RULE 113
People vs. De Guia
FACTS:
Accused De Guia was charged of Estafa, Illegal Recruitment and violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. The cases were tried jointly. The trial
court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. Aggrieved, the accused appealed
to the Supreme Court and questioned the legality of his arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can question the legality of his arrest for the first time on appeal
HELD:
Appellant's alleged warrantless arrest will not exculpate him from his guilt as found by the trial court. To be
sure, the plea comes too late in the day. We note that upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
Information and did not raise the alleged illegality of his arrest. By so pleading, he waived the alleged illegality
of his arrest
Pestilos vs. Generoso
G.R. No. 182601
Doctrine:
Personal knowledge in Sec 5 (b) which states: When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is
enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts of circumstances, that the person to be arrested has
recently committed the crime.
Facts: On February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and
Atty. Moreno Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station to report the incident. Acting
on this report, the Desk Officer dispatched policemen to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance.
The policemen arrived at the scene less than one hour after the allegedaltercation and they saw Atty. Generoso
badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police
officers to invite the petitioners to go to the police station for invsestigation. The petitioners went with the
police officers. At the inquest proceeding, the city prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso
with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. The petitioners were indicted for
attempted murder.
The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not
been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took pplace since the police officers had no
personal knowledge that thye were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just invited
to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for the preliminary
investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC denied the motion. The court likewise denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners challenged the lower courts ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition or certiorari. They
attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the RTC for the denial of
their motion for preliminary investigation.
The CA dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.
Ruling: Yes.
The requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section
5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forth with
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
113.
Personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-mentioned provision, does not
require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts of circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR
DOCTRINE: In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant
of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as
to the existence of probable cause.
FACTS:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due
process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima
faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or
not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for
his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable
cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaintaffidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice
sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President,
through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion
for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments,
petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost
factual support.
ISSUE:
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Whether or Not respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause
RULING: NO. The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by
the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has
apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This
is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before
their courts..
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to
the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN
SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT, petitioners,vs. HONORABLE COMMISSIONER
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION,
respondent.
G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988
DOCTRINES:
An arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such
person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence;
and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it
It is a fundamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or
has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.
The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings.
FACTS:
Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, are both American nationals
residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna, while Adriaan Van Elshout, 58 years old, is a Dutch citizen also residing at
Pagsanjan, Laguna. Petitioners were apprehended from their respective residences by agents of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam
Defensor-Santiago of the CID. Petitioners were among the twentytwo (22) suspected alien pedophiles. Of the
original twenty two (22), only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation. Seized during petitioners
apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious
poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising
the child prostitutes. Deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens
under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against
petitioners for violation of the Immigration Act and the Revised Administrative Code. The Board of Special
Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners. Petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent
denied considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. Subsequently,
petitioners availed of the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
ISSUES:
Whether respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required
by the said provision; whether mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the
activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles,
are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act.
RULING:
NO. The Court upholds respondent's official acts. There can be no question that the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons,
including aliens, whether accused of crime or not. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search
warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. An arrest without a warrant may be
effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In this case, the
arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three months during
which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure
of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of
petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed
against them, as undesirable aliens. Warrants of arrest were issued against them. A hearing is presently being
conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal. It is a
fundamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal,
although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.
Furthermore, that petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were
found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those
circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia".
Lastly, deportation proceedings are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a
punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary
Court proceedings. The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings. In the case at bar, probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants
of arrest were issued. The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by
them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of
discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. As deportation proceedings do not
partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in
said proceedings. At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered
as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity.
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Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may
deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.
Alimpoos v. CA
G.R. No. L-27331
July 30, 1981
Rule 113 Doctrine:
When a party is represented by counsel, notice should be sent, not to the party, but to his counsel of record.
Before a municipal judge issues a warrant of arrest he should first satisfy himself that there is a probable cause
by examining the witnesses personally, and that the examination must be under oath and reduced to writing
in the form of searching questions and answers.
Facts:
Reynaldo Mosquito was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan,
Agusan, by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge in the Criminal Case, which was a
prosecution for Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries.The place allegedly robbed belonged to the
spouses Eliseo Alimpoos and Ciriaca Alimpoos.
Contending that the Warrant was issued without the observance of the legal requirements for the issuance
thereof, the Accused, then detained, and his wife instituted the Habeas Corpus case before the Trial Court.
After due hearing in the Habeas Corpus case, respondent Trial Judge issued the appealed Order dated March
26, 1966 declaring illegal the detention of plaintiff Reynaldo Mosquito by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued
without the observance of the fundamental legal requirements prior to the issuance of said Writ. The petition
for habeas corpus is therefore granted and it is hereby ordered that
said detention prisoner be forthwith released from custody
The Acting Provincial Fiscal of Agusan received copy of said ORDER on March 31, 1966, and on April 1,
1966, moved for extension of time within which to appeal, but eventually desisted from doing so.
On April 4, 1966, counsel for the spouses and the Witnesses mailed from Cebu City a Notice of Appeal to
the Court of Appeals stating that:
Undersigned counsel received a copy of the order only today (April 4, 1966) which copy
was handed to
him by defendant (petitioner) Eliseo Alimpoos.
The appeal was opposed by the Accused on the ground that it was filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary
period within which to perfect an appeal in Habeas Corpus proceedings.
Counsel contends that the reglementary period to appeal can not be reckoned from March 31, 1966 because,
under the Rules, when a party is represented by counsel, notice should be sent, not to the party, but to his
counsel of record. Counsel for the spouses and the Witnesses further maintains that the period from which
to reckon the period of appeal should actually be April 14, 1966 when the counsel actually received, through
the mails, his copy of the ORDER, as shown by the rubber stamp of his office appearing on the upper right
hand corner of a duplicate copy of the ORDER
Both RTC and CA dismissed the appeal of the spouses. they declared that the notice of appeal was not filed
within the 48-hour limit. Petitioners appeal was therefore filed out of time and the judgment has become
final.
