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With respect to the third requisite, the salvage Before the action was tried, M. Garza made an
operation, it is true, was a success. But as the application to intervene under the provisions of
sacrifice was for the benefit of the vessel to enable section 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he alleging
it to proceed to destination and not for the in support of his application that the steamer was
purpose of saving the cargo, the cargo owners are carrying for him at the time several thousand pesos'
not in law bound to contribute to the expenses. worth of merchandise as freight, which was lost as a
result of the collision. He was permitted to intervene
and accordingly filed a complaint setting up the loss
of this merchandise and the value thereof and
The final requisite has not been proved, for it does alleging, as the basis for his right to recover, the
not appear that the expenses here in question were negligence of one or the other of the vessels, without
incurred after following the procedure laid down in specifying which, and praying that the court award
article 813 et seq. him damages against the vessel the negligence of
which, upon the trial, was shown to have caused his damages with reasonable accuracy. It was proved
loss. upon the trial that it would require an expenditure of
P3,525 to put the sail vessel in the condition in which
it was before the injury; that it cost 245 to get the
The case turns upon the question which of the vessel to Manila after the injury; that the value of the
vessels was negligent in failing to conform to the supplies lost was P240.99. The evidence relative to
International Rules for the Prevention of Collissions the loss of earnings is not sufficient to permit the
at Sea. The learned trials court found that those court to formulate any conclusion in relation thereto,
managing the steamer were guilty of gross even if it be considered a proper item of damage.
negligence and that for that reason the plaintiff could
recover nothing.
We think the judgment of the trial court was correct
in dismissing the complaint of intervention. The
ISSUE: intervener had no "legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both." Their action was personal,
involved no rights in property which extended
HELD: beyond their immediate selves, and touched no third
party in any of the ramifications of those rights.
Therefore, she will not be held in fault for adhering In coming to this conclusion we have not lost sight
to her course, although the steamer seems to be of the case of Place vs. Norwich and N. Y. Trans. Co.
manuevering in an uncertain and dangerous way. (118 U. S., 468), in which it was held that, under the
provision of the Act of Congress relative thereto,
insurance money obtained by reason of the loss of a
We are satisfied from the authorities that, under the vessel causing damages, as in the case at bar, was
facts stated in the opinion of the trial court, the not subject to the payment of the damages
defendant is entitled to recover such damages as sustained by the negligence of the vessel lost by
reasonably and naturally flowed from the collision. reason of the accident in which the damages
There is sufficient evidence in the record to fix such occurred. We do not follow that case because we
are met in this jurisdiction with article 1186 of the On August 10, 1915, plaintiff owned a launch named
Civil Code, which provides that "after the obligation Active and defendant owned a launch named bohol.
is extinguished by the loss of the thing, all the Both launches were in use upon the Pasig River in the
actions which the debtor may have against third city of Manila. About 8 o'clock in the morning of this
persons, by reason thereof, shall pertain to the date, in the Pasig River, below and near the bridge of
creditor," and with article 2 of the Code of Spain, the launch bohol was towing up the river two
Commerce, which provides that where the Code of rudderless scows or lighters, one behind the other.
Commerce is silent to the law relating to the The scow nearest the launch was about 5 meters
matters of which it treats, those matters shall be behind, was empty, and was high in the water. The
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. second lighter was tied to the rear of the fist one,
with a distance of about 2 meters intervening, was
loaded, and was lower in the water. The second
That said article 1186 is, under the Spanish lighter was tied to the rear of the first one, with a
jurisprudence, applicable to money obtained from distance of about 2 meters intervening, was loaded,
the insurance of the thing lost or destroyed, there and was lower in the water. The Active was coming
can be no doubt. (Manresa, vol. 8, 353.) down the river from Pandacan toward Manila Bay.
