals by Defendants and their agents. There is no

81
Quickfacts: Madison County, Mississippi, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/28089,28 (last visited May 5, 2017).

74
appropriate avenue for protection of the Class members constitutional rights other than a class

action.

304. The Class members share a number of questions of law and fact in common,

including, but not limited to: whether the MCSD has a policy, practice, and/or custom of

targeting members of the Class for unreasonable searches and seizures on the basis of race in

violation of both the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

305. The named Plaintiffs claims are typical of those of the Class. Like the other

members of the Class, the named Plaintiffs have been and likely will again be victims of

Defendants policy, practice, and/or custom of conducting unreasonable searches and seizures on

the basis of race in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

306. The legal theories under which the named Plaintiffs seek declaratory and

injunctive relief are the same or similar to those on which all members of the Class will rely, and

the harms suffered by the named Plaintiffs are typical of the harms suffered by the Class

members.

307. The named Plaintiffs have a strong personal interest in the outcome of this action,

have no conflicts of interest with members of the Plaintiff Class, and will fairly and adequately

protect the interests of the Class. The named Plaintiffs are all current or former Black residents

of Madison County or nearby areas who continue to reside in, have their permanent place of

residence in, travel to and in, and/or intend in the near future to reside in, Madison County. As

long as the MCSD continues to implement the policy, practice, and/or custom described herein,

the named Plaintiffs will remain at substantial risk of suffering constitutional violations as a

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result of the conduct of MCSD personnel. The named Plaintiffs are seeking compensatory and

punitive damages only on an individual basis.

308. The named Plaintiffs are represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of

Mississippi, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, and by the law firm Simpson

Thacher & Bartlett LLP. Counsel for the Plaintiffs have the resources, expertise, and experience

to prosecute this action. Counsel for the Plaintiffs know of no conflicts among members of the

Class or between the attorneys and members of the Class.

309. The Plaintiff Class should be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the

Class, thereby making Class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate.

CAUSES OF ACTION

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Claims of Named Plaintiffs and Class Members Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983


Against All Defendants for Violations of the Fourth Amendment)

310. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege paragraphs 1 through 309 above as if fully set forth

herein.

311. Defendants Sheriff Tucker and the County have implemented, enforced,

encouraged, and sanctioned a policy, practice, and/or custom of conducting unreasonable

searches and seizures of County residents in the absence of reasonable suspicion and/or probable

cause. These constitutional abuses are at times accompanied by the use of excessive force.

312. The MCSDs constitutional abuses and violations were and are directly and

proximately caused by policies, practices, and/or customs devised, implemented, enforced,

encouraged, and sanctioned by the County and Sheriff Tucker, including: (a) the failure to

adequately and properly screen, train, and supervise MCSD personnel; (b) the failure to

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adequately and properly monitor and discipline MCSD personnel; and (c) the overt and tacit

encouragement and sanctioning of, and the failure to rectify, the MCSDs practice of conducting

unconstitutional searches and seizures.

313. Each of the Defendants has acted with deliberate indifference to the Fourth

Amendment rights of the named Plaintiffs and other members of the Class. As a direct and

proximate result of the acts and omissions of each of the Defendants, the Fourth Amendment

rights of the named Plaintiffs and other Class members have been violated. By acting under color

of state law to deprive the named Plaintiffs and other Class members of their rights under the

Fourth Amendment, Defendants have violated 42 U.S.C. 1983, which prohibits the deprivation

under color of state law of rights secured under the United States Constitution.

314. The MCSD targets individuals for suspicionless and otherwise unjustified

detentions, frisks, searches, and arrests in areas where Plaintiffs reside and/or visit. Thus, a real

and immediate threat exists that the Fourth Amendment rights of the named Plaintiffs and other

Class members will be violated by MCSD personnel in the immediate future. Moreover, because

Defendants policies, practices, and/or customs subject the named Plaintiffs and other Class

members to suspicionless and otherwise unjustified detentions, frisks, searches, and arrests

without any reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminality, and on the basis of their race, the

named Plaintiffs and other Class members cannot alter their behavior to avoid future violations

of their constitutional and civil rights by the MCSD.

