Title VII Summary of Rulings

Bayot vs Sandiganbayan
Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of
Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from his alleged involvement, as a government auditor of the
Commission on Audit assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with some officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau
of Treasury and the Teacher's Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for non-existent obligations of
the Teacher's Camp resulting in damage to the government of several million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25, 1978. In
the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in the local elections held in January 1980. He was elected.
On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting herein petitioner and some of his co-accused in all but one of the
thirty-two (32) cases filed against them. Pending appeal, on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others,
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
"Sec. 13. Suspension of and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for
any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings had been filed against
him."
On July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order directing the suspension of all the accused including herein petitioner "from their public
positions or from any other public office that they may be holding . . ."
SC Ruling
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes
the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension
from office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law.
Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from the employment or public office during the trial
or in order to institute proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before final judgment.
Not being a penal provision, therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial, of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in
the amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law.
Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a position different from that under which he
is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. Thus, by the use of the word "office" the same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he was charged.
Petition was dismissed.

Calilung vs Suriaga
Complainant is the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer case filed with respondent Suriaga, MTC Judge in Angeles City. A favorable decision
was rendered, but it was appealed to the sala of respondent Iturralde. Claiming that Suriaga was demanding P250,000.00 for a favorable judgment
of the appealed case, complainant sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation. The entrapment was conducted on April 19, 1999
with NBI Supervising Agent Dapilos acting as the "yaya" of complainant's son. Suriaga, after talking with somebody over the phone about the
appealed case and assuring that complainant would be given a draft of the favorable decision, received the marked money in the amount of
P250,000.00. Thus, his arrest which was even published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer's April 22, 1999 edition. Suriaga was thereafter charged
with the crime of Corruption of a Public Official under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code before the Sandiganbayan and this administrative
complaint for serious misconduct was filed against him and Iturralde. However, the evidence presented against respondent Iturralde was the
alleged telephone conversation between him and Suriaga that transpired during the entrapment.
On April 20, 1999, Director Santiago Y. Toledo of the NBI forwarded the findings of SRA Arnel B. Azul and company to the Inquest
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice in Padre Faura, Manila. On the same day, two Informations were filed against Judge Suriaga by State
Prosecutor Rosalina P. Aquino for "Corruption of Public Officials (Art. 212, RPC) and for "Violation of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019 otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." These were indorsed by Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano to the Ombudsman on
the same date "requesting approval for the filing of the corresponding informations and to direct the prosecutor of this Office to handle the
prosecutions of the case."
Thereafter, in a Joint Review Action dated 21 April 1999, Graft Investigating Officer II Germain G. Lim recommended "that the subject
Informations and the Resolutions dated 20 April 1999 rendered by the Department of Justice, National Prosecution Service, Manila be
AFFIRMED and APPROVED en toto, finding the existence of probable cause against" Judge Suriaga as charged. On even date, this Joint Review
Action was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman. Likewise on the same day, an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 25244 was filed
before the Sandiganbayan accusing Judge Wilfredo Samson Suriaga of the crime of Corruption of a Public Official, defined and penalized under
Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code.
SC Ruling
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and conclusion of Justice Ramirez. The culpability of respondent Judge Suriaga for serious
misconduct has been established not just by substantial evidence which suffices in an administrative investigation 167 but by an overwhelming
preponderance thereof. The testimony of Supervising Agent Julma Dizon-Dapilos who posed as yaya of complainant's two-year old son during the
entrapment operation demolishes whatever credibility respondent's proffered defense has. Dizon-Dapilos, a disinterested observer in addition to
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being a law enforcement officer corroborated the testimony of the complainant and his wife. She was a direct witness to the entrapment operation
and, equally important, respondent judge failed to present any reason why her testimony should be disbelieved.
SC Ruling on Judicial Ethics
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that both the reality and the appearance must concur. Case law repeatedly teaches that "[j]udicial
office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to pay for accepting and
occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice. The irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the
judiciary. It is thus the duty of the members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the
judiciary."
Given the factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court does not hesitate to conclude that "[r]espondent Judge tainted the image of
the judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it all times unsullied and worthy of the people's trust." A judge should conduct
himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people for he is the visible representation
of the law. Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs that a judge should behave at all times to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary."
Perforce, the penalty of dismissal from the service is the most appropriate penalty under the circumstances for respondent Judge
Suriaga's malfeasance in office. As has been stated earlier, the Court has time and again "[a]dmonished judges to conduct themselves in a
manner that is free even from the appearance of impropriety. For judicial officers to enjoy the trust and respect of the people, it is necessary that
they live up to the exacting standards of conduct demanded by the profession and by the Code of Judicial Conduct. This is especially true in the
case of judges who, on a daily basis, interact with the public. Their official conduct, as well as personal behavior should always be beyond
reproach."
As regards the case against Judge Iturralde, complainants capitalized on a telephone conversation that allegedly transpired in the house of
Judge Suriaga on April 19, 1999, the date the latter was entrapped and arrested. There being no sufficient showing at this time to establish the
culpability of Judge Iturralde, the case against him should be referred back to the Office of the Court Administrator for further investigation as to
his participation in the anomalous transactions complained of. In the meantime, in order to enable Judge Iturralde to perform his functions, this
Court lifts his suspension pending the proceedings against him.
Respondent Wilfredo S. Suriaga is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The administrative complaint against respondent Philbert I. Iturralde is REFERRED back to the Office of the Court Administrator for
further investigation. In the meantime, his preventive suspension is hereby LIFTED.