The patron of the Active blew one blast of his whistle,
which indicated that the Active had a clear way and
should pass to starboard. When under the bridge of
The judgment in this case is, therefore, collectible, Spain, the Active passed the bohol and the first scow
but the amount collected cannot exceed the amount towed by it. But when the Active was about to pass
of insurance money actually received. the second scow, the latter swerved to the left, and
its forward left end corner struck the Active on the
port side between the cabin and the bow with such
The writer of this opinion had doubts of the force and impact that the launch sank immediately.
applicability of article 1186, referred to; but has
yielded to the learning of the majority relative to the
Roman and Spanish jurisprudence on this point. The Active was in good condition and state of
operation before the collision occurred. The launch
was so seriously damaged by the collision and the
MARINE TRADING COMPANY VS THE GOVERNMENT sinking that it took the sum of P9,677 to repair
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS it.lawphil.net
FACTS:
As opposed to the foregoing, we find that the
plaintiff's agent was in no way to blame for the
collision.
M/V Don Carlos, an inter-island vessel owned and
operated by private respondent Go Thong was sailing
south bound for Cebu, when it collided with M/S
This disposes of the three assignments of error and Yotai Maru, a merchant vessel of Japanese registry
the principal issue in the case. It is to be noted, which was approaching the port of Manila coming in
however, that the judgment was for legal interest from Kobe, Japan. The bow of the Don Carlos
and costs. Is this right? rammed the left side of the Yotai Maru inflicting a
gaping hole through which seawater rushed in and
flooded the hatch, damaging all the cargo stowed
It is the undoubted law that the State (in this therein. The consignees of the damaged cargo having
jurisdiction, the Government of the Philippine Islands) been paid by their insurance companies, the latter in
never pays interest unless it expressly engages to do turn commenced actions against private respondent
so. This is especially true in case the claim is an Go Thong for damages sustained by the various
unliquidated one. Among other authorities, we find shipments. 2 cases were filed before the RTC. The
first case (Smith Bell and Sumitomo Insurance v. Go recognize in a timely manner the risk of collision with
Thong) reached the SC which ruled in finality that the Yotai Maru coming in from the opposite
negligence was with the officers and crew of Don direction, was at least in part due to the failure of the
Carlos. On the contrary, the second case (Smith Bell Don Carlos to maintain a proper look-out.
and Tokyo Insurance v. Go Thong) was decided by the
CA holding the officers and crew of Yotai Maru at
fault in the collision. Hence the present petition. (3) The third factor constitutive of negligence on the
part of the Don Carlos relates to the fact that
Second Mate Benito German was, immediately
ISSUE: before and during the collision, in command of the
Don Carlos. Second Mate German simply did not
have the level of experience, judgment and skill
Whether or not inscrutable fault is present in said essential for recognizing and coping with the risk of
collision. collision as it presented itself that early morning
when the Don Carlos, running at maximum speed
and having just overtaken the Don Francisco then
approximately one mile behind to the right side of
HELD: the Don Carlos, found itself head-on or nearly head
on vis-a-vis the Yotai Maru. It is essential to point
out that this situation was created by the Don
NO. Carlos itself.
The Court believes that there are three (3) principal FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court
factors which are constitutive of negligence on the of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
part of the Don Carlos, which negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision.
*Inscrutable Fault where it cannot be determined
which of the 2 vessels caused the collision, each
(1) The first of these factors was the failure of the vessel shall suffer its own damages, and both shall be
Don Carlos to comply with the requirements of solidarily responsible for the losses and damages
Rule 18 (a) of the International Rules of the Road occasioned to their cargoes.
which provides as follows: (a) When two
power-driven vessels are meeting end on, or nearly
end on, so as to involve risk of collision, each shall GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS
alter her course to starboard, so that each may pass PHILIPPINE STEAMSHIP
on the port side of the other. The evidence on this
factor state that Don Carlos altered its course by
five degrees to the left instead of to the right which
maneuver was the error that caused the collision in FACTS:
question. Why it did so is because Don Carlos was
overtaking another vessel, the Don Francisco, and
was then at the right side of the aforesaid vessel. It It appears in evidence that at about 10 o'clock at
was in the process of overtaking Don Francisco that night on February 10, 1920, the coastwise Isabel,
Don Carlos was finally brought into a situation equipped with motor and sails, left the port of Manila
where he was meeting end-on or nearly end-on with primary destination to Balayan, Batangas,
Yotai Maru, thus involving risk of collision. carrying, among its cargo, 911 sacks of rice belonging
to the plaintiff and consigned to points in the south.