315. The named Plaintiffs and other members of the Class have no adequate remedy at

law and will suffer serious and irreparable harm to their constitutional rights unless Defendants

are enjoined from continuing the MCSDs policy, practice, and/or custom of conducting

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unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, homes, cars, and property on the basis of race,

with the concomitant use of excessive force.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Claims of Named Plaintiffs and Class Members Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983


Against All Defendants for Violations of the Equal Protection Clause)

316. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege paragraphs 1 through 315 above as if fully set forth

herein.

317. Defendants Sheriff Tucker and the County have implemented, enforced,

encouraged, and sanctioned a policy, practice, and/or custom of targeting the named Plaintiffs

and members of the Plaintiff Class for unreasonable searches and seizures on the basis of their

race, which violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The MCSDs

constitutional abuses and violations were and are directly and proximately caused by policies,

practices, and/or customs devised, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned by the

County and Sheriff Tucker, including: (a) the failure to adequately and properly screen, train,

and supervise MCSD personnel; (b) the failure to adequately and properly monitor and discipline

MCSD personnel; and (c) the overt and tacit encouragement and sanctioning of, and the failure

to rectify, the MCSDs use of racial profiling to target Black individuals for unconstitutional

searches and seizures through its Policing Program.

318. Each of the Defendants has acted with deliberate indifference to the Fourteenth

Amendment rights of the named Plaintiffs and other members of the Class. As a direct and

proximate result of the acts and omissions of each of the Defendants, the Fourteenth Amendment

rights of the named Plaintiffs and other Class members have been violated. By acting under color

of state law to deprive the named Plaintiffs and other Class members of their rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment, Defendants have violated 42 U.S.C. 1983.

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319. The MCSD targets Black persons in areas where the named Plaintiffs and other

Class members reside and/or visit. As a result, a real and immediate threat exists that the

Fourteenth Amendment rights of the named Plaintiffs and other Class members will be violated

by MCSD personnel in the immediate future. Moreover, because Defendants policies, practices,

and/or customs subject the named Plaintiffs and other Class members to unreasonable detentions,

frisks, searches, and arrests without any reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminality, and on

the basis of their race, the named Plaintiffs and other Class members cannot alter their behavior

to avoid future violations of their constitutional and civil rights by the MCSD.

320. The named Plaintiffs and other members of the Class have no adequate remedy at

law and will suffer serious and irreparable harm to their constitutional rights unless Defendants

are enjoined from continuing the MCSDs policy, practice, and/or custom of conducting

unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, homes, cars, and property on the basis of race,

with the concomitant use of excessive force.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Claims of Named Plaintiffs and Class Members Pursuant to Title VI of the


Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000(d), et seq., Against the County)

321. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege paragraphs 1 through 320 above as if fully set forth

herein.

322. The law enforcement activities described in this Complaint have been funded, in

part, with federal funds.

323. Discrimination based on race in law enforcement activities and other conduct

described herein is prohibited under 42 U.S.C. 2000(d), et seq. The acts and conduct of the

Defendants complained of herein were motivated by racial animus, and were intended to

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discriminate on the basis of race and/or had a disparate impact on minorities, namely Black

residents of and visitors to the County.

324. As a direct and proximate cause of the above mentioned acts, the named Plaintiffs

and members of the Class have suffered injuries and damages and have been deprived of their

rights under the Civil Rights Act. Without appropriate injunctive relief, these violations will

continue to occur.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Individual Claims of Khadafy Manning Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983


Against John Does #1 through #6)

325. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege paragraphs 1 through 324 above as if fully set forth

herein.

326. The conduct of John Does #1 through #6 on June 16, 2016 in unlawfully and

forcibly entering Mr. Mannings home; unlawfully seizing, handcuffing, choking, dragging, and

beating Mr. Manning; and unlawfully compelling Mr. Manning to write a false witness statement

under threat of criminal punishment, was conduct performed entirely under color of law, absent

reasonable suspicion of criminality or other constitutionally-required grounds, and on the basis

of Mr. Mannings race. The warrantless and consentless entry into the home of; the seizure,

which amounted to an arrest of; and the compelled execution of a false witness statement by,

Plaintiff Khadafy Manning by John Does #1 through #6 were carried out using unjustified and

unconstitutionally excessive force.

327. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, John Does #1 through #6 deprived

Mr. Manning of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

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328. As a direct and proximate result of those constitutional abuses, Mr. Manning has

suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental

anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.

