WEEK 2

II. RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT

II.A

Art. 25, Labor Code

Rules and Regulations Governing Private Recruitment and Placement Agency for Local
Employment [June 5, 1997]

II.B.1

R.A. 8042 as amended by R.A. 10022

Rule II- Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by R.A. 10022

PNB v. Cabansag, G.R. No. 157010, June 21, 2005 DANESSA

Doctrine:

The basic policy that all Filipino workers, whether employed locally or overseas, enjoy the
protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislations. Our labor statutes may not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or stipulations agreed upon, in a
foreign country.

Facts:

"In late 1998, Respondent Florence Cabansag arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She applied for
employment, with the Singapore Branch of the PNB, a private banking corporation organized and
existing under Philippine laws,with principal offices at Manila. The Singapore PNB Branch was
under the helm of Ruben C. Tobias, a lawyer, as General Manager, with the rank of Vice-President
of the Bank. At the time, too, the Branch Office had two (2) types of employees: (a) expatriates or
the regular employees, hired in Manila and assigned abroad including Singapore, and (b) locally
(direct) hired. She applied for employment as Branch Credit Officer, at a total monthly package of
$SG4,500.00, effective upon assumption of duties after approval. Tobias found her eminently
qualified and wrote a letter to the President of the Bank in Manila, recommending her
appointment for the position.

The President of the Bank approved the recommendation of Tobias. She then filed an Application,
with the Ministry of Manpower of the Government of Singapore, for the issuance of an

Page 1 of 60
Employment Pass as an employee of the Singapore PNB Branch. Her application was approved
for a period of two (2) years. On December 7, 1998, Tobias wrote a letter to Cabansag offering her
a temporary appointment, as Credit Officer, at a basic salary of Singapore Dollars 4,500.00, a
month and, upon her successful completion of her probation of 3 months,she may be extended at
the discretion of the Bank, a permanent appointment.

Cabansag accepted the position and assumed office. In the meantime, the Philippine Embassy in
Singapore processed her employment contract and, on March 8, 1999, she was issued by the POEA
an Overseas Employment Certificate, certifying that she was a bona fide contract worker for
Singapore. Barely three (3) months in office, she submitted to Tobias, her initial Performance
Report to which the latter was so impressed. However, in the evening of April 14, 1999, when
Cabansag was in a flat she rented along with her office mates, she was told that Tobias had asked
them to tell her to resign from her job. She then verified the information from Tobias, to which the
latter confirmed, with the explanation that her resignation was imperative to a cost-cutting
measure of the Bank. She was also also told that it will be transformed into a remittance office and
that, in either way, she had to resign from employment. She then asked Tobias that she be
furnished with a Formal Advice from the PNB Head Office in Manila. However, Tobias refused. On
April 16, 1999, Tobias summoned to his office and demanded that she submit her letter of
resignation, with the pretext that he needed a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer to penetrate the
local market, with the information that a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer had already been hired
and will be reporting for work soon. Without giving any definitive answer, she asked Tobias that
she be given sufficient time to look for another job. She was given until May 15, 1999. However, on
April 20, 1999, she received a letter from Ruben C. Tobias terminating her employment with the
Bank.

Consequently, Cabansag filed before the LA a complaint for illegal dismissal, to which the
LA ruled her favor. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LAs decision.CA ruled that even though
Cabansag secured an employment pass from the Singapore Ministry of Employment, she however
did not waive Philippine labor lawsor the local jurisdiction over her complain for illegal
dismissal and that petitioner failed to establish a just cause for her dismissal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the arbitration branch of the NLRC in the National Capital Region has jurisdiction
over the instant controversy.

SC Ruling:

Yes. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is specified in Article 217 of the Labor Code as
follows:

"ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided
under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision
without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
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1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving
wage, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the
legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all
other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount of exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless
of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor
Arbiters.

More specifically, Section 10 of RA 8042 reads in part:

"SECTION 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint,
the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary
and other forms of damages.

Based on the foregoing provisions, labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving
all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers (OFW).15

We are not unmindful of the fact that respondent was directly hired, while on a tourist status in
Singapore, by the PNB branch in that city state. Prior to employing respondent, petitioner had to
obtain an employment pass for her from the Singapore Ministry of Manpower. Securing the pass
was a regulatory requirement pursuant to the immigration regulations of that country.

Similarly, the Philippine government requires non-Filipinos working in the country to first obtain
a local work permit in order to be legally employed here. That permit, however, does not
automatically mean that the non-citizen is thereby bound by local laws only, as averred by
petitioner. It does not at all imply a waiver of ones national laws on labor. Absent any clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, such permit simply means that its holder has a legal status as
a worker in the issuing country.

Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for and secured an Overseas Employment
Certificate from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy in Singapore. The Certificate, issued on
March 8, 1999, declared her a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Under Philippine law, this
document authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and
processes under our statutes. Thus, even assuming arguendo that she was considered at the start
of her employment as a "direct hire" governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and
Page 3 of 60
customs prevailing in Singapore, she subsequently became a contract worker or an OFW who was
covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. At the time her
employment was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment Certificate.

Moreover, petitioner admits that it is a Philippine corporation doing business through a branch
office in Singapore. Significantly, respondents employment by the Singapore branch office had to
be approved by Benjamin P. Palma Gil, the president of the bank whose principal offices were in
Manila. This circumstance militates against petitioners contention that respondent was "locally
hired"; and totally "governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and customs" of
Singapore, not of the Philippines. Instead, with more reason does this fact reinforce the
presumption that respondent falls under the legal definition of migrant worker, in this case one
deployed in Singapore.

Under the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" (RA 8042), a migrant
worker "refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a
remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used
interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker."Undeniably, respondent was employed by
petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. Admittedly, she is a Filipino and not a legal resident of
that state. She thus falls within the category of "migrant worker" or "overseas Filipino worker."

Hence, petitioner cannot escape the application of Philippine laws or the jurisdiction of the NLRC
and the labor arbiter.

II.B.2

Rule II, Sec. 1 (pp)- Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by R.A. 10022

Art. 13, Labor Code

II.B.3

POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-
Based Overseas Workers [February 4, 2002]

POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers
[May 23, 2003]

Page 4 of 60
II.C.1

Arts. 38, 34, 39, Labor Code

Sec. 5, R.A. 10022

C.F. Sharp Crew Management v. Espanol, G.R. No. 155903, September 14, 2007
ALBERT

Doctrine:

Prior to approval of the transfer of accreditation, no recruitment or deployment may be

made by the principal by itself or through the would-be transferee manning agency, or by
the latter, as this would constitute illegal recruitment by a non-holder of authority under
Sec. 6, R.A. 8042 in relation to Article 13(b) and (f) and Article 16 of the Labor Code as
amended; Rule II(jj), Book I, and Sec. 1 and 6, Rule 1, Book III, POEA Rules and Regulations
Governing Overseas Employment.

Facts:

In 1991, Louis Cruise Lines (LCL), a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of Cyprus, entered into a Crewing Agreement with Papadopolous Shipping, Ltd.
(PAPASHIP). PAPASHIP in turn appointed private respondent Rizal International Shipping
Services (Rizal) as manning agency in the Philippines, recruiting Filipino seamen for LCLs vessel.

On October 3, 1996, LCL terminated the Crewing Agreement with PAPASHIP to take effect on
December 31, 1996. It then appointed C.F. Sharp as crewing agent in the Philippines. C.F. Sharp
requested for accreditation as the new manning agency of LCL with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), but Rizal objected on the ground that its accreditation still
existed and would only expire on December 31, 1996.

Pending approval of the accreditation, Theodoros Savva and Adrias Tjiakouris of LCL arrived in
the Philippines and conducted a series of interviews for seafarers at C.F. Sharps office. Rizal
reported LCLs recruitment activities to the POEA on December 9, 1996, and requested an ocular
inspection of C.F. Sharps premises.

Page 5 of 60
On December 17, 1996, POEA representatives conducted an inspection and found Savva and
Tjiakouris at C.F. Sharp interviewing and recruiting hotel staffs, cooks, and chefs for M/V Cyprus,
with scheduled deployment in January 1997. The Inspection Report signed by Corazon Aquino of
the POEA and countersigned by Mr. Reynaldo Banawis of C.F. Sharp was thereafter submitted to
the POEA.

On January 2, 1997, Rizal filed a complaint for illegal recruitment, cancellation or revocation of
license, and blacklisting against LCL and C.F. Sharp with the POEA, docketed as POEA Case No. RV-
97-01-004. Then, on January 31, 1997, Rizal filed a Supplemental Complaint adding violation of
Section 29 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, for designating and/or appointing agents,
representatives and employees, without prior approval from the POEA.

For its part, C.F. Sharp admitted that Savva and Tjiakouris conducted interviews at C.F.
Sharps office, but denied that they were for recruitment and selection purposes. According to C.F.
Sharp, the interviews were held for LCLs ex-crew members who had various complaints against
Rizal. It belittled the inspection report of the POEA inspection team claiming that it simply stated
that interviews and recruitment were undertaken, without reference to who were conducting the
interview and for what vessels. C.F. Sharp also averred that Rizal was guilty of forum shopping,
and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on this ground and for its lack of merit.

The POEA Administrator was not persuaded and found C.F. Sharp liable for illegal
recruitment. According to the Administrator, the inspection report of Ms. Aquino established that
Savva and Tjiakouris had conducted, and, at the time of the inspection, had been conducting
interviews, selection and hiring for LCL, without any authority from the POEA. The Administrator
also held that C.F. Sharp violated Section 29 of the Labor Code when it designated officers and
agents without prior approval of the POEA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not C.F. Sharp is liable for illegal recruitment.

Ruling:

Yes. C.F. Sharp is liable for illegal recruitment.

Undoubtedly, in December 1996, LCL had no approved POEA license to recruit. C.F. Sharps
accreditation as LCLs new manning agency was still pending approval at that time. Yet Savva and
Tjiakouris, along with C.F. Sharp, entertained applicants for LCLs vessels, and conducted
preparatory interviews.

Page 6 of 60
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:

any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement.

On the basis of this definition and contrary to what C.F. Sharp wants to portray - the conduct of
preparatory interviews is a recruitment activity.

The fact that C.F. Sharp did not receive any payment during the interviews is of no moment. From
the language of Article 13(b), the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. Notably, it is thThe
fact that C.F. Sharp did not receive any payment during the interviews is of no moment. From the
language of Article 13(b), the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. Notably, it is the lack
of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of payment, that renders the recruitment activity
of LCL unlawful.

C.F. Sharps claim that the interviews were not for selection and recruitment purposes does not
impress.

The petitioner-appellant (C.F. Sharp) must be reminded that prior to approval of the transfer of
accreditation, no recruitment or deployment may be made by the principal by itself or through the
would-be transferee manning agency, or by the latter, as this would constitute illegal recruitment
by a non-holder of authority under Sec. 6, R.A. 8042 in relation to Article 13(b) and (f) and Article
16 of the Labor Code as amended; Rule II(jj), Book I, and Sec. 1 and 6, Rule 1, Book III, POEA Rules
and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment.

C.F. Sharp alleges that there is no need for a license to enable LCLs officers to conduct their
alleged activities of interviewing, selecting and hiring crewmen. Indeed, LCLs officers could have
conducted these activities without a license.

Such claim is without legal basis, as direct hiring by employers of Filipino workers for
overseas employment is banned; they can only do so through, among others, licensed private
recruitment and shipping/mining agencies (Art. 18, Labor Code as amended; Sec. 1, Rule 1, Book
II, POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment).

Page 7 of 60
 People of the Philippines v. Saulo, G.R. No. 125903, November 15, 2000 ELERLENNE
Doctrine:

The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the
Labor Code and penalized under Art. 39 of the same Code, are as follows:

(1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under
Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit
and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and
(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.

The Labor Code states that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement. Corrolarily, a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any person, corporation or
entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and
placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended,
revoked, or canceled by the POEA or the Secretary. It also bears stressing that agents or
representatives appointed by a licensee or a holder of authority but whose appointments
are not previously authorized by the POEA fall within the meaning of the term nonlicensee
or nonholder of authority. Thus, any person, whether natural or juridical, that engages in
recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority shall be penalized under
Art. 39 of the Labor Code.

Facts:

Romulo Saulo (Accused-Appellant), together with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz,
were charged with violation of Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code for illegal recruitment in large
scale.