After the boat had been under weigh for about four
(2) The second circumstance constitutive of hours, and has passed the San Nicolas Light near the
negligence on the part of the Don Carlos was its entrance into Manila Bay, the watch and the mate on
failure to have on board that night a proper the bridge of the Isabel discerned the light of another
look-out as required by Rule I (B) Under Rule 29 of vessel, which proved to be the Antipolo, also a
the same set of Rules, all consequences arising from coastwise vessel, on its way to Manila and coming
the failure of the Don Carlos to keep a proper towards the Isabel. At about the same time both the
look-out must be borne by the Don Carlos. In the watch and mate on the bridge of the Antipolo also
case at bar, the failure of the Don Carlos to saw the Isabel, the two vessels being then about one
mile and a half or two miles apart. Each vessel was Negligence shortly preceding the moment of collision
going approximately at the speed of 6 miles an hour, is, however, undoubtedly chargeable to the Isabel,
and in about ten minutes they had together for the incorrect and incompetent way in which this
traversed the intervening space and were in close vessel was then handled. The explanation of this may
proximity to each other. perhaps be found in the fact that the mate on the
Isabel had been on continuous duty during the whole
preceding day and night; and being almost absolutely
When the mate of the Antipolo, who was then at the exhausted, he probably was either dozing or
wheel, awoke to the danger of the situation and saw inattentive to duty at the time the other vessel
the Isabel "almost on top of him," to use the words of approached.
the committee on marine accidents reporting the
incident, he put his helm hard to the starboard.
It results, as already stated, that both vessels were at
fault; and although the negligence on the part of the
This maneuver was correct, and if the helmsman of mate of the incoming vessel preceded the negligence
the Isabel had done likewise, all would apparently on the part of the mate of the outgoing vessel by an
have been well, as in that event the two vessels appreciable interval of time, the first vessel cannot
should have passed near to each other on the port on that account be absolved from responsibility.
side without colliding. As chance would have it, Indeed, in G. Urrutia & Co. vs. Baco River Plantation
however, the mate on the Isabel at this critical Co., supra, this court found reason for holding that
juncture lost his wits and, in disregard of the the responsibility rested exclusively on a steamer
regulations and of common prudence, at once placed which had allowed dangerous proximity to a sailing
his own helm hard to port, with the result that his vessel to be brought about under somewhat similar
boat veered around directly in the path of the other conditions.
vessel and a collision became inevitable. Upon this
the mate on the Antipolo fortunately stopped his
engines, but the Isabel continued with full speed We are of the opinion therefore that his Honor, the
ahead, and the two vessels came together near the trial judge, committed no error in holding that both
bows. The Isabel immediately sank, with total loss of vessels were to blame and in applying article 827 of
vessel and cargo, though the members of her crew the Code of Commerce to the situation before him. It
were picked up from the water and saved. is there declared that where both vessels are to
blame, both shall be solidarily responsible for the
damage occasioned to their cargoes. As the Isabel
ISSUE: was a total loss and cannot sustain any part of this
liability, the burden of responding to the Government
of the Philippine Islands, as owner of the rice
embarked on the Isabel, must fall wholly upon the
HELD: owner of the other ship, that is, upon the defendant,
the Philippine Steamship Company, Inc.
Petition
ISSUE:
International transportation is defined in paragraph
(2) of Article 1 as follows:
Whether or not Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw
Convention is in accordance with the constitution so
as to deprive the Philippine Courts jurisdiction over (2) For the purposes of this convention, the
the case expression "international transportation" shall mean
any transportation in which, according to the
contract made by the parties, the place of departure
HELD: and the place of destination, whether or not there be
a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are
situated [either] within the territories of two High
Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at Contracting Parties . . .
the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, either before the court
of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place Whether the transportation is "international" is
of business, or where he has a place of business determined by the contract of the parties, which in
through which the contract has been made, or before the case of passengers is the ticket. When the
the court at the place of destination. contract of carriage provides for the transportation of
the passenger between certain designated terminals
"within the territories of two High Contracting
Constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention Parties," the provisions of the Convention
automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights
and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.
