Case Digest: People vs.

Villanueva

14 SCRA 109 (1965)

FACTS:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the crime of
Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by
counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by
City AttorneyAriston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, after securing the
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear
at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel
for the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the isolated appearance of Atty. Fule as private prosecutor constitutes practice of law.

RULING:

No. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as ah agent or friend of the offended
party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity.
As Assistant City Attorney of Sail Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes
committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from
Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. As such,
there could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule us Assistant City Attorney of San
Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. Furthermore, the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did
not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. Thus, the
appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of
law. And, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor,
the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complaint in the case at bar who is a relative. Decision affirmed.
Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of
the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1,
Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the
petition is DISMISSED.
People v. Tuanda

FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the
practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on commission basis. In 1984,
instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored
by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of
dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted of
estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing Check Law). The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that
the offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted
arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the
aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and
she is not guilty of the offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a
Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme
Court in the premises.

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of a person
convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public
interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interest of parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial
papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure
the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of which
respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.
ROYONG VS. OBLENA

AC No. 376 April 30, 1963

FACTS:

Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench, with rape.
The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that there was no rape, the carnal
knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex.

In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape,
nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint charging the
respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good
moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18
year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render judgment
ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation of
respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.

HELD:

Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

RATIO:

The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment.

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.

Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock
common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble
profession of the law.

As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral
character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.

Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He
lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to
his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
LEE VS ABASTILLAS
A.M. No. RTJ-92-863 and A.C. No. 3815.
July 11, 1994

Facts
The complainant alleged that the respondent solicited a bribe by asking their council to double his attorneys fee so
the Respondent can share. Because of bad experience in judiciary, the complainant herein agreed to give the money
on installment of which P20, 000.00 was given through Atty. Chua on May 2 or 3, 1991.
Jonny K.H Uy
testified that he visited the respondent herein in his residence 11:30 in the morning on October 7, 1991 to discuss the
course of the case under his sala. And before Uy parted, the respondent ask if Lee could help him with the
$5,000.00.
After sometime and realizing that the respondent herein was giving a runaround, not having done anything to their
case under his sala, the complainant appeared before JBC sometime in 1992 to oppose Judge Abastillas application
for transfer to Manila RTC.
The above allegations of the complainants was denied by the respondent.

Ratio
The conversation was taped.
The court finds no sufficient proof to sustain the charge that Judge Abastillas accepted the amount of P20, 000.00 in
view of Atty Chuas uncertainty as to the date he delivered the money.
However, there is strong and convincing evidence that Judge Abastillas had willingly and knowingly discussed with
interested parties.
Canon 1 of Code of Judicial Conduct requires that:
(Rule 1.01) A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
(Rule 1.02) - Administer justice impartially and without delay.
(Rule 2.01) - Behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

Decision
Judge Renato E. Abastillas, RTC, Branch 50 Bacolod city, is hereby found GUILTY of serious misconduct, for the
purpose of discussing or soliciting bribe in connection said cases and is hereby DISMISSED from office.
Atty. Enrique S. Chua administratively liable for alleged bribing of Judge Abastillas. He is STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of a similar acts or violation committed by him in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Canon 1 of the IBP Code of Professional Responsibility

A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
mans cause.
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement.
Arciga v. Maniwang

106 SCRA 591 Legal Ethics Gross Immoral Conduct

In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then a medical technology
student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. The two then went to
Arcigas hometown to tell the latters parent about the pregnancy. They also made Arcigas parents believe that they
were already married but they would have to have the church wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar
exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a marriage license.

In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with Arciga. Arciga located
his whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married another woman. Arciga confronted Maniwangs
wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted physical injuries upon Arciga.

Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct. Maniwang admitted that
he is the father of Arcigas child; that he did promise to marry Arciga many times; that he broke those promises
because of Arcigas shady past because apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with
Maniwang was born.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwangs case is different from the cases of Mortel vs Aspiras and
Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwangs refusal to marry Arciga was not so corrupt nor
unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much discussion was provided by the ponente as to why). But the
Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-
laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.
Surigao Waters v. Cloribel

31 SCRA 1 Legal Ethics Duty to Respect Judicial Authorities Contempt of Court

In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and
Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads

In 1968, the Supreme Court promulgated a unanimous decision (24 SCRA 491; G.R. No. L-27072) which was not
favorable to MacArthur International Minerals Co. The latters lawyer, Atty. Vicente Santiago then filed a motion
for reconsideration. Eventually, a third motion for reconsideration was submitted by him where the following
paragraph was stated:

6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen
messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their
judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering
that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or
favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion
to hold himself in contempt of court seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral
principle involved and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an
accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright
dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government
officials are just amoral?

Scattered in his motion were other statements where he attacked the 1968 decision of the Supreme Court as false,
erroneous, and illegal.

In another motion, Atty. Santiago sought the inhibition of two Justices: Justice Fred Castro, because allegedly, he is
the brother of the vice president of the opposing party. And Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion because immediately
after the 1968 decision, his son was appointed to a significant position in the government. (Here Atty. Santiago
implied that the justices were not fair and that their decision was influenced).

In his defense, Atty. Santiago said that he originally deleted the above paragraph and was only included due to
inadvertence. But that any rate, he averred that the language he used was necessary to defend his client.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Santiago is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. Lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their
clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients success is wholly subordinate; and
their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. Thus, Santiagos defense is not tenable.

A lawyer must avoid language that tend to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief in the judicial system. A
lawyers duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses
in the observance thereof.

Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: To observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.

Atty. Santiago was fined for his infractions.

Castillo v. Padilla

Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for the use of
insulting language in the course of judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings of the parties.

Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in Criminal Case No.
13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff.
At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard
respondent say "bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter looking at him (complainant)
menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people, complainant was unable to proceed with
his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.

While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant, claiming that what he
said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant and highly
offensive matters into the record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty.
Castillo referred to by respondent was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment was because
defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation at his house and crying over the
phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and immediately, this representation like any good
husband would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to the school and confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr.
with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and if yes, right then and
there l would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library

Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b)
and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel.
(Canon 17.)

Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que
bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark
while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but
also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct
required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time
that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been
admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the
preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)

The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondents actuation was triggered by complainants own
manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when respondent
unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words.

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper decorum
and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

SO ORDERED.
Canon 10 1. Director of Lands v. Adorable
Facts: Adorable files a land claim before the Director of Lands. The case went to the CA for appeal. However, the
war broke out. After the war, Adorable files a reconstitution case before the SC believing that the case was not
resolved by the CA. Atty. Zamora, counsel of the appellee of the case informed the Court that the case was already
settled by the CA in favor of Adorable. Issue: WON the conduct of Atty. Zamora is proper. Held: Yes. The conduct
of Atty. Zamora is proper. The Court in this case praised Atty. Zamora s conduct as the highest standard of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility as becomes of the deserving member of the bar. Hence, the act of Atty. Zamora is
proper. 2. Carlet v. CA and Zarate Facts: Carlet who is the Special Administrator of the Estate of Sevillo through
Atty. Jimenez files before the Trial Court an action for reconvenyance of property of Sevillo. Zarate then moved to
dismiss such action invoking res judicata since it was the same facts that had been settled by the trial court, CA and
SC. The action was then dismissed by the Trial Court and ordered Atty. Jimenez regarding forum-shopping. Atty.
Jimenez then appealed it before the CA, but to no avail.

Issue: WON the action of Atty. Jimenez is proper.

Held: No. The action of Atty. Jimenez is not proper. Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. In the case at bar, the action of Atty Jimenez
of filing a reconveyance case despite his knowledge that there is finality of the case shows that he does not have
good faith towards the court. Hence, his conduct is not proper. 3. Allied Bank v. CA and Galanida Facts: Galanida
was terminated from Allied Bank due to his refusal to be transferred to other branch. Hence, he filed an action
before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter then rendered a decision in Galanidas favor citing the Dosch case,
lifted from the syllabus of the SCRA.

Issue: WON the conduct of the labor arbiter is proper.

