PACIFICO M. VALIAO, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY

G.R. No. 170757

November 28, 2011

PERALTA, J.:

Facts of the Case:

Petitioners4 Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed with the
RTC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of
504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.Private
oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the following
grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to
bar the application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.

Issue: Whether the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto and
therefore such land can be registered under the petitioners name

Held: Yes, in support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject
property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio Millarez (Basilio), who purchased the land from a
certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of Sale5 dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish
language. Basilio possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's
possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner.
Upon Basilio's death, the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, when oppositor Zafra
unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their property, which compelled them to file complaints of
Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra. In support of their claim of possession over the subject
property, petitioners submitted in evidence Tax Declaration No. 9562 6 dated September 29, 1976 under the
names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLOS R. VEGA et al

G. R. No. 177790

January 17, 2011

SERENO, J.:

Facts of the Case: On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R. Vega,et al filed an application for registration of
title. The application covered a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6191, Cadastre 450 of Los Baos, Laguna,
with a total area of six thousand nine hundred two (6,902) square meters (the subject land)..Respondents
Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land from their mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in
turn inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza. Their mothers siblings (two brothers and a sister) died
intestate, all without leaving any offspring.On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to
respondents Vegas application for registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject land or
portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such, not subject to private appropriation.

Issue: Whether or not the subject parcel of land has been classified as alienable land and therefore can be
registered in the name of the applicants

Held: Yes, the land has been classified as alienable land and therefore registrable. Unless a land is reclassified
and declared alienable and disposable, occupation of the same in the concept of an owner - no matter how
long -cannot ripen into ownership and result in a title; public lands not shown to have been classified as
alienable and disposable lands remain part of the inalienable domain and cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights. Pursuant to the provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove the
following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and
(2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.11 Section 14 (1) of the law requires that
the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration is filed.12Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject land in the present Petition, the Court will limit its focus on the first
requisite: specifically, whether it has sufficiently been demonstrated that the subject land is alienable and
disposable.The Court finds that despite the absence of a certification by the CENRO and a certified true copy
of the original classification by the DENR Secretary, there has been substantial compliance with the
requirement to show that the subject land is indeed alienable and disposable based on the evidence on
record. First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the CENRO who testified that the
subject land is alienable and disposable, and who identified his written report on his inspection of the subject
land. Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered as evidence by respondents-intervenors
Buhays,29expressly indicates that the land is alienable and disposable. Finally, upon being informed of
respondents Vegas application for original registration, the LRA never raised the issue that the land subject
of registration was not alienable and disposable. 33 In any event, the Report, as well as the Subdivision Plan,
readily reveals that the subject land was of registration was not alienable and disposable.certified as
alienable and disposable as early as 31 December 1925 and was even classified as residential and
commercial in nature.
 Spouses MANUEL and FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION, Inc., Respondent.

G.R. No. 170575

June 8, 2011

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts of the Case: Petitioners filed a Complaint6 for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City,. Said complaint contains, among others, the following
significant allegations: Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel of land, situated at
Dayao, Roxas City and covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18397 issued to the
plaintiffs by the Register of Deeds for Roxas City as evidenced by a xerox copy thereof which is hereto
attached as Annex "A". Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took
full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial
purposes. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any
contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendants possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.But
[plaintiffs] patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in the last quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made
several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of the property.
Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and refused, as it continues to fail and refuse
to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and occupancy of the land, and to vacate the subject premises
despite the lapse of the fifteen-day period specified in the said demand letters. Consequently, defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners thereof. 7

Issue: Whether the complaint filed sufficiently establish a case for unlawful detainer based on the
allegations provided therein

Held: No,taken in its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for forcible
entry, and not for unlawful detainer."In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any
land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth."31 "[W]here the
defendants possession of the property is illegal ab initio," the summary action for forcible entry
(detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.32In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that
the respondent took possession and control of the subject property without any contractual or legal
basis.33 Assuming that these allegations are true, it hence follows that respondents possession was
illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners complaint is one for forcible
entry that is "the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without
right."34 Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that
respondents possession was illegal at the inception. Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical
possession, as alleged inpetitioners Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy
and force, this Court finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for
Forcible Entry and not the instant suit for unlawful detainer.Petitioners should have filed a Complaint
for Forcible Entry within the reglementary one-year period from the time of dispossession.Petitioners
likewise alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and occupancy of subject
property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the
time of dispossession, the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when petitioners filed their
Complaint in 2003. As a consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action against
the respondent.
 ANITA MONASTERIO-PE and the SPOUSES ROMULO TAN and EDITHA PE-TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE JUAN TONG, herein represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, JOSE Y. ONG, Respondent.

