FLORLYN M.

PAMA JD-3

1. LAGMAN ET AL. VS. MEDIALDIA ET. AL

G.R.Nos.231658,231771& 231774
July 4, 2017
Majority Opinion

Facts:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. Within the timeline set by
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017,
a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for
decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated
and worsened with the passing of time.
The President explained that on May 23, 2017, a governmet operation to capture the
high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted.
These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the
government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the
government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties.
The Proclamation stated therein that the same was anchored on Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provides that 'the crime of rebellion or insurrection is
committed by rising and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from
the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or
any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. It also
provided that part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent
acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack on the military outpost in Butig,
Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in
Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees; that on May 23,
2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur,
established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government private
facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and started flying the flag of
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly attempting to remove
from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief
Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public
order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; and that such attack shows the
capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage
to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao.
The Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 3888 expressing full support to the martial law
proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in
accordance with the law". Further, The House of Representatives likewise issued House
Resolution No. 105010 expressing its full support to the Proclamation.
On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito S. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano,
Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition claiming that the
declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because:
 1.) There is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It
argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion since there is no proof
that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines,
its laws, or its territory;
2.) The President's Report contained "false, inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic
accounts;
3.) That the President acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or any
ranking officials before making the proclamation.

On June 9, 2017, two other similar petitions docketed as G.R. No. 231771 and 231774 were
filed and eventually consolidated with G.R. No.231658. The Cullamat Petition claims that the
alleged "capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror and cause death and
damage to property" does not rise to the level of rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the
whole of Mindanao. It further alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations, and falsities in the Report of
the President to Congress.
Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi it not so grave as to require the
imposition of martial law. It asserts that th Marawi incidents "do not equate to the existence of a
public necessity brought about by an actual rebellion, which would compel the imposition if
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habea corpus". It proposes that
"[m]artial law can only be justified if th rebellion or invasion has reached such gravity that [its]
imposition x x x compelled by the needs of public safety" which, it believes, is not present in
Mindanao.

Issues:
1. Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of Martial Law or
suspension of the Privilige of the Write of Habeas Corpus

2. Whether or not the Presidents is required to obtain the favorable recommendation

thereon of the Secretary of National Defense

Ruling:
1. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and
the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President,
the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of
such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the
time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based
on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the
past events should be from the present depends on the President. Past events may be considered
as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as these are connected or related to
the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.
 As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what to include and what not
to include in the proclamation and the written Report taking into account the urgency of the
situation as well as national security. He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports and
confidential infonnation that may prejudice the operations and the safety of the military.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the
written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
since these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may
be used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of
factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.

2. The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Even the recommendation
of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking military
officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare martial law is not
subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that
public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the
President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only
on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.

2. JUSTICE LEONEN DISSENTING OPINION

First issue: Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of Martial
Law or suspension of the Privilige of the Write of Habeas Corpus

Proclamation No. 216 issued in Russia on May 23, 2017 along with all other issuances made
pursuant to this declaration should be declared unconstitutional.
The Constitution does not only require that government alleges facts, it must show that the
facts are sufficient. The facts are sufficient when (a) it is based on credible intelligence and (b)
taken collectively establishes that there is actual rebellion and that public safety requires the
suspension of the privilege of the writ ofHabeas Corpus and the exercise of defined powers
within the rubric of martial law. We cannot use the quantum of evidence that is used by a
prosecutor or a judge. We have to assume what a reasonable President would do given the
circumstances.
The facts presented are not sufficient to reasonably conclude that the armed hostilities and
lawless violence happening in Marawi City is for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to
said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, or any
body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature,
wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Based on the facts inferred by the respondents from their intelligence sources, the
perpetrators or the atrocities are not numerous or have sufficient resources or even community
support to hold any territory. Neither do the facts show convincingly that public safety requires
martial law. Respondents did not show how the available legal tools magnified by the call out of
the armed forces would not be sufficient. Publicsafety is always the aim of the constitutional
concept of police power. Respondents failed to show what martial law would add. Martial law is
not the constitutionally allowed solution to terrorism. It is an emergency grant of power in cases
where civilian authority has been overrun due to actual hostilities motivated by a demonstrable
purpose of actually seizing government. As an emergency measure, the capability and
commitment of the lawless group must also be shown.
The presentation of facts made by the respondents who bear the burden in these cases was
wanting. Many of the facts presented by the respondents are simply allegations. Most are based
on inference contradicted by the documents presented by the respondents themselves.
Respondents did not exert any effort to either show their sources or the cogent analysis of
intelligence information that led to their present level of confidence with respect to the cogency
of their interpretation. Even the sources of the respondents show the lack of credibility of some
of their conclusions.
Even with a charitable view that all the bases of the factual allegations are credible, the facts
as presented by the parties are still not sufficient to justify the conclusion that martial law, as
provided in Proclamation No. 216, General Order No. 1, and in the Operational Directive of the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), should be declared and that it cover
the entire Mindanao Region. None of the directives also specifies which island or island groups
belong to Mindanao.

Second Issue: Whether or not the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Article VII,
Section 18 is a petition for certiorari as evidenced by ArticleVIII, Section 1, which states:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actua1 controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.

