PP. Gerente
Gerente [GR 95847-48, 10 March 1993]
In Gerente Case:
The case is all about killing of certain person Clarito Blace by the appellant that was arrested
by the police force.
Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo
Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital
where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died
on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy
object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and
Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place.
There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of
marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw
the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him
to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia
frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped
in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination.
Is the arrest valid?
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions
had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of
the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block
which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the
killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the
violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they
could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant.
People vs.
First Division, Grino-Aquino (J): 3 concur
Facts: At about 7:00 a.m. of 30 April 1990, Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren
and Totoy Echigoren, allegedly started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in Gerente's
house which is about 6 meters away from the house of Edna Edwina Reyes who was in her
house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito
Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito
Blace." Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at
about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Reyes allegedly witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck
the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit
him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a
hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind
the house of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the
Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling
incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was
informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was
massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman
Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to
Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with
blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by Reyes that
she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed
Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house of Gerente, who was then sleeping. They told
him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen.
Patrolman Urrutia frisked Gerente and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried
leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of
Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. Only
Gerente was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are
still at large. On 2 May 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of RA 6425, and for
Murder. When arraigned on 16 May 1990, Gerente pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint
trial of the two cases was held. On 24 September 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Branch 172, found Gerente guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of 12 years and 1 day, as
minimum, to 20 years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. .
Gerente appealed.
Issue: Whether the police officers have the personal knowledge of the killing of Blace to allow Both accused were convicted of the crime chared. Hence, this present petition.
them to arrest, and the subsequent searchly Gerentes person, without the necessary warrant.

Held: The search of Gerente's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession
were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. Paragraphs (a) and (b), ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that "A peace officer or a private admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom was valid.
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;" The policemen arrested Gerente HELD:
only some 3 hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in
We hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless
the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of
arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113. Under Section 5
death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon
(a), a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing,
him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen
or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing
and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of thekillers. Under those circumstances, since
an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust
the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating
operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a
that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a
warrant.
warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled
the law as his two companions did. The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the
lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that "A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence
commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search of Gerente's person obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 105 The
upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the
themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them evidence obtained there from may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
unless he is first disarmed. incident to a lawful arrest; 2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught
red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of
PEOPLE VS. DORIA Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there
was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in
FACTS:
"hot pursuit."114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced
on her.
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police which caught accused Doria red-handed of
selling prohibited drugs and during the operation the police officers searched for the marked
This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of
bills that they used in buying said drugs which happened to be in the house of Gaddao,
marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
according to Doria. When they reached her house, the police officers came upon a box. He
saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement
officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and
its discovery inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was
inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized
without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents
are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article,
then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that
the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search
warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. 135 It was fruit of the poisonous tree
and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.
PP VS. MONTILLA Y GATDULA
Political Law Search and Seizure Informers Tip Warrantless Arrest
On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset
that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to Dasmarias carrying an undetermined
amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was
waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmarias. Montilla was then apprehended and he
was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla denied
the allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any
effects with him at that time except for some pocket money. He was sentenced to death
thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was no
warrant and that he should have been given the opportunity to cross examine the informant.
He said that if the informant has given the cops the information about his arrival as early as
the day before his apprehension, the cops should have ample time to secure a search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.
HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the warrantless search. Sec
2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception when it comes to warrantless searches, they are:
(1) customs searches;
(2) searches of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consented searches;
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
(6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops
was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from
Baguio in the early morning of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not
pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the
information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the
corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew
the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a
warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open
by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no
evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants,
not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances
should be considered, especially in rural areas.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police
officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender
(1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.
PEOPLE VS. ACOL
G.R. Nos. 106288-89, May 17 1994
FACTS:
When Percival Tan was driving his jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao. When they
crossed Pasay Road, the two wayfarers, together with two other companions, announced a
hold-up where the other passengers were divested of their personal belongings, including the
jacket of passenger Rene Araneta. After which Percival Tan and his passengers went to Fort
Bonifacio to report the crime.
A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to track down the culprits. Victim Rene Araneta who
went with the responding police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was wearing
his stolen jacket, told the police authorities to accost said persons. After the CAPCOM officers
introduced themselves, the four men scampered to different directions but three of them,
namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended.
Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver
with bullets. The line of defense the accused have adopted is one of denial. Tirso Acol escaped
from detention during the trial, thus obviating any review of his conviction, as indeed, even if
he had appealed and thereafter escaped, he would be considered as having abandoned his
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid arrest, search and seizure.
HELD:
Yes. With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused-appellant, we are of the view
that the search falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which serves as an
exception to the requisite warrant prior to arrest:
When an offense has in fact been committed, and the one has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; Inasmuch as the police team was
formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the crime on account of the
information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just been robbed. And
since accused-appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto
was valid.
Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the
accused for the robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The
principle imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the ruling in Magoncia vs. Palacio
that:
When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the offending
police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person,
they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of
the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti.
Alvarez vs. CFI
64 Phil. 33 (1937)
ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses
Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn
affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by
him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief
of the task force, didnt say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but
was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant
ordering the search of Alvarez house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place
and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of
lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the
custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be
declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because
the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be
allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge
sustained the latters motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the
search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain
custody be declared null and void.
Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of
Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the
facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge
thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable.
Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General
Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search
warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of
the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any
form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act
faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person
taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility
to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge
of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance
of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as
the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the
manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent
seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this
jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It
is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon
the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any
other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take
the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition
to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions
is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense
with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because
his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it
is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicants
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal
because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the
facts.
ALVAREZ VS CFI
NARCISO ALVAREZ vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY
BOARD
G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937
Facts:
the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice,
presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David an affidavit alleging that according to reliable
information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts,
lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender
charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit,
the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the
best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own
knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.
Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject
matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or
night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery
thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law.
With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioners store
and residence at seven oclock on the night and seized and took possession of the following
articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two
cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three
bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories,
two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases
of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez,
fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many documents and loan contracts with
security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation.
As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search
warrant, the petitionerfiled a motion praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other
agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of
court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the
court. Motion granted. Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a
motion praying that the order be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to
retain the articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for the necessary investigation.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the affidavit is valid for purposes in issuing a search warrant
2. Whether or not affidavit of witnesses is needed
3. Whether or not the constitutional mandate that the thing to be seized is particularly
described is violated
4. Whether or not fishing evidence is valid
Ruling:
1. The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable cause before the
issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application
supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. The oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon
and affiant be held liable for damages caused.
it appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and
therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of
the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the
deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.
other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because
his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant.
3. These provisions of the constitution are mandatory and must be strictly complied with but
where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather generally, it is
not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could
issue. The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as
follows: that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and
other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a
usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law. Taking into consideration the nature of the
article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could
have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the
contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions
because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.
4. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that
the books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct
an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and
documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a
criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional
because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the
constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SANTIAGO SY JUCO, defendant.

2. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue
Facts:
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The crime alleged is fraud of revenue against the Government. Pursuant to a search warrant
issued, the officers searched the building occupied by Santiago Sy Juco. In the process, the
It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or
authorities seized, among others, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by Atty. Remo to be his
complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in
and contained some letters, documents and papers belonging to his clients. Also, books
this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he
belonging to Salakam Lumber Co., Inc., were seized.
did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor
General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the Issue:
witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the
latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than 1. Is the search warrant in question valid or not, taking into consideration the provisions of
to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the the law and of the Constitution relative thereto?
affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of
2. Does the art metal filing cabinet seized by the agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
belong to Santiago Sy Juco or to Teopisto B. Remo?
Ruling:
The search and seizure was not valid. It is not stated in the affidavit that the books, documents
or records referred to therein are being used or are intended to be used in the commission of
fraud against the Government and, notwithstanding the lack of such allegation; the warrant
avers that they are actually being used for such purpose.
Also, it assumes that the entire building is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco, when the only ground
upon which such assumption is based is the BIR agent's statement which is mere hearsay
(coming from an informant) and when in fact part thereof was occupied by Atty. Remo. It was
not asked that the things belonging to Atty. Remo and to others also be searched and seized.
For all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors assigned by the appellant are very
well founded, the appealed judgment is reversed, and it is ordered that the art metal filing
cabinet, together with the key thereof seized by the internal revenue agent by virtue of the
judicial warrant in question, which is hereby declared null and void, be immediately returned
unopened to the appellant; and that a copy of this decision be sent to the Solicitor-General for
him to take action, if he deems it justified, upon careful investigation of the facts, against the
internal revenue agent or agents who obtained and executed the warrant in question, in
accordance with the provisions of article 129 of the Revised Penal Code, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
NEMESIO PRUDENTE vs Hon Judge ABELARDO M. DAYRIT
G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989
FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C.
Angeles), it was made mentioned of result of our continuous surveillance conducted for
several days. We gathered information from verified sources that the holders of said firearms
and explosives as well as ammunitions arent licensed to possess said firearms and
ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not
student who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions.
Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,
Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives hand
grenades and ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the office of Department of
Military Science and Tactics and at the office of the President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:
1. Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts
2. The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and answers
3. Search warrant was a general warrant
4. Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege
under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
HELD:
Search Warrant annulled and set aside.
RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined
personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the complainant,
and that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons and things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one
specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search Warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, In writing and under oath, the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Probable Cause for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.
- This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the complainant
and witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.