Jinggoy Estrada vs Sandiganbayan

As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against former President Estrada, five criminal complaints against him and members of his
family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman. One of the informations was for the
crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner, then Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila. The case
was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the amended information on
the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law was unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. The Ombudsman opposed the motion. The
petitioner filed several other motions. Thereafter, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash and very
urgent omnibus motion, as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In this petition, the petitioner questioned the decision of the
Sandiganbayan for not declaring unconstitutional the Anti-Plunder Law. Petitioner also claimed that he was denied substantive due process when
the charge against him was sustained. He also faulted the Sandiganbayan for not fixing bail for his release from confinement.
The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutionality of the Anti-Plunder Law has been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan. It also
ruled that the time to assail the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman had long passed and the issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
According to the Supreme Court, the allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be
required proving it. In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the amended information alleged in general terms how the accused committed the
crime of plunder. The use of the words "in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused" in the said information was sufficient to allege the
conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder. As to the question of bail, the Supreme Court ruled that it
is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter required evidentiary hearing that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The
records did not show that evidence on petitioner's guilt was presented before the lower court. Upon proper motion of the petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan should conduct hearing to determine if the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
The petition was dismissed for failure to show that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
Sandiganbayan Ruling
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's "Motion to Quash and Suspend" and "Very Urgent
Omnibus Motion." Petitioner's alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused.
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and
proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.
SC Ruling on the Constitutionality of RA 7080
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him the equal protection of the laws.
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has been settled in the case of Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan. Petitioner's contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on the premise that the
Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioner's premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is divided into three (3) parts: (1)
the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie
"Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in
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committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four subparagraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime
of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which is of "receiving or collecting,
directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit . . .." In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is
charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioner's posture, the
allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several instances" means
the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only
one act or offense despite the phrase "several instances" is to indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any probable cause against him for
plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of
arrest against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the
Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
SC Ruling on RA 7080s Complete and Sufficient Standard
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to guide the courts in dealing with
accused alleged to have contributed to the offense." Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1)
he is charged with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended
Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on
the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended
Information charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists
in the commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these allegations are proven, the
penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act
of the other.
The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires illgotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
SC Ruling on Conspiracy
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for "sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses and with alleged
conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not
vicarious results in the denial of substantive due process."
It is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to
enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information
is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former
President to amass the subject illgotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered
into by the other accused with the former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its
sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in
sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass
ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations.
The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former
President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of
the acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth. They also found that under the then existing laws such as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time and
different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken
down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39)
separate and independent cases were filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder
Law was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem.
The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that
each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and
receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them,
by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or
for former President Estrada.
The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful
purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an
illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the
underlying substantive offense.
In our jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as
constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the
offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for this crime must
contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information . A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the

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 offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When the offense was committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by statute, state the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the
offense was committed. Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in order to
meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by statute or by reference to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it. The information must also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions
and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
In People v. Quitlong, we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information. In the
case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used
the words "in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused." Following the ruling in Quitlong , these words are sufficient to allege the
conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder.
SC Ruling on Bail
We now come to petitioner's plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant petition before this Court, petitioner filed
with respondent Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons." Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to
his serious medical condition which is lifethreatening to him if he goes back to his place of detention. The motion was opposed by respondent
Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt
is strong.
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that should be conducted by the
Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence
only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioner's guilt was
presented before the lower court. Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if
the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
Petition was dismissed.
VITUG, J. , separate opinion
Plunder may be committed by any public officer either by himself or "in connivance" with other persons; it may also be committed by a
person who participates with a public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder. A person may thus be held
accountable under the law by conniving with the principal co-accused or by participating in the commission of "an offense" contributing to the
crime of plunder. The term "in connivance" would suggest an agreement or consent to commit an unlawful act or deed with or by another, to
connive being to cooperate secretly or privily with another. Upon the other hand, to participate is to have a part or a share in conjunction with
another of the proceeds of the unlawful act or deed.
The Supreme Court in Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan has declared the antiplunder law constitutional for being neither vague nor ambiguous on
the thesis that the terms "series" and "combination" are not unsusceptible to firm understanding. "Series" refers to two or more acts falling
under the same category of the enumerated acts provided in Section 1(d) of the statute; "combination" pertains to two or more acts
falling under at least two separate categories mentioned in the same law.
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states (a) the name of the accused; (b) the designation of the offense given by the statute; (c) the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (d) the name of the offended party; (e) the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and (f) the place where the offense was committed. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included
in the complaint or information.
As conspiracy was not adequately alleged, the acts stated in sub-paragraph (a) of the information, standing alone, would not constitute the
crime of plunder, the elements of which are: (1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (2) That he amassed, accumulated or
acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving directly or indirectly, any commission,
gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project by reason of the office or position of the public officer ; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of government owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting any shares of stock, equity or any form of interest
of participation, including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural,
industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementing of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interest; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines;
and (3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

