EVIDENCE provides that things have happened according to the ordinary

course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Rule 128 Sec. 1
Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a
judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact.
Atienza v Board of Medicine
A complaint was filed against petitioner for gross negligence arising
from the fact that they removed the wrong kidney of the
complainants wife. The victim filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence consisting of photocopies of the X-Ray
request forms on which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the ultrasound examination.
Petitioner objected to said offer arguing that the documentary
evidence offered were inadmissible as it were incompetent.
Further, he alleged that the same documents were not properly
identified and authenticated, violate the best evidence rule and his
substantive rights, and are completely hearsay.
Evidence was admitted.
The Rules on Evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies.
Admissibility of Evidence refers to the question of whether or not
the circumstance is to be considered at all.
Probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or
not it proves an issue.
The proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of
her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the
exhibits offered in evidence.
The introduction of secondary evidence is allowed. Section 3, Rule
130 provides that when the subject of the inquiry is the contents
of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except when the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on
the offeror. Since the original documents cannot be produced
based on the testimony of Dr. Aquino BOM properly admitted
Edithas formal offer of evidence, and thereafter, the BOM shall
determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.
The documentary evidence was properly identified and
authenticated. The records show that the exhibits offered by
private respondent were the same evidence attached in Doctor
Lantin's counter-affidavit filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in answer to the criminal complaint of the
respondent. To lay the predicate for her case, private respondent
offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her kidneys were
both in their proper anatomical locations at the time of her
operation.
These exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence. The anatomical
positions whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and the removal
of one or both, may still be established through a belated
ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of the
respondents exhibit need not be proved as it is covered by
mandatory judicial notice. Laws of nature involving the physical
science, specifically biology include the structural make-up and
composition of living things such as human beings in which the
court may take judicial notice.
RULE 128 (Sec. 2&4)
Sec.2 Scope
Rules of Evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and
hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules.
Sec. 4 Relevancy
Evidence must have a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief
in its existence or non-existence.
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed except when it
tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue.
Sasan Sr. v NLRC
Complaint was filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Case
was appealed to the NLRC, and on such appeal, one of the
parties(Helpmate) submitted several documents which it did not
present to the Labor Arbiter (Certificate of filing of increase of
capital stock, Audited Financial Statement, TCT and Tax
Declaration). NLRC took into consideration the pieces of evidence
presented and reversed Labor Arbiters decision, CA affirmed. Issue
in this case is whether or not the CA acted in excess of jurisdiction
and/or committed grave abuse of discretion. (Nope)
Technical Rules of Evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor
officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain facts in
each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities
of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not
prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. Rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor
cases. NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and
affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The
submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice
the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.
Petitioners were afforded every right to be heard and seek
reconsideration on the adverse judgment against them. It cannot
win its case by merely raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on
the weakness of the adverse partys evidence.

Petitioners substantive rights were not violated when the

documentary evidence were admitted. The fact sought to be
proved by the exhibits that the two kidneys of Editha were in their
proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on is
presumed under Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which
 Rule 128 Sec. 3
Admissibility
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules.
People vs Wagas
Wagas was charged with estafa. Prosecution presented
complainant (Ligaray) as its lone witness. Complainant testified
that he transacted with Wagas only through the telephone and
that he did not personally meet Wagas, and that the goods were
released to Canada, Wagas brother-in-law. Wagas himself testified
and admitted having issued the check to Canada but denied having
any telephone conversation with Ligaray. (RTC convicted Wagas,
appealed directly to SC by notice of appeal)
We deem it essential for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness
that a telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had
with the buyer of rice to be first authenticated before it could be
received in evidence. Among others, the person with whom the
witness conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily
identified by voice recognition or any other means. Without the
authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to
the telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In this
respect, an identification based on familiarity with the voice of the
caller, or because of clearly recognizable peculiarities of the caller
would have sufficed. The identity of the caller could also be
established by the caller's self-identification, coupled with
additional evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone
call, the contents of the statement challenged, internal patterns,
and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of
facts known peculiarly to the caller.
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a
telephone communication is accorded probative weight. The identity
of the caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence.
According to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where
they are relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is
governed by the same rules of evidence concerning face to face
conversations, except the party against whom the conversations are
sought to be used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary
that the witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify
the person with whom the conversation was had, provided
subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence somewhere in the development of the case. The mere
statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient
proof of such identity, in the absence of corroborating
circumstances so as to render the conversation admissible.
However, circumstances preceding or following the conversation
may serve to sufficiently identify the caller. The completeness of the
identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its
admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the first instance with the
district court to determine within its sound discretion whether the
threshold of admissibility has been met.|||
There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a
reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary
force. Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification
of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude
a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not
measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt
demanded in criminal cases. Perforce, the accused's constitutional
right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not
overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, even though his
innocence may be doubted.
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be
held civilly liable where the preponderance of the established facts
so warrants. Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was legally
liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due
course. Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay
the amount of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per
annum from the finality of this decision. (he who asserts, not he who
denies must prove)
People vs Lauga
Lauga was charged with qualified rape. One of the witnesses
Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan, testified that Lauga admitted
to him that he raped AAA, his minor daughter. (RTC convicted him,
CA affirmed with modifications). Appellant argued that even if he
indeed confessed to Moises Boy Banting, the confession was
inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer
and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the barangay chairman,
in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement
officer for puproses of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of
the Constitution. Accused-appellant, already being a suspect, was
already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution should have already been observed. For this
reason, the confession of accused-appellant are inadmissible as
evidence. (People v Malngan)
The nature of a bantay bayan, is a group of male residents living in
the area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their
community, which is an accredited auxiliary of the PNP. Also, it is
worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1 (g) of Executive
Order No. 309 issued on November 11, 1987, as amended, a Peace
and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized to serve
as an implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order
Council at the Barangay Level, of which barangay tanods are
included. The Court is therefore convinced that barangay-based
volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups are
recognized to perform functions related to the preservation of
peace and order in the barangay level, as such any inquiry he makes
has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights, mainly the
Miranda Rights, is concerned.
The extrajudicial confession of appellant, as such, is inadmissible as
evidence.
The conviction of the accused-appellant in this case however was
not based solely on said confession but from the confluence of
evidence.
On the issue on the witness credibility. The inconsistency in the
statements is too trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies.
Such inconsistencies, which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential
ones, even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase
doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.
The testimony of AAA is entitled to greater weight since her
accusing words were directed against a close relative.
 Tating vs Marcella
The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of
land which Daniela Tating owned. Daniela sold the property to
Nena. Daniela died leaving her children as her heirs. After her
death, said heirs discovered a sworn statement executed by
Daniela stating that she had actually no intention of selling the
property. On the basis of said statement, Carlos and Felicidad,
some of the heirs, filed a complaint against Nena praying for the
nullification of the deed of sale, cancellation of the TCT issued in
the name of Nena, issuance of a new title and tax declaration in
their name, and the award of moral and exemplary damages as
well as attys fees and litigation expenses. (RTC and CA ruled in
favor of heirs)
In this case, the Court ruled that there is no issue in the
admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its Relevance
and Competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
Affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. The
Court finds that both the trial court and the court of appeals erred
in giving the statement probative weight. The adverse party is
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.
Furthermore, even if Danielas affidavit is disregarded, the fact
remains that private respondents failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance of evidence that
the contract of sale between Daniela and Nena was simulated. The
legal presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts and the
party who impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its
simulation.
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs CA
Two Marine vessels collided in the said case. PNOC was the one at
fault as stated by the findings of the Philippine Coastguard. CFI
ruled in favor of MEFC, CA affirmed)
MEFC presented Testimony of its general manager that the MV
was indeed owned by MEFC, and that at the time it sank it was
carrying 1,060 tubs of assorted fish, also lost were 2 engines, radar,
pathometer and a compass.
They also presented Documentary evidence:
-Certified true copy of the certificate of ownership of MV Maria
Efigenia XV
-Marine Protest
-Various quotations
PNOC only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, a senior estimator, to
support its position that the price quotations were excessive, and
as an expert witness, used the quotations of his suppliers in making
his own estimates.
The SC held that the price quotations are ordinary private writings
which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been
proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del
Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of
the writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing
fleet because he was not the one who issued the price quotations.
Sec. 36 of Rule 130 states that a witness can only testify to those
facts that he knows of his personal knowledge. Moreover, because
he was the owner of private respondent corporation whatever
testimony he would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel,
its equipment, cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-
interest therein.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of
hearsay evidence considering that the persons who issued them
were not presented as witnesses. They also do not fall under the
exceptions to the hearsay rule. They are mere price quotations
issued personally to Del Rosario and are not published in any list,
register, periodical or other compilation relevant to the subject
matter. They are also not considered as commercial lists because
of the fact that they are not standard handbooks or periodicals
containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in
the work of the occupation.
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whther or not
the circumstance is to be considered at all while the probative
value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it
proves an issue.
Anti-wiretapping Act
Ramirez vs CA
Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the confrontation in
her office, wherein the alleged acts of vexation, insult, and
humiliation against her was committed. The transcript was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by the petitioner.
The Anti-wiretapping act applies to recordings made by one of the
parties in a conversation. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 states that it shall
be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described. Even a person privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the
latter will qualify as a violator under said provision. Nowhere in the
said law is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator,
the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a
third person should be professed. In this case, the use of tape
recorder falls under the devices enumerated in the law. The act of
recording therefore constitutes an offense.
Salcedo vs Ortanez
This is a case for annulment of marriage with damages.
Private respondent offered as evidence three cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and
unidentified persons. Trial court admitted said evidence to which
the petitioner assailed such admittance by filing a petition for
certiorari with the CA. CA denied said motion stating that tape
recordings are not admissible per se. They can be admitted in
evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are
presented and offered and how the Judge utilizes them in the
interest of truth and fairness and the even-handed administration
of justice.
Recordings are not admissible.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or
any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this
Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility
of the subject tapes is mandatory under R.A. 4200.
Note: Writ of Certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court, the proper remedy is an ordinary
appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, where the
assailed order is patently erroneous, the Court may allow certiorari
as a mode of redress.
Ganaan vs IAC
Atty Gaanan secretly listened to a phone conversation through an
extension so as to hear the proposed conditions for the settlement
proposed to his client, and using the knowledge he acquired from
the conversation filed a case against the other party. A case was
subsequently filed against him for violation of R.A. 4200.
No, he did not violate R.A. 4200. Extensions cannot be considered
as one of the devices used for wiretapping. The device or
arrangement contemplated in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the
main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation
or presence cannot be presumed by the party being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and
their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a
telephone conversation. In this case interception has not occurred.
Furthermore it is a general rule that penal statutes must be
construed strictly on favor of the accused.
Arrests, Searches and Seizures Order
Pollo vs CSC
The right to privacy constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of
all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable searches and
seizures. The American case of OConnor vs Ortega states that
special needs authorize warrantless searches involving public
employees for work-related reasons. The balancing test of which is
the weighing of government interests against the reasonable
expectation of privacy of the employee.
In this case, the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his computer files. Furthermore, the CSC in this case had
implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they
have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send
or receive in their office computers, and that the CSC may monitor
the use if said computers. This implies that on the spot check-ups
may be done.
The search conducted was also reasonable in its scope and
inception, it was conducted in connection with the investigation of a
work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-
complaint addressed to the Chairperson. The Commission pursued
the search in its capacity as government employer and that it was
undertaken in connection with a work-related misconduct. Also,
there being a reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored
therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the
investigation justifies the search as it clearly falls under the
exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative
searches defined in O Connor.
People vs Amminudin
The evidence obtained from Amminudin resulting from the search
conducted cannot be admitted as it is a fruit of the poisonous tree.
The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because no
warrant was issued and the warrantless arrest did not come under
the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the
warrantless arrest search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest, to all appearances he was like any other passenger
innocently disembarking from the vessel.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government
against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-
enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction
upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding
as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions
of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every
individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent
and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order
is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again,
said, "I think it a less evil that some criminal should escape than that
the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed
in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if
the law violated is the Constitution itself.
People vs Mengote
The evidence obtained from the search done on Mengote was
inadmissible due to the fact that the search or seizure done is
illegal. Mengote did not commit any offense, was committing an
offense or attempted to commit an offense in the presence of the
police. In arrests without a warrant it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. The fact of the commission of the offense must
be undisputed.
People vs Laguio
The Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused was granted by
Judge Laguio due to the fact that based on the findings the arrest
preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a
lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful.
Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof
are inadmissible in evidence. The law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made.
To be caught in flagrante delicto there must be an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit a crime, and such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
People vs Dela Cruz
Accused-appelant was charged with possession of illegal drugs. The
Court however found him not guilty due to the fact that there was
insufficient evidence to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution was not able to show his participation in any drug
dealing. He was merely found inside a room with shabu, not as the
rooms owner but as a guest. The prosecution in this case clearly
failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a showing of
either actual or constructive possession by accused-appellant.
Since he was not in possession of the illegal drugs his subsequent
arrest was not valid.
Human Security Act of 2007 RA 9372
Republic vs Roque
The petition is meritorious.
An act of a court or t1ribunal can only be considered as with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. It is wellsettled that the abuse of discretion to be
qualified as grave must be so patent or gross as to constitute an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or
to act at all in contemplation of law.3 In this relation, case law
states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.4 The degree of gravity, as above-described, must be
met.
Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave
abuse of discretion could be ascribed on the part of the RTC when
it found that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of
RA 9372 in the Southern Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded
its jurisdiction when it ruled that private respondents petition had
met all the requisites for an action for declaratory relief.
Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismiss was
altogether improper.
To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did
not make any definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA 9372.
The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases were dismissed
based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the remedy
of certiorari was improper; (b) petitioners therein lack locus
standi; and (c) petitioners therein failed to present an actual case
or controversy. Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion.
The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to
the RTCs ruling on the sufficiency of private respondents petition
for declaratory relief.
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action
for declaratory relief: first, the subject matter of the controversy
must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of
said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require
judicial construction; third, there must have been no breach of the
documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the ripening seeds of one between persons
whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for
judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not available
through other means or other forms of action or proceeding8.
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that
while the first,9 second,10 and third11 requirements appear to
exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements,
however, remain wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual
justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one exists in this
case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,
not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.12 Corollary
thereto, by ripening seeds it is meant, not that sufficient accrued
facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its
inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper,
animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms
ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent
and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and
stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.13
A perusal of private respondents petition for declaratory relief
would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left
to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA
9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern
Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general
interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the
government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the
said law would remain untrammelled. As their petition would
disclose, private respondents fear of prosecution was solely based
on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed
to the general public.14 They, however, failed to show how these
remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action
geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In
other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to
any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become
pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by
double contingency, where both the activity the petitioners
intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public
official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of
ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not
avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal
and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372
since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before
courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable.15 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in
the Southern Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others, lack
of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds of one), the
RTC should have dismissed private respondents petition for
declaratory relief all the same.
It is well to note that private respondents also lack the judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
required locus standi to mount their constitutional challenge thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of RA
9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in
G Holdings Inc. vs NAMAWU
the case.16 While it has been previously held that transcendental
public importance dispenses with the requirement that the
petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision
and personal injury,17 it must be stressed that cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and
different genus of constitutional litigation.18 Towards this end,
compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of NAMAWU, in which we upheld the right of herein private
harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus
respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims. Upon the same principle
standi,19 as in this case. To rule otherwise, would be to corrupt
the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an
of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision in Republic of
interest shared by the general public.20
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. G
can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for
adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above- Holdings, Inc., in which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser
discussed allegations in private respondents petition, remain
highly-speculative and merely theorized. It is well-settled that a of the shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.21 This the company notes accompanying the said purchase.These
private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to company notes, consisting of three (3) Promissory Notes, were part
proceed with a discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs
of the documents executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC
since no impending threat or injury to the private respondents
exists in the first place. by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of these notes
All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for uniformly contains stipulations establishing and constituting in
an action for declaratory relief, as well as the irrelevance of the
sixth requisite, private respondents petition for declaratory relief favor of GHI mortgages over MMCs real and personal
should have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to the
same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its properties. The stipulations were subsequently formalized in a
discretion.
separate document denominated Deed of Real Estate and Chattel

