discrimination for refusing to serve accmodate customer patron for his her

exercise of right to free speech

westnext_discrim_for_refus_serve_accmod_cosumer_patron_for_his_her_exercis
e_of_free_speech_results

** 17. Cuviello v. Cal Expo

United States District Court, E.D. California. September 19, 2012 Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 2012 WL 4208201
CIV. S-11-2456 KJM

This case was on calendar on February 10, 2012 for argument on the individual defendants motion to
dismiss. Plaintiff Joseph Cuviello appeared pro se; Gilbert Leigh appeared for plaintiffs Deniz Bolbol
and Shannon Campbell; David Beauvais appeared telephonically for plaintiff Mark Ennis; George Acero
and David King appeared for defendants Cal...
...These guidelines provide, in relevant part, that activities are deemed to be on-site if they occur within Cal Expos
grounds and parking lots; that a public forum is an event wherein the facilities are available to members of the public
for debate of social issues; that with the exception of the State Fair, no public forum events occur on Cal Expos
ground, but it is Cal Expos policy to allow free speech activity when it is not inconsistent with Cal Expos normal
operations; that the parking areas become congested with vehicle traffic during events; that free expression zones
are therefore necessary to balance the needs of those involved in free...
...Plaintiffs have also argued that defendants actions interfered with their First Amendment rights to speech and
against retaliation for the exercise of their right to protest, the right to due process, the right to be free from
malicious prosecution and the right to equal protection of the laws....
...Plaintiffs allege that all defendants planned, authorized, directed, ratified, and/or personally participated in
retaliation against plaintiffs for the exercise of their First Amendment rights; arrested plaintiffs for engaging in
constitutionally protected activities; refused to allow plaintiffs access to public areas of the Cal Expo complex in order
to exercise their First Amendment rights; singled out plaintiffs because of their viewpoints; refused to return
plaintiffs property; and used threats and intimidation against plaintiffs. 89....
...The individual defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs claim under the Civil Rights
Act because they were enforcing Cal Expos presumptively valid free speech guidelines....

** 28. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson

Supreme Court of California, In Bank. February 08, 1982 30 Cal.3d 721 640 P.2d 115 L.A. 31199

Tenants appealed from a judgment of the Municipal Court, Los Angeles County, Harold I. Cherness, J.,
upholding landlords policy of excluding all families with minor children from apartment complex. The
Supreme Court, Tobriner, J., assigned, held that: (1) protection against discrimination afforded by the
Unruh Act applies to...
... As already noted, in Cox we explained that the provisions of section 51 derive from the common law doctrine which
imposed upon certain enterprises affected with a public interest the duty to serve all customers on reasonable
terms without discrimination. ...
... As we stated in Cox : In holding that the Civil Rights Act forbids a business establishment generally open to the
public from arbitrarily excluding a prospective customer, we do not imply that the establishment may never insist that
a patron leave the premises....
...In reaching this conclusion, we relied, inter alia, upon the fact that the Unruh Act had emanated from the venerable
common law doctrine which attached [to various public or common callings] certain obligations includingat
various stages of doctrinal development the duty to serve all customers on reasonable terms without
discrimination (italics added) ( id., at p. 212, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992), and upon the fact that prior judicial
decisions construing the predecessors of the Unruh Act had clearly held that the statutory protections were not limited
to discrimination...
... Relying upon the fact that the act, by its terms, expressly referred only to discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, ancestry or national origin, 6 the city argued in response that the acts proscriptions were limited to
discrimination which was based on the specifically enumerated forbidden criteria, and did not encompass the
alleged discrimination against hippies or their associates....