329. The acts of John Does #1-#6 were intentional, wanton, malicious, reckless, and

oppressive, thus entitling Plaintiff Khadafy Manning to an award of punitive damages.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Individual Claims of Quinnetta Manning Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983


Against John Does #1 through #6)

330. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege paragraphs 1 through 329 above as if fully set forth

herein.

331. The conduct of John Does #1 through #6 on June 16, 2016 in unlawfully and

forcibly entering Mrs. Mannings home, unlawfully detaining Mrs. Manning, and unlawfully

compelling Mrs. Manning to write a false witness statement under threat of criminal punishment,

was conduct performed entirely under color of law, absent reasonable suspicion of criminality or

other constitutionally-required grounds, and on the basis of Mrs. Mannings race. The seizure,

which amounted to an arrest, of Plaintiff Quinnetta Manning by John Does #1 through #6 was

carried out using excessive and disproportionate force.

332. As a direct and proximate result of such acts, John Does #1 through #6 deprived

Mrs. Manning of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

333. As a direct and proximate result of those constitutional abuses, Mrs. Manning has

suffered, and will continue to suffer, physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, mental

anguish, and crippling fear of law enforcement.

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334. The acts of John Does #1 through #6 were intentional, wanton, malicious,

reckless, and oppressive, thus entitling Plaintiff Quinnetta Manning to an award of punitive

damages.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Individual Claims of Khadafy Manning and Quinnetta Manning


Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 Against the County)

335. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege paragraphs 1 through 334 as if fully set forth herein.

336. Defendant Madison County has directly and proximately caused the MCSDs

policy, practice, and/or custom of conducting unreasonable searches and seizures on the basis of

race, including by devising, implementing, enforcing, adopting, sanctioning, and ratifying a

policy, practice, and/or custom of (a) failing to adequately and properly screen, train, and

supervise MCSD personnel; (b) failing to adequately and properly monitor and discipline MCSD

personnel; and (c) overtly and tacitly encouraging and sanctioning, and failing to rectify the

MCSDs constitutional abuses.

337. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid acts and omissions, Defendant

Madison County has deprived Plaintiffs Khadafy Manning and Quinnetta Manning of their

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the named Plaintiffs and other members of the Class they seek to

represent pray that the Court will:

A. Issue an order certifying this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and
(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the manner described above
herein, with the named Plaintiffs as class representatives;

B. Issue a class-wide judgment declaring that the MCSDs policy, practice, and/or
custom of unreasonably searching and seizing persons, homes, cars, and property
in the absence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause and on the basis of race,
and of using unconstitutionally excessive force in connection with such searches

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and seizures, including the specific practices alleged herein, violates the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Title VI, and
that its implementation, enforcement, and sanctioning by MCSD personnel is a
direct and proximate result of the following policies, practices, and/or customs of
the County and Sheriff Tucker:

i. Failing to adequately screen, train, and supervise officers;

ii. Failing to adequately monitor the MCSD and its personnel and
discipline those personnel who violate the constitutional rights of
the residents of the communities they patrol; and

iii. Encouraging, sanctioning, and failing to rectify the MCSDs


policy, practice, and/or custom of unreasonably searching and
seizing persons, homes, cars, and property in the absence of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause and on the basis of race,
and of using unconstitutionally excessive force in connection with
such searches and seizures.

C. Issue an order for the following injunctive relief:

i. Enjoining the MCSD from continuing its policy, practice, and/or


custom of unreasonably searching and seizing persons, homes,
cars, and property in the absence of reasonable suspicion or
probable cause and on the basis of race, and of using
unconstitutionally excessive force in connection with such
searches and seizures;

ii. Requiring the County to establish an independent civilian


complaint review board which will be tasked with reviewing and
investigating complaints by the public against the MCSD for abuse
of authority, discrimination, and improper use of force, stops and
frisks, and searches and seizures; and requiring the County to
empower the civilian complaint review board to investigate MCSD
policies and practices to identify systemic problems, subpoena
MCSD documents and testimony for investigations, and impose
binding disciplinary decisions upon findings that an officer of
MCSD has violated civil rights;

iii. Requiring the County and Sheriff Tucker to institute and


implement improved policies and programs with respect to
training, discipline, and promotion designed to eliminate the
MCSDs policy, practice, and/or custom of unreasonably searching
and seizing persons, homes, cars, and property in the absence of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause and on the basis of race,
and of using unconstitutionally excessive force in connection with
such searches and seizures;