Mortgage on September 5, 1996. Thereafter, the Deed was

Judicial Notice
registered on February 4, 2000.
Rule 129 (Sec. 1, 2, 3)
We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In

Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take fact, they should have guided the courts below in the disposition of
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, the controversy at their respective levels. To repeat, these decisions
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the respectively confirm the right of NAMAWU to its labor claims and
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts
of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, affirm the right of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over the
the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
real and personal properties of MMC, as will be explained
divisions.
below. The assailed CA decision apparently failed to consider the
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are impact of these two decisions on the case at bar. Thus, we find it
capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
timely to reiterate that: courts have also taken judicial notice of
judges because of their judicial functions.
previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the
trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon. case under consideration.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper

court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower

court to issue the challenged writ of injunction depends on the


validity of the third partys (GHIs) claim of ownership over the
property subject of the writ of execution issued by the labor
department. Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed by the CA
decision was whether GHI could be treated as a third party or a
stranger to the labor dispute, whose properties were beyond the
reach of the Writ of Execution dated December 18, 2001
In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial
notice of the two cases aforesaid, as they provide the necessary
perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party with a valid
ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of
execution. In Juaban v. Espina we held that in some instances,
courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases
that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases
may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to
invoke a rule of judicial notice. The two cases that we have taken
judicial notice of are of such character, and our review of the instant
case cannot stray from the findings and conclusions therein.
Spouses Latip vs Chua
Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 129 declare when the taking of
judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary. ( State Prosecutors v.
Muro is also instructive: o The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Requisites:
1. Matter must be one of common and general knowledge
2. It must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain 3. It must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court o Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge.
The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court. - reiterates the requisite of notoriety (
Things of common knowledge of which courts could take judicial
notice may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally
in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are
capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. From the
foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent
that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of
does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the
CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill
money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor
the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that
the practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously known.
Corinthian Gardens vs Sps. Tanjangco
Citing Sia v. Court of Appeals [272 SCRA 141, May 5, 1997],
petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial notice of the
reasonable rental or the general price increase of land in order to
determine the amount of rent that may be awarded to them. In
that case, however, this Court relied on the CA's factual findings,
which were based on the evidence presented before the trial
court. In determining reasonable rent, the RTC therein took
account of the following factors: 1) the realty assessment of the
land, 2) the increase in realty taxes, and 3) the prevailing rate of
rentals in the vicinity. Clearly, the trial court relied, not on mere
judicial notice, but on the evidence presented before it. Indeed,
courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and
occupation of a disputed property. However, petitioners herein
erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount of rent,
could simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without
considering any evidence. As we have said earlier, a court may fix
the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still base its action on
the evidence adduced by the parties. In Herrera v. Bollos [G.R. No.
138258, January 18, 2002], the trial court awarded rent to the
defendants in a forcible entry case. Reversing the RTC, this Court
declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined
not by mere judicial notice, but by supporting evidence:
x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in
controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public
knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must
allow the parties to be heard thereon. Hence, there can be no
judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question
without supporting evidence. Truly, mere judicial notice is
inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to determine
the proper rental value. But contrary to Corinthian's arguments,
both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was due the
Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of
their property. This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA
was based on the evidence presented below. Moreover, in Spouses
Catungal v. Hao,[43] we considered the increase in the award of
rentals as reasonable given the particular circumstances of each
case. We noted therein that the respondent denied the petitioners
the benefits, including rightful possession, of their property for
almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of
possession and use of their property for more than two decades
through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no cogent reason to
disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA.
 Judicial Admissions
Rule 129 Sec. 4 & Rule 130 Sec. 26
Rule 129 Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or
written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
Rule 130 Section 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him.
Toshiba Information vs CIR
The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial
by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission.[45] Under
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission
requires no proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. The Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial
admission especially when the opposing party relied upon the same
and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact already
admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the
proceedings does not require proof.[46]
In the instant case, among the facts expressly admitted
by the CIR and Toshiba in their CTA-approved Joint Stipulation are
that Toshiba is a duly registered value-added tax entity in
accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code, as amended[,][47] that
is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export sales
in accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as
amended.[48] The CIR was bound by these admissions, which he
could not eventually contradict in his Motion for Reconsideration of
the CTA Decision dated October 16, 2000, by arguing that Toshiba
was actually a VAT-exempt entity and its export sales were VAT-
exempt transactions. Obviously, Toshiba could not have
been subject to VAT and exempt from VAT at the same
time. Similarly, the export sales of Toshiba could not have
been subject to zero percent (0%) VAT and exempt from VAT as
well.
The CIR cannot escape the binding effect of his Judicial Admissions.
The Court disagrees with the Court of Appeals when it ruled in its
Decision dated August 29, 2002 that the CIR could not be bound by
his admissions in the Joint Stipulation because (1) the said
admissions were made through palpable mistake[49] which, if
countenanced, would result in falsehood, unfairness and
injustice;[50] and (2) the State could not be put in estoppel by the
mistakes of its officials or agents. This ruling of the Court of Appeals
is rooted in its conclusion that a palpable mistake had been
committed by the CIR in the signing of the Joint
Stipulation. However, this Court finds no evidence of the
commission of a mistake, much more, of a palpable one.
Cuenco vs Talisay Sports Complex
It was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the documentary
evidence of an alleged property inventory conducted on June 4,
1998, that the CA based its conclusion that the amount of damage
sustained by the leased premises while in the possession of
petitioner exceeded the amount of petitioner's deposit. This
contradicts the judicial admission made by respondents' counsel
which should have been binding on the respondents.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made
by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does
not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.
A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2)
during the trial, by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations,
or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The stipulation of
facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The
veracity of judicial admissions require no further proof and may be
controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were
made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made.
Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in
the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.
Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel,
neither did they claim that the same was made through palpable
mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and
may be relied upon by the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the
proceedings and matters dealt therein may not be brushed aside in
the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of
compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and
worthless. Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the
scope of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of
the client which renders respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is
meant that an admission or representation is conclusive upon the
person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon.
Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their
counsel at the pre-trial. Accordingly, the CA committed an error
when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents' evidence
contradictory to the judicial admission.
Alfelor vs Halasan
The children and heirs of late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor
filed a Complaint for Partition. One of their children is Jose Alfelor.
Among those who filed said complaint were Teresita Sorongon and
her two children Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claims to be the
spouse and children of Jose Alfelor, respectively. Later, Josefina
Halasan filed a Complaint-in-Intervention claiming she has a legal
interest in the matter because she is the surviving spouse and
primary compulsory heir of Jose Alfelor. Petitioners opposed the
motion and the motion was set for hearing. Josefina did not appear
but presented the Reply-in-Intervention where Teresita declared
that she knew "of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor
with that of the herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956. Moreover,
Teresita in her testimony said she knew that her husband had been
previously married to Josefina and that the two did not live
together as husband and wife. RTC dismissed the Complaint-in-
Intervention stating that e intervenor failed to appear to testify in
court to substantiate her claim. CA, through a Rule 65 petition filed
by Josefina set aside the decision of RTC ruling that Teresita had
already admitted (both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had
been married to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of
the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no longer
requires proof.
DOCTRINE:
SC agreed with CA and ruled that Josefina Halasan has a right to
intervene in the case because as admitted by plaintiff Teresita
Alfelor in her Reply in-Intervention and in her testimony, there
exist a previous marriage between Josefina Halasan and Jose K.
Alfelor. Thus, Josefina Halasan being a surviving spouse of Jose
Alfelor is a legal heir and has interest in the case. A party who
judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is
dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact
from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in
the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the
contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether
objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations,
statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as
against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.
Object Evidence
Rule 130 Sec. 1
OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE
Section 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those
addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to
the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the
court.
Lucas vs Lucas
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack
of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no
evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More
essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the
circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that
no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the
latter has just set the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CA's view that it would be dangerous to allow a
DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves
the Court's attention. In light of this observation, we nd that there
is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the
courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in
paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question
of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can
issue a DNA testing order. The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted
to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of
DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed
parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity
(i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory
reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available
objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well
as the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that
the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is
utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or
abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA
analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the
public." Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio
or on application of any person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such
order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
parties upon a showing of the following:
A biological sample exists that is relevant to
the case;
The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to
DNA testing, but the results may require
confirrmation for good reasons; HCSEIT
The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique;
The DNA testing has the scientific potential to
produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and
The existence of other factors, if any, which
the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA
testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without
need of a prior court order, at the behest of any
party, including law enforcement agencies, before
a suit or proceeding is commenced.This does not
mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be
issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing,
the said conditions are established. In some states,
to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order,
there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must rst present suf cient evidence to
establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the
holding of the test. 36 In these states, a court order
for blood testing is considered a "search," which,
under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a nding of probable cause in order to
be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie
case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a nding of probable
cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently
explained Although a paternity action is civil, not
criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of suf cient justi
cation under the particular factual circumstances of
the case must be made before a court may order a
compulsory blood test. Courts in various
jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
procedures which are required, but those
jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court
can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing
in paternity cases. We agree, and nd that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an
order for compulsory blood testing, the moving
 party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in
cases in which paternity is contested and a party to
the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood
test, a show cause hearing must be held in which
the court can determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood
testing. The same condition precedent should be
applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during
the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that
the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is absolute
necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
preponderance of evidence to establish paternity
and the DNA test result would only be
corroborative, the court may, in its discretion,
disallow a DNA testing.
People v. Rufino Umanito
FACTS
Around 9PM, private complainant AAA was accosted by a young
male (whom she later knew as Umanito). He waited for her by the
creek, and he pointed as knife at her abdomen. He dragged her
into the Home Economics Building of Daramuangan Elementary
School. He undressed her while still holding the knife. He set her
down on a bench, put down the knife, and had sex with her. He
dressed up and threatened to kill her if she reported the incident.
Six months later, AAA s mother noticed the prominence on her
stomach, and it was then that she divulged to her mother the
alleged rape. Her mother brought her to the police station.
(Umanito s alibi: He was at home all day. Re: AAA, he admitted
that he courted her but she spurned him. He conjectured that she
had a crush on him since she frequently visited him.)
RTC rendered judgment against Umanito and sentenced him
to suffer reclusion perpetua. Umanito s appeal was transferred to
the CA for intermediate review (as per Mateo ruling), and CA
affirmed RTC. Umanito seeks acquittal on reasonable doubt, with
the belated filing of the case and AAA s questionable credibility as
grounds. He also said that AAA filed the complaint only upon her
mother s insistence; this supports his claim that AAA had sex with
another (a married man). Also, he claimed that there were several
inconsistencies in her assertions.
CASE IS REMANDED TO THE RTC FOR RECEPTION OF DNA EVIDENCE
RATIO
The fact that AAA bore a child because of the purported rape may
provide the definitive key to Umanito s absolution, since it can
now be determined with reasonable certainty WON he is the
father of her child. AAA and her child are directed to submit
themselves to DNA testing under the aegis of the New Rule on
DNA Evidence (AM No. 06-11-5-SC) which took effect on 15 Oct
2007 (a few days before promulgation of this case).
DNA print / identification technology is now recognized as a
uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve
one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available.
The groundwork for acknowledging the strong weight of DNA
testing was first laid out in Tijing v. CA . Herrera v. Alba discussed
DNA analysis as evidence and traced the development of its
admissibility in our jurisdiction. Tecson v. COMELEC said that in
case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to establish,
DNA testing could be resorted to.
The determination of WON Umanito is the father (through
DNA testing) is material to the fair and correct adjudication of his
appeal. Under Sec. 4 of AM No. 06-11-5-SC, the courts are
authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a
DNA testing. However, since SC is not a trier of facts, it would be
more appropriate that the case be remanded to RTC for reception
of evidence.
The hearing should be confined to ascertaining the feasibility of
DNA testing with due regard to the standards set. RTC should
order the DNA testing if it finds it to be feasible in this case. RTC
shall determine the institution to undertake the testing, and the
parties are free to manifest their comments on the choice. After
the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the
parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in
accordance with the rules of evidence, which shall be assessed by
RTC in keeping with Sections 7 (Assessment of probative value of
DNA evidence) and 8 (Reliability of DNA testing methodology). RTC
is also enjoined to observe confidentiality and preservation of DNA
evidence.
To facilitate the execution of this resolution, although the
parties are primarily bound to bear the expenses for DNA testing,
such costs may be advanced by SC if needed.
Habeas Corpus Case Reynaldo De Villa
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have
been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The
writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the
person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. The
most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that
the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom
of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ
of habeas corpus is unavailing.
People v Vallejo
The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are
conclusive. The court reiterated that even though DNA evidence is
merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused considering
that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in
this rape-slay case.
The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA
evidence in this case and for the first time recognized its evidentiary
value in the Philippines, thus:
DNA is an organic substance found in a persons cells which contains
his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each persons DNA
profile is distinct and unique.
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of
the crime or from the victims body for the suspects DNA. This is the
evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the
reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association
exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The
samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to
establish their profile.32 The test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated
from different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and
requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test,
whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This
might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various
parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a
different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same
source (inclusion). In such a case, the samples are found to be
similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance
of the Similarity.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts
should consider, among others things, the following data: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing
the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.
Tijing vs CA
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless
we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test 19 for
identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. 20 Of course, being a novel scientific CD
Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com technique, the
use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. 21
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said result is to deny progress. 22 Though it is not necessary in this
case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all
concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity
issues.
People vs Yatar
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends
that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were
conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution.
Is the contention of appellant tenable?
HELD: NO.
The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is
simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant
insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and
submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against
him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or
any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial
compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde, where immediately
after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused
without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no
violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be
compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
Electronic Evidence
People vs. Enojas
Enojas was riding a taxi parked in front of Aguila Auto Glass shop.
He was approached by patrolling policemen who found the taxi
suspicious. He was asked to come with them to the police station.
However, on the way to the police station, they encountered
robbers. During such encounter with robbers, Enojas was able to
escape. The policemen became suspicious of Enojas involvement
in the robbery and monitored his mobile phone which he
inadvertently left in the patrol car. The police conducted an
entrapment, posing as Enojas in communicating with the other
accused. Enojas and another accused Gomez were arrested.
The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone
text messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.
The accused asserted that they were entitled to an acquittal
because they were illegally arrested and the evidence of the text
messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.
ISSUE: Whether or not the text messages were admissible as
evidence against the accused
RULING: Affirmative.
Text messages are admissible according to the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of
them.
The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene
by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and
identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an
entrapment using this knowledge.
 Nuez v Cruz-Apao
Facts:The complaint arose out of respondents solicitation of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in
exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the latters
pending case in the Court of Appeals.
Complainant earlier sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The
crew of the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where
he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion.
Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if
the latter was still asking for the money and to set up a meeting
with her. Upon learning that respondents offer of a favorable
decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was
still standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was
formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.
During the hearing of this case, respondent would like the court to
believe that she never had any intention of committing a crime,
that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from
complainant and that it was complainant and the law enforcers
who instigated the whole incident.
When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained
in complainants cellphone and which reflected her cellphone
number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating
but claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she
was transacting with complainant.
Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell
the latter to stop calling and texting her, not to get the One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.
Issue:
Whether or not the text messages are admissible as evidence in
court?
Held:
Yes. Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction
with the text messages from respondent duly presented before the
Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the
formers pending case with the CA. The text messages were
properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now
covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence65 which provides:
Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone
conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has
personal knowledge thereof . . . . In this case, complainant who
was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal
knowledge thereof testified on their contents and
import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number
reflected in complainants cellphone from which the messages
originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have
had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to
rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity
of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well
to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
The Court has no doubt as to the probative value of the text
messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of
respondent in this case.
Ang vs CA
Facts:After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia
message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with her face
superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against
said accused for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.
The senders cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-
8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that
he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they
were in Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it
would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of
her and threatened to spread the picture he sent through the
internet.
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section
5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),
the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The CA
denied Rustans motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the
obscene picture presented in the case?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided
under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M.
01-7-01-SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the
obscene picture for the first time before the Supreme Court. The
objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered
in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such
ground for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal
action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil
actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each
and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
NAPOCOR vs Codilla
Facts: On april 20, 1996, M/V DibenaWinm being operated and
owned by the herein private respondent Bangpai shipping company
under its hip agent Wallen shipping Inc., accidentally bumped the
power barge of the herein petitioner, NAPOCOR. The latter filed a
complaint for damages on april 26, 1996 before the sala of the
herein public respondent judge. During the presentation of
evidence, the petitioner presented as pieces of evidence Xerox
copies, to which such was admitted by the court. Hoever, a motion
to strike out the evidence was filed before the court to which the
court ordered that such pieces of evidence be stricken out of the
records but has to be attached to the documents for proper
disposition by the appellate in case of appeal before the latter. The
petitioner aver that such documents be admitted for the basic
reason that such is within the purview of the electronic evidence.
Issue: Whether or not thepeices of evidence submitted by the
petitioner be regarded within the purview of the electronic
evidence for the court be compelled to admit?
Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following?
Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
models of written expression, described or however represented,
by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any
printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic document. For the
purpose of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be
used interchangeably with "electronic data message".
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information
or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
models of written expression, described or however represented,
by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.It includes digitally signed documents and any
printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic document.
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic
document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an
electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information
contained therein, similar to any other document which is
presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what
differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based
document is the manner by which the information is processed;
clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents
therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly
signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically.
By no stretch of the imagination can a persons signature affixed
manually be considered as information electronically received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced.
Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts
were produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on
Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous,
interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered
photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is
consequential that the same may not be considered as the
functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions.
There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the
subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody
of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a
certified copy of which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in
the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to
prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the
original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror
which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices
of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the
loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that
a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for
the document in the proper place or places. However, in the case at
bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as
documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was
made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the
abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the
court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by
petitioner as documentary evidence.
Indeed the documents presented by the petitioner as evidence
before the court were not within the purview electronic document
or electronic data message. It will be highly unacceptable to regard
an information manually written down to be regarded as electronic
message. The petitioner cannot aver now to submit the original
copies of the documents since they were given enough time to
submit such but they refused to do so and insist that the
photocopies be admitted instead.
The high court denied such petition.
Vidallon-Magtolis v Salud
Facts:Respondent is charged and held liable for offenses on
inefficiency and incompetence of official duty; conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and directly and
indirectly having financial and material interest in an official
transaction considering his undue interest in the service of the
order of release and actual release of Melchor Lagua.
Lagua was found guilty of homicide and was then detained at the
Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City. Laguas
petition for bond was approved in a Resolution where the
appellate court directed the issuance of an order of release in
favor of Lagua. The resolution was brought to the office of Atty.
Madarang, Division Clerk of Court, for promulgation.
Respondent served the resolution and order of release of Lagua at
the National Penitentiary, where Lagua was detained for homicide.
Meanwhile, Atty. Madarang received a call from a certain Melissa
Melchor, who introduced herself as Laguas relative, asking how
much more they had to give to facilitate Laguas provisional liberty,
and that they sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of RTC
Pasig, but was told that they still had a balance. When Atty.
Madarang was able to get the mobile number of respondent, he
represented himself as Laguas relative and exchanged text
messages with said respondent for a possible pay-off for the
Laguas provisional liberty. Atty. Madarang later discovered that
the respondent did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution
and Order of Release upon the accused-appellant and his counsel.
but gave them to a certain Art Baluran, allegedly Laguas relative.
Later on, Complainant called the respondent to her office. When
confronted, the respondent denied extorting or receiving money
for Laguas release, or in any other case. He, however, admitted
serving the copies of resolution and order of release intended for
Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran. Complainant then lodged the
complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14,
2003.
Issue:
Whether or not the admission of text messages as evidence
constitutes a violation of right to privacy of the accused?
Held:No. The respondents claim that the admission of the text
messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his
right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as
ephemeral electronic communication under Section 1(k), Rule 2
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge thereof. Any question as to the admissibility of such
messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself,
as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of
the first three messages on Atty. Madarangs cell phone.
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case
of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that case, the Court, in finding
the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct,
considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for
a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case
pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:
The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee
since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone
conversations, text messages and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.
Paraffin Test
Marturillas v People
That some pieces of evidence are circumstantial does not diminish
the fact that they are of a nature that would lead the mind
intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, toward the
conviction of petitioner. Circumstantial, vis--vis direct, evidence is
not necessarily weaker. Moreover, the circumstantial evidence
described above satisfies the requirements of the Rules of Court,
which we quote:
"SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -- Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt."62
Paraffin Test
Petitioner takes issue with the negative results of the paraffin test
done on him. While they were negative, that fact alone did not
ipso facto prove that he was innocent. Time and time again, this
Court has held that a negative paraffin test result is not a
conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. In other words,
it is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when
culprits wear gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in
perspiration. Besides, the prosecution was able to establish the
events during the shooting, including the presence of petitioner at
the scene of the crime. Hence, all other matters, such as the
negative paraffin test result, are of lesser probative value.
Corpus Delicti
Petitioner then argues that the prosecution miserably failed to
establish the type of gun used in the shooting. Suffice it to say that
this contention hardly dents the latters case. As correctly found by
the appellate court, the prosecution was able to give sufficient
proof of the corpus delicti -- the fact that a crime had actually been
committed. Ruled this Court in another case: "[Corpus delicti] is
the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the
testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does
not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, to the
firearms in the crime of homicide with the use of unlicensed
firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom, or x x x to the seized contraband cigarettes." To
undermine the case of the prosecution against him, petitioner
depends heavily on its failure to present the gun used in the
shooting and on the negative paraffin test result. These pieces of
evidence alone, according to him, should exculpate him from the
crime. His reliance on them is definitely misplaced, however. In a
similar case, this Court has ruled as follows: Finally, as regards
petitioners alibi, we need not belabor the point. It was easily, and
correctly, dismissed by the CA thus: "[Petitioners] alibi is utterly
untenable. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission. Here, the locus criminis
was only several meters away from [petitioners] home. In any
event, this defense cannot be given credence in the face of the
credible and positive identification made by Ernita.
Photograph as Evidence
Jose v CA
It is well-settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the
evidence offered to support the particular contention. In the
proceedings below, petitioners relied mainly on photographs,
identified in evidence as Exhibits 1 to 3, showing the position of
the two vehicles after the collision. On the other hand, private
respondents offered the testimony of Rommel Abraham to the
effect that the collision took place because Bus 203 invaded their
lane.The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs
rather than on Rommel Abrahams testimony which was obviously
biased and unsupported by any other evidence. Physical evidence
is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high
in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as
murder or rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if
found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied principally
upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People v.
Vasquez, where the physical evidence on record ran counter to the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that
the physical evidence should prevail.
Chain of Custody
People v Abetong
The prosecution failed
to establish an
unbroken chain of
custody over the drug
evidence
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not
readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis
to determine their composition and nature. And the risk of
tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit of this nature
is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical
characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances
familiar to people in their daily lives. As a reasonable measure, in
authenticating narcotic specimens, a standard more stringent than
that applied to cases involving objects which are readily
identifiable must be applied a more exacting standard that
entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness
if only to render it improbable that the original item has either
been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered
with.
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition
in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of it.
In the case at bar, the failure of Inspector Lorilla to testify is fatal to
the prosecution's case. To recall, only PO3 Perez and Inspector
Ompoy testified against accused-appellant. During his testimony,
PO3 Perez admitted that he put the confiscated item in the
evidence locker on August 22, 2003 for safekeeping and
subsequently brought them to Inspector Ompoy at the crime
laboratory on August 25, 2003. During this three-day interval, the
items were allegedly kept inside the evidence locker to which only
Inspector Lorilla has the key
It is evident from this sequence of events that during the interim,
Inspector Lorilla constructively acquired custody over the seized
items. As the lone key holder and consequentially a link in the
chain, Inspector Lorilla's testimony became indispensable in
proving the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Only he could have testified that from August 22 to 25, 2003 no
one else obtained the key from him for purposes of removing the
items from their receptacle. Only he could have enlightened the
courts on what safety mechanisms have been installed in order to
preserve the integrity of the evidence acquired while inside the
locker. Absent his testimony, therefore, it cannot be plausibly
claimed that the chain of custody has sufficiently been established.
To be sure, PO3 Perez did not even testify that he was assigned to
safeguard the evidence locker for the said duration; only that he
was the one who put it in and three days later took them out of brought the marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. 33 The
the locker room before bringing them to the crime laboratory. forensic chemist examined the very same specimen brought to
her, and in her findings, she confirmed it to be positive for
The presumption of regularity has been overturned marijuana.