Held: No. The conduct of the labor arbiter is not proper. Rule 10.02 of the CPR mandates that a lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority. In the case at bar, the fact that the labor
arbiter quoted in their decision a syllabus from the SCRA is an act of misrepresenting the decision of the Supreme
Court since such syllabus is not part of the decision, instead a note of the author of such report. Hence, such conduct
is improper. 4. Del Rosario v. Chingcuanco and Imperio Facts: The CAR rendered a decision evicting Del Rosario
from the land which he leases from Imperio. However, the former refused to vacate the land since the latter does not
want to refund him of the improvement he had done to the property. Del Rosario, further, filed a motion before the
SC to stay such execution. Due this, Imperio filed a petition to cite Del Rosario s counsel in contempt since said
counsel quoted a non-existing SC decision. However, it was discovered that such belief was brought by a mere
typographical error.

Issue: WON the conduct of Del Rosario s counsel deserves a disciplinary action.
Held: No. The conduct of Del Rosario s counsel does not deserve a disciplinary action. In this case, the Court
ruled that the name of the case was given correctly and there was clearly no deception on the part of the counsel.
Hence, the conduct of said counsel does not deserve a disciplinary action. 5. Munoz v. CA and Sutton Facts: Sutton
made some misrepresentations in the facts of the case where she seeks a review before the SC.

Issue: WON such conduct deserves disciplinary action.

Held: Yes.The conduct of Atty. Sutton deserves disciplinary action. Under the Canon 10 of the CPR, a lawyer shall
owes candor and honesty to the court. In the case at bar, the fact that Atty. Sutton made false facts in her pleading
for review in SC is a clear manifestation that she lacks candor for the court. Hence, her conduct warrants a
disciplinary action. 6. Adez Realty v. CA Facts: Atty. Dacanay made some intercalation in the decision of the Court
of Appeals when he appealed before the SC. Due this, the Court had suspended him indefinitely. Dacanay argued
that it was his client who made the intercalation and later on he admitted that his secretary made the intercalation on
the document.

Issue: WON the conduct of Dacanay warrants a suspension.

Held: Yes. The conduct of Dacanay warrants suspension. Rule 10.01 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of the paper, language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the
text of a decision or authority. In the case at bar, the fact that Atty. Dacanay made the intercalation on the CA
decision makes him liable under such rule. Hence, his conduct warrants a disciplinary action. 7. The Insurance Life
Assurance Co. Employees Assoc. v. Insular Life Assurance Co. Facts: The Employees Assoc. Files before the CIR a
complaint for unfair labor practice against the Company. The CIR then dismissed such complaint. In its decision,
CIR Judge Martinez misquoted a SC decision in the case of Lopez Sr v. Chronicle Publication Employees
Ass n: (1) 60 words of the paragraph quoted by Martinez do NOT appear in the original; (2) Martinez used For
it is settled that...; the original reads, For it must be remembered... (3) Last sentence in the quoted paragraph of
Martinez is actually part of the immediately succeeding paragraph in the SC decision. In the respondents brief,
counsels for respondents quoted the CIR s decision Issue: Whether or not the Judge and the respondent s
counsel are liable for contempt. Held: No. The Judge and the respondent s counsel are not liable for contempt.
In citing SC s decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy
the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. This is because only the decisions of this
Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction. (Miranda v. Imperial). However, there
was good faith in both the Judge and the respondent s counsel, hence their action is not liable for contempt
Canlas v. CA

FACTS:

August, 1982: Osmundo S. Canlas executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Vicente Maosca to mortgage
2 parcels of land situated in BF Homes Paranaque in the name of his wife Angelina Canlas.
Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the lands to Maosca for P850K, P500K payable within 1 week, and
the balance serves as his investment in the business. Maosca issued 2 checks P40K and P460K. The P460K
lacked sufficient funds.
September 3, 1982: Maosca mortgage to Atty. Manuel Magno the parcels of lands for P100K with the help of
impostors who misrepresented themselves as the Spouses Canlas.
September 29, 1982: Maosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) for P500K with the
parcels of land as security and with the help of the same impostors. The loan was left unpaid resulting in a
extrajudicially foreclosure on the lots.
January 15, 1983: Canlas wrote a letter informing ASB that the mortgage was without their authority. He also
requested the sheriff Contreras to hold or cancel the auction. Both parties refused.
The spouses Canlas filed a case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction
RTC: restrained the sheriff from issuing a Certificate of Sheriffs Sale and annulled the mortgage
CA: reversed holding Canlas estopped for coming to the bank with Maosca and letting himself be introduced as
Leonardo Rey
ISSUE: W/N the ASB had was negligent due to the doctrine of last clear chance

