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1. GOCHAN vs GOCHAN

Gochan vs Gochan

Facts:

Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and the Mactan
Realty Development Corporation. Respondents offered to sell their shares in the two corporations to
the individual petitioners, the heirs of the late Ambassador Esteban Gochan, for and in consideration
of the sum of P200,000,000:00. Petitioners accepted and paid the said amount to respondents.
Accordingly, respondents issued to petitioners the necessary "Receipts."3 In addition, respondents
executed their respective "Release, Waiver and Quitclaim,"4 wherein .they undertook that they would
not initiate any suit, action or complaint against petitioners for whatever reason or purpose.

,Respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr., required individual petitioners to execute a


"promissory note. Unbeknown to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the "promissory note" a
phrase that says, "Said amount is in partial consideration of the sale."6

On April 3, 1998, respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance
and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-21854. Respondents alleged that sometime in November 1996, petitioner Louise Gochan, on
behalf of all the petitioners, offered to buy their shares of stock, consisting of 254 shares in the Felix
Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and 1,624 shares of stock in the Mactan Realty Development
Corporation; and that they executed a Provisional Memorandum of Agreement, wherein they
enumerated the following as consideration for the sale:

1. Pesos: Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200M)

2. Two (2) hectares more or less of the fishpond in Gochan Compound, Mabolo, Lot 4F-2-B

3. Lot 2, Block 9 with an area of 999 square meters in Gochan Compound, Mabolo, Cebu

4. Three Thousand (3,000) square meters of Villas Magallanes in Mactan, Cebu

5. Lot 423 New Gem Building with an area of 605 square meters.7

ISSUE:

a. Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for non-payment of the correct
docket fees?
b. Whether or not there is forum shopping?

Held:

A. The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL)
v. Asuncion,12 this Court held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
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In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a
real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance.
Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed
value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant.

B. Likewise, we do not find that there is forum-shopping in the case at bar. The first petition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, which is now the subject of the instant petition,
involved the propriety of the affirmative defenses relied upon by petitioners in Civil Case
No. CEB-21854. The second petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54985, raised the
issue of whether or not public respondent Judge Dicdican was guilty of manifest partiality
warranting his inhibition from further hearing Civil Case No. CEB-21854.

More importantly, the two petitions did not seek the same relief from the Court of
Appeals. In CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, petitioners prayed, among others, for the annulment
of the orders of the trial court denying their motion for preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB-21854. No such reliefs are involved in the
second petition, where petitioners merely prayed for the issuance of an order enjoining
public respondent Judge Dicdican from further trying the case and to assign a new judge
in his stead.

2. CHING vs RODRIGUEZ

FACTS:

Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,[5] the respondents filed a

Complaint[6] against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena

Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights

or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.

The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of

Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary

Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of

the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).

The respondents filed an Amended Complaint[14] dated April 7, 2005 impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-

interest of co-defendant Global Bank. The Amended Complaint relative to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus

Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed that they

be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to them. Alternatively, the respondents

prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the pendency of the case.

On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss[18] the respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged

ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the

Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the
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propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for

declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an ordinary court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the suit partakes the nature of a special proceeding?

HELD:

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to

settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature

of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.[32] A

special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. [33] It is distinguished

from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or

redress of a wrong.[34] To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.

The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound, because a

settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have

been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained

from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated

therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.

3. HERNANDEZ vs RURAL BANK OF LUCENA INC.

FACTS:

On March 21, 1961 the spouses Francisco S. Hernandez and Josefa U. Atienza obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena,
Inc. a loan of P6,000 which was payable on March 21, 1962. The loan was cured by a mortgage on their two lots situated in
Cubao, Quezon City with a total area of 600 square meters. The interest for one year was paid in advance.

About three months after that loan was obtained, the Lucena Bank became a distress bank. In a letter dated June 6,
1961 the Acting Governor of the Central Bank apprised the stockholders of the Lucena bank that the Monetary Board in its
Resolution No. 928, which was approved on June 13, 1961 allegedly after hearing the Lucena bank. found that its officers,
directors and employees had committed certain anomalies or had resorted to unsound and unsafe banking practices which
were prejudicial to the government, its depositors and creditors.

That letter of the Central Bank Governor was construed as a directive to the Lucena bank to suspend operations. The
Manila times in its issue of June 21, 1961 carried a news story with the heading "Bank told to suspend operations". The story
was accompanied by a picture of depositors who jammed the lobby of the bank trying to withdraw their money.

It was only on October 12, 1964 when Hernandez and his wife filed an action in the Court of First Instance at Lipa City
to compel the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., the Central Bank as liquidator, and Jose S. Martinez as receiver, to accept the check
and to execute the cancellation of the real estate mortgage. The Hernandez spouses also asked for moral damages in the
amount of P10.000 and attorney's fees of P3,000 (Civil Case No. 1615).
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On October 20, 1964 the Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss. It contended that there was improper venue

because, as the action allegedly involved title to real property, it should have been instituted in Quezon City where the

encumbered lots are situated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the suit is in proper venue?

HELD:

Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that "actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province
where the property or any part thereof lies".

Note that the rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage but does not mention an action for the
cancellation of a real mortgage. In the instant case, the action is primarily to compel the mortgagee to accept payment of the
mortgage debt and to release the mortgage.