The prosecution cannot skirt the issue of the broken chain of 0The prosecution indeed sufficiently proved that that the chain of
custody by relying on the presumption of regularity. This custody of the marijuana was never broken from the time PO1
presumption, it must be stressed, is not conclusive. Any taint of Alano received the marijuana from Ronnie up to the moment it
irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the was presented in court as evidence. AEIDTc
presumption unavailable. The presumption, in other words, We quote with approval the ruling of the appellate court in this
obtains only when nothing in the records suggests that the law matter:
enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official
duty as provided for in the law. But where the official act in As borne out by the extant evidence, after the conclusion of the
question is irregular on its face, as in this case, an adverse entrapment operation, the buy-bust team, together with
presumption arises as a matter of course. appellants, proceeded to their headquarters at Fort Bonifacio.
Thereat, PO1 Alano marked with his initials the two (2) brown
The arresting officers unduly deviated from legal procedure envelopes containing the marijuana and then turned over custody
of the same to the Chief of their unit, P.Supt. Pepito Dumantay.
It is beyond dispute that the date and time of confiscation do not The latter in turn prepared a request for laboratory examination
appear on the markings of the seized items. It cannot also be thereof, describing them in the request as ". . . two (2) folden
denied that no photograph was taken of the recovered items for brown envelopes, each containing suspected dried
documentation purposes. It is admitted that no representative
marijuana owering tops, marked WAA/8/18/98." The qualitative
from the media, from the Department of Justice, or any elective examination of
official was present to serve as witness in recording the arrest. The
prosecution's testimonial evidence is likewise bereft of any the specimen conducted by forensic chemist S/Insp. Grace M.
allegation of efforts undertaken by the law enforcers to contact Eustaquio yielded positive results for marijuana.
these representatives. Nevertheless, an accused can still be
All told, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that
convicted in spite of these circumstances provided that a
appellants were caught in flagrante delicto selling marijuana.
justifiable ground for excusing non-compliance with the
requirements under Sec. 21 of RA 9165 has satisfactorily been
established by the prosecution as required by jurisprudence and
the law's implementing rules. Such justifiable ground is wanting in
this case. No explanation whatsoever was offered by PO3 Perez in
his testimony justifying non-compliance. Without this justification,
it was improper for the court a quo to affirm accused-appellant's
conviction. To sustain the RTC and the CA's findings would render
the legal requirements under Sec. 21 of RA 9165 inutile and would
effectively diminish the safeguards offered by the law in favor of
the accused. EHCDSI

People vs Morales

Appellants also assert that the police officers failed to establish the
chain of custody of themarijuana, considering that PO1 Alano
categorically admitted that the marijuana was only marked at their
office.

In People v. Resurreccion, 30 this Court reiterates that failure to

immediately mark seized drugs will not automatically impair the
integrity of chain of custody as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved, as
these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