The material facts are as follows:

Benny Maligaya, having learned from a relative of accused-appellant that the latter was recruiting
workers for Taiwan, went to accused-appellants house, together with Angeles Javier and Amelia
de la Cruz, in order to discuss her chances for overseas employment. During that meeting,
accused-appellant told Maligaya that she would be able to leave for Taiwan as a factory worker
once she gave accused-appellant the fees for the processing of her documents. Sometime in May,
1990, Maligaya also met with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz at their house in Baesa,
Quezon City and they assured her that they were authorized by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit workers for Taiwan. Maligaya paid
accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz the amount of P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a
receipt signed by accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz. Seeing that he had reneged on his
promise to send her to Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint against accused-appellant with the
POEA.

Page 8 of 60
Angeles Javier, a widow and relative by affinity of accused-appellant, was told by Ligaya,
accused-appellants wife, to apply for work abroad through accused-appellant. At a meeting in
accused-appellants Quezon City residence, Javier was told by accused-appellant that he could get
her a job in Taiwan as a factory worker and that she should give him P35,000.00 for purposes of
preparing Javiers passport. Javier gave an initial amount of P20,000.00 to accused- appellant, but
she did not ask for a receipt as she trusted him. As the overseas employment never materialized,
Javier was prompted to bring the matter before the POEA.[

Leodigario Maullon, upon the invitation of his neighbor Araceli Sanchez, went to
accused-appellants house in order to discuss his prospects for gaining employment abroad. As in
the case of Maligaya and Javier, accused-appellant assured Maullon that he could secure him a job
as a factory worker in Taiwan if he paid him P30,000.00 for the processing of his papers. Maullon
paid P7,900.00 to accused-appellants wife, who issued a receipt. Thereafter, Maullon paid an
additional amount of P6,800.00 in the presence of accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz, which
payment is also evidenced by a receipt. Finally, Maullon paid P15,700.00 to a certain Loreta
Tumalig, a friend of accused- appellant, as shown by a receipt dated September 14, 1990. Again,
accused-appellant failed to deliver on the promised employment. Maullon thus filed a complaint
with the POEA.

In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was also applying with Amelia de la Cruz for
overseas employment. He asserts that it was for this reason that he met all three complainants as
they all went together to Amelia de la Cruz house in order to follow up their applications.
Accused-appellant flatly denied that he was an overseas employment recruiter or that he was
working as an agent for one. He also denied having received any money from any of the
complainants or having signed any of the receipts introduced by the prosecution in evidence. It is
accused-appellants contention that the complainants were prevailed upon by accused-appellants
mother-in-law, with whom he had a misunderstanding, to file the present cases against him.

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of three counts of estafa and of illegal recruitment in
large scale.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.

Ruling:

Yes. The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the
Labor Code and penalized under Art. 39 of the same Code, are as follows:

(1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under Article 13
(b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and
deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and
Page 9 of 60
(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.
Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

After a careful and circumspect review of the records, the Court finds that the trial court was
justified in holding that accused-appellant was engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement
activities. The prosecution clearly established that accused-appellant promised the three
complainants - Benny Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon employment in Taiwan as
factory workers and that he asked them for money in order to process their papers and procure
their passports. Relying completely upon such representations, complainants entrusted their
hard-earned money to accused-appellant in exchange for what they would later discover to be a
vain hope of obtaining employment abroad. It is not disputed that accused-appellant is not
authorized nor licensed by the Department of Labor and Employment to engage in recruitment
and placement activities. The absence of the necessary license or authority renders all of
accused-appellants recruitment activities criminal.

Moreover, The fact that accused-appellant did not sign all the receipts issued to complainants does
not weaken the case of the prosecution. A person charged with illegal recruitment may be
convicted on the strength of the testimonies of the complainants, if found to be credible and
convincing. The absence of receipts to evidence payment does not warrant an acquittal of the
accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions cause.

Accused-appellant contends that he could not have committed the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale since Nancy Avelino, a labor and employment officer at the POEA, testified that licenses
for recruitment and placement are issued only to corporations and not to natural persons. This
argument is specious and illogical. The Labor Code states that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged
in recruitment and placement. Corrolarily, a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any person,
corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in
recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been
suspended, revoked, or canceled by the POEA or the Secretary. It also bears stressing that agents
or representatives appointed by a licensee or a holder of authority but whose appointments are
not previously authorized by the POEA fall within the meaning of the term nonlicensee or
nonholder of authority. Thus, any person, whether natural or juridical, that engages in recruitment
activities without the necessary license or authority shall be penalized under Art. 39 of the Labor
Code.

Page 10 of 60
 People of the Philippines v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 124439, February 5, 2004 EVY

DOCTRINE:

Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any
activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Art.
13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor
Code.

The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the two elements
concur, with the addition of a third element: the recruiter committed the same
against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

FACTS:

On April 18, 1994, Rosemarie Tugade went to the house of one Celia Bautista, a recruiter-agent
of the accused, at Brgy. Bulala, Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Celia told Rosemarie that she had to submit the
following requirements for her application to work in Dubai as a domestic helper: P4,000.00 as
placement fee, P1,200.00 for passport, P850.00 for medical, six (6) 2x2 pictures and her original
birth certificate.

The next day, Rosemarie, together with recruiter-agent Celia Bautista and fellow applicant
Evelyn Ramos, traveled to Manila to the house of one Esther Gamilde, another of the accuseds
recruiter-agents. There, Rosemarie and Evelyn filled out their bio-data forms. The two then
underwent a medical examination before having their whole-body picture taken. Esther told them
that they would know the results of their application from Celia.

Two weeks later, Celia told Rosemarie that her application for Dubai was already approved and
that she will be receiving $150.00-dollars per month. For the first 3 months, however, there will
be salary deductions.

On August 27, 1994, Rosemarie and Evelyn, along with Celia and Esther, went to the accuseds
office at Sarifudin Manpower and General Services at EDSA Extension, Pasay City. The accused told
Rosemarie that she needed to pay P2,000.00 more. The accused said she had received all of
Rosemaries documents and the money paid to Celia. Trusting in Celia, Rosemarie did not demand
a receipt from the accused.

Private complainant Evelyn Ramos was with Rosemarie when she went to Celia Bautistas house
on April 19, 1994. Celia told Evelyn that for P4,000.00 she could leave for Dubai to work as a
domestic helper. Like Rosemarie, Evelyn gave all her documents and paid the fees to Celia, who in
turn handed them to Esther Gamilde in Tondo. On June 10, 1994, Ramos gave Bautista P8,000.00,
which was also turned over to Gamilde.

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On August 22, 1994, Celia told Evelyn that she only had to wait one more week before she left for
Dubai. On August 27, 1994, Esther brought Evelyn to the accuseds office, where the accused asked
for an additional P2,000.00 as processing fee for the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA). Evelyn paid the amount on August 31, 1994, including a terminal fee of P500.00. Like
Rosemarie, Evelyn was not able to leave the country despite the accuseds promises.

Another complainant, Rosalyn Sumayo, also applied for overseas job placement as a domestic
helper in Dubai. Her experience was more agonizing. In her case, it was one Marilyn Garcia who
assisted Rosalyn. She submitted a copy of her birth certificate, 6 copies of 2 x 2 pictures, 2 copies
of her whole-body picture, passport, and medical certificate. Marilyn also asked Rosalyn to pay: a
processing fee of P7,500.00, P2,620.00 as full tax, P500.00 as terminal fee, and P3,000.00 as
service charge.

All the documents and money given by Rosalyn to Marilyn were subsequently remitted to the
accused at her office on June 28, 1994. The accused told Rosalyn that she would be leaving
anytime, but after three months, Rosalyns departure did not push through.

Despite the setback, the accused kept assuring Rosalyn that she would still be able to leave. One
time, the accused brought her to the airport and instructed her to hide in the airport
restroom. After fifteen minutes, the accused told her that they had to leave the airport
because mahigpit sa immigration. On another occasion, the accused directed Rosalyn to hide
inside the Kayumanggi Restaurant for 15 minutes. Nothing happened after, though, and they went
home.

On November 14, 1994, Rosalyn was again at the airport. The accused warned her, though, that if
the Immigration Officer insisted on seeing her papers, it would be better for her to leave. As
directed, she left the airport when she was asked to produce her documents.

Exasperated, Rosalyn went to the accuseds house and demanded the return of her money and her
documents. Instead of acceding to Rosalyns demands, the accused shouted at her and warned her
that she had to pay a cancellation fee of $300.00. Rosalyn was not able to give the amount so she
stayed with the accused, who assured her that she would still be able to leave the country and that
she would receive a monthly salary of $150 to $200. These promises were never fulfilled. Rosalyn
thus went to the POEA, where POEA Administrator Felicisimo Joson, Jr. informed her that the
accused did not have a license to recruit.

Generosa Asuncion suffered the same fate as her co-applicants. In August 1994, she applied for
overseas job placement with one Linda Rabaino. Generosa submitted her passport, medical
certificate, clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), birth certificate, bio-data
and pictures. She also paid P15,000.00 in two installments on September 9 and 12, 1994,40 which
payments were not receipted.

Linda told Generosa she would be leaving on September 13, 1994. However, she was not able to
leave because, according to Linda, at 25, Generosa was under-aged. Linda then referred Generosa
to the accused in the latters office, where Linda turned over Generosas documents as well as the
P15,000 00 to the accused. The accused promised that Linda would be able to leave, but her
Page 12 of 60
departure never took place.44 When Generosa demanded the return of her money and her
documents, the accused told her that she had to pay a cancellation fee of $600.00. Stunned, Linda
just opted to await the further outcome of her application.46 Her waiting was all for naught.

With the promises of jobs abroad unfulfilled, complainants decided to verify if the accused was a
licensed recruiter. Upon learning from the POEA that she was not so licensed, they proceeded to
the Philippine Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) to execute their respective affidavits.

SPO4 Johnny Marqueta investigated the womens complaint. He confirmed with the POEA that the
accused was not licensed or authorized to recruit overseas contract workers. The four
complainants also informed him that the accused wanted to meet with the group on January 26,
1995.50 SPO4 Marqueta thus had their money, totaling P2,000.00, marked at the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) Forensic Section for their entrapment operation.

On January 26, 1995, the accused met with the four complainants at Jollibee, Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City. As soon as she finished counting the marked money and wrapping it in
Jollibee napkins, the accused was arrested.

In her defense, the accused claimed that as an employee of a duly licensed agency who was
tasked to recruit and offer job placements abroad, she could not be held liable for illegal
recruitment. She admitted that she had no authority to recruit in her personal capacity, but that
her authority emanated from a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and a Certification issued by a
licensed agency.

ISSUE:

WON appellant is guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale

HELD:

YES

Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the offender has
no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity within the
meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Art. 13(b), or any of the prohibited
practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code.

Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" as "any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons, shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."

Page 13 of 60
The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the two elements concur, with
the addition of a third element: the recruiter committed the same against three or more
persons, individually or as a group.

Appellant argues that as a representative of a duly licensed recruitment agency, she cannot be
held guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. We disagree.

Section 11, Rule II, Book II of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment requires
the prior approval of the POEA of the appointment of representatives or agents xxx

Section 1, Rule X of the same Book, in turn, provides that "recruitment and placement activities of
agents or representatives appointed by a licensee, whose appointments were not authorized by
the Administration shall likewise constitute illegal recruitment."

The Certification from the POEA that it "has not received nor acknowledged the representation of
Ms. Gutierrez" establishes that the appointment of appellant by Serafudin as a representative or
agent was not authorized by the POEA. It may be true that the POEA received from Serafudin a
revocation of appellant's appointment, but still is of no consequence since Serafudin in the first
place did not submit her appointment to the POEA, and so the POEA has nothing to approve.

Appellant cannot escape liability by claiming that she was not aware that before working
for her employer in the recruitment agency, she should first be registered with the
POEA. Illegal recruitment in large scale is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Good faith is
not a defense.

That appellant engaged in recruitment and placement is beyond dispute. The complaining
witnesses categorically testified that the accused promised them on several occasions that
they would be leaving for work abroad. Appellant received complainants' money and
documents, a fact that the complainants themselves witnessed and which the accused
acknowledged when she returned the same to them after the filing of the case against her.
Appellant even brought complainant Rosalyn Sumayo to the airport three times, raising her
expectations, but leaving her hanging in mid-air. The accused even had the audacity to
demand cancellation fees from the complainants when they asked for a refund.

People of the Philippines v. Gallardo, G.R. Nos. 140067-71, August 29, 2002 FAITH
Doctrine:

Illegal recruitment is committed when it is shown that the accused-appellant gave the priva
te complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send complaina
nts abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order t

Page 14 of 60
 o be employed. To be engaged in the practice and placement, it is plain that there must at le
ast be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether l
ocally or abroad.

