8/25/2016 G.R.No.

L26400

TodayisThursday,August25,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L26400February29,1972

VICTORIAAMIGABLE,plaintiffappellant,
vs.
NICOLASCUENCA,asCommissionerofPublicHighwaysandREPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES,
defendantsappellees.

MAKALINTAL,J.:p

ThisisanappealfromthedecisionoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofCebuinitsCivilCaseNo.R5977,dismissing
theplaintiff'scomplaint.

VictoriaAmigable,theappellantherein,istheregisteredownerofLotNo.639oftheBaniladEstateinCebuCity
asshownbyTransferCertificateofTitleNo.T18060,whichsupersededTransferCertificateofTitleNo.RT3272
(T3435) issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior
expropriationornegotiatedsale,thegovernmentusedaportionofsaidlot,withanareaof6,167squaremeters,
fortheconstructionoftheMangoandGorordoAvenues.

Itappearsthatsaidavenueswerealreadyexistingin1921although"theywereinbadconditionandverynarrow,
unlikethewideandbeautifulavenuesthattheyarenow,"and"thatthetracingofsaidroadswasbegunin1924,
andtheformalconstructionin
1925."*

OnMarch27,1958Amigable'scounselwrotethePresidentofthePhilippines,requestingpaymentoftheportion
ofherlotwhichhadbeenappropriatedbythegovernment.TheclaimwasindorsedtotheAuditorGeneral,who
disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to
Amigable'scounselbytheOfficeofthePresidentonJanuary7,1959.

OnFebruary6,1959Amigablefiledinthecourtaquoacomplaint,whichwaslateramendedonApril17,1959
upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of
landtraversedbytheMangoandGorordoAvenues.Shealsosoughtthepaymentofcompensatorydamagesin
thesumofP50,000.00fortheillegaloccupationofherland,moraldamagesinthesumofP25,000.00,attorney's
feesinthesumofP5,000.00andthecostsofthesuit.

Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the
complaintandinterposingthefollowingaffirmativedefenses,towit:(1)thattheactionwaspremature,theclaim
nothavingbeenfiledfirstwiththeOfficeoftheAuditorGeneral(2)thattherightofactionfortherecoveryofany
amountwhichmightbeduetheplaintiff,ifany,hadalreadyprescribed(3)thattheactionbeingasuitagainstthe
Government,theclaimformoraldamages,attorney'sfeesandcostshadnovalidbasissinceastotheseitems
theGovernmenthadnotgivenitsconsenttobesuedand(4)thatinasmuchasitwastheprovinceofCebuthat
appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action
againstthedefendants.

Duringthescheduledhearingsnobodyappearedforthedefendantsnotwithstandingduenotice,sothetrialcourt
proceededtoreceivetheplaintiff'sevidenceexparte.OnJuly29,1959saidcourtrendereditsdecisionholding
thatithadnojurisdictionovertheplaintiff'scauseofactionfortherecoveryofpossessionandownershipofthe
portionofherlotinquestiononthegroundthatthegovernmentcannotbesuedwithoutitsconsentthatithad

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neitheroriginalnorappellatejurisdictiontohear,tryanddecideplaintiff'sclaimforcompensatorydamagesinthe
sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the government and that the claim for moral
damageshadlongprescribed,nordidithavejurisdictionoversaidclaimbecausethegovernmenthadnotgiven
itsconsenttobesued.Accordingly,thecomplaintwasdismissed.Unabletosecureareconsideration,theplaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact
involved.

Theissuehereiswhetherornottheappellantmayproperlysuethegovernmentunderthefactsofthecase.

InthecaseofMinisteriovs.CourtofFirstInstanceofCebu,1involvingaclaimforpaymentofthevalueofaportionof
land used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held
that where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal
processofexpropriationornegotiatedsale,theaggrievedpartymayproperlymaintainasuitagainstthegovernmentwithout
therebyviolatingthedoctrineofgovernmentalimmunityfromsuitwithoutitsconsent.Wetheresaid:.

... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use
weretoberespected,asitshould,thenasuitofthischaractershouldnotbesummarilydismissed.
Thedoctrineofgovernmentalimmunityfromsuitcannotserveasaninstrumentforperpetratingan
injusticeonacitizen.Hadthegovernmentfollowedtheprocedureindicatedbythegoverninglawat
thetime,acomplaintwouldhavebeenfiledbyit,andonlyuponpaymentofthecompensationfixed
by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it
"havetherighttoenterinanduponthelandsocondemned,toappropriatethesametothepublic
usedefinedinthejudgment."Iftherewereanobservanceofproceduralregularity,petitionerswould
notbeinthesadplainttheyarenow.Itisunthinkablethenthatpreciselybecausetherewasafailure
toabidebywhatthelawrequires,thegovernmentwouldstandtobenefit.Itisjustasimportant,ifnot
moreso,thattherebefidelitytolegalnormsonthepartofofficialdomiftheruleoflawweretobe
maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use,
which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes
manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of
immunityfromsuitcouldstillbeappropriatelyinvoked.

Consideringthatnoannotationinfavorofthegovernmentappearsatthebackofhercertificateoftitleandthat
shehasnotexecutedanydeedofconveyanceofanyportionofherlottothegovernment,theappellantremains
theownerofthewholelot.Asregisteredowner,shecouldbringanactiontorecoverpossessionoftheportionof
landinquestionatanytimebecausepossessionisoneoftheattributesofownership.However,sincerestoration
ofpossessionofsaidportionbythegovernmentisneitherconvenientnorfeasibleatthistimebecauseitisnow
andhasbeenusedforroadpurposes,theonlyreliefavailableisforthegovernmenttomakeduecompensation
which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis
shouldbethepriceorvaluethereofatthetimeofthetaking.2

Asregardstheclaimfordamages,theplaintiffisentitledtheretointheformoflegalinterestonthepriceofthe
land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. 3 In addition, the
governmentshouldpayforattorney'sfees,theamountofwhichshouldbefixedbythetrialcourtafterhearing.

WHEREFORE,thedecisionappealedfromisherebysetasideandthecaseremandedtothecourtaquoforthe
determinationofcompensation,includingattorney'sfees,towhichtheappellantisentitledasaboveindicated.No
pronouncementastocosts.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes

*Decision,RecordonAppeal,p.12.

1G.R.No.L31635,August31,1971(40SCRA464).

2Alfonsovs.CityofPasay(106Phil.1017).

3Alfonsovs.CityofPasay,supra.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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