Issue/s:
1. WON the appeal was filed on time
2. WON the writ of Habeas Corpus if the proper remedy for Mosquito?
3. WON the warrant of arrest was illegal?
Held:
The appeal was filed on time. The Trial Judge and the Appellate Tribunal relied on the last page of the ORDER,
purportedly showing that the law office of counsel for the Offended Parties and the Witnesses received
its copy on March 30, 1966 and not on April 4, 1966. However, on the back of the envelope of the
registered mail sent to the counsel of the spouses appears a big diagonal stamp FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY and two post office stamp marks:
REGISTERED
CITY OF BUTUAN
PHILIPPINES
March 31, 1966
CEBU CITY
Received
April 11, 1966
Philippines
Since the registered mail was received in Cebu City only on April 11, 1966, it is not unlikely that the law office
and addressee, as alleged by it, received the mail only three days after, or on April 14, 1966.
It is apparent then that both respondent Trial Judge and the Appellate Tribunal committed error in holding that
the Offended Parties appeal was interposed beyond the reglementary period. Service on the Offended Party,
Eliseo Alimpoos, on March 31, 1966 cannot be deemed as notice in law to his counsel. 8 Under the
circumstances, therefore, reliance may be placed on the assertion of counsel that the Offended Party, Eliseo
Alimpoos, had given him a copy of the ORDER only on April 4, 1966, which must be deemed as the date of
notice to said counsel of the ORDER. Counsel lost no time in mailing his Notice of Appeal on the same day,
April 4, 1966 from Cebu. 9 Procedurally, the appeal was seasonably filed.
2. The Habeas Corpus is not the proper remedy. When awarrant of arrest is being assailed for improper
preliminary investigation, the remedy is a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or petition for reinvestigation
of the case. It is the general rule that Habeas Corpus should not be resorted to when there is another remedy
available.
As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or could
have been procured by resort to another general remedy, such as appeal or writ of error. But
the existence of another remedy does not necessarily preclude a resort to the writ of habeas
corpus to obtain relief from illegal detention, especially where the other remedy is deemed not
to be as
effective as that of habeas corpus.
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Time and again, it has been explained that Habeas Corpus cannot function as a writ of error.
3. The warrant of arrest is illegal. The judge issued the warrant without conducting a preliminary
examination. In the Luna-Plaza case, SC declared that:
We wish to stress, however, that what has been stated in this opinion is certainly not intended to sanction the
return to the former practice of municipal judges of simply relying upon affidavits or sworn statements that are
made to accompany the complaints that are filed before them, in determining whether there is a probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. That practice is precisely what is sought to be voided by the amendment
of Section 87 (c) of Republic Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) which requires that before a municipal judge
issues a warrant of arrest he should first satisfy himself that there is a probable cause by examining the witnesses
personally, and that the examination must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching
questions and answers. It is obvious that the purpose of this amendment is to prevent the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against a person based simply upon affidavits of witnesses who made, and swore to, their statements
before a person or persons other than the judge before whom the criminal complaint is filed. We wish to
emphasize strict compliance by municipal or city judges of the provision of Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act
of 1948, as amended by Republic Act 3828, in order to avoid malicious and/or unfounded criminal prosecution
of persons.
PEOPLE V RACHO
[ G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010 ]
Doctrine:
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides the requirements when a warrantless arrest may be lawful.
The rule also requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Facts:
Appellant Jack Racho was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of
R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing,
dangerous drugs.
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded Not Guilty to both charges.
The RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section
11, Article II, R.A. 9165. And on appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Racho assails the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questions the
admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Issue:
Whether Rachos warrantless arrest was valid.
Ruling:
No.
But the records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
Considering the lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case, the Supreme Court held that
they must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus
curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction
of the court over his person.
However, regardless of such waiver, Supreme Court held that the warrantless search was invalid.
In searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process
cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the
arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
In the case at hand, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given
by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest.
Appellant Racho was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting
officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was
committing, or about to commit an offense.
At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle.
Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police
officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the
information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been
made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
This is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in.
Provided in the 1987 Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
An acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his
arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of
an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal,
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.
Ongcoma v People, G.R. Nos. 144261-62, May 9, 2001 Doctrine:
The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from which the corpus
delicti of the crime was obtained. For, without a valid warrantless arrest, the alleged confiscation of
the contraband resulting from a warrantless search on the petitioner's body is surely a violation of
his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. As a consequence, the alleged
contraband shall be inadmissible as evidence against him.
The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
Facts:
Petitioner Ongcoma Hadji Homar was charged for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165(Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). The Information states around August 20, 2002, the petitioner was found to
possess 0.03 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. The petitioner pleaded
not guilty during arraignment.
PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution. He testified that on August 20, 2002, at around
8:50 in the evening, their Chief, P/Chief Supt. Alfredo C. Valdez, ordered him and civilian agent (C/A) Ronald
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Tangcoy (Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing, Roxas Boulevard. While proceeding to the area onboard a mobile
hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately
accosted him and told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing area.
The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery
of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on the petitioner's body and found and confiscated
a plastic sachet containing what he suspected as shabu. Tangcoy and Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on
the incident.
The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense. He testified that on August 20, 2002, he was going home at
around 6:30 p.m. after selling imitation sunglasses and other accessories at the BERMA Shopping Center. After
crossing the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped and frisked him despite his refusal. They poked a gun
at him, accused him of being a holdupper, and forced him to go with them. They also confiscated the kitchen
knife, which he carried to cut cords. He was likewise investigated for alleged possession of shabu and detained
for one day. He was criminally charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 77 for
the possession of the kitchen knife but he was eventually acquitted.