That action, which is not expressive included in the enumeration found in section 2(a) of Rule 4, does not involve the title to the
mortgage lots. It is a personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has, not foreclosure the mortgage, Plaintiffs' title is
not in question. They are in possession of the mortgaged lots.

Hence, the venue of plaintiffs' personal action is the place where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff (Sec. 2[b], Rule 4).

4. EMERGENCY LOAN PAWNSHOP INC and DANILO R. NAPALA VS COURT OF APPEALS 10TH DIVISION AND TRADERS
ROYAL BANK GR NO. 129184, FEBRUARY 28, 2001

FACTS Traders Royal Bank (TRB) sold a parcel of land located at Baguio City to Emergency Loan Pawnshop Inc (ELPI) for
P500,000. At the time of the sale, TRB misrepresented to ELPI that the subject property was a vacant residential lot with
approximately 1,143.75 sqm usable land area without any illegal occupants where in truth, the subject property was
dominantly a public road with only 140sqm usable area. After knowing the actual condition of the property, ELPI demanded
from TRB the rescission and cancellation of the sale of the property of which TRB refused. ELPI filed with the RTC of Davao City
a complaint for the annulment of the sale plus damages against TRB. TRB filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground
of improper venue. The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, TRB filed a Motion for Reconsideration of which the trial
court again denied. TRB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction or TRO contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of improper venue. After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of the
defendant and orders the dismissal of the civil case filed by ELPI on ground of improper venue. Hence, petitioners seek to set
aside the decision rendered by the CA alleging that the court erred in entertaining the petition for certiorari and prohibition for
lack of jurisdiction and erred in ruling that the RTC erred in not dismissing the complaint for improper venue. According to the
petitioners, the determination of whether the venue of an action was improperly laid was a question of law, thus, the Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari and prohibition, which involves pure questions of law.
Petitioners further alleged that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory in nature that cannot be the subject of an
appeal and cannot be even reviewed by a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE Whether or not an appeal be taken from a decision of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of improper venue.

RULING

The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory order and, hence, cannot be appealed
or questioned via a special civil action of certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered. The remedy of
the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to
dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. However, the
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rule is not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, (a) when
the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the
trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a
defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling
the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case. In the case at
bar, the trial court erred grievously amounting to ousting itself of jurisdiction. The motion of respondent TRB was well founded
because venue was clearly improperly laid. The action in the Regional Trial Court was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of
land located in Baguio City. The venue of such action is unquestionably within the territorial jurisdiction of the proper court
where the real property or part thereof lie. An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on real property, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area where the real
property or any part thereof lies. Hence, the case at bar clearly falls within the exceptions to the rule. The Regional Trial Court
has committed a palpable and grievous error amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of improper venue.

6. Gomez vs. CA

FACTS:

The spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. 10616 and 31856 to Dr. Clarence Yujuico. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed and the
properties sold at public auction on July 11, 1988, and before the expiry of the redemption period,
the spouses Trocino sold the property to petitioners on December 12, 1989, who in turn, redeemed
the same from Dr. Yujuico. The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey ownership of the
properties to petitioners

Summons and copies of the complaint were served to the defendants Jacob, Jesus Jr.,
Adolfo, Mariano, Consolacion, Alice, Racheal thru defendant Caridad Trocino at their given address
at Maria Cristina Extension. At the time summons was served on them, Adolfo Trocino was already
in Ohio, U.S.A., and has been residing there for 25 years, while Mariano Trocino was in Talibon,
Bohol, and has been residing there since 1986.

ISSUE:

Whether or not summons was effectively served on respondents?

Held:

A distinction, however, must be made with regard to service of summons on respondents Adolfo
Trocino and Mariano Trocino. Adolfo Trocino, as records show, is already a resident of Ohio, U.S.A.
for 25 years. Being a non-resident, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and validly
try and decide the case against him.

When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit
himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the State is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. This cannot be done if the defendant is not physically
present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore
cannot validly try and decide the case against him.17 An exception was accorded in Gemperle vs.
Schenker wherein service of summons through the non-residents wife, who was a resident of the
Philippines, was held valid, as the latter was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil
case filed by the non-resident, and the second case was merely an offshoot of the first case.18
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On the other hand, Mariano Trocino has been in Talibon, Bohol since 1986. To validly acquire
jurisdiction over his person, summons must be served on him personally, or through substituted
service, upon showing of impossibility of personal service. Such impossibility, and why efforts
exerted towards personal service failed, should be explained in the proof of service. The pertinent
facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service
or Officers Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional
grounds.24

In the present case, the process server served the summons and copies of the complaint on
respondents Jacob, Jesus, Jr., Adolfo, Mariano, Consolacion, Alice and Racheal,25 through their
mother, Caridad Trocino.26 The return did not contain any particulars as to the impossibility of
personal service on Mariano Trocino within a reasonable time. Such improper service renders the
same ineffective.

5 Domagas vs Jensen

Facts:

The respondent by means of force, strategy, and stealth gained entry into the petitioners
property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence. Petitioner filed a
complaint for forcible entry against respondent.

The summons and the complaint werer not served on the respondent, because the latter was
apparently out of the country. The sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, who
was then in the respondent house.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid service of summon and complaint?

HELD:

The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal
service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made.
Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said
service ineffective.

In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint in Civil Case
No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and
void.
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