GR NOS.

120681-83, October 01, 1999

JEJOMAR C. BINAY vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
&
G.R. NO. 128136. OCTOBER 1, 1999
MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate
informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, and
two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The informations, which were subsequently amended on
September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during
petitioners incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 128136, in a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of
San Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain,
officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the
respondent municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping
project of the San Pascual Central School.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the filing of
an information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the
Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S. Asuncion concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended approval of the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting
Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following marginal note: Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon to cause the preparation of the information and to approve the same for filing with the proper court.
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed against petitioners and
Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas
City. The information was signed by a Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation Officer who
recommended the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners right to speedy disposition has been violated by the inordinate delay in the
resolution of the subject cases by the Ombudsman.

HELD:
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings
but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
Article III of the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing
test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is
weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of
the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
In Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan, the Court held that the length of delay and the simplicity of the issues did not
justify the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The unexplained inaction of the prosecutors called
for the dismissal of the cases against petitioner Tatad.
In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court also ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy disposition.
The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by
presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new
ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and
powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such right,
and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena, the complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to
speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat to her claim to the constitutional guarantee.
In Cadalin vs. POEAs Administrator, the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases (not run-of-the-
mill variety) and the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not
violated therein.
In this case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject cases.

GR NO. 142848, June 30, 2006

EUGENE C. YU vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF TAGAYTAY CITY

FACTS:
In the evening of 14 November 1994, Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and his driver Eduardo Constantino were abducted by several persons in Alabang,
Muntinlupa, and brought somewhere in Cavite where they were both shot to death. At about 5:00 oclock in
the afternoon of 17 November 1994, the bodies of the two victims were dug up in a shallow grave at Barangay
Malinta, Sampaloc 2, Dasmarin as Cavite. Charged to investigate the abduction and killing was the Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). After having conducted a thorough investigation of the case, the PACC filed
charges before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Both the prosecution and the petitioner filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the aforequoted
resolution. The prosecution sought to maintain the original informations charging petitioner as principal,
while the latter sought the dismissal of the cases against him for lack of probable cause. Both motions were
denied in an order of the court a quo dated February 6, 1996.
The prosecution filed a Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses and Exclude from the Information accused
Ochoa and de los Santos on April 17, 1996. Petitioner, who is one of the accused in the aforementioned
criminal cases, claims that the orders were issued by public respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, claiming that there is no legal basis or justification to discharge
as state witnesses accused Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos (hereinafter referred to as private
respondents).
From the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 dated 6 March 1997, petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated 30 September
1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. he Court of Appeals concluded that there
was no necessity for a hearing to determine a persons qualification as a state witness after the DOJ had
attested to his qualification. Republic Act No. 6981, Witness Protection and Security Benefit Program
(WPSBP), conferred upon the DOJ the sole authority to determine whether or not an accused is qualified for
admission into the program. The appellate court held that under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981, upon
the filing by the prosecution of a petition to discharge an accused from the information, it is mandatory for the
court to order the discharge and exclusion of the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether the court of appeals erred when it did not consider that the trial court gravely abused its discretion
when it discharged the accused despite the failure of the prosecution to present evidence to show that the
private respondents are entitled to be discharged as state witness.

HELD:
The discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981 as availed of by the prosecution in favor of the
private respondents, is distinct and separate from the discharge of an accused under Section 17, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 is only one of the modes for a
participant in the commission of a crime to be a state witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, is another mode of discharge. The immunity provided under Republic Act No. 6981 is
granted by the DOJ while the other is granted by the court.
Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, contemplates a situation where the
information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned and the case is undergoing trial. The discharge
of an accused under this rule may be ordered upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, that is, at
any stage of the proceedings, from the filing of the information to the time the defense starts to offer any
evidence.
On the other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981, only compliance with the
requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is required but not the
requirement of Rule 119, Section 17.
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides that the issuance of a certification of admission into the program
shall be given full faith by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required not to include the witness in the
criminal complaint or information, and if included, to petition for his discharge in order that he can be utilized
as a state witness. This provision justifies the regularity of the procedure adopted by the prosecution for the
discharge of the private respondents.
Hence, the Court held that the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 1999 and
4 April 2000, respectively, are affirmed.
GR NO. 154629, October 05, 2005
MARINO SOBERANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
In November 2000, the prominent public relations practitioner, Salvador Bubby Dacer, together with his
driver, Emmanuel Corbito, was abducted along Zobel Roxas St. in the City of Manila. Their charred remains,
consisting of burnt bones, metal dental plates and a ring, were later found in Barangay Buna Lejos, Indang,
Cavite. They were positively identified by their dentists and by forensic pathologists from the University of the
Philippines. Both victims were killed by strangulation.
A preliminary investigation was conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) through a panel of prosecutors
made up of State Prosecutor II Ruben B. Carretas, State Prosecutor Geronimo L. Sy and Prosecution Attorney
Juan Pedro C. Navera. On 11 May 2001, an Information was filed by the panel of prosecutors with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), City of Manila charging petitioners for the crime of double murder.
On 18 June 2001, one of the accused, P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asserting
that he was mistakenly identified as a participant in the double murder. He stressed that it was not him but a
certain SPO3 Allan Cadenilla Villanueva who was previously identified by several witnesses as one of the
culprits. This was granted by the trial court.