Facts:

Remedios Malapit and Nenita Maria Olivia Gallardo were charged with one (1) count of illegal recr
uitment committed in large-scale, three (3) counts of estafa, and one (1) count of simple illegal rec
ruitment before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3.

Only accused-appellant Remedios Malapit was brought to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Her co-
accused, Nenita Maria Olivia Gallardo, remained at large.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges. The five (5) cases were con
solidated and tried jointly.

Marie Purificacion Abenoja and Marilyn Mariano met accused-appellant at her beauty parlor in Lo
pez Building, Session Road, Baguio City. MARIE met accused-appellant sometime in January 1997 t
hrough her friend, Florence Bacoco. A month later, MARILYN was introduced to accused-appellant
by Grace Lanozo, a fellow nurse at the PMA Hospital.

MARIE claims that accused-appellant enticed her to apply for work as a caregiver in Canada. Accus
ed-appellant showed her a piece of paper containing a job order saying that Canada was in need of
ten (10) caregivers and some messengers. Accused-appellant also promised her that she will be re
ceiving a salary of CN$2,700.00 (Canadian Dollars) and will be able to leave for Canada in a month
s time. Heeding accused-appellants guaranty, Marie eventually applied for the overseas job opport
unity.

On June 6, 1997, accused-appellant introduced Marie to co-accused Nenita Maria Olivia-Gallardo i

n Tandang Sora, Quezon City. On the same day, Marie submitted herself to a physical examination
and personally handed to Gallardo a partial payment of P18,000.00, for which the latter issued a re
ceipt. Marie made another payment in the amount of P52,000.00, for which accused-appellant issu
ed a provisional receipt. This amount included the placement fee of her sister, Araceli Abenoja, wh
o became interested in the opportunity to work abroad. Accused-appellant issued to Marie the rec
eipt for Araceli in the amount of P35,000.00, signed by Gallardo.

Page 15 of 60
Three months lapsed without any news on Marie's deployment to Canada. Her sister, Araceli, had
already left for work abroad through the efforts of their other town-mate. The weekly follow-ups
made by Marie to accused-appellant pertaining to her application and that of Aracelis were to no a
vail. Accused-appellant just promised Marie that she will return her money. Realizing that she had
been hoodwinked, Marie decided to file a complaint against the accused-appellant and Gallardo wi
th the National Bureau of Investigation. She no longer verified the authority of both accused-appell
ant and Gallardo in recruiting workers overseas because she was told by Gallardo that she is a dire
ct recruiter.

MARILYN Mariano, on the other hand, was told by accused-appellant that she was recruiting nurse
s from Baguio City and was looking for one more applicant to complete the first batch to fly to Can
ada. After giving her all the information about the job opportunity in Canada, accused-appellant en
couraged her to meet Gallardo. Not long after, Grace Lanozo accompanied her to meet Gallardo at t
he latters house in Quezon City.

Gallardo required her to undergo a medical check-up, to complete her application papers within th
e soonest possible time and to prepare money to defray the expenses for her deployment to Canad
a. Upon the instruction of accused-appellant, Marilyn paid a total amount of P36,000.00 to Gallard
o, which was evidenced by a receipt. Of this amount, the P1,500.00 was for her medical check-up,
P20,000.00 for processing of papers and P15,000.00 for her visa.

Marilyn was further made to accomplish a form, prepared by both accused-appellant and Gallardo,
at the residence of accused-appellant in Baguio City. Thereafter, she was informed that the process
ing of her papers abroad shall commence within the next three months. She was also made to atte
nd a meeting conducted by both accused-appellant and Gallardo at the formers house in Baguio Cit
y, together with other interested applicants.

After three months of waiting with no forthcoming employment abroad, Marilyn and the other app
licants proceeded to the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, Regional Administrative Unit, o
f the Cordillera Administrative Region in Baguio City, where they learned that accused-appellant a
nd Gallardo were not authorized recruiters.[14] Marilyn confronted accused-appellant about this,
whereupon the latter assured her that it was a direct hiring scheme. Thereafter, Marilyn reported
accused-appellant and Gallardo to the NBI. [15]

Page 16 of 60
After trial on the merits, accused-appellant was found guilty of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale and Estafa on three (3) counts.

Issue:

Whether the court erred in convicting Accused-appellant because she did not commit any of the ac
tivities enumerated in the Labor Code on illegal recruitment.

SC Ruling:

NO

Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) essential elements concur:

(1) that the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully en
gage in the recruitment and placement of workers, and

(2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement def
ined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Co
de.

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:

Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring wor
kers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement.

In the case at bar, the first element is present. Nonette Legaspi-Villanueva, the Overall Supervisor
of the Regional Office of the POEA in Baguio City, testified that per records, neither accused-appell
ant nor Gallardo were licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment in the Ci
ty of Baguio or in any part of the Cordillera Region.

The second essential element is likewise present. Accused-appellant purported to have the ability

Page 17 of 60
to send Marie Purificacion Abenoja, Araceli Abenoja and Marilyn Mariano for employment abroad
through the help of her co-accused Gallardo, although without any authority or license to do so. Ac
cused-appellant was the one who persuaded them to apply for work as a caregiver in Canada by m
aking representations that there was a job market therefor. She was also the one who helped them
meet Gallardo in order to process their working papers and personally assisted Marie, Araceli and
Marilyn in the completion of the alleged requirements. Accused-appellant even provided her hous
e in Baguio City as venue for a meeting with other applicants that she and Gallardo conducted in co
nnection with the purported overseas employment in Canada. Accused-appellant, therefore, acted
as an indispensable participant and effective collaborator of co-accused Gallardo, who at one time
received placement fees on behalf of the latter from both Marie and Araceli Abenoja. The totality o
f the evidence shows that accused-appellant was engaged in the recruitment and placement of wor
kers for overseas employment under the above-quoted Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Hence, sh
e cannot now feign ignorance on the consequences of her unlawful acts.

Likewise untenable are accused-appellants claims that she did not represent herself as a licensed r
ecruiter, and that she merely helped complainants avail of the job opportunity. It is enough that sh
e gave the impression of having had the authority to recruit workers for deployment abroad. In fac
t, even without consideration for accused-appellants services, she will still be deemed as having en
gaged in recruitment activities, since it was sufficiently demonstrated that she promised overseas
employment to private complainants. Illegal recruitment is committed when it is shown that the a
ccused-appellant gave the private complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or
ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with thei
r money in order to be employed. To be engaged in the practice and placement, it is plain that ther
e must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter whet
her locally or abroad.

While accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment, we do not agree with the trial court that th
e same qualifies as large scale.

Accused-appellants conviction of the illegal recruitment in large scale was based on her recruitme
nt of Marie Purificacion Abenoja and Marilyn Mariano, private complainants in Criminal Case No. 1
5320-R, and Araceli Abenoja, private complainant in Criminal Case No. 15570-R. It was error for th
e trial court to consider the three private complainants in the two criminal cases when it convicted
accused-appellant of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. The conviction of illegal recruit
ment in large scale must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more

Page 18 of 60
persons, whether individually or as a group.

In sum, accused-appellant is only guilty of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment.

People of the Philippines v. Juego, G.R. No. 123162, October 13, 1998 MARCELO
DOCTRINE:

Article 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code defines recruitment as referring to

. . . any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or

procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.

Under Art. 38, par. (a), of the same Code, any recruitment activity including the prohibited
practices enumerated in Art. 34, becomes illegal when undertaken by non-licensees or non-
holders of authority.

Art. 38, par. (b), of the Labor Code provides that illegal recruitment is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. And
when so committed it is considered an offense involving economic sabotage punishable
under Art. 39, par. (a), of the same Code with life imprisonment and fine of one hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00).

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be
charge and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa under par. 2 (a), Art. 315,
of The Revised Penal Code, as the offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where
the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in
se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. 17 In other words, a
conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar punishment for offenses
punishable by other laws.
FACTS:

NENITA JUEGO and WILFREDO GAERLAN were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale by twenty-six (26) individual complainants.

Of the twenty-six (26) complainants, only six (6) 3 pursued the illegal recruitment case.

Page 19 of 60
Sometime in April 1992 Anastacio Magleo met Nenita. Nenita convinced him to apply as factory
worker in Taiwan with a salary of approximately $500.00 a month with free accommodation. For
this purpose, she persuaded him to give an initial payment for processing fee.

On 10 October 1992 Anastacio went to Nenita's office, AJ International Trade Link, where he gave
her an initial payment of P15,000.00. She issued a receipt 7 but signed the name of her husband
Abelardo Juego thereon with the excuse that he was out of town. She told Anastacio that she would
be able to send him to Taiwan that month but first he must pay the balance of the fee. She even
showed him certain job orders from Taiwan and a Block Visa.

Fernando Magalong went on 3 September 1992 to the AJ International Trade Link to apply for a
job. He conferred with Abelardo and Nenita, who told him there was a slot for him in Taiwan as a
contract worker. She required him to submit an NBI clearance, his passport and pictures, and to
pay P8,000.00. Fernando personally handed over the amount to her in the office. On 9 October
1992 he gave Wilfredo P1,115.00 for insurance as evidenced by a receipt of PHILAM Plans, Inc.
and P950.00 for medical examination. He was not however able to leave for Taiwan. Having failed
to get a refund, he filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation against Nenita and
Wilfredo.

Raul Romero was recruited in January 199. He and his companions were told by the Juegos that as
workers in Taiwan they would earn $700.00 per month and would depart in one (1) or three (3)
months' time. He was required to submit all the necessary papers for his overseas employment
and to pay a processing fee of P30,000.00. His payments which totalled P30,115.00 were
evidenced by receipts, 11 three (3) of which were signed by Wilfredo, one (1) by Abelardo, and one
(1) by Nenita. He and the other applicants waited for several months but were unable to leave. He
wanted to confront Nenita but could not locate her until he was informed of her arrest and
detention at the Western Police Headquarters.

Me: So, all in all, this is the same modus by the accused Nenita to all her complainants. She would
promise them that she can send them abroad to fill up several job openings. In the process she will
ask the complainants for money but it will end up for nothing.

ISSUE:

Whether the acts committed by Nenita of contracting or procuring workers abroad for a fee
constituted illegal dismissal?

SC Ruling:

YES!

Article 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code defines recruitment as referring to

Page 20 of 60
 . . . any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.

Under Art. 38, par. (a), of the same Code, any recruitment activity including the prohibited
practices enumerated in Art. 34, becomes illegal when undertaken by non-licensees or non-
holders of authority.

As stated by the trial court, based on People v. Naparan Jr., 15 illegal recruitment is committed
when these requisites concur: (a) that the offender has no valid license or authority required by
law to enable one to engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and, (b) that the offender
undertakes any activity within the meaning given to recruitment and placement by the pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code. The certification issued by the POEA clearly showed that appellant
did not possess the requisite license or authority. And despite the absence thereof she engaged in
recruitment activities as overwhelmingly substantiated by the prosecution witnesses

The complainants positively identified appellant as their recruiter for employment abroad,
bringing into play the same modus operandi for all. They were one in stating that appellant assured
them that there were jobs for them in Taiwan and inveigled them into paying processing or
placement fees. As against the hard evidence built by the prosecution, appellant's defense was a
mere denial which the trial court found to be weak; so does this Court. Appellant's attack is
ultimately directed against the credibility of the complainants, the best judge of which is the trial
court. In the matter of weighing the evidence of the prosecution vis-a-vis that of the defense
through an assessment of their respective merits, it is firmly settled that the findings of the trial
court are given great weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court, and may be
disregarded only where substantial errors have been committed or determinative facts have been
overlooked which otherwise would have dictated a different conclusion or verdict.

Appellant's arguments that if she really participated in the recruitment activities of her husband
she would have signed the receipts in her name and that her signature on a particular receipt was
not genuine are irrelevant since her precise role in the illegal recruitment has been adequately
demonstrated through other means. Moreover the prosecution could have dispensed with the
presentation of the receipts. This Court has ruled in several cases that the absence of receipts in a
case for illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the accused and is not fatal to the
case of the prosecution. As long as the witnesses positively show through their respective
testimonies that the accused is the one involved in the prohibited recruitment, he may be
convicted of the offense despite the lack of receipts

Art. 38, par. (b), of the Labor Code provides that illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. And when so
committed it is considered an offense involving economic sabotage punishable under Art. 39, par.
(a), of the same Code with life imprisonment and fine of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00). Appellant having originally recruited twenty-six (26) persons although only six
Page 21 of 60
(6) pursued their case without license or authority was properly convicted by the trial court in
Crim. Case No. 93-128140 of illegal recruitment in large scale and properly sentenced to life
imprisonment pursuant to Art. 39, par. (a) of the Labor Code. However, the trial court erroneously
omitted the penalty of fine which the law requires to be imposed in addition to the life sentence.
Thus, the correct penalty is life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00). In addition, appellant should be made to indemnify the complainants in the
amounts respectively paid by them.