The Government further argues that by correlating Section 1 and Section 5( 1) 4 of

Article VIII, a petition for certiorari becomes the sole "appropriate remedy" referred to under
Article VII, Section 18 as it is the only "logical, natural and only recourse. respondents are
mistaken.
The power of judicial review is the Court's authority to strike down acts of the executive and
legislative which are contrary to the Constitution. This is inherent in all courts, being part of their
power of judicial review. Article VIII, Section 1 includes, but does not limit, judicial power to
the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies and determine whether or not any branch or
instrumentality of the Government has committed grave abuse of discretion.
Traditionally, Angara v. Electoral Commission clarifies that judicial review is not an
assertion of the superiority of the judiciary over other departments. Rather, it is the judiciary's
promotion of the superiority of the Constitution:
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
 conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is
in truth all that is involved in what is termed ''judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution.
The traditional concept of judicial review or "that the declaration of the unconstitutionality
of a law or act of government must be within the context of an actual case or controversy brought
before the courts, calls for compliance with the following requisites before a court may take
cognizance of a case:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very !is mota of the
case.
Despite adherence to its traditional jurisdiction, the Court has also embraced and acted on a
more articulated jurisdiction provided for under Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
11 In emphasizing the Court's jurisdiction, the 1987 Constitution broadened the Court's power of
judicial review from settling actual controversies involving legally demandable and enforceable
rights, to determining if a Government branch or instrumentality has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction. 12 By deliberately increasing the Court's
power of judicial review, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to prevent courts from
seeking refuge behind the political question doctrine to avoid resolving controversies involving
acts of the Executive and Legislative branches, as what happened during martial law under
President FerdinandMarcos. The Constitution further provides for a stricter type of judicial
review in Article VII, Section 18. It mandates the Supreme Court to review "in an appropriate
proceeding the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof."
The "appropriate proceeding" referred to under Article VII, Section 18 cannot simply be
classified under the established types of judicial power, since it does not possess any of the usual
characteristics associated with either traditional or expanded powers of judicial review.
"Appropriate proceeding" under the martial law provision is a sui generis proceeding or in a
class by itself, as seen by how it is treated by the 1987 Constitution and the special mandate
handed down to the Supreme Court in response to the President's declaration of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Distinct from its more recognized
power of judicial review is that it can be found in Article VII (Executive) and not Article VIII
(Judiciary) of the 1987 Constitution. It emphasizes the additional role of the Supreme Court
which should assume a vigilant stance when- it comes to reviewing the factual basis of the
President's declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A similar though not identical role is vested on Congress in the same Commander-in-Chief
provision. The Constitution expects both Houses to check on the wisdom of the President's
proclamation since they have been given a blanket authority to revoke the proclamation or
suspension.
3. JUSTICE ANTONIO T. CARPIO DISSENTING OPINION

First Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of Martial
Law or suspension of the Privilige of the Write of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao
 The quantum of evidence required is probable cause. tisfies the standard of proof for a valid
declaration of martial law of suspension of the privilege of the writ. Probable cause is the same
amount of proof required for the filing of a criminal information by the prosecutor and for the
issuance of an arrest warrant by a judge.
However, the sufficiency of the factual basis of martial law must be determined at the time
of its proclamation. Immediately preceding or contemporaneous events must establish probable
cause for the existence of the factual basis. Subsequent events that immed~ately take place,
however, can be considered to confirm the existence of the factual basis.
Probable cause exists that there is actual rebellion and that public safety requires the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ in Marawi City, but not
elsewhere. The armed and public uprising in Marawi City by 400 to 500 MauteHapilon armed
fighters, with the announced intention to impose Shariah Law in Marawi City and make it an
Islamic State, is concrete and indisputable evidence of actual rebellion.
Without question, the widespread killing of both government forces and innocent civilians,
coupled with the destruction of government and private facilities, thereby depriving the whole
population in Marawi City of basic necessities and services, endangered the public safety in the
whole of Marawi City. Hence, with the concurrence of an actual rebellion and requirement of
public safety, the President lawfully exercised his Commander-in-Chief powers to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ in Marawi City. However, the same does not
apply to the rest of Mindanao. Proclamation No. 216 and the President's Report to Congress do
not contain any evidence whatsoever of actual rebellion outside of Marawi City. The
Proclamation itself admits that only "this part of Mindanao" is the subject of separation from
Philippine sovereignty by the rebels. The President's Report did not mention any other city,
province or territory in Mindanao, other than Marawi City, that had a similar public uprising by a
rebel group, an element of actual rebellion.

Second Issue: Whether or not the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ satisfies the requirements on the concurrence of two elements: (1) the existence
of actual rebellion or invasion; and (2) public safety requires it

The power of the President to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ is
anchored on Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In exercising this
Commander-in-Chief power Constitution requires that the President establish the following: (1)
the existence of actual rebellion or invasion; and (2) public safety requires the declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ to suppress the rebellion or invasion.
The term "rebellion" in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution refers to the crime
of rebellion as defined by the Revised Penal Code. Based on its statutory definition, the crime of
rebellion has the following elements: (1) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against
the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to
the Government or its laws: (1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (2) any
body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress,
wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives. To clarify, mass or crowd action is
not a requisite for rebellion.
However, the existence of actual rebellion or invasion alone would not justify the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. Another requisite must be
satisfied, that is, public safety requires the declaration The 1987 Constitution mandates that
the President must establish that the gravity of the rebellion or invasion is such that public safety
requires the imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ to suppress the
rebellion or invasion. .. if there is no actual rebellion or invasion, or even if there is, but the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ is not necessary to suppress
the rebellion or invasion, then the Court must strike down the proclamation for being
unconstitutional.