Otherwise than Being: Levinas compassion and Nagarjunas karuna

Rashid Begg

Stellenbosch University

Abstract:

This paper compares Emmanuel Levinas concept of responsibility to the Madhyamikas

account of compassion. Central to both philosophical ideas is the position of the Other.

In the case of Levinas, the notion of responsibility and compassion becomes the duty of

all individuals whereas in the case of the Madhyamikans, a heightened sense of

responsibility toward the Other becomes the duty of the bodhisattva. With these two

philosophical orientations we have two systems of thought, roads that lead if not to the

same mountain, at least to peaks from which very similar views may be seen.

Key words: Levinas, Madhyamika, Boddhisattva, Suntyata and Nagarjuna.

Emmanuel Levinas and the founders of Madhyamika Buddhism are widely separated

historically and culturally. Yet there are many similarities in Levinas concept of

responsibility for the other and Madhyamikas accounts of the compassion of

bodhisattvas. Central to both systems is the view that no self or ego is a separate,

independent entity. The subject/object duality breaks down when the selfs sense of

independence is overwhelmed in the wake of the Infinity of the other (Levinas) or

through the force of co-dependent origination and sunyatas denial of inherent self-

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existence (Madhyamika). The ethics that results focuses on the importance of fulfilling

the needs of others and overcoming category-dependent thinking to recognize the

interdependence of all beings. Although there are differences in both content and context,

Levinas responsibility and Madhyamikas compassionate bodhisattvas share this denial

of a fundamental separation between the subject as I and everything else. Ethical

consequences arise from this belief.

Levinas sees responsibility as involuntary and passive. Whether or not we accept,

acknowledge and understand this responsibility, Levinas says, each of us still bears this

responsibility to the other. It is an absolute and unreserved responsibility that preempts

any construction of justice and conscious intervention. It applies to all of us, unlike the

Madhyamikan notion of some subset of humanity who have taken bodhisattva vows.

Although reaching further, the universality of Levinas' approach may be less "practical."

In interviews Levinas has acknowledged that he uses the word "ethics" differently from

other philosophers, and this set of ethics is not always applicable to daily life

(Bernasconi, 1988:581). This acknowledgement would seem to indicate his philosophy is

more "descriptive" than "prescriptive." Furthermore, Levinas' responsibility is pre-

conscious, possibly even unconscious. However, this has not prevented others from

attempting to apply his concepts to politics, sociology, or a more "practical" ethics.

In comparing responsibility and bodhisattvic compassion, the initial stage will be to detail

how Levinas deconstruction of subject/object duality lays the foundation for his views

on responsibility. Then the Madhyamikan point of view is examined and shown to be

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similarly rooted in the overcoming of subject/object duality on the road to living the

compassionate ideal of the bodhisattvas. The similaritieswhich are extensiveof

Levinas and Madhyamikas approaches will be reviewed, and the inevitable differences

pointed out, differences that do not greatly detract from the general parallels drawn.

Emmanuel Levinas belief in our responsibility to the other can be traced to his rejection

of an illusory subject/object duality. This rejection leads him to substitute a relationship

that escapes the structures of subject-object, signifier-signified, saying-said correlation

(Levinas, 2000:148). The illusion of an independent Self collapses when confronted by

the Infinite. No theme, no present, has a capacity for the Infinite, he writes (Levinas,

2000:146). Under the weight of its confrontation with the Infinite, or the other, the Self or

the same takes on the responsibility of fulfilling the needs of the other: The same in its

bearing as same is more and more extended to the other, to the point of substitution as a

hostage (Levinas, 2000:146). This responsibility is involuntary and passive: The

condition of being hostage is not chosen; if there had been a choice, the subject would

have kept his as-for-me, and the exits found in inner life. But this subjectivity, his very

psyche, is for the other, his very bearing independence consists in supporting the other,

expiating for him (Levinas, 2000:136). Responsibility is not a conscious decision: The

inscription of the order in the for-the-other of obedience is an anarchic being affected,

which slips into me like a thief through the outstretched nets of consciousness

(Levinas, 2000:148). Because the distinction between subject and object is foregone,

responsibility entails compassion:

The difference in proximity between the one and the other, between me and a
neighbor, turns into non-indifference, precisely into my responsibility. Non-

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 indifference, humanity, the-one-for-the-other is the very signifyingness of
signification, the intelligibility of the intelligible, and thus reason. The non-
indifference of responsibility to the point of substitution for the neighbor is the
source of all compassion. (Levinas, 2000:66)

Levinas distinguishes between this compassion and justice: Out of representation is

produced the order of justice moderating or measuring the substitution of me for the

other, and giving the self over to calculus (Levinas, 2000:158-159). And out of this

compassion, this substitution, this responsibility for the other, comes release from the

chains of the ego: Substitution frees the subject from ennui, that is, from the

enchainment to itself, where the ego suffocates in itself due to the tautological way of

identity, and ceaselessly seeks after the distraction of games and sleep in a movement that

never wears out (Levinas, 2000:124).

