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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 137599 October 8, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
GILBERT BAULITE and LIBERATO BAULITE, accused-appellants.

PARDO, J.:

Appeal seeking to reverse the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato, at Kidapawan City,
Branch 17 finding accused Gilbert Baulite and Liberato Baulite guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape with homicide and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
Delia Jacobo Lano in the sum of P50,000.00, with costs.

On December 1, 1993, Eddie Arguelles, a farmer, passed by a river on his way to Old Bunawan,
Tulunan, Cotabato. In the river, he saw two men Gilbert and Liberato Baulite washing their
bloodied hands. Eddie continued on his way after seeing them. Upon reaching the road, he hear a
boy shouting that somebody was found dead.

Jonathan Cando, a civilian volunteer, was on horseback crossing a river on his way to Bunawan. He
heard a woman crying "indi" "indi". He checked his left, and approximately six (6) meters away, he
saw a person mounting somebody, as if choking the one mounted. He went to the barangay captain
and related what he heard and saw. The barangay captain, however, dismissed the incident,
speculating that the two were "only sweethearts."

Around 3 to 4 in the afternoon of the same day, a boy found the body of Delia Jacobo Lano, Delia
was a public school teacher at Old Bunawan, Datu Paglas and a resident of Maybula, Tulunan,
Cotabato. An examination of her body revealed that Delia suffered a three-inch-deep punctured
wound between her eyes, a smashed face (left side) and a bruised neck (upper portion). Vaginal
smear test also found her positive for (dead) spermatozoa. However, there were no indications that
Delia's genitalia sustained any laceration. The medical examiner opined that Delia had probably
delivered several children. The examination was conducted approximately five (5) to six (6) hours
after Delia died.

On December 7, 1993, 2nd assistant provincial prosecutor of Cotabato Alfonso B. Dizon, Jr., filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato, at Kidapawan an information for rape with homicide against
Gilbert Baulite and Liberato Baulite, the two men caught wshing their bloodied hands by the river.
The information reads:

"That on or about December 1, 1993. At Barangay New Bunawan, Municipality of Tulunan,


Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above named accused, with lewd design, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with the use of force and intimidation succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
one DELIA JAGOBO LANO against her will, and thereafter said accused, with intent to kill
with personal violence, strangulated the victim with the use of a hand as shoen by finger
nails marking which caused hematoma of the upper portion of the neck and likewise with the
use of a sharp object, inflicted punctured wound (sic) located just above and between the
eyes, three (3) inched deep, directed and posteriorly and superiorly and multiple fracture of
the bone of the left face with hematoma of both eyes, which injuries is (sic) the direct and
proximate cause of death of said DELIA JOCOBO LANO."2

On June 23, 1994, the trial court arraigned the accused. They each pleaded not guilty. 3

After due trial, on November 25, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision finding the two accused
guilty of rape with homicide, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

"Prescinding from the foregoing facts and considerations, the Court finds accused Gilbert
Baulite and Liberato Baulite guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime charged, accused
Liberato Baulite and Gilbert Baulite are hereby sentenced each to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua. Consonant with the recent jurisprudence, both accused are hereby
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Delia Jacobo Lano the sum of P50,000.00

"With costs de oficio. 1wphi1.nt

IT IS SO ORDERED.4

On December 29, 1998, the accused filed a notice of appeal.5

The issues in the appeal are: (1) Was the guilt of the accused-appellants proved beyond reasonable
doubt? (2) Is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict the accused-appellants?

The Trial court convicted the accused on the basis of the following circumstantial evidence, namely:

a) A witness saw accused-appellants Gilbert and Liberato Baulite washing their bloodied
hands;

b) A boy was heard shouting that somebody was found dead;

c) A witness hear a woman shouting "indi" "indi" who was being choked and later the dead
body of Delia Lano was found.6

An autopsy revealed that the body of Delia Lano sustained a three-inch-deep punctured wound
between the eyes and a smashed face.7

Accused-appellants explained that the blood in their hands was that of a chicken that they had
dressed recently.8

Witness Jonathan Cando heard a woman shouting "indi", "indi", then saw a person mounting
somebody as if choking the person mounted. However, in the absence of an eye-witness identifying
the person choking, accused-appellants would not necessarily be incriminated in the crime.
Subsequent examination of the body of Delia Lano revealed that she was choked, as evidenced by
the finger markings or hematoma on the upper portion of her neck. The fact that the upper portion of
the neck was the one severely injured is physical evidence consistent with the scenario that one in a
mounting position applied pressure or choking in the upper portion of the neck of person "mounted."
The prosecution, unfortunately, failed to positively identify the person "mounting and choking" the
victim.9
In light of the prosecution's evidence, we are not convinced that the guilt of the accused has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. "The rule is clear. The guilt of the accused must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution, on its part, must rely on the strength of its own evidence and
must not simply depend on the weakness of the defense. The slightest possibility of an innocent
man being convicted for an offense he has never committed, let alone when no less than the capital
punishment is imposed, would be far more dreadful than letting a guilty person go unpunished for a
crime he may have perpetrated."10 "On the whole then, the scanty evidence for the prosecution casts
serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused. It does not pass the test of moral certainty and is
insufficient to rebut the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees the accused. It
isapropos to repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt; the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt."11

Where the evidence is purely circumstantial, there must be an even greater need to apply the rule
that the prosecution depends not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of its own
evidence. Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilty of the accused.
"For circumstantial evidence to convict, the Rules of Court require that: (1) there is more than one
circumstance: (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. On
the latter, decided cases expound that the circumstantial evidence presented and proved must
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person." 12

The Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the accused. 13 We agree.

We find the circumstantial evidence adduced not sufficient to support a finding that both accused-
appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. To begin with, witness
Jonathan Cando was no able to identify either the woman victim or the person choking the victim. 14

We cannot conclude with certainly that the blood in the hands of the accused-appellant was the
blood of the victim, and that the person choking her was one of the accused-appellants.
Speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.15 In a criminal case, every circumstance favoring the innocence
of the accused must be duly taken into account.16

In our criminal justice, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of
the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 17 Where there is reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused, he must be acquitted even though his innocence may be
doubted since the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can only be
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.18

In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused-appellant, they must be
acquitted. "Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; that presumption is
solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The contrary requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Short of this, it is not only the
right of the accused to be freed; it is even the constitutional duty of the court to acquit them. 19

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED. Accused-appellants Gilbert Baulite and


Liberato Baulite are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in Criminal Case 2834 of the Regional
Trial Court, Cotabato, Kidapawan, on reasonable doubt. 1wphi1.nt

Costs de oficio.
The Director, Bureau of Corrections is ordered to release the accused-appellants immediately unless
held for another cause. He shall inform the Court of such release or the reason for non-release
within ten (10) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, on official leave.

Footnote

1
In Criminal Case No. 2834, dated November 25, 1998, Original Record, pp. 381-387.

2
Rollo, pp. 6-7

3
Original Record, p. 20.

4
Rollo, pp. 16-23, at p. 23.

5
Rollo, p. 24. On July 05, 1999, we accepted the appeal (Rollo, p. 26).

6
Decision, Regional Trial Court, Rollo, pp. 16-23, at p. 23.

7
Original Record, p. 7.

8
TSN, January 7, 1998, pp. 7-11.

9
TSN, July 11, 1995, pp. 5-7.

10
People v. Manzano, 227 SCRA 780, 787 [1993].

11
People v. Dismuke, 234 SCRA 51, 61 [1994], citing People v. Dramayo, 149 Phil. 107
[1971]; People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 [1992].

12
People v. Santos, 333 SCRA 319, 336 [2000].

13
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Brief, Rollo, pp. 84-96.

14
TSN, July 11, 1995, pp. 5-7.

15
People v. Isla, 343 Phil. 562, 570 [1997], citing People v. Jumao-as, 230 SCRA 70 [1994].

16
People v. Sinatao, 319 Phil. 665, 687 [1995].

17
People v. Parel, 330 Phil. 453, 471 [1991]; People v. Salangga, 234 SCRA 407 [1994].
18
Pecho v. People, 331 Phil. 1, 19 [1999].

19
People v. Valeriano, 226 SCRA 694 [1993], citing People v. Pido, 200 SCRA 45 [1991].

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 190178 February 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA, Accused-Apellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely upon the word of
the private complainant because it is essentially committed in relative isolation or even in secrecy,
and it is usually only the victim who can testify of the unconsented coitus. Thus, the long standing
rule is that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed. Since the participants are usually the only
witnesses in crimes of this nature and the accused's conviction or acquittal virtually depends on the
private complainant's testimony, it must be received with utmost caution. It is then incumbent upon
the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the credibility of the victim's testimony. Judges
must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman claiming to have
been sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant
of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should
equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice according to law.
1

Before Us is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the
2

Decision of the Regional Trial Court, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
3

of Forcible Abduction with Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The present case involves eight (8) sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape filed by
private complainant ("AAA") against appellant, Felimon Patentes.

The Prosecutions Case

On 5 December 1998, at about 11:00 a.m., AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit and
bring medicines to her sick grandmother. While seated at the rear portion of the bus, appellant
suddenly sat next to her. It was the second time AAA met appellant; the first time was on 4
December 1998, when appellant persistently courted her. She only knew appellant as he was a
friend of her brother.
After a brief conversation, appellant suddenly showed her his bolo, covered by a red scabbard
tucked in his right side while he held a red steel pipe with Arabic markings, which he used to
threaten to kill AAA should AAA disobey him. Appellant then accompanied AAA to her grandmothers
place and returned to Davao City proper by bus. As they walked around, appellant placed his right
hand on AAAs shoulder. Appellant also held AAAs right hand, which covers her mouth with a
handkerchief.