The RTC's Ruling
The RTC convicted the petitioner. It ruled that PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy were presumed to have performed
their duties regularly in arresting and conducting a search on the petitioner. The RTC also noted that PO1 Eric
Tan was straightforward in giving his testimony and he did not show any ill motive in arresting the petitioner.
The RTC also did not believe the petitioner's defense of denial and ruled that it is a common and standard
defense ploy in most prosecutions in dangerous drugs cases. This defense is weak especially when it is not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence as in this case.
The petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.
The CA's ruling
The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC's findings. According to the CA, Section 5, paragraph (a)
of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the circumstances when a warrantless arrest
is legal, valid, and proper. One of these is when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer or a private person. In the present case,
the petitioner committed jaywalking in the presence of PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy; hence, his warrantless arrest
for jaywalking was lawful. Consequently, the subsequent frisking and search done on the petitioner's body
which produced the knife and the shabu were incident to a lawful arrest allowed under Section 13, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The CA likewise ruled that PO1 Tan clearly showed that the petitioner
was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of shabu. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the CA.
Petitioners Contention:
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction on the following grounds:
The shabu, which was allegedly recovered from the petitioner, is inadmissible as evidence because
it was obtained as a result of his unlawful arrest and in violation of his right against unreasonable
search and seizure. The petitioner has not committed, was not committing and was not attempting to
commit any crime at the time of his arrest. In fact, no report or criminal charge was filed against him
for the alleged jaywalking.
Assuming for the sake of argument that there was a valid arrest, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a search that is directed only upon dangerous weapons or
"anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
warrant." In the present case, the offense, for which the petitioner was allegedly caught in flagrante
delicto, is jaywalking. The alleged confiscated drug has nothing to do with the offense of jaywalking.
The non-presentation of Tangcoy, who allegedly recovered the shabu from the petitioner, renders
the prosecution's evidence weak and uncorroborated. Consequently, the sole testimony of Tan cannot
sustain the petitioner's conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Respondents Contention:
In his Comment, the respondent argues that the guilt of the petitioner was conclusively established beyond
reasonable doubt. He reiterates that the warrantless frisking and search on the petitioner's body was an incident
to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking. The non-filing of a criminal charge of jaywalking against the
petitioner does not render his arrest invalid. The respondent also assails the petitioner's defense that the shabu
is inadmissible as evidence. According to the respondent, the petitioner can no longer question his arrest after
voluntarily submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea of not guilty and
when he testified in court.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was unlawful.
Whether or not contraband that is seized from an unlawful warrantless arrest is inadmissible as evidence in
court.
Ruling:
Unlawful Warrantless Arrest
The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful warrantless arrest preceded the search conducted on the petitioner's
body.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions when a person may
be lawfully arrested without a warrant. In the present case, the respondent alleged that the petitioner's
warrantless arrest was due to his commission of jaywalking in flagrante delicto and in the presence of Tan and
Tangcoy.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting officer.
The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from which the corpus delicti of
the crime - shabu - was obtained. For, without a valid warrantless arrest, the alleged confiscation of the shabu
resulting from a warrantless search on the petitioner's body is surely a violation of his constitutional right against
unlawful search and seizure. As a consequence, the alleged shabu shall be inadmissible as evidence against him.
Also, the filing of a criminal charge is not a condition precedent to prove a valid warrantless arrest. Even if there
is a criminal charge against an accused, the prosecution is not relieved from its burden to prove that there was
indeed a valid warrantless arrest preceding the warrantless search that produced the corpus delicti of the crime.
Futhermore, the testimony of Tan, as quoted in the CA decision, and the findings of the RTC, cast doubt on
whether Tan and Tangcoy intended to arrest the petitioner for jaywalking. Arrest is the taking of a person into
custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint,
nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary. It may be clearly deduced from the testimont of Tan that no arrest
preceded the search on the person of the petitioner. When Tan and Tangcoy allegedly saw the petitioner
jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted him and pointed to him the right place for crossing. In fact,
according to the RTC, Tan and Tangcoy "immediately accosted him and told him to cross [at] the designated
area." Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to restrain his liberty. This lack
of intent to arrest him was bolstered by the fact that there was no criminal charge that was filed against the
petitioner for crossing a "no jaywalking" area. From Tan's testimony, the intent to arrest the petitioner only came
after they allegedly confiscated the shabu from the petitioner, for which they informed him of his constitutional
rights and brought him to the police station.
The respondent's argument that there was a lawful search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking
appears to be an afterthought in order to justify a warrantless search conducted on the person of the petitioner.
In fact, the illegality of the search for the shabu is further highlighted when it was not recovered immediately
after the alleged lawful arrest, if there was any, but only after the initial search resulted in the recovery of the
knife. Thereafter, according to Tan, Tangcoy conducted another search on the person of the petitioner resulting
in the alleged confiscation of the shabu. Clearly, the petitioner's right to be secure in his person was callously
brushed aside twice by the arresting police officers.
Inadmissibility of contraband as Evidence
We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment as required by the Rules. In addition, he actively participated in the trial of the case. As a result,
5
the petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his
arrest.
However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his person. It is
well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its
inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner. WHEREFORE, we
GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 10,
2008, and its Resolution dated April 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29364. Petitioner ONGCOMA HADJI
HOMAR is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. SO ORDERED
People v Givera
GR No. 132159 January 18, 2001
DOCTRINE Unless specifically provided in the warrant, the same remains enforceable until it is executed,
recalled or quashed. The ten-day period provided in Rule 113, 4 is only a directive to the officer executing the
warrant to make a return to the court.
FACTS This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City finding
accused-appellant Cesar Givera y Garote guilty of murder of Eusebio Gardon y Arrivas and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs of the suit. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on April 10, 1996, whereupon
he was tried.
ISSUE W/NOT the Court a quo has committed an error in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of
murder.