Garcia vs Sandiganbayan
The instant case stemmed from the Complaint of Maria Lourdes Miranda against petitioner, then Regional Director, Land Transportation
Office (LTO), Region X, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa, employees of the same office, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act for their alleged frequent borrowing of motor vehicles from Oro Asian Automotive Center Corporation (Company). Finding probable cause
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for violation thereof, Graft Investigation Officer II Gay Maggie F. Balajadia-Violan recommended that petitioner, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery
Tagupa be indicted for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
Sanduganbayan Ruling
The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision convicting petitioner of fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended. Accused Tagupa was acquitted, while the cases against accused Nabo, who remained at large, were archived.
SC Ruling on RA 3019
To be convicted of violation of Section 3(b) 20 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
following elements: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share a percentage, or a benefit (3)
on behalf of the offender or any other person; (4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government; (5) in which the
public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene. Petitioner maintains that not all the elements of Section 3(b)
have been established by the prosecution. Petitioner focuses primarily on the fourth element. He argues that the prosecution failed to show the
specific transactions of the Company with the LTO of Cagayan de Oro that petitioner approved and/or intervened in so that he could borrow from,
or be lent by, the Company a vehicle. Inasmuch as he was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b) for
allegedly borrowing the Company's vehicle fifty-six times, the Sandiganbayan, he stresses, should have at least pointed out what these
transactions were. This, petitioner claims, the Sandiganbayan failed to show with certainty in its decision. Petitioner adds that the prosecution did
not even attempt to introduce evidence to show what contract or transaction was pending before the LTO over which petitioner had the right to
intervene being the Regional Director when, at the period stated in all the fifty-six informations, he borrowed a vehicle.
We agree with petitioner that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the existence of the fourth element. It is very clear from Section 3(b)
that the requesting or receiving of any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit must be in connection with "a contract or transaction"
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. In the case at bar, the prosecution did not specify what
transactions the Company had with the LTO that petitioner intervened in when he allegedly borrowed the vehicles from the Company. It is
insufficient that petitioner admitted that the Company has continually transacted with his office. What is required is that the transaction involved
should at least be described with particularity and proven. To establish the existence of the fourth element, the relation of the fact of
requesting and/or receiving, and that of the transaction involved must be clearly shown. This, the prosecution failed to do. The
prosecution's allegation that the Company regularly transacts with petitioner's LTO Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in the
reporting of its engine and chassis numbers, as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer's report, and other similar transactions, will not suffice.
This general statement failed to show the link between the 56 alleged borrowings with their corresponding transactions.
SC Ruling on Bribery and Indirect Bribery
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is
a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or
promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. Thus,
the acts constituting direct bribery are: (1) by agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present
an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties; (2) by accepting a gift in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duty; or (3) by agreeing to refrain,
or by refraining, from doing something which is his official duty to do, in consideration of any gift or promise.
In the case under consideration, there is utter lack of evidence adduced by the prosecution showing that petitioner committed any of the
three acts constituting direct bribery. The two prosecution witnesses did not mention anything about petitioner asking for something in
exchange for his performance of, or abstaining to perform, an act in connection with his official duty. In fact, Atty. Aurora Chiong,
Vice-President and General Manager of the Company, testified that the Company complied with all the requirements of the LTO without
asking for any intervention from petitioner or from anybody else from said office. From the evidence on record, petitioner cannot likewise be
convicted of Direct Bribery.
Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. The essential
ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted
the gift or material consideration. In the case at bar, was the prosecution able to show that petitioner indeed accepted a gift from the Company?
The alleged borrowing of a vehicle by petitioner from the Company can be considered as the gift in contemplation of the law. To prove that
petitioner borrowed a vehicle from the Company for 56 times, the prosecution adduced in evidence 56 delivery receipts allegedly signed by
petitioner's representative whom the latter would send to pick up the vehicle.
The prosecution was not able to show with moral certainty that petitioner truly borrowed and received the vehicles subject matter of the 56
informations. The prosecution claims that petitioner received the vehicles via his representatives to whom the vehicles were released. The
prosecution relies heavily on the delivery receipts. We, however, find that the delivery receipts do not sufficiently prove that petitioner
received the vehicles considering that his signatures do not appear therein. In addition, the prosecution failed to establish that it was
petitioner's representatives who picked up the vehicles. The acquittal of one of the accused (Nery Tagupa) who allegedly received the vehicles
from the Company further strengthens this argument. If the identity of the person who allegedly picked up the vehicle on behalf of the petitioner is
uncertain, there can also be no certainty that it was petitioner who received the vehicles in the end.
Factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and are
contradicted by evidence on record. In the case before us, we are constrained to apply the exception rather than the rule. We find that the
ruling of the Sandiganbayan that petitioners actually received the vehicles through his representatives is grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise, and conjectures, and not supported by evidence on record. The certainty of petitioner's receipt of the vehicle for his alleged personal
use was not substantiated.
The petitioner was acquitted.