HELD:
The contract is a single undivided operation,
beginning with the place of departure and ending
with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular (1) NEGATIVE.
in this expression indicates the understanding of the
parties to the Convention that every contract of Under the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier is made
carriage has one place of departure and one place of liable for damages for:a.The death, wounding or
destination. An intermediate place where the other bodily injury of a passenger if the accident
carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of causing it took place onboard the aircraft or I the
destination." course of its operations of embarking or
disembarking;b.The destruction or loss of, or damage
to, any registered luggage or goods, if the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs occurrencecausing it took place during the carriage
against the petitioner. It is so ordered. by air; andc.Delay in the transportation by air of
passengers, luggage or goods.The convention
however denies to the carrier availment of the
provisions which exclude or limit his liability,if the
damage is caused by his willful misconduct, or by The assigned errors shall be discussed seriatim
such default on his part as is considered to
beequivalent to willful misconduct. The Convention
does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of 1. The airline ticket (Exh. "G') contains the
theinstances of an airline's liability, or as an absolute following conditions:
limit of the extent of that liability. It should be
deemed alimit of liability only in those cases where
the cause of the death or injury to person, or NOTICE
destruction, loss or damage to property or delay in its
transport is not attributable to or attended by any
willful misconduct, badfaith, recklessness, or
otherwise improper conduct on the part of any If the passenger's journey involves an ultimate
official or employee for which thecarrier is destination or stop in a country other than the
responsible, and there is otherwise no special or country of departure the Warsaw Convention may be
extraordinary form of resulting injury.In the case at applicable and the Convention governs and in most
bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may cases limits the liability of carriers for death or
be ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline; personal injury and in respect of loss of or damage to
and Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to baggage. See also notice headed "Advice to
her, belatedly, it is true, but withoutappreciable International Passengers on Limitation of Liability.
damage. The fact is, nevertheless, that some species
of injury was caused to Dr. Pablobecause petitioner
ALITALIA misplaced her baggage and failed to deliver CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT
it to her at the time appointed - abreach of its
contract of carriage. Certainly, the compensation for
the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannotunder the
1. As used in this contract "ticket" means this
circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the
passenger ticket and baggage check of which these
Warsaw Convention for delay in thetransport of
conditions and the notices form part, "carriage" is
baggage.
equivalent to "transportation," "carrier" means all air
carriers that carry or undertake to carry the
passenger or his baggage hereunder or perform any
(2) POSITIVE. other service incidental to such air carriage.
"WARSAW CONVENTION" means the convention for
She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
loss or damage to her luggage. She is however
International Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw, 12th
entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says,
October 1929, or that Convention as amended at The
is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
Hague, 28th September 1955, whichever may be
whichhas been violated or invaded by the defendant,
applicable.
may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the
purposeof indemnifying the plaintiff that for any loss
suffered and this Court agrees that the respondent
Court of Appeals correctly set the amount thereof 2. Carriage hereunder is subject to the rules and
at PhP 40,000.00 limitations relating to liability established by the
Warsaw Convention unless such carriage is not
"international carriage" as defined by that
Convention.