** 30. Costco Companies, Inc. v. Gallant

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California. February 27, 2002 96 Cal.App.4th 740 117 Cal.Rptr.2d
344 D035997

CIVIL RIGHTS - Free Speech. Store regulation prohibiting activism on 34 days was valid time, place,
and manner restriction.
...Retailer was not required at stand-alone stores to allow any expressive activity by petition gatherers, although
stores were open to the public; stores were not essential or invaluable forums for the general exercise of free
speech, and customers at stand-alone stores could not avoid petition gatherers due to single entrance and exit.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; Wests Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, 2(a)....
...Thus the court found that the [ Robins ] balancing test leads us to conclude that the societal interest in using the
Santa Rosa Trader Joes as a forum for exercising free speech and petitioning activities does not outweigh Trader
Joes interest in exercising exclusive control over the use of its private property. ...
...In HCHH Associates v. Citizens for Representative Government (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1193, 1208, 238 Cal.Rptr.
841, the court summarized this aspect of Robins: In essence, Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, supra, 23
Cal.3d 899, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341, in affirming a shopping center owners right to impose reasonable time,
place and manner restrictions on petitioning activity, recognized in the owner important rights of substance; those
rights are identified as freedom from disruption of normal business operations and freedom from interference with
customer convenience....
...Retailers regulation prohibiting petition gatherers from operating outside mall stores on 34 busiest days of the year
was narrowly tailored and thus a valid time, place, and manner restriction on free speech rights, although
regulations only allowed three gatherers on any given day and store ingress and egress was not likely to be
hampered by only three gatherers; retailer had substantial interest in smooth operation of its stores on those days,
which were less than 10% of the calendar year, ban left more than 300 days for expressive activity, and regulation
was content neutral. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; Wests Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, 2(a)....

**37. Lopez v. Target Corp.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. April 10, 2012 676 F.3d 1230 2012 WL 1174505 11-12534

CIVIL RIGHTS - Contracts. Store patron failed to state 1981 claim against store and store employee
based on employees refusal to serve patron.
...Store patron, who was a Hispanic male, was not actually denied ability to make, perform, enforce, modify, or
terminate a contract when store employee, who was a white female, refused to allow him to make purchases in her
check-out line, and thus patron could not show loss of actual contract interest, as required for 1981 claim against
store and store employee, where patron was able to complete his transaction at same store, buy his desired goods
at same price, and use same payment method as any other customer. 42 U.S.C.A. 1981....
...The only factual difference between this case and Arguello is that Arguellos transaction was completed by the
same clerk who initially refused to serve her on equal terms as other customers....
...4 We are not faced here with circumstances where a customer was refused service by the retail store, was
required to contract on different terms, got frustrated and left the store, or was in any other way denied the right to
make, enforce, or terminate a contract....
...3 First, Lopez argues that the district court erred in dismissing his 1981 claims because Winns refusal to serve
Lopez sufficiently thwarted his 1981 right to contract, notwithstanding the fact that Lopez was ultimately able to
purchase the items he wanted at the prices quoted by the store....

In re Cox, (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 217, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24

And the court stated at p. ,

*217 [5] **In holding that the Civil Rights Act forbids a business establishment generally open to the public from
arbitrarily excluding a prospective customer, we do not imply that the establishment may never insist that a patron
leave the premises.12 Clearly, an entrepreneur need not tolerate customers who damage property, injure others, or
otherwise disrupt his business. A business establishment may, of course, promulgate reasonable department
regulations that are rationally related to the services performed and the facilities provided. ***32 **1000 (See Orloff
v. Los Angeles Turf Club, supra, 36 Cal.2d 734, 740741, 227 P.2d 449.13 In the absence of a finding of facts by
the trial court, however, we cannot determine whether the shopping center excluded petitioner upon such a
reasonable basis.
[6]
In ultimately determining whether the shopping center did rely upon a reasonable ground in requesting petitioner
to quit the premises, the trial court will bear in mind that the shopping center has generally opened the premises to
the public and invited it to treat the center as the modern analogue of the town center. 14 The shopping center may no
more exclude *218 individuals who wear long hair or unconventional dress, 15 who are black, who are members of
the John Birch Society, or who belong to the American Civil Liberties Union, merely because of these
characteristics or associations, than may the City of San Rafael.16

And the court stated at p. 221,

*221 4. The San Rafael trespass ordinance is not void on its face
[9]
Petitioner contends that the local ordinance on its face constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on First
Amendment rights. In enacting section 8.12.210 of the San Rafael Municipal Code, the City Council of San Rafael
engrafted upon its trespass ordinance an exception for any interference with or inhibition of any other exercise of a
constitutionally protected right of freedom of speech such as (but not limited to) peaceful expressions of political or
religious opinions, not involving offensive personal conduct. * * * (San Rafael Mun. Code, s 8.12.210(c)(4).)