ISSUE:
What is the correct interpretation of two pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e.,
Section 14 of Rule 110 on amendment of information and Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge of an
accused as state witness.

HELD:
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here is primary an amendment of an information
to exclude some accused and that the same is made before plea. Thus, at the very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is
applicable which means that the amendment should be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. What seems to complicate the situation is that the exclusion of
the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of discharging them as witnesses for the State. The
consequential question is, should the requirements for discharge of an accused as state witness as set forth in
Section 17, Rule 119 be made as additional requirements (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 17, Rule 119)
or should only one provision apply as ruled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals ( i.e., Section 14, Rule
110 or Section 17, Rule 119)?
An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one of the accused must be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in compliance
with Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the accused.
Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of
probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some other
ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for the prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet
come into play. This is because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of who
should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one. [29] The
prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide
range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. By virtue of the trial court having granted
the prosecutions motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the
prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is
thus equipped with discretion wide and far reaching regarding the disposition thereof.

GR NO. 72670, September 12, 1986

GALMAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
Ninoy Aquino was cold-bloodedly killed while under escort away by soldiers from his plane that had just
landed at the Manila International Airport on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a bullet
fired point-blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was
ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically
impossible to get inside (such) a cordon. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that
the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days
later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in
turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who
joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom. The fact is that
both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows
to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen.
Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six
private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the
chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them. Then President Marcos stated that evidence
shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for.
The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and
respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition
and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same
Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal
ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are
entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the
Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, petitioners filed their motion
to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of
the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.

HELD:
The prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their case which
grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent
as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the
first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial
before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy.
The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President ordered
the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due
pressure to the judiciary. The courts decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in
observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy
cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the account of collusion
between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.
Therefore, the Court held that the denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was
set aside and rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was
granted.

GR NO. 177960, January 29, 2009

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP vs. PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG

FACTS:
This case had its origins in the filing of an Information on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial Prosecutors
Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. On 10 January
2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he
pleaded not guilty to the charge.
On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for
leave of court to file an amended information. They sought to add the allegation of abandonment of the
victims by petitioner, thus: The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the victims, at a time when
said (Lou-Gene) R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he was only extracted from the car by the by-
standers. On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the
motion to amend the information be considered withdrawn. On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted the
withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn.
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the prosecution had
rested its case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his
Demurrer to Evidence dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecutions failure to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment dated 25
April 2005. In the Order dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the
crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish
the allegations in the Information.
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging that the MTCs dismissal of the
case was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added that the
MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented.

ISSUE:
Whether the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the Information.

HELD:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the
case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares
that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist. This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has
not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is
the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting
the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused
to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way
of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.
A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the
acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioners civil liability has been extinguished by his acquittal. It
should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a
crime had been committed and that accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution
failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never
identified petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the
MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by
the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the
truck by petitioner, clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. Consequently,
there is no more need to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case,
since petitioners acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.

GR NO. 117363, December 17, 1999

MILA G. PANGILINAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
On 20 September 1990, appellant Mila G. Pangilinan was charged with the crime of Estafa in an information.
On 12 March 1991, appellant was arraigned before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, where she
entered a plea of not guilty. After due trial, said court in a Decision dated 7 October 1992 convicted the
appellant of the crime of Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
This unfavorable verdict was appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 13 August 1993, affirmed the
conviction but modified the sentence, stating that there was no proof of mitigating and or aggravating
circumstances which attended the commission of the offense. A Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
respondent court on 11 November 1993. On 3 December 1993, appellant filed a petition for New Trial in the
Court of Appeals which was denied by said Court on 10 January 1994.

ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of the petitioner has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
A circumspect examination of the allegations in the information will disclose that the information under
which the appellant is charged with does not contain all the elements of estafa falling under Article 315 (b).
There was a failure to allege that demand was made upon the appellant by the offended party.
Thus, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals in the questioned decision, to which the Solicitor General
agrees, appellant was charged under an information alleging an offense falling under the blanket provision of
paragraph 1(a) of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, which treat other Deceits.
The Office of the Solicitor General makes a final attempt to bolster its position by citing Section 4, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance between the
offense charged in complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the
offense as charge is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
or of the offense charge included in that which is proved.
According to the OSG, since the offense proved (Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code) is necessarily included
in the offense charged, then the decision of the respondent court modifying the court of origins judgment is
perfectly valid and the petitioners claim that the trial court had no jurisdiction must necessarily fail. [15]
This argument is specious. Aforementioned section applies exclusively to cases where the offenses as charged
is included in or necessarily the offense proved. It presupposes that the court rendering judgment has
jurisdiction over the case based on the allegations in the information. However, in the case at bar, from the
onset of the criminal proceedings, the lower court had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to try the case against
the appellant, it is no longer necessary to consider the other issues raised as the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is null and void.

490 S.E.2d 389, October 6, 1997

BERRY vs. STATE OF GEORGIA

FACTS:
Rondelrick Berry was convicted of malice murder in the shooting death of Craig Glover. On appeal, Berry
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, and asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
gender-based challenges to the jury selection process and in allowing the testimony of a State's witness
whose name did not appear on the list of witnesses provided to the defense.
Berry contends that there was no credible evidence to support the verdict because two of the State's
witnesses, Michael Clark and William Lowe, who initially identified Berry as the perpetrator, recanted their
testimony at trial.
Craig Glover was shot and killed while sitting in the driver's seat of his car, as a result of two gunshot wounds
to the abdomen fired from a .9 millimeter pistol.
Prior to trial, eyewitness Michael Clark was interviewed by investigating officers and his six-page statement
was transcribed. Clark reviewed and signed the document, attesting to its truthfulness and voluntariness. In
that statement, Clark told police that he observed Glover alone in a blue car on Daniel Street at midnight.
Berry approached Glover's car, and after a brief exchange, Glover declined Berry's offer to sell drugs, stating,
"every time I come up this street I don't have to buy dope." Berry accused Glover of "trying to get smart" with
him, and then Berry reached into some nearby bushes, withdrew a .9 millimeter pistol, and fired three or four
shots from close range into the driver's side window of Glover's car. Berry ran past Clark, retrieved a packet of
drugs from the bushes, and left the scene. Clark told the officers that two of Berry's friends also witnessed the
shooting and they called out to Berry, "why did you shoot that manstop before you kill him." Clark recognized
the murder weapon as belonging to Berry. When subpoenaed for trial, Clark advised an agent of the
prosecution that everything he had to say was contained in the statement given to police.
At trial, Clark testified that he had fabricated the entire statement. He did admit, however, that gunshots had
been fired at him after lie gave his statement to police and that he was afraid to be involved in the case. Clark's
fears were confirmed by a police officer who testified that Clark informed him prior to trial that he had been
shot at and that he feared retaliation for his testimony.
A second eyewitness, William Lowe, had also given a signed statement to police unequivocally identifying
Berry as the shooter. He later testified at a hearing in juvenile court where he again identified Berry as the
perpetrator. At trial, Lowe described the events leading up to the shooting in a manner consistent with his
prior statements, but when asked to identify the perpetrator, he responded, "I'm not sure who he was." This
testimony was rebutted by another officer, who likewise stated that Lowe had recanted due to fear of
retaliation.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in allowing Karl Cal to testify for the State, because Cal's name did not appear on
the State's list of witnesses, and insufficient notice was given to the defense.

HELD:
Former OCGA 17-7-110 prevented an unlisted witness from testifying at trial without the defendant's
consent, unless the evidence sought to be presented is newly discovered evidence which the State was not
aware of at the time it furnished the witness list to the defendant. Because the State had been unable to *392
locate Cal until the day he testified and had no knowledge of what evidence he might offer, the "newly
discovered" requirement of OCGA 17-7-110 was satisfied.
Additionally, the prosecution's failure to list a witness may be remedied by allowing the defense to interview
the witness before the testimony is given. Since the defense was adequately afforded such an opportunity, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Cal to testify.
GR NO. 158802, November 17, 2004
REYNALDO DE VILLA vs. DIR. of NEW BILIBID PRISONS

FACTS:
This case is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First,
that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa;
and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial. These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly
exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly
collected from the petitioner and a child born to the victim of the rape.
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo de Villa, the found petitioner
guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusin
perpetua; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and
support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his
sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced with the question of Reynaldo de
Villas guilt or innocence. Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that
during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for
all if Reynaldo was the father of the victims child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed during the
pendency of the automatic review of petitioners case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those
given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of
the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA
Analysis Laboratory.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which showed that
Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a
match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioners sample and those of any of the other samples,
including Leahlyns.