PAN AMERICA WORLD AIRWAYS VS IAC
On the other hand, the ruling in Shewaram v. ...The case is now before us on petition for review by
Philippine Air Lines, Inc. [G.R. No. L-20099, July 2, certiorari, upon the ground that the lower court has
1966, 17 SCRA 606], where the Court held that the erred: (1) in holding that the Warsaw Convention of
stipulation limiting the carrier's liability to a October 12, 1929, relative to transportation by air is
specified amount was invalid, finds no application in not in force in the Philippines: (2) in not holding that
the instant case, as the ruling in said case was respondent has no cause of action; and (3) in
premised on the finding that the conditions printed awarding P20,000 as nominal damages.
at the back of the ticket were so small and hard to
read that they would not warrant the presumption
that the passenger was aware of the conditions and We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the First
that he had freely and fairly agreed thereto. In the assignment of error because the same is the basis of
instant case, similar facts that would make the case the second assignment of error, and the latter is
fall under the exception have not been alleged, devoid of merit, even if we assumed the former to be
much less shown to exist. well taken. (Emphasis supplied.)
In view thereof petitioner's liability for the lost Thus, it is quite clear that the Court never intended to,
baggage is limited to $20.00 per kilo or $600.00, as and in fact never did, rule against the validity of
stipulated at the back of the ticket. provisions of the Warsaw Convention. Consequently,
by no stretch of the imagination may said quotation
from Northwest be considered as supportive of the
/////WARSAW///// At this juncture, in order to appellate court's statement that the provisions of the
rectify certain misconceptions the Court finds it Warsaw Convention limited a carrier's liability are
necessary to state that the Court of Appeal's reliance against public policy.
on a quotation from Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Cuenca [G.R. No. L-22425, August 31, 1965, 14 SCRA
1063] to sustain the view that "to apply the Warsaw NORTHWEST VS CUENCA
Convention which limits a carrier's liability to US$9.07
per pound or US$20.00 per kilo in cases of
contractual breach of carriage ** is against public FACTS:
policy" is utterly misplaced, to say the least. In said
case, while the Court, as quoted in the Intermediate
Appellate Court's decision, said:
This is an action for damages for alleged breach of
contract. After appropriate proceedings the Court of
First Instance of Manila, in which the case was
Petitioner argues that pursuant to those provisions, originally filed, rendered judgment sentencing
an air "carrier is liable only" in the event of death of a defendant Northwest Airlines, Inc. hereinafter
passenger or injury suffered by him, or of destruction referred to as petitioner to pay to plaintiff Cuenca
or loss of, or damages to any checked baggage or any hereinafter referred to as respondent the sum
goods, or of delay in the transportation by air of of P20,000 as moral damages, together with the sum
passengers, baggage or goods. This pretense is not of P5,000 as exemplary damages, with legal interest
borne out by the language of said Articles. The same thereon from the date of the filing of complaint,"
merely declare the carrier liable for damages in December 12, 1959, "until fully paid, plus the further
enumerated cases, if the conditions therein specified sum of P2,000 as attorney's fees and expenses of
are present. Neither said provisions nor others in the litigation." On appeal taken by petitioner, said
aforementioned Convention regulate or exclude decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except
liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier. as to the P5,000.00 exemplary damages, which was
Under petitioner's theory, an air carrier would be eliminated, and the P20,000.00 award for moral
exempt from any liability for damages in the event of damages, which was converted into nominal
its absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a damages. The case is now before us on petition for
contract of carriage, which is absurd. review by certiorari filed by petitioner, upon the
ground that the lower court has erred: (1) in holding
that the Warsaw Convention of October 12, 1929,
relative to transportation by air is not in force in the
Philippines; (2) in not holding that respondent has no Petitioner argues that pursuant to those provisions,
cause of action; and (3) in awarding P20,000 as an air "carrier is liable only" in the event of death of
nominal damages. a passenger or injury suffered by him, or of
destruction or loss of, or damage to any checked
baggage or any goods, or of delay in the
transportation by air of passengers, baggage or
ISSUE: goods. This pretense is not borne out by the
language of said Articles. The same merely declare
the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated
HELD: cases, if the conditions therein specified are present.
Neither said provisions nor others in the
aforementioned Convention regulate or exclude
Indeed the second assignment of error is predicated liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier.
upon Articles 17, 18 and 19 of said Convention, Under petitioner's theory, an air carrier would be
reading: exempt from any liability for damages in the event of
its absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a
contract of carriage, which is absurd.