Upon reaching Davao City, they rode a jeepney to Sasa and alighted at a nearby convenience store.
Upon arrival, a man gave something to appellant, which he immediately placed inside his pocket.
Appellant then brought AAA to his house in Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where his parents, sister,
brother-in-law, nephews and nieces live.

Upon entering the house, appellant dragged AAA to a room upstairs and tied her to a sewing
machine. Appellant then started to smoke something, which he also forced AAA to inhale, causing
AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy. This prevented AAA from fighting back as appellant removed AAAs
clothes. Doffed of his own clothes, appellant mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina.

The following day, 6 December 1998, appellant again forced AAA to inhale the smoke from his
cigarette, causing her to feel weak and dizzy as appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA.

On 7 December 1998, appellant again had carnal knowledge of AAA using threats, force and
intimidation, causing bruises on AAAs arms.

On 8 December 1998, while appellant was sleeping beside AAA, AAA slowly got up to escape.
However, AAAs attempt, while feeble, woke up appellant. Appellant then punched her in the
stomach, causing AAA to lose consciousness. When AAA gained a little strength, appellant again
mauled her and raped her again.

On 9 December 1998, after AAA took a bath, appellant raped AAA while pointing a bolo to her neck.

On 10, 11 and 12 December 1998, appellant raped AAA while threatening her with bodily harm. He
also threatened to kill her family, in case she tells anyone of her ordeal.

On 13 December 1998, to free herself from her predicament, AAA convinced appellant that she will
marry him. Appellant agreed. Appellants mother accompanied AAA to the latters house to discuss
the marital plans with AAAs family. Surprised by the marital plans, AAAs mother asked for a private
moment with AAA. In their conversation, AAA confessed how appellant forcibly took her to his house
on 5 December 1998 and raped her for more than a week. AAAs mother then accompanied AAA to
report her ordeal to the police, where AAA was examined by a doctor, Dr. Samuel Cruz, the City
Health Officer of Davao City.

Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the following observations about
AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and can readily admit
a normal-sized erect male penis without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for
spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether it was AAAs first sexual intercourse as
the vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations.

The Accused-Appellants Defense

On 5 December 1998, pursuant to their previous agreement, appellant accompanied AAA to


Bansalan to visit and bring medicines to AAAs grandmother. After going around Davao City, they
went to his house at about 7:00 p.m. Appellant then offered to bring AAA to her house but the latter
refused, insisting that she wanted to live with appellant because she was fed up with her mother,
who often called her "buntog" or prostitute.

AAA stayed in appellants house together with the latters parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews
and nieces. AAA slept in the same room with appellant and had consented sexual intercourse.
Throughout AAAs stay, she was free to roam around the house and even helped in the household
chores. Pursuant to their marital plans, AAAs grandfather went to appellants house on 7 December
1998. As a result, they agreed to set the wedding date on 27 May 1999. Appellants mother also
went to AAAs house to discuss the marital plans on 14 December 1998. However, AAAs mother
rejected the marriage proposal because of appellants social standing.

Leonora Gerondio (Gerondio), appellants neighbor, testified that she first met AAA in appellants
house on 5 December 1998. The following day, Gerondio again saw AAA when she went to
appellants house. Appellant told her that he will marry AAA. Since then, Gerondio saw AAA
everyday from 7 to 11 December 1998, cleaning the surroundings, doing the laundry, and walking
around the vicinity. AAA even visited her house and talked about AAA and appellants marital plans.
In her observation, AAA and appellant acted like a couple. Gerondio also accompanied appellants
mother to AAAs house to discuss AAA and appellants marital plans. However, AAAs mother
rejected the marriage proposal.

Wilma Enriquez (Enriquez), a common friend of AAA and appellant, testified that between 5 to 12
December 1998, she went twice to appellants house upon AAAs invitation to talk about the couples
marital plans.

During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, private complainant herself;
(2) Dr. Samuel Cruz; (3) PO1 Lennie Ronquillo; (4) private complainants mother; and (5) Julie
Dayaday.

On the other hand, the defense presented: (1) Felimon Patentes, accused-appellant himself; (2)
Leonora Gerondio; (3) Wilma Enriquez; and (4) Francisca Patentes.

After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of
Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
Felimon Patentes a.k.a. Arnold Patentes is hereby sentenced as follows:

1. Criminal Case No. 42,786-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

2. Criminal Case No. 42,787-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

3. Criminal Case No. 42,788-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

4. Criminal Case No. 42,789-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

5. Criminal Case No. 42,790-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

6. Criminal Case No. 42,791-99 - Reclusion Perpetua


7. Criminal Case No. 42,792-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

8. Criminal Case No. 42,793-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

The accused shall indemnify AAA Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) in each of the eight cases for
a total of Two Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P240,000.00).

SO ORDERED. 4

Aggrieved, appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court with modification. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED as to the conviction of appellant FELIMON


PATENTES for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of eight (8)
counts of Rape and as to the imposition upon him of the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the
eight (8) offenses. His civil liability, however, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

Appellant FELIMON PATENTES is hereby directed to pay the following amounts:

1. P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of P400,000.00;

2. P75,000.00 each as moral damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of P600,000.00; and

3. P25,000.00 each as temperate damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape
and seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of P200,000.00.

SO ORDERED. 5

The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses
for the prosecution. According to the appellate court, "AAAs account of her ordeal in the hands of
appellant was straightforward, firm, candid and consistent. Notwithstanding the rigid, lengthy and
rigorous cross-examination by the defense, AAA remained steadfast in her narration of the details of
her harrowing experience. A thorough reading of the transcript shows that AAAs testimony bears the
earmarks of truth and credibility."
6

Hence, this appeal.

The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge
of the victim; and (2) said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b)
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12
years of age or is demented. In the case at bar, appellant never denied having carnal knowledge of
7

AAA. The only matter, thus, to be resolved by this Court is whether appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation, or that AAA was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or was under 12 years of age or is demented.

Appellant argues that if AAA really was raped for more than an entire week, it is perplexing why she
did not escape, or even seek the help of the neighbors despite several opportunities to do
so. Appellant further alleges that AAAs failure to escape and her helping in the household chores in
8

appellants house prove that she was not raped and that they had consensual sexual intercourse. 9
About this position, the appellate court noted and reasoned that, "appellant threatened AAA with
harm in the event that she told anyone of what happened between them. The lingering fear instilled
upon AAA is understandable considering that appellant was always armed with a bolo and was
constantly showing it to AAA. The possibility of him making good his threat was not at all remote and
the fear for her life remained palpable."10

Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. There is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident as the workings of the
human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. Nevertheless, the Court must
11

be guided by established principles.

In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape
is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2) inasmuch
as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense. So long as the private complainants testimony meets the test of credibility, the
12

accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. 13

Following these legal precepts, AAAs testimony, placed side by side with the prosecutions evidence,
must stand the test of credibility.

1. Absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of rape since proof
of injuries is not an essential element of the crime. And, it is also a precept that physical evidence is
14

of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together. In the case at bar,
15

the prosecution failed to present any scintilla of proof to support its claim. In fact, contrary to the
prosecutions claim that AAA was dragged, tied, mauled, slapped and boxed, the medical certificate
revealed no telltale sign of the prosecutions allegations. It has to be noted that the medical
examination was conducted the day after AAAs supposed escape from appellant. As shown by the
medical certificate, AAA had no external signs of physical injuries, save for a kiss mark, to wit:
16

EXTRAGENITAL PHYSICAL INJURY:

Contusion, reddish purple, breast, right side, lower-inner quadrant, 2.0x1.0 cm. xxx

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The above physical injury was noted on the body of the subject, age of which is
consistent with the alleged date of infliction.

2. That under normal conditions without subsequent complications and unless a


deeper involvement might be present but which is not clinically apparent at the time
of examination, said injury will require medical attendance of not more than seven (7)
days from date of infliction.

3. Hymen intact and its orifice, wide as to allow complete penetration by an average-
sized male organ in erection without causing hymenal injury. 17

2. The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility
with human knowledge, observation and common experience of man. Thus, whatever is repugnant
18
to the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie
outside judicial cognizance.
19

As culled from the records, AAA lived with appellants family for eight (8) days in the same house
where appellants parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces also lived. AAA even called
appellants mother, "mama." As argued by the defense, "the members of the appellants family could
have noticed that she was being forced and raped by the accused if the accusations were really
true." Indeed, it is incompatible with human experience to keep a sex slave for eight (8) days in a
20

house where the abusers entire family, including the abusers minor nephews and nieces live.

When appellant and AAA arrived in the formers house, they were greeted by appellants father. If
AAAs account were true that appellant dragged her to a room upstairs and then tied her to a sewing
machine, appellants father could have noticed and reacted to the obvious violence. To say the least,
he would have talked to the appellant about the deed. Instead, and incredibly, appellants mother
went to AAAs house to propose marriage contrary to the common experience.

Contrary to the prosecutions claim that AAA only saw appellant on 4 December 1998, a day before
the alleged commission of the crime, it was stipulated that AAA knew appellant as appellant was a
neighbor and friend of AAAs brother. Furthermore, appellants mother was the midwife who
21

assisted AAAs housemaid in giving birth. Lastly, AAA and appellant have a common friend,
22

Enriquez, who testified that she saw the two in appellants house, through AAAs invitation. The TSN
23

reflects the inconsistencies in AAAs testimony:


24

Q: Do you know that his mother is a midwife?