ISSUE:
Whether a new trial to consider newly discovered evidence is proper.

HELD:
The petitioner relies upon erroneous legal grounds in resorting to the remedy of a motion for new trial. A
motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is available only for a limited period of
time, and for very limited grounds. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
motion for new trial may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, that is, within
fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a motion for new
trial is no longer an available remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds for a new trial:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably
change the judgment.
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly newly-discovered evidence, i.e., the
DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a
result of the rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has long
attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an
examination of the evidence presented by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within the
statutory or jurisprudential definition of newly- discovered evidence.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are
met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it
would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.
In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we nonetheless find
that it does not meet the criteria for newly-discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. Such evidence
disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable
diligence.

GR NO. 147678-87, July 07, 2004

PEOPLE vs. EFREN MATEO

FACTS:
On 30 October 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, allegedly committed on ten different
dates 07 October 1995, 14 December 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 29 February 1996, 08 May
1996, 02 July 1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996 were filed against appellant Efren
Mateo.
The trial ensued following a plea of not guilty entered by appellant to all the charges. According to Imelda
Mateo, she was born on 11 September 1980 to the spouses Dan Icban and Rosemarie Capulong. Rosemarie
Capulong and appellant started to live together without the benefit of marriage when private complainant
was only two years old. Imelda stayed with her mother and appellant in a house in Buenavista, Tarlac, and
adopted the surname of appellant when she started schooling.
Imelda recalled that each time the ten rape incidents occurred her mother, Rosemarie, was not at home.
Imelda stated that each of the ten rape incidents were committed in invariably the same fashion. All were
perpetrated inside the house in Buenavista, Tarlac, during the night and, each time, she would try to ward off
his advances by kicking him but that he proved to be too strong for her. These incidents occurred in the
presence of her three sleeping siblings who failed to wake up despite the struggles she exerted to fend off the
advances. She recalled that in all ten instances, appellant had covered her mouth with a handkerchief to
prevent her from shouting. Subsequently, however, she changed her statement to say that on two occasions,
particularly the alleged sexual assaults on 02 July 1996 and 18 July 1996, appellant had only covered her
mouth with his hands. Still much later, Imelda testified that he had not covered her mouth at all.

ISSUE:
Whether a direct appeal from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court is proper.
HELD:
The Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the
same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the
1987 Constitution. In Article VIII, Section 5, the Supreme Court have the power to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in, and in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.
The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule
122, Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124 and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. It must be
stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily
prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in
favor of the accused.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10
of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct
appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19
September 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to
be deemed modified accordingly.

GR NO. 141524, September 14, 2005

DOMINGO NEYPES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo
Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of
Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various motions with
the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the
Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the
respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales,
resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands
and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as
against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was
improper; (2) the Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were
hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss
filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual
matters that could be determined only after trial.
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on the
ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the
complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.
In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the
action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998
and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the
trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July
22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This
was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was
denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

ISSUE:
Within which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.

HELD:
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to
do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural
rules. BP 129, as amended, provides that the period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the
final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus
cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from.
The period of ordinary appeal, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that the appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a
record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
days from the notice of judgment or final order. The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for
new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration
shall be allowed.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the
court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at
the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or
judgment that dismisses an action.

GR NO. 170979, February 09, 2011

JUDITH YU vs. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD

FACTS:
Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa against the
petitioner was filed with the RTC. In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. It
imposed on her a penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto mayor), a fine of P3,800,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount as
the fine.
Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging
that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was
convicted. In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for new trial for lack
of merit. On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to
our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a fresh period of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the
receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of
appeal. On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes for his
guidance. On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days
late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases. On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed
a motion for execution of the decision. On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted
for resolution. On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting
on the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision.
The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions motions when she filed her
notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the fresh
period rule enunciated in Neypes.

ISSUE:
Whether the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases.