Centuries before, the Mahayanist Buddhists developed their concept of the bodhisattva

grounded in the Madhyamikan concept of sunyata, which has many definitions but

implies the lack of an independent, separate reality inherent to any object:

The unfolding of the Mahayana marked a decisive phase in the history of the
Buddhist tradition. Against earlier forms of Buddhism the Mahayana
represented a metaphysical shift from a radical pluralism to an absolutism
anchored in the doctrine of sunyata; epistemologically, through Nagarjunas
Madhyamika, the Mahayana moved from a psychologically-oriented
empiricism to a mode of dialectical criticism; ethically the centre of gravity
shifted from the arhat ideal of private salvation to that of the bodhisattva, one
attuned to the universal deliverance of all beings down to the last blade of
grass. (Oldmeadow, 1997:181)

According to Oldmeadow, The bodhisattva is one who voluntarily renounces the right to

enter nirvana, who, under certain inextinguishable vows, undergoes countless rebirths in

the samsaric realm in order to devote his/her energies, in a spirit of boundless

compassion, to the deliverance of all beings [...] (Oldmeadow, 1997:183). He adds, The

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attainment of insight into sunyata makes possible the compassionate mission of the

bodhisattva, unhindered by dualistic misconceptions (Oldmeadow, 1997:185).

Oldmeadow further details the relationship of insight into sunyata and development along

the path of the bodhisattva: In the Mahayanist perspective karuna (compassion) is

inseparable from prajnainsight into sunyata which, for the moment, we can translate in

conventional fashion as emptiness or voidness (Oldmeadow, 1997:186). However, to

avoid the egoic attachment of the subject to this insight of prajna, Ultimately, karuna is

identified not only with prajna but with sunyata itself. This is so because the duality of

knower and known must be transcended (Oldmeadow, 1997:187).

Francis Brassard explores the notion of bodhicittathe bodhisattvas desire to serve

othersas explained by Santideva, a Madhyamika philosopher. Brassard examines two

traditional stages of bodhicitta: The first type is called bodhipranidhicitta and can be

translated as the resolution to attain Bodhi [awakening] and the second,

bodhiprasthanacitta, as progression toward the attainment of Bodhi (Brassard,

1996:51). Brassard rejects the view that an active will or desire is involved in the second

stage, the progression. In his analysis of Santidevas work, he comes to the conclusion

that the efforts given to help all sentient beings are not the product of a desire but rather

the result of having reached a certain spiritual stage (Brassard, 1996:59). Referring to

the many passages in Mahayana literature exploring self-sacrifice of the historical

Buddha or of bodhisattvas, Brassard writes:

What transpires from such passages is not the idea of strong will or intense
motivation on the part of the Bodhisattva, but rather, an attitude or readiness.
This readiness does not seem to be the result of an active effort of renunciation
similar to that given by a smoker trying to stop smoking, but, on the contrary,

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 it appears to be a natural disposition of the mind. It is something that is or
ought to be done quite effortlessly. (Brassard, 1996:60)

Again relying on textual citations, Brassard writes, The idea of readiness is further

emphasized by the fact that it is not the Bodhisattva who initiates the action of giving but

rather those who are in need (Brassard, 1996:60). Brassard concludes:

Given these examples, I am of the opinion that it would be wrong again to

interpret the generous attitude of the Bodhisattva on account of his willpower
or even his commitment to the final goal. Instead, his readiness to give up parts
of his body for the sake of others could be explained by the fact that he or she
has attained a state of mind characterized by the absence of a lack of
motivation. (Brassard, 1996:61)

Brassard states that feelings of joy and contentment are related to the self-sacrificing

attitude of the Bodhisattva and not a product of strong will (Brassard, 1996:63). Once

a particular spiritual level has been reached, an act of will or a commitment, as

mentioned earlier, does not have any role to play; as a matter of fact, it might be

counterproductive because it reinforces the distinction between subject and object

(Brassard, 1996:64).

Rounding out our examination of the ethics of the bodhisattva is Peter Harveys account.