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charge and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa under par. 2 (a), Art. 315, of The Revised
Penal Code, as the offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent
of the accused is crucial for conviction. 17 In other words, a conviction for offenses under the Labor
Code does not bar punishment for offenses punishable by other laws.

Rodolfo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 146964, August 10, 2006 IMEE

DOCTRINE:

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" as "[a]ny act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not."

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati for illegal recruitment
alleged to have been committed as follows:

Sometime in August and September 1984, accused-appellantapproached private complainants

Necitas Ferre and Narciso Corpus individually and invited them to apply for overseas employment
in Dubai. The accused-appellant being their neighbor, private complainants agreed and went to the
formers office. This office which bore the business name "Bayside Manpower Export Specialist"
was in a building situated at Bautista St. Buendia, Makati, Metro Manila. In that office, private
complainants gave certain amounts to appellant for processing and other fees. Ferre gave
P1,000.00 as processing fee (Exhibit A) and another P4,000.00 (Exhibit B). Likewise, Corpus gave
appellant P7,000.00 (Exhibit D). Appellant then told private complainants that they were
scheduled to leave for Dubai on September 8, 1984. However, private complainants and all the
other applicants were not able to depart on the said date as their employer allegedly did not
arrive. Thus, their departure was rescheduled to September 23, but the result was the same.
Suspecting that they were being hoodwinked, private complainants demanded of appellant to
return their money. Except for the refund of P1,000.00 to Ferre, appellant was not able to return
Page 22 of 60
private complainants money. Tired of excuses, private complainants filed the present case for
illegal recruitment against the accused-appellant.

The prosecutuon also presented Jose Valeriano, a Senior Overseas Employment Officer of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), who testified that accused-appellant was
neither licensed nor authorized by the then Ministry of Labor and Employment to recruit workers
for overseas employment.

Petitioners defense: it was the private complainants who asked her help in securing jobs abroad.
As a good neighbor and friend, she brought the private complainants to the Bayside Manpower
Export Specialist agency because she knew Florante Hinahon, 5 the owner of the said agency.
While accused-appellant admitted that she received money from the private complainants, she
was quick to point out that she received the same only in trust for delivery to the agency. She
denied being part of the agency either as an owner or employee thereof.

RTC Decision: convicted her of illegal recruitment which was affirmed by the CA.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner is guilty of illegal recruitment

SC RULING:

YES.
Art. 38 and 39 provides for the definition of illegal recruitment and its corresponding penalty.
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" as "[a]ny act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not."

Elements of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT:

The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, which must concur, are: (1) that the offender
has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement
of workers; and (2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment
and placement under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the
Labor Code. 13 If another element is present that the accused commits the act against three or
more persons, individually or as a group, it becomes an illegal recruitment in a large scale.

FIRST ELEMENT, Jose Valeriano, Senior Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, testified that the records of the POEA do not show that petitioner is
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.

We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory declarations and statements, greater weight
must be given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the
Page 23 of 60
defendant. Article 38 (a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment is an offense that is essentially
committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. A non-licensee means any person,
corporation or entity to which the labor secretary has not issued a valid license or authority to
engage in recruitment and placement; or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked
or cancelled by the POEA or the labor secretary. A license authorizes a person or an entity to
operate a private employment agency, while authority is given to those engaged in recruitment and
placement activities.

SECOND ELEMENT, The act of referral, which is included in recruitment, 18 is "the act of passing
along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected
applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau." 19 Petitioners
admission that she brought private complainants to the agency whose owner she knows and her
acceptance of fees including those for processing betrays her guilt.

That petitioner issued provisional receipts indicating that the amounts she received from the
private complainants were turned over to Luzviminda Marcos and Florante Hinahon does not free
her from liability. For the act of recruitment may be "for profit or not." It is sufficient that the
accused "promises or offers for a fee employment" to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.

Sec. 13(b) of P.D. 442 [The Labor Code] does not require that the recruiter receives and keeps the
placement money for himself or herself. For as long as a person who has no license to engage in
recruitment of workers for overseas employment offers for a fee an employment to two or more
persons, then he or she is guilty of illegal recruitment.

WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.

Lapasaran v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179907, February 12, 2009 KIRBY
Doctrine:

Illegal recruitment is committed when it is shown that petitioner gave the complainant the
distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send the complainant abroad for
work, such that the latter was convinced to part with his money in order to be employed.
To be engaged in the practice of recruitment and placement, it is plain that there must, at
least, be a promise or an offer of employment from the person posing as a recruiter
whether locally or abroad. Petitioners misrepresentations concerning her purported
power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and the collection from Menardo
of various amounts, clearly indicate acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.

Facts:

Private complainant Menardo Villarin (Menardo) and his sister Vilma Villarin (Vilma) met
petitioner Arlene N. Lapasaran, who worked at Silver Jet Travel Tours Agency. For a fee of
P85,000.00, petitioner undertook the processing of the papers necessary for the deployment
Page 24 of 60
(under a tourist visa) and employment of Menardo in South Korea. Petitioner informed Menardo
that he would be employed as "factory worker," which was, subsequently, changed to "bakery
worker." Thereafter, Menardo paid the said fee in installments. Menardo left for South Korea .
Unfortunately, he was incarcerated by South Korean immigration authorities and was
immediately deported to the Philippines because the travel documents issued to him by the
petitioner were fake. He immediately contacted petitioner and informed her of what happened.
Thereupon, petitioner promised to send him back to South Korea, but the promise was never
fulfilled. Consequently, Menardo and his sister Vilma demanded the return of the money they paid,
but petitioner refused and even said, "Magkorte na lang tayo." It was later found out that
petitioner was no longer connected with Silver Jet.

Hence, the charge for illegal recruitment.

In her defense, petitioner testified that she owned a travel agency named A&B Travel and Tours
General Services, engaged in the business of visa assistance and ticketing. She admitted
transacting with the Villarins, but committed only to securing a tourist visa and a two-way
airplane ticket for Menardo, for which she received P70,000.00 as payment.

Issue:
Won petitioner is guilty of illegal recruitment.

Ruling:

YES.
Petitioner was charged with illegal recruitment, defined and penalized by the Labor Code as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042. Illegal recruitment is committed when it is shown that
petitioner gave the complainant the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send
the complainant abroad for work, such that the latter was convinced to part with his money in
order to be employed. To be engaged in the practice of recruitment and placement, it is plain that
there must, at least, be a promise or an offer of employment from the person posing as a recruiter
whether locally or abroad. Petitioners misrepresentations concerning her purported power and
authority to recruit for overseas employment, and the collection from Menardo of various
amounts, clearly indicate acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.

Petitioners claim that she did not represent herself as a licensed recruiter, but that she merely
tried to help the complainants secure a tourist visa could not make her less guilty of illegal
recruitment, it being enough that she gave the impression of having had the authority to recruit
workers for deployment abroad.

Page 25 of 60
 People of the Philippines v. Jamilosa, G.R. No. 169076, January 23, 2007 MEL
Doctrine:

To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to prove three (3)
essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under
Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused did
not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers; and (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons individually
or as a group. As gleaned from the collective testimonies of the complaining witnesses
which the trial court and the appellate court found to be credible and deserving of full
probative weight, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the
guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged. Indeed, the findings of the
trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA, are conclusive on this Court absent evidence that
the tribunals ignored, misunderstood, or misapplied substantial fact or other circumstance.

The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document signed by
appellant where he acknowledged to have received money and liquor does not free him
from criminal liability. Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as
consideration for the services of appellant, the latter is considered as being engaged in
recruitment activities.

FACTS:

In this case, Joseph Jamilosa was convicted of large scale illegal recruitment. On arraignment, the
appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Prosecutions evidence: Witness Imelda D. Bamba testified that she met the appellant in
Cubao, Quezon City on board an aircon bus. She was on her way to Shoemart (SM), North
EDSA, Quezon City where she was working as a company nurse. The appellant was seated
beside her and introduced himself as a recruiter of workers for employment abroad. The
appellant told her that his sister is a head nurse in a nursing home in Los Angeles,
California, USA. He further averred that he has connections with the US Embassy, being a
US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent on official mission in the Philippines for one
month. According to the appellant, she has to pay the amount of US$300.00 intended for
the US consul. The appellant gave his pager number and instructed her to contact him if she
is interested to apply for a nursing job abroad.

Page 26 of 60
The appellant fetched her at her office. They then went to her house where she gave him
the photocopies of her transcript of records, diploma, Professional Regulatory Commission
(PRC) license and other credentials. On January 28 or 29, 1996, she handed to the appellant
the amount of US$300.00 at the McDonalds outlet in North EDSA, Quezon City, and the
latter showed to her a photocopy of her supposed US visa. The appellant likewise got
several pieces of jewelry which she was then selling and assured her that he would sell the
same at the US embassy. However, the appellant did not issue a receipt for the said money
and jewelry.

The appellant promised to see her and some of his other recruits before their scheduled
departure to hand to them their visas and passports; however, the appellant who was
supposed to be with them in the flight failed to show up. Instead, the appellant called and
informed her that he failed to give the passport and US visa because he had to go to the
province because his wife died. She and her companions were not able to leave for
the United States. They went to the supposed residence of the appellant to verify, but
nobody knew him or his whereabouts. They tried to contact him at the hotel where he
temporarily resided, but to no avail. They also inquired from the US embassy and found out
that there was no such person connected with the said office. Thus, she decided to file a
complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Appellants evidence: Accused JOSEPH JAMILOSA testified on direct examination that he

got acquainted with Imelda Bamba inside an aircon bus bound for Caloocan City when the
latter borrowed his cellular phone to call her office at Shoe Mart (SM), North Edsa, Quezon
City. He never told Bamba that he could get her a job in Los Angeles, California, USA, the
truth being that she wanted to leave SM as company nurse because she was having a
problem thereat. Bamba called him up several times, seeking advice from him if Los
Angeles, California is a good place to work as a nurse. He started courting Bamba and they
went out dating until the latter became his girlfriend. He met Geraldine Lagman and Alma
Singh at the Shoe Mart (SM), North Edsa, Quezon City thru Imelda Bamba. As complainants
were all seeking advice on how they could apply for jobs abroad, lest he be charged as a
recruiter, he made Imelda Bamba, Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh sign separate
certifications on January 17, 1996 (Exh. 2), January 22, 1996 (Exh. 4), and February 19,
1996 (Exh. 3), respectively, all to the effect that he never recruited them and no money was
involved. Bamba filed an Illegal Recruitment case against him because they quarreled and
separated. He came to know for the first time that charges were filed against him in
September 1996 when a preliminary investigation was conducted by Fiscal Daosos of the
Department of Justice.

RTC: accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Joseph Jamilosa is guilty of large scale illegal recruitment.

Page 27 of 60
RULING:

Yes.

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement as follows:

(b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,

contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:

SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee
or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree
No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:
Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so
engaged. x x x

Any recruitment activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of contracts shall be

deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.

To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to prove three (3)
essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article
13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused did not have the
license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3)
accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group. As gleaned
from the collective testimonies of the complaining witnesses which the trial court and the
appellate court found to be credible and deserving of full probative weight, the prosecution
mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged. Indeed, the findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA,

Page 28 of 60
are conclusive on this Court absent evidence that the tribunals ignored, misunderstood, or
misapplied substantial fact or other circumstance.

The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document signed by appellant
where he acknowledged to have received money and liquor does not free him from criminal
liability. Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as consideration for the services of
appellant, the latter is considered as being engaged in recruitment activities.

It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code that the act of
recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee
employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. As the Court held in People v. Sagaydo:

Such is the case before us. The complainants parted with their money upon the
prodding and enticement of accused-appellant on the false pretense that she had the
capacity to deploy them for employment abroad. In the end, complainants were
neither able to leave for work abroad nor get their money back.

The fact that private complainants Rogelio Tibeb and Jessie Bolinao failed to
produce receipts as proof of their payment to accused-appellant does not free the
latter from liability.The absence of receipts cannot defeat a criminal prosecution for
illegal recruitment. As long as the witnesses can positively show through their
respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in prohibited
recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense despite the absence of receipts.