Petitioner charges that the phrase offensive personal conduct is simply too vague and broad a standard for the
regulation of expression or conduct intertwined with expression. The prosecution in its return to the writ concedes:
The term offensive personal conduct should be narrowly construed so that it applies to some act other than the
speech itself but its use does not render the ordinance unconstitutional. We accept the prosecutions suggestion
and construe the provision so as to avoid the constitutional infirmities of the entire trespass ordinance and
particularly the phrase offensive personal conduct. (See Ashwander v. T.V.A. (1936) 297 U.S. 288, 341, 345348,
56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (concurring opn. of Brandeis, J.).)

***35 **1003 As we have very recently observed in In re Bushman, supra, 1 Cal.3d 767, 773775, 83 Cal.Rptr.
375, 463 P.2d 727, the term offensive, in the absence of a narrowing construction, might proscribe conduct which
is protected by the First Amendment.19 Under the ordinance a shopowner or guard at the center might find a picket
sign or leaflet offensive merely because of disagreement with its content. The very presence of an individual who
sought to exercise his freedom of speech, who dressed in unconventional clothing, wore a beard, or displayed an
unusual hair style might cause a guard at the center to react with resentment, vexation, or annoyance.
As the United States Supreme Court observed in Terminiello v. Chicago (1949) 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 896, 93
L.Ed. 1131, * * * a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger. As the Court of Appeal has concluded, the constitutional *222 right to speak,
demonstrate, and picket on behalf of causes known to be highly offensive to those picketed was settled in
Terminiello. * * * (People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 366, 51 Cal.Rptr. 56, 60.) Thus the First
Amendment nullifies an ordinance so loosely drawn that a police officer can construe it to mean that he can expel
from public places persons whom he finds objectionable. To given the police officer the ambulatory power to act as
an uncontrolled roving legislature is to give him a license to vitiate the First Amendment. (See Bachellar v.
Maryland (1970) 397 U.S. 564, 565, 90 S.Ct. 1312, 1313, 25 L.Ed.2d 570; In re Davis (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 645,
655, 51 Cal.Rptr. 702.)

Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, (1951) 36 Cal.2d 734, 735, 227 P.2d 449

**The plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the defendant from refusing to admit him to the racing arena of Santa
Anita Park. The complaint shows that on the 31st day of January, 1946, the plaintiff purchased a ticket and was
admitted to the Park at $1:00 p. m. At 4:00 p. m. he was ejected. His ejection under similar circumstances occurred
on February 2, 1946. Both occurrences were alleged to have been without cause or provocation on the plaintiffs
part. The plaintiff has been refused admittance to the Park since his removal therefrom.

And the court stated at p.735,

**The issues involve the construction and application of sections 51-54 of the Civil Code. Section 51 provides that
all citizens under state jurisdiction are entitled to the full accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of
hotels, eating places, barber shops, theaters, conveyances, and other *736 places of public accommodation and
amusement subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law applicable alike to all citizens.

And the court stated at p. 735,

In substance the following evidence is relied on by the defendant to support the judgment. Between 1929 and 1939
the plaintiff was convicted in seven cases of various misdemeanors. Four of the convictions, form chart possession,
were under an ordinances held to be invalid in Re Page, 1931, 19 Cal.App.2d 1, 298 P. 178. In 1929 he paid a $10
fine on a conviction of gambling. In 1935 he was convicted of bookmaking, Penal Code, s 337a, on a plea of guilty
and received a suspended thirty day sentence and paid a $100 fine. In July 1939 he pleaded guilty to a charge of
violation of section 3 of Act 3421, Deerings General Laws (Regulation and Licensing of Horse Racing) by the
placing of a wager outside of the course, and paid a $50 fine. There is no evidence that any of the violations was
committed on a race-course. There was no evidence that the plaintiff was drunk, boisterous, lewd or conducted
himself in any but an orderly and proper manner. The tracks arresting officer testified that he observed the plaintiff
talking to persons who, by check with police files, were stated to have criminal records. The plaintiff conducts one
or more restaurants. The testimony of two police officers was that they investigated the plaintiffs reputation, and
that their investigation disclosed that he was reputed to be a bookmaker and doing a bookmaking business; that at
the present time he was not known as a bookmaker but as a gambler, and that his place of business was known as a
congregating place for professional gamblers and bookmakers.
The trial court did not find that the plaintiff was a person of immoral character. The finding is that he had a
reputation as a man of immoral character, was a known undesirable, *737 and a person guilty of conduct detrimental
to racing and to the public welfare. This finding purported to justify the defendants exclusion of the plaintiff from
the race-course pursuant to rules formulated by the horse racing board regulating the application for and granting of
licenses, the conduct of races, and other matters pertaining to the operation of race-courses where wagering is
permitted.

