[G.R. No. 166337.

March 7, 2005]

BAYANIHAN MUSIC vs. BMG

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 7 2005.

G.R. No. 166337 (Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. vs. BMG Records (Pilipinas) and Jose Mari Chan, et al.)

Subject of this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision dated December 14, 2004[1] of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69626, upholding the Order dated August 24, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court at Quezon City, Branch 90, which found no merit in petitioner's application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, along with the Order dated January 10, 2002, which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

On July 16, 1973, private respondent Jose Mari Chan (Chan) entered into a contract with petitioner
Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. (Bayanihan), whereunder the former assigned to the latter all his rights,
interests and participation over his musical composition "Can We Just Stop and Talk A While". On March 11,
1976, the parties entered into a similar contract over Chan's other musical composition entitled "Afraid For
Love To Fade".

On the strength of the abovementioned contracts, Bayanihan applied for and was granted by the National
Library a Certificate of Copyright Registration for each of the two musical compositions, thus: November 19,
1973, for the song "Can We Just Stop and Talk A While" and on May 21, 1980, for the song "Afraid for Love
To Fade."

Apparently, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner Bayanihan, Chan authorized his co-respondent
BMG Records (Pilipinas) [BMG] to record and distribute the aforementioned musical compositions in a then
recently released album of singer Lea Salonga.

In separate letters both dated December 7, 1999, petitioner Bayanihan informed respondents Chan and
BMG of its existing copyrights over the subject musical compositions and the alleged violation of such right
by the two. Demands were made on both to settle the matter with Bayanihan. However no settlement was
reached by the parties.

Hence, on August 8, 2000, Bayanihan filed with the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City a complaint against
Chan and BMG for violation of Section 216 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as theIntellectual
Property Code of the Philippines, with a prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent BMG from further recording and distributing the
subject musical compositions in whatever form of musical products, and Chan from further granting any
authority to record and distribute the same musical compositions.

In its answer, BMG contended, among others, that: (1) the acts of recording and publication sought to be
enjoined had already been consummated, thereby rendering moot Bayanihan's prayer for TRO and/or
preliminary injunction; and (2) there is no clear showing that petitioner Bayanihan would be greatly
damaged by the refusal of the prayed for TRO and/or preliminary injunction. BMG also pleaded a cross-claim
against its co-respondent Chan for violation of his warranty that his musical compositions are free from
claims of third persons, and a counterclaim for damages against petitioner Bayanihan.

Chan, for his part, filed his own answer to the complaint, thereunder alleging that: (1) it was never his
intention to divest himself of all his rights and interest over the musical compositions in question; (2) the
contracts he entered into with Bayanihan are mere music publication agreements giving Bayanihan, as
assignee, the power to administer his copyright over his two songs and to act as the exclusive publisher
thereof; (3) he was not cognizant of the application made by and the subsequent grant of copyrights to
Bayanihan; and (4) Bayanihan was remissed in its obligations under the contracts because it failed to
effectively advertise his musical compositions for almost twenty (20) years, hence, he caused
the rescission of said contracts in 1997. Chan also included in his answer a counterclaim for damages
against Bayanihan.

After hearing the parties, the lower court came out with an order denying Bayanihan's prayer for TRO,
saying, thus:

After carefully considering the arguments and evaluating the evidence presented by counsels, this Court
finds that the plaintiff has not been able to show its entitlement to the relief of TRO as prayed for in its
verified complaint (see Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), hence, this
Court is of the considered and humble view that the ends of justice shall be served better if the aforecited
application is denied.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the aforecited application or prayer for the issuance of a TRO is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, the same court, in its subsequent Order dated August 24, 2001,[2] likewise denied
cralaw

Bayanihan's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to wit:

After carefully going over the pleadings and the pertinent portions of the records insofar as they are
pertinent to the issue under consideration, this Court finds that the plaintiff has not been able to show its
entitlement to the relief of preliminary injunction as prayed for in its verified complaint (see Section 4, Rule
58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), hence, this Court is of the considered and humble
view that the ends of justice shall be served better if the aforecited application is denied, (see also Order
dated July 16, 2001).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application or prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
denied.

SO ORDERED.

Its motion for a reconsideration of the same order having been likewise denied by the trial court in its
next Order of January 10, 2002,[3] petitioner Bayanihan then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
cralaw

for certiorari, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69626, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court in issuing the Orders of August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2001, denying its prayers for a writ
of preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration, respectively.

In the herein assailed Decision dated December 14, 2004, the Court of Appeals upheld the challenged
orders of the trial court and accordingly dismissed Bayanihan petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding neither flaw of jurisdiction nor taint of grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the
assailed Orders of the respondent court dated August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2002, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[4] cralaw

Hence, Bayanihan's present recourse.