PARTICULARITY
For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree punishes
several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase illegal
possession of firearms etc. - - Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the
search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant to mention the particular provision of
PD1-866 that was violated is not of such gravity as to call for the invalidation of this case.
Stonehill vs. Diokno
20 SCRA 383 (GR No. L-19550)
June 19, 1967
CJ Concepcion
Facts:
Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent) issued on
different dates a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill et. al.) and/or
corporations of which they were officers to search the persons of the petitioner and/or
premises of their officers warehouses and/or residences and to seize and take possession of
the personal property which is the subject of the offense, stolen, or embezzled and proceeds
of fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used or the means of committing the
offense, which is described in the application as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus and injunction and prayed that, pending final disposition of the case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued against the prosecutors, their agents and representatives
from using the effect seized or any copies thereof, in the deportation case and that thereafter,
a decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null
and void. For being violative of the constitution and the Rules of court by: (1) not describing
with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) money not mentioned in
the warrants were seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases
filed against the petitioner; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal
in accordance with law.
In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid and issued
in accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by petitioners consent; and
(3) in any event the effects are admissible regardless of the irregularity.
The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However by a
resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the
offices of the corporations.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of search
warrants issued against the corporation of which they were officers.
2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general search
warrants.
3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the illegality
of its seizure.
Held:
I
Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were seized by
means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of
them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be
invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
II
The Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner
set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein
named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace
officers.
To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of
Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules
of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners persons,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravened the explicit command
of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending
to defeat its major objective the elimination of general warrants.
III
Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.
The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is
no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental
law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for
the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of
the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of
fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of
the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as
the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be,
as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
Stonehill vs Diokno (20 SCRA 383)
Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners
personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search
the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to
search for personal properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for
violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised
Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the
respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other
records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to
question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as
evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same
on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.
Held:
Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being
general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the
things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers.
Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a
poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the
circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from
the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different
from that of the corporation.
ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner
v
HON. JOSE HERRERA, respondent
Facts:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the
City Court of Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents,
papers, receipts and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent
Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search
warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance
fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200
Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of
the NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search
warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao,
president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they
seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1)
estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit
command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is
nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all
documents, papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the
CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her
premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roques
leased residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the
documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the
fiscals office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials.
Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally
obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not
sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that
probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded
to the applicants witness.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?
HELD:
NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which
includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are;
what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court,
search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too general.
Nolasco, et al vs. Pao