HELD NO. First. The prosecution presented evidence which shows beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant and his companions (Epifanio Gayon, Arturo Gayon, and Maximo Givera), all of whom were
convicted of murder in another case, were responsible for the killing of Eusebio Gardon on May 2, 1993.
Milagros Gardons testimony, an excerpt from which is quoted at the beginning of this opinion, is spontaneous,
detailed, and consistent. There are apparent lapses in the testimony of Milagros, as when she testified that she
knew at the very beginning that it was accusedappellant who was stoning their house when in fact, as she
admitted, she only knew this because the victim said so. Moreover, it may be doubted whether the victim's other
daughter, Laura, was hit by the stones hurled by accused-appellant as she came out of their house, since the
door of the house was so narrow that only one person at a time could pass through it. Nonetheless, a close
reading of the records will show that indeed it was accused-appellant who was stoning the house because when
the witness followed the victim outside, she saw accused-appellant throwing stones at their house. She then saw
accused-appellant hitting the victim with stones. In the process, Laura was also hit. Second. Accused-appellant
claims that his arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May 4, 1996 was made without a warrant. This is
not true. He was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the court on April 27, 1995. However, as the records
show, the warrant of arrest was returned unserved by the arresting officer on June 7, 1995 as accused-appellant
could not be found. He was finally found only on May 4, 1996. Now, no alias warrant of arrest is needed to
make the arrest. Unless specifically provided in the warrant, the same remains enforceable until it is executed,
recalled or quashed. The ten-day period provided in Rule 113, 4 is only a directive to the officer executing the
warrant to make a return to the court.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL
and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE,
petitioners, v. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO,
BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents. FACTS:
- First the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong
Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second a wounded person listed in the
hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot
wound; third as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the
hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural
- In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and
action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, believe
that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in
St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance
with the directives of the law, and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
READ ME: in essence lahat sila sa case na to ay members ng NPA and they were arrested without a warrant
while the others were searched. Si Espiritu nahuli siya kasi sabi niya during a gathering of drivers and
sympathizers "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na ISSUE:
- WON in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without warrant, and in relying on the
provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such
arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested
HELD: No
- It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by
petitioners under the Rules of Court. The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus
is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered
forthwith released.
- In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before
rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were
made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the
detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.
REGARDING WARRANT OF ARREST:
- There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest
anyone without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. The law expressly
allowing arrests without warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the
grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
- In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113.
- Dural was committing an offense when he was arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of
the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized as a continuing offense.
- The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other
crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy
of nationwide magnitude
- His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts the arrest of Dural falls under Section
5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without
warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting
peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is
the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant,
based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person PROBABLE
CAUSE:
- It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion
6

- The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
- As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers
who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers who arrested Dural are deemed to have
conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their
official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in
arresting Dural. It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with
the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
- Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an
information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against
Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly
placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988,
he was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is
now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
- They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed
firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto
which justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations
were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition.
Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court during the
hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the authorities.
- (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to
make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses
(one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA
for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and
Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
- And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information
they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain
crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found
in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of
the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the
time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then,
shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as
CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding informations were filed in court
against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant
made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear
to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
- With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons
(Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent man can say that it would have been
better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an
unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
- For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive
and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged
violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. An arrest is therefore in the nature of
an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the
requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met.
- This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.
- In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth
in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of
committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason
that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public
order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.
- The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions
set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later
found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But if they do not strictly comply
with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanction.
VILLANUEVA VS. PEOPLE
GR No. 199042 - November 17, 2014
Doctrine:
While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to
preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate
care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the
means.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful
warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a private person.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search. Records have established
that both the arrest and the search were made without a warrant. While the accused has already
waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have equally waived his
right to contest the legality of the search.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be conducted. These
searches include: (1) search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4)
waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstance.
While this type may seemingly fall under the consented search exception, we reiterate that consent
to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. Consent must
also be voluntary inorder to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion
Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." Without the seized item,
therefore, the conviction of accused appellant cannot be sustained.
Facts:
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
7

Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Arturo, (2) Police Officer (PO) 3
Coralde, (3) PO2 Mananghaya, and (4) Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Asiones. Their testimonies reveal that a
Complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo Villanueva for allegedly shooting the former along C-3
Road, Navotas City. After recording the incident in the police blotter, PO3 Coralde, SPO3 de Jesus, SPO2
Martin and SPO1 Asiones, together with Resco, proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They informed
Villanueva about the Complaint lodged against him. They invited him to the police station. There, he was
subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from the left pocket of
his pants.
The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home watching TV when PO3 Coralde, along
with three others, invited him to go with them to the police station. Informed that he had been identified as
responsible for shooting Resco, the accused was then frisked and detained at the police station.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City, in its Decision dated 6 April 2009, convicted
petitioner of the offense charged. On 4 May 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court. Hence, the
instant Petition.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONERS
CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DESPITE THE
ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST AND THE LAPSES ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS
IN THE HANDLING OF THE CONFISCATED DRUG.
HELD:
We find the instant appeal meritorious.
Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview of valid warrantless arrests, since it took place
on the day of the alleged shooting incident.
Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a private person.
The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the arresting officer show none of the above
that would make the warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant never
objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He
actively participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is considered as one who had properly and voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.
The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search. Records have established that both
the arrest and the search were made without a warrant. While the accused has already waived his right to contest
the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be conducted. These searches
include: (1) search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented
search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstance.
The search made was not among the enumerated instances. While this type may seemingly fall under the
consented search exception, we reiterate that consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear
and convincing evidence."
Consent must also be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. In this case, petitioner
was merely "ordered" to take out the contents of his pocket.
The evidence obtained is not admissible.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in evidence against
accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution:
"Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding." Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused appellant cannot be sustained.
