People vs.

Yorac [GR L-29270, 23 November 1971] En Banc, Fernando (J): 8 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: Rodrigo Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the
offended party being a certain Lam Hock who, according to the medical certificate issued in 10 April
1968 by a Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, a resident physician of the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital, was
confined "since 8 April 1968 up to the present time for head injury." Then came a plea of guilty by Yorac
on 16 April 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days of arresto menor. He started serving
his sentence forthwith. On 18 April 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an information, this time in the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, charging Yorac with frustrated murder arising from the same act
against Lam Hock upon another medical certificate dated 17 April 1968 issued by the same Dr. Zulueta.
The later information for frustrated murder was based on a second medical certificate after the lapse of
one week from the former previously given by the same physician who, apparently, was much more
thorough the second time, to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater injury than was at first
ascertained. The lower court, presided by the Honorable Judge Nestor B. Alampay, considering that
there was no supervening fact that would negate the defense of double jeopardy, sustained the motion
to quash (filed on 10 June 1968) in an order of 21 June 1968. The People appealed.

Issue: Whether the new medical findings warrant the filing of the new information against the accused,
without violating the rule against double jeopardy.

Held: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." A defendant in a
criminal case should be adjudged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the
latter case the State being precluded from taking an appeal. It is in that sense that the right against
being twice put in jeopardy is considered as possessing many features in common with the rule of
finality in civil cases. For the accused is given assurance that the matter is closed, enabling him to plan
his future accordingly, protecting him from continued distress, not to mention saving both him and the
state from the expenses incident to redundant litigation. There is likewise the observation that this
constitutional guarantee helps to equalize the adversary capabilities of two grossly mismatched litigants,
a poor and impecunious defendant hardly in a position to keep on shouldering the costs of a suit. As
ruled in Melo vs. People, the rule of identity does not apply "when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no
possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent." Stated differently, if after the first prosecution "a new fact supervenes" on which defendant
may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct
offense, "the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." There is
then the indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact [which] supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the
facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense. Herein, if the X-ray examination
discloses the existence of a fracture on 17 January 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first
examination was made on 10 December 1956. There is, therefore, no new or supervening fact that
could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action. The new finding of
fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and
inconclusive examination made on 10 December 1956. Had an X-ray examination been taken at the
time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was
already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the very
superficial examination then made. No supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of
the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, for which reason the general rule of
double jeopardy should be applied.