SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO THE 2015 REMEDIAL LAW BAR EXAMINATION

I. Lender extended to Borrower a P100,000.00 loan covered by a promissory note. Later, Borrower
obtained another P100,000.00 loan again covered by a promissory note. Still later, Borrower
obtained a P300,000.00 loan secured by a real estate mortgage on his land valued at P500,000.00.
Borrower defaulted on his payments when the loans matured. Despite demand to pay the
P500,000.00 loan, Borrower refused to pay. Lender, applying the totality rule, filed against
Borrower with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a collection suit for P500,000.00.

a. Did Lender correctly apply the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes of action? (2%)
At the trial, Borrower's lawyer, while cross-examining Lender, successfully elicited an
admission from the latter that the two promissory notes have been paid. Thereafter,
Borrower's lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that as proven only
P300,000.00 was the amount due to Lender and which claim is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. He further argued that lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
b. Should the court dismiss the case? (3%)

Answers:

a) Yes Lender correctly applied the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes of action.

Under the rule on joinder of causes of action, a party may in one pleading assert as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party. Under the totality rule, where the claims
in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall
be the test of jurisdiction.

Here the causes of action by Lender are all against borrower and all the claims are principally for
recovery of money.

Hence the aggregate amount claimed, which is P500,000 shall be the test of jurisdiction and
thus it is the RTC of Manila which has jurisdiction.

Although the rules on joinder of causes of action state that the joinder shall not include
special civil actions, the remedy resorted to with respect to the third loan was not foreclosure but
collection. Hence joinder of causes of action would still be proper.

b) No, the court should not dismiss the case.

The Supreme Court has held that subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the amount of
the claim alleged in the complaint and not the amount substantiated during the trial. (Dionisio v
Sioson Puerto, 31 October 1974).

Here the amount claimed was P500,000. Even if the claim substantiated during the trial was
only P300,000 that is not determinative of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Hence the argument that lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time is
misplaced since in the first place the RTC has jurisdiction.

II. Circe filed with the RTC a complaint for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage against siblings Scylla
and Charybdis, co-owners of the property and cosignatories to the mortgage deed. The siblings
permanently reside in Athens,
Greece. Circe tipped off Sheriff Pluto that Scylla is on a balikbayan trip and is billeted at the Century Plaza
Hotel in Pasay City. Sheriff Pluto went to the hotel and personally served Scylla the summons, but the latter
refused to receive summons for Charybdis as she was not authorized to do so. Sheriff Pluto requested Scylla
for the email address and fax number of Charybdis which the latter readily gave. Sheriff Pluto, in his return of
the summons, stated that "Summons for Scylla was served personally as shown by her signature on the
receiving copy of the summons. Summons on Charybdis was served pursuant to the amendment of Rule 14 by
facsimile transmittal of the summons and complaint on defendant's fax number as evidenced by transmission
verification report automatically generated by the fax machine indicating that it was received by the fax
number to which it was sent on the date and time indicated therein." Circe, sixty (60) days after her receipt of
Sheriff Pluto's return, filed a Motion to Declare Charybdis in default as Charybdis did not file any responsive
pleading.

a.) Should the court declare Charybdis in default? (2%) Scylla seasonably filed her answer setting
forth therein as a defense that Charybdis had paid the mortgage debt.

b.) On the premise that Charybdis was properly declared in default, what is the effect of Scylla's
answer to the complaint? (2%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, the court should not declare Charybdis in default.

Under the Rules of Court, the amendment of Rule 14 allowing service of summons by facsimile
transmittal refers only to service of summons upon a foreign private juridical entity under Section 12 of Rule
14, not to a non-resident defendant under Section 15 of Rule 14. Service of summons by facsimile cannot be
effected under Section 15 unless leave of court was obtained specifically permitting service by facsimile
transmittal.

Here the defendant is not a foreign private juridical entity but a non-resident defendant and no leave
of court was obtained to serve summons by facsimile.

Hence there was no valid service of summons and thus the court could not declare Charybdis in
default.

b) The effect of Scyllas answer to the complaint is that the court shall try the case against both Scylla
and Charybdis upon the answer filed by Scylla.

Under Section 3(c) of Rule 9, when a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against
several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case
against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.

Here there was a common cause of action against Scylla and Charybdis since both were co-signatories
to the mortgage deed.

Hence the court should not render judgment by default against Charybdis but should proceed to try the
case upon the answer filed and the evidence presented by Scylla.