As a final word, we reiterate that while this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to
uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with
deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and
the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means."
WHEREFORE, Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED. SO ORDERED.
RULE 113
MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 191532, August 15, 2012
Doctrine
A legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search
and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense.
The accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed
an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Facts
Two separate Informations were filed against Ambre, and co-accused, Bernie Castro (Castro) and Kaycee
Mendoza(Mendoza), before the RTC charging them with illegal possession of drug paraphernalia docketed and
illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.
April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust
operation pursuant to a tip from a police informant that a certain Abdulah Sultan (Sultan) and his wife Ina Aderp
(Aderp) were engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential compound in Caloocan City; that the
8
buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao (Tagoranao); that Sultan ran
away from the scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that
in the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to his house; that inside the house, the police
operatives found Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre, in particular, was caught
sniffing what was suspected to be shabu in a rolled up aluminum foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while
PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu.
The items confiscated from the three were marked and, thereafter, submitted for laboratory examination.
Physical Science Report No. DT-04105 to DT-043-05 stated that the urine samples taken from Ambre and her
coaccused were positive for the presence of shabu while Physical Science Report No. D-149-05 showed that
the items seized from them were all found positive for traces of shabu.
On September 1, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution was able to establish with
certitude the guilt of Ambre for illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or violation of Section 15,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Ambre's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid. Held:
Ambre was lawfully arrested in accordance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Ambre was caught
by the police officers in the act of using shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo
positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro.
Section 5, Rule 113, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of
a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer,
there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest
of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency
of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to
commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
A legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search
and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense.
The issue of validity and irregularity in her warrantless arrest, the Court holds that Ambre is deemed to have
waived her objections to her arrest for not raising them before entering her plea.
Doctrine: Rule 113 Arrest
Title: ALVIN COMERCIANTE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
205926, July 22, 2015
FACTS:
1. According to the prosecution, on July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the
NARCOTICS group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the
area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City.
2. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about
10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla (Dasilla) -
standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic
sachets to the other.
3. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached
Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5) meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as
a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said
sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.darclaw
4. After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the
RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence,
the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence.dar
5. In his defense, Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a
notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of
a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers
claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their
release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to
undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
The RTC Ruling - RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article
II of RA 9165 and maintains that PO3 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante, which
yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this relation, the RTC opined that there was probable cause
to justify the warrantless arrest, considering that PO3 Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante was carrying
the said sachets when he decided to approach and apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found that absent any
proof of intent that PO3 Calag was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be presumed to have properly
performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante. CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction.
Petitioners Contentions: PO3 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him. Consequently, the
evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets containing shabu should
be
rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the Philippines,
maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule, especially
considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction for
violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165? NO
RATIO: Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the
absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning
of said constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),
Article III22 of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. The exclusionary
rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exceptions established by
jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest.24 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed.25 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as
9

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule
112.
The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected:
(a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined
during the pendency of his case or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.26redarclaw
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.27 On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense
had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed it.28redarclaw
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely
required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b), he knows for a
fact that a crime has just been committed.29redarclaw
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been no lawful
warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. PO3 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising
at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing
"improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other.
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. These circumstances are not enough
to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity, which would constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3
Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made
on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of
the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated October 20, 2011 and
the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason. SO
ORDERED.
GO v. Court of Appeals G.R. no. 101837 February
11, 1992 Facts:
Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P.
Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the
opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and
Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot
Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby
restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter
at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for
a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was
registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports
that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith
detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively
identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide the office of the provincial prosecutor of Rizal.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could
be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).
On 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an
information for murder before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom
of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper
preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed.
Issues: first, whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Held:
1) we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within
the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as
follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
10
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously
were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither
could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting
had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers
had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's
plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge."
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section
5 of Rule 113.
Section 7 of Rule 112 is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San
Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he
was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed
a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a
preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the
killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that
Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for
petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any
conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to
be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
2) Rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion
of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. . . .
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that right is
statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a
component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other
penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is
inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To
deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to
due process.
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at
the time of entering a plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his
right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already
before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary
investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right
to preliminary investigation.
People v. Doria
GR No. 125299 January 22, 1999
Doctrine: Sec. 5 Rule 113. Arrest without warrant; when lawful
Facts: Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one Jun [Doria] was engaged in
illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They
frisked him but did not find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house of
his associate Neneth [Gaddao], so he led the police team to her house.
The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. Jun identified her as Neneth, and she was
asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3 Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside
the house]. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the box s
flaps was open, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
sold to him by Jun. His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the box. He peeked
inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered the
marked bills from Neneth and they arrested her. The bricks were examined and they were found to be dried
marijuana leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972],
Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to
Section 21 [Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.
Issue: WON Gaddaos arrest was a valid warrantless arrest
Held: Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under
Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there
was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In
fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. Neither could the arrest of
appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests
without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."
Gaddao s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification
made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he
left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing
drugs. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure
of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
Doria was sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua plus P500,000 fine and Gaddao was acquitted.
RULE 113
POSADAS V. OMBUDSMAN
GR NO. 131492 SEPTEMBER 29, 2000
DOCTRINE: In view of Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by
virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and
after finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions
when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, 5 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
FACTS:
Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between
his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In a letter dated December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger
Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the crime. In response to the request,
respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went to U.P. on
December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro
Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis
Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing
of Venturina. It appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk
between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
11
 Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty.
Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with
them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of
their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day. However, criminal
charges were filed later against the two student suspects.
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas,
Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor
with violation of P.D. 1829, which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution
of criminal offenders.
On May 18, 1995, an information was filed against them.
Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of the case.
But the recommendation was disapproved. In a memorandum, dated September 8, 1997, the Office of the
Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the
Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman's
office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a
warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829.