PO1 Alano accounted for the crucial links in the chain of custody of
the marijuana. It can be recalled that the green plastic bag
containing marijuana placed inside two (2) envelopes was handed
to him by Ronnie. After arresting appellants, PO1 Alano and the
rest of the NARCOM operatives immediately brought appellants
and the seized marijuana to Fort Bonifacio. Upon reaching the
camp, PO1 Alano placed his initials on each envelope and turned
them over to P/Supt. Pepito Dumantay (P/Supt. Dumantay).
Together with PO1 Buenafe and P/Supt Dumantay, PO1 Alano
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of
writing or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures,
symbols or other modes of written expression offered as proof of
their contents. (n)
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:
(a)When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b)When the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c)When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
(d)When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office. (2a)
Sec. 4. Original of document.
(a)The original of the document is one the contents of which are the
subject of inquiry.
(b)When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about
the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally
regarded as originals.
(c)When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one
being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction,
all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals. (3a)
SECONDARY EVIDENCE
Sec. 5.When original document is unavailable. When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove
its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated. (4a)
Sec. 6.When original document is in adverse partys custody or
control. If the document is in the custody or under the control
of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If
after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails
to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as
in the case of its loss. (5a)
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. When the original of document is in the custody of public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved
by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
(2a)
Sec. 8. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it. A
party who calls for the production of a document and inspects the
same is not obliged to offer it as evidence. (6a)
Cases
MACUA vs AVENIDO
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming
to have been validly married to the same man, now deceased.
In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got(deceased) married to
another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she
claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In
support of her claim, Tecla presented eyewitnesses to the
ceremony, the birth certificate of their children and certificates
to the fact that the marriage certificate/records were
destroyed.
Peregrina, showed the marriage contract between her and
Eustaquio.
RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina.
The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a
presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as
they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four
children. Such presumption, supported by documentary
evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by
the RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of
the fact of marriage. The CA found that its appreciation of the
evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
SC RULING
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence
of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence,
even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the
marriage certificate, no other proof can be accepted.
The execution of a document may be proven by the parties
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and
recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution
thereof.
In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness
testimonies and of Tecla herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the officiating
priest. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidencetestimonial and documentarymay be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage..
It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the
marriage certificate, no other proof can be accepted.
The execution of a document may be proven by the parties
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and
recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution
thereof.
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law.in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is
that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No.
28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume
marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was
completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the
unrebutted fact of the birth within the cohabitation of Tecla and
Eustaquio of four (4) children coupled with the certificates of the
children's birth and baptism; and the certifications of marriage
issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of
Talibon, Bohol.
DANTIS vs MAGHINANG
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness
by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay
evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of cross-
examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of
oath.
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence
where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. The sworn
statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was not identified
and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly,
Exhibit "3" must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an
inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot be deemed a declaration
against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to
the hearsay rule because the declarant was not the seller (Emilio),
but his father (Ignacio).
Exhibit "4," on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence
being a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to
prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt.
The best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of
proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents
of a document are best proved by the production of the document
itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence,
pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule
130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof
of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the
secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates
thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the
loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and
(3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part
of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the
document and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the
introduction of secondary evidence. In MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, it was held that where the
missing document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in
proof is required than where the document is only collaterally
involved.
PEOPLE VS ALCOBER
In People v. Pruna, the Court established the guidelines in
appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance, as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an
original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to
have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member
of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date
of birth of the offended partypursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; DCIEac
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. TaDSHC
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or
the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the
victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it
is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the
age of the victim. (Emphases supplied, citation omitted.)
In the case at bar, no birth or baptismal certificate or school record
showing the date of birth of AAA was presented. AHCTEa
Pursuant to number 4 of the guidelines, however, in the absence of
the foregoing documents (certificate of live birth or authentic
document), the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it
is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
 EDSA SHANGRILA VS BF CORPORATION
Admissibility of Photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs
and WVOs
Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the
matter of the admission in evidence of the photocopies of Progress
Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the complementing PMIs and the WVOs.
According to petitioners, BF, before being allowed to adduce in
evidence the photocopies adverted to, ought to have laid the basis
for the presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence,
conformably to the best evidence rule.
Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with the
laying-the-basis requirement. Defending the action of the courts
below in admitting into evidence the photocopies of the documents
aforementioned, BF explained that it could not present the original
of the documents since they were in the possession of ESHRI which
refused to hand them over to BF despite requests. cSEaDA
We agree with BF. The only actual rule that the term "best evidence"
denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing must, as a
general proposition, be produced and secondary evidence of its
contents is not admissible except where the original cannot be had.
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best
evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except
in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror; EaHcDS
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;(Emphasis added.)
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which
reads:
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or
control. If the document is in the custody or under control of the
adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in
the case of loss. CScTDE
Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or
document refers to evidence other than the original instrument or
document itself. A party may present secondary evidence of the
contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed,
but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse
party. In either instance, however, certain explanations must be
given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.
In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the
photocopied documents in question as secondary evidence. Any
suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for presenting the
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their
originals has to be dismissed.
Four factual premises are readily deducible from the exchanges, to
wit: (1) the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had
possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to produce the
documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them;
and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them. IDcAHT
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the
exception under Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 130. In other words, the
conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the
photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence have
been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the original document's
execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the original
document's unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith. While
perhaps not on all fours because it involved a check, what the Court
said in Magdayao v. People is very much apt, thus:
To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the
original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party,
Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given
reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in
court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its
existence. EScaIT
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or
control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the
admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has
done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to
the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the
form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open
court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces
tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has
sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original
of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses
to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted
GAW VS CHUA
Facts:
Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw,
borrowed P200,000 from Suy Ben Chua to be used for the
construction of their house. Suy Ben Chua issued a check for the
amount. The parties agreed that the loan will be payable in 6
months without interest. Chua Sioc Huan then executed a Deed of
Sale over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for
P255,000 in favor of respondent Suy Ben Chua.
Spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed
within the designated period. Suy Ben Chua then filed a Complaint
for Sum of Money against the Spouses Gaw.
During trial, Spouses Gaw called Suy Ben Chua to testify
as an adverse witness under Rule 132, Section 10. On cross-
examination, Suy Ben Chua explained that he ceased to be a
stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares of stock to
the other stockholders. He further testified that Chua Sioc
Huan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition,
executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn, became the owner
of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan
through a Deed of Sale.
A copy of the deed of partition and the deed of sale was
presented as evidence.
RTC ruled in favor of Suy Ben Chua
The trial court further held that the validity and due
execution of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale, evidencing
transfer of ownership of Hagonoy Lumber from Chua Sioc Huan to
respondent, was never impugned. Although respondent failed to
produce the originals of the documents, petitioner judicially
admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even
acknowledged her signature thereon, thus constitutes an exception
to the best evidence rule. As for the Deed of Sale, since the
contents thereof have not been put in issue, the non-presentation
of the original document is not fatal so as to affect its authenticity
as well as the truth of its contents. Also, the parties to the
documents themselves do not contest their validity. Ultimately,
petitioner failed to establish her right to demand an accounting of
the operations of Hagonoy Lumber nor the delivery of her 1/6
share therein.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, alleging that
the trial court erred when it considered as evidence for the
defendant, plaintiff's testimony when he was called to testify as an
adverse party under Section 10 (e), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court;
and when it considered admissible mere copies of the Deed of
Partition and Deed of Sale to prove that respondent is now the
owner of Hagonoy Lumber.
CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. The appellate court found
baseless the petitioner's argument that the RTC should not have
included respondent's testimony as part of petitioner's evidence.
In fact, the CA noted that the facts testified to by respondent were
deducible from the totality of the evidence presented. The CA
likewise found untenable petitioner's claim that Exhibits "H" (Deed
of Sale) and Exhibit "I" (Deed of Partition) were merely temporary
paper arrangements. The CA agreed with the RTC that the
testimony of petitioner regarding the matter was uncorroborated
she should have presented the other heirs to attest to the truth
of her allegation. Instead, petitioner admitted the due execution of
the said documents. Since petitioner did not dispute the due
execution and existence of Exhibits "H" and "I", there was no need
to produce the originals of the documents in accordance with the
best evidence rule. On December 2, 2003, the CA denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Petitioner is before this Court in this petition for review on
certiorari.
The SC affirmed.
It is also worthy to note that both the Deed of Partition and the
Deed of Sale were acknowledged before a Notary Public. The
notarization of a private document converts it into a public
document, and makes it admissible in court without further proof of
its authenticity. It is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A
notarized document carries evidentiary weight as to its due
execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public
have in their favor the presumption of regularity. Such a document
must be given full force and effect absent a strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or
defects recognized by law. A public document executed and
attested through the intervention of a notary public is, generally,
evidence of the facts therein expressed in clear unequivocal
manner. The "best evidence rule" as encapsulated in Rule 130,
Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when
the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where
the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply
and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary
evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the
original. Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed
with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever the opponent does not
bonafide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring production.
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to
the instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of
either deed. The petitioner never even denied their due execution
and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition. As for the
Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its genuineness and
due execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner
required by the rules. An agreement or the contract between the
parties is the formal expression of the parties' rights, duties and
obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties.
The parties' intention is to be deciphered from the language used
in the contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions of one
of the parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the contract.
Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED.
DECS vs Del Rosario
Facts:
A complaint for recovery of possession was filed befire
the trial court by Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario, Pacencia Del
Rosario and the Heirs of Santos Del Rosario against petitioner.
Alleging that they own a parcel of land situated in Kaypombo, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. The Property was registered in 1976 in the name
of respondents. They further alleged that the Kaypombo Primary
School Annex under DECS was occupying a portion of the Property
through respondents' tolerance and that of their predecessors-in-
interest. Respondents further alleged that KPPS refused to vacate
the premises despite their valid demands to do so. DECS argued
that said land was donated by the father of the Del Rosarios.
Atty. Ely Natividad, now a regional trial court judge,
prepared the deed of donation and the acceptance. KPPS started
occupying the Donated Site in 1962. Because of the donation,
DECS now claims ownership of the 650 square meter Donated Site.
In fact, DECS renamed the school the Isaias Del Rosario Primary
School.
During the pre-trial DECS admitted the existence and
execution of TCT No. T-222432 (Exhibit "A"), Tax Declaration No.
6310 (Exhibit "B"), and the tax receipts in respondents' names for
the years 1991 and 1992 (Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2"). On the other
hand, respondents admitted the existence of Judge Natividad's
affidavit that he prepared the deed of donation (Exhibit "1") and
the tax declaration for 1985 in the Municipality's name (Exhibit
"2"). Since there was no dispute that the Property was registered
in respondents' names, the parties agreed to a reverse trial with
DECS presenting its evidence first to prove that there was a valid
donation to the Municipality. DECS presented three witnesses:
Ricardo Nicolas, Vidal De Jesus and Judge Natividad, all residents of
Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Said witnesses testified that the
land was donated by Isaias, that the heirs knew of said donation,
that the deed of donation existed but cannot be found due to the
transfer of the municipal hall from the old to the new building.
Respondents presented two witnesses: Eugenia R.
Ignacio and Maria Del Rosario-Esteban, daughters of the late
Isaias. Said witnesses testified that they had no knowledge of such
donation and that they were the owners of the said land by virtue
of succession.
The Trial Court dismissed the complaint of the heirs.
Stating that the court is of the opinion that the defense was able to
prove the due execution of the deed of donation and its
acceptance, as well as the loss of the same, in accordance with
Rule 130[,] Sec. 4. It is recalled that Judge Eli Natividad, then a
municipal councilor of Sta. Maria, testied that he was the person
who prepared the deed of donation and later notarized the same,
and that said deed was duly executed and signed before him and in
his presence. Likewise, he affirmed that the municipal board of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, passed a resolution accepting the deed of
donation in favor of the said municipality.
Noteworthy is the rule that a recantation/recollection
of witness is a form of secondary evidence to prove the
existence/content of a document. Since the loss of the deed
subject matter of this case was likewise duly proved by the
defense, exerting the best possible efforts to locate or secure a
copy of the same and without bad faith on its part, this Court is
bent to give a greater weight to the secondary evidence adduced
by the defense vis- -vis the title in the name of the plaintiff[s],
most particularly in this case, where the plaintiffs failed to make it
appear that other and more secondary evidence is known to the
defendant and can be produced by them. Further judging on the
consistency, credibility and personality of the witnesses of the
defense, notably Judge Eli Natividad who was then a municipal
councilor of Sta. Maria at the time of the execution of the deed of
donation and who is thus in a best position to testify on the
matter, not to mention the fact that their testimonies were all
under oath, the Court cannot avoid but give weight to their
statements and declarations. The defense witnesses were not
induced by ill motive to testify in favor of the DECS, considering
that they will not derive any personal benefit, material or
otherwise, from such an act.
The CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
Stating that DECS failed to prove the existence and due
execution of the deed of donation as well as the Resolution of the
municipal council accepting the donation. The Court of Appeals
was not fully satisfied that DECS or the Municipality had made a
diligent search of the alleged "lost" deed of donation.
There was no evidences to show that Atty. Natividad
looked for a copy of the the deed, only that he testified that he
was the one who furnished it. "Before secondary evidence of a
writing may be introduced on the ground that the instrument has
been lost there must be proof that a diligent search has been
made in the place where it is most likely to be found and that the
search has not been successful "Secondary evidence of the
contents of writings is admitted upon the theory that the original
cannot be produced by the party by whom the evidence is offered
within a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Until, however, the non-production of the primary evidence has
been sufficiently accounted for, secondary evidence is not
ordinarily admissible."
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in its decision.
Held:
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA.
The petition lacks merit.
Article 749 of the Civil Code requires that the donation of real
property must be made in a public instrument. Otherwise, the
donation is void. A deed of donation acknowledged before a notary
public is a public document. The notary public shall certify that he
knows the person acknowledging the instrument and that such
person is the same person who executed the instrument,
acknowledging that the instrument is his free act and deed. The
acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate instrument. An acceptance made in a separate
instrument must also be in a public document. If the acceptance is
in a separate public instrument, the donor shall be notified in
writing of such fact. Both instruments must state the fact of such
notification.
Best and Secondary Evidence
The best or primary evidence of a donation of real
property is an authentic copy of the deed of donation with all the
formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil Code. The duty to
produce the original document arises when the subject of the
inquiry are the contents of the writing in which case there can be no
evidence of the contents of the writing other than the writing itself.
Simply put, when a party wants to prove the contents of the
document, the best evidence is the original writing itself. A party
may prove the donation by other competent or secondary evidence
under the exceptions in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. Secondary evidence of the contents of a document
refers to evidence other than the original document itself. A party
may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a written
instrument not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also
when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is no bad faith
on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily
explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort
to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof
of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the
original instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its
discretion may change this order if necessary.
Sufficiency of Proof of Loss
What mainly militates against DECS' claim is, as the Court of
Appeals found, inadequate proof that DECS or the Municipality
made a diligent search in the places where the deed of donation
may likely be found and that the search was unsuccessful. Prior to
the introduction of secondary evidence, a party must establish the
existence and due execution of the instrument. After a party
establishes the existence and due execution of the document, he
must prove that the document was lost or destroyed. The
destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person
knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew
the fact of its loss, or by anyone who had made, on the judgment of
the court, a sufficient examination in the place [or] places where
the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the
person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been
unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.
However, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Judge
Natividad who claimed to have notarized the deed of donation
failed to account for other copies of the deed, which the law
strictly enjoins him to record, and furnish to other designated
government offices. The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations
and duties of a notary public. The law requires him to keep a
notarial register where he shall record all his official acts as notary
public. The law species the information that the notary public must
enter in the notarial register. Failure to perform this duty results in
the revocation of his commission as notary public.

DECS should have produced at the trial the notarial

register where Judge Natividad as the notary public should have
recorded the deed of donation. Alternatively, DECS should have
explained the unavailability of the notarial register. Judge Natividad
could have also explained why he did not retain a copy of the deed
of donation as required by law. As the Court of Appeals correctly
observed, there was no evidence showing that DECS looked for a
copy from the Clerk of Court concerned or from the National
Archives. All told, these circumstances preclude a finding that DECS
or the Municipality made a diligent search to obtain a copy of the
deed of donation. In civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
"Preponderance of evidence" means that the evidence as a whole
adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. In other words,
preponderance of evidence means the greater weight of the
evidence or evidence that outweighs the evidence of the adverse
party.