And the court stated at p. ,

*740 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888. The plaintiff is thus a person entitled to
know by reasonably definite standards when the right here involved may lawfully be withheld.

**The term immoral has been defined generally as that which is hostile to the welfare of the general public and
contrary to good morals. Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, dissoluteness; or as wilful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to the opinions of respectable members of the community, and as an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and the public welfare. 20 Words & Phrases, pp. 159-160.
[10] [11]
The legislature did not specify who was to be considered a person of immoral character. Failure of greater
specification where restraints on the exercise of fundamental rights are involved, as indicated, may be fatal to the
application of the statutory standard or guide. But the omission in the present statute is not fatal to any use of the
standard of immorality as a guide. Here it becomes a matter of construction and application conformable to the
legislative objective in providing the various standards. In pursuing the investigation into the legislative objective,
Civ. Code, sec. 4, it is observed that there is no procedure provided for an inquiry into good moral character as a
preliminary to the exercise of the declared right. A preliminary inquiry into the general moral character of an
applicant for admittance to a public place of amusement, even if feasable, could not have been intended. Cases
involving the method of ascertaining the good moral character required of an applicant for a privilege, such as the
license to operate the race-course, are inapplicable.
[12] [13] [14] [15]
In providing the standards to guide proprietors in placing restraints on the exercise of the personal right
here involved the legislature was undoubtedly **454 concerned with the safety and welfare of the attending public.
The general objective was the protection of others on the premises. As in other matters involving the exercise of the
police power, reasonableness is the governing criterion. **The statute justifies the denial of the declared right to
persons under the influence of liquor and to persons engaging in boisterous conduct. Such conditions ordinarily are
obvious. In these respects the standards do not suggest an inquiry beyond visible or readily *741 ascertainable
aspects and exclusion on those grounds is reasonable. **Similarly reasonable as a ground of exclusion is the
commission when applying for or after admittance, of lewd, immoral, or other acts inimical to the public safety or
welfare. A determination concerning the then commission of such acts is likewise made from visible and obvious
factors. But the private business, the personal relations with others, the past conduct not on the premises, of a person
applying for or admitted to the course, whether or not relevant to indicate his character, are immaterial in the
application of the statutory standards under the facts of this case.

[16]
It may be assumed that the plaintiff might be suspected of illegal gambling activities off the race-course. The
defendant would be justified in taking reasonable precautions to prevent opportunities for the commission of
criminal activities on the course. Here, however, there is no evidence whatsoever, and it is not suggested, that the
plaintiff while on the course was or ever had engaged in illegal activities or in an attempt to commit a crime. Under
any proper construction and application of the statutory guides, mere suspicion based on past conduct and alleged
reputed activities off the course, or an conversations without disclosure of their substance held on the course with
persons considered questionable, did not justify the ejection or exclusion of the plaintiff.

Whenever disagree with someone they try to attack their character by

saying that they are harassing other
Whenever they disagree with someone they say that they are harassing
statements

Human relation issues

Whenever disagree with someone

I am exercising the right to speak make derogatory statements about others
that they are harassing them

False accusations of persecution delusions of persecution

Falsely acusse someone is unethical, irresponsible

Human relation issues

Whenever disagree with someone they try to attack their character by
saying that they are harassing other
Whenever they disagree with someone they say that they are harassing
statements
I am exercising the right to speak make derogatory statements about others
that they are harassing them
False accusations of persecution delusions of persecution
Falsely acusse someone is unethical, irresponsible