A: No, Sir. Because she helped in the delivery of our housemaid.

Q: When did your housemaid give birth?

A: When I went to Bansalan on December 5 I passed by the house she was about to deliver and I
saw the mother of the accused thats the time I came to know his mother.

Q: Is it not that your stepfather even went to the house where you stayed?

A: No, sir.

Q: You will deny that?

A: I did not see him.

xxxx

Q: Is it not you said you were being locked?

A: I was locked at the door when my father arrived. I do not know because he locked me at the
room. [Emphasis supplied]

For several days that AAA had been missing, which would have caused worry and anxiety among
AAAs family members, AAAs father, instead of reporting the matter to police authorities, went to
appellants house to discuss AAA and appellants marital plans on 7 December 1998. Clearly, this is
25

contrary to human logic and experience, and inconsistent with the prosecutions claim.
3. The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance
in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape. In the case at bar, the actuations of AAA
26

after the alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It is contrary to normal
human behavior for AAA to willingly go with her abusers mother, and worse, to live with her abusers
entire family in one roof for eight (8) days sans any attempt to escape.

It goes against the grain of human experience for a woman who has been robbed of her honor and
chastity not to seize an opportunity to escape from the clutches of her malefactor. Instead of
27

escaping from her abuser, AAA visited appellants neighbor. Even if AAA had several opportunities
28

to share her ordeal to be rescued by her friend, Wilma, AAA inexplicably failed and instead described
the details of her marital plans. What is truly exceptional, however, is the testimony of AAA that she
visited her grandmother during the period of her alleged abduction. Despite inconsistencies in her
testimony as shown in the TSN, AAA admitted the visit to her grandmother: 29

Q: So you did not proceed to your grandmothers house, where is the house of your grandmother?

A: Km. 81.

Q: Near the Dulo?

A: A bit farther of Dulo.

Q: You rode in a jeep and the driver is your cousin?

A: No sir we rode (sic) pedicab going to my grandmothers place.

Q: There were no people?

A: We are used to ride (sic) pedicab.

Q: So you rode a pedicab at that time?

A: No, Sir. [Emphasis supplied]

We are mindful that appellants bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must
be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes,
photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers. There is such
30

corroboration in this case. To support its sweetheart theory, the defense presented appellant and
AAAs common friend, Enriquez, who attested to the veracity of appellants claim: 31

Q: When you arrived at their house did you see the complainant AAA?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were you able to talk to her?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell the court what was the subject of your conversation?
A: She told me that she and Felimon Patentes are getting married, saying where they will live and
that they will go into the buy and sell business.

Q: Did you notice AAA to be happy with Felimon Patentes?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And the second time you went to their place do you remember what was the subject of your
conversation?

A: Regarding their plan of getting married. [Emphasis supplied]

Appellants neighbor, Gerondio, corroborated the testimony: 32

Q: Do you remember seeing the accused sometime on December 5, 1998?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where did you see him?

A: In their house, he just arrived.

Q: Was he alone?

A: He is with AAA.

xxxx

Q: On the following day did you see again AAA?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where did you see her?

A: Inside their house, she was walking.

xxxx

Q: When was that when you saw her?

A: The next day, December 6, 1998.

xxxx

Q: On the succeeding days, from December 7 to 11 were you able to see AAA in the house of
Felimon?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did you see her?

A: In the house of the accused, Felimon.

Q: What was she doing?

A: She was cleaning the surroundings of the house and did the laundry, and she was also going
around.

Q: When you said going around or "suroy-suroy" where did she go around?

A: She also went to our house.

Q: Were you able to talk to her personally?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: What did you observe from them?

A: As if they are married.

Q: What were the actions that you saw in them?

A: They were loving with each other.

Q: What do you mean by loving?

A: They are close to each other, they joke, and Felimon would place his arm on the shoulder of AAA.
[Emphasis supplied]

A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means
a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. In the
33

case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the
truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats,
force or intimidation.

The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate
credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility
34

to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is
not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting
interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim
35

undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render
justice based on the law. 36

The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable
doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of
1wphi1

appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the
quantum of proof to support a conviction. 37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, finding appellant
FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Forcible Abduction with Rape,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. His immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless he is being
detained for some other charge.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATT E STATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
People v. Macapanpan, 449 Phil. 87-89 (2003) citing People v. Alitagtag, 368 Phil. 637, 647
(1999); People v. Baltazar, 385 Phil. 1023, 1031 (2000); People v. Dumaguing, 394 Phil. 93,
103 (2000); People v. Gallo, 348 Phil. 640, 665 (1998); People v. Babera, 388 Phil. 44, 53
(2000); People v. Alvario, 341 Phil. 526, 538-539 (1997).
2
Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C.
Lantion and Edgardo T. Lloren concurring, Court of Appeals, Twenty First Division, Cagayan
de Oro, CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00062; CA rollo, p.159-187.

3
Penned by Presiding Judge Jesus V. Quitain, promulgated on 7 March 2005, People v.
Felimon Patentes, Crim. Case No. 42,786-793-99, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Davao
City. Records, pp. 129-144.

4
Id. at 144.

5
CA rollo, p. 186.

6
Id. at 179.

7
People v. Bongat, G. R. No. 184170, 2 February 2011, 641 SCRA 496, 505.

8
CA rollo, p. 101.

9
Id. at 93.

10
Id. at 181.

11
People v. Mariano, G.R. No. 168693, 19 June 2009, 590 SCRA 74, 90.

12
People v. Marquez, GR Nos. 137408-10, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 510, 517.

13
Id.

14
People v. Freta, 406 Phil. 853, 862 (2001).

15
People v. Bardaje, 187 Phil. 735, 744 (1980).

16
Exhibit "B," records, p. 7.

17
Id.

18
People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 192250, 11 July 2012, 676 SCRA 347, 360.

19
Id.

20
CA rollo, p. 103.

21
Records, p. 13.

22
TSN, 8 February 2000, p. 46.

23
TSN, 9 December 2002, p. 3.

24
TSN, 8 February 2000, pp. 46-47.
25
TSN, 8 February 2000, pp. 46-47.

26
People v. Sapinoso, 385 Phil. 374, 387 (2000); People v. Moreno, 378 Phil. 951, 969
(1999).

27
People v. Macapanpan, supra note 1, at 106; citing People v. Malbog, 396 Phil. 784 (2000).

28
TSN, 20 June 2001, p. 4.

29
TSN, 8 February 2000, p. 37

30
People v. Jimenez, 362 Phil. 222, 233 (1999).

31
TSN, 9 December 2002, pp. 3-4.

32
TSN, 20 June 2001, pp. 2-4.

33
Section 2, Rule 133, Revised Rules on Evidence; People v. Palma Gil, 348 Phil. 608, 626
(1998).

34
People v. Gilbero, 425 Phil. 241, 249 (2002).

35
People v. Medel, 350 Phil. 208, 226 (1998).

36
People v. Alvario, 341 Phil. 526, 538-539 (1997).

37
People v. Villajlores, 422 Phil. 776, 792 (2001), citing People v. Bravo, 376 Phil. 931, 944
(1999).

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137599. October 8, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GILBERT BAULITE


and LIBERATO BAULITE, accused-appellants.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

Appeal seeking to reverse the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato, at Kidapawan
City, Branch 17 finding accused Gilbert Baulite and Liberato Baulite guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape with homicide and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of Delia Jacobo Lano in the sum of P50,000.00, with costs.
On December 1, 1993, Eddie Arguelles, a farmer, passed by a river on his way to Old
Bunawan, Tulunan, Cotabato. In the river, he saw two men Gilbert and Liberato Baulite washing
their bloodied hands. Eddie continued on his way after seeing them. Upon reaching the road, he
heard a boy shouting that somebody was found dead.
Jonathan Cando, a civilian volunteer, was on horseback crossing a river on his way to
Bunawan. He heard a woman crying "indi" "indi." He checked his left, and approximately six (6)
meters away, he saw a person mounting somebody, as if choking the one mounted. He went to
the barangay captain and related what he heard and saw. The barangay captain, however,
dismissed the incident, speculating that the two were only sweethearts.
Around 3 to 4 in the afternoon of the same day, a boy found the body of Delia Jacobo
Lano. Delia was a public school teacher at Old Bunawan, Datu Paglas and a resident of Maybula,
Tulunan, Cotabato. An examination of her body revealed that Delia suffered a three-inch-deep
punctured wound between her eyes, a smashed face (left side) and a bruised neck (upper
portion). Vaginal smear test also found her positive for (dead) spermatozoa. However, there were
no indications that Delias genitalia sustained any laceration. The medical examiner opined that
Delia had probably delivered several children. The examination was conducted approximately
five (5) to six (6) hours after Delia died.
On December 7, 1993, 2nd assistant provincial prosecutor of Cotabato Alfonso B. Dizon, Jr.,
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato, at Kidapawan an information for rape with
homicide against Gilbert Baulite and Liberato Baulite, the two men caught washing their
bloodied hands by the river. The information reads:

That on or about December 1, 1993, at Barangay New Bunawan, Municipality of


Tulunan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with one DELIA JAGOBO LANO against her
will, and thereafter said accused, with intent to kill, with personal violence,
strangulated the victim with the use of a hand as shown by finger nails marking which
caused hematoma of the upper portion of the neck and likewise with the use of a sharp
object, inflicted punctured wound (sic) located just above and between the eyes, three
(3) inches deep, directed and posteriorly and superiorly and multiple fracture of the
bone of the left face with hematoma of both eyes, which injuries is (sic) the direct and
proximate cause of death of said DELIA JACOBO LANO. [2]

On June 23, 1994, the trial court arraigned the accused. They each pleaded not guilty.[3]
After due trial, on November 25, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision finding the two
accused guilty of rape with homicide, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

Prescinding from the foregoing facts and considerations, the Court finds accused
Gilbert Baulite and Liberato Baulite guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime
charged, accused Liberato Baulite and Gilbert Baulite are hereby sentenced each to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Consonant with the recent jurisprudence,
both accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Delia Jacobo Lano the sum
of P50,000.00.