IV. Strauss filed a complaint against Wagner for cancellation of title. Wagner moved to dismiss the complaint
because Grieg, to whom he mortgaged the property as duly annotated in the TCT, was not impleaded as
defendant.

a.) Should the complaint be dismissed? (3%)

 b.) If the case should proceed to trial without Grieg being impleaded as aparty to the case, what is his
remedy to protect his interest? (2%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, the complaint should not be dismissed.

The Supreme Court has held that non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground of a motion
to dismiss. (Vesagas v. CA, 371 SCRA 508).

Here although Grieg, the registered mortgagee, is an indispensable party (Metrobank v. Alejo, 364 SCRA
813 [2001]), his non-joinder does not warrant the dismissal of the complaint.

b) The remedy of Grieg is to file a motion for leave to intervene.

Under Rule 19, a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation may intervene in the action.
Here Grieg is a mortgagee and such fact was annotated in the title. Hence he has a legal interest in the title
subject-matter of the litigation and may thus intervene in the case.

VII. Plaintiff sued defendant for collection of P1 million based on the latter's promissory note. The
complaint alleges, among others:

1) Defendant borrowed P1 million from plaintiff as evidenced by a duly executed promissory note;

2) The promissory note reads:

"Makati, Philippines
Dec. 30, 2014

For value received from plaintiff, defendant promises to pay

plaintiff P1 million, twelve (12) months from the above indicated
date without necessity of demand.

Signed
Defendant"

A copy of the promissory note is attached as Annex "A." Defendant, in his verified answer, alleged
among others:

1) Defendant specifically denies the allegation in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint, the truth
being defendant did not execute any promissory note in favor of plaintiff, or

2) Defendant has paid the P1 million claimed in the promissory note (Annex "A" of the Complaint) as
evidenced by an
"Acknowledgment Receipt" duly executed by plaintiff on January 30, 2015 in Manila with his spouse
signing as
witness. A copy of the "Acknowledgment Receipt" is attached as Annex "1" hereof.
 Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that defendant's answer failed to
tender an issue as the allegations therein on his defenses are sham for being inconsistent; hence, no defense
at all. Defendant filed an opposition claiming his answer tendered an issue.

a.) Is judgment on the pleadings proper? (3%)

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there are no longer any triable
genuine issues of facts.

b.) Should the court grant defendant's motion for summary judgment? (3%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, judgment on the pleadings is not proper.

Under Section 2 of Rule 8, a party may set forth two or more statements of a defense alternatively or
hypothetically. The Supreme Court has held that inconsistent defenses may be pleaded alternatively or
hypothetically provided that each defense is consistent with itself. (Baclayon v. Court of Appeals, 26
February 1990).

Hence Plaintiffs contention that defendants answer failed to tender an issue as his defenses are sham
for being inconsistent is without merit.

b) Yes, the court should grant Defendants motion for summary judgment.

Under Section 2 of Rule 35, a defendant may at any time, move with supporting admissions for a
summary judgment in his favor.

Here the Plaintiff had impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of the acknowledgment
receipt, which was the basis of Defendants defense, by failing to specifically deny it under oath.

Hence the Defendant may move for a summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff had admitted that
Defendant had already paid the P1 million obligation.

VIII. Aldrin entered into a contract to sell with Neil over a parcel of land. The contract stipulated a
P500,000.00 down payment upon signing and the balance payable in twelve (12) monthly installments of
P100,000.00. Aldrin paid the down payment and had paid three (3) monthly installments when he found out
that Neil had sold the same property to Yuri for P1.5 million paid in cash. Aldrin sued Neil for specific
performance with damages with the RTC. Yuri, with leave of court, filed an answer-in-intervention as he had
already obtained a TCT in his name.

After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering Aldrin to pay all the instalments due, the cancellation of
Yuri's title, and Neil to execute a deed of sale in favor of Aldrin. When the judgment became final and
executory, Aldrin paid Neil all the installments but the latter refused to execute the deed of sale in favor of the
former.

Aldrin filed a "Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution" with proper notice of hearing. The petition
alleged, among others, that the decision had become final and executory and he is entitled to the issuance of
the writ of execution as a matter of right. Neil filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it
lacked the required certification against forum shopping.
 a.) Should the court grant Neil's Motion to Dismiss? (3%) Despite the issuance of the writ of
execution directing Neil to execute the deed of sale in favor of Aldrin, the former obstinately refused
to execute the deed.

b.) What is Aldrin's remedy? (2%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, the court should not grant Neils Motion to Dismiss.

Under Section 5 of Rule 7, a certification against forum shopping is required only for initiatory
pleadings or petitions.