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply
The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family
not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity
acted simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures
affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to Atty. Magno
previous deed of mortgage did not bear the tax account number of the spouses as well as the Community Tax
Certificate of Angelina Canlas
doctrine of last clear chance
where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the
other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom
the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence
of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence
Antecedent Negligence: Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente Maosca the opportunity to perpetrate the
fraud, by entrusting him the owner's copy of the transfer certificates of title of subject parcels of land
Supervening Negligence: Failing to perform the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for
banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them - ASB bears the loss
Canlas went to ASB with Maosca and he was introduced as Leonardo Rey. He didn't correct Maosca. However,
he did not know that the lots were being used as a security for he was there to make sure that Maosca pays his debt
so he cannot be estopped from assailing the validity of the mortgage
But being negligent in believing the misrepresentation by Maosca that he had other lots and that the lot were not to
be used as a security, Canlas was negligent and undeserving of Attorney's fees.
the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves as the
spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas = complete nullity
Zaldivar v. Gonzales

166 SCRA 316 Legal Ethics Contemptuous Language Duty of a Lawyer

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the
Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued
a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing
informations against Zaldivar.

Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez
even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme
Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the
Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain
his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of
speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed
into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached
him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme
Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court.
Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country.

Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom
of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of
these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration
of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of
fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial
power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the
Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing
lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar,
his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no
relation to the Zaldivar case.

The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.
In re: Aguas Phil records

In the matter of the proceedings against MARCELINO AGUAS for contempt of the COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA.
Claudio Gabriel, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta, representing the Respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. CONTEMPT OF COURT; TREATMENT OF WITNESS. An attorney may rightfully protest against personal
violence to a witness at the hands of the court, and such protest, if respectful, is not contempt of court.
2. ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT. A finding that an attorneys attitude toward the court was menacing is a mere
conclusion and will not support a judgment of contempt.

DECISION
SMITH, J. :
It appears from the record in this matter that on the 29th of August, 1900, during the progress of a trial then being
held before the Court of First Instance at Bacolor, in the Province of Pampanga, the court had occasion to caution
Angel Alberto, a witness in the case, not to look at the attorney for the defendant but to fix his attention on the judge
who was at the time examining him. It seems that the witness did not give heed to this warning, and the judge
thereupon arose from his seat and approaching the witness, seized him by the shoulders, and using the expression,
Lingon ang mucha (Look at me), either shook him, as insisted by the attorney for the defendant, or only turned
him about, as claimed by the judge and others. Whether the witness was shaken or only turned about, at all events
seizing him, brought the defendants attorney to his feet, who, protesting against the action of the judge as
coercive of the witness, demanded that a record be made of the occurrence and that the further hearing of the case be
postponed. Two days afterward the clerk entered in his record a recital of the incident substantially as above, and
also a statement that on other and prior occasions the attorney, Marcelino Aguas, had been wanting in respect to the
court by making use of improper phrases, and by interrupting opposing counsel in their examination of witnesses.
The court on this record adjudged the attorney to be in contempt of court and suspended him from the practice of his
profession for a period of twenty days. The attorney appealed, but his appeal having been disallowed by the lower
court, he asked to be heard in justification, which was granted.
On the hearing in justification evidence was taken touching the contempt alleged to have been committed by Seor
Aguas, from which the court found that during the trial of the case of Roberto Toledo v. Valeriano Balatbat, the
judge, having had occasion to seize the witness, Alberto Angel, by the shoulders to turn him around, Seor Aguas,
attorney for defendant, had risen from his seat in a menacing attitude, and with a voice and body trembling
protested that the action of the judge was coercive of the witness; and further that his attention being called to the
fact that he was wanting in respect to the court and that he should sit down, he waived his right to go on with the
trial and moved a postponement of the hearing. On this finding the court again adjudged the attorney guilty of
contempt of court, and suspended him from the practice of his profession for a period of twenty days. From this
judgment Seor Aguas appealed to this court.
In our opinion the action of the judge in seizing the witness, Alberto Angel, by the shoulder and turning him about
was unwarranted and an interference with that freedom from unlawful personal violence to which every witness is
entitled while giving testimony in a court of justice. Against such conduct the appellant had the right to protest and
to demand that the incident be made a matter of record. That he did so was not contempt, providing protest and
demand were respectfully made and with due regard for the dignity of the court. The only question, therefore in this
case is, Was the appellant respectful and regardful of the courts dignity in presenting his objection and asking that it
be recorded in the proceedings? The witnesses say and the judge finds that his attitude was menacing (bastante
amenazadora) in the moment of making his protest, but beyond that there is nothing in the record which even tends
to show that he was disrespectful to the court or unmindful of its dignity. In our opinion both testimony and finding
state a mere conclusion which, in the absence of the facts from which it was deduced, is wholly valueless to support
a judgment of contempt. The statement that the attorneys attitude was menacing tended no more to competently
establish the alleged offense of contempt than if the witnesses had testified and the court had found that his conduct
was contemptuous or lacking in respect. The specific act from which it was inferred that his attitude was menacing
should have been testified to by the witnesses and found by the court, and failing that, the record does not show
concrete facts sufficient to justify the conclusion that he was disrespectful to the court or offensive to its dignity.
The judgment appealed from must therefore be reversed, and it is so ordered, with costs de oficio.
Maceda v. Ombudsman Velasquez