HELD:
In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to
appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration
within which to appeal.
The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that constituted the
final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
The raison dtre for the fresh period rule is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do
away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to
appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants
today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day
period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to
appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction
between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states
that [t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction,
we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction. [17]
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no
substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period
stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt
of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed
in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6,
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also
apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
If the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court
in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
treated differently.
Were the Court to strictly interpret the fresh period rule in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period
to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil
case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a situation that gives undue favor to
civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of
treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty
stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to
reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is
not allowed in law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.
If a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more
reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal
case where no less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection the Court must
extend to matters of liberty cannot be overstated.
In light of these legal realities, the Court held that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on
November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005,the date of receipt of
notice denying her motion for new trial.

GR NO. 154034, February 05, 2007

FIRST AQUA SUGAR TRADERS vs. BPI

FACTS:
Petitioners First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. and CBN International Corporation were the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 99-930 filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57. Respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands
was the defendant in that case.
On October 16, 2000, the trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Petitioners
received a copy of the judgment on October 27, 2000. Hence, they had fifteen days to file a notice of
appeal. Instead, on November 6, 2000, or 10 days after, they opted to file a motion for reconsideration which
was denied in the order dated January 30, 2001.
Petitioners claim they received a copy of the January 30, 2001 order on February 16, 2001 and that they filed a
notice of appeal on the same day. On February 19, 2001, the trial court gave due course to the notice of appeal
on the premise that the same was filed within the prescribed period.
Respondent, on the other hand, filed a motion to declare the October 16, 2000 judgment final alleging that
petitioners notice of appeal was filed out of time. According to respondent, the January 30, 2001 order was
sent to the address of petitioners counsel and was received there by a certain Lenie Quilatan on February 9,
2001. Hence, petitioners had only five days left to file the notice of appeal counted from February 9, 2001, or
until February 14, 2001. Thus, the February 16, 2001 filing was out of time.
Petitioners disputed respondents allegation and maintained their position that the reckoning point of the
remaining 5-day period should be the date of their actual receipt which was February 16, 2001. They claimed
that Quilatan, who allegedly received the January 30, 2001 order on February 9, 2001, was not in any way
connected to them or their counsel. On March 30, 2001, the trial court ruled for the respondents. On
certiorari, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding and dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the notice of appeal was filed on time.

HELD:
The actual date of receipt of the notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration dated January 30, 2001 is a
factual issue which the trial court and the Court of Appeals have already ruled on. Accordingly, this Court, not
being a trier of facts and having no reason to reverse the said finding, holds that the date of receipt of the
January 30, 2001 order was February 9, 2001.
However, we disagree with the lower courts finding that the notice of appeal was filed late. In the recent case
of Neypes v. Court of Appeals, we stated that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
In the light of this decision, a party litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days from
receipt of the original decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration. Being procedural in nature, Neypes is deemed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of its effectivity and is thus retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
Petitioners notice of appeal filed on February 16, 2001 was therefore well-within the fresh period of fifteen
days from the date of their receipt of the January 30, 2001 order on February 9, 2001.

GR NO. 72670, September 12, 1986

GALMAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
Ninoy Aquino was cold-bloodedly killed while under escort away by soldiers from his plane that had just
landed at the Manila International Airport on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a bullet
fired point-blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was
ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically
impossible to get inside (such) a cordon. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that
the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days
later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in
turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who
joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom. The fact is that
both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows
to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen.
Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six
private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the
chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them. Then President Marcos stated that evidence
shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for.
The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and
respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition
and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same
Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal
ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are
entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the
Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, petitioners filed their motion
to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of
the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.

HELD:
The prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their case which
grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent
as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the
first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial
before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy.
The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President ordered
the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due
pressure to the judiciary. The courts decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in
observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy
cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the account of collusion
between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.
Therefore, the Court held that the denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was
set aside and rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was
granted.
GR NO. L-25133, September 28, 1968
JOSE SANTIAGO vs. CELSO ALIKPALA
The validity of a court-martial proceeding was challenged in the lower court on due process grounds to show
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner, a sergeant in the Philippine Army and the accused in court-martial proceeding,
through a writ of certiorari and prohibition, filed on April 17, 1963, with the lower court, sought to restrain
respondents, the officers, constituting the court-martial, that was then in the process of trying petitioner for
alleged violation of two provisions of the Articles of War, from continuing with the proceedings on the ground
of its being without jurisdiction. There was likewise a plea for a restraining order, during the pendency of his
petition, but it was unsuccessful.
No response, either way, was deemed necessary by the then Presiding Judge of the lower court, now
Justice Nicasio Yatco of the Court of Appeals, as petitioner had, in the meanwhile, been convicted by the court-
martial. The lower court verdict, render on September 16, 1963, was one of dismissal, as in its opinion, this
case had already become moot and academic
An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, the same due process objections raised. The Court thinks that the
question before is of such import significance that an easy avoidance through the technicality of the moot
and academic approach hardly recommendation itself. For reasons to be more fully set forth, the Court found
such court-martial was not lawfully convened, and, consequently devoid of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether the failure to comply with the dictates of the applicable law insofar as convening a valid court
martial is concerned, amounts to a denial of due process.