II.C.2

Art. 13, Labor Code

Rule II, Sec. 1 (w), Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by R.A. 10022

Rule II, Sec. 1 (b), Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by R.A. 10022

Page 29 of 60
II.C.3.a

Romero v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 171644, November 23, 2011 LOURDES
DOCTRINE:

The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity within
the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.
Under the first element, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is any person,
corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in
recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has
been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary.1[6] Clearly, the
creation of the POEA did not divest the Secretary of Labor of his/her jurisdiction over
recruitment and placement of activities. The governing rule is still Article 352[7] of the
Labor Code.
In illegal recruitment, mere failure of the complainant to present written receipts for
money paid for acts constituting recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution,
provided the payment can be proved by clear and convincing testimonies of credible
witnesses.

FACTS:

Private respondent Romulo Padlan (Romulo) was a former classmate of petitioner in

college. Sometime in September 2000 Romulo went to petitioner's stall (wedding gown rentals) to
inquire about securing a job in Israel. Convinced by petitioner's words of encouragement and
inspired by the potential salary of US$700.00 to US$1,200.00 a month, Romulo asked petitioner
the amount of money required in order for him to be able to go to Israel. Petitioner informed him
that as soon as he could give her US$3,600.00, his papers would be immediately processed. When
he was able to raise the amount, Romulo went back to petitioner and handed her the money.
Petitioner contacted Jonney Erez Mokra who instructed Romulo to attend a briefing at his
(Jonney's) house in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Romulo was able to leave for Israel on October 26,
2000 and was able to secure a job with a monthly salary of US$650.00. Unfortunately, after two
and a half months, he was caught by Israel's immigration police and detained for 25 days. He was
subsequently deported because he did not possess a working visa. On his return, Romulo
demanded from petitioner the return of his money, but the latter refused and failed to do so.

Page 30 of 60
 On the other hand, private respondent Arturo Siapno is petitioner's nephew. Sometime in
August 2000, he went to petitioner's stall. He was convinced by the petitioner that if he could give
her US$3,600.00 for the processing of his papers, he could leave the country within 1 to 2 weeks
for a job placement in Israel. Petitioner processed Arturo's papers and contacted Jonney Erez
Mokra. Jonney instructed Arturo to attend a briefing in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Afterwards,
Arturo left for Israel sometime in September 2000. He was able to work and receive US$800.00
salary per month. After three months of stay in Israel, he was caught by the immigration officials,
incarcerated for ten days and was eventually deported. After arriving in the country, Arturo
immediately sought the petitioner. Petitioner promised him that she would send him back to
Israel, which did not happen.

Arturo, after learning that Romulo suffered the same fate, checked with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) Dagupan District Office whether petitioner, Teresita D. Visperas
and Jonney Erez Mokra had any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas
employment. Finding that petitioner and the others were not authorized to recruit for overseas
employment, Arturo and Romulo filed a complaint against petitioner, Teresita and Jonney before
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Consequently, an Information dated June 18, 2001 was
filed against petitioner and Jonney Erez Mokra for the crime of Illegal Recruitment.

The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision
of the RTC.

ISSUE:

WON the accused is liable for illegal recruitment.

SC RULING:

YES.

Illegal recruitment is defined in Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, as follows:

ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-
holders of authority, shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The
[Department] of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints
under this Article.

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall

be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.

Page 31 of 60
 Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme
defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed
in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a
group.

Article 13 (b) of the same Code defines, recruitment and placement as: any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee,
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely:
(1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity
within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.3

In disputing the absence of the first element, petitioner offers her opinion that the CA erred
in affirming the trial court's reliance on a mere certification from the DOLE Dagupan District Office
that she does not have the necessary licence to recruit workers for abroad. She claims that the
prosecution committed a procedural lapse in not procuring a certification from the agency
primarily involved, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). The said
argument, however, is flawed.

Under the first element, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is any person,

corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in
recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been
suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary.4[6] Clearly, the creation of the

Page 32 of 60
POEA did not divest the Secretary of Labor of his/her jurisdiction over recruitment and placement
of activities.

It is apparent that petitioner was able to convince the private respondents to apply
for work in Israel after parting with their money in exchange for the services she would
render. The said act of the petitioner, without a doubt, falls within the meaning of
recruitment and placement as defined in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code.

As to petitioner's contention that the testimony of Arturo Siapno that the latter paid a
certain amount of money to the former must not be given any credence due to the absence of any
receipt or any other documentary evidence proving such, the same is without any merit. In People
v. Alvarez,5[16] this Court ruled that in illegal recruitment cases, the failure to present receipts
for money that was paid in connection with the recruitment process will not affect the
strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution as long as the payment can be
proved through clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses. It was discussed
that:

In illegal recruitment, mere failure of the complainant to present written receipts

for money paid for acts constituting recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution,
provided the payment can be proved by clear and convincing testimonies of credible
witnesses.

People of the Philippines v. Bacos, G.R. No. 178774, December 8, 2010 MAE CLAIRE
Doctrine:

Absence of a consideration or misrepresentations employed is not material in the

prosecution for illegal recruitment. By its very definition, illegal recruitment is deemed
committed by the mere act of promising employment without a license or authority and
whether for profit or not.

SC previously held that the time when the misrepresentation was made, whether prior or
simultaneous to the delivery of the money of the complainants, is only material in the crime
of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and not in the
crime of illegal recruitment.

Page 33 of 60
Facts:

Together with her common law husband Efren Dimayuga, the appellant was charged of
illegal recruitment in large scale before the RTC. They pleaded not guilty but Dimayuga died
during the pendency of the trial.

Of the ten (10) complainants, only three (3) testified that they met Dimayuga and the
appellant at their house. Dimayuga represented that he was a recruiter who could send them to
work in Japan and appellant assured them that they (she and Dimayuga) could send them abroad.
Believing that Dimayuga was a legitimate recruiter, the complainants parted with their money to
be used as placement and processing fees. Dimayuga issued receipts for the money received.

The complainants were not deployed within the period promised by Dimayuga thus they
filed complaints for illegal recruitment against Dimayuga and the appellant before the authorities.

The prosecution presented documentary evidence consisting of two (2) Certifications from
the POEA stating that Efren Dimayuga, Marlyn P. Bacos and Marlyn Reyes y Bacos are not
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.

The appellant testified that she had no participation in the transactions, denied having
received any money from the complainants, and likewise denied signing any receipt for payments
made. She claimed that she only served snacks whenever they came to where she and Dimayuga
then resided.

RTC ruled that sufficient evidence existed establishing that the two accused conspired in
engaging in illegal recruitment activities.

CA ruled that all the elements of illegal recruitment, as defined under Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code in relation to Article 34 of the same Code, were sufficiently proven.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not appellant is a principal in the crime charged absent any direct and clear
evidence of her active participation in the illegal recruitment. In the alternative, whether or not
the appellant is only liable as an accomplice.

SC Ruling:

Appellant is liable as a principal.

Together with Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995), the law governing illegal recruitment is the Labor Code which defines recruitment and
placement as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for

Page 34 of 60
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. The same Code also defines and
punishes Illegal recruitment.

Despite the lack of license or authority to engage in recruitment, the appellant admitted
that she gave the complainants "assurances" that she and Dimayuga could deploy them for
employment in Japan. Also (a) her acceptance of the placement fee given by the complainants; (b)
the fact that she communicated to the complainants the date of their departure; and (c) her
information on how the balance of the placement fee should be paid all show that she was engaged
in illegal recruitment activities together with Dimayuga. Her liability under the circumstances
cannot be considered as that of a mere accomplice, but rather as a principal directly and actively
engaged in illegal recruitment activities.

Her argument that she did not derive any consideration from the transactions cannot serve
to exonerate her from the crime as absence of a consideration or misrepresentations employed by
the appellant is not material in the prosecution for illegal recruitment. By its very definition, illegal
recruitment is deemed committed by the mere act of promising employment without a license or
authority and whether for profit or not.

SC previously held that the time when the misrepresentation was made, whether prior or
simultaneous to the delivery of the money of the complainants, is only material in the crime of
estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and not in the crime of
illegal recruitment.

The illegal recruitment having been committed against three victims is illegal recruitment
in large scale, as provided under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code. Committed in large scale,
the illegal recruitment is deemed to constitute economic sabotage.

The penalty is life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00, pursuant to the first paragraph
of Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended. SC adds an award of legal interest with respect to the
complainants civil indemnity. The amounts of civil indemnity represent the amount of placement
fees that the complainants paid to Dimayuga and the appellant. The legal interest of 12% per
annum is imposed, reckoned from the filing of the information until the finality of the judgment,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.

People of the Philippines v. Gallo, G.R. No. 187730, June 29, 2010 MARGARET

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Gallo and co-accused Pacardo and Manta, with 9 others, were charged with
syndicated illegal recruitment and 18 counts of estafa committed against eighteen complainants,
including Dela Caza, Guantero and Sare. The present appeal concerns solely accused-appellants
conviction for syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and for estafa in
Criminal Case No. 02-206297. According to the prosecution, Dela Caza was introduced by
Panuncio to accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and
another Korean national at the office of MPM Agency located in Malate, Manila. Accused-appellant
Page 35 of 60
Gallo then introduced himself as a relative of Mardeolyn and informed Dela Caza that the agency
was able to send many workers abroad. Together with Pacardo and Manta, he also told Dela Caza
about the placement fee of PhP150,000 with a down payment of PhP45,000 and the balance to be
paid through salary deduction. With accused-appellants assurance that many workers have been
sent abroad, as well as the presence of the 2 Korean nationals and upon being shown the visas
procured for the deployed workers, Dela Caza was convinced to part with his money and paid the
agency. After 2 weeks, the said agency moved and changed their name. After 2 more months of
waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela Caza and the other applicants decided to take action. The first
attempt was unsuccessful because the agency again moved to another place. However, with the
help of the Office of Ambassador Seres and the Western Police District, they were able to locate the
new address at Carriedo, Manila. The agency explained that it had to move in order to separate
those who are applying as entertainers from those applying as factory workers. Accused-appellant
Gallo, together with Pacardo and Manta, were then arrested. For his defense, accused-appellant
denied having any part in the recruitment of Dela Caza. In fact, he testified that he also applied
with MPM Agency for deployment to Korea as a factory worker. RTC and CA convicted the
appellants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.

HELD:
Yes. To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the
offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined
under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor
Code; (2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. When illegal recruitment
is committed by a syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group, it is considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Under
Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. SC
believes that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the offense sufficiently. The
evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency was never licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for
overseas employment. In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in
Sec. 6 of R.A. 8042. Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in
consideration of a promise of foreign employment, accused-appellant received the amount of Php
45,000.00 from Dela Caza. When accused-appellant made misrepresentations concerning the
agencys purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process,
collected money in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of
illegal recruitment.

Page 36 of 60
II.C.3.b

Art. 38, Labor Code

Sec. 5, R.A. 10022

See People of the Philippines v. Gallo, G.R. No. 187730, June 29, 2010 supra

People of the Philippines v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 199211, June 4, 2014 JESON
Doctrine:

For illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove three essential
elements, namely:
o the accused undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited
practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
o the accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and
o the accused committed such illegal activity against three or more persons individually
or as a group.
Facts:

The appellant is convicted of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and five ( 5) counts of
estafa committed against complainants Airene Etac, Jowel A. Baja, Joemar Aquino, Luis M.
Bernardo and Anthony M. Canlas.

The trial court ruled that the appellant represented to the complainants that he had the power
and ability to send them in Hongkong, and that by virtue of this representation and fraud, the
complainants were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.

SC Ruling:

Yes.

Illegal Recruitment In Large Scale

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or

Page 37 of 60
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

For illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove three essential
elements, namely:

(1) the accused undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice
under Article 34 of the Labor Code;

(2) the accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; and

(3) the accused committed such illegal activity against three or more persons individually or as a
group.

In the present case, the appellant promised the five complainants that there were jobs available
for them in Hongkong; and that through his help, they could be deployed for work within a month
or two. He exacted money from them for the plane ticket, hotel accommodation, processing of visa
and placement fees.

Notably, the prosecution presented a Certification dated January 10, 2003 issued by Felicitas Q.
Bay, Director II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Licensing Branch, showing
that the appellant had no authority or license to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement
of workers.

These acts, to our mind, constitute illegal recruitment. There is illegal recruitment when one who
does not possess the necessary authority or license gives the impression of having the ability to
send a worker abroad. Corollarily, where the offense is committed against three or more persons,
as in this case, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which provides a higher penalty
under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code.