He connects the Buddhist principle of co-dependent arising, which states that all

phenomena are related, to the Madhyamikan concept of sunyata:

Nothing exists absolutely, with an absolute nature; things only arise in a

mutually conditioning network of processes. A key feature of each process,
and the network as a whole, is its emptiness (sunyata): its lack of inherent,
substantial existence. This is also expressed by saying that all the dharmas
[which Harvey earlier defined as changing mental and physical processes]
lack any nature of their own except this shared quality of emptiness: the
sameness of all dharmas. (Harvey, 2000:124)

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From this postulated interdependence, Santideva persuasively draws on such ideas to

argue that indifference to the suffering of others is as absurd as indifference to ones

own suffering (Harvey, 2000:125).

Hence it can be seen in both Levinas responsibility and the Madhyamikans compassion

of the bodhisattvas that a deconstruction of subject/object duality leads to a rather similar

responsibility or compassion for the other. The breaking down of this duality is not a

conceptual affair but rather is preconscious or intuitivealthough in the case of the

bodhisattvas there are vows, obviously conscious, that are taken first. Nonetheless, true

progress on the bodhisatvic path is not rooted in conscious acts of willnor is conscious

will a central feature of Levinas responsibility. As we have seen, Levinas vividly

sketches a picture of the Self held hostage by the other in light of the

incomprehensibility of the other or the Infinite. The Self as seen by Levinas expresses

itself most fully in meeting the needs of the other, just as the bodhisattva expresses

compassion through a non-volitional self-sacrifice. In neither case is this expression of

compassion dependent on justice or other conscious frameworks. Instead, intuitively

grasping the illusory nature of the subject/object dualism leads to recognizing the needs

of the other as the responsibility of the Self.

Of course there are differences in these approaches. As with Buddhism in general,

Madhyamika sees in sunyata the end to all dualism. Levinas is more ambiguous. Peter C.

Blum says Levinas rejects Kantian dualism in which the intelligibility of the world [is

placed] entirely within the confines of subjectivity (Blum, 2000: 95) but Levinas retains

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some elements of Cartesian dualism in his indebtedness to the idea of God (or, as he

refers to it, the idea of infinity) in Ren Descartess Meditationsan idea from which he

draws primary inspiration for his account of the Other (Blum, 2000: 99). Although

Levinas rejects the Cartesian notion of a self-reliant subject, there remain traces of a

Western dualism in his thought.

Levinas presents his analysis of the human condition as a universalhe makes no

exceptions. The path of the bodhisattva, and the notion of the bodhisattvas compassion,

is a notion limited to those who have taken the vows of the bodhisattva. These spiritual

adepts demonstrate their compassion in daily life. Levinas approach to responsibility is

that our responsibility endures even if it is not displayed. In Blums words:

Further, my responsibility is not eliminated even if I eliminate the Other

physically. The face commands me not to murder; that I am capable of
breaking this command does not silence it. That there is an Other means that I
am perhaps not the center of the universe after all and that I am not the only
one who might possess all that I possess. To go on as if I were the center, as if
I were the only possessor, would be to position myself over against the Other
in a way that would necessarily impact the Other. I did not know I was so
rich, but I no longer have the right to keep anything for myself. Metaphysical
desire is as much a compassion and a generosity as an appetite. (Blum, 2000:
111)

So in Levinas there is a universal, but often hidden, responsibility. In comparison, the

compassion of the bodhisattvas may be hoped for as an ideal for all humanity, but by

definition the compassion of the bodhisattvas is seen only in that limited group of people

who choose the bodhisattvic path.

Tracing these philosophical systems separated in time and space, one is left with the unity

of belief in the illusion of subject/object duality and the road to responsibility or

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compassion that this leads to. Levinas explicitly incorporate the idea of compassion in his

notion of responsibility, and in turn the bodhisattvic compassion entails a responsibility

for the other with self-sacrificing dedication. Although Levinas and the Madhyamika

school of Buddhism differ in the details, the tight connection between the dismissal of

this duality and compassion for the other remains. It is perhaps yet another indication of

an enduring ethical and spiritual meaning that underlies all systems of thought: transcend

the ego, a selfless compassion results. Here we have two systems of thought, roads that

lead if not to the same mountain, at least to peaks from which very similar views may be

seen.

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Bibliography:

Bernasconi, R. & Wood, D. 1988. The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other.
London: Routledge.

Blum, P.C. 2000. Overcoming Relativism? Levinass Return to Platonism. The Journal of
Religious Ethics, 28(1): 91-117.

Brassard, F. 1996. The concept of bodhicitta in Sntideva's Bodhicaryvatra. Doctoral

dissertation. Montreal: McGill University.

Harvey, P. 2000. An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Levinas, E. 2000. Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Pittsburg: Duquesne

University Press.

Oldmeadow, H. 1997. Delivering the last blade of grass: Aspects of the Bodhisattva
ideal in the Mahayana. Asian Philosophy, 7(3), 181194.

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