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against
petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his
certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a
period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact,
petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted
for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and
under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service,
the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this
power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge
or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
1st Phil Intl Bank v CA

252 SCRA 259 Legal Ethics Forum Shopping

Civil Law Contract of Sale Parties to a Sales Contract

Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International Bank), which has been under conservatorship since 1984,
is the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank had an agreement with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the two to
purchase the parcels of land for a purchase price of P5.5 million pesos. The said agreement was made by Demetria
and Janolo with the Banks manager, Mercurio Rivera. Later however, the Bank, through its conservator, Leonida
Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement as it alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such
an agreement, hence there was no valid contract of sale. Subsequently, Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank.
The regional trial court ruled in favor of Demetria et al. The Bank filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with the said Bank, filed a motion for intervention with the
trial court. The trial court denied the motion since the trial has been concluded already and the case is now pending
appeal. Subsequently, Co, assisted by ACCRA law office, filed a separate civil case against Demetria and Janolo
seeking to have the purported contract of sale be declared unenforceable against the Bank. Demetria et al argued that
the second case constitutes forum shopping.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is forum shopping.

2. Whether or not there is a perfected contract of sale.

HELD:

Yes. There is forum shopping because there is identity of interest and parties between the first case and the second
case. There is identity of interest because both cases sought to have the agreement, which involves the same
property, be declared unenforceable as against the Bank. There is identity of parties even though the first case is in
the name of the bank as defendant, and the second case is in the name of Henry Co as plaintiff. There is still forum
shopping here because Henry Co essentially represents the bank. Both cases aim to have the bank escape liability
from the agreement it entered into with Demetria et al. The Supreme Court did not lay down any disciplinary action
against the ACCRA lawyers but they were warned that a repetition will be dealt with more severely.
Yes. There is a perfected contract of sale because the bank manager, Rivera, entered into the agreement with
apparent authority. This apparent authority has been duly proved by the evidence presented which showed that in all
the dealings and transactions, Rivera participated actively without the opposition of the conservator. In fact, in the
advertisements and announcements of the bank, Rivera was designated as the go-to guy in relation to the disposition
of the Banks assets.
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan

PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies in the COCO LEVY FUNDS.
PCGG wants petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm, as well as other information
regarding Cojuangco.

Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name?

Held: NO.

As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general is that a lawyer may
not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.

1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. A
party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against
unknown forces.