G.R. No. L-69803
October 8, 1985
Facts:
The present case was subject for resolution.
Supreme Court held in a criminal case that the arrest of the petitioners was illegal, annulling
the decision of respondent Judge Pao, and that the seizure of the items by virtue of the
warrant by the same respondent judge are inadmissible as evidence in the Subversive
Documents case. However the Court held that the items were to be retained in case it would
be used as evidence in a separate criminal case pending before the Special Military
Commission No.1, returning the rest which are determined irrelevant by petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the portion of the decision regarding the retention of the properties
seized. One of the petitioners also assailed the respondents claim that the search was
incidental to her arrest for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or not some of the properties seized may be introduced as evidence in a separate
criminal case.
Held:
The Court ruled the propriety of the declaration of the arrest and search as null and void. It
was held that the warrant was one of a general warrant issued in gross violation of the
constitutional mandate against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Bill of rights also
orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: Any evidence obtained in
violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding (Sec.
4[2]).
All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot
be used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of
Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985).
Since the search was not an incident of an arrest as it was in fact made under a void general
warrant, the seizure of documents could not be justified as an incident of an arrest
The Court ordered the return of all seized items to petitioners.
Malaloan v. CA
GR No. 104879
May 6, 1994
Regalado, J:
Facts: A search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of PD1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated in Quezon City. The application
for search warrant however was made in Caloocan City. The petitioners, Malaloan and Luarez,
were the ones indicted by virtue of the said search warrant. Information was filed against
them for violation of PD1866. Petitioners assailed the validity of the search warrant since it
was applied in Caloocan City which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City.
Issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant
in connection with an offense allegedly committed outside its territorial jurisdiction
Held: Yes, the court may take cognizance and may issue a search warrant even if the
offense is committed outside its territorial jurisdiction
Ratio: A search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only
to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof.
In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to
require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may eventually be filed where, in
the first place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a
territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then
located. This is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different
venues under the rules for delitos continuados or in those instances where different trial
courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal offense.
Other contentions:
Petitioners used the following circulars to justify their contention that a search warrant must
be applied in Quezon City if the illegal articles sought are in Quezon City. Circular No. 13,
Circular No. 19 and Administrative Order No. 3
Circular No. 13 and 19
Both circulars were not intended to be of general application to all instances involving search
warrants and in all courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules
of Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as
emergency guidelines on applications for search warrants filed only in the courts of
Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas and only with respect to violations
of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code, illegal
possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In
other words, the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue search warrants would
not apply to single-sala courts and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to
be adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure which would be
vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.
Rule 126, Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed.* An application
for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where
the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in
the court where the criminal action is pending.
Administrative Order No. 3
For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that
Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts," was the source of thesubject matter jurisdiction of,
as distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this
administrative order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, the pertinent portion of which states:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme Court shall
define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority.
The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned
for purposes of determining the venue of all writs, proceedings or actions, whether civil or
criminal, . . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a
procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction
conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basically regional in scope.
Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a
region which shall be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court
to any branch or city or municipality within the same region as public interest may require,
and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station . . ." which,
otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.
In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se
confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches, such that non-
observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines
the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its
authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only
allocated to the three executive judges the administrative areas for which they may
respectively issue search warrants under the special circumstance contemplated therein, but
likewise pursuant to the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg, 129.
xxxxxxxxxx
Guidelines on possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in one court
and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property
intended to be used as evidence in said crime.
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to
issue search warrants necessitated by and for the purposes of said case.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may
be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the
appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the
issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending
for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same
is offered therein for said purpose.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the
same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property
seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal
case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is
charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with
concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action.
Note: (Please check the Original Case for the full explanation of each guideline)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion
(tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its
members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by
the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant
tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house
searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and
used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in
any subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of
subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear,
threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is
done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his
house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7.
Issue: If defendants arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a
firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful.
Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendants house to arrest him upon the
information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with themin
wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs
Querubin, the state, however powerful, doesnt have access to a mans home, his haven of
refuge where his individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of
objects he wants around him. In the traditional formulation, a mans house, however humble,
is his castle, and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government.
The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another
and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the
ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendants arrest, he wasnt in actual
possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any subversive
acthe was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential
precondition is that a crime must have beenin fact or actually have been committed first; it
isnt enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for
the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why
they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no
showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or
escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.
In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents,
assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional
rights at the time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus
inadmissible as evidence.
Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by
counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the
alleged subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned,
defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been
charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in
accordance with law.
The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a
rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, while the government should continue to repel the
communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it
should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the
framework of our Constitution and our laws.
PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDTG.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
Facts:
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM)
stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose
of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint
was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they
would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused
waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accuseds
passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required
him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a
pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious
looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he
alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag.
It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his
passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained
also hashish.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually
being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made
upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law,
which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio
City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
Padilla vs CA
G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997
Facts: High-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of
petitioner Robin Padilla:
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazine with ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.
Appellant voluntarily surrendered item no. 3. and a black bag containing two additional long
magazines and one short magazine.
PNP Chief Espino, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office issued a Certification
which stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle
SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta
SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla. A second Certification stated
that the three firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla.
Issue: Whether or not his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions
taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule
Held: No. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that
per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer or private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established
that petitioners vehicle figured in a hit and run an offense committed in the presence of
Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this
point that presence does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but
also when he hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene. As
testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the
sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave
chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After
having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan
bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already
positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen
who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. We beg to disagree. That
Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the
vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioners arrest, did not in any way affect the
propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have
taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably
better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner)
who , in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian
may not be able to contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that
curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with
private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved
fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved
crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat
the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police
was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action. The exigent circumstances of
hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime all
created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges
police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.
Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith &
Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioners warrantless arrest was proper as he
was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.
Besides, the policemens warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under
paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or
a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover,
after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarangs report, the
policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate
number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. These
formed part of the arresting police officers personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
petitioners Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the
arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay
information.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioners belated
challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial
and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest.
Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant,
the admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid,
are as follows:
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence,
Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity.
consented warrantless search, and
customs search.
In conformity with respondent courts observation, it indeed appears that the authorities
stumbled upon petitioners firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active
search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is
concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was
justified for they came within plain view of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the
revolver and magazine tucked in petitioners waist and back pocket respectively, when he
raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as
they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the drivers
seat. Thus it has been held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police
officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are
not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the
guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti.
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject
to seizure even without a warrant.
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver
of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the
information estopped him from assailing any purported defect.
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by
the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant
nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance).
Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the
passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioners grabbing
distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an
incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestees custody or
area of immediate control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The
products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule.
Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith,
a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that
either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or
the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the
proceeds of some criminal offense.

