Canvassing, Pre-Proclamation Controversy, Proclamation

1. Codilla vs De Venecia, et al.

Facts:
Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was
filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned
by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte,
for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codillas name remained in the
list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was
suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered disqualified.
Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently
took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of
Locsins proclamation.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative.
2. Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally elected Representative.
Ruling:
1. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the
petitioner.
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his
proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order
of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of
the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
2. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which has no jurisdiction in the instant case.
The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has
assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives,
could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements
themselves. This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a
division or en banc.
The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question.
There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having
obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that
respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide
margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the
winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless unproclaimed candidate.
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a petition
for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant
the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which
an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got
53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin;
on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the
petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision
has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the
COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by
all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

2. Guiao vs COMELEC
Facts:
After the canvass of the returns for assemblyman in Pampanga, petitioner Ben Guiao, who lost, submitted his written
objections to the inclusion of several returns in the canvass. He asked that a subpoena be issued to the members of the citizens
election committee. The Board of Canvassers denied the request for the subpoena and dismissed the objections for failure of
petitioner to substantiate them and proclaimed the winners. Petitioner questioned the proclamation of the private respondent but
did not question the proclamation of other winners who belonged to his political party.
Issue:
Whether or not the BOC should issue a subpoena.
Ruling:
Petitioner cannot challenge the proclamation of any one of the candidates. The proclamation cannot be void as to one and
valid with respect to the others. The written objection of the petitioner were not timely presented. The time to object in writing in
any election return is when it is being examined by the board of canvassers. The board of canvassers was correct in refusing to
subpoena the members of the citizen election committee. The function of the board of canvassers is purely ministerial. To have
acceded to the request of the petitioner would have made the board a hearing body to ascertain the issue of duress and other
irregularities alleged by petitioner.

3. Lee vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Sally A. Lee (Lee) and respondent Leovic R. Dioneda (Dioneda) were candidates for Mayor of Sorsogon City.
During the canvassing of the election returns, counsel for Dioneda moved for the exclusion of Election Return No. 41150266 for
Precinct No. 28A2 from Barangay Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City on the ground that no entries were made for the position of
congressman and that Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) watchers were utilized to fill up election returns.
The Board of Canvassers (BOC) ruled in favor of Lee on the ground that the questioned election return was clear and regular
on its face, the BOC then proclaimed Lee as the winning candidate for Mayor of Sorsogon City. Dioneda then filed a petition to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for annulment of Lees proclamation and the exclusion of the questioned election return.
The COMELEC Second Division granted Dionedas petition and accordingly excluded the questioned return from the canvass
and nullified the proclamation of Lee. Lee filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC En Banc.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in annulling Lees proclamation and excluded the questioned
election return
Ruling:
Lee argues that as the case at bar is a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the
election returns and is without jurisdiction to go [beyond] or behind them and investigate election irregularitie, citing the case of
Loong v. Commission on Elections.
The doctrine cited by Lee presupposes that the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face.
Where, as in the case at bar, there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the
questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis for the
exclusion of the questioned election return.
The doctrine that COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go behind
them and investigate election irregularities presupposes that the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their
face hence, if there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the questioned
election return, the doctrine does not apply.

4. Lagumbay vs COMELEC
Facts:
This petition prays for revision of an order of the Commission on Elections declining to reject the returns of certain
precincts of some municipalities in Mindanao. The Constitution provides for review by this Court of the rulings of the said
Commission.
The matter being urgent, and having reached the conclusion that the returns of certain questioned precincts were
"obviously manufactured" In each precinct the number of registered voters equaled the number of ballots and the number of votes
reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party, the party in power, whereas, all the Nacionalista Party
got exactly zero.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC was correct in not rejecting obviously manufactured election returns of certain questioned
precincts.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is no such thing as block voting now-a-days. The election returns showing
all 8 candidates of the Liberal party getting all the votes, with each one of them getting the same number of votes while the 8
nacionalista candidates got zero are evidently false or fabricated because of the inherent improbability of such a result. It is against
statistical improbabilities especially because at least 1 vote should have been received by the Nacionalista candidates, i.e. the
Nacionalista inspector. While it is possible that the inspector did not like his partys senatorial live-up, it is not, however, possible
that he disliked all of such candidates and it is also not likely that he favoured all the 8 candidates of the Liberal party. Hence, most
probably, he was made to sign an obviously false return by force or duress. If he signed voluntarily, then he betrayed his party and
any voting or counting of ballots was a fraud and a mockery of the popular will. Rejecting such returns on the ground that they are
manifestly fabricated or falsified would constitute a practical approach to the COMELECs mission to insure a free and honest
election.