With costs de oficio.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[4]

On December 29, 1998, the accused filed a notice of appeal.[5]


The issues in the appeal are: (1) Was the guilt of the accused-appellants proved beyond
reasonable doubt? (2) Is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict the accused-appellants?
The trial court convicted the accused on the basis of the following circumstantial evidence,
namely:
a) A witness saw accused-appellants Gilbert and Liberato Baulite washing their bloodied hands;
b) A boy was heard shouting that somebody was found dead;
c) A witness heard a woman shouting "indi, indi" who was being choked and later the dead
body of Delia Lano was found.[6]
An autopsy revealed that the body of Delia Lano sustained a three-inch-deep punctured
wound between the eyes and a smashed face.[7]
Accused-appellants explained that the blood in their hands was that of a chicken that they
had dressed recently.[8]
Witness Jonathan Cando heard a woman shouting "indi, indi," then saw a person mounting
somebody as if choking the person mounted. However, in the absence of an eye-witness
identifying the person choking, accused-appellants would not necessarily be incriminated in the
crime. Subsequent examination of the body of Delia Lano revealed that she was choked, as
evidenced by the finger markings or hematoma on the upper portion of her neck.The fact that the
upper portion of the neck was the one severely injured is physical evidence consistent with the
scenario that one in a mounting position applied pressure or choking in the upper portion of the
neck of the person mounted. The prosecution, unfortunately, failed to positively identify the
person mounting and choking the victim.[9]
In light of the prosecutions evidence, we are not convinced that the guilt of the accused has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is clear. The guilt of the accused must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution, on its part, must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and must not simply depend on the weakness of the defense. The slightest possibility of
an innocent man being convicted for an offense he has never committed, let alone when no less
than the capital punishment is imposed, would be far more dreadful than letting a guilty person
go unpunished for a crime he may have perpetrated.[10] On the whole then, the scanty evidence for
the prosecution casts serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused. It does not pass the test of
moral certainty and is insufficient to rebut the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees the accused. It is apropos to repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not, according to
the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt; the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of
innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[11]
Where the evidence is purely circumstantial, there must be an even greater need to apply the
rule that the prosecution depends not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of its
own evidence. Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of the
accused. For circumstantial evidence to convict, the Rules of Court require that: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. On the latter, decided cases expound that the circumstantial evidence presented and
proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.[12]
The Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the accused.[13] We agree.
We find the circumstantial evidence adduced not sufficient to support a finding that both
accused-appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. To begin with,
witness Jonathan Cando was not able to identify either the woman victim or the person choking
the victim.[14]
We cannot conclude with certainty that the blood in the hands of the accused-appellant was
the blood of the victim, and that the person choking her was one of the accused-
appellants. Speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [15] In a criminal case, every circumstance favoring
the innocence of the accused must be duly taken into account.[16]
In our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts
the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. [17] Where
there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, he must be acquitted even though his
innocence may be doubted since the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty can only be overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[18]
In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused-appellant, they
must be acquitted. Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; that
presumption is solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The contrary requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind. Short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is even the constitutional
duty of the court to acquit them.[19]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED. Accused-appellants Gilbert Baulite
and Liberato Baulite are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in Criminal Case 2834 of the
Regional Trial Court, Cotabato, Kidapawan, on reasonable doubt.
Costs de oficio.
The Director, Bureau of Corrections is ordered to release the accused-appellants
immediately unless held for another cause. He shall inform the Court of such release or the
reason for non-release within ten (10) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.

[1]
In Criminal Case no. 2834, dated November 25, 1998, Original Record, pp. 381-387.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 6-7.
[3]
Original Record, p. 20.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 16-23, at p. 23.
[5]
Rollo, p. 24. On July 05, 1999, we accepted the appeal (Rollo, p. 26).
[6]
Decision, Regional Trial Court, Rollo, pp. 16-23, at p. 23.
[7]
Original Record, p. 7.
[8]
TSN, January 7, 1998, pp. 7-11.
[9]
TSN, July 11, 1995, pp. 5-7.
[10]
People v. Manzano, 227 SCRA 780, 787 [1993].
[11]
People v. Dismukem, 234 SCRA 51, 61 [1994], citing People v. Dramayo, 149 Phil. 107 [1971]; People v. Garcia,
215 SCRA 349 [1992].
[12]
People v. Santos, 333 SCRA 319, 336 [2000].
[13]
Manifestation and motion in Lieu of Brief, Rollo, pp. 84-96.
[14]
TSN, July 11, 1995, pp. 5-7.
[15]
People v. Isla, 343 Phil. 562, 570 [1997], citing People v. Jumao-as, 230 SCRA 70 [1994].
[16]
People v. Sinatao, 319 Phil. 665, 687 [1995].
[17]
People v. Parel, 330 Phil. 453, 471 [1999]; People v. Salangga, 234 SCRA 407 [1994].
[18]
Pecho v. People, 331 Phil. 1, 19 [1999].
[19]
People v. Valeriano, 226 SCRA 694 [1993], citing People v. Pido, 200 SCRA 45 [1991].

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 183830


PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,


LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
-versus- BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
DELFIN CALISO,
Accused-Appellant. October 19, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The decisive question that seeks an answer is whether the identification of


the perpetrator of the crime by an eyewitness who did not get a look at the face of
the perpetrator was reliable and positive enough to support the conviction of
appellant Delfin Caliso (Caliso).

Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 21, in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte found him guilty
of murder for the killing of AAA,[1] a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and
sentenced him to death in its decision dated August 19, 2002.[2] The appeal of the
conviction was brought automatically to the Court. On June 28, 2005,[3] the Court
transferred the records to the Court of Appeals (CA) for intermediate review
pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo.[4] OnOctober 26, 2007,[5] the CA,
although affirming the conviction, reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua and
modified the civil awards. Now, Caliso is before us in a final bid to overturn his
conviction.

Antecedents

The information dated August 5, 1997 charged Caliso with rape with
homicide perpetrated in the following manner:

That on or about the 5th day of June, 1997, at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon one AAA, who
is a minor of 16 years old and a mentally retarded girl, against her will and
consent; that on the occasion of said rape and in furtherance of the accuseds
criminal designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon said AAA by mauling her, pulling her towards a muddy
water and submerging her underneath, which caused the death of said AAA soon
thereafter.

CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of Article 335 of the Revised Penal


Code in relation to R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the Heinous Crimes Law.[6]

At his arraignment on November 12, 1997,[7] Caliso pleaded not guilty to the
charge.

The records show that AAA died on June 5, 1997 at around 11:00 am in the
river located in Barangay Tiacongan, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte; that the
immediate cause of her death was asphyxia, secondary to drowning due to
smothering; that the lone eyewitness, 34-year old Soledad Amegable (Amegable),
had been clearing her farm when she heard the anguished cries of a girl pleading
for mercy: Please stop noy, it is painful noy!; [8] that the cries came from an area
with lush bamboo growth that made it difficult for Amegable to see what was
going on; that Amegable subsequently heard sounds of beating and mauling that
soon ended the girls cries; that Amegable then proceeded to get a better glimpse of
what was happening, hiding behind a cluster of banana trees in order not to be
seen, and from there she saw a man wearing gray short pants bearing the number
11 mark, who dragged a girls limp body into the river, where he submerged the girl
into the knee-high muddy water and stood over her body; that he later lifted the
limp body and tossed it to deeper water; that he next jumped into the other side of
the river; that in that whole time, Amegable could not have a look at his face
because he always had his back turned towards her;[9] that she nonetheless insisted
that the man was Caliso, whose physical features she was familiar with due to
having seen him pass by their barangay several times prior to the incident;[10]that
after the man fled the crime scene, Amegable went straight to her house and told
her husband what she had witnessed; and that her husband instantly reported the
incident to the barangay chairman.

It appears that one SPO3 Romulo R. Pancipanci declared in an


affidavit[11] that upon his station receiving the incident report on AAAs death at
about 12:45 pm of June 5, 1997, he and two other officers proceeded to the crime
scene to investigate; that he interviewed Amegable who identified the killer by his
physical features and clothing (short pants); that based on such information, he
traced Caliso as AAAs killer; and that Caliso gave an extrajudicial admission of the
killing of AAA. However, the declarations in the affidavit remained worthless
because the Prosecution did not present SPO3 Pancipanci as its witness.