G.R. No. 151369

March 23, 2011

PERALTA, J.:

Facts of the Case: The instant petition stemmed from an action for ejectment filed by herein
respondent Jose Juan Tong (Tong) through his representative Jose Y. Ong (Ong) against herein
petitioners Anita Monasterio-Pe (Anita) and the spouses Romulo Tan and Editha Pe-Tan .In the
Complaint, it was alleged that Tong is the registered owner of two parcels of land known as
Lot Nos. 40 and 41 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9699 and T-9161,
together with the improvements thereon, located at Barangay Kauswagan, City Proper, Iloilo City;
herein petitioners are occupying the house standing on the said parcels of land without any contract
of lease nor are they paying any kind of rental and that their occupation thereof is simply by mere
tolerance of Tong; that in a letter dated December 1, 1999, Tong demanded that respondents vacate
the house they are occupying, but despite their receipt of the said letter they failed and refused to
vacate the same; Tong referred his complaint to the Lupon of Barangay Kauswagan, to no avail.3In
their Answer with Defenses and Counterclaim, herein petitioners alleged that Tong is not the real
owner of the disputed property, but is only a dummy of a certain alien named Ong Se Fu, who
is not qualified to own the said lot and, as such, Tong's ownership is null and void; petitioners are the
true and lawful owners of the property in question and by reason thereof they need not lease nor pay
rentals to anybody

Issue: Whether or not the ejectment case was filed within the prescriptive period of one year

Held: Yes, respondent alleged in his complaint that petitioners occupied the subject property by his
mere tolerance. While tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate
by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand.19 Respondent
sent petitioners a demand letter dated December 1, 1999 to vacate the subject property, but
petitioners did not comply with the demand. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him.20 Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the one-year period within
which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand,
because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.21 Respondent
filed the ejectment case against petitioners on March 29, 2000, which was less than a year from
December 1, 1999, the date of formal demand. Hence, it is clear that the action was filed within the
one-year period prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful detainer case. Neither is the Court
1av vphi1

persuaded by petitioners' argument that respondent has no cause of action to recover physical
possession of the subject properties on the basis of a contract of sale because the thing sold was
never delivered to the latter.
 SERVILLANO E. ABAD, PETITIONER, VS. OSCAR C. FARRALES AND DAISY C. FARRALES-VILLAMAYOR,
RESPONDENTS.

GR NO. 178635
April 11, 2011

ABAD, J.:

Facts of the Case: Petitioner Servillano Abad claims that on August 6, 2002 he and his wife, Dr. Estrella E.
Gavilan-Abad, bought a 428-square meter registered property on 7 Administration St., GSIS Village, Project 8,
Quezon City,[1] from Teresita, Rommel, and Dennis Farrales. The latter were the wife and sons, respectively, of
the late brother of respondents Oscar Farrales (Oscar) and Daisy Farrales-Villamayor (Daisy).[2] Teresita
operated a boarding house on the property. On December 7, 2002, Dr. Abad went to the boarding house to
have certain damage to some toilets repaired. While she was attending to the matter, she also hired house
painters to give the boarding house fresh coat of paint.[7] On December 8, 2002 Oscar and Daisy came,
accompanied by two men, and forcibly took possession of the boarding house. Frightened, the painters called
the Abads who immediately sought police help. The Abads were later appeased, however, when they learned
that the intruders left the place.
Two days later or on December 10, 2002, the day the Abads left for abroad, Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered
and took possession of the property once again. Because of this, on March 10, 2003 petitioner Servillano Abad
(Abad) filed a complaint[8] for forcible entry against the two before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City. the RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC in its totality. It held that Oscar and Daisy could no
longer impugn the jurisdiction of the MeTC over the action since they raised the ground of Abad's failure to
allege prior physical possession in his complaint for the first time on appeal.