Jacutin vs People
Petitioner, a public officer, being then the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the
crime of sexual harassment for demanding sexual favors from Juliet Yee who was seeking employment in the office of the petitioner. After trial,
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the Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty of the crime of sexual harassment under Republic Act No. 7877 and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) months, plus a fine of P20,000.00 and damages.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath, and she said she was so in a hurry that she did not find time for it.
Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and she said "no." Petitioner told her to raise her foot and lower her pants so that he might
confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of the research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held her thigh. He put his
hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair. Surprised, she exclaimed "hala ka!" and instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner then
touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her to raise her
shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her
breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that she was through with
the research. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before she alighted from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider
her decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.
Sandiganbayan Ruling
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, dated 05 November 1999, penned by Mr. Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao,
finding the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment under Republic Act No. 7877.
Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to
enlist his help in her desire to gain employment. He did try to show an interest in her plight, her father being a boyhood friend, but finding no
opening suitable for her in his office, he asked her about accepting a job in a family planning research project.
SC Ruling
Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if
not indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal, no cogent reasons having been sufficiently shown to now hold otherwise. The assessment on the
credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of being able to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses at the stand, an opportunity that is denied the appellate court.
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a
recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner
himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliet's employment. Indeed, petitioner
would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of
Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioner's secretary between 1979
to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were said to
have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.
Juliet should be recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological counseling expert, has found Juliet to be
emotionally and psychologically disturbed and suffering from post trauma stress following her unpleasant experience with petitioner. The Court
finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00 exemplary damages to
serve as a deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions.
Conviction was affirmed.

Merencillo vs People
The RTC and Sandiganbayan convicted the accused.
SC Ruling on the Witness
Both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan found the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses (that petitioner demanded and received money
from private complainant Cesar for the release of the CAR) sufficient and credible enough to sustain conviction.
Moreover, findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy the respect of appellate courts because trial courts
have the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. In the absence of any arbitrariness in the trial court's findings
and evaluation of evidence tending to show that it overlooked certain material facts and circumstances, its findings and evaluation of evidence
should be respected on review. The presiding judge of the trial court had the opportunity to actually observe the conduct and demeanor of the
witnesses on the witness stand on direct examination by the prosecution, cross-examination by the defense as well as during clarificatory
questioning by the trial judge himself. Between the trial judge and this Court, the former was concededly in a better position to determine whether
or not a witness was telling the truth. Based on the records, we find no reason to disagree with the trial court's assessment and to discredit the
prosecution's witnesses.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the RTC and the Sandiganbayan considered the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Both courts, however, ruled that the inconsistencies referred only to minor details that did not detract from the truth of the
prosecution's testimonial evidence.
The RTC and the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner were neither material nor
relevant to the elements of the offenses for which he was charged. For instance, whether or not it was petitioner himself who handed the
CAR to private respondent was immaterial. The fact was that petitioner demanded and received money in consideration for the issuance
of the CAR.
SC Ruling on Double Jeopardy
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The test is whether one
offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An offense charged necessarily includes that
which is proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter;
and an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and those of
violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses. The elements of the
crime penalized under Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he requested or received a gift, present, share,
percentage or benefit; (3) he made the request or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other person; (4) the request or receipt was

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made in connection with a contract or transaction with the government and (5) he has the right to intervene, in an official capacity under
the law, in connection with a contract or transaction has the right to intervene.
On the other hand, direct bribery has the following essential elements: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the offender accepts an
offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another; (3) such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be
received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do and (4) the act which
the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties.
Clearly, the violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common
elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. Whereas the mere
request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019,
acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3 (b) of RA
3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority
to intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a crime;
(b) execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is his official
duty to do.
Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses.
No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance between the elements of the offenses charged. The constitutional protection against
double jeopardy proceeds from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one.
The conviction was affirmed.