5. Castromayor vs COMELEC
Facts:
Castromayor was declared and proclaimed winner in an election contest held in1995 in Calinog, Iloilo, taking the 8 th
Sangguniang Bayan seat. When the chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers rechecked the totals of the Statement of Votes,
there was some disparity and it appeared that another candidate, Demorito has more votes than Castromayor and the reason was
that votes from one (1) precinct was overlooked. She thereafter sent a fax to the COMELEC requesting that the MBC be reconvened
for purposes of rectifying the error and annulling the proclamation of Castromayor and proclaim Demorito as the 8 th member of the
Saggunian.
The COMELEC then issued aresolution based on the request. Petitioner then assailed the resolution of the COMELEC.
Petitioner contends that he was denied due process since the issue involves a preproclamation controversy and he should be
entitled to notice and hearing so that he can be afforded an opportunity to refute the allegations. Petitioner contests the Resolution
of the COMELEC which was based on a fax letter sent by Garin.
Issue:
Whether or not the resolution is valid and that the proclamation of petitioner is valid.
Ruling:
What the COMELEC resolution contemplates is a hearing before the MBC at which petitioner will be heard on his objection
and that only if warranted will the MBC be authorized to set aside the proclamation of petitioner previously made. In its notice to
the candidates, the MBC did not state that it was going to reconvene to annul petitioner's proclamation and make a new one but
only that it was going to do so "for the correction of the errors noted in the Statement of Votes per Precinct/Municipality. The
Statement of Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and of the proclamation, any error in the statement ultimately
affects the validity of the proclamation. It begs the question, therefore, to say that this is not a pre-proclamation controversy and
the procedure for pre-proclamation controversies cannot be applied to the correction in the computation of the totals in the
Statement of Votes. What is involved here is a simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per
precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In making the correction in computation, the
MBC will be acting in an administrative capacity, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Hence any question pertaining
to the proceedings of the MBC may be raised directly to the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide
questions affecting elections.

6. Fermo vs COMELEC
Facts:
Laxina and Fermo are candidates for the position of Punong Brgy. in QC. Laxina was proclaimed winner. Fermo filed election
protest question results in 4 clustered precincts on ground of massive fraud and serious irregularities.
The MTC ruled that Fermo won the contested post and granted a motion for execution pending appeal. COMELEC reversed on
ground that the possibility that the term of contested seat might expire by the time appeal is decidednot a good reason to
warrant execution pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in
annulling the order of the MTC granting herein petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal on the ground that there were no
"good reasons" for the issuance therefor.
Ruling:
We rule in the negative.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based "upon good reasons to
be stated in a special order."
In the present case, the petitioner relies solely on one ground to support his petition i.e. "shortness of term". We find that
the COMELEC committed no reversible error. "Shortness of term", alone and by itself cannot justify premature execution. It must be
manifest in the decision sought to be executed that the defeat of the protestee and the victory of the protestant has been clearly
established.

Post proclamation remedies

7. Crespo vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On 25 January 1971, an
administrative complaint was filed against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and
oppression. As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should not be dealt with administrdatively, with the
Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185.
On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent Provincial Board conducted a hearing
of the aforecited administrative case. During the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence,
testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented, the respondent Provincial Board passed
Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was denied due process by respondent Provincial Board.
Ruling:
We agree with the petitioner that he was denied due process by respondent Provincial Board.
Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. To
controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its
Memorandum, contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in writing,
sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said petitioner mayor
at the usual time of the respondent Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner
mayor to appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal."
The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in the absence of proof or evidence to support it. Moreover, in
the proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing therein can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written
explanation submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence
presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco.