Issue: 1. Whether or not Abad sufficiently alleged in his complaint the jurisdictional fact of prior physical
possession of the disputed property to vest the MeTC with jurisdiction over his action; and

2. In the affirmative, whether or not Abad sufficiently proved that he enjoyed prior physical possession of the
property in question

Held: 1. Yes, There is no question that Abad made an allegation in his complaint that Oscar and Daisy
forcibly entered the subject property. The only issue is with respect to his allegation, citing such property as
one "of which they have complete physical and material possession of the same until deprived thereof." Abad
argues that this substantially alleges plaintiffs prior physical possession of the property before the
dispossession, sufficient to confer on the MeTC jurisdiction over the action. The Court agrees. The plaintiff in
a forcible entry suit is not required to use in his allegations the exact terminology employed by the rules. It is
enough that the facts set up in the complaint show that dispossession took place under the required
conditions.

2.No,evidently, the Abads did not take physical possession of the property after buying the
same since they immediately rented it to Teresita who had already been using the property as a boarding
house. Abad claims that their renting it to Teresita was an act of ownership that amounted to their acquiring
full physical possession of the same. Abad argued that with the title to the property in his name, he has in his
favor the right to the actual, physical, exclusive, continuous, and peaceful possession of the same. He pointed
out that his possession de factobegan from the time of the signing and notarization of the deed of absolute
sale, becoming de jure once the title was issued in his nameIt is of course true that a property owner has the
right to exercise the attributes of ownership, one of which is the right to possess the property. But Abad is
missing the point. He is referring to possession flowing from ownership which is not in issue in this case.
Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physical possession or possession de facto, not
legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the
issue.The Court finds that Servillano utterly failed to prove prior physical possession in his favor. The absence
of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry warrants the dismissal of the complaint. [40]
 PEDRO ANGELES , Represented by ADELINA T. ANGELES, Attorney-in Fact, Petitioner,
vs.
ESTELITA B. PASCUAL, MARIA THERESA PASCUAL, NERISSA PASCUAL, IMELDA
PASCUAL, MA. LAARNI PASCUAL and EDWIN PASCUAL, Respondents.

G.R. No. 157150

September 21, 2011

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts of the Case: Neighbors Regidor Pascual (Pascual) and Pedro Angeles (Angeles) were
registered owners of adjacent parcels of land located in Cabanatuan City. Pascual owned Lot 4,
Block 2 (Lot 4) covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. T-43707 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija;2 Angeles owned Lot 5, Block 2 (Lot 5) of the same consolidation-subdivision plan covered by
TCT No. T-9459 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija.3 Each of them built a house on his
respective lot, believing all the while that his respective lot was properly delineated. It was not
until Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), as the highest bidder in the foreclosure
sale of the adjacent Lot 3, Block 2 (Lot 3), caused the relocation survey of Lot 3 that the geodetic
engineer discovered that Pascuals house had encroached on Lot 3. As a consequence,
Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual.In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his
own Lot 4 and discovered that Angeles house also encroached on his lot. Of the 318 square
meters comprising Lot 4, Angeles occupied 252 square meters, leaving Pascual with only about 66
square meters. Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the encroached area of Lot 4 from Angeles,
or the removal of Angeles house. Angeles refused the demand. Accordingly, Pascual sued
Angeles for recovery of possession and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Cabanatuan City.

Issue: Whether or not the options laid down by the CA, i.e., for Pascual either to buy the portion of
Angeles house or to sell to Angeles the portion of his land occupied by Angeles were contrary to its
finding of good faith.