PEOPLE VS AMINNUDIN
Facts:
The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was
identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached him
as he descended from the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him
and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were
later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding,
the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
Issue:
Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and seizure is
violated
Ruling:
The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of
court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be
committed or had just been committed.
A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the
customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.
In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And from the information they have
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had determine
on his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary.
The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law
enforcement agents.
ACQUITTED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALVARO SAYCON y BUQUIRAN,
accused-appellant
G.R. No. 110995
September 5, 1994
SUBJECT: The State vs. Suspected Shabu Courier
OVERVIEW OF THE CASE: The Philippine Coastguard and Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) were alerted to the arrival of a suspected shabu courier in a ship docking that
morning. The suspected courier was invited for questioning and asked to reveal the
contents of his bag. Prohibited drugs were found and he was arrested.
FACTS:
Alvaro Saycon (D) was charged with violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425 as
amended, the Dangerous Drugs Act when he was found transporting four (4) grams of
metamphetamine hydrochloride ("shabu") and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P20,000.00.
On or about July 8, 1992, at 6:00am, a Coastguard personnel received information from a
NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro
Saycon was on board the MV Doa Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete
City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer ordered a combined team
of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel to intercept the suspect. The vessel
docked at 6:00am that same morning at Dumaguete City. Saycon alighted from the boat
carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard
where he was identified by a police officer of the NARCOM. Saycon was then invited to the
Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area and he willingly went with them. At the
headquarters, Saycon was asked to open his bag and he willingly obliged. In it were personal
belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a cigarette pack
(Marlboro) containing the suspected "shabu". When asked whether the cigarette pack
containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon merely bowed his head. Then, Saycon , his
bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When Alvaro
Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest.
Contention of respondent:
Saycon contends that the search of his bag was illegal because it had been made without
a search warrant and that, therefore, the "shabu" discovered during the illegal search was
inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE:
Is the warrantless search valid? Is the warrantless arrest valid?
RULING:
Yes. The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a
search and seizure is not absolute. "There are certain exceptions recognized in our law," the
Court noted in People vs. Barros. The exception which appears most pertinent in respect of
the case at bar is that relating to the search of moving vehicles. In People vs. Barros, the Court
said: Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles without need of a
warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since
such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may
be sought. (People vs. Bagista, supra; People vs. Lo Ho Wing, supra) In Valmonte vs. De Villa,
178 SCRA 211 (1989), the Court stated: "Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." When, however, a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the
contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the
proceeds of some criminal offense. Close examination of the record of the case at bar shows
that there did exist reasonable or probable cause to believe that appellant Alvaro Saycon
would be carrying or transporting prohibited drugs upon arriving in Dumaguete City on the
MV Doa Virginia on 8 July 1992.

This probable cause in fact consisted of two (2) parts.

Firstly, Senior Police Officer Winifredo Noble had testified in court that the NARCOM Agents
had, approximately three (3) weeks before 8 July 1992, conducted a test-buy which confirmed
that appellant Saycon was indeed engaged in transporting and selling "shabu.". The police
authorities did not, on that occasion, arrest Alvaro Saycon, but what should be noted is that
the identity of Saycon as a drug courier or drug distributor was established in the minds of the
police authorities.

Secondly, the arresting officers testified that they had received confidential information that
very early morning of 8 July 1992, Alvaro Saycon would probably be on board the MV Doa
Virginia which was scheduled to arrive in Dumaguete City at 6:00 a.m. on 8 July 1992,
probably carrying "shabu" with him.

The Court considers that a valid warrantless search had been conducted. It follows that
the warrantless arrest of Saycon which ensued forthwith, was also valid and lawful.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No.
10325, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONS, however, that appellant shall
suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correctional as maximum, and that the fine
of P20,000.00 shall be DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Rule of Law:
General rule: The search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning
of the above constitutional provisions.
Exception: Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles
without need of a warrant.