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 PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Sec. 9.Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a)An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b)The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c)The validity of the written agreement; or
(d)The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term agreement includes wills. (7a)
Cases
MARQUEZ VS ESPEJO
Ruling:
1. The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners
assail the CAs rejection of their evidence (as to the contractual
intent) as inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule. The question
involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal question that is
within the Courts authority to review. Besides, even if it were a
factual question,we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to
the general rule because the appellate court misappreciated the
facts of the case through its erroneous application of the Best
Evidence Rule.
2. The appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence
Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original
document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction,
photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The
original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected
tampering with the document.
There is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule in this
case because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the
documents for it is admitted by the parties that the Deed of Sale
referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners
VLTs referred to TCT No.T-62836 as its subject. The real issue is
whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the parties.
Theres an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an
apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the true
intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be
had to evidence outside of the instruments.
3. The CA refused to look beyond the literal wording of the
documents and rejected any other evidence that could shed light on
the actual intention of the contracting parties in which it would
appear that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence
Rule instead, which provides that when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement. It excludes parol or extrinsic
evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or
subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument.
But even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the
case at bar. First ,respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed
between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written
contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol
evidence rule is exclusive only as "between the parties and their
successors-in-interest." The parol evidence rule may not be invoked
where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy
of a party to the written document in question, and does not base
his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument.
Second, the instant casefalls under the exceptions to the Parol
Evidence Rule because there were issues on the intrinsic ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; and the failure of
the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130,
Section 9.
It was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to
express the true intent of the parties which necessitates an
examination of the parties respective parol evidence, in order to
determine the true intent of the parties.
It is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap
property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to
convey the Murong property to the petitioners.
Although the CAs decision had already become final and executory
as against RBBI with the dismissal of RBBIs petition in G.R. No.
163320, our ruling herein in favor of petitioners is a supervening
cause which renders the execution of the CA decision against RBBI
unjust and inequitable.
The SC granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari and
declared thatthe Deed of Sale between respondents and RBBI
covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the VLTs
and CLOAs of the petitioners covered the Murong property under
TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed
to make the necessary corrections to the titles of the said properties
in accordance with this decision.
ACI Phil., Inc. vs. Coquia
A contract of adhesion is one wherein a party, usually a
corporation, prepares the stipulations in the contract, and the
other party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto.
There is every indication in this case that respondent, a
presumably astute businesswoman who has dealings with big
corporations, gave her assent to Purchase Order No. 106211 with
full knowledge. She was, in fact, the one who sought a contract
with petitioner upon learning of the latters need for a supply of
flint cullets. The Court cannot, therefore, apply the rule on
contracts of adhesion in construing the provisions of the purchase
orders in this case. Even the conditions of purchase, enumerated
at the reverse side of the purchase orders, do not reveal any hint
of one-sidedness in favor of petitioner. Petitioner raised the failure
of the purchase order to express the true intent of the parties, i.e.,
that petitioner entered into a contract with respondent
conditioned upon the latters prompt delivery of flint cullets, as an
issue in its Answer with Counterclaims. Unfortunately, the trial
court sustained respondents objection based on the parol
evidence rule.
It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of
substance, that the written document is the best evidence of its
own contents. It is also a matter of both principle and policy that
when the written contract is established as the repository of the operation of a valid contract.
parties stipulations, any other evidence is excluded and the same
cannot be used as a substitute for such contract, nor even to alter The Vehicle Sales Invoice is the best evidence of the transaction. The
or contradict them. This rule, however, is not without exception. terms of the subject sales invoice are clear. They show that
Section. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a party may Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex 200 LC Excavator paid for by
present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the checks issued by one Romeo Valera.
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the
written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties. Since an exception to the parol evidence rule was squarely
raised as an issue in the answer, the trial court should not have
been so inflexible as to completely disregard petitioners evidence.
Sifting through the testimony of respondent, the Court finds that
although she was not given definite days during which she should
deliver the flint cullets, she was indeed apprised of petitioners
urgent need for large quantities thereof. Furthermore, petitioner
presented the unrebutted testimony of Ermilinda Batalon, its
materials control manager, to prove that it agreed to the P4.20 per
kilo purchase price only because respondent assured it of prompt
deliveries sufficient for petitioners production requirements. These
testimonies give a more complete picture of the transaction
between the parties and allow for a more reasoned resolution of
the issues, without over-reliance on the tenuous application of the
rule on contracts of adhesion.

SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. AUTOCORP GROUP AND

PAUL Y. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 164326, October 17, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Seaoil Petroleum Corporation purchased one unit of
ROBEX 200 LC Excavator, Model 1994 from respondent Autocorp
Group. The sales agreement was embodied in the Vehicle Sales
Invoice No. A-0209 and Vehicle Sales Confirmation No. 258. Seaoil
issued 12 checks as payment therefor; however 10 checks were
not honored by the bank since Seaoil requested that payment be
stopped. Autocorp filed a complaint for recovery of personal
property with damages and replevin in the Regional Trial Court.

Seaoil claims that Seaoil and Autocorp were only utilized as

conduits to settle the obligation of one foreign entity named
Uniline Asia, in favor of another foreign entity, Focus Point
International, Incorporated. The real transaction is that Uniline,
through Rodriguez, owed money to Focus. In lieu of payment,
Uniline instead agreed to convey the excavator to Focus. This was
to be paid by checks issued by Seaoil but which in turn were to be
funded by checks issued by Uniline.

Petitioner Seaoil in sum alleges that the written agreement failed

to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, thus parol
evidence is admissible.

ISSUE:

Whether or not parol evidence rule is applicable in this case.

HELD:

No. Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of

a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or
mistake. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement
is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the
 INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS
Sec. 10.Interpretation of a writin gaccording to its legal meaning.
The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the
legal meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the
parties intended otherwise. (8)
Sec. 11.Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions.
In the construction of an instrument, where there are several
provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be
adopted as will give effect to all. (9)
Sec. 12.Interpretation according to intention; general and
particular provisions. In the construction of an instrument, the
intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a
particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the
former. So a particular intent will control a general one that is
inconsistent with it. (10)
Sec. 13.Interpretation according to circumstances. For the
proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under
which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof
and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be
placed in the position of those who language he is to interpret.
(11)
Sec. 14.Peculiar signification of terms. The terms of a writing are
presumed to have been used in their primary and general
acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show that they have a
local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so
used and understood in the particular instance, in which case the
agreement must be construed accordingly. (12)
Sec. 15.Written words control printed. When an instrument
consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and
the two are inconsistent, the former controls the latter. (13)
Sec. 16.Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain
writings. When the characters in which an instrument is written
are difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not understood by
the court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the
characters, or who understand the language, is admissible to
declare the characters or the meaning of the language. (14)
Sec. 17.Of Two constructions, which preferred. When the terms
of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the
different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in
which he supposed the other understood it, and when different
constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to
be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor
the provision was made. (15)
Sec. 18.Construction in favor of natural right. When an
instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in
favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to be
adopted. (16)
Sec. 19.Interpretation according to usage. An instrument may be
construed according to usage, in order to determine its true
character. (17)
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
1. QUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES
Sec. 20.Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the
next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make their known perception to others, may be
witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not
be ground for disqualification. (18a)
Sec. 21.Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a)Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production
for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently
making known their perception to others;
(b)Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a)
Sec. 22.Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case
for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct
descendants or ascendants. (20a)
Sec. 23.Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse
party. Parties or assignor of parties to a case, or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or
against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against
the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind. (20a)
Sec. 24.Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.
The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
(a)The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be
examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during
the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latters direct descendants or ascendants;
(b)An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his
advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, nor can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk
be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in
such capacity;
(c)A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient
in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to
enable him to act in capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient;
(d)A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person
making the confession, be examined as to any confession made to
or any advice given by him in his professional character in the
course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or
priest belongs;
(e)A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or
afterwards, as to communications made to him in official
confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would
suffer by the disclosure. (21a)
Cases
Qualification of Witness (Rule 130 Sec. 20-24)
People vs Obogne
Facts:
Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of rape of a 12-year old
mentally retarded person, to the damage and prejudice of the said
"AAA".
He was convicted of the crime by the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes
but said trial court did not consider AAAs mental retardation as a
qualifying circumstance considering that the Information failed to
allege that appellant knew of AAAs mental disability.
Aggrieved, he appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC
decision with modifications. Hence, this appeal.
Appellant argued that the testimony of AAA deserves no credence
because she was incapable of intelligently making known her
perception to others by reason of her mental disability.
Whether or not AAA (mentally challenged) is qualified to be a
witness?
Held:
We are not persuaded.
Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in
the next succeeding section all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses: (a)
Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others; (b) Children whose mental
maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
In this case, "AAA" is totally qualified to take the witness stand
notwithstanding her mental condition. As correctly observed by
the trial court: When "AAA" was presented on November 14, 2006,
she was able to recall what [appellant] did to her. This Court finds
"AAA" a very credible witness, even in her mental condition.
Contrary to defense counsel's objection that "AAA" was not
capable of intelligently making known her perception to others,
"AAA" managed to recount the ordeal she had gone through in the
hands of the accused, though in a soft voice and halting manner . .
. . "AAA's" simple account of her ordeal clearly reflects sincerity
and truthfulness. While it is true that, on cross-examination, "AAA"
faltered in the sequence of events . . . this is understandable
because even one with normal mental condition would not be able
to recall, with a hundred percent accuracy, events that transpired
in the past. But "AAA" was certain that 'it was a long time . . . after
the incident' when it was reported to the police. Likewise, she was
very certain that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina . . . .
In the same vein, the appellate court found "AAA" qualified to take
the witness stand, viz. :Our own evaluation of the records reveals
that "AAA" was shown to be able to perceive, to make known her
perception to others and to remember traumatic incidents. Her
narration of the incident of rape given in the following manner is
worthy of note: Private complainant "AAA" provided a clear,
convincing and competent testimonial evidence to prove the guilt
of the accused-appellant of the crime of rape beyond reasonable
doubt. As found by the trial court, the testimony of "AAA" was
replete with consistent details, negating the probability of
fabrication. We stress that, contrary to accused-appellant's
assertions, mental retardation p e r s e does not affect a witness'
credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness.
PEOPLE VS PRUNA
Case Summary:
The 3-year old victim was defecating behind their neighbors house
when the accused allegedly brought her to a grassy area nearby
and had sexual intercourse with her. It was established by the
medical examinations that the victim was indeed penetrated and
ejaculation occurred inside her by a finding of sperm cells in her
urine and vaginal canal, and the reddening of tissue on her vaginal
opening. The accused was convicted and sentenced to death by
the trial court for qualified rape. The Supreme Court affirmed the
defendants guilt for committing rape beyond reasonable doubt by
overwhelming circumstances (See No. 4, Held) but sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua instead of death because the victims
minority (must be below age 7) was not established for qualified
rape.
RULING
No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be
excluded from testifying. The intelligence, not the age, is the test of
the competency as a witness. A child, regardless of age, can be a
competent witness if he can perceive and, in perceiving, can make
known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating
truthfully the facts for which he is examined.
Here, the victim cannot be disqualified as a witness on the sole
ground of her age. From the testimony, it is shown that the victim
had the capacity of observation, recollection and communication
and that she could discern the consequence of telling a lie.
As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law,
on ground of public policy, presumes that he is competent. The
court cannot reject the witness in the absence of proof of his
incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon the party objecting
to the competency of a witness to establish the ground of Here, the victims mothers testimony on the incident, related to
incompetency. Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence her by her daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay. The
enumerates the persons who are disqualified to be witnesses. declarant the victim herself was sworn as a witness to the
Among those disqualified are "[c]hildren whose mental maturity is fact testified by her mother.
such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and relating them truthfully." No precise
minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from
testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test
of the competency as a witness. It is settled that a child, regardless
of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive and, in
perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is
capable of relating truthfully the facts for which he is examined. In
determining the competency of a child witness, the court must
consider his capacity (a) at the time the fact to be testified to
occurred such that he could receive correct impressions thereof; (b)
to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those
facts truly to the court at the time he is offered as a witness. The
examination should show that the child has some understanding of
the punishment which may result from false swearing. The
requisite appreciation of consequences is disclosed where the child
states that he knows that it is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would
be punished if he does so, or that he uses language which is
equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for false
swearing. A child can be disqualified only if it can be shown that his
mental maturity renders him incapable of perceiving facts
respecting which he is being examined and of relating them
truthfully. The question of competency of a child-witness rests
primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. This is so
because the trial judge sees the proposed witness and observes his
manner of testifying, his apparent possession or lack of
intelligence, as well as his understanding of the obligation of an
oath. Since many of the witness' manners cannot be
photographed into the record, the finding of the trial judge will not
be disturbed or reversed unless from what is preserved it is clear
that such finding was erroneous. In this case, appellant questions
the competency of LIZETTE as a witness solely on the ground of her
age. He failed to discharge the burden of showing her mental
immaturity. From the above-quoted testimony, it can be gleaned
that LIZETTE had the capacity of observation, recollection, and
communication and that she could discern the consequence of
telling a lie. We, therefore, sustain the trial court in admitting her
testimony and according it great weight. We are not persuaded by
appellant's assertion that LIZETTE should not be allowed to testify
two years after the alleged rape "when the interplay of frail
memory combines with the imagination of earlier years." It must
be noted that it is a most natural reaction for victims of criminal
violence to have a lasting impression of the manner in which the
crime was committed and the identity of the person responsible
therefor. In a string of cases, we have said that the testimony of a
rape victim who is of young or tender age is credible and deserves
full credit, especially where no motive is attributed to the victim
that would make her testify falsely against the accused. Indeed, a
girl of such age as LIZETTE would not concoct a story of
defloration; allow the examination of her private parts; and
undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a
public trial unless she was in fact raped.