8. Jalandoni vs Crespo
Facts:
On May 23, 2001, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez,
the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila pursuant to the May 14, 2001 elections. He was credited with 32,097
votes or a margin of 768 votes over petitioner who obtained 31,329 votes.
On May 31, 2001, petitioner filed with the HRET an electoral protest against private respondent, impugning the election in
807 precincts in the 6th District of Manila.
Petitioner prayed that a revision and appreciation of the ballots in the 807 contested precincts be conducted; and that,
thereafter, he be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
On June 18, 2001, private respondent filed his answer with counter-protest vehemently denying that he engaged in massive
vote buying. He also opposed petitioners allegation that there is a need for the revision and appreciation of ballots.
Meanwhile, on March 6, 2003, the HRET, in HRET Cases Nos. 01-020, Bienvenido Abante & Prudencio Jalandoni vs. Mario
Crespo, and 01-023, Rosenda Ann M. Ocampo vs. Mario Crespo, issued Resolutions declaring that private respondent is ineligible for
the Office of Representative of Sixth District of Manila for lack of residence in the district and ordering him to vacate his office
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
 Petitioner averred that since private respondent was declared disqualified in HRET Cases Nos. 01-020 and 01-023, the votes
cast for him should not be counted. And having garnered the second highest number of votes, he (petitioner) should be declared the
winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6 th District of Manila.
On March 26, 2003, private respondent filed an opposition to petitioners motion to implement the afore-quoted provision.
On March 27, 2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding that private respondent was guilty of vote-buying and
disqualifying him as Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the votes cast in favor of private respondent should not be counted pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646;
2. Whether or not petitioner, a second placer in the May 14, 2001 congressional elections, can be proclaimed the duly elected
Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
Ruling:
1. There must be a final judgment before the election in order that the votes of a disqualified candidate can be considered
stray.
The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final
judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the
honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
government.
In the present case, private respondent was declared disqualified almost twenty-two (22) months after the May 14, 2001
elections. Obviously, the requirement of final judgment before election is absent. Therefore, petitioner can not invoke Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646.
2. We revert back to the settled jurisprudence that the subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner.

9. Javier vs COMELEC
Facts:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in
Antique. During election, Javier complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and
falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on
Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to
proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the
proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period
of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved
before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the
COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition
close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.
Issue:
Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
Ruling:
Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution provides that: The COMELEC may sit en banc or in three divisions. All
election cases maybe heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be
heard and decided en banc.
The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held
that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense
of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for
the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments
of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to
the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are
supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the
ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.
 10. Frivaldo vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed
office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Salvador
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos
election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.

Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses
that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely
forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictators agents abroad." He
added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that
the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within ten days
from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Ruling:
The Court decided in the negative. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.
473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
However, it appears that Frivaldo has not taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy
he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions
surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive
allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective
office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
The petition is dismissed and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the
same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province.

11. Defensor vs COMELEC

Facts:
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
(hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative"
(hereafter, Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in
establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
Senator Roco filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days.
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel
Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period
of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders,
enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen
Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before
the COMELEC.
Ruling:
 The instant petition is viable despite the pendency in the COMELEC of the Delfin Petition.
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because
after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit
within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due
course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's
motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the
said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of
signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure in cases of transcendental importance.

12. Perla Garcia vs HRET

Facts:
On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten (10) day period from respondent Harry Angping's proclamation as duly elected
Representative for the 3rd District of Manila, petitioners, all duly registered voters in the district, filed a petition for quo warranto
before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against Congressman Harry Angping. Petitioners questioned the
eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office in the House of Representatives, claiming that the latter was not a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a constitutional requirement. They prayed that Congressman Angping be declared ineligible to assume or
hold office as member of the House of Representatives and for the candidate who received the highest number of votes from
among the qualified candidates to be proclaimed the winner.
Upon filing of their petition, petitioners duly paid the required P5,000.00 filing fee.
On June 10, 1998, however the HRET issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for quo warranto for failure to pay the
P5,000.00 cash deposit required by its Rules. After recieving a copy of the aforesaid Resolution, petitioners paid the P5,000.00 cash
depositcon June 26, 1998 and attached the corresponding receipt to the Motion for Reconsideration they filed with the HRET on the
same day. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied, in view of Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules which required a
P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees for quo warranto cases.
Hence, the instant Petition, filed on August 14, 1998.
Issue:
Whether or not the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for quo warranto of
petitioners and in refusing to reinstate the same even after the payment of the required Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash
deposit.
Ruling:
It may be argued that unlike in the case of election protests, no period is provided for to make the cash deposit in the case
of petitions for quo warranto. However, the cash deposit required in quo warranto cases is fixed, i.e., P5,000.00. It does not vary nor
can it be varied; it is required to be paid together with the filing fee at the time the petition is filed. It is different from a protest
and/or counter-protest where the amount of the required cash deposit is yet to be determined since it has to be based on the
number of ballot boxes and other election documents and paraphernalia to be collected and brought to the Tribunal. Therefore,
depending on the amount that may be required for the collection of the ballot boxes and other election documents and
paraphernalia, the parties are given specified periods within which to pay. Thus, when the required amount of cash deposits does
not exceed P75,000.00, the party concerned must make the deposit within ten (10) days after the filing of the protest or counter-
protest; otherwise, when it exceeds P75,000.00 he is required to make a partial deposit of at least P75,000.00 likewise within ten
(10) days and the balance payable in installments as may be determined by the Tribunal.
Petitioners herein, Peril Garcia, Pat Cruz and Geraldine Padernal, filed their petition for quo warranto on May 29, 1998.
However, the required cash deposit of P5,000.00 was paid only on June 26, 1998, which was after the dismissal of the petition and
only after an unreasonable delay of twenty-eight (28) days. Indeed, in dismissing the petition the HRET acted judiciously, correctly
and certainly within its jurisdiction. It was a judgment call of the HRET which is clearly authorized under its Rules. As long as the
exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the
Tribunal.
The petition for quo warranto attacks the ineligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. This is a serious charge which, if true, renders Congressman
Angping disqualified from such office. In view of the delicate nature and importance of this charge, the observance of the HRET
Rules of Procedure must be taken seriously if they are to attain their objective, i.e., the speedy and orderly determination of the true
will of the electorate. Correlatively, party litigants appearing before the HRET or to be more precise, their lawyers, are duty bound to
know and are expected to properly comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the Tribunal without being formally
ordered to do so. They cannot righteously impute abuse of discretion to the Tribunal if by reason of the non-observance of those
requirements it decides to dismiss their petition. Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities precisely
designed to ensure its proper and swift dispensation.