Except:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual
of a crime, the clients name is privileged.
That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's
identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.
LEGARDA v CA

New Cathay House, Inc. (Cathay) and Victoria Legarda entered into a lease agreement for a property in QC owned
by Legarda. For some reason, Legarda refused to sign the contract. Cathay made a deposit and downpayment of
rentals then led for specic performance. Legardas counsel, Dean Antonio Coronel, requested a 10-day
extension to le an answer which was granted. But Dean Coronel failed to le an answer within that period.
Cathay presented evidence ex parte. Cathay won the case (Katay si Legarda). Service of decision was made on Dean
Coronel but he still did not do anything. The QC property was then levied and auctioned o to pay for the
judgment debt. Cathays manager, Cabrera, was the highest bidder in the auction. Legarda did not redeem the
property within the 1 year period. Kahit natalo na sila dahil walang ginagawa si Dean (hindi nga niya sinabihan si
Legarda kung ano na nangyari sa kaso nila, na wala na yung lupa), Legarda still did not lose faith in her counsel.
Dean Coronel then led a petition for annulment of judgment. Petition was denied. No motion for reconsideration or
appeal was made on the order of denial (ibang klase ka dean!) So, Legarda hired a new lawyer. New lawyer asked
for annulment of judgment upon the ground that the old lawyer was negligent in his duties. The petition was granted
and the sale of the QC property to be set aside. The SC said that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Cathay
because of the reckless, inexcusable and gross negligence of Dean Coronel. Hence this motion for reconsideration
of SC decision.

Issue: W/N Legarda can be bound by the gross negligence of her counsel

Held: Yes. Original decision is reinstated (Legarda=loser) As long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend her interests in due course, she cannot be said to have been denied due process of law. If indeed Legarda is
innocent, then all the more that Cathay is innocent. Between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for
the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss. Legarda misjudged and hired the services of
Dean Coronel who in the end sort of abandoned her case. Decision was res ipso nal due to failure to appeal the
decision.
IN RE SOTTO

Facts:

Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement2in connection with the decision of this
Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the
locality. The court required Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should not be charged with contempt of court.

Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but he contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme
Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the
approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with
no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion,
erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any
one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.

Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court? Yes

Ratio:
Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an act which was not
punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt
That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly
accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our
Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after those of that country.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court
in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in
no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision.
Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is
pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members
of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing
the Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of
Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to
2 As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel
Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source
of anews published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law,
but thatit is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In
the wake ofso many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the
only remedy to putan end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce
that one of the first measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, a constantperil to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may
hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano,Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory
of the Philippine Judiciary.his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision
of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney,
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. An attorney as an officer of the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.

Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. He is also required to show cause why he should not be disbarred.
People v. Venerasyon

249 SCRA 244 Civil Law Preliminary Title Application of Laws Duty of a Judge to Impose Prescribed
Penalty

In August 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide committed against a
seven year old girl. The Presiding judge was Lorenzo Veneracion.

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which treats of the crime of Rape with Homicide, the penalty
imposable shall be death. However, Judge Veneracion refused to impose the death penalty but instead he sentenced
the four accused to reclusion perpetua. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the
penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused but the judge refused to act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion to impose a lesser penalty than that imposed by law.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should
impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In
this case, the judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article
9 thereof) which provides that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity,
or insufficiency of the laws.
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Luis Tabuena as General Manager of MIAA received direct order from Marcos to pay directly to his office
sum of 55mio in cash to pay for MIAAs liability to PNCC. He then received Presidential Memorandum from Fe
Gimenez (secretary). The money was delivered in cash in three withdrawals, no vouchers prepared to support the
disbursement although Gimenez issued a receipt on the third delivery for the entire amount. Tabuena was accused
and convicted of the crime of malversation by Sandiganbayan for defrauding the government, taking and
misappropriating money when there is no outstanding obligation between MIAA and PNCC. Petitioner contended
that he was acting in good faith when the office of the president directed him to deliver the said amount to his office
person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan violated due process on the ground of departing from that common standard of
fairness and impartiality?

Decision: Sandiganbayan decision reversed and set aside. Tabuena and Peralta are acquitted of the crime of
malversation. The majority believes that the interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just too excessive that
it cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even under the standard employed in a non-jury trial
where the judge is admittedly given more leeway in propounding questions to clarify points and to elicit additional
relevant evidence.

It is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting attorney. However anxious a judge may be for
the enforcement of the law, he should always remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the defendant accused
of crime, and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state, for the purpose of safeguarding the
interests of society.