Held: No, With the unassailable finding that Angeles house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that
Angeles had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights
and obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable.
Consequently, the land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to
Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or
obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of Angeles,
therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the grant of the
reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code.
1wp
 TORBELA VS. SPS. ROSARIO & BANCO FILIPINO

GR NO. 140553

December 7, 2011

Facts of the Case: The controversy began with a parcel of land, with an area of 374 square meters,
located in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan Valeriano gave Lot No. 356-A to his sister Marta Semilla,
married to Eugenio Torbela (spouses Torbela). Upon the deaths of the spouses Torbela, Lot No.
356-A was adjudicated in equal shares among their children, the Torbela siblings, by virtue of a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition.On December 12, 1964, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim10 over Lot No. 356-A in favor of Dr. Rosario. On December 16, 1964, OCT No.
16676 in Valerianos name was partially cancelled as to Lot No. 356-A and TCT No. 5275112 was
issued in Dr. Rosarios name covering the said property.Another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim13 was
subsequently executed on December 28, 1964, this time by Dr. Rosario, acknowledging that he only
borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings and was already returning the same to the latter
for P1.00. Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages on Lot No. 356-A, Lot No. 4489,
and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A which was made by Dr. Rosario. During the public auction on April 2,
1987, Banco Filipino was the lone bidder for the three foreclosed properties for the price
of P1,372,387.04. The Certificate of Sale dated April 2, 1987, in favor of Banco Filipino, was
annotated on TCT No. 52751 On December 9, 1987, the Torbela siblings filed before the RTC their
Amended Complaint,31 impleading Banco Filipino as additional defendant in Civil Case No. U-4359
and praying that the spouses Rosario be ordered to redeem Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino.

Issue: Is Banco Filipino not a mortgagor in goodfaith and therefore the subject land is owned by
Torebala siblings

Held: Banco Filipino cannot be deemed a mortgagee in good faith, much less a purchaser in good
faith at the foreclosure sale of Lot No. 356-A. Hence, the right of the Torbela siblings over Lot No.
356-A is superior over that of Banco Filipino; and as the true owners of Lot No. 356-A, the Torbela
siblings are entitled to a reconveyance of said property even from Banco Filipino.The landowner has
to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the
builder to pay the price of the land. But even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the
building to remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the
owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not
more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the
land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other
party fails to pay for the same.86This case then must be remanded to the RTC for the determination
of matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448, in relation to Article 546, of the Civil
Code. Such matters include the option that the Torbela siblings will choose; the amount of indemnity
that they will pay if they decide to appropriate the improvements on Lot No. 356-A; the value of Lot
No. 356-A if they prefer to sell it to Dr. Rosario; or the reasonable rent if they opt to sell Lot No. 356-
A to Dr. Rosario but the value of the land is considerably more than the improvements. The
determination made by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1999 that the current
value of Lot No. 356-A is P1,200,000.00 is not supported by any evidence on record.
 TECNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL SEVENTEENTH DIVISION) and EDUARDO
UY, respondents.

G.R. No. 108894

February 10, 1997

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts of the Case: The parties in this case are owners of adjoining lots in Paraaque, Metro Manila. It was
discovered in a survey, that a portion of a building of petitioner, which was presumably constructed by its
predecessor-in-interest, encroached on a portion of the lot owned by private respondent. That plaintiff (which
is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws is the registered
owner of a parcel of land situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque; that said land was purchased by plaintiff
from Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970, together with all the buildings and improvements including the wall
existing thereon; that the defendant is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4531-B of Lot
4531 of the Cadastral Survey of Paraaque, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 279838, of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal;; that portions of the buildings and wall bought by plaintiff
together with the land from Pariz Industries are occupying a portion of defendant's adjoining land; that upon
learning of the encroachment or occupation by its buildings and wall of a portion of defendant's land,
plaintiff offered to buy from defendant that particular portion of defendant's land occupied by portions
of its buildings and wall with an area of 770 square meters, more or less, but defendant, however, refused the
offer.

Issue: Is petitioner considered a builder in bad faith because, as held by respondent Court, he is "presumed to
know the metes and bounds of his property as described in his certificate of title"?

Whether or not the same benefit can be invoked by petitioner who, as earlier stated, is not the builder of
the offending structures but possesses them as buyer.

Whether or not petitioner lose its right under Article 448 on the basis of the fact after acquiring the
property in good faith, it learned about and aptly recognized the right of private respondent

Whether or not the private respondent can exercise the remedy of removal?