Here the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, although erroneously denominated as
a petition is actually a motion for issuance of a writ of execution under Rule 39.

Hence the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of a certification against forum shopping should be
denied.

b) Aldrins remedy is to file a motion for judgment for specific act under Section 10(a) of Rule 39.

Under Section 10(a) of Rule 39, if a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land and the
party fails to comply, the court may direct the act to be done at the disobedient partys cost by some other
person appointed by the court or the court may by an order divest the title of the party and vest it in the
movant or other person.

XIII. Jaime was convicted for murder by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in a decision promulgated on
September 30, 2015. On October 5, 2015, Jaime filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground that errors of law
and irregularities prejudicial to his rights were committed during his trial. On October 7, 2015, the private
prosecutor, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, filed an Opposition to Jaime's motion. On October 9,
2015, the court granted Jaime's motion. On October 12, 2015, the public prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration. The court issued an Order dated October 16, 2015 denying the public prosecutor's motion
for reconsideration. The public prosecutor received his copy of the order of denial on October 20, 2015 while
the private prosecutor received his copy on October 26, 2015.

a.) What is the remedy available to the prosecution from the court's order granting Jaime's motion
for new trial? (3%)

b.) In what court and within what period should a remedy be availed of? (1%)

c.) Who should pursue the remedy? (2%)

ANSWERS:

a) The remedy available to the prosecution from the court's order granting Jaime's motion for new trial
is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
 Under Section 1(b) of Rule 41, no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order and the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65.

Here the order granting the motion for new trial is an interlocutory order since it does not completely
dispose of the case but still leaves something to be done, that is, conducting the new trial.

Hence the available remedy is the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

b) The special civil action for certiorari should be filed with the Court of Appeals. It should be
filed within 60 days from receipt by the public prosecutor of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 65. The 60-day period should be reckoned from the receipt by
the public prosecutor who has the direction and control of the prosecution pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 110.

c) The remedy should be pursued by the Office of the Solicitor General.

Under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, the authority to
represent the government in criminal cases before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court is vested solely in
the Office of the Solicitor General. (Cario v. De Castro, 30 April 2008).

SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO 2014 REMEDIAL LAW BAR EXAM

1. An order of the court requiring a retroactive re-dating of an order, judgment or document filing be entered
or recorded in a judgment is: (1%)

(A) pro hac vice

(B) non pro tunc

(C) confession relicta verificatione

(D) nolle prosequi

ANSWER:

(B) (Note: Should be nunc pro tunc.).

V.

Landlord, a resident of Quezon City, entered into a lease contract with Tenant, a resident of Marikina City,
over a residential house in Las Pias City. The lease contract provided, among others, for a monthly rental of
P25,000.00, plus ten percent (10%) interest rate in case of non-payment on its due date. Subsequently,
Landlord migrated to the United States of America (USA) but granted in favor of his sister Maria, a special
power of attorney to manage the property and file and defend suits over the property rented out to Tenant.
Tenant failed to pay the rentals due for five (5) months. Maria asks your legal advice on how she can
expeditiously collect from Tenant the unpaid rentals plus interests due. (6%)

`(A) What judicial remedy would you recommend to Maria?

(B) Where is the proper venue of the judicial remedy which you recommended?
(C) If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, when do you reckon the one (1)-year period
within which to file the action?

ANSWERS:

(A)

The judicial remedy that I would recommend to Maria is to file a collection suit for the P125,000 rentals
in arrears and the P12,500 interest due. The remedy would be expeditious since it would be governed by the
Rules on Summary Procedure as the amount of the demand, excluding interest, does not exceed P200,000.

(B)

The proper venue of the collection suit would be in Marikina City, where Tenant resides.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, venue in personal actions is with the residence of either the
plaintiff or the defendant, at the plaintiffs election.

Since the Plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, venue may be laid only in Marikina City where the
defendant Tenant resides.

(C)

If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, the one-year period within which to file the
action shall be reckoned from the expiration of 5-days from notice of the last demand to pay and
vacate. (Cruz v. Atencio, 28 February 1959; Sy Oh v. Garcia, 30 June 1969).

VI.

As a rule, courts may not grant an application for provisional remedy without complying with the
requirements of notice and hearing. These requirements, however, may be dispensed with in an
application for: (1%)

(A) writ of preliminary injunction

(B) writ for preliminary attachment

(C) an order granting support pendente lite

(D) a writ of replevin

IX.