Ombudsman vs Apolonio
Dr. Apolonio served as the Executive Officer of the National Book Development Board (NBDB) from 1996 to August 26, 2002. As NBDB's
executive officer, Dr. Apolonio supervised NBDB's Secretariat and managed its day-to-day affairs. In December 2000, NBDB's Governing Board
approved the conduct of a Team Building Seminar Workshop for its officers and employees. The workshop was scheduled to be a two-day event,
to be held on December 20-21, 2000. On March 29, 1995, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued National Budget Circular
No. 442 prescribing a P900.00 limit for each participant per day in any seminar/workshop/conference undertaken by any government agency. In
compliance with the circular, the NBDB disbursed the amount of P108,000.00 to cover the P1,800.00 allowance of the 60 employees for the
two-day event. Prior to the conduct of the workshop, some of the employees/participants approached Dr. Apolonio to ask whether a part of their
allowance, instead of spending the entire amount on the seminar, could be given to them as cash. Dr. Apolonio consulted Rogelio Montealto, then
Finance and Administrative Chief of NBDB, about the proposal and the possible legal repercussions of the proposal. Concluding the proposal to
be legally sound and in the spirit of the yuletide season, Dr. Apolonio approved the request. Thus, after the end of the workshop, SM gift cheques
were distributed to the participants in lieu of a portion of their approved allowance.
CA Ruling
First, the Ombudsman does not possess the power to directly impose the penalty of removal against a public official. In reaching this
conclusion, the CA cited Section 13 (3), Article XI of the Constitution which shows that the Ombudsman only possesses recommendatory
functions in the removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution of erring government officials and employees. The CA addressed
Section 21 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." It held that RA 6770 "cannot rise above the
Constitution" and since it conflicts with the provisions of Section 13 (3), Article XI, the Ombudsman's authority to impose penalties against public
officials or employees remains to be merely recommendatory.
Second, Dr. Apolonio undeniably realigned a portion of the budget allotted for the workshop for the purchase of the gift cheques. The CA
noted, however, that not only is there no evidence that Dr. Apolonio pocketed any amount from the realignment, but her decision to
purchase the gift cheques was "greatly influenced" by the appeal of the employee/participants. Thus, the CA held that Dr. Apolonio did
not intend to violate the law for a corrupt purpose, thereby negating the Ombudsman's findings that she committed grave misconduct.
The CA likewise found that Dr. Apolonio's acts do not constitute dishonesty because it was not shown that she has predisposition to lie,
defraud and deceive which are inimical to the interests of the public service. Since she was motivated by the pleas of the employees and in the
spirit of the yuletide season, her actions lack an evil or corrupt motive. Dr. Apolonio is, therefore, only liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, the conclusion reached and recommended by GIO Bohol. The CA imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6) months,
but due to her retirement from the service, the amount corresponding to her salary for six months was deducted from her retirement benefits.
On April 16, 2004, the Ombudsman moved to intervene and reconsider the decision of the CA. Although the CA granted the motion to
intervene, it denied the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated August 23, 2004.
SC Ruling on the Power of the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman's power to impose these penalties, on the
allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court.
The conclusion reached by the Court in Ledesma is clear: the Ombudsman has been statutorily granted the right to impose
administrative penalties on erring public officials. That the Constitution merely indicated a "recommendatory" power in the text of
Section 13 (3), Article XI of the Constitution did not deprive Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the Ombudsman powers
beyond those stated.
SC Ruling on Simple Misconduct
We disagree with both the CA's and the Ombudsman's findings. Instead, we find Dr. Apolonio guilty of simple misconduct. At the outset,
the Court notes that no questions of fact are raised in these proceedings. Both the Ombudsman and Dr. Apolonio concede that the latter
appropriated funds intended for the workshop to a purpose other than the one stated and approved by the NBDB. Therefore, the only issue to be
determined is whether the purchase of the gift cheques constitutes a grave misconduct or, as found by the CA, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. As already stated, we find Dr. Apolonio guilty of neither, and instead hold her liable for simple misconduct.
In Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, the Court defined misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." We further stated that misconduct becomes grave if it "involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial
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evidence." Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Therefore, "[a] person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple
misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave."
In Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, respondent was found guilty of simple misconduct by this Court when she accepted amounts
meant for the payment of Environmental Compliance Certificates and failed to account for P460.00. The Court noted that "[d]ismissal and
forfeiture of benefits, however, are not penalties imposed for all infractions, particularly when it is a first offense." Despite evidence of
misconduct in her case, the Court emphasized that "[t]here must be substantial evidence that grave misconduct or some other grave
offense meriting dismissal under the law was committed."
Dr. Apolonio's use of the funds to purchase the gift cheques cannot be said to be grave misconduct.
First, Dr. Apolonio's actions were not attended by a willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Although the Court
agrees that Dr. Apolonio's acts contravene the clear provisions of Section 89 of PD 1445, otherwise known as the "Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines," such was not attended by a clear intent to violate the law or a flagrant disregard of established rules. Several circumstances
militate in favor of this conclusion.
Dr. Apolonio merely responded to the employees' clamor to utilize a portion of the workshop budget as a form of Christmas
allowance. To ensure that she was not violating any law, Dr. Apolonio even consulted Mr. Montealto, then Finance and Administrative Chief of
the NBDB, on the possible legal repercussions of the proposal. Likewise, aside from receiving the same benefit, there is no evidence in the record
that Dr. Apolonio unlawfully appropriated in her favor any amount from the approved workshop budget. Therefore, we see no willful intent in Dr.
Apolonio's actions.
Second, we disagree with the Ombudsman's insinuations that Dr. Apolonio's acts may be considered technical malversation and, therefore,
constitute a crime. In Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the Court held that in the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the public fund
allegedly technically malversed for another public purpose, an accused did not commit technical malversation as set out in Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code. In that case, the Court acquitted Oscar P. Parungao (then a municipal treasurer) of the charges of technical malversation even
though he used funds allotted (by a Department of Environment and Natural Resources circular) for the construction of a road project and
re-allocated it to the labor payroll of different barangays in the municipality. The Court held that since the budget for the construction of the
road was not appropriated by a law or by an ordinance for that specified public purpose, the reallocation of the budget for use as payroll
was not technical malversation. Similarly, in this case, the budget allocation for the workshop was neither appropriated by law nor by
ordinance since DBM National Budget Circular No. 442 is not a law or an ordinance. Even if it had been, however, it must be noted that
DBM National Budget Circular No. 442 only prescribed the amounts to be used for any workshop, conference or seminar. It did not
appropriate the specific amounts to be used in the event in question.
Thus, we hold that Dr. Apolonio is guilty of simple misconduct. Although her actions do not amount to technical malversation, she did
violate Section 89 of PD 1445 when she approved the cash advance that was not authorized by the NBDB's Governing Board. Further, since the
approval of the cash advance was an act done pursuant to her functions as executive officer, she is not merely guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.