II.C.3.c

People of the Philippines v. Velasco, G.R. No. 195668, June 25, 2014 RIZA MAE
DOCTRINE:
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1) that the
accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article
13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the same Code;
(2) that the accused had not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment with respect to the requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit
and deploy workers; and (3) that the accused committed the unlawful acts against 3 or
more persons. In simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without

Page 38 of 60
 authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to send
workers abroad for employment purposes.

FACTS:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed in the RTC two informations charging Inovero,
Ma. Harleta Velasco y Briones, Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino with illegal recruitment as defined
and penalized under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act of 1995), and 11
informations charging the same accused with estafa as defined and penalized under Article315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Only Inovero was arrested and prosecuted, the other
accused having remained at large.
Regarding Criminal Case No. for Illegal Recruitment, the prosecution presented the five (5) private
complainants as witnesses to prove the crime, namely: Novesa Baful ("Baful"), Danilo Brizuela
("Brizuela"), Rosanna Aguirre ("Aguirre"), Annaliza Amoyo ("Amoyo"), and Teresa Marbella
("Marbella"), and Mildred Versoza ("Versoza") from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration ("POEA").
Baful testified that she, together with her sister-in-law, went to Harvel International Talent
Management and Promotion ("HARVEL") upon learning that recruitment for caregivers to Japan
was on-going there. On said date, she allegedly met Inovero; Velasco, and Diala, and saw Inovero
conducting a briefing on the applicants. She also testified that Diala, the alleged talent manager,
directed her to submit certain documents, and to pay P2,500.00 as training fee, as well as
P30,000.00 as placement and processing fees. Diala also advised her to undergo physical
examination. After complying with the aforesaid requirements and after paying Diala the amounts
of P18,000.00 and P10,000.00, Baful was promised deployment within two (2) to three (3)
months. She likewise testified that Inovero briefed her and her co-applicants on what to wear on
the day of their departure. However, she was never deployed. Finally, she testified that she found
out that HARVEL was not licensed to deploy workers for overseas employment.
Brizuela testified that he went to HARVELs office in Makati to inquire on the requirements and
hiring procedure for a caregiver in Japan. There, Diala told him the amount required as processing
fee and the documents to be submitted. And when he submitted the required documents and
payments, it was, this time, Paulino who received them. He claimed that he underwent training and
medical examination; he likewise attended an orientation conducted by Inovero at which time, he
and his batchmates were advised what clothes to wear on the day of their departure; he was
assured of deployment on the first week of June 2003, however, on the eve of his supposed "pre-
departure orientation seminar," Paulino texted him that the seminar was cancelled because
Inovero, who had the applicants money, did not show up. He testified that he was not deployed.
Neither was his money returned, as promised. On cross-examination, Brizuela testified that
Inovero was the one who conducted the orientation, and represented to all the applicants that
most of the time, she was in the Japanese Embassy expediting the applicants visa.
Aguirre testified that she went to HARVEL's office to apply as caregiver in Japan. Diala informed
her that Inovero was one of the owners of HARVEL and Velasco was its President; she paid
P35,000.00, and submitted her documents, receipt of which was acknowledged by Diala; despite
her undergoing medical examination and several training seminars, she was however not deployed
to Japan. Amoyo testified that she went to HARVELs office to apply as caregiver in Japan, and
Page 39 of 60
Diala required her to submit certain documents, to undergo training and medical examination, and
to pay P35,000.00 as placement and processing fees. However, after complying with said
requirements, she was never deployed as promised.
Marbella was the last complainant to testify. She alleged that she applied for the position of
janitress at HARVEL sometime in December 2002; just like the rest of the complainants, she was
required to submit certain documents and to pay a total amount of P20,000.00 as processing fee;
after paying said fee, Diala and Inovero promised her and the other applicants that they will be
deployed in 3 months or in June 2003; however, the promised deployment never materialized; she
later found out that HARVEL was not even licensed to recruit workers.
[Mildred] Versoza is a Labor and Employment Officer at the POEA Licensing Branch. She testified
that she prepared a Certification certifying that neither HARVEL nor Inovero was authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment as per records at their office.
Inovero denied the allegations hurled against her; she claimed that she is the niece of accused
Velasco, the owner of HARVEL, but denied working there. Explaining her presence in HARVEL, she
alleged that she worked for her uncle, Velascos husband, as an office assistant, hence, for at least
two or three times a week, she had to go to HARVEL on alleged errands for her uncle. She also
testified that her alleged errands mainly consisted of serving food and refreshments during
orientations at HARVEL. Inovero likewise denied receiving any money from the complainants, nor
issuing receipts therefor.
RTC: acquitted Inovero of five counts of estafabut convicting her in Criminal Case No. 04-1562 of
illegal recruitment committed in large scale as defined and penalized by Section 6 and Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 8042.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in affirming her (Inovero) conviction by the RTC.

RULING:
The appeal lacks merit.
In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the entire findings of fact of the RTC, stating:
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1) that the accused
engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the same Code; (2) that the accused
had not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment with
respect to the requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and (3)
that the accused committed the unlawful acts against 3 or more persons. In simplest terms, illegal
recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the
impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. In Our
view, despite Inoveros protestations that she did not commit illegal recruitment, the following
circumstances contrarily convince Us that she was into illegal recruitment.
First, private complainants Baful and Brizuela commonly testified that Inovero was the one who

Page 40 of 60
conducted orientations/briefings on them; informed them, among others, on how much their
salary would be as caregivers in Japan; and what to wear when they finally will be deployed.
Second, when Diala introduced her (Inovero) to private complainant Amoyo as one of the owners
of HARVEL, Inovero did not bother to correct said representation. Inoveros silence is clearly an
implied acquiescence to said representation.
Third, Inovero, while conducting orientation on private complainant Brizuela, represented herself
as the one expediting the release of applicants working visa for Japan.
Fourth, in a Certification issued and attested to by POEAs Versoza Inovero had no license nor
authority to recruit for overseas employment.
Based on the foregoing, there is therefore no doubt that the RTC correctly found that Inovero
committed illegal recruitment in large scale by giving private complainants the impression that
she can send them abroad for employment purposes, despite the fact that she had no license or
authority to do so.
All that Inoveros appeal has offered was her denial of complicity in the illegal recruitment of the
complainants. But the complainants credibly described and affirmed her specific acts during the
commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. Their positive assertions were far trustworthier
than her mere denial.
SC concur with the RTC and the CA that Inovero was criminally liable for the illegal recruitment
charged against her. Strong and positive evidence demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt her
having conspired with her co-accused in the recruitment of the complainants. The decision of the
CA amply recounted her overt part in the conspiracy. Under the law, there is a conspiracy when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to
commit it.

See People of the Philippines v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 199211, June 4, 2014 supra

People of the Philippines v. Rea, G.R. No. 197049, June 10, 2013 STEPHEN
Doctrine:
The crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is committed upon concurrence of these (3)
elements, namely: (1) the offenders undertake any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined in Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practices
enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the offenders have no valid license or
authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; and (3) the offenders commit the acts against three or more
persons, individually or as a group.

Recruitment and placement is defined in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code as any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and

Page 41 of 60
 includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not.

Facts:

That in the period from June 2005 to August 23, 2005, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with a certain "Edith", whose true name and present where about is still
unknown and mutually helping one another, representing themselves to have the capacity of
contracting, enlisting and transporting Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, recruit and promise employment/job placement
abroad specifically in London, United Kingdom as caregivers and general services for a fee in the
following amount of P100,000.00 from Michael Nio Soriano y Torres, P150,000.00 from Maricel
Tumamao y Coloma, P250,000.00 from Dandy Mendoza Paller, P150,000.00 from Rebecca
Villaluna y Bernardo, P200,000.00 from Nyann Pasquito y Saiasa, P120,000.00 from Alvaro
Trinidad y Pili and P132,000.00 from Cyrus Chavez y Fallaria, without first securing the required
license and authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, and without any capacity
and means to deploy workers abroad despite receipt of the aforestated fees, accused failed to
deploy them as workers, which acts were committed and carried out by a group of more than
three (3) persons conspiring and confederating with one another and the same was committed
against more than three (3) persons, hence, the offense is considered committed by a syndicate or
in large scale, in violation of the aforementioned law.2 (Underscoring not supplied).

The RTC rendered judgment convicting appellants of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.

The trial court found that all elements of illegal recruitment in large scale were established
through the testimonies of the private complainants and that appellants conspired to commit the
crime. On 10 January 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue:
whether or not the accused in the case at bar are liable for illegal recruitment in large scale

Held:
Yes, they are liable for illegal recruitment in large scale

The crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is committed upon concurrence of these (3)
elements, namely: (1) the offenders undertake any activity within the meaning of recruitment and
placement defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of the
Labor Code; (2) the offenders have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the offenders commit the
acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.17

Recruitment and placement is defined in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code as "any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring worker; and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not."
Page 42 of 60
Simply put, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for
employment purposes.18

That Tendenilla made misrepresentations concerning her purported power to recruit for overseas
employment; and personally, or through Azul but on her behalf, collected placement fees from
private complainants were clearly established from the testimonies of private complainants
themselves

We reiterate the findings of the Court of Appeals, to wit:

In the case at bar, it cannot be doubted that both accused-appellants indispensably cooperated
and coordinated in illegally recruiting the private complainants. From the evidence, it can be seen
that the success of the scheme depended on accused-appellants joint efforts. Estrellita

Tendenilla directly dealt with the private complainants, promising them employment, demanding
money from them, conducting dubious trainings, and sending them to Thailand. Maria Jenny Rea,
on the other hand, covered the next phase of the process, that is, travelling with the private
complainants to Thailand, bringing them to the border of Thailand and Malaysia, securing their
fraudulent non-immigrant visas, and accompanying them back to the Philippines.33

Based on the foregoing, appellants were correctly found guilty of large scale illegal recruitment
tantamount to economic sabotage.

People of the Philippines v. Daud, G.R. No. 197539, June 2, 2014 MARVIN
Doctrine:

To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur: (a) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities
within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article13(b) of the Labor Code,
or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042); and (c) the offender committed the same against three
or more persons, individually or as a group.

Facts:

Marcelo de Guzman (De Guzman), a dentist by profession with a clinic in Bulacan, testified that he
was introduced by his patient Modesta Marqueda to her cousin, accused Daud. Daud encouraged
De Guzman to apply for work abroad and convinced him that she would be able to send him to
Korea. To prove to him that she was capable of sending workers abroad, Daud invited him to visit
her office located at Taft Avenue, Manila.

Page 43 of 60
A month later, De Guzman and his cousins went to the said office. The group was shown job orders
and photos of Daud with Korean employees to prove that she was indeed sending workers abroad.
It was at this office that De Guzman first met appellant and Hanelita.

Meanwhile, Daud, together with Hanelita and appellant, put up their own business named Green
Pastures Worldwide Tours and Consultancy Corporation in their residence at No. 4 Sta. Maria
Apartment, India St., Better Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraque City.

Having been convinced by the documents shown to him at the Taft Avenue office, De Guzman paid
Daud the amount of P35,000.00 as initial payment for his placement fee at the latters office and
residence in Paraque City on February 2, 2001. On February 5, 2001, the amount of P15,000.00
which was witnessed by Hanelita. He gave another P15,000.00 on February 22, 2001. However, he
lost the original receipts.

On March 3, 6 and 7, 2001, De Guzman again gave Daud different amounts consisting of
P35,000.00, P30,000.00 and P15,000.00, respectively, at her office in Paraque City. However, when
he was issued receipts, the name Nimfa Nim was affixed. Daud explained to him that Nimfa Min
was her contact who happened to be the wife of a Korean national. De Guzman trusted Daud and
accepted her explanation. De Guzman was told by Daud and appellant that he and his group would
be leaving in two weeks time.

[De Guzman] and his companions were instructed to appear before the Korean Embassy and were
promised that they would be able to leave on March 11, 2001 as trainee workers in Korea.

When their departure date was getting near, Daud postponed it thrice. Eventually, UponINQUIRY
with the Korean Embassy, De Guzman was told that it was fake. The POEA informed them that it
was not registered with the POEA and the said agency was not licensed to recruit employees for
abroad (Exhibit D).