Bayani, an overseas worker based in Dubai, issued in favor of Agente, a special power of attorney to sell his
house and lot. Agente was able to sell the property but failed to remit the proceeds to Bayani, as agreed upon.
On his return to the Philippines, Bayani, by way of a demand letter duly received by Agente, sought to recover
the amount due him. Agente failed to return the amount as he had used it for the construction of his own
house.

Thus, Bayani filed an action against Agente for sum of money with damages. Bayani subsequently filed an ex-
parte motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment duly supported by an affidavit. The court
granted the ex-parte motion and issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon Bayanis posting of the
required bond. Bayani prayed that the courts sheriff be deputized to serve and implement the writ of
attachment. On November 19, 2013, the Sheriff served upon Agente the writ of attachment and levied on the
latters house and lot. On November 20, 2013, the Sheriff served on Agente summons and a copy of the
complaint. On November 22, 2013, Agente filed an Answer with Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment
alleging that at the time the writ of preliminary attachment was issued, he has not been served with summons
and, therefore, it was improperly issued. (4%)

(A) Is Agente correct?

(B) Was the writ of preliminary attachment properly executed?

ANSWERS:

(A)

No, Agente is not correct.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a writ of attachment may issue even before service of summons upon the
defendant. (S2 R57).

(B)

No, the writ of preliminary attachment not properly executed.

Under S5 R57, no levy on preliminary attachment shall be enforced unless there is prior or simultaneous
service of the summons and the accompanying papers. (S5 R The Supreme Court has held that subsequent
service of summons will not cure the irregularity that attended the enforcement of the writ (Onate v. Abrogar,
23 February 1995).

Here the sheriff levied upon the house and lot prior to the service of the summons and the complaint upon
Agente. Hence the writ of preliminary attachment was not properly executed. The subsequent service of
summons and the complaint did not cure the irregularity in the enforcement of the writ.

XIV.

When a Municipal Trial Court (MTC), pursuant to its delegated jurisdiction, renders an adverse judgment in
an application for land registration, the aggrieved partys remedy is: (1%)

(A) ordinary appeal to the Regional Trial Court

(B) petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court

(C) ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals

(D) petition for review to the Court of Appeals

ANSWER:
(C) (See Sec. 34, B.P. Blg. 129)

XVI.

Plaintiff filed a complaint denominated as accion publiciana, against defendant. In his answer, defendant
alleged that he had no interest over the land in question, except as lessee of Z. Plaintiff subsequently filed an
affidavit of Z, the lessor of defendant, stating that Z had sold to plaintiff all his rights and interests in the
property as shown by a deed of transfer attached to the affidavit. Thus, plaintiff may ask the court to render:
(1%)

(A) summary judgment

(B) judgment on the pleadings

(C) partial judgment

(D) judgment by default

ANSWER:

(A) (S1 & 3, R35)

XIX.

A vicarious admission is considered an exception to the hearsay rule. It, however, does not cover: (1%)

(A) admission by a conspirator

(B) admission by a privy

(C) judicial admission

(D) adoptive admission

(C) Note: a vicarious admission is an extrajudicial admission. Hence C is not covered by the rule regarding
vicarious admissions.

XXII.

Which of the following decisions may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court (SC)? (Assume that the
issues to be raised on appeal involve purely questions of law) (1%)

(A) Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

(B) Decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

(C) Decision of the Civil Service Commission.

(D) Decision of the Office of the President.

ANSWER:
 (B) Note: In an appeal from RTC judgment in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the appeal should be to
the CA even if the questions are only legal. Hence A should be excluded. (S2[c] R42).

XXV.

Mr. Boaz filed an action for ejectment against Mr. Jachin before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Mr.
Jachin actively participated in every stage of the proceedings knowing fully well that the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the action. In his mind, Mr. Jachin was thinking that if the MeTC rendered judgment against
him, he could always raise the issue on the jurisdiction of the MeTC. After trial, the MeTC rendered judgment
against Mr. Jachin. What is the remedy of Mr. Jachin? (1%)

(A) File an appeal

(B) File an action for nullification of judgment

(C) File a motion for reconsideration

(D) File a petition for certiorari under Rule 65

ANSWER:

(A) See S8 R40. R47 is not available since appeal is still available. Not C since a prohibited pleading.

XXVI.

Parole evidence is an: (1%)

(A) agreement not included in the document

(B) oral agreement not included in the document

(C) agreement included in the document

(D) oral agreement included in the document

ANSWER:

(A) Note: It is suggested that either A or B be considered as correct. Strictly speaking parol evidence does
not have to be an agreement; it is simply any evidence, whether written or oral, which is not contained in a
written agreement subject of a case and which seeks to modify, alter, or explain the terms of the written
agreement.