13. Guerero vs COMELEC

Facts:
In the Second Division of the COMELEC, Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify respondent Farias as a candidate for the
position of Congressman.1 Ruiz alleged that Farias had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998
polls, despite his failure to file a Certificate of Candidacy for said office. Ruiz averred that Farias failure to file said Certificate
violated Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code 2 in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 2577, dated January 15, 1998. Ruiz asked
the COMELEC to declare Farias as a "nuisance candidate" pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code 3 and to disqualify
him from running in the May 11, 1998 elections, as well as in all future polls.
On May 8, 1998, Farias filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC, substituting candidate Chevylle V. Farias who
withdrew on April 3, 1998.
On May 9, 1998, Ruiz filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion To Resolve Petition" with the COMELEC, attaching thereto a copy of
the Certificate of Candidacy of Farias.
On May 10, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC decided Case No. SPA 98-227 by dismissing it.
On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as scheduled. The post-election tally of votes in Ilocos Norte showed that
Farias got a total of 56,369 votes representing the highest number of votes received in the first district. Farias was duly
proclaimed winner.
On May 16, 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farias could not validly substitute for Chevylle
V. Farias, since the latter was not the official candidate of the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but was an
independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate. Thus, Farias certificate of candidacy
claiming to be the official candidate of LAMMP in lieu of Chevylle V. Farias was fatally defective, according to Ruiz.
On June 3, 1998, Farias took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives.
On June 10, 1998, petitioner herein filed his "Petition-In-Intervention" in COMELEC Case No. SPA 98-227. Petitioner averred
that he was the official candidate of the Liberal Party (LP) in said elections for Congressman, and stood to be adversely affected by
Case No. SPA 98-227.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC commited grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of the
certificate of candidacy of respondent Farias is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives.
Ruling:
A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of when the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling the proceeding. It is the proper remedy to question any final order, ruling and
decision of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. But for an action for certiorari to
prosper, there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion. This means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or excess thereof, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law.
In the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its jurisdiction over
Case No. SPA 98-277 had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Farias as Representative for the first district of Ilocos
Norte. While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that
power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farias is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries
separating the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET). Under Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over
the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.
Whether respondent Farias validly substituted Chevylle V. Farias and whether respondent became a legitimate candidate, in
our view, must likewise be addressed to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Only thus can we demonstrate fealty to the
Constitutional provision that the Electoral Tribunal of each House of Congress shall be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members".
 14. De Castro vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Gloria, Oriental Mindoro during the May 8, 1995 elections.
In the same elections, private respondent was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of the same municipality.
On May 19, 1995, petitioner's rival candidate, the late Nicolas M. Jamilla, filed an election protest before the Regional Trial
Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.
During the pendency of said contest, Jamilla died. Four days after such death or on December 19, 1995, the trial court
dismissed the election. The issue or issues brought out in this protest have become moot and academic".
On January 9, 1995, private respondent learned about the dismissal of the protest from one Atty. Gaudencio S. Sadicon,
who, as the late Jamilla's counsel, was the one who informed the trial court of his client's demise.
On January 15, 1996, private respondent filed his Omnibus Petition/Motion for Intervention and/or Substitution with
Motion for Reconsideration. Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner on January 30, 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not election contest involves both the private interests of the rival candidates and the public interest in the
final determination of the real choice of the electorate, and for this reason, an election contest necessarily survives the death of the
protestant or the protestee.
Ruling:
We agree.
It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property transmissible to his heirs upon death.
Thus, applying the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona, upon the death of the incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed
to continue holding his office in his place. But while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an
election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust
the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings.
An election contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with paramount public interests.
Upon the same principle, the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed against
him, and it may stated as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite the death of the
protestee.
The death of the protestant, as in this case, neither constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor ousts the trial court
of its jurisdiction to decide the election contest.