Leo Bering, the barangay chairman of San Vicente, Kapatagan, Lanao Del
Norte, attested that on the occasion of Calisos arrest and his custodial
interrogation, he heard Caliso admit to the investigating police officer the
ownership of the short pants recovered from the crime scene; that the admission
was the reason why SPO3 Pancipanci arrested Caliso from among the curious
onlookers that had gathered in the area; that Amegable, who saw SPO3
Pancipancis arrest of Caliso at the crime scene, surmised that Caliso had gone
home and returned to the crime scene thereafter.[12]

Municipal Health Officer Dr. Joseph G.B. Fuentecilla conducted the post-
mortem examination on the body of AAA on June 6, 1997, and found the following
injuries, to wit:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. The dead body was generally pale wearing a heavily soiled old sleeveless
shirt and garter skirts.
2. The body was wet and heavily soiled with mud both nostrils and mouth
was filled with mud.
3. The skin of hands and feet is bleached and corrugated in appearance.
4. 2 cm. linear lacerated wound on the left cheek (sic).
5. Multiple small (sic) reddish contusions on anterior neck area.
6. Circular hematoma formation 3 inches in diameter epigastric area of
abdomen.
7. Four erythematus linear abrasion of the left cheek (sic).
8. Presence of a 6x8 inches bulge on the back just below the inferior angle of
both scapula extending downwards.
9. The body was wearing an improperly placed underwear with the garter
vertically oriented to the right stained with moderate amount of yellowish
fecal material.
10. Minimal amount of pubic hair in the lower pubis with labia majora
contracted and retracted.
11. Theres no swelling abrasion, laceration, blood hematoma formation in the
vulva. There were old healed hymenal lacerations at 5 and 9 oclock
position.
12. Vaginal canal admits one finger with no foreign body recovered (sic).
13. Oval shaped contusion/hematoma 6 cm at its greatest diameter anterior
surface middle 3rd left thigh.
14. Presence of 2 contusion laceration 1x0.5 cm in size medial aspect left
knee.[13]

Dr. Fuentecilla also conducted a physical examination on the body of Caliso


and summed up his findings thusly:

P.E. FINDINGS:
1. Presence of a 7x0.1 cm. horizontally averted linear erythematus contusion
left side of neck (Post ).
2. 8x0.2 cm. reddish linear abrasion (probably a scratch mark) from the left
midclavicular line extending to the left anterioraxillary line.
3. Presence of 2 erythematus abrasion 3 cmx0.1 cm in average size dorsal
surface (probably a scratch mark) middle 3rd left arm.
4. 2.5 cm. abrasion dorsal surface middle and right forearm.
5. Presence of a linear erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 2x7
cm. in average size lateral boarder of scapula extending to left posterior
axillary line.
6. Presence of 2 oblique oriented erythematus contusion (probably a scratch
mark) 14x022 cm. and 5x0.2 cm. in size respectively at the upper left
flank of the lower back extending downward to the midline.
7. Presence of 5 linear reddish pressure contusion parallel to each other with
an average 5 cm left flank area.[14]

In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed an alibi, insisting
that on the day of the killing, he plowed the rice field of Alac Yangyang from
7:00 am until 4:00 pm.

Yangyang corroborated Calisos alibi, recalling that Caliso had plowed his
rice field from 8 am to 4 pm of June 5, 1997. He further recalled that Caliso was in
his farm around 12:00 noon because he brought lunch to Caliso. He conceded,
however, that he was not aware where Caliso was at the time of the killing.

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment on August 19, 2002, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused DELFIN


CALISO is hereby sentenced to death and to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the
amount of P50,000.00. The accused is also hereby ordered to pay the said heirs
the amount of P50, 000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[15]
The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA
because the old-healed hymenal lacerations of AAA and the fact that the victims
underwear had been irregularly placed could not establish the commission of
carnal knowledge; that the examining physician also found no physical signs of
rape on the body of AAA; and that as to the killing of AAA, the identification by
Amegable that the man she had seen submerging AAA in the murky river was no
other than Caliso himself was reliable.

Nevertheless, the RTC did not take into consideration the testimony of
Bering on Calisos extrajudicial admission of the ownership of the short pants
because the pants were not presented as evidence and because the police officers
involved did not testify about the pants in court. [16] The RTC cited the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength to raise the crime from homicide to
murder, regarding the word homicide in the information to be used in its generic
sense as to include all types of killing.

Ruling of the CA

On intermediate review, the following errors were raised in the brief for the
accused-appellant,[17] namely:

i. The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the


crime of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt;

ii. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the
incredible and inconsistent testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

iii. The court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength and the generic aggravating
circumstance of disregard of sex[; and]

iv. The court a quo gravely erred in imposing the death penalty.

As stated, the CA affirmed Calisos conviction for murder based on the same
ratiocinations the RTC had rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by
Amegable of Caliso, despite his back being turned towards her during the
commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she made a positive identification of
Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident happened at
noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact that Amegables
view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAAs body had been
submerged in the water; that the RTC expressly found her testimony as clear and
straightforward and worthy of credence; that no reason existed why Amegable
would falsely testify against Caliso; that Caliso did not prove the physical
impossibility for him to be at the crime scene or at its immediate vicinity at the
time of the incident, for both Barangay San Vicente, where AAAs body was found,
and Barangay Tiacongan, where the rice field of Yangyang was located, were
contiguous; that the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified
the killing of AAA to murder; that disregard of sex should not have been
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance due to its not being alleged in the
information and its not being proven during trial; and that the death penalty could
not be imposed because of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting its
imposition in the Philippines.

The CA decreed in its judgment, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 19, 2002,
finding appellant guilty of Murder, is hereby AFFIRMEDwith
the MODIFICATION that appellant Delfin Caliso is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, and is directed to pay the victims heirs the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages, as well as the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, in
addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 he had been adjudged to pay by the
trial court.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Issue

The primordial issue is whether Amegables identification of Caliso as the


man who killed AAA at noon of July 5, 1997 was positive and reliable.

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.


In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty
of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be
no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.[19]

The CA rejected the challenge Caliso mounted against the reliability of his
identification as the culprit by Amegable in the following manner:[20]

As to the first two errors raised, appellant contends that the testimony of Soledad
Amegable was replete with discrepancies. Appellant avers, for instance, that
Soledad failed to see the assailants face. Moreover, considering the distance
between where Soledad was supposedly hiding and where the incident transpired,
appellant states that it was inconceivable for her to have heard and seen the
incident. According to appellant, witness Soledad could not even remember if at
that time, she hid behind a banana plant, or a coconut tree.

At bench, the incident happened at noon, when the sun was at its brightest.
Soledad could very well recognize appellant. Furthermore, notwithstanding the
fact that it was his back that was facing her, she asserted being familiar with the
physical features of appellant, considering that he frequented their barangay. Even
during her cross-examination by the defense counsel, Soledad remained steadfast
in categorically stating that she recognized appellant:

Q: Mrs. Amegable, you said during your direct examination that


you saw Delfin Caliso, the accused in this case, several times
passed by your barangay, am I correct?
A: Several times.

Q: By any chance prior to the incident, did you talk to him?


A: No, sir.

Q: Are you acquainted with him?


A: Yes, sir.

Q: Even if he is in his back position?


A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis Supplied)

Given the circumstances as stated above, it was even probable that Soledad
caught glimpses of the profile of the appellant at the time of the incident. She
related, in addition, that when the victim was being submerged in the water, there
was no object obstructing her view.

The inconsistencies as alleged by appellant, between Soledad Amegables


declaration in court and her affidavit, such as the tree or plant from where she was
hiding behind at the time of the incident, are insignificant and cannot negate
appellants criminal liability. Her whole attention was riveted to the incident that
was unfolding before her. Besides, any such inconsistencies are minor. Slight
contradictions are indicative of an unrehearsed testimony and could even serve to
strengthen the witness credibility. A witness who is telling the truth is not always
expected to give a perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of time and
the treachery of human memory.

In fact, the testimony of a single eye-witness is sufficient to support a conviction,


so long as such testimony is found to be clear and straightforward and worthy of
credence by the trial court. Furthermore, over here, witness Soledad had no reason
to testify falsely against appellant.

Besides, the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best


undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. Findings of
the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court.

Contrary to the CAs holding that the identification of Caliso based on


Amegables recognition of him was reliable, the Court considers the identification
not reliable and beyond doubt as to meet the requirement of moral certainty.

When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable


enough for establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for


conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise,
no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed,
trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and
overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court
has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde,[21] to
wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of
the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last
seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:

xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per
se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime.
There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or
accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the
very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There
may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually
seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively
identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance
when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim
immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting
an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the
accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual
eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or
accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there
is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no
conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition
is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of
a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove
identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go
free and the community would be denied proper protection.[22]
Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen
him pass by in her barangay several times prior to the killing. Such assertion
indicates that she was obviously assuming that the killer was no other than
Caliso. As matters stand, therefore, Calisos conviction hangs by a single thread of
evidence, the direct evidence of Amegables identification of him as the perpetrator
of the killing. But that single thread was thin, and cannot stand sincere scrutiny. In
every criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is required in establishing
the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Her identification of
Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means by
which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral
certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its
distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should
encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the
dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or
any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.

A witness familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a


positive identification, does not always pass the test of moral certainty due to the
possibility of mistake.

No matter how honest Amegables testimony might have been, her


identification of Caliso by a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be
regarded as positive enough to generate that moral certainty about Caliso being the
perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable circumstances showing him to
be AAAs killer. Her identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of
exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her being mistaken. Indeed,
there could be so many other individuals in the community where the crime was
committed whose backs might have looked like Calisos back. Moreover, many
factors could have influenced her perception, including her lack of keenness of
observation, her emotional stress of the moment, her proneness to suggestion from
others, her excitement, and her tendency to assume. The extent of such factors are
not part of the records; hence, the trial court and the CA could not have taken them
into consideration. But the influence of such varied factors could not simply be
ignored or taken for granted, for it is even a well-known phenomenon that the
members of the same family, whose familiarity with one another could be easily
granted, often inaccurately identify one another through a sheer view of anothers
back. Certainly, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of
mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.[23]

Amegables recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the


number 11 did not enhance the reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one,
such pants were not one-of-a-kind apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered
in evidence. Yet, even if they had been admitted in evidence, it remained doubtful
that they could have been linked to Caliso without proof of his ownership or
possession of them in the moments before the crime was perpetrated.

Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute
the killing to Caliso guarantee the reliability and accuracy of her identification of
him. The dearth of competent additional evidence that eliminated the possibility of
any human error in Amegables identification of Caliso rendered her lack of bad
faith or ill motive irrelevant and immaterial, for even the most sincere person could
easily be mistaken about her impressions of persons involved in startling
occurrences such as the crime committed against AAA. It is neither fair nor
judicious, therefore, to have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of
Amegable raise her identification to the level of moral certainty.

The injuries found on the person of Caliso by Dr. Fuentecilla, as borne out
by the medical certificate dated June 9, 1997,[24] did not support the culpability of
Caliso. The injuries, which were mostly mere scratch marks, [25] were not even
linked by the examining physician to the crime charged. Inasmuch as the injuries
of Caliso might also have been due to other causes, including one related to his
doing menial labor most of the time, their significance as evidence of guilt is nil.

In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the


culprit, the accuseds constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal,[26] though his innocence
may be doubted.[27] The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to
every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused must
rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the strength of the
evidence for the Prosecution.[28]

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on October 26, 2007


is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence, and accused-
appellant Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City is directed to


forthwith release Delfin Caliso from confinement, unless there is another lawful
cause warranting his further detention.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice
C E R T I FI CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
The real name of the victim and her immediate family are withheld per R.A. No. 7610 and R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) and its implementing rules. See People v. Cabalquinto,
G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
[2]
Records, pp, 174-191.
[3]
CA rollo, p. 122.
[4]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004,433 SCRA 640.
[5]
CA rollo, pp. 125-133; penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, with Associate Justice TeresitaDy-Liacco
Flores (retired) and Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim concurring.
[6]
Records, p. 1.
[7]
Id., p. 25.
[8]
TSN, July 8, 1998, p. 4.
[9]
TSN, September 2, 1998, p. 11.
[10]
Id, p. 3.
[11]
Records, p. 3.
[12]
TSN, September 2, 1998, p. 12.
[13]
Records, p. 73.
[14]
Id., p. 74.
[15]
Id., p. 191.
[16]
Id., p. 186.
[17]
CA rollo, pp. 54-68.
[18]
Id., p. 133.
[19]
People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 141644, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 478; People v. Esmale, G.R. Nos. 102981-82,
April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 578; Tuason v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 113779-80, February 23, 1995, 241 SCRA
695.
[20]
CA rollo, pp. 129-130.
[21]
G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000, 325 SCRA 835.
[22]
Id., at pp. 849-850; bold emphasis supplied.
[23]
People v. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15, 2000; 328 SCRA 185; Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA
335, 346 [1980]; People v. Beltran, L-31860, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 246, 250; People v. Manambit, G.R.
No. 1274445, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 344, 377; People v. Maongco, G.R. No. 108963-65, March 1, 1994, 230
SCRA 562, 575.
[24]
Records, p. 74.
[25]
TSN, June 16, 1999, pp. 11.
[26]
See Natividad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40233, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 335, 346.
[27]
Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996, 262 SCRA 518, 533, Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
76203-04, December 6, 1989, 180 SCRA 9; People v. Sadie, No. L-66907, April 14, 1987, 149 SCRA 240; U.S.
v. Gutierrez, No. 1877, 4 Phil. 493 April 29, [1905].
[28]
People v. Pidia, G.R. No. 112264, November 10, 1995, 249 SCRA 687, 702.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 124676. May 20, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RESTITUTO


MANHUYOD, JR., accused-appellant.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a case of a father having raped his 17-year old daughter after the effectivity
of R.A. No. 7659.[1] Accused could thus have been meted out the death penalty pursuant
to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,
if found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. However, here, the trial courts imposition of
capital punishment was not based on said statute, but by reason of the aggravating
circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.
However repulsive and condemnable the act of a father raping his daughter, yet, the
Constitution mandates that an accused is entitled to the presumption of
innocence. Thus, after a scrutiny of the record and the evidence in this case, we find
ourselves unable to affirm the judgment of the trial court. Acquittal then is compelled by
law since the presumption of innocence was not overcome, the conviction having been
based on hearsay evidence and a miscomprehension of the rule on statements forming
part of the res gestae.
On 6 June 1995, before the Central Visayas Office (CEVRO) of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), a complaint [2] for rape was filed by Yolanda Manhuyod, accuseds
wife and mother of the offended party, Relanne S. Manhuyod. The complaint charged
accused with having raped Relanne, then 17 years of age, on 20 April 1995 and 3 May
1995. Immediately upon the filing of the complaint, Relanne was examined by Dr.
Tomas Refe, Medico-Legal Officer III of the CEVRO, NBI, whose findings and
conclusions in Living Case No. 95-MI-II,[3]were as follows:

GENITAL EXAMINATION:

Pubic hairs, fully grown, abundant. Labia mejora, gaping. Labia minora,
gaping posteriorly. Fourchette, tense. Vestibular mucosa, reddish to
violaceous. Hymen, moderately thick, wide, with old healed lacerations,
superficial at 8:00 oclock and deep at 4:00 oclock positions corresponding to
the face of a wacth [sic]; edges of these lacerations are rounded and non-
coaptable. Hymenal orifice, admits a tube 2.8 cms. in diameter with moderate
resistance. Vaginal walls, moderately tight and rugosities, moderately
prominent.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. No evidence of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of


the Subject at the time of examination.
2. Hymenal orifice, 2.8 cms. in diameter distensible as to allow
complete penetration of an average size adult penis in erection
without producing further laceration.
On 8 June 1995, Yolanda and Relanne gave their sworn statements [4] to Atty. Oscar
Tomarong, Officer-in-Charge of the NBI Sub-office in Dipolog City. Then in a
letter[5] dated 9 June 1995 to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Dipolog City, Atty.
Tomarong recommended the prosecution of accused for rape, as charged by Yolanda
and Relanne. On even date, Relanne, assisted by Yolanda, filed a complaint[6] with the
Provincial Prosecutors Office charging herein accused with rape committed on 3 May
1995.
After due proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga del
Norte, through Valeriano Lagula, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-
Charge, filed with Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, sitting
in Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, an information charging accused with rape,
allegedly committed as follows:
That, in the morning, on or about the 3rd day of May, 1995, in the
Municipality of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, moved by lewd and unchaste
desire and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual
intercourse with one RELANNE S. MANHUYOD, his 17 year old
daughter, against her will and without her consent, as a result of which
she became pregnant.
CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 335, Revised Penal Code).[7]

At his arraignment on 23 June 1995 following his arrest and commitment in the
Provincial Jail, accused entered a plea of not guilty. Pre-trial and trial were then set for
18 June 1995.[8] The record, however, does not disclose if pre-trial was actually
conducted as scheduled.

On 6 July 1995, the prosecution, with conformity of the accused, filed a Motion to
Dismiss[9] on the ground that Relanne and Yolanda had executed a Joint Affidavit of
Desistance,[10] declaring that they lost interest in the further prosecution of the [case] as
the case arose out of a family conflict which was [already] patched up; thus the
prosecution declared that without the testimonies of the complainants, the prosecution
cannot prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

In its resolution[11] of 17 July 1995, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the
following grounds: (1) the affidavit of desistance could not justify dismissal of the
complaint, as the so-called pardon extended to accused by affiants in the affidavit of
desistance was made after the filing of the information, [12] hence could not serve as the
basis for dismissing the case;[13] (2) once a complaint for a private crime was filed, the
State effectively became the offended party and any pardon given by the private
complainant would be unavailing; and (3) Section 20-A of R.A. No. 7659 provides that
any person charged under the Act for an offense where the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death would not be allowed to take advantage of the provision
on plea-bargaining. The trial court then set the case for pre-trial and trial on 18 and 25
of August and 1 September 1995.
As Relanne and Yolanda did not appear at pre-trial on 18 August 1995, the court
issued an order[14] declaring pre-trial terminated and ordering trial to proceed on 25
August and 1 September 1995.
On 25 August 1995, as well as on the succeeding dates thereafter set by the trial
court for Relanne and Yolanda to testify, to wit: 8 September 1995;[15] 22 September
1995;[16] 6 October 1995;[17] and 27 October 1995, [18] mother and daughter did not appear
in court, despite the courts orders directing the prosecutor to file a complaint to hold
them for indirect contempt[19] and ordering NBI agents Atty. Oscar Tomarong and Atty.
Friolo Icao, Jr. to arrest them.[20]
In a 1st indorsement[21] dated 6 May 1995, Atty. Tomarong reported to the trial court
that, among other things, Relanne and Yolanda had left for Cebu probably to elude
arrest after having learned from both the print and broadcast media that the court had
ordered their arrest; Yolanda, a public school teacher, had filed an indefinite leave of
absence; and Relanne had not been attending her classes. The NBI thus asked for
more time to arrest Relanne and Yolanda, but due to its failure to arrest and produce
them in court both at the scheduled hearings of 6 October and 27 October 1995, the
prosecution rested its case solely on the basis of the testimonies of NBI agent Atty.
Tomarong, NBI agent Atty. Icao, Jr. and NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Refe, together with
the documents they identified or testified on. The court then gave the prosecution 10
days to submit a formal offer of exhibits, and announced to the parties that if the exhibits
would be admitted, the defense could file a demurrer to evidence which, if denied,
would be followed by the defense presenting its evidence beginning 15 December 1995.
[22]