XXVII.

Mr. Avenger filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against Ms. Bright for annulment of deed of
sale and other documents. Ms. Bright filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of
action. Mr. Avenger filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. State and discuss the appropriate
remedy/remedies under each of the following situations: (6%)
(A) If the RTC grants Ms. Brights motion to dismiss and dismisses the complaint on the ground of lack of
cause of action, what will be the remedy/remedies of Mr. Avenger?

(B) If the RTC denies Ms. Brights motion to dismiss, what will be her remedy/remedies?

(C) If the RTC denies Ms. Brights motion to dismiss and, further proceedings, including trial on the merits, are
conducted until the RTC renders a decision in favor of Mr. Avenger, what will be the remedy/remedies of Ms.
Bright?

ANSWERS:

(A)

If the RTC grants Ms. Brightss motion to dismiss, the remedies of Mr. Avenger are:

(a) File a motion for reconsideration under Rule 37.

(b) Re-file the complaint. The dismissal does not bar the re-filing of the case (S5 R16).

(c) Appeal from the order of dismissal. The dismissal order is a final order as it completely disposes of the
case; hence it is appealable.

(d) File an amended complaint as a matter of right curing the defect of lack of cause of action before the
dismissal order becomes final. This is because a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading; hence Mr.
Avenger can amend the complaint as a matter of right. (S2 R10).

(B)

If the RTC denies Ms. Brights motion to dismiss, her remedies are:

(a) File a motion for reconsideration.

(b) Proceed to trial and if she loses, appeal and assign the failure to dismiss as a reversible error.

(c) File a special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus if the denial of the order to dismiss is made with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.

(C)

If the RTC renders a decision in favor of Mr. Avenger, Ms. Brights remedies are:

(a) File a motion for reconsideration or new trial under Rule 37.

(b) File an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41.

(c) File an appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 if the appeal will raise only questions of law.

(d) File a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38.

(e) File an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction.
XXIX.

Estrella was the registered owner of a huge parcel of land located in a remote part of their barrio in Benguet.
However, when she visited the property after she took a long vacation abroad, she was surprised to see that
her childhood friend, John, had established a vacation house on her property.

Both Estrella and John were residents of the same barangay. To recover possession, Estrella filed a complaint
for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), alleging that she is the true owner of the land as
evidenced by her certificate of title and tax declaration which showed the assessed value of the property as
P21,000.00. On the other hand, John refuted Estrellas claim of ownership and submitted in evidence a Deed of
Absolute Sale between him and Estrella. After the filing of Johns answer, the MTC observed that the real issue
was one of ownership and not of possession. Hence, the MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal by Estrella to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a full-blown trial was conducted as if the case was
originally filed with it. The RTC reasoned that based on the assessed value of the property, it was the court of
proper jurisdiction. Eventually, the RTC rendered a judgment declaring John as the owner of the land and,
hence, entitled to the possession thereof. (4%)

(A) Was the MTC correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction? Why or why not?

(B) Was the RTC correct in ruling that based on the assessed value of the property, the case was within its
original jurisdiction and, hence, it may conduct a full-blown trial of the appealed case as if it was originally
filed with it? Why or why not?

ANSWERS:

(A)

No, the MTC was not correct in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
has held that an allegation of ownership as a defense in the answer will not oust the MTC of jurisdiction in
an ejectment case. (Subano v. Vallecer, 24 March 1959). What determines subject-matter jurisdiction is the
allegations in the complaint and not those in the answer. Furthermore, the MTC is empowered under S16
R70 to resolve the issue of ownership, albeit for the purpose only of resolving the issue of possession.

(B)

No the RTC was not correct in ruling that the case was within its original jurisdiction and that hence it
may conduct a full-blown trial of the appealed case as if it were originally filed with it.

Under S8 R40, if an appeal is taken from an MTC order dismissing a case for lack of jurisdiction without
a trial on the merits, the RTC on appeal may affirm the dismissal order and if it has jurisdiction thereover, try
the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it.

Here the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case since it is an ejectment suit cognizable exclusively
by the MTC. The assessed value of the land is irrelevant for the purpose of determining jurisdiction in
ejectment suits and would not oust the MTC of jurisdiction in the same manner as allegations of ownership
would not oust the MTC of jurisdiction.

The RTC should have reversed the dismissal order and remanded the case to the MTC for further
proceedings. (S8 R40).