It is petitioner's submission that the appellate court committed reversible error when it dismissed its petition
for certiorari and upheld the trial court's denial of its application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner insists that as assignee of the copyrights over the musical compositions in question, it has a clear
legal right to a writ of preliminary injunction; that respondents BMG and Chan violated its copyrights over
the same musical compositions; that despite knowledge by respondent BMG of petitioner's copyrights over
the said musical compositions, BMG continues to record and distribute the same, to petitioner's great and
irreparable injury.
We DENY.

We have constantly reminded courts that there is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate and
requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or which is more dangerous in a doubtful case,
than the issuance of an injunction. A court should, as much as possible, avoid issuing the writ which would
effectively dispose of the main case without trial.

Here, nothing is more evident than the trial court's abiding awareness of the extremely difficult balancing
act it had to perform in dealing with petitioner's prayer for injunctive reliefs. Conscious, as evidently it is, of
the fact that there is manifest abuse of discretion in the issuance of an injunctive writ if the following
requisites provided for by law are not present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right
to be protected; and (2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such
right,[5] the trial court threaded the correct path in denying petitioner's prayer therefor. For, such a writ
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should only be granted if a party is clearly entitled thereto.[6] cralaw

Of course, while a clear showing of the right to an injunctive writ is necessary albeit its existence need not
be conclusively established,[7] as the evidence required therefor need not be conclusive or complete, still,
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for an applicant, like petitioner Bayanihan, to be entitled to the writ, he is required to show that he has the
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint.[8] Here, the trial court did not find ample
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justifications for the issuance of the writ prayed for by petitioner.

Unquestionably, respondent Chan, being undeniably the composer and author of the lyrics of the two (2)
songs, is protected by the mere fact alone that he is the creator thereof, conformably with Republic Act No.
8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code, Section 172.2 of which reads:

172.2. Works are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or form of
expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose.

An examination of petitioner's verified complaint in light of the two (2) contracts sued upon and the
evidence it adduced during the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, yields not the existence
of the requisite right protectable by the provisional relief but rather a lingering doubt on whether there is or
there is no such right. The two contracts between petitioner and Chan relative to the musical compositions
subject of the suit contain the following identical stipulations:

7. It is also hereby agreed to by the parties herein that in the event the PUBLISHER [petitioner herein]
fails to use in any manner whatsoever within two (2) years any of the compositions covered by this contract,
then such composition may be released in favor of the WRITER and excluded from this contract and the
PUBLISHER shall execute the necessary release in writing in favor of the WRITER upon request of the
WRITER;

xxx xxx xxx

9. This contract may be renewed for a period of two-and-one-half (2 1/2) years at the option of the
PUBLISHER. Renewal may be made by the PUBLISHER by advising the WRITER of such renewal in writing at
least five (5) days before the expiration of this contract.[9]cralaw

It would thus appear that the two (2) contracts expired on October 1, 1975 and March 11, 1978,
respectively, there being neither an allegation, much less proof, that petitioner Bayanihan ever made use of
the compositions within the two-year period agreed upon by the parties.

Anent the copyrights obtained by petitioner on the basis of the selfsame two (2) contracts, suffice it to say
'that such purported copyrights are not presumed to subsist in accordance with Section 218[a] and [b], of
the Intellectual Property Code,[10] because respondent Chan had put in issue the existence thereof.
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It is noted that Chan revoked and terminated said contracts, along with others, on July 30, 1997, or almost
two years before petitioner Bayanihan wrote its sort of complaint/demand letter dated December 7, 1999
regarding the recent "use/recording of the songs 'Can We Just Stop and Talk A While' and 'Afraid for Love to
Fade,'" or almost three (3) years before petitioner filed its complaint on August 8, 2000, therein
praying, inter alia, for injunctive relief. By then, it would appear that petitioner had no more right that is
protectable by injunction.

Lastly, petitioner's insinuation that the trial court indulged in generalizations and was rather skimpy in
dishing out its reasons for denying its prayer for provisional injunctive relief, the same deserves scant
consideration. For sure, the manner by which the trial court crafted its challenged orders is quite
understandable, lest it be subjected to a plausible suspicion of having prejudged the merits of the main
case.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q.
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Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas; Rollo, pp. 49-62.

[2]
cralaw Rollo, p. 148.

[3] cralaw Rollo, p. 162.

[4] cralaw Rollo, pp. 49-63.

[5]
Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106043, March 4,
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1996 citing Sales v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 169 SCRA 109 [1989].

[6] cralaw Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 686, [2000].

[7] cralaw Developers Group of Companies, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 715, March 8, 1993.

[8]
cralaw Ibid.

[9]
cralaw Rollo, pp. 58-59.

[10] cralaw Section 218. 2. In an action under this Chapter:

(a) Copyright shall be presumed to subsist in the work or other subject matter to which the action relates if
the defendant does not put in issue the question whether copyright subsist in the work or subject matter;
and

(b) Where the subsistence of the copyright is established, the plaintiff shall be presumed to be the owner of
the copyright if he claims to be the owner of the copyright and the defendant does not put in issue the
question of his ownership;