2. The rule on hearsay only apply when the declarant does not
testify.

Examination of a Child Witness
People vs Gutierez
For a measly five- or ten-peso tip that a 10-year-old child would
need for lunch money, a known acquaintance of their family would
destroy a child's dignity by having illicit carnal knowledge of her. This
case involves an act that is so dastardly that it is punished by Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code as statutory rape which carries a
sentence of r eclusion perpetua .
Facts:
Rodrigo Gutierez was charged with statutory rape before the RTC
of Baguio City. He plead not guilty.
RTC convicted Rodrigo of statutory rape.
Rodrigo appealed 15 15 to the Court of Appeals claiming that
AAA's testimony fell short of the requirement of the law on the
quantum of evidence required. He argued that she did not cry for
help when her family's house was just nearby, which was cause for
reasonable doubt that the trial court failed to appreciate.
CA affirmed RTC decision.
SC affirmed the decision of the CA with modification.
RULING
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under
12 years of age and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her,
regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation;
whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or
whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is
enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was
sexual intercourse.
The defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10 years old at
the time of the incident. Her birth certificate was presented before
the trial court.
As shown by her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in a clear and
categorical manner the ordeal that was done to her. As a child-
victim who has taken significant risks in coming to court, her
testimony deserves full weight and credence.
People v. Veloso stated that: In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled
that the testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be given full weight
and credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender
years, who barely understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute
to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not true.
Her candid narration of how she was raped bears the earmarks of
credibility, especially if no ill will as in this case motivates her
to testify falsely against the accused. It is well-settled that when a
woman, more so when she is a minor, says she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is required to prove the ravishment. The accused
may thus be convicted solely on her testimony provided it is
credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things.
AAA's ordeal was supported by the testimonies of her teachers
whose concern for her led to the discovery of the crime. The medical
certificate presented in court, together with the testimonies of the
physicians, is consistent with the finding that she was sexually
abused. Rodrigo asserted that AAA's failure to cry out for help shows
reasonable doubt. He noted that her house was just near his house
where the incident happened. This argument is so feeble that it could
only have been put up out of desperation.
With his moral ascendancy, it would not be unreasonable to assume
that even the child victim's desire for help would be muffled by her
fear of her "Uncle Rod." To a young 10year-old, the ordinary world
can be daunting. To be so young and silently aware that one is the
victim of such callous depravation by Rodrigo, who she could have
expected to take care of her, can create the kind of lasting fear that
diminishes the development of her own person and her own
convictions.
There are not enough words to condemn the depravity that one adult
can do to a child victim. The many years that Rodrigo Gutierez will, by
law, serve in prison will, of course, not make up for the wrong and the
injury that he has so selfishly and callously caused and with utter
disregard for what truly makes us human: that we care, nurture, and
protect our children because we hope that they can make their world
better than ours. All this was lost on Rodrigo Gutierez. The five pesos
that he gave on every occasion that he deled his child-victim simply
underscores the ignominy of his act.
People vs Ugos
Facts:
Roger Ugos was charged with the rape of his 7year-old stepdaughter
AAA. Dr. Danilo Ledesma testified having examined AAA and
reiterated his findings, that she suffered injuries on her face and
complete hymenal laceration at the 5 and 9 oclock positions. The
accused-appellant was the lone witness for the defense and he
stated that he did not hit and rape the victim, that she fell because
the road was dark and slippery.
RTC convicted accused of the crime of rape.
CA affirmed with modifications.
Notice of appeal of CA decision.
Accused-appellant claims that the testimonies of AAA and her
mother reveal only the commission of acts of lasciviousness. There
was no sexual intercourse, according to him, as he only inserted his
finger into her sex organ, adding that this was what AAA originally
told her mother. He surmises that AAA, being underage, might have
been confused with what the word "rape" meant. Accused-
appellant further states that AAA only testified that he inserted his
penis into her vagina when probed by the prosecutor through
leading questions.
SC affirmed the CA ruling.
AAA, as found by both the trial and appellate courts, was unequivocal
in her testimony that she was raped by accused-appellant. While her
mother may have contradicted AAA's testimony by stating that AAA
reportedly told her she was merely "fingered" by accused-appellant,
it is AAA's clear and credible testimony that should determine
accused-appellant's guilt. She detailed both in direct and cross-
examinations how accused-appellant violated her; she minced no evidence adduced. It is basic that the trial court's evaluation of the
words about what accused appellant did to her on August 7, 1997. testimonies of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect as
Accused-appellant does not dispute AAA's testimony, arguing that it has the best opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of
she might have been coached in her answers. He likewise states that witnesses on the stand and to establish whether they are telling the
what AAA and her mother reported to the police was an attempt truth.
attempt to rape AAA. It was only when the prosecutor asked her
leading questions that she testied that accused-appellant inserted
his penis into her vagina. The Court is not persuaded by his
contentions for the following reasons: First, the testimony of Police PEOPLE VS SANTOS
Officer Jickain, who related that AAA's mother approached him on
The trend in procedural law is to give a wide latitude to the courts in
August 7, 1997 while he was on duty as Police Station Child and
exercising control over the questioning of a child witness. Under
Youth Officer, has documentary support. He stated that AAA's
Sections 19 to 21 of the Rules on Examination of a Child Witness,
mother reported that accused-appellant raped her daughter.
child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions
Second, accused-appellant's contention is at odds with what are
may be allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if
contained in the records, which show that during cross-examination
the same will further the interest of justice. It must be borne in
the trial court asked AAA what accused-appellant did to her.
mind that the offended party in this case is a 6 - y e a r old minor
The line of leading questions objected to by accused-appellant was who was barely five when she was sexually assaulted. As a child of
warranted given the circumstances. A child of tender years may be such tender years not yet exposed to the ways of the world, she
asked leading questions under Section 10 (c), Rule 132 of the Rules of could not have fully understood the enormity of the bestial act
Court. Sec. 20 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness also committed on her person. Indeed
provides, "The court may allow leading questions in all stages of
Studies show that children, particularly very young children, make
examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice".
the "perfect victims." They naturally follow the authority of adults
The afore-cited rule was formulated to allow children to give reliable
as the socialization process teaches children that adults are to be
and complete evidence, minimize trauma to children, encourage
respected. The child's age and developmental level will govern how
them to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment
much she comprehends about the abuse and therefore how much it
of truth. We find that the alleged coaching used in the course of
affects her. If the child is too young to understand what has
examining AAA merely aided her in testifying with more detail and
happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no
did not suggest to her the answers integral to the actual commission
comprehension of the consequences. Certainly, children have more
of rape. What is more, AAA's charge of rape finds support in the
problems in providing accounts of events because they do not
medical report on her physical injuries. The medico-legal witness,
understand everything they experience. They do not have enough
Dr. Ledesma, testified that he examined AAA four days after the
life experiences from which to draw upon in making sense of what
rape incident and found fresh bruises on her face and lacerations in
they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a limited
her vagina. Accused-appellant's denial of the crime cannot prevail
vocabulary. With her limited comprehension, the child could not
over the positive testimony of the victim. As held in People v. Suarez,
have a perfect way of relating that she had been sexually abuse.
a rape victim's straightforward and candid account, corroborated by
The record discloses that the questions propounded by the judge
the medical findings of the examining physician, is sufficient to
were intended to elicit the truth from the child witness. This
convict the accused. This conclusion becomes all the more norm
perceived undue inquisitiveness of the judge did not unduly harm
where, as in this case, the child-victim takes the witness stand.
the substantial rights of the appellant. In fact, it is only to be
Previous decisions involving rape cases have shown us the high
expected from the judge who, with full consciousness of his
improbability that a girl of tender years would impute to any man a
responsibilities could not, and should not, easily be satisfied with
crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true. Also, as
incompleteness and obscurities in the testimonies of the witness.
correctly pointed out by the CA, corroboration of a child's testimony
is not even required under Sec. 22 of the Rule on Examination o f a
Child Witness, thus: Corroboration shall not be required of a
testimony of a child. [The child's] testimony, if credible by itself, shall OBEDENCIO VS MURILLO
be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment
subject to the standard of proof required in criminal and non-criminal Affidavit of Desistance was filed by the victim however such
cases. affidavit was made without the consent of the child.