HELD:
There is such a denial not only under the broad standard which delimits the scope and reach of the due
process requirement, but also under one of the specific elements of procedural due process.
It is to be admitted that there is no controlling and precise definition of due process which, at the most
furnishes a standard to which governmental action should conform in order to impress with the stamp
of validity any deprivation of life, liberty or property. A recent decision of this Court, in Ermita-Malate Hotel v.
Mayor of Manila, treated the matter thus: It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due
process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardoso, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty to those strivings for justice and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect democratic
traditions of legal and political thought.
Nor is such a reliance on the broad reach of due process the sole ground on which the lack of jurisdiction of
the court-martial convened in this case could be predicated. Recently, stress was laid an
ew by us on the first requirement of procedural due process, namely, the existence of the court or tribunal
clothed with judicial, or quasi-judicial, power to hear and determine the matter before it. This is a
requirement that goes back to Banco Espan ol-Filipino v. Palanca.
There is the express admission in the statement of facts that respondents, as a court-martial, were not
convened to try petitioner but someone else, the action taken against petitioner being induced solely by a
desire to avoid the effects of prescription; it would follow then that the absence of a competent court or
tribunal is most marked and undeniable. Such a denial of due process is therefore fatal to its assumed
authority to try petitioner. The writ of certiorari and prohibition should have been granted and the lower
court, to repeat, ought not to have dismissed his petition summarily.
It is even more indispensable, therefore, that such quasi-judicial agencies, clothed with the solemn
responsibility of depriving members of the Armed Forces of their liberties, even of their lives, as a matter of
fact, should be held all the more strictly bound to manifest fidelity to the fundamental concept of fairness and
the avoidance of arbitrariness for which due process stands as a living vital principle. If it were otherwise,
then, abuses, even if not intended, might creep in, and the safeguards so carefully thrown about the freedom
of an individual, ignored or disregarded. Against such an eventuality, the vigilance of the judiciary furnishes a
shield. That is one of its grave responsibilities. Such a trust must be lived up to; such a task cannot be left
undone.

GR NO.114046, October 24, 1994

HONORATO GALVEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one
Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated
homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado
and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr. The cases were raffled to the sala of Judge Felipe N. Villajuan of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan.
On November 15, 1993, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment
and Subsequent Proceedings to enable him to review the evidence on record and determine once more the
proper crimes chargeable against the accused, which was granted by Judge Villajuan in an order dated
November 16, 1993. Thereafter, pursuant to Department Order No. 369 of the Department of Justice,
respondent Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan and
was instructed to conduct a re-investigation of the aforesaid criminal cases filed against herein petitioners. By
virtue of a Manifestation with Ex-parte Motion dated November 23, 1993 filed by respondent prosecutor, the
proceedings were again ordered suspended by Judge Villajuan until after the prosecutions request for change
of venue shall have been resolved by the Supreme Court, and the preliminary investigation being conducted
by the former shall have been terminated. It appears that on December 2, 1993, private complainants, through
their counsel, Atty. Silvestre R. Bello III, had filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Change of Venue,
purportedly to safeguard the lives of the victims and their witnesses, and to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion
to Withdraw Informations in said cases. This motion was granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15,
1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor
Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated
murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms which were
subsequently raffled to the sala of Judge Victoria Pornillos of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan.

ISSUE:
When may the fiscal be allowed to move to dismiss an information and when he should merely move to
amend it.

HELD:
Section 14 of Rule 110, which is invoked by petitioners, reads as follows:
 SEC. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of
form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights
of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in
double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second
paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. Under the second paragraph, the court
can order the filing of another information to charge the proper offense, provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could only be true if the offense proved does not necessarily
include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the original information.
It has been the rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, the amendment of the information
may also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused. Hence, in the case of Dimalibot vs. Salcedo, the accused therein were
originally charged with homicide and were released on bail. However, the then provincial fiscal, after a review
of the affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution, discovered that the killing complained of was
perpetrated with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and
employing means to weaken the defense of the victim. Consequently, an amended information for murder was
filed against the accused who were ordered re-arrested without the amount of bail being fixed, the new
charge being a capital offense.

