CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 1
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW - MANILA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES
ARTICLE III Bill of Rights
SECTION 1
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ
Questions we ask when Due Process Clause is applied
1. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare
involved?
2. Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the legislature's purpose?
3. Is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive?
4. Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with
the matter involved?
5. Has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power?
6. Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or
is it not merely an unjustified interference with private
interest?
Conflict between Police Power and Due Process of Law
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than
real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to
coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise
it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty,
for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of
law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard,
as always, is reason.
Reasonability as the test of limitation
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands
only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
subject sought to be attained. . . . .
Adoption of Economic Policy in relation to Due Process
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the
absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy,
or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws
passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements
of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functus officio. . . .
Necessity of the Bill applying the Test of Reasonableness
The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy
under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose
into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not
merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to
have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory
note that accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to
prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a
strangle hold upon our economic life. If the persons who control this
vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to
this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions,
and who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not
really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our
national security, will be at the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to
deprive persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means
of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of
persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be
wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our
national security it respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
Law as expressly held by the Constitutional Convention
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the
constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a
noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru
the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must
have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact
legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people,
their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they
expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing
their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the
legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires
the nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the
amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and
others on this matter because it is convinced that the National
Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino
and American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11
Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages
66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. vs. TORRES
Essence of Due Process
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Where, as in the instant case, petitioner PHILPHOS
agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to
consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position
papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the
requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable
opportunity to present its side.
YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Why is the Due Process Clause kept ambiguous?
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain
also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due
process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron
rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the
guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to
make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its
protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific
description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal
straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to
vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have
preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were,
to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion
in the course of the decision of cases as they arise."
Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for
example, would go no farther than to define due process and in so
doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the
embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play."
The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the
reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed
against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the
lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won
for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that
is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John
made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the
ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every
person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to
have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the
sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is
formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously,
one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be
considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed
appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two
sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to
the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the
other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that
this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or
useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or
worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
Minimum Requirements of Due Process
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because
they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a
gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of
this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our
fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play.
Law of the Land Defined
We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which
Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous
Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It
has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the
reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would
degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
Are notice and hearing imperative in every case? NO
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case
for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary
evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or
there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 2
Instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission
of these requisites of notice and hearing:
1. Summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on
the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the
people.
2. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic
drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed.
3. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may
be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the
country he has fled.
4. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the
interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the
public morals.
Reason for such exceptions: In such instances, previous judicial
hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the
nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect
the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
No guarantee of fair play in the instant case
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he
had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play.
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
Due Process is violated in the case at bar
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated
is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender
is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers.
ALONTE vs. SAVELLANO
Mandatory and Indispensable Requirements of Due Process in
Criminal Proceedings
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before
it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of
the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
Principle: The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely
expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process
cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.
Constitutional presumption of innocence
"x x x each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the
trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in
favor of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient
opportunity to present his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its
evidence.

"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always
take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether
in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges
are sworn not only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and
just. The judicial gavel should not be wielded by one who has an
unsound and distorted sense of justice and fairness.
Standard of Waiver (example: of the right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses)
The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but
must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Mere silence of the
holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and
the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
Deviations found by the Solicitor General from the regular course
of the trial
(1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to
prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled
for the purpose;
(2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present
rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent
Judge for the purpose; and
(3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the
Information so as to justify any modification in the order of
trial.
Can there be a shortcut in the legal process? NONE
There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no
excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process,
rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of
Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even
to the most undeserving.
Affidavit of Desistance and Retractions
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought
which should not be given probative value. It would be a dangerous
rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply
because the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one
reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and
place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the
Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly
unreliable.
ANIAG vs. COMELEC
Non-disclosure of the City Prosecutor violative of Due Process
The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was
a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process
which requires that the procedure established by law should be obeyed.
Substantive and Procedural Right
Due process guarantees the observance of both substantive and
procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
Right to Preliminary Investigation as a component part in criminal
justice
While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than
constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by
statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The
right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound
over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 3
right; it is a substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity to avoid
a process painful to anyone save, perhaps, to hardened criminals is a
valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation
would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.
Is the filing of a motion for reconsideration with COMELEC can be
considered as a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary
investigation? NO
The motion itself expresses petitioner's vigorous insistence on his
right. Petitioner's protestation started as soon as he learned of his
inclusion in the charge, and did not ease up even after COMELEC's
denial of his motion for reconsideration. This is understandably so
since the prohibition against carrying firearms bears the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than one (1) year nor more than six (6) years
without probation and with disqualification from holding public office,
and deprivation of the right to suffrage. Against such strong stance,
petitioner clearly did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation.
SPOUSES ROMUALDEZ vs. COMELEC
No denial of due process in the instant case
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim
that the election offenses charged against them by private respondent
are entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of
before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there
appears to be no incongruity between the charges as contained in the
Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC,
notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged
violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of
the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC
against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were
based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private
respondents Complaint-Affidavit.
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
Petitioners were afforded due process because they were granted the
opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondents
Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-
Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to
Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly
filed a Memorandum before the said body.
Elementary Rule of the jurisdiction of the court
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of
a court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or
Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the
trial.
Real Nature of the Criminal Charge
Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.
In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private respondents
Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the
Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC
Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim
that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence
against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC.
Who designates the proper offense?
Citing Orquinaza vs. People: On a claim that there was deprivation of
due process, therein petitioner argued that the Information for acts of
lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted

was for sexual harassment. The court held that the designation by the
police officer of the offense is not conclusive as it is within the
competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence submitted and
determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged.
Void-for-vagueness Doctrine
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.
Is facial invalidation of criminal statutes appropriate? NO
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that
'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard
to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken
as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional.'
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would
result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even
reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure
from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and
permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no
factual concreteness.
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation
of statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have
allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant has been charged.
Facial Overbreadth Adjudication
But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial
overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of
practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as
the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction
moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if
expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that
reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls
over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Prosecutorial power of the COMELEC
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the
prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound
discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offense and malpractices. Generally, the Court will not interfere with
such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse
of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except
as may otherwise be provided by law.
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP. vs.
ALCUAZ
Quasi-judicial performance demands notice and hearing
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix
rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises
of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative
character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 4
same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is
predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by
the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more
than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner.
Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said
report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof
and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the
conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in
making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking
of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands
previous notice and hearing.
If the nature of the administrative agency, are notice and hearings
necessary? NO
'If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the
requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a
rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or
property are not involved, is not determined according to the same
rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a
specific individual.
Notice and Hearing in Administrative Proceedings
In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of
administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative
action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive,
administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public
administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its
acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective,
the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is
entitled to notice and hearing.
The order in the case bar is that one of a quasi-judicial adjudication
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt
contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is
the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no
other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently
superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates
charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial
statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation
as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements
warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was
offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which
prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%)
rate reduction.
Hearing is essential in the case at bar
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no
authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing,
whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial
whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation,
or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. That such
a hearing is required is evident in respondents' order of September 16,
1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted PHILCOMSAT a
provisional authority "to continue operating its existing facilities, to
render the services it presently offers, and to charge the rates as
reduced by them "under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and the
final consideration of the merit of this application, the Commission
may modify, revise or amend the rates ..."
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may
have other sources of information or data, still, since a hearing is
essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the basis of the
evidence before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise

acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so
adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert.
Justice Gutierrez Concurring Opinion RE The Necessity of
Hearings in Administrative Agencies performing Quasi-Legislative
functions
I believe that in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers, administrative
agencies, much, much more than Congress, should hold hearings and
should be given guidelines as to when notices and hearings are
essential even in quasi-legislation.
ANG TIBAY vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
What is the Court of Industrial Relations?
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No.
103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of
the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive,
acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court
of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law,
is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial
or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far
more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1)
Can the Court of Industrial Relations entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character? NO
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said
to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character.
Primary Rights which must be respected in administrative trials and
investigations
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it
is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more
fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding
or conclusion but the evidence must be "substantial."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 5
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
ATENEO DE MANILA vs. CAPULONG
Students Rights in a school disciplinary proceeding were respected
On the contrary, respondent students' rights in a school disciplinary
proceeding, as enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National
University, Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C. Branch and Non v. Dames II have
been meticulously respected by petitioners in the various investigative
proceedings held before they were expelled.
The minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions
From the Guzman Case
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.
Hazing as a ground for disciplining students
Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a students, to the extent of
dismissal or expulsion, finds its raison d' etre in the increasing
frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the neophytes by their
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes the test of reasonableness and
absence of malice on the part of the school authorities. Far from
fostering comradeship and esprit d' corps, it has merely fed upon the
cruel and baser instincts of those who aspire to eventual leadership in
our country.
Exception to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Remedies
It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as
in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have
been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from
petitioner university.
Essential Academic Freedoms
(1) who may teach:
(2) what may be taught;
(3) how it shall be taught; and
(4) who may be admitted to study.
Right to establish policies
As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are
inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic
and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In
the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what
shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to
study.
Academic Freedom in the 1987 Philippine Constitution
In an attempt to give an explicit definition with an expanded coverage,
the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of the 1986
came up with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed
by students, by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate

and ringing speeches, the final version which was none too different
from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as
found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the
question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are
included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained:
"Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the
frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave
it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."
Religious aspect of education
In essence, education must ultimately be religious not in the sense
that the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or
profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the
renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is "an education
which inculcates duty and reverence." It appears that the particular
brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila has been
lost on the respondent students.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC.
vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
Doctrine of Vagueness and Doctrine of Overbreadth
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth
do not operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine
assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and
will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.
Facial challenge and As-applied Challenge
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not
only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.
Distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it
marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case
basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the
rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 6
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to
raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire
statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad
law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes
it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent
effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough
to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth
ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those
third parties.(Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as
applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition
of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or
imminent charge against them
It stressed that statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular
defendant.
American jurisprudence instructs that vagueness challenges that do not
involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific
facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial
validity.
Does the law penalizes speech to give way for the invocation of the
laws invalidity using the facial challenge applicable only to free
speech cases? NO
What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must
first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of
JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)
the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including
the coercion of the government to accede to an unlawful
demand. Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at
singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the
prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a
protected speech.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the
criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially
harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not
speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the
expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element
of coercion perceptible.