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iv. Requiring the County and Sheriff Tucker to deploy MCSD
personnel with appropriate and adequate supervision;

v. Requiring the County and Sheriff Tucker to implement appropriate


measures to ensure that MCSD deputies document:

1. all roadblocks and checkpoints, including the location of


each roadblock and checkpoint and the number, race, and
gender of each individual(s) stopped;

2. all stops, frisks, searches (including home entries),


including the basis for and the location of each stop, frisk,
and search, and the number, race, and gender of each
individual stopped, frisked, and/or searched; and

3. all citations and arrests, including the date, location, and


circumstances under which the citation was issued and/or
the arrest made, the basis and/or charge for the
arrest/citation, and the race and gender of each individual
cited or arrested,

in sufficient detail as to permit supervisory review for compliance


with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act;

vi. Requiring the County and Sheriff Tucker to implement appropriate


measures to ensure that documentation of all vehicular stops and
pedestrian stops and/or frisks is retained in a single, up-to-date
computerized database;

vii. Requiring the County and Sheriff Tucker to make publicly


available, on a semiannual basis, data on all roadblocks,
checkpoints, stops, frisks, and searches (including home entries),
conducted by the MCSD, including the locations of each
roadblock, checkpoint, stop, frisk and/or search and the race,
ethnicity, and gender of each individual stopped and/or searched,
as well as the purpose of the roadblocks/checkpoints and the
reasons for stops, frisks, and searches;

viii. Requiring the County and Sheriff Tucker to monitor and audit
MCSD policies, practices, and customs to ensure that all
roadblocks, checkpoints, stops, frisks, and searches (including
home entries), comport with constitutional and statutory
requirements, including by, among other things, periodically
reviewing forms documenting roadblocks, checkpoints, stops,
frisks, and searches (including home entries), and analyzing data
on roadblocks, checkpoints, stops, frisks, and searches (including
home entries); and
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ix. Requiring the County and Sheriff Tucker to acknowledge the role
of policing in past and present injustice and discrimination and
how it is a hurdle to the promotion of community trust; and

x. Requiring the County and Sheriff Tucker to embrace a guardian


mindset to build public trust and legitimacy by adopting procedural
justice as the guiding principle for internal and external policies
and practices to guide their interactions with the citizens they
serve.

D. Award named Plaintiffs Khadafy Manning and Quinnetta Manning compensatory


damages against John Does #1 through #6 and against the County in amounts that
are fair, just, and reasonable, to be determined at trial;

E. Award named Plaintiffs Khadafy Manning and Quinnetta Manning punitive


damages against John Does #1 through #6 to the extent that their liability is based
on reprehensible actions and/or inaction undertaken in their individual capacities,
in amounts that are fair, just, and reasonably designed to punish and deter said
reprehensible conduct, to be determined at trial;

F. Award all Plaintiffs, including the members of the Class, reasonable attorneys
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988;

G. Award all Plaintiffs, including the members of the Class, costs of suit pursuant to
42 U.S.C. 1920 and 1988; and

H. Award such other and further relief as this Court may deem appropriate and
equitable, including injunctive and declaratory relief as may be required in the
interests of justice.

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Dated: May 8, 2017

By: ______________________________
Joshua Tom

SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION


Jonathan K. Youngwood (pro hac vice OF MISSISSIPPI FOUNDATION
forthcoming) Paloma Wu (pro hac vice forthcoming)
Janet A. Gochman (pro hac vice Joshua Tom (Miss. Bar No. 105392)
forthcoming) 233 East Capitol Street
Isaac Rethy (pro hac vice forthcoming) Jackson, MS 39201
Nihara K. Choudhri (pro hac vice (601) 354-3408
forthcoming) PWu@aclu-ms.org
Yukiu Chan (pro hac vice forthcoming) JTom@aclu-ms.org
425 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10017
(212) 455-2000
jyoungwood@stblaw.com
jgochman@stblaw.com AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
irethy@stblaw.com FOUNDATION
nchoudhri@stblaw.com Ezekiel Edwards (pro hac vice forthcoming)
monica.chan@stblaw.com Jeffery Robinson (pro hac vice forthcoming)
125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004
(212) 549-2610
eedwards@aclu.org
jrobinson@aclu.org

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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