15. Poe vs Arroyo

Facts:
Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and acting
as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) the duly
elected President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808 votes, as against 11,782,232 votes for the second-placer, the movie
actor Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She took her Oath of Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.
Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before this
Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. As
counsels for the parties exchanged lively motions to rush the presentation of their respective positions on the controversy, an act of
God intervened. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. The
medical certificate, filed by counsel as part of the Notice of Death of the Protestant, showed that he died of cardio-pulmonary arrest,
secondary to cerebral infarction.
However, neither the Protestees proclamation by Congress nor the death of her main rival as a fortuitous intervening
event, appears to abate the present controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice may be taken of periodic mass actions,
demonstrations, and rallies raising an outcry for this Tribunal to decide the electoral protest of Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and
for all.
Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant, his counsel has submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10,
2005, a "MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ," by
the widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe, who signed the verification and certification therein.
Issue:
Whether or not the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latters
protest case.
Ruling:
The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. Pursuant to this rule, only two
persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined
the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not
been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2 nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be the
legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.
 This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous and
suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals.
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It
can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election
contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs
upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies
during the pendency of the protest.
We are not unaware that a contest before election tribunals has two aspects. First, it is in pursuit of ones right to a public
office, and second, it is imbued with public interest.
Indeed the personal aspect of the case is inextricably linked with the public interest. For an election protest involves not
merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with public interest which raises it into a plane over and above ordinary civil
actions. But herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed that it is with the "paramount public interest" in mind that she
desires "to pursue the process" commenced by her late husband. She avers that she is "pursuing the process" to determine who
truly won the election, as a service to the Filipino people. We laud her noble intention and her interest to find out the true will of the
electorate. However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election
protest. Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET Rules.
In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not
immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest
number of votes. We fully appreciate counsels manifestation that movant/intervenor herself claims she has no interest in assuming
the position as she is aware that she cannot succeed to the presidency, having no legal right to it. Yet thus far, in this case, no real
parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the
deceased protestant. In our view, if persons not real parties in the action could be allowed to intervene, proceedings will be
unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable and this is not the policy of the law. It is far more prudent to abide by the
existing strict limitations on intervention and substitution under the law and the rules.

Election Offenses and Electoral Cheating

16. Maliksi vs COMELEC
Facts:
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor
of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected
Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the
COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksis motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as
Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots
through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring
Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it
issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTCs decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly
elected Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had
not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were
secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been
preserved.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksis motion for reconsideration.Maliksi went to the
Supreme Court reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to
him in violation of his constitutional right to due process of law, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount
proceedings conducted by the First Division.
In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksis petition for
certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division referring to the orders of the First Division directing Saquilayan
to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his
objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its
discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images were
not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on
Electronic Evidence; and that the First Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully
established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision.
In his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Maliksi again raised the alleged violation of his right to due process.
Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings and to be present at every stage
thereof; (b) that he was deprived of such rights when he was not informed of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot
images by the First Division; (c) that the March 28, 2012 and April 17, 2012 orders of the First Division did not sufficiently give him
notice inasmuch as the orders did not state the date, time, and venue of the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (d)
that he was thus completely deprived of the opportunity to participate in the decryption proceedings.
Issue:
Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a clear violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to due process of law considering that decryption, printing and examination of the digital images of the ballots were done
inconspicuously upon motu propio directive of the COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the petitioner and for the first time on
appeal.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses the decision promulgated
on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due
notice on the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings conducted by
the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images.
It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount proceedings because
it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first
instance. The recount proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be
conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving
elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.
We should not ignore that the parties participation during the revision and recount proceedings would not benefit only the
parties, but was as vital and significant for the COMELEC as well, for only by their participation would the COMELECs proceedings
attain credibility as to the result. The parties presence would have ensured that the requisite procedures have been followed,
including the required authentication and certification that the images to be printed are genuine. In this regard, the COMELEC was
less than candid, and was even cavalier in its conduct of the decryption and printing of the picture images of the ballots and the
recount proceedings. The COMELEC was merely content with listing the guidelines that the First Division had followed in the
appreciation of the ballots and the results of the recount. In short, there was vagueness as to what rule had been followed in the
decryption and printing proceeding.
The Supreme Court held that the Resolution does not intend to validate the victory of any of the parties in the 2010
Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court simply does not want to countenance a denial of the fundamental
right to due process, a cornerstone of our legal system.