People vs Delos Santos

On 17 January 1958, the Sigue-sigue held a meeting where they decided to liquidate their rivals. They met again on the night of 15 February
1958, and decided that the next day, a Sunday, would be the appointed day. Thus, pandemonium broke loose in the penitentiary at between eight
and nine o'clock on Sunday morning, 16 February 1958, when the Sigue-sigues staged a riot against their enemies. This started with a commotion
in the upper floor of the cell house. A mass of about 150 prisoners, many of whom were armed with improvised weapons, forcibly opened the
door to the cell house, liberated their companions from their individual cells and then opened the cells where the Oxos were, took them out by
force or deception, and then clubbed and stabbed them to death, one after the other. Five (5) died when the riot was quelled. At about the same
time on the following day, 17 February 1958, another riot, carried out in the same fashion as the day before, accounted for four (4) more deaths.
Two drums of weapons, consisting of ice-picks, sharpened instruments, improvised from nails and parts of a steel drum, and wooden and iron
clubs made from broken windows and beds (tarima), were collected from the site after each day's riot.
SC Ruling on the Credibility of Witness
Catbagan's testimony is assailed because, when he was presented as a defense witness about six months after he testified for the prosecution,
he recanted his previous testimony against the accused, on the excuse that he was maltreated by prison authorities. The recantation and the excuse
cannot be believed: his sworn testimony as a prosecution witness remained clear and straight forward for four (4) session days, on 5, 11, 12 and
30 June 1958, without detectable hint of untruth or fabrication, or lack of voluntariness.
The observation of this Court is that the testimony of each prosecution witness, when not corroborating another, dovetails into the
narrative of the others, such that, taken together, the completed whole generates belief even unto its parts. The inconsistencies or faults in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are minor, not uncommon, and do no damage to the substance of the evidence. It would have
been extraordinary indeed if in the observation and narration of rapidly changing events of high emotional content no inconsistencies had
developed.
That the Court a quo acquitted some accused also implicated by the witnesses of the prosecution, because it felt that the incriminating
evidence lacked adequate corroboration, does not establish that the testimony was false or fabricated. It merely emphasizes a commendable
caution in weighing the proof in a capital case.
The evidence compels us to agree with the trial court that the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Put the members of the Court can not in conscience concur in the death penalty imposed, because they find it impossible to ignore the
contributory role played by the inhuman conditions then reigning in the penitentiary, vividly described by the trial judge in his decision. It is
evident that the incredible overcrowding of the prison cells, that taxed facilities beyond measure, and the starvation allowance of ten centavos per
meal for each prisoner, must have rubbed raw the nerves and dispositions of the unfortunate inmates, and predisposed them to all sorts of
violence to seize from their owners the meager supplies from outsider in order to take out their miserable existence. All this led inevitably to the
formation of gangs that preyed like wolf packs on the weak, and ultimately to pitiless gang rivalry for the control of the prisoners, abetted by the
inability of the outnumbered guards to enforce discipline, and which culminated in violent riots. The government cannot evade responsibility for
keeping prisoners under such subhuman and dantesque conditions. Society must not close its eyes to the fact that if it has the right to exclude from
its midst those who attack it, it has no right at all to confine them under circumstances that strangle all sense of decency, reduce convicts to the
level of animals and convert a prison term into prolonged torture and slow death.
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 Penalty was lowered.