GR NO. 118644, July 07, 1995

EPIMACO A. VELASCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
FACTS:
On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed against her on 19
November 1994. Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators Flor L.
Resurreccion and Antonio M. Erum, Jr. proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, on 21
November 1994 and arrested the latter, who was thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her
rapist. Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue, Manila.
On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00. Judge Padolina forthwith issued an order
recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest issued on 16 September 1993 and directing the Jail Warden of
the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement unless otherwise detained for some other cause.
Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins because he was still detained for
another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he would be held for inquest.
On 23 November 1994, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by Alinea. It contains a certification
by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Yson that it is filed pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused not having opted to avail of his right to
preliminary investigation and not having executed a waiver pursuant to Article 125 of the RPC. The
complaint was filed with the RTC of Antipolo on 2 December 1994.
On 2 December 1994, Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for Bail wherein
he alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong, as he had no carnal
knowledge of the complainant and the medical report indicates that her hymen was neither lacerated nor
ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that he has no intention of going out of the
country or hiding away from the law. On 6 December 1994, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty. Theodore
O. Te, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release,
principally based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest.

ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrest of Larkins is valid.

HELD:
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody.
What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a
writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening
events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of
the application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge
of the detained person.
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts
against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be
allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing tha, Nor shall anything
in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines or of a person suffering from imprisonment under lawful judgment.
It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he was under the custody of the
court and voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction. It is settled that the giving or posting of bail by
the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
However, the Court note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for bail, as
required under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant or denial of bail must be based upon the
courts determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be
exercised after evidence is submitted at the hearing conducted for that purpose. The courts order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise, the order would be defective and voidable. In fact, even if the
prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask
the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the States evidence or judge the adequacy
of the amount of bail. It was thus incumbent upon the trial court to receive the evidence for the prosecution
on the urgent motion for bail. For this procedural shortcoming, Larkins should also be partly blamed. He did
not press for a hearing after the scheduled hearing on 5 December 1994 was cancelled because, as he claimed,
the presiding Judge was out of the country.

GR NO. 124639, February 01, 2001

PEOPLE vs. REYNALDO DE VILLA

FACTS:
Elevated to the Supreme Court by way of automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, sentencing accused-appellant to death for committing the crime of rape and ordering him to indemnify
the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to support the child whom he sired with the victim.
Accused-appellant raised the defense that at the time of the alleged rape committed in April 1994, he was 67
years old. Ten years previous to that, he was suffering from stomach ulcer and confined in a hospital. Since
that time, he has been incapable of having an erection. He further alleged that from the time that he got
married to the sister of Aileens father, the family of his father-in-law has held a grudge against him.
The trial court rejected the claim of impotency on the ground that there was no convincing evidence to show
that at his age of 66 or 67 years old, accused-appellant could no longer engage in sexual intercourse. Thus,
finding that accused-appellant is the uncle of the victim, being married to the sister of her father, the trial
court applied Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentenced
accused-appellant to suffer the supreme penalty of death, to indemnify the victim the sum of P50,000.00, to
pay the cost of the suit and to support the child.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused is of the crime of rape.

HELD:
As a rule, appellate courts will not disturb the findings by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, for the
trial court is in a better position to pass upon the same. As succinctly explained in the case of People vs. Atop,
the trial court has the valuable edge of observing the witness deportment and manner of testifying, her
furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or
full realization of an oath all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness honesty
and sincerity.
Accused-appellant denies having sired the victims child, who was born some eight months from the time of
the alleged rape by normal delivery. He cites the case of People v. Lao, where this Court acquitted the accused
of the crime of rape because the logical date of conception did not coincide with the alleged occasions of rape.
Said ruling, however, finds no application in the case at bar, because in said case, the victim gave birth seven
months from the dates of the supposed rapes, and she admitted that she had no sexual contact with the
accused prior to the seven-month period.
In the case at bar, the discrepancy lies in the fact that between the date of commission of the rape, i.e., in the
third week of April. 1994, to the date of birth of the victims child, on December 19, 1994, only eight months
elapsed. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, the date of birth of Aileens child is medically consistent
with the time of the rape since the child was born within the nine-month gestation period. Moreover, when
the victims mother testified that Aileen delivered her baby in a normal way, she did not state that Aileen
gave birth to a full-term nine-month old baby. Thus, the prosecution maintained that Aileen prematurely gave
birth to an eight-month old baby by normal delivery.
The Court, therefore, finds credible the victims testimony that she was raped by accused-appellant. Time-
honored is the doctrine that no young and decent woman would publicly admit that she was ravished and her
virtue defiled, unless such was true, for it would be instinctive for her to protect her honor. No woman would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and submit herself to public
humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to
have the culprit apprehended and punished.
It bears emphasis that the victim was barely thirteen when she was raped. It is settled jurisprudence that
testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor,
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