RULING:
(1) No. In view of Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue
of a warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and
after finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. The
exceptions when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, 5 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the commission of
the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably
guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which
is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.
We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting
officers:
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section
5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime.
When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not committing a
crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On
the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk called
to put an end to the violence on the campus.
To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to
supplant the courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested
committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen
to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we
cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties.
(2) No. The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects were guilty.
The question is whether the suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a warrant issued by a court,
considering that, as already explained, the attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided in
Rule 113, 5. Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well have authorized the arrest
without warrant of the students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts could decide the
question of probable cause since the students were not being arrested in flagrante delicto.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.
CHI CHAN LIU a.k.a. CHAN QUE and HUI LAO CHUNG a.k.a. LEOFE
SENGLAO, Appellants
[G.R. No. 189272. January 21, 2015]
Doctrines:
- Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that:
The court may find the defendant guilty of any offense, or of any frustrated or attempted offense, the commission
of which is necessarily included in the charge in the complaint or information.
- When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and
after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Facts:
On December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani Yuzon, the officers-on-duty at the PNP
Station, Looc, Occidental Mindoro, received a radio message from the Barangay Captain of Ambil Island, Looc,
Maximo Torreliza, that a suspicious looking boat was seen somewhere within the vicinity of said island.
Immediately thereafter, the police officers headed towards the specified location wherein they spotted two (2)
boats anchored side by side, one of which resembled a fishing boat and the other, a speed boat. They noticed
one (1) person on board the fishing boat and two (2) on board the speed boat who were transferring cargo from
the former to the latter. As they moved closer to the area, the fishing boat hurriedly sped away. Due to the strong
waves, the police officers were prevented from chasing the same and instead, went towards the speed boat,
which seemed to be experiencing engine trouble. On board the speed boat, the officers found the appellants Chi
Chan Liu a.k.a. ChanQue and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with several transparent plastic bags
containing a white, crystalline substance they instantly suspected to be the regulated drug, methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu." They requested the appellants to show their identification papers
but appellants failed to do so. Thus, the police officers directed appellants to transfer to their service boat and
thereafter towed appellants speed boat to the shore behind the Municipal Hall of Looc, Occidental Mindoro.
On their way, the police officers testified that appellant Chi Chan Liu repeatedly offered them "big, big amount
of money" which they ignored.
Upon reaching the shore, the police officers led the appellants, together with the bags containing the crystalline
substance, to the police station. In the presence of the appellants and Municipal Mayor Felesteo Telebrico, they
conducted an inventory of the plastic bags which were forty five (45) in number, weighing about a kilo each.
Again, SPO3 Yuson requested proper documentation from the appellants as to their identities as well as to the
purpose of their entry in the Philippine territory. However, the appellants did not answer any of SPO3 Yusons
12
questions. Immediately thereafter, SPO3 Yuson reported the incident to their superiors, PNP Provincial
Command in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro and PNP Regional Command IV in Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba,
Laguna. The PNP Regional Director General Reynaldo Acop advised them to await his arrival the following
day.
On December 4, 1998, General Acop arrived together with Colonel Damian on a helicopter. They talked with
Mayor Telebrico and the arresting officers and then brought the appellants with the suspected illegal drugs to
Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, for further investigation. There, the appellants and the suspected
prohibited drugs were turned over to Police Inspector Julieto B. Culili, of the Intelligence and Investigation
Division, PNP, Regional Office IV, who attempted to communicate with the appellants using "broken" English.
According to Inspector Culili, appellant Chi Chan Liu only kept saying the phrase "call China, big money,"
giving him a certain cellular phone number. He allowed appellants to call said number in which they spoke with
someone using their native language, which he could not understand. Because of this difficulty, Inspector Culili
sought the assistance of Inspector Carlito Dimalanta in finding an interpreter who knew either Fookien or
Cantonese.
On December 5, 1998, the interpreter arrived. With the assistance of said interpreter, Inspector Culili informed
and explained to the appellants their rights under Philippine laws inclusive of the right to remain silent, the right
to counsel, as well as the right tobe informed of the charges against them, and the consequences thereof.
Inspector Culili also requested the interpreter to ask the appellants whether they wanted to avail of said
constitutional rights. However, appellants only kept repeating the phrase "big money, call China." Apart from
their names, aliases and personal circumstances, the appellants did not divulge any other information. Inspector
Culili, with the assistance of the arresting officers, then prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of the
appellants, requested for their physical and medical examination, as well as the laboratory examination of the
white, crystalline substance inthe bags seized from them. According to Inspector Culili, moreover, he was able
to confirm that the appellants are Chinese nationals from Guandong, China, based on an earlier intelligence
report that foreign nationals on board extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang
Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province.
On December 8, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed an Information with
the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, against appellants for violation of Section 14, Article III, in relation
to Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425 as amended by RA No. 7659. Appellants pleaded not guilty to the
charges against them. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, where the facts earlier stated were testified to by
the witnesses for the prosecution, specifically: SPO2 Paglicawan, SPO3 Yuson, Police Inspector Culili, and
Police Inspector Geronimo.
The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense, namely: Jesus Astorga and
Fernando Oliva, both residents of Ambil Island, Leopoldo S. J. Lozada, a former Supervising Crime
Photographer of the PNP, and Godofredo de la Fuente Robles, a Member of the Looc Municipal Council,
essentially maintain that the subject crystalline substance was merely recovered by the apprehending police
officers from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza and not actually from the speed boat the
appellants were on.
The trial court found appellants guilty. CA affirmed the trial courts decision. CA further denied the appellants
Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution finding no cogent reason to make any revision, amendment, or
reversal of its assailed Decision.
Issue: W/N the arraignment of the accused appellants is valid
Ruling: Yes. The Court denied their appeal.
Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that:
The court may find the defendant guilty of any offense, or of any frustrated or attempted offense, the commission
of which is necessarily included in the charge in the complaint or information.
As will be seen from this provision, to convict of an offense included in the charge in the information it is not
sufficient that the crime maybe included, but it must necessarily be included. While, the case before us, the
possession of the opium by the appellants was proved beyond question and they might have been convicted of
that offense if they have been charged therewith, nevertheless, such possession was not an essential element of
the crime of illegal importation and was not necessarily included therein. The importation was complete, to say
the least, when the ship carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium be discharged or
that it be taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the Philippine
Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine
Islands with intent to discharge its cargo. That being the case it is clear that possession, either actual or
constructive, is not a necessary element of the crime of illegal importation nor is it necessarily included therein.
Therefore, in acquitting the appellants of the charge of illegal importation, we cannot legally convict them of
the crime of illegal possession.
However, in our more recent ruling in People v. Elkanish, 33 this Court held that possession is inherent in
importation. In that case, the accused, who was suspected of being the owner of sixty-five (65) large boxes of
blasting caps found aboard a ship of American registry docked inside Philippine territory, was charged with
illegal importation of the articles under Section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code and illegal possession
of the same articles under Section 1 of Act No. 3023, in two (2) separate informations. Ruling that double
jeopardy exists in view of the fact that possession is necessarily included in importation, this Court affirmed the
dismissal of the information on illegal importation, in the following wise:
Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court reads:
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and
after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
With reference to the importation and possession of blasting caps, it seems plain beyond argument that the latter
is inherent in the former so as to make them juridically identical. There can hardly be importation without
possession. When one brings something or causes something to be brought into the country, he necessarily has
the possession of it. The possession ensuing from the importation may not be actual, but legal, or constructive,
but whatever its character, the importer, in our opinion, is a possessor in the juristic sense and he is liable to
criminal prosecution.If he parts with the ownership of interest in the article before it reaches Philippine territory,
he is neither an importer nor a possessor within the legal meaning of the term, and he is not subject to prosecution
for either offense under the Philippine Laws. The owner of the merchandise at the time it enters Philippine water
is its importer and possessor. He who puts merchandise on board a vessel and alienates the title thereto while it
is in transit does not incur criminal liability. Possession on ownership of a prohibited article on a foreign vessel
on the high seas outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines does not constitute a crime triable by the courts of
this country.
Applying the aforequoted ruling, the Court finds that while appellants cannot be held liable for the offense of
illegal importation charged in the information, their criminal liability for illegal possession, if proven beyond
reasonable doubt, may nevertheless be sustained. As previously mentioned, the crime of importation of
regulateddrugs is committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without being
authorized by law. Indeed, when one brings something or causes something to be brought into the country, he
necessarily has possession of the same. Necessarily, therefore, importation can never be proven without first
establishing possession, affirming the fact that possession is a condition sine qua nonfor it would rather be unjust
to convict one of illegal importation of regulated drugs when he is not proven to be in possession thereof.
In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught by the apprehending officers in
flagrante delicto. As previously stated, the records reveal that on the date of their arrest, the apprehending
officers, while acting upon a report from the Barangay Captain, spotted appellants transferring cargo from one
boat to another. In addition, this Court does not find the consequent warrantless search and seizure conducted
on appellants unreasonable in view of the fact that the bags containing the regulated drugs were in plain view
of the arresting officers, one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement of obtaining a search
warrant.
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As to appellants assignment of failure on the part of the prosecution to substantiate beyond reasonable doubt
the corpus delictiof the crime charged for the chain of custody of the illegal drugs was not sufficiently
established, the same cannot be sustained as a review of the records of the case provides otherwise. From the
time of appellants arrest, the seized bags of regulated drugs were properly marked and photographed. Proper
inventory was also conducted in the presence of the appellants and Mayor Telebrico, who signed a receipt
evidencing that the confiscated drugs were turned over to the PNP Regional Headquarters.
Another factor that militates against the accused is their failure to testify on their own behalf, the defense is
trying to justify for want of Chinese interpreter. The instant case has been filed in Court since December 8, 1998
or six years more or less until now. It is highly unbelievable that for such period oftime that this case has been
pending in court, accused could not still secure the services of a Chinese interpreter when as borne out by the
records, they were able to secure the services of several lawyers one after the other. The accused on two (2)
occasions have even submitted written requests in English which were granted by the Court allowing them to
call their relatives but still they failed to secure the services of an interpreter. To the mind of the Court, accused
can also understand English as proven by their letters. x x x54
Indeed, this Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the lower court as to appellants guilt
of the offense charged against them, especially when such findings are adequately supported by documentary
as well as testimonial evidence. It is a settled policy of this Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain
the findings of fact of the trial court in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in a better position to
assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an honest determination of the witnesses
deportment during the trial.
People vs. Cubcubin DOCTRINE:
Under Rule 113 Sec. 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the
offender has just committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that personal
knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
FACTS:
At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police
station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard
in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3
Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead
on his tricycle which was then parked on the road.
Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that Garcellanos
description fitted a person known as alias Jun Dulce. Armando Plata, who knew where accused-appellant lived,
led PO3 Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and Prosecutor Lu to accused-appellants house in Garcia Extension, Cavite
City. The policemen knocked on the door for about three minutes before it was opened by a man who answered
the description given by Danet Garcellano and who turned out to be accused-appellant. The police operatives
identified themselves and informed him that he was being sought in connection with the shooting near the
cemetery. Accusedappellant denied involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked
permission to enter and look around the house.
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the house, he noticed a white t-shirt, bearing the brand name
Hanes and the name Dhenvher written in the inner portion of the shirts hemline, placed over a divider near the
kitchen. Upon close examination, he said that he found it to be bloodied." When he picked up the t-shirt, two
spent .38 caliber shells fell from it. PO3 Rosal stayed with accused-appellant while he conducted a search. They
then took the t-shirt and the two bullet shells. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked accused-appellant to go with them
to Sting Cafe for purposes of identification. There, accused-appellant was positively identified by Danet
Garcellano as the victims companion. The police investigators asked accused-appellant where the fatal gun was.