Uriarte vs People
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. No. 058 and its Resolution denying the motion for
partial reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision affirmed with modification the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cantilan,
Surigao del Sur, Branch 41, convicting petitioner Demie L. Uriarte for violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
Petitioner was the Municipal Assessor of the Municipality of Carrascal, Surigao del Sur. In 1948, Joventino Correos declared for taxation
purposes a .9434-hectare parcel of land under Tax Declaration (TD) No. 3352.
Alterations were allegedly committed by petitioner when she was the Municipal Assessor and Deputy Provincial Assessor of Carrascal,
Surigao del Sur. On May 21, 1999, Evelyn Arpilleda, through counsel, sent a letter informing petitioner of the alterations that had been made on
the tax declarations of her predecessor, Joventino Correos. She requested that the "erroneous and prejudicial entries" be rectified.
SC Ruling on RA 3019
The anti-graft court held that all the elements of violation of the offense had been alleged in the information; the allegation that the appellant
willfully changed the location and boundaries of the subject properties was the prohibited act, while the element of undue injury was alleged in
the phrase "to the damage and prejudice of the said heirs." The facts that had not been alleged in the information were evidentiary matters. As to
the prosecution's alleged failure to specify the element of undue injury, the anti-graft court held that the injury caused by petitioner was not in
terms of money but, on the part of private complainant, the deprivation of three-fourths of her property. Lastly, the court held that under the
General Instructions Governing the Conduct and Procedures in the General Revision of Real Property Assessment, the municipal assessor had no
discretion to change the entries in tax declarations. Moreover, the failure of petitioner to notify Joventino Correos of the changes in the entries
defies the provision therein that owners should participate in the revision. Lastly, the presumption of regularity has been overcome by petitioner's
unilateral act of restoring the original boundaries and location of the property owned by Joventino Correos.
The essential elements of this crime have been enumerated in several cases decided by this Court, as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality,
or by culpa as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious or
plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but
also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or
ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for
ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
The third element provides for the modalities in which the crime may be committed, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party,
including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The use of the disjunctive
term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), or as aptly held in Santiago v. Garchitorena, as two (2) different modes
of committing the offense. This does not, however, indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, rather, that an accused may be charged
under either mode or under both.
We affirm the Sandiganbayan's finding that there was substantial compliance with the requirement. The wording of the information shows
that petitioner, in willfully changing the boundaries of the tax declarations of Joventino Correos and Antioco Uriarte, both caused undue
injury to private complainant and gave himself and his father unwarranted benefit. In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently
interpreted as "actual damage." Undue has been defined as more than necessary, not proper, or illegal; and injury as any wrong or damage done
to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property, that is, the invasion of any legally protected interest of another. On the other hand, in
Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that unwarranted means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized; or
without justification or adequate reasons. Advantage means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit or gain of any
kind; benefit from course of action. Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.
Tax declarations are indicia of a valid claim of ownership, they do not constitute conclusive evidence thereof. They are prima facie proofs of
ownership or possession of the property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, however,
they may become the basis of a claim for ownership. Moreover, a person who claims ownership of real property is duty bound to clearly identify
the land being claimed in accordance with the document on which he anchors his right of ownership. Proof of ownership together with identity of
the land is the basic rule.
It must be stressed that the alterations made by petitioner compromised the identity of the private complainant's property. The fact that
petitioner restored the original entries in the tax declarations is of no moment; restoration of the entries in the tax declaration is not one of those
enumerated under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code as one of the ways by which to extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code applies in a suppletory character as provided for under Article 10 of the same Code.
It is evident from the decisions of both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan that petitioner was charged and convicted of violating Section 3(e),
R.A. 3019; he was not civilly held liable for dispossession of property or eviction. The anti-graft court correctly held that the finding of the
RTC "that there was hidden intention on the part of the petitioner to grab and dispossess private complainant from their property" was
merely descriptive of how petitioner acted with evident bad faith. There was thus no need for this matter to be alleged in the information.
It bears stressing that an information needs only to allege the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. 85 It must state
only the relevant facts, since the reason therefor could be proved during the trial. Thus, an allegation of evident bad faith on the part of petitioner
is sufficient. The trial court correctly found that petitioner's hidden intention to grab the land of private complainant is a manifestation of evident
bad faith, which need not be further alleged in the information.
Petition was denied.
Ysidoro vs People