Held: Yes, We disagree with respondent Court. The two cases it relied upon do not support its main
pronouncement that a registered owner of land has presumptive knowledge of the metes and bounds of its own
land, and is therefore in bad faith if he mistakenly builds on an adjoining land. Aside from the fact that those
cases had factual moorings radically different from those obtaining here, there is nothing in those cases which
would suggest, however remotely, that bad faith is imputable to a registered owner of land when a part of his
building encroaches upon a neighbor's land, simply because he is supposedly presumed to know the boundaries
of his land as described in his certificate of title. No such doctrinal statement could have been made in those
cases because such issue was not before the Supreme Court. Quite the contrary, we have rejected such a theory
in Co Tao vs. Chico, 20 where we held that unless one is versed in the science of surveying, "no one can determine
the precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title."
 Yes, In the first place, there is no sufficient showing that petitioner was aware of the encroachment at
the time it acquired the property from Pariz Industries. We agree with the trial court that various factors in
evidence adequately show petitioner's lack of awareness thereof. In any case, contrary proof has not
overthrown the presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code, as already stated, taken together
with the disputable presumptions of the law on evidence. These presumptions state, under Section 3 (a) of Rule
131 of the Rules of Court, that the person is innocent of a crime or wrong; and under Section 3 (ff) of Rule
131, that the law has been obeyed. In fact, private respondent Eduardo Uy himself was unaware of such
intrusion into his property until after 1971 when he hired a surveyor, following his purchase of another
adjoining lot, to survey all his newly acquired lots. Upon being apprised of the encroachment, petitioner
immediately offered to buy the area occupied by its building a species of conduct consistent with good
faith.

In the context of the established facts, we hold that petitioner did not lose its rights under Article 448 of the
Civil Code on the basis merely of the fact that some years after acquiring the property in good faith, it learned
about and aptly recognized the right of private respondent to a portion of the land occupied by its
building. The supervening awareness of the encroachment by petitioner does not militate against its right to
claim the status of a builder in good faith. In fact, a judicious reading of said Article 448 will readily show that
the landowner's exercise of his option can only take place after the builder shall have come to know of the
intrusion in short, when both parties shall have become aware of it. Only then will the occasion for
exercising the option arise, for it is only then that both parties will have been aware that a problem exists in
regard to their property rights.

No,the private respondent's insistence on the removal of the encroaching structures as the proper
remedy, which respondent Court sustained in its assailed Decisions, is thus legally flawed. This is not one of
the remedies bestowed upon him by law. It would be available only if and when he chooses to compel the
petitioner to buy the land at a reasonable price but the latter fails to pay such price. 33 This has not taken place.
Hence, his options are limited to: (1) appropriating the encroaching portion of petitioner's building after payment of
proper indemnity, or (2) obliging the latter to buy the lot occupied by the structure. He cannot exercise a remedy of
his own liking.
 FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN DUMLAO, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-57348

May 16, 1985

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Facts of the Case: Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T3087, known as Lot No. 685, situated in the municipality of Dumangas,
Iloilo, with an area of approximately 8,870 square meters. Agustin Dumlao, defendant-appellant, owns an
adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683, with an approximate area of 231 sq. ms.Sometime in 1972, when
DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of thirty four (34)
square meters of DEPRA's property, After the encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of
DEPRA's lot made on November 2,1972, his mother, Beatriz Depra after writing a demand letter asking
DUMLAO to move back from his encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on February 6,1973
against DUMLAO in the Municipal Court of of Dumangas, , Said complaint was later amended to include
DEPRA as a party plaintiff. Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith, and applying
Article 448 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment ordering a forced lease. Such decision was later on dclared
null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the land owner can refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel
the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it erected

Held: No, the owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the
possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner
of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the
building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot as respondents here did refuse both to
pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where
it erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land. the other party fails
to pay for the same . We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to
remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither
to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought
to be executed
 THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR.
vs.
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 157537

September 7, 2011

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts of the Case: On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140
square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later, or on
March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver,1 whereby he affirmed under
oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land
(the property).On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of
the petitioners.2On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B.
Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for
5,686,768.00.3 On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property,4 but Servacio refused
to heed their demand..The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became
conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community
property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.

Issue: Is the disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior
liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is void if said portion has not yet been allocated by
judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse

Held: No, Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of
the Civil Code,15 and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of
Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its
liquidation.16 The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,17 to
wit Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had
was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share.18 Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share;
hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his
co-owners.19Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-
owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred,
making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share.20 This result conforms to the well-established
principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando
res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).21