Gina Decena, for her part, she was introduced by her cousin, Maricel Rayo, to accused Daud,
Hanelita and appellant, at the Makati Medical Towers where Maricel had her medical examination.
They enticed Decena to apply at their agency by showing her job orders that offered $400 a month
salary, 150% overtime pay, free board and lodging as well as photographs of prospective Korean
employers.The three accused assured Decena that they had already sent several applicants for
employment abroad. Convinced, Decena and her husband Marcelo Rayo applied at their agency.
They were instructed to undergo medical examination, to attend a Korean Language seminar, and
to pay P70,000.00 processing fee.

Thus, on February 15, 2001, Decena and her husband each gave accused Daud the amount of

Page 44 of 60
P35,000.00 as placement fees.

Thereafter, the couple were told to wait for two weeks for the processing of their visas. As two
weeks have passed and nothing happened to their applications, Decena and her husband went to
the POEA to verify the status of the agency. They were informed to the effect that said agency was
not licensed to send workers abroad.

Francisco Poserio(Poserio) was brought along by his cousin [De Guzman] to No. 4 Sta. Maria Apt.,
India St., Better Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraque City. While thereat, [De Guzman]
introduced [Daud], Hanelita and [appellant] as the owners of Green Pastures Worldwide Tours
and Consultancy and that they were sending workers to Korea. To convince [Poserio] that they
can send workers to Korea, they showed him job orders from Hyundai Group and Nike requiring
workers for Korea, a copy of a Korean visa of one of their job applicants, and photos of Daud in
Korea with a Korean national who would be Poserios prospective employer if he applied with
their agency.

Enticed, Poserio mortgaged his property to get funds for his job application. He was then told to
pay P100,000.00 as processing fee for his job application. He parted with his money amounting to
P70,000. A year after his payment, Poserio was still not able to leave the country. Upon
verification with the POEA, he and the other job applicants discovered that the said agency was
not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.

Roderick Gallemit(appellant) denied owning the agency, undertaking any recruitment act or
receiving any amount from the complainants considering that his name did not appear in the
receipts. He admitted that he is married to co-accused Hanelita and that co-accused Daud is his
mother-in-law. He was aware that his mother-in-law Daud was a recruiter and owned an agency
named Green Pasture Worldwide Travel and Tours which she operated in the same apartment. He
claimed that Daud has only one employee, a certain Badjong, who processed documents.

He denied he was present when the complainants gave their payments to Daud. He insisted that he
was not involved with Dauds business and that he was always out of the house as he would often
go to Cavite to ask for financial help from his siblings.

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction by the RTC, but modified the
indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the three counts of estafa.

ISSUE:

Page 45 of 60
Whether the accused appellant is liable for Large Scale Illegal Recruitment and Estafa

HELD:

Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

The crime of illegal recruitment, according to the Supreme Court is committed when, among other
things, a person, who without being duly authorized according to law, represents or gives the
distinct impression that he or she has the power or the ability to provide work abroad convincing
those to whom the representation is made or to whom the impression is given to thereupon part
with their money in order to be assured of that employment. This is what obtains in this case.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale
if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur: (a) the offender has
no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" under Article13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042);
and (c) the offender committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

Given the foregoing, we uphold the conviction of appellant for illegal recruitment in a large scale,
which constitutes economic sabotage. The penalty of life imprisonment and the fine of
P500,000.00, imposed upon appellant for the said offense by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, is in accord with Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, xxx (b) The penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more
than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage as defined herein.

Page 46 of 60
II.C.4

People of the Philippines v. Chua, G.R. No. 187052, September 13, 2012 KEISHA

Doctrine:

It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted

for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern:
illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is
imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of fraud.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following: (a) that there must be a false
pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or
fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property;
and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

xxx

Unlike in illegal recruitment where profit is immaterial, a conviction for estafa requires a
clear showing that the offended party parted with his money or property upon the
offenders false pretenses, and suffered damage thereby.

Facts:

Private complainants Alberto A. Aglanao, Rey P. Tajadao, Billy R. Danan and Roylan Ursulum filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal in large scale against Melissa Chua alleging that the latter offered
them a job as factory workers in Taiwan for deployment within a month. She required each of
them on separate occasions to undergo medical examination and pay a placement fee of P 80,000
each. Chua assured each of them that whoever pays the application fee the earliest can leave
sooner. After completing payment, they followed-up their applications. However, they learned that
Chua was not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.

Chua denied having recruited private complainants for overseas employment and interposed the
defense that she was only a cashier at Golden Gate Office and that she has no knowledge of
whether the agency was licensed to recruit workers during her tenure as it has been delisted.
The RTC of Manila found Chua guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, which was affirmed by
the CA.

Page 47 of 60
Issue:

Whether or not Melissa Chua liable for illegal recruitment in large scale and four (4) counts of
estafa?

SC Ruling:

The Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial court and
appellate court. The prosecution witnesses were positive and categorical in their testimonies that
they personally met appellant and that the latter promised to send them abroad for employment.
Inarguably, appellant Chua engaged in recruitment when she represented to private complainants
that she could send them to Taiwan as factory workers upon submission of the required
documents and payment of the placement fee. The four private complainants positively identified
appellant as the person who promised them employment as factory workers in Taiwan for a fee
of P 80,000. More importantly, Severino Maranan the Senior Labor Employment Officer of the
POEA, presented a Certification dated December 5, 2002, issued by Director Felicitas Q. Bay, to the
effect that appellant Chua is not licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas
employment.

Furthermore, we agree with the appellate court that the same pieces of evidence which establish
appellants liability for illegal recruitment in large scale likewise confirm her culpability for estafa.

It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal
recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by
using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of fraud.27

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following: (a) that there must be a false pretense
or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the
offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced
to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.

In this case, the prosecution has established that appellant defrauded the complaining witnesses
by leading them to believe that she has the capacity to send them to Taiwan for work, even as she
does not have a license or authority for the purpose. Such misrepresentation came before private
complainants delivered P 80,000 as placement fee to appellant. Clearly, private complainants
would not have parted with their money were it not for such enticement by appellant. As a

Page 48 of 60
consequence of appellants false pretenses, the private complainants suffered damages as the
promised employment abroad never materialized and the money they paid were never recovered.

xxx

Be that as it may, we take exception as regards private complainant Roylan Ursulum. The Court
finds that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of the third and fourth elements of
estafa as regards the incident with Roylan Ursulum. While Ursulum claims that he delivered to
Chua two installments of P 40,000 each on July 29, 2002 and August 3, 2002, he failed to produce
receipts to substantiate the same. Instead, Ursulum relies on ten text messages allegedly sent by
appellant as evidence of their transaction. Out of said series of messages, Ursulum presented only
one which reads, "Siguro anong laking saya nyo pag namatay na ko." Notably, the prosecution did
not present evidence to confirm whether said text message actually emanated from appellant.
Assuming arguendo that it did, still, said message alone does not constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was able to obtain P 80,000 from Ursulum as a result of her false
pretenses.

Unlike in illegal recruitment where profit is immaterial, a conviction for estafa requires a clear
showing that the offended party parted with his money or property upon the offenders false
pretenses, and suffered damage thereby.

Now on the matter of the appropriate penalty. Under Section 6, R.A. No. 8042, illegal recruitment
when committed in large scale shall be considered as an offense involving economic sabotage.
Accordingly, it shall be punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P 500,000 nor
more than P 1,000,000. The law provides further that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if
illegal recruitment is committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant Melissa Chua, a.k.a. Clarita Ng Chua is
ACQUITTED of one count of estafa filed by private complainant Roylan Ursulum.

See People of the Philippines v. Gallo, G.R. No. 187730, June 29, 2010 - supra

II.C.5.a,b.i,c

Gagui v. Dejero, G.R. No. 196036, October 23, 2013 GIME

DOCTRINE:

To make corporate officers jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a
finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring
or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.

Page 49 of 60
FACTS:

On 14 December 1993, respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo filed separate
Complaints for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries and overtime pay, refund of
transportation expenses, damages, and attorney fees against PRO Agency Manila, Inc., and Abdul
Rahman Al Mahwes.

The Labor Arbiter Pedro Ramos rendered a decision ordering respondents Pro Agecy Manila Inc.,
and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes to pay complainants. The LA also issued a Writ of Execution. When
the writ was returned unsatisfied, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued, but was also returned
unsatisfied.

Respondents filed a Motion to Implead Respondent Pro Agency Manila, Inc. Corporate Officers and
Directors as Judgment Debtor. It included petitioner as the Vice-president/Stockholder/Director
of PRO Agenct, Manila, Inc. The LA granted the motion.

A 2nd Alias Writ of Execution was issued, which resulted in the garnishment of petitioner bank
deposit in the amount of P85,430.48. Since, judgment remained unsatisfied, respondents sought a
3rd alias writ of execution. The motion was granted resulting in the levying of two parcels of lot
owned by petitioner located in San Fernando Pampanga.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 3rd Alias Writ of Execution. Petitioner alleged that apart from
not being made aware that she was impleaded as one of the parties to the case, the LA decision did
not hold her liable in any form whatsoever. Executive Labor Arbiter denied the motion.

Upon appeal, NLRC denied the appeal for lack of merit. NLRC ruled that in so far as overseas
migrant workers are concerned, it is R.A. 8042 itself that describes the nature of the liability of the
corporation and its officers and directors. It is not essential that the individual officers and
directors be impleaded as party respondents to the case instituted by the worker. A finding of
liability on the part of the corporation will necessarily mean the liability of the corporate officers
or directors.

The CA affirmed the NLRC decision. The two Motions for Reconsideration were denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc. in
accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042, despite not having been impleaded in the Complaint and
named in the Decision?

RULING:

The pertinent portion of Section 10, R.A. 8042 reads as follows: The liability of the
principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this

Page 50 of 60
section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval.

In Sto. Tomas v. Salac, we had the opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of this provision.
We have thus maintained: the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the
liability of corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily
liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of
that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.

Hence, for petitioner to be found jointly and solidarily liable, there must be a separate finding that
she was remiss in directing the affairs of the agency, resulting in the illegal dismissal of
respondents. Examination of the records would reveal that there was no finding of neglect on the
part of the petitioner in directing the affairs of the agency. In fact, respondents made no mention
of any instance when petitioner allegedly failed to manage the agency in accordance with law,
thereby contributing to their illegal dismissal.

See People of the Philippines v. Velasco, G.R. No. 195668, June 25, 2014- supra

Sunace International v. NLRC, G.R. No. 161757, January 25, 2006 GIME

DOCTRINE:

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the
principal, employer Xiong, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-
foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
FACTS:

Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), deployed to Taiwan Divina A.

Montehermozo (Divina) as a domestic helper under a 12-month contract effective February 1,
1997. The deployment was with the assistance of a Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang, President
of Jet Crown International Co., Ltd.

After her 12-month contract expired on February 1, 1998, Divina continued working for her
Taiwanese employer, Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after which she returned to the
Philippines on February 4, 2000.

Page 51 of 60
Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a complaint before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez, the Taiwanese broker,
and the employer-foreign principal alleging that she was jailed for three months and that she was
underpaid

Reacting to Divina's Position Paper, Sunace filed on April 25, 2000 an ". . . ANSWER TO
COMPLAINANT'S POSITION PAPER" alleging that Divina's 2-year extension of her contract was
without its knowledge and consent, hence, it had no liability attaching to any claim arising
therefrom, and Divina in fact executed a Waiver/Quitclaim and Release of Responsibility and an
Affidavit of Desistance, copy of each document was annexed to said

The Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunace's claim that the extension of Divina's contract for two more
years was without its knowledge and consent.

ISSUE:

Whether the act of the foreigner-principal in renewing the contract of Divina be attributable to
Sunace.

RULING:

No, the act of the foreigner-principal in renewing the contract of Divina is not attributable to
Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year
employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner"
cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Divina's claims arising from the 2-year employment
extension.

Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency
relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment
contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Divina and entered into a new and separate
employment contract in Taiwan.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal,
employer Xiong, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer
cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

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 APQ Ship Management v. Casenas, G.R. No. 197539, June 2, 2014 DY
Doctrine:

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribed the knowledge of the agent to the principal, not
the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer could not,
therefore, be imputed to its agent.

There are three (3) requirements necessary for the complete termination of the
employment contract: 1]termination due to expiration or other reasons/causes; 2]signing
off from the vessel; and 3]arrival at the point of hire.