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 The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of
violation of illegal use of public property (technical malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. The facts show that the Municipal
Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided
construction materials to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for
construction.
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped
reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge,
for such construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of Cristina
Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality's Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to
malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already
distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries. Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold
James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and
signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP. Mayor Ysidoro instructed Garcia and
Polinio, however, to consult the accounting department regarding the matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk of the
Municipal Accountant's Office, signed the withdrawal slip based on her view that it was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods.
Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards, Garcia reported the matter to the MSWDO and to the municipal
auditor as per auditing rules.
SC Ruling on Technical Malversation
The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code has three elements: a) that the offender is an
accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public
use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or
ordinance. Ysidoro claims that he could not be held liable for the offense under its third element because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of
sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose. But the evidence shows that on
November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001. This appropriation
was based on the executive budget which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of
Social Services which covers the CSAP housing projects. The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian's intention to appropriate separate
funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used for SFP's needs, observing the rules
prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The target clientele of the SFP according to its manual are: 1) the
moderately and severely underweight pre-school children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2) the families of six members whose total
monthly income is P3,675.00 and below. This rule provides assurance that the SFP would cater only to the malnourished among its people
who are in urgent need of the government's limited resources.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those providing free labor for the rebuilding
of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction materials appropriated for the
CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food intended for the latter to CSAP
beneficiaries.
Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings of the SFP and that, therefore, the same could already be diverted to the
CSAP beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v. People which states that funds classified as savings are not considered appropriated by law or
ordinance and can be used for other public purposes. The Court cannot accept Ysidoro's argument. The subject goods could not be regarded as
savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ran throughout the year. Consequently, no one could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had
already finished its project, leaving funds or goods that it no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had already distributed the food items
needed by the SFP beneficiaries for the second quarter of 2001 does not mean that the remaining food items in its storeroom constituted
unneeded savings. Since the requirements of hungry mouths are hard to predict to the last sack of rice or can of sardines, the view that
the subject goods were no longer needed for the remainder of the year was quite premature.
The power of the purse is vested in the local legislative body. By requiring an ordinance, the law gives the Sanggunian the power to
determine whether savings have accrued and to authorize the augmentation of other items on the budget with those savings.
Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing irregular in the diversion of the subject goods, such finding should be
respected. The SB ruled, however, that since Ysidoro failed to present the municipal auditor at the trial, the presumption is that his testimony
would have been adverse if produced. Ysidoro argues that this goes against the rule on the presumption of innocence and the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions.
Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the municipal auditor testified, his testimony would have been adverse
to the mayor. The municipal auditor's view regarding the transaction is not conclusive to the case and will not necessarily negate the mayor's
liability if it happened to be favorable to him. The Court will not, therefore, be drawn into speculations regarding what the municipal auditor
would have said had he appeared and testified.
Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but
from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no
criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by
law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited
act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of
public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro's act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical
malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.
The conviction was affirmed.

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 Joseph Estrada vs Sandiganbayan
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime
of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law
to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the
offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not
constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later
or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
SC Ruling on Constitutionality
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the
presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law
clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the
fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be
no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to
sustain." And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the
Plunder Law.
SC Ruling on Vagueness
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him
as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key
phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions,
according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in
the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the
Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of
the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration
provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the
National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater
pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1,
par. (d), and Sec. 2.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under
the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated
in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be
invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates
due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as
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against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to
those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked
where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and
bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all
other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the
allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process
of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as
a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will
not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied'
to a particular defendant."Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these
phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
SC Ruling on Beyond Reasonable Doubt
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of
overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the
accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The use of the "reasonable doubt"
standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that
the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.
This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process
Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such
pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a
by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation
for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
RA 7080 as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL.

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