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said accusedappellant refused to tell him where he hid the gun so he sought his (accused-
appellants) permission to go back to his house to conduct a further search. Inside the house, they saw accused-
appellants 11-year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy, Jr. found on top of a plastic water container (drum) outside the
bathroom a homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver
(six shooter), without a serial number (Exh. F). He found the gun loaded with five live bullets (Exhs. M, M-1,
M-2, M-3, and M-4). PO3 Estoy, Jr. said that he inscribed his initials RDE (for Raymundo D. Estoy) on the
cylinder of the gun with the use of a sharp object. While PO3 Estoy, Jr. was conducting the search, SPO1
Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal stayed with accused-appellant in the sala.
Accused-appellant was then taken to the police station, where he was photographed along with the things
seized from him
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest was valid HELD:
In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. The question,
therefore, is whether there was probable cause for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to
believe that accused-appellant committed the crime. We hold that there was none. The two did not have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the
circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirely
on what they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio, Cavite
City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997 and reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe
Boulevard of the said city; by an alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the
Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the victim was
lean, mustachioed, darkcomplexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a
tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano fitted
accused-appellant, alias Jun Dulce and who said he knew where accused-appellant lived and accompanied them
to accused-appellants house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to
them by others.
Mallari vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110569
Doctrine: When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the
cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly
resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him or when the giving of such information will imperil
the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if
the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable.
Facts: Sometime on December 27, 1990, at around 2:30 p.m., Pat Manipon and Pfc. Esguerra, who were both
then assigned at the Capas Police Station, received reliable information that appellant Diosdado Mallari, who
has a standing warrant of arrest in connection with Criminal Case No. 471 for homicide in 1989, was seen at
Sitio 14, Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac.
Immediately upon receipt of such information, Pfc. Manipon, accompanied by Pat. Esguerra and Pat. Narciso
Simbulan, with personal knowledge of the existence of a standing warrant of arrest against appellant in
connection with Criminal Case No. 471 for Homicide, immediately proceeded to Sitio 14, Sta. Rita, Capas,
Tarlac. Upon reaching the place, the arresting officers surrounded the house of appellant, arrested him and told
him to remain stationary. Thereupon, the arresting officers searched him and found a homemade gun (paltik)
with one M-16 live ammunition.
Appellant was handcuffed and brought to the Capas Police Station where he was endorsed to the chief
investigator while the homemade gun and live ammunition were endorsed to the property custodian. The
incident was then entered in the police blotter after which the spot and investigation reports were prepared.
After investigation, the petitioner was charged with the crime of Illegal Posession of Firearms and
Ammunition, and pleaded not guilty on arraignment.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid even if the police authorities did not have the warrant in their
possession at the precise moment.
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Ruling: Yes.
Even if the SC acquitted the accused Mallari, it stressed that the case is not of a warrantless arrest but
merely an instance of an arrest effected by the police authorities without having the warrant in their possession
at that precise moment. Finding as it does, this Court deems it unnecessary to delve into the applicability of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and on the merits of both the petitioners and the Office of the Solicitor
Generals arguments with respect thereto.The applicable provision is not Section 5, Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court on warrantless arrests, but Section 7, Rule 113 which provides as follows:
Sec. 7. Method of Arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. -- When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant the
officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued
for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him or
when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.The officer need not have the warrant in his
possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be
shown to him as soon as practicable. [Underscoring supplied]
The abovequoted rule clearly allows a police officer to effect arrest without the warrant in his possession
at the time of the arrest. Thus, appellants arrest being lawful, the search and seizure made incidental thereto is
likewise valid, albeit conducted without a warrant. In the case of People v. Acol, where the unlicensed firearms
were found when the police team apprehended the accused for robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition, this Court held that the unlicensed firearms may be seized without the necessity of obtaining
a search warrant. Expounding thereon, it stated that:
` x x x The illegality of the search is independent from the illegal possession of prohibited arms. The illegality
of the search did not make legal an illegal possession of firearms. When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the
commission of a criminal offense, the offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense
being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the
apprehension of the guilty and the taking of the corpus delicti.
SALIBO VS WARDEN
DOCTRINE: Rule 113, Sec. 5 authorizes arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who
witnessed the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of committing the offense. This Court in promulgating
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now
requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed." This connotes immediacy in point of time and
excludes cases under the old rule where an offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago.
Similarly, the arrestor must have "personal knowledge of facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it"
(instead of just "reasonable ground to believe that the [arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule).
FACTS:
Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a pending warrant of arrest issued by
the trial court in People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the police officers of
Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, he presented himself to
clear his name. Salibo presented to the police pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other
documents tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre
happened. The authorities, however, apprehended and detained him. He questioned the legality of his detention
via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, maintaining that he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang.
The CA issued the writ, making it returnable to the judge of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial
court granted Salibos petition and ordered his immediate release from detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even assuming Salibo was not the
Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked. Salibos proper remedy, according to the
CA, should have been a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest. ISSUE: W/N Salibo was validly
arrested without warrant RULING:
NO. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not restrained
under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly
availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the
Regional Trial Courtcharged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of
murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested
without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a warrantless
arrest may be made:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on- personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense
that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. The police officers, therefore,
had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty
without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
Rule 113, Sec. 5 authorizes arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the arrestee
in flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of committing the offense. This Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure have tightened and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an offense
"has in fact just been committed." This connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old
rule where an offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must have
"personal knowledge of facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it" (instead of just "reasonable ground
to believe that the [arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule). Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a
Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash
Information apply to him.
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