Facts:

Respondent Caseas was hired by petitioner APQ, acting for and in behalf of its principal Crew
Management as Chiefmate of MV Perseverance for a period of 8 months from June 204 to February
2005. Upon his departure to Miami to join his assigned vessel, he found out that the said vessel
could not depart form the Florida port because of incomplete documents. he was then transferred
to another vessel, the MV Haitien Pride, docked in Haiti. The latter vessel was also unable to leave
the dock because of incomplete documents. while in Haiti, respondent was left to fend for himself
without any assistance from the agency. He barely had access to basic necessities and the
uncertainty of his future caused him extreme stress and anxiety. During the same time, his
contract was extended from the original 8 months to 26 months. Subsequently, the vessel left for
the Bahamas and while on voyage, Caseas experienced chest pains. He was subsequently brought
to the hospital and was diagnosed with hypertension; he was then repatriated on August 2006.
Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he underwent the routinary post-employment check up and
was declared unfit for sea service, and was unable to work for more than 120 days from his
repatriation. Respondent claimed that petitioner APQ refused to provide him further medical
attention thus incufrring medical bills. Caseas also claimed disability benefits, sickness
allowance, and medical expenses he was untitled to under POEA-SEC but was refused by APQ.
APQ on the other hand contended that it was Caseas who refused to return to the country after
the expiration of his contract, until he finally did so in August 2006. Petitioner also contended that
it could not be held liable for claims pertaining to the extended portion of the contract for it did
not consent to it; that Caseas was fully paid of his wages and other benefits for the duration of his
8-month contract; and that he suffered illness after the expiration of the contract, hence, it could
not be made liable to pay him any benefits for his injury/illness.

Respondent presented as evidence the deck logbook dated August 14, 2006 to show that his
contract was extended, to which petitioner says that it did not prove mutual consent among the
parties.

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The LA dismissed Caseas complaint as he was of the view that his contract was not extended in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract. The LA pointed out that the
illness/disease suffered by Caseas was sustained while serving on board MVCap Haitien Pride,
which was outside the period of his contractual employment. Thus, Caseas' claims could not be
awarded.

The NLRC, on appeal, set aside the decision of the LA and rendered a decision in favor of Caseas
ruling that his illness, Essential Hypertension, was a compensable disease under Section 32-A, No.
20 of the POEA-SEC. Hence, NLRC ruled that Caseas was entitled to his claims because the illness
was sustained within the duration of his employment contract. The NLRC, acting on the APQs
MFR, subsequently overturned its previous resolution and ruled that the documentary evidence
presented only proved the extension of contract but not the consent given to it by APQ. Caseas
failed to present the new contract duly signed by APQ or Crew Management, or any proof that they
consented to the extension.

The CA reinstated the earlier NLRC Resolution. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the employment contract of Caseas was extended with the consent of APQ/Crew
Management?

SC Ruling:

YES
Employment contracts of seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels are not ordinary
contracts. They are regulated and an imprimatur by the State is necessary. While the seafarer and
his employer are governed by their mutual agreement, the POEA Rules and Regulations require
that the POEA-SEC be integrated in every seafarers contract.15 In this case, there is no dispute that
Caseas employment contract was duly approved by the POEA and that it incorporated the
provisions of the POEA-SEC.

In Sunace, the Court ruled that the theory of imputed knowledge ascribed the knowledge of the
agent to the principal, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer
could not, therefore, be imputed to its agent.

APQs primary argument revolves around the fact of expiration of Caseas employment contract,
which it claims was not extended as it was without its consent. While the contract stated that any
extension must be made by mutual consent of the parties, it, however, incorporated Department
Order (DO)No. 4 and Memorandum Circular No. 09, both series of 2000, which provided for the

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Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean
Going Vessels. Sections 2 and 18.

In a nutshell, there are three (3) requirements necessary for the complete termination of the
employment contract:
1. 1]termination due to expiration or other reasons/causes;
2. 2]signing off from the vessel; and
3. 3]arrival at the point of hire.

In this case, there was no clear showing that Caseas signed off from the vessel upon the
expiration of his employment contract, which was in February or April 2005. He did not arrive
either in Manila, his point of hire, because he was still on board the vessel MV Haitien Pride on the
supposed date of expiration of his contract. It was only on August 14, 2006 that he signed off 21
from MV Haitien Pride and arrived in Manila on August 30, 2006.

APQ avers that Caseas transferred from MV Perseverance to MV Haitien Pride, which was not the
ship specifically mentioned in his contract. Section 15 of the POEA-SEC guides the Court on this. It
reads:
Section 15. Transfer Clause The seafarer agrees to be transferred at any port to any vessel
owned or operated, manned or managed by the same employer, provided it is accredited to
the same manning agent and provided further that the position of the seafarer and the rate
of his wages and terms of services are in no way inferior and the total period of
employment shall not exceed that originally agreed upon.
Any form of transfer shall be documented and made available when necessary.

APQ did not argue that MV Haitien Pride was not operated or managed by Crew Management. It
did not claim either that said vessel was not accredited by it. The logical conclusion, therefore, is
that MV Haitien Pride was operated/managed by Crew Management and accredited by APQ.
Even assuming arguendo that MV Haitien Pride was not related in any way with either Crew
Management or APQ, it is with more reason that the transfer should have been properly
documented pursuant to the above provision because it necessitated the termination of his
employment contract and his repatriation to the Philippines, pursuant to Section 26(A) of the
POEA-SEC.

Accordingly, Caseas contract should have been terminated and he should have been repatriated
to the Philippines because a seafarer cannot be forced to sail with an unseaworthy vessel,
pursuant to Section 24 of the POEA-SEC.25 There was, however, no showing that his contract was
terminated by reason of such transfer.

Page 55 of 60
APQ cannot now feign ignorance of any extension of the contract and claim that it did not consent
to it. As it had knowledge of the extended contract, APQ is solidarily liable with Crew Management
for Caseas claims. Caseas is, therefore, entitled to the unpaid wages during the extended
portion of his contract.

II.C.6

Skipper United v. Doza, G.R. No. 175558, February 8, 2012 DY

Doctrine:

Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination by the employee of the employment
contract by serving written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance.
Given that provision, the law contemplates the requirement of a written notice of
resignation. In the absence of a written resignation, it is safe to presume that the employer
terminated the seafarers.

Facts:

Skippers United Pacific, Inc. deployed, in behalf of Skippers, De Gracia (10 months), Lata and
Aprosta (12 months) to work on board the vessel MV Wisdom Star. Meanwhile, there was no
employment contract submitted for Doza.

De Gracia, et al. claimed that Skippers failed to remit their respective allotments for almost five
months, compelling them to air their grievances with the Romanian Seafarers Free Union. ITF
Inspector Adrian Mihalcioiu of the Romanian Seafarers Union sent Captain Savvas of Cosmos
Shipping a fax letter, relaying the complaints of his crew, namely: home allotment delay, unpaid
salaries (only advances), late provisions, lack of laundry services (only one washing machine), and
lack of maintenance of the vessel (perforated and unrepaired deck). Sometime in January 1999, De
Gracia, et al. were unceremoniously discharged from MV Wisdom Stars and immediately
repatriated. Upon arrival in the Philippines, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
Labor Arbiter in April 1999 and prayed for payment of their home allotment for the month of
December 1998, salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees.

Skippers, on the other hand, claims that on December 3, 1998, De Gracia, caused disturbance while
intoxicated in the cabin of the Master of MV Wisdom Stars. This incident was evidenced by the
Captains Report sent via telex to Skippers on said date. Skippers also claims that sometime in
January 1999, Aprosta, De Gracia, Lata and Doza, arrived in the masters cabin and demanded
immediate repatriation because they were not satisfied with the ship. They threatened that they

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may become crazy any moment and demanded for all outstanding payments due to them. This is
evidenced by a telex of Cosmoship MV Wisdom to Skippers, which however bears conflicting dates of
22 January 1998 and 22 January 1999. Skippers also claims that, due to the disembarkation of De
Gracia, et al., 17 other seafarers disembarked under abnormal circumstances.

Skippers admitted the nonpayment of home allowances but wanted to offset the amount for the
repatriation expenses since it is their contention that respondents preterminated their contract,
thus they are liable for their repatriation expenses in accordance with Section 19(G) of Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Memorandum Circular No. 55.

The LA and NLRC respectively dismissed the case because of lack of merit, meanwhile the CA ruled
in favor of the respondent seafarers.

Issue:

Whether or not the telex communication sent on January is sufficient evidence that the seafarers
preterminated their contract?

Ruling:

NO.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the telex message is "a biased and self-serving document that does
not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence."

For a workers dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both procedural and
substantive due process. The legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes procedural due
process, while the legality of the act of dismissal constitutes substantive due process.

Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing.
The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of
employment can be effected: (1) the first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second notice informs the employee of the
employers decision to dismiss him. Before the issuance of the second notice, the requirement of a
hearing must be complied with by giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is not
necessary that an actual hearing be conducted.

Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be made
under a just or authorized cause under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code.

Page 57 of 60
In this case, there was no written notice furnished to De Gracia, et al. regarding the cause of their
dismissal. Cosmoship furnished a written notice (telex) to Skippers, the local manning agency,
claiming that De Gracia, et al. were repatriated because the latter voluntarily pre-terminated their
contracts. This telex was given credibility and weight by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in deciding
that there was pre-termination of the employment contract "akin to resignation" and no illegal
dismissal.
If, indeed, De Gracia, et al. voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts, then De Gracia, et al. should
have submitted their written resignations.

Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination by the employee of the employment contract
by "serving written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance." Given that
provision, the law contemplates the requirement of a written notice of resignation. In the absence
of a written resignation, it is safe to presume that the employer terminated the seafarers.

In addition, the telex message relied upon by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC bore conflicting dates of
22 January 1998 and 22 January 1999, giving doubt to the veracity and authenticity of the
document. In 22 January 1998, De Gracia, et al. were not even employed yet by the foreign
principal. For these reasons, the dismissal of De Gracia, et al. was illegal.

Poseidon International v. Tamala, G.R. No. 186475, June 26, 2013 RAVANES
DOCTRINE:
REQUISITES FOR VALID PRE-TERMINATION OF EMPLOYEES
1. The decision to close or cease operations must be bona fide in character;

2. Service of written notice on the affected employees and on the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) at least one (1) month prior to the effectivity of the termination; and

3. Payment to the affected employees of termination or separation pay equivalent to one

(1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher.

FACTS:
In 2004, Poseidon hired the respondents, in behalf of Van Doorn, to man the fishing vessels of Van
Doorn and those of its partners Dinko Tuna Farmers Pty. Ltd. (Dinko) and Snappertuna Cv. Lda.
(Snappertuna) - at the coastal and offshore area of Cape Verde Islands.
The fishing operations for which the respondents were hired started on September 17, 2004. On
November 20, 2004, the operations abruptly stopped and did not resume. On May 25, 2005, before
the respondents disembarked from the vessels, Goran Ekstrom of Snappertuna (the respondents

Page 58 of 60
immediate employer on board the fishing vessels) and the respondents executed an agreement
(May 25, 2005 agreement) regarding the respondents salaries. The agreement provided that the
respondents would get the full or 100% of their unpaid salaries for the unexpired portion of their
pre-terminated contract in accordance with Philippine laws.
On May 26, 2005, however, Poseidon and Van Doorn, with Goran of Snappertuna and Dinko Lukin
of Dinko, entered into another agreement (letter of acceptance) reducing the previously agreed
amount to 50% of the respondents unpaid salaries (settlement pay) for the unexpired portion of
their contract. On May 28, 2005, the respondents arrived in Manila. On June 10, 2005, the
respondents received the settlement pay under their letter of acceptance. The respondents then
signed a waiver and quitclaim and the corresponding cash vouchers.
On November 16, 2005, the respondents filed a complaint before the Labor Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC, National Capital Region for illegal termination of employment with prayer for the
payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts; and for non-payment of
salaries, overtime pay and vacation leave pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents were validly pre-terminated from their employment contract.
HELD:
NO
We confirm in this regard that, by law and subject to the States corollary right to review its
determination, management has the right to regulate the business and control its every aspect.
Included in this management right is the freedom to close or cease its operations for any reason,
as long as it is done in good faith and the employer faithfully complies with the substantive and
procedural requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence. Article 283 of our Labor Code
provides:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. - The employer may also terminate
the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the [Department of Labor and Employment] at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof. x x x In case of retrenchment to prevent losses
and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)
month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A
fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year. [Italics, underscores
and emphases ours]

This recognition is subject to compliance with the following requisites:

Page 59 of 60
 1. The decision to close or cease operations must be bona fide in character;

2. Service of written notice on the affected employees and on the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) at least one (1) month prior to the effectivity of the termination; and

3. Payment to the affected employees of termination or separation pay equivalent to one

(1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher.

See Serrano v. Gallant Maritime, G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009- supra

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