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BOOK REVIEWS 633
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634 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 42, 1980
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BOOK REVIEWS 635
Michael Yahuda sets out to answer two questions. What have the
Chinese leaders seen as China's role in world affairs? And what has
caused them to change their minds? His time frame is from 1949 to
the present. He has used secondary literature as well as primary
source material. His point of view is cautiously sympathetic.
Generally, the book is well argued. However, Mr. Yahuda has
some ideas about national security which need further elaboration.
Since the Chinese have spoken little about their nuclear capabilities,
Mr. Yahuda argues, they enjoy an advantage. "No one can be quite
certain as to what kind of second strike capability the Chinese might
have by now." (12) The recent SALT debate in the United States
Senate has made it evident that the American and Russian in-
telligence services can well monitor each other's nuclear activities.
Most of the monitoring techniques can be applied against China. On
the other hand, the Chinese are probably less able to monitor the
Russian or American nuclear capabilities. Calculating an oppo-
nent's first-strike capabilities is an indispensible step in determining
one's own second-strike capabilities. In sum, the Russians and the
Americans may know better than the Chinese whether or not the
Chinese are able to launch a second strike.
Mr. Yahuda also posits that backwardness is, if not beautiful,
beneficial for security. At least, "Backwardness is a major factor in
China's capacity to fight a people's war . . . . The cellular economy
with decentralized management and the largely self-sufficient com-
munes, the dispersed grain stores, a militia force, a people's army
and so on all suggest a situation in which popular resistance and
warfare could be carried on . . . . The relatively unmodernized
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