In the prosecutions formal offer of its exhibits dated 9 November 1995, [23] the
following exhibits were offered: (1) A, the complaint sheet accomplished and filed by
Yolanda with the NBI, CEVRO; (2) B, the sworn statement of Yolanda given before Atty.
Tomarong and subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995; (3) C, the
sworn statement of Relanne given before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995; and (4) D, the
medical certificate issued by Dr. Refe. NBI agent Tomarong identified Exhibits A and B,
[24]
NBI agent Icao identified Exhibit C,[25] while Dr. Refe identified Exhibit D. [26]
Accused objected to the admission of Exhibits A, B and C on the ground that they
were hearsay, and to Exhibit D on the ground that the medical certificate was not
conclusive as to the commission of rape and the contents in said exhibit were not
corroborated on its material points by the offended party since the latter did not testify. [27]
In its order[28] of 15 November 1995, the trial court admitted all the foregoing exhibits
as exception[s] to the hearsay rule, and ordered that the defense commence presenting
its evidence on 15 December 1995.
On 9 November 1995, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence, [29] which, however,
the trial court denied in its resolution of 23 November 1995 [30] for being devoid of
merit. The trial court held that Exhibits B and C were convincing as they mentioned
details which could not have been concocted, as such, they constitute[d] part of the res
gestae, an exception to the hearsay rule; and as to the statement of Dr. Refe in answer
to clarificatory questions (pp. 5 to 6 t.s.n. hearing on 22 September 1995), while the
same may have had all the earmarks of hearsay, the statement was admissible for not
having been objected to. Finally, the trial court held that since it was a settled rule that
an affidavit was not considered the best evidence if the affiant was available, then, as in
this case where Relanne and Yolanda were unavailable, their sworn statements were
admissible for being the best evidence.
The trial court likewise denied[31] the accuseds motion[32] to reconsider the resolution,
and set the reception of accuseds evidence on 15 December 1995, which, however,
was subsequently reset to 12 January 1996. [33]
In his first and second manifestations, [34] accused informed the trial court that he was
waiving his right to present his evidence and asked that the case be submitted for
decision. He reiterated this waiver at the hearing on 12 January 1996, [35] which then
prompted the court to order the parties to simultaneously submit their respective
memoranda within a non-extendible period of 20 days. The record, however, once more
fails to disclose that any of the parties so filed.
On 23 February 1996, the trial court promulgated its decision, [36] the decretal portion
of which read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SPO2 Restituto Manhuyod,
Jr. guilty of the crime of Rape by force and intimidation with [the]
aggravating circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH (R.A. 7659), and to indemnify the complainant P50,000.
(People vs. Magaluna., 205 SCRA 266 [1992]).
Pursuant to Circular No. 4-92-A of the Supreme Court [let] accused
immediately be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
On 26 February 1996, accused filed his Notice of Appeal. [37]
We accepted the Appeal on 3 December 1996.
In his Accused-Appellants Brief filed on 30 April 1997, accused imputes to the trial
court the commission of the following errors:
I

IN NOT DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST


APPELLANT FOR EVIDENT LACK OF INTEREST TO PROSECUTE.
II

IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF THE


PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE THE TIMELY AND
VEHEMENT OBJECTIONS OF THE DEFENSE INASMUCH AS THEY
HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRIME ASCRIBED
AGAINST APPELLANT.
III

IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT


THAT THE GUILT OF APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Accused jointly discusses these assigned errors, in the main, reiterating his
arguments in his demurrer to evidence, i.e., the sworn statements of Relanne and
Yolanda were inadmissible hearsay and could not be part of the res gestae under
Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the NBI agents and medico-legal
officer had no personal knowledge as to what actually and truthfully happened; hence,
their testimony as to what Relanne and Yolanda narrated were likewise inadmissible
hearsay. Accused further contended that what was established during trial was that
Relanne and Yolanda were no longer interested in pursuing the criminal complaint
against him; hence the case should have been dismissed for their lack of interest to
prosecute the same.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial
court and prayed for the affirmance in toto of the challenged decision. As accused
waived the filing of a Reply Brief in his Manifestation filed on 16 April 1997, this case
was then deemed submitted for decision on 3 February 1998.
As we stated at the outset, the accused must be acquitted.
Indeed, the evidence for the prosecution failed miserably in meeting the quantum of
proof required in criminal cases to overturn the constitutional presumption of
innocence. Section 2 of Rule 133 expressly provides that an accused in a criminal case
is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of
error, produces absolute certainty; all that is required is moral certainty, or that degree of
proof which produces a conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
In this case, in view of the desistance of the offended party, Relanne, and her
mother, Yolanda, and their failure to appear and testify at trial, the prosecution was left
with nothing but their sworn statements (Exhibits C and B, respectively); the sworn
charge sheet (Exhibit A) of Yolanda; and the testimonies of the NBI agents before whom
the sworn statements were given or subscribed to and the NBI medico-legal officer who
examined Relanne on 6 June 1995.
We first scrutinize the testimonies of the NBI agents and the medico-legal officer.
NBI agent Atty. Tomarong identified the charge sheet signed by Yolanda (Exh. A)
and her sworn statement (Exh. B), then detailed the questions he asked and information
he obtained from Yolanda as to the alleged rape. [38] On his part, NBI Agent Atty. Icao, Jr.
identified Relannes sworn statement (Exh. C) and testified in the same manner as Atty.
Tomarong.[39] Finally, NBI Medico-Legal Officer Refe identified the medical certificate he
issued (Exhibit D), then testified as to the details of his examination of Relanne and his
findings.[40]
While the defense objected to the presentation of Atty. Tomarong and Atty. Icao on
the ground that their testimonies would be hearsay, [41]plainly, nothing was objectionable
concerning their identification of the documents they themselves prepared in the course
of performing their official duties. However, there can be no doubt that as regards the
alleged commission of rape as related to them by Relanne and Yolanda, the testimonies
of the NBI officials constituted inadmissible hearsay.
It is a basic rule in evidence set forth in Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal
knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony
would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as evidence not of what the witness
knows himself but of what he has heard from others. [42] Obviously then, the NBI agents
testimonies touching upon what was told them by Relanne and Yolanda concerning the
events relating to the alleged commission of rape in question was hearsay. As a matter
of fact, insofar as Yolanda was concerned, since she was not an eyewitness to the
commission of the rape, but obtained knowledge thereof only from Relanne, the
testimony of Atty. Tomarong with respect to what Yolanda told him, even constituted
double hearsay.
It is settled that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the
averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from a judicial proceeding
for being inadmissible hearsay. The rationale for this is respect for the accuseds
constitutional right of confrontation, or to meet the witnesses against him face-to-face.
[43]
To safeguard this right, Section 1 of Rule 132, of the Rules of Court thus provides that
the examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing must be done in open court,
and under oath or affirmation. [44] At bottom, admitting Exhibits A, B, and C only as part of
the testimonies of the NBI agents could validly be done, but in light of the foregoing
discussion, these exhibits should have been excluded insofar as their contents related
to the truth of the matter concerning the commission of the rape in question.
Anent the medical certificate (Exhibit D), we disagree with accused, however, that
the contents thereof likewise constituted inadmissible hearsay. Exhibit D was prepared
by Dr. Refe on the basis of his actions and what he observed during his medical
examination of Relanne.Thus, as he actually testified thereto and was cross-examined
by the defense, accuseds contention on this score must fail.
The trial court brushed aside accuseds invocation of the hearsay rule on the ground
that the sworn statements could be considered as part of the res gestae, thus
constituting admissible hearsay pursuant to Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, which reads as follows:
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying
an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance,
may be received as part of the res gestae.
In People v. Sanchez,[45] this Court observed:
Res gestae means the things done. It refers to those exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a
crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission
of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. A
spontaneous exclamation is defined as a statement or exclamation
made immediately after some exciting occasion by a participant or
spectator and asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it is
observed by him. The admissibility of such exclamation is based on our
experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical or
mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced in a
spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control,
so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere
response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by
the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate
and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and
reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of self-
interest could not have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be
taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the act just
observed by him. In a manner of speaking, the spontaneity of the
declaration is such that the declaration itself may be regarded as the
event speaking through the declarant rather than the declarant
speaking for himself. Or, stated differently, xxx the events speak for
themselves, giving out their fullest meaning through the unprompted
language of the participants. The spontaneous character of the
language is assumed to preclude the probability of its premeditation or
fabrication. Its utterance on the spur of the moment is regarded, with a
good deal of reason, as a guarantee of its truth.
In People v. Ner,[46] this Court stated:
All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of
the res gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a startling
event witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he
had time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a
falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence
in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in question or its
immediate attending circumstances.
In sum, there are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1)
that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were
made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that
the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.[47]
It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical. The following
factors are then considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as
part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously, viz., (1) the time that lapsed
between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2)
the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he
made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the
occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of
the statement itself.[48] As to the first factor, the following proves instructive:
T]he rule is that the statements, to be admissible, should have been
made before there had been time or opportunity to devise or contrive
anything contrary to the real facts that occurred. What the law
altogether distrusts is not afterspeech but afterthought.
[T]here are no limits of time within which the res gestae can be
arbitrarily confined. These limits vary in fact with each particular
case.The acts or declarations are not required to be contemporaneous
with the primary fact, but they must be so connected with it as to make
the act or declaration and the main fact particularly inseparable, or be
generated by an excited feeling which extends, without break or let-
down, from the moment of the event they illustrate. In other words, if
the acts or declarations sprang out of the principal transaction, tend to
explain it, were voluntary and spontaneous, and were made at a time
so near it as to preclude the idea of deliberate design, they may be
regarded as contemporaneous in point of time, and are admissible.[49]
In People v. Sanchez,[50] this Court had occasion to state that the cases are not
uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence of the startling
event and the making of the declaration. What is important is that the declarations were
voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the
presence of the transaction which they illustrate or explain, and were made under such
circumstances as necessarily to exclude the ideas of design or deliberation.
As to the second factor, it may be stressed that a statement made, or an act done,
at a place some distance from the place where the principal transaction occurred will
not ordinarily possess such spontaneity as would render it admissible. [51]
Anent the third factor, [a] statement will ordinarily be deemed spontaneous if, at the
time when it was made, the conditions of the declarant was such as to raise an
inference that the effect of the occurrence on his mind still continued, as where he had
just received a serious injury, was suffering severe pain, or was under intense
excitement. Conversely, a lack of spontaneity may be inferred from the cool demeanor
of declarant, his consciousness of the absence of all danger, his delay in making a
statement until witnesses can be procured, or from the fact that he made a different
statement prior to the one which is offered in evidence. [52]
With regard to the fourth factor, what is to be considered is whether there intervened
between the event or transaction and the making of the statement relative thereto, any
circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant which would thus restore his
mental balance and afford opportunity for deliberation. [53]
The last factor needs no further elaboration.
Tested against the foregoing requisites to admit statements as part of the res
gestae and factors to test the spontaneity of the statements, we do not hesitate to rule
that the sworn statement of Relanne (Exhibit C) fails to qualify as part of the res gestae
for these reasons: (1) it was executed only on 8 June 1995 or, thirty-six (36) days after
the alleged rape on 3 May 1995, providing her more than sufficient time to concoct or
contrive a falsehood; (2) it was made after she had resolved to file a case for rape
against her father, a decision which required much deliberation and would cause her
obvious pain as the filing would expose her to public humiliation and shame, bring
dishonor to her family and visit upon her father the penalty of death; (3) she gave the
statement after three critical intervening events had occurred, viz., her pregnancy, filing
the complaint sheet and her being referred to the NBI medico-legal officer for
examination; and (4) it was made far from the place where the principal event -- the
alleged rape -- was committed, i.e., the latter took place in the De la Paz, Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte, while the statement was made in Dipolog City, at the sub-office
of the NBI, and any map of Zamboanga del Norte will show that Tampilisan and Dipolog
City do not even adjoin each other.
Turning to the sworn statement of Yolanda (Exhibit B), with more reason should this
not qualify as forming part of the res gestae. Yolanda did not witness the principal event
and all she knew of it was told to her by Relanne. Even if the issue of admissibility is
confined to what Relanne had told Yolanda, the same conclusion would be reached for
it clearly appears in Exhibit A that Relanne had not spontaneously told Yolanda of the
alleged rape. In fact, the latter had to confront the former only after the accused
confessed to Yolanda that he had molested Relanne. Moreover, the confrontation took
place on 3 June 1995, or a month after the alleged rape.
Ineluctably then, the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits B and C as part of the res
gestae.
Parenthetically, before the issue of res gestae is laid to rest, it must not be forgotten
that Section 42 of Rule 130 concerns itself with admissibility of evidence and not its
weight and sufficiency,[54] which is covered by Rule 133. Clearly, these two rules of
evidence are not synonymous.
The trial court was, however, correct in denying the motion to dismiss the case
solely on the basis of the affidavit of desistance. The rule supporting the denial is well
entrenched. While it may be true that under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by said
persons, as the case may be, the pardon to justify dismissal of the case should have
been granted prior to the institution of the criminal action. Consequently, an affidavit of
desistance filed after the institution of the criminal action in these cases, even if based
on an express pardon, cannot be a ground to dismiss the action. [55] With stronger reason
then may plain desistance not justify dismissal of the proceedings once instituted. The
reason for this rule is that the true aggrieved party in a criminal prosecution is the
People of the Philippines whose collective sense of morality, decency and justice has
been outraged. Once filed, control of the prosecution for any of the aforementioned
crimes is removed from the offended partys hands. [56]
The trial court, however, once more gravely erred when it imposed the death
penalty not because of the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, which the court a quo even cited, but due to the alternative
circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of said Code. The pertinent portion of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,
reads:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. Where the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
Clearly then, the father-daughter relationship in rape cases, or between accused
and Relanne, in this case, has been treated by Congress in the nature of a special
circumstance which makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory. Hence,
relationship as an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code,
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, should no longer be applied in view of the
amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7659. It may be pointed, however, that without the
foregoing amendment, relationship would still be an aggravating circumstance in the
crimes of rape (Article 335) and acts of lasciviousness (Article 336). [57]
If relationship in the instant case were to be appreciated under Article 15 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable on accused then would not be death, but
merely reclusion perpetua for, assuming that Relannes testimony in court would have
confirmed what she narrated in her sworn statement (Exhibit C), no circumstance then
attended the commission of the rape which could bring the crime under any provision of
Article 335 which imposes a penalty higher than reclusion perpetua or of reclusion
perpetua to death.
Finally, a few words on the lack of care devoted to the preparation of the information
filed before the trial court. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had in its possession
evidence that the crime was committed by a father against his 17-year old daughter
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, hence the imposable penalty was death. It was
then necessary to make reference to the amendatory law to charge the proper offense
that carried the mandatory imposition of capital punishment. Yet, the information merely
stated:

CONTRARY TO LAW (violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code).

Strictly speaking, this statement refers to the unamended provisions of Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, as even a freshman student of law should know, the
original provisions of said Article had, even prior to R.A. No. 7659, already been
amended by R.A. No. 2632 and R.A. No. 4111. Prosecutors are thus admonished to
exercise utmost care and diligence in the preparation of complaints or informations to
avert legal repercussions which may prove prejudicial to the interest of the State and
private offended parties.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the appealed decision in
Criminal Case No. S-2579 of the Regional Trial Court of the Ninth Judicial Region,
Branch 11, sitting in Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, and, for lack of evidence,
ACQUITTING accused-appellant RESTITUTO MANHUYOD, JR., whose immediate
release from detention is hereby ordered, unless his continued detention is justified by
any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to inform
the Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof of the fact of such release or continued
detention, as the case may be.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, and Quisumbing JJ., concur.
Purisima, J., on leave.

[1]
Entitled An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes Amending for the purpose the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, other Special Laws, and for other Purposes, effective 31 December
1993 (People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 [1994]).
[2]
Original Record (OR), Criminal Case No. S-2579, 1.
[3]
Exhibit D, OR, 9.
[4]
Exhibits B and C, respectively, OR, 4-5; 6-8.
[5]
OR, 2.
[6]
Id., 1.
[7]
Id., 12; Rollo, 7.
[8]
Id., 15.
[9]
Id., 18.
[10]
Id., 17.
[11]
OR, 19-23.
[12]
Citing People v. Entes, 103 SCRA 162 [1981].
[13]
Citing People v. Miranda, 57 Phil. 274 [1932].
[14]
OR, 25.
[15]
Id., 33.
[16]
Id., 41.
[17]
Id., 47.
[18]
Id., 49.
[19]
Id., 34-35.
[20]
Id., 42.
[21]
Id., 45.
[22]
OR, 49.
[23]
Id., 56-59.
[24]
Id., 38.
[25]
Id., 39.
[26]
Id., 43.
[27]
Id., 60-61.
[28]
OR, 62.
[29]
Id., 50-54.
[30]
Id., 71-75.
[31]
Id., 82.
[32]
Id., 77-81.
[33]
Id., 83.
[34]
Id., 84; 85.
[35]
Id., 89.
[36]
OR, 92-110; Rollo, 15-33. Per Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena.
[37]
Id., 112; Id., 34.
[38]
TSN, 8 September 1995, 3-19.
[39]
Id., 22-30.
[40]
TSN, 22 September 1995, 3-5.
[41]
TSN, 8 September 1995, 4, 22.
[42]
Ricardo J. Francisco, Evidence 244 (3rd ed., 1996) (hereafter Francisco).
[43]
Section 14(2), Article III.
[44]
People v. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70, 77 [1992] (citations omitted). See also 2 Florenz D. Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium 603 (7th ed., 1995).
[45]
Supra note 44 at 78-79 (citations omitted).
[46]
28 SCRA 1151, 1161-1162 [1969].
[47]
People v. Sanchez, supra note 44 at 79. See also People v. Taneo, 218 SCRA 494, 506 [1993];
Anciro v. People, 228 SCRA 629, 642 [1993].
[48]
Francisco 315-317.
[49]
Id., 315 (citations omitted).
[50]
Supra note 44 at 80.
[51]
Francisco 316.
[52]
Francisco 317.
[53]
Id.
[54]
Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 477, 486 [1993].
[55]
Bayani M. Alonte v. Hon. Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., et al., G.R. Nos. 131652 and 131728, 9 March
1998, at 20.
[56]
See People v. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, 256 [1991].
[57]
1 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code 471 (13th ed., 1993).

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