Accused-appellant's suggestion that the charge against him could
have been fabricated, an offshoot of the argument he had with
AAA's mother, has nothing to support itself. There is likewise
nothing in the records indicating that the prosecution witnesses
testified against accused-appellant out of malice. A rape victim's
testimony as to who abused her is credible where she has absolutely
no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused. Categorical
and positive identifications of an accused, without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter,
prevails over denial and alibi, which are negative and self-serving.
We thus affirm the trial court's appreciation of the testimonial
Licel was only 14 years old, definitely a minor, on May 22, 2001,
when she was presented before respondent's sala to affirm the
execution of her affidavit of desistance. This being the case, said
affidavit should have been executed with the concurrence of her
parents. Licel could not validly give consent to an affidavit of
desistance, for a minor is incompetent to execute such an
instrument. Yet, notwithstanding the absence of her parents'
conformity to the affidavit of desistance and lack of notice to them
or their lawyer of the scheduled hearing, respondent judge
dismissed the criminal case. Truly, he should have exercised more
prudence and caution instead of perfunctorily dismissing the case,
considering the nature and gravity of the offense charged. At the
very least, herein respondent should have appointed a guardian ad
litem for Licel, to protect her welfare and interest, instead of hastily
dismissing the rape case. The Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, governs the
examination of child witnesses who are victims of, accused of, or
witnesses to a crime. In the absence or incapacity of the parents to
be the guardian, Section 5 (a) of said rule provides that the court
may appoint a guardian a d lit e m to promote the best interests of
the child. This rule was already in effect when respondent judge
dismissed the rape case on May 22, 2001.
PEOPLE VS BISDA
SYNOPSIS
This case is an automatic review of the decision convicting
appellants for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentencing
them to the penalty of death. The Court affirmed the convictions
and the single indivisible penalty of death was imposed on
appellants regardless of the aggravating circumstance of use of a
motor vehicle and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender of appellant Basilan. cSIADH Records revealed that
appellants fetched 5-year old Angela from her school, telling her
that her parents were waiting at the Jollibee but at the same time,
held Angela's hand tightly and poked a knife at her. Thereafter,
boarding a taxi, Angela was taken to a dirty house and henceforth
taken care of but kept locked in the house. Meantime, the parents
of Angela were worriedly negotiating with the kidnapper who was
asking money for ransom. Luckily, the PAOCTF operatives were
able to follow the suspicious appellant Bisda and accosted her.
Appellant Basilan later surrendered.
RULING
It cannot be argued that simply because a child witness is not
examined on the nature of the oath and the need for her to tell the
whole truth, the competency of the witness and the truth of her
testimony are impaired. If a party against whom a witness is
presented believes that the witness is incompetent or is not aware
of his obligation and responsibility to tell the truth and the
consequence of him testifying falsely, such party may pray for
leave to conduct a voire dire examination on such witness to test
his competency. The court may motu proprio conduct the voir dir e
examination. In US v. Buncad , this Court held that when a child of
tender age is presented as a witness, it is the duty of the judge to
examine the child to determine his competency. In Republic v.
CA,this Court held that: [W]hen a witness is produced, it is a right
and privilege accorded to the adverse party to object to his
examination on the ground of incompetency to testify. If a party
knows before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be
made before he has given any testimony; if the incompetency
appears on the trial, it must be interposed as soon as it becomes
apparent. The competency of a person to take the prescribed oath
is a question for the trial court to decide. If a party admits proof to
be taken in a case without an oath, after the testimony has been
acted upon by the court, and made the basis of a judgment, such
party can no longer object to the admissibility of the said
testimony. He is estopped from raising the issue in the appellate
court. This was the ruling of this Court in Republic v. CA, thus:
Simply put, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be
made at the time such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as
the objection to its admissibility becomes apparent, otherwise the
objection will be considered waived and such evidence will form
part of the records of the case as competent and admissible
evidence. The failure of petitioner to interpose a timely objection
to the presentation of Divinaflor's testimony results in the waiver
of any objection to the admissibility thereof and he is therefore
barred from raising said issue on appeal.
PEOPLE VS MENDOZA
SYNOPSIS
Atanacio Mendoza was charged with two counts of rape by Marilyn
Bernardo that took place on February 1996 and March 1997 and
with one count of rape by Jennifer Fernandez that took place on
March 25, 1998. During trial, Mendoza interposed denial as a
defense. Thereafter, in a joint judgment, the trial court gave
credence to the clear and positive testimonies of private
complainants, thus, it convicted Mendoza of three counts of rape
and the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed upon him in
each count. In this appeal, Mendoza contended, among others,
that the prosecution failed to present evidence sufficient to
convict him of the offenses charged. The Court was partly
convinced. In order for rape to be consummated, there must be
proof of the entry or sliding of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum of the female organ. As to the charge that the first rape
incident that happened in February 1996, there was nothing in the
testimony of Marilyn that would prove that appellant's penis
reached the labia of her pudendum. Hence, the Court cannot
conclude with moral certainty that appellant should be held liable
for consummated rape. In contrast, her testimony regarding the
March 1997 incident indicated with certainty that the penis of
appellant penetrated her vagina. As to Jennifer's accusation of
rape, the evidence on record convincingly proved the
consummation of rape. Accordingly, appellant was found guilty of
one count of attempted rape and two counts of simple rape.
RULING
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES, ASSESSMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS
CONCLUSIVE.
When it comes to the issue of credibility of witnesses, we generally
defer to the assessment of the trial court, because it had the
singular opportunity to observe their demeanor. Thus, its findings
are conclusive, unless it is shown that certain facts of substance
and value have been plainly overlooked. In the present case, a
review of the records and the transcripts shows that the RTC had
ample opportunity to examine the testimony of the complaining
witnesses. Appellant has not given us sufficient reason to overturn
the lower court's factual findings. Moreover, in the prosecution of
rape cases, it is well-settled that long silence and delay in reporting
the crime cannot detract from the victim's credibility, especially
where the delay is satisfactorily explained. In Jennifer's case,
reporting the crime four months after it occurred is hardly
unreasonable. Meanwhile, in the case of Marilyn, the fact that she
waited two years before she reported the dastardly deeds was
justified by her fear.
Time and time again, we have said that a rape victim, especially one
of tender age, would not normally concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter permit
herself to be subjected to a public trial, if she is not motivated solely
by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. Thus,
when a woman more so if she is a minor says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape was committed. And as long as the testimony meets the test
of credibility, the accused may be convicted on that sole basis.
It must be noted that a young girl, unlike a mature woman, cannot
be expected to have the courage and the intelligence to report
immediately a sexual assault committed against her, especially
when a death threat hangs over her head. It is not proper to judge
the action of children who have undergone traumatic experiences
by the norms of behavior expected of mature individuals under
similar circumstances. This is especially true in the case at bar, in
which the malefactor was a trusted friend and neighbor.
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MENTAL
INCAPACITY/IMMATURITY
PEOPLE VS GOLIMLIM
The trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses
testimonies is accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion on its part, it having had the advantage
of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence including
the demeanor of the witnesses. A mental retardate or a
feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a
witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility.
It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter
what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of
a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and
reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. In the present case,
no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from
the findings of the trial court with respect to the assessment of
Evelyns testimony. From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of
this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn's credibility. To be
sure, her testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course
her feeblemindedness. By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-
Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of
the Bicol Medical Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn
was suffering from moderate mental retardation with an IQ of
46, she is capable of perceiving and relating events which
happened to her.
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF DEATH OR INSANITY
OF ADVERSE PARTY
SANSON VS CA
As for the administratrixs invocation of the Dead Mans Statute, the
same does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties
to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope
by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein.
Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are
not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction
between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part
therein. Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor
a person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified
as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those
involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family
members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be
excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their
relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to
prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later,
independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the
Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary
evidence the checks.
The Dead Mans Statute proscribes the admission of testimonial
evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased.
The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony. Since the
separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-
documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases
of said checks. This brings this Court to the matter of the
authenticity of the signature of the deceased appearing on the
checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By Celedonias account, she
knows the signature of the deceased. While the foregoing
testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the
quantum of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence which provides that the handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person x x x not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the
same; from a comparison with the naked eye of the deceaseds
signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas with that of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all
of which checks were drawn from the same account, they appear to
have been affixed by one and the same hand.
In fine, as Sanson, et al. have, by their evidence, substantiated their
claims against the estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence
had shifted to the administratrix who, however, expressly opted not
to discharge the same when she manifested that she was dispensing
with the presentation of evidence against the claims.
ICARD VS MARASIGAN
Section 383, par. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is now
Rule 123, section 26, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, is designed
to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips
of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party
the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims
against the deceased. Where, as in the instant case the purpose of
the oral testimony is to prove a lesser claim than what might be
warranted by clear written evidence, to avoid prejudice to the
estate of the deceased, the law has certainly no reason for its
application Ratione cessante, cessat ipsa lex.|||
GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGE
NERI VS SENATE COMMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and
employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws
and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where
the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by
the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and
foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy
greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received
by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity
with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that the information sought likely contains important
evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials
necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process
and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic
of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy
or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of
petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional
provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. We might have agreed with such contention if
petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where
he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions
from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his
claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE
PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION
MERCADO VS VITRIOLO
the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the
factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective
attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship
that the client made the communication. aCTHDA
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected
by the rule on privileged communication even if the prospective
client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines
the employment. The reason for this is to make the prospective
client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without
fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against
him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information
from the prospective client.
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to
a lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the
(prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the
evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations.
We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged
communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her
claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She
contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for
falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint
disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then
handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts
which will determine the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot
be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which
the complainant must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP.
Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific
confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without
her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there
was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such
confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of
the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client.
It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The
burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party
asserting the privilege.
||| ADVERSE SPOUSAL TESTIMONY PRIVILEGE
TRAMMEL VS US
The privilege claimed by petitioner has ancient roots. It sprang from
two canons of medieval jurisprudence: the rule that an accused was
not permitted to testify in his own behalf because of his interest in
the proceeding; second, the concept that husband wife were one,
and that since the woman had no recognized separate legal
existence, the husband was that one. The rule evolved into one of
privilege, rather than one of absolute disqualification. The modern
justification for the privilege is its perceived role in fostering the
harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship. The long history
of the rule suggests it should not be casually cast aside. This Court
must decide whether the privilege against adverse spousal
testimony promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the
need for probative evidence in the administration of criminal justice.
The complete privilege provided by prior precedent is unnecessary
to protect information privately disclosed between husband and
wife in the confidence of the marital relationship. Those are
privileged under the independent rule protecting confidential
marital communications. The privilege addressed is intended to
exclude evidence of criminal acts and of communications made in
the presence of third persons.The privileges between priest and
penitent, attorney and client, and physician and patient limit
protection to private communications. The ancient foundations for so
sweeping a privilege have long since disappeared. The contemporary
justification for allowing such a privilege is also unpersuasive. If one
spouse is willing to testify, their relationship is almost certainly in
disrepair, with little in the way of marital harmony to preserve. It
seems far more likely to frustrate justice than to foster family peace.
FILIAL PRIVILEGE
PEOPLE VS INVENCION
As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not
affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise
known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule
on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or
disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a
privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other
privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not
compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial
privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven
declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his
own accord and only "to tell the truth."|||
ADMISSIONS, CONFESSIONS AND EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
PEOPLE VS SAN VICENTE
An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of C
ourt as the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fa
ct. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130, Section 33 is
the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged or any offense necessarily included therein.
More particularly, a confession is a declaration made at any time
by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement
stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in
the commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other hand,
is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the
accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of the
guilt of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense with
which he is charged. In short, in a confession, an accused
acknowledges his guilt; while there is no such acknowledgment of
guilt in an admission. There is no question that the letter dated
June 14, 1995 is an admission, not a confession, because of the
unmistakable qualification in its last paragraph that For all
intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary
surrender, without admission of guilt on the part of my client.
PEOPLE VS MUIT
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit
strengthened the case against them. There is nothing on record to
support appellants' claim that they were coerced and tortured into
executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the indicia of
voluntariness in the execution of appellants' extra judicial
statements is that each contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have
supplied, without the knowledge and information given by
appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers
when they executed their statements. Atty. Mallare testified that
Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements voluntarily and
affixed their signatures after he talked with them alone and
informed them of their constitutional rights. Muit, on the other
hand, was assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed
his two extra judicial confessions; his second statement was even
witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio, and his brother, Dominador.
Muit cannot just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the
contents of his extra judicial confession.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit
also strengthened the prosecution's case against Romeo. The rule
that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person
making it recognizes various exceptions. One such exception is
where several extra judicial statements had been made by several
persons charged with an offense and there could have been no
collusion with reference to said several confessions, the fact that
the statements are in all material respects identical is confirmatory
of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against
other persons implicated therein. They are also admissible as
circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to
show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the
commission of the crime and may likewise serve as corroborative
evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other
persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged
and proved. These are known as "interlocking confessions".
PEOPLE VS SATORRE
the basic test for the validity of a confession is was it voluntarily
and freely made. The term "voluntary" means that the accused
speaks of his free will and accord, without inducement of any kind,
and with a full and complete knowledge of the nature and
consequences of the confession, and when the speaking is so free
from influences affecting the will of the accused, at the time the
confession was made, that it renders it admissible in evidence
against him. Plainly, the admissibility of a confession in evidence
hinges on its voluntariness.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language
such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being
replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused
reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered
voluntary. The problem with appraising voluntariness occurs when
the confession is an oral extrajudicial confession because the proof
of voluntariness cannot be inferred from the testimony of a witness
who allegedly heard the confessant since there is no written proof
that such confession was voluntarily made. Neither can the
confessant be appraised by the court since, precisely, it was made
outside the judicial proceeding. The problem posed therefore by an
oral extrajudicial confession is not only the admissibility of the
testimony asserting or certifying that such confession was indeed
made, but more significantly whether it was made voluntarily.
On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the
age, character, and circumstances prevailing at the time it was made
must be considered. Much depends upon the situation and
surroundings of the accused. This is the position taken by the
courts, whatever the theory of exclusion of incriminating
statements may be. The intelligence of the accused or want of it
must also be taken into account. It must be shown that the
defendant realized the import of his act.
|||To be sure, a confession is not required to be in any particular
form. It may be oral or written, formal or informal in character. It
may be recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures, or
tape. However, while not required to be in writing to be admissible
in evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded by video tape
or other means, to reduce the confession to writing. This adds
weight to the confession and helps convince the court that it was
freely and voluntarily made. If possible the confession, after being
reduced to writing, should be read to the defendant, have it read
by defendant, have him sign it, and have it attested by witnesses.
On the whole, it appears that the trial court simply based
appellant's conviction on the testimonial evidence of prosecution
witnesses that appellant orally owned up to the killing. We cannot
affirm appellant's conviction on mere testimonial evidence,
considering that the voluntariness of said confession cannot be
conclusively established because of appellant's personal
circumstances and the failure of the police to reduce the alleged
oral confession into writing. The doubts surrounding the alleged
oral confession, the conduct of the investigation as well as the
inapplicable jurisprudential precedents cited by the trial court do
not lead to the same moral certainty of appellant's guilt.
To conclude, it must be stressed that in our criminal justice system,
the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable
doubt as to their guilt. Where there is no moral certainty as to their
guilt, they must be acquitted even though their innocence may be
questionable. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In fact, unless the prosecution discharges the
burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA
TAMARGO VS AWINGAN
Columnas extrajudicial confession in his affidavit was not admissible
as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios
acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios
acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another.Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay
against them. The reason for this rule is that: on a principle of good
faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and
declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the
acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by
a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.This rule prescribes that
the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators
provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside
from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission
of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators,
it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence
other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the
common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used
against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their
constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against
them and to cross-examine them.
BANK OF COMMERCE VS MANALO
SIMILAR ACT AS EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBLE ONLY TO
PROVE HABIT, USAGE OR PATTERN OF CONDUCT OR THE INTENT
OF THE PARTIES. Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is
not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at
another time, although such evidence may be received to prove
habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. Similar
acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do
the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received
to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. Habit, custom, usage
or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts
must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of
usage, of habit or pattern of conduct, the offering party must
establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform
response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given
manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The
offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct
that might constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered in
evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous
enough to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere
similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently
similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and
confusion. In determining whether the examples are numerous
enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria are adequacy of
sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means a
course of behavior of a person regularly represented in like
circumstances. It is only when examples offered to establish
pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an
inference of systematic conduct that examples are admissible. The
key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response
or ratio of reaction to situations.
PEOPLE VS RAQUEL
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is
not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that,
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own
acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are
his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be
bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party
ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their
acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential
exceptions, those exceptions do not however apply to the present
case.
Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado
Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever linking appellants to
the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato
that appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of
Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente, was
negated by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he treated no
person by the name of Danny Clemente.
Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as
prosecution evidence, was made in violation of the constitutional
rights of accused Amado Ponce.
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation
without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be
considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to
counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the
assistance of counsel. These rights, both constitutional and
statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
OFFER OF COMPROMISE
PEOPLE VS ERGUIZA
The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the
case cannot be used against appellant as evidence of his guilt.
Appellant testified that he did not ask his parents to settle the case.
Moreover, appellant was not present when the offer to settle was
allegedly made.
An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person
cannot amount to an admission of the party himself. Although the
Court has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the
accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt, we
believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to amount to
an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been present
or at least authorized the proposed compromise. Moreover, it has
been held that where the accused was not present at the time the
offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of
compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.
Faced with two conflicting versions, the Court is guided
by the equipoise rule. Thus, where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test
of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The
equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is
evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts
the scales in favor of the accused.
|||
 CORPUS DELICTI
RIMORIN VS PEOPLE
Petitioner argues that he cannot be convicted of smuggling under
the Tariff and Customs Code, because respondent failed to present
the seized contraband cigarettes in court. Equating the actual
physical evidence -- the 305 cases of blue seal cigarettes -- with the
corpus delicti, he urges this Court to rule that the failure to present
it was fatal to respondents cause.
The Court, on several occasions, has explained that corpus delicti
refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the
body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer
to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to
the body of the person murdered. Hence, to prove the corpus
delicti, it is sufficient for the prosecution to be able show that (1) a
certain fact has been proven -- say, a person has died or a building
has been burned; and (2) a particular person is criminally
responsible for the act.
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime,
this Court has ruled that even a single witness uncorroborated
testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a
conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been
competently established by respondents evidence, which
consisted of the testimonies of credible witnesses and the Custody
Receipt[8] issued by the Bureau of Customs for the confiscated
goods.
Col. Panfilo Lacsons testimony on the apprehension of petitioner
and on the seizure of the blue seal cigarettes was clear and
straightforward.
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION
PEOPLE VS CACHUELA
Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons
involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex in a police
line-up held at the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We
note that Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the
National Center for Mental Health, and subsequently died there
during the trial. For this reason, we examine with greater scrutiny
Lino's testimony regarding Zaldy's alleged out-of-court
identification.
People v. Algarme 17 explains the procedure for out-of-court
identification and the test to determine its admissibility, as follows:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various
ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought
face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the
suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose . . . In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.:
(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5)
the length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police
line-up, identified the appellants as the persons involved in the
robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the
line-up took place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were
the persons in the line-up with the appellants (if there were indeed
other persons included in the line-up); and whether the line-up was
confined to persons of the same height and built as the appellants.
Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied Zaldy before and
during the line-up, and whether there had been the possibility of
prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy
regarding the appearance of the appellants.
To our mind, Lino's failure to state relevant details surrounding the
police line-up is a glaring omission that renders unreliable Zaldy's
out-of-court identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate
the factors used in determining the admissibility and reliability of
out-of-court identifications, such as the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The absence of an
independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies
our strict treatment and assessment of Lino's testimony.
PEOPLE VS VILLACORTA
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and
not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of
commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a
criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to
the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct
evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a
witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a
crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused
as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the
person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately
before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other
pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to the
only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is
the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual
eyewitness are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify
a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can
ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic
and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an
accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely
absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to
circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of
the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would
go free and the community would be denied proper protection.
She was the person who had the motive to commit the crime, and
the series of events following her threat to cause chaos and arson
in her neighborhood the fire that started in her room, and her
actuations and remarks during, as well as immediately before and
after the fire sufficiently points to the accused-appellant as the
author of the said crime.
DOCUMENTED ALIBI
LEJANO VS PEOPLE
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and
satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at another place at the
time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it
might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and
regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for
impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the
presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack.
They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence.
Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence
to impeach the entries in Webb's passport and the certifications of
the Philippine and U.S.' immigration services regarding his travel to
the U.S. and back. The prosecution's rebuttal evidence is the fear
of the unknown that it planted in the lower court's minds.
Webb's documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony,
not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano,
Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the
Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the
crime took place, Alfaro's testimony will not hold together. Webb's
participation is the anchor of Alfaro's story. Without it, the evidence
against the others must necessarily fall.
HEARSAY EVIDENCE
MIRO VS MENDOZA VDA DE EREDEROS
Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the
facts that he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., those which
are derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify on
what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof
of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. Hearsay
evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of
what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral
testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements,
such as affidavits.
That the complainants alleged in the preface of their affidavits that
they "noticed and witnessed" the anomalous act complained of
does not take their statements out of the coverage of the hearsay
evidence rule. Their testimonies are still "evidence not of what the
witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others."
Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence.
The affidavits also show that the complainants did not allege any
specific act of the respondents. All that the affidavits allege is a
description of the allegedly anomalous scheme and the
arrangement whereby payments were to be made to Alingasa.
There is no averment relating to any "personal demand" for the
amount of P2,500.00.
Based on these considerations, we cannot conclude that the
complainants have personal knowledge of Erederos' and
Mendoza's participation in the anomalous act. At most, their
personal knowledge only extends to the acts of Alingasa who is the
recipient of all payments for the processing of confirmation
certificates. This situation, however, is affected by the
complainants' failure to specify Alingasa's act of personally
demanding P2,500.00 a crucial element in determining her guilt
or innocence of the grave misconduct charged.
With respect to Pedroza's allegation in her affidavit that Alingasa
and Erederos categorically told them that it was Mendoza who
instructed them to collect the P2,500.00 for the confirmation
certificates, we once again draw a distinction between utterances
or testimonies that are merely hearsay in character or "non-
hearsay," and those that are considered as legal hearsay.
Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay,
To the former belongs the fact that utterances or statements were
made; this class of extrajudicial utterances or statements is offered
not as an assertion to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but
only as to the fact of the utterance made. The latter class, on the
other hand, consists of the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement; this kind pertains to extrajudicial utterances and
statements that are offered as evidence of the truth of the fact
asserted.
The difference between these two classes of utterances lies in the
applicability of the rule on exclusion of hearsay evidence. The first
class, i.e., the fact that the statement was made, is not covered by
the hearsay rule, while the second class, i.e., the truth of the facts
asserted in the statement, is covered by the hearsay rule. Pedroza's
allegation belongs to the first class; hence, it is inadmissible to
prove the truth of the facts asserted in the statement.
The following discussion, made in Patula v. People of the
Philippines, 32 is particularly instructive:
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human
utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted,
the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and,
therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when
made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-
examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not
as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference
to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply.
For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies
that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief,
this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was
really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those
words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal
hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the
statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply,
and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which
the hearsay rule applies.
Failure to identify the affidavits renders them inadmissible under
the hearsay evidence rule. We additionally note that the affidavits
were never identified by the complainants. All the allegations
contained therein were likewise uncorroborated by evidence,
other than the NBI/Progress report.
For the affiants' failure to identify their sworn statements, and
considering the seriousness of the charges filed, their affidavits must
not be accepted at face value and should be treated as inadmissible
under the hearsay evidence rule.
MARCOS VS HEIRS OF NAVARRO
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely
perceive and make known her perception to others. We have no
doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified
as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications
specified under the Rules. Respondents' motion to disqualify her
should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of
these grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the
qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her
testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that
the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to
wit:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez's testimony would
be hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence,
PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP
document examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already
ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarez's testimony is hearsay even
before her testimony is offered and she is called to the witness
stand. Under the circumstances, the CA should have issued a
corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the RTC ruling.
True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts.
Jurisprudence is also replete with instances wherein this Court
dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove
forgeries. However, we have also recognized that handwriting
experts are often offered as expert witnesses considering the
technical nature of the procedure in examining forged documents.
More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the deed
of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to
the resolution of the case.
In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a
witness. She has the qualifications of witness and possess none of
the disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of
an expert witness to be received as evidence. The value of PO2
Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be determined if PO2 Alvarez is not
even allowed to testify on the handwriting examination she
conducted.
BAYANI VS PEOPLE
Petitioner denies having issued the check subject of this case. He
argues that the evidence pinpointing him as the signatory on the
check is merely hearsay.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the rule on
hearsay evidence, to wit:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from
his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Under the above rule, any evidence whether oral or
documentary is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other
person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is
relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is
considered hearsay. In the present case, complainant Evangelista
testified that she was approached by Alicia Rubia who told her that
she was requested by petitioner to have the check exchanged for
cash, as he needed money badly. Obviously, Evangelista's
testimony is hearsay since she had no personal knowledge of the
fact that petitioner indeed requested Rubia to have the check
exchanged for cash, as she was not personally present when
petitioner supposedly made this request. What she testified to,
therefore, was a matter that was not derived from her own
perception but from Rubia's. However, petitioner is barred from
questioning the admission of Evangelista's testimony even if the
same is hearsay. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires
that the trial court shall not consider any evidence which has not
been formally offered. Section 35 of the same Rule provides that as
regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the
time the witness is asked to testify. And under Section 36 of the
same Rule, objection to a question propounded in the course of the
oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the ground
therefor becomes reasonably apparent. Thus, it has been held that
"in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was
hearsay, the evidence offered may be admitted." Since no objection
to the admissibility of Evangelista's testimony was timely made
from the time her testimony was offered and up to the time her
direct examination was conducted then petitioner has
effectively waived any objection to the admissibility thereof and his
belated attempts to have her testimony excluded for being hearsay
has no ground to stand on. While Evangelista's statement may be
admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily follow that the same
should be given evidentiary weight. Admissibility of evidence should
not be equated with weight of evidence In this regard, it has been
held that although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of
lack of objection by the adverse party's counsel, it is nonetheless
without probative value, unless the proponent can show that the
evidence falls within the exception to the hearsay evidence rule. In
this case, Evangelista's testimony may be considered as an
independently relevant statement, an exception to the hearsay
rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish the fact that the
statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent
of the truth or the falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been
made is relevant.
 DYING DECLARATION
PEOPLE VS TABARNERO
While Ernesto was not able to testify in court, his statement is
considered admissible under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person,
made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be
received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, we held as follows:
It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a
realization by the decedent that his demise or at least, its
imminence -- not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at
hand. This may be proven by the statement of the deceased himself
or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedents
wounds, or other relevant circumstances.
In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab wounds which caused his
death within the next 48 hours. At the time he uttered his
statement accusing Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his body was
already very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his inability to
speak and write towards the end of the questioning.
We have considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the
highest credence, for no person who knows of his impending death
would make a careless or false accusation. When a person is at the
point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. It is
hard to fathom that Ernesto, very weak as he was and with his
body already manifesting an impending demise, would summon
every remaining strength he had just to lie about his true
assailants, whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.
PEOPLE VS PENA
The requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations have
already been established in a long line of cases. An ante-mortem
statement or dying declaration is entitled to probative weight if: (1)
at the time the declaration was made, death was imminent and the
declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to
the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the
declaration relates to facts which the victim was competent to
testify to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the declaration
is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant's death is the
subject of the inquiry.
The first element is lacking in the case at bar. It was not established
with certainty whether Pelagio uttered his statement with
consciousness of his impending death. While he was in pain when
he made his statement, he expressly stated that accused-appellant
only pistol-whipped him and almost shot him. The significance of a
victim's realization or consciousness that he was on the brink of
death cannot be gainsaid. Such ante mortem statement is evidence
of the highest order because at the threshold of death, all thoughts
of fabricating lies are stilled. The utterance of a victim made
immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be considered
the incident speaking through the victim. It is entitled to the
highest credence.
that Pelagio, after giving his statement, later on realized that he
was dying, his statement still cannot be considered a dying
declaration. The crucial factor to consider is the contemporaneity of
the moment when the statement was made and the moment of the
realization of death. The time the statement was being made must
also be the time the victim was aware that he was dying.
While it may not qualify as a dying declaration, Pelagio's statement
may nonetheless be admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae.
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is
deemed as part of the res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.
In People v. Naerta, this Court held that:
The term "res gestae" comprehends a situation which presents a
startling or unusual occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous
and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements
are made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought
or deliberate design in the formulation of their content.
Pelagio's declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae since it
was made shortly after a startling occurrence and under the
influence thereof. Under the circumstances, the victim evidently
had no opportunity to contrive his statement beforehand.
RES GESTAE
MARTURILLAS VS PEOPLE
Ernita positively identified Marturillas as the one running away
immediately after the sound of a gunshot. Certain that she had
seen him, she even described what he was wearing, the firearm he
was carrying, and the direction towards which he was running. She
also clarified that she had heard the statement, help me pre, I was
shot by the captain. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of
the RTC and the CA that Ernitas testimony is credible because the
spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her
house. The identification of a person can be established through
familiarity with ones physical features. Once a person has gained
familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an easy
task even from a considerable distance.
Moreover, the statement of the victim is considered by the Court as
both a dying declaration and res gestae. Statements made by a
person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. Res gestae
refers to statements made by the participants of the victims of, or
the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its
commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any
opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. All the
requisites of res gestae are present in this case:
1.) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
2.) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and
3.) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
Both the statements of the victim and Ernita can be considered res
gestae.
INDEPENDENT RELEVANT STATEMENT
PEOPLE VS GADDI
This Tribunal had previously declared that a confession constitutes
evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his
conscience. Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a
crime can be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay
rule which only prohibits a witness from testifying as to those facts
which he merely learned from other persons but not as to those
facts which he "knows of his own knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception." Hence, while the testimony of a
witness regarding the statement made by another person, if
intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the
statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose
of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact
that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
ENTRIES IN THE REGULAR COURSE OF BUSINESS
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST CO. VS GAN
Petitioner invokes Section 43 of Rule 130:
Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the
time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased,
or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein
stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance
of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence
of entries in corporate books required the satisfaction of the
following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to
testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or
religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.
Mercado, petitioner's bookkeeper who prepared the entries, was
presented to testify on the transactions pertaining to the account
of respondent. It was in the course of his testimony that the ledger
entries were presented. There was, therefore, neither justification
nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as the person who
made them was available to testify in court.
Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts
constituting the entries, particularly those entries which resulted in
the negative balance. He had no knowledge of the truth or falsity
of these entries.
There is good reason why evidence of this nature is incorrigibly
hearsay. Entries in business records which spring from the duty of
other employees to communicate facts occurring in the ordinary
course of business are prima facie admissible, the duty to
communicate being itself a badge of trustworthiness of the entries,
but not when they purport to record what were independent
agreements arrived at by some bank officials and a client. In this
case, the entries become mere casual or voluntary reports of the
official concerned. To permit the ledgers, prepared by the bank at
its own instance, to substitute the contract as proof of the
agreements with third parties, is to set a dangerous precedent.
Business entries are allowed as an exception to the hearsay rule
only under certain conditions specified in Section 43, which must be
scrupulously observed to prevent them from being used as a source
of undue advantage for the party preparing them.
PATULA VS PEOPLE
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or
near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the
facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if
such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
This was another grave error of the RTC. The terse yet sweeping
manner of justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable
due to the need to show the concurrence of the severa lrequisites
before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the
hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows:
(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to
testify;
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer;
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;
d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or
religious;
(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
PEOPLE VS TOLEDO
The affidavit is considered hearsay because the one who made it
was not presented in court under oath to testify on his written
statement. This is the general rule. But regarding the supporting
question, the answer is also yes. The exhibit is admissible as
evidence the reason being that it is one of the accepted exceptions
of the hearsay rule. This is called the Declaration Against interest or
in the book of Agpalo, the dead mans statute. Sec. 38 of the Rules
of Court exemplifies this rule.
Sec.38 Declaration against interest.- The declaration made by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or
his successors in interest and against third persons.
In order for a statement to be admissible (in this case made as an
exhibit) it must comply the following requisites:
1. That the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
2. That it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
3. That at the time he maid said declaration the declarant was
aware That the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
4. That the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such
declaration to be true.
In the case it bar, it is clear as day that the declarant made the
statement before the municipal president before he died and that it
was clearly against his interest because it had the effect of
exonerating Eugenio Toledo from liability. Declarant was also aware
of this fact and knows this to be true because otherwise, he
wouldnt have made such a statement. Here the declarant is
deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read
in such a way as to ring with the truth. When Sisenando Holgado
declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at
the end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would
be expected to make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one
of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the
house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by
the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not as
conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into
consideration in connection with the other proven facts.
DECLARATION AGAINST PEDIGREE
LAZATIN VS CAMPOS
We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree,
although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are
natural expressions of persons who must know the truth. Pedigree
testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the
case admits and because greater evil might arise from the rejection
of such proof than from its admission. But, in proving an adoption,
there is a better proof available and it should be produced. The
whereabouts of the child's family and circulation of the jurisdiction
in which they resided and investigation in those courts where
adoption are usually granted would surely produce an adoption
order, if indeed there was an order. Besides, since the point in favor
of receiving hearsay evidence upon matters of family history or
pedigree is its reliability, it has been set forth as a condition upon
which such evidence is received that it emanate from a source
within the family. Pursuant to this view, before a declaration of a
deceased person can be admitted to prove pedigree, or ancestry,
the relationship of the declarant, by either of blood or affinity to
the family in question, or a branch thereof, must ordinarily be
established by competent evidence. Section 33 of Rule 130 states:
"The act or declaration of a person deceased, or outside of the
Philippines, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received
in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration..
FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE
GRAVADOR VS MAMIGO
Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of
his birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his
parents and relatives, and his testimony in such case is an assertion
of family tradition. Indeed, even in his application for backpay, filed
through the Office of the Superintendent of Schools, on October 7,
1948, the petitioner stated that the date of his birth is December
11, 1901. He repeated the same assertion in 1956 and again in
1960 when he asked the Government Service Insurance System
and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his birth to
December 11, 1901. Again the import of the declaration of the
petitioner's brother, contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral
case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then
23 years old, cannot be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a
deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding
pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. Thus, December 11, 1901 is established
as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of family
tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a
deceased relative.
COMMON REPUTATION
IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE
A landing certificate issued under section 7 of Act 702 by the
Collector of Customs is based on an administrative ex parte
determination of the evidence presented and the facts as stated by
the applicant. As such, it carries little evidentiary weight as to the
citizenship of the applicant's spouse.
ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS
HAVERTON VS NLRC
In declaring that copy of the Official Entry in the Ship's Log Book
was not legally binding for being hearsay, public respondents
overlooked the fact that under our laws the ship's captain is
obligated to keep a "log book" where, among others, he records the
decisions he has adopted. Even according to the law of the vessel's
registry, that book is also "required by law" as disclosed by the
entry itself. There is no controversy as to the genuineness of the
said entry. The vessel's log book is an official record and entries
made by a person in the performance of a duty required by law
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
COMMERCIAL LIST
MERALCO VS QUISUMBING
The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support
its position regarding the wage issue cannot be an accurate basis
and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase. Under
Section 45 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, statement of
matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only "if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein."
As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited
report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial
list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no
persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures
to support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its
accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on
news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence
was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a
person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as
trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy,
these reports are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers
containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when
the source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere
analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In
particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made
available considering that the same is necessary for compliance
with certain governmental requirements.
OPINION RULE
DOMINGO VS DOMINGO
Under the Rules of Court, the genuineness of a handwriting may be
proved by the following:
(1) A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument;
(2) A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his
opinion thereon, such opinion being an exception to the opinion
rule;
(3) A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and
admitted genuine specimen thereof; and
(4) Expert evidence.
The law makes no preference, much less distinction among and
between the different means stated above in proving the
handwriting of a person. It is likewise clear from the foregoing that
courts are not bound to give probative value or evidentiary value
to the opinions of handwriting experts, as resort to handwriting
experts is not mandatory.|
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
PEOPLE VS LEE
Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, viz: "Section 51. Character evidence not
generally admissible; exceptions: (a) In Criminal Cases: (1) The
accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged. (2) Unless in
rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be
proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.
In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in any prosecution involving an
unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a woman where the
willingness of a woman is material, the woman's character as to her
chastity is admissible to show whether or not she consented to the
man's act. The exception to this is when the woman's consent is
immaterial such as in statutory rape or rape with violence or
intimidation. The burden of proof that the complainant is a woman
of good reputation lies in the prosecution, and the accused may
introduce evidence that the complainant is a woman of bad
reputation.
GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE IN HOMICIDE CASES. In homicide cases,
a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two
situations: (1) as evidence of the deceased's aggression; and (2) as
evidence of the state of mind of the accused. The pugnacious,
quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his
calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is
relevant in determining whether the deceased or the accused was
the aggressor. When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the
known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show
that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the
mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt
defensive action was necessary.
PROOF OF VICTIM'S BAD MORAL CHARACTER, IRRELEVANT TO
DETERMINE THE PROBABILITY OR IMPROBABILITY OF THE KILLING
IN CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, proof of the bad moral
character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or
improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that
the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-
defense. There is no connection between the deceased's drug
addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of
accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony,
the claim that because of the victim's bad character he could have
been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure
and simple speculation.
NOT NECESSARY IN CASE OF MURDER COMMITTED WITH
TREACHERY AND PREMEDITATION. [P]roof of the victim's bad
moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with
treachery and premeditation.
CHARACTER OF ACCUSED AND VICTIM
MICHELSON VS UNITED STATES
Generally, the prosecution may not resort in its case in chief to any
kind of evidence of defendants evil character, disposition, and
reputation to establish probability of his guilt. However, when the
defendant puts his reputation in issue, the entire subject is fair
game and the prosecution may cross-examine the defendants
character witnesses as to the contents and extent of the hearsay on
which they base their conclusions. When the defendant elects to
initiate a character inquiry commonly called character evidence,
the witness may not testify about defendants specific acts or
courses of conduct.
In this case, the inquiry concerned an arrest twenty-seven years
before the trial. Events a generation old are likely to be lived down
and dropped from the present thought and talk of the community
and to be absent from the knowledge of younger or more recent
acquaintances. But, where defendant has put his reputation in issue
by the calling of character witnesses, he cannot complain at the
latitude which is allowed the prosecution in meeting, by cross-
examination the issue thus voluntarily tendered, notwithstanding
the difficulty which the jury may experience in comprehending the
courts limiting instructions.

UNITED STATES VS NIXON
Courts are not required to proceed against the President as if the
President was any other individual.
Courts should review communications claimed to be privileged in
camera.
The Supreme Court of the United States had to balance the
executive privilege against the rights of citizens to face their
accusers and to have a speedy and fair trial. The Court made the
point that the President is not a normal citizen, and therefore
should receive great deference regarding executive claims of
privilege. However, executive privilege is not absolute and must be
balanced against the right of the accused in criminal proceedings.
The Court took great care to limit its opinion because it was delving
into a political dispute between the President and Congress,
something the Supreme Court is loath to do.
UNITED STATES VS JACKSON
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), character evidence is
generally not admissible "for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion. . . ." The rules make
an exception, however, and permit the introduction of "[e]vidence of
a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered
by an accused. . . ." FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). Federal Rule of Evidence
405 provides that such a "trait of character" may always be
demonstrated to the jury by presenting evidence of the victim's
reputation. On the other hand, testimony about "specific instances of
conduct" may be used only if the "character or a trait of character of
a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense. . . ."
FED. R. Evid. 405 (emphasis added).
The district court was correct to limit Jackson's ability to present
Brown's disciplinary records. Brown's propensity for violence is a
pertinent trait of character, because it supports Jackson's argument
that Brown was the first aggressor. Accordingly, the court allowed
extensive testimony on Brown's reputation in the prison
community.
EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS
BOYD VS US
we are constrained to hold that the evidence as to the Brinson,
Mode and Hall robberies was inadmissible for the identification of
the defendants, or for any other purpose whatever, and that the
injury done the defendants, in that regard, was not cured by
anything contained in the charge. Whether Standley robbed
Brinson and Mode, and whether he and Boyd robbed Hall, were
matters wholly apart from the inquiry as to the murder of Dansby.
They were collateral to the issue to be tried. No notice was given by
the indictment of the purpose of the government to introduce
proof of them. They afforded no legal presumption or inference as
to the particular crime charged. Those robberies may have been
committed by the defendants in March, and yet they may have
been innocent of the murder of Dansby in April. Proof of them only
tended to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw their
minds away from the real issue, and to produce the impression that
they were wretches whose lives were of no value to the community,
and who were not entitled to the full benefit of the rules prescribed
by law for the trial of human beings charged with crime involving
the punishment of death. Upon a careful scrutiny of the record we
are constrained to hold that, in at least the particulars to which we
have adverted, those rules were not observed at the trial below.
However depraved in character, and however full of crime their
past lives may have been, the defendants were entitled to be tried
upon competent evidence, and only for the offence charged.
US VS CUNNINGHAM
Evidence of the defendants addiction and of her prior suspension
for stealing Demerol from her former employer was admissible on
the issue of motive.
Discussion. F.R.E. Rule 404(b) forbids the introduction of evidence of
a persons prior conduct for the purpose of showing a propensity to
act in accordance with the character indicated by that conduct.
However, evidence of prior conduct may be introduced for other
purposes, such as motive. Here, prior bad acts were allowed to show
that the defendant had a motive to tamper with the Demerol filled
syringes since she was addicted to the drug. In the end, the judge
has the power to exclude such evidence if it has a prejudicial effect
upon the jury to convince them that the defendant is guilty based
on crimes committed in the past. The defendants prior suspension
was allowed since it also showed that she had the motive to tamper
with the syringes.
US VS GONZALES
To be relevant, evidence need only tend to prove the
government's case