GR NO. 168728, August 02, 2007

SAMUEL BARREDO vs. HON. VICENTE VINARAO
FACTS:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner Samuel Barredo y Golani prays for his
release from the maximum security compound of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on the ground
that he has already served the sentence imposed on him for carnapping and for illegal possession of firearms.
The cases were tried jointly. After trial, the court rendered a joint decision finding petitioner guilty of both
charges. No appeal was made, hence, the decision became final and executory.
Petitioner was committed to the custody of the Quezon City Jail (as detention prisoner) on March 15, 1993.
After conviction, he was transferred to and confined at the maximum security compound of the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City on July 23, 1994 where he is now still detained.
According to petitioner, as of August 2, 2004, he already served a total of 18 years. He claims that, on October
9, 2001, the Board of Pardons and Parole passed a resolution recommending the commutation of his sentence
to a period of from 15 to 20 years. He further points out that, based on the Bureau of Corrections revised
computation table for determining the time to be credited prisoners for good conduct while serving sentence,
he should only serve 14 years, 9 months and 18 days.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner entitled to the writ of habeas corpus?

HELD:
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement, detention or deprivation of liberty. It was
devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. More specifically, it is a
remedy to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without
sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test
the circumstances under which a person is detained.
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid
judgment. However, the writ may be allowed as a post-conviction remedy when the proceedings leading to the
conviction were attended by any of the following exceptional circumstances:
1. there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;
2. the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence or
3. the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.
The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus
will not be allowed. Thus, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Petitioner was detained pursuant to a final judgment of the Quezon City RTC convicting him for the crimes of
carnapping and illegal possession of firearms. He is therefore not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.
GR NO. 151876, June 21, 2005
SUSAN GO vs. FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA

FACTS:
Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented
to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason account
closed. Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 under separate Complaints
filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio City. After a joint trial, the MTCC (Branch 4)
rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases.
The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio City. On May 23, 2000, the RTC denied the
appeal and sustained his conviction. There being no further appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC
issued on February 1, 2001, a Certificate of Finality of the Decision.
Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his
sentence as a result of his conviction. The trial court also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil
liability. In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and directed the
issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba. On September 28, 2001, he was arrested and imprisoned for
the service of his sentence. On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order directing the
immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement

ISSUE:
Whether the Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted.

HELD:
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are
deprived of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of
inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is detained.
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid
judgment. However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC
No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP
22. Respondent sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty
imposed on him for being excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support
the issuance of the writ.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had invoked in the said
Motions. The Court believes that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity. The
remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed
that the execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously
with the intent of finding a favorable court. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to
reopen a case that had already become final and executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum
shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different
action in another forum.
The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.

GR NO. 127444, September 13, 2000

PEOPLE vs. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO

FACTS:
The idyllic morning calm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of Manila, was shattered by gunshots
fired in rapid succession. The shooting claimed the life of young Alex Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin
brother Levi who permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. A slug
tunneled through his right arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed in his stomach where it
remained until extracted by surgical procedure.
As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide
were originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of
San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. On 14
December 1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the same accused
upgrading the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation
of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth Information had to be
filed.
On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated. The trial court found the
accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated
murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It
also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a
violation of law.

ISSUE:
Whether the criminal culpability of private respondent Galvez despite acquittal by the trial court should not
be considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy.

HELD:
The doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may apply only when the Court finds that
the criminal trial was a sham because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case
was denied due process. The Court in People v. Bocar rationalized that the remand of the criminal case for
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the
humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal
contest with the State. Thus Green expressed the concern that the underlying idea, one that is deeply
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the
right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule
establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is part of the paramount importance criminal justice system
attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction. The interest in the finality-of-acquittal
rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for repose, a desire to
know the exact extent of ones liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a
protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys leniency, will not be
found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendants interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding
by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which the
criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a
single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate
goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As
observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, the fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State
should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process. Because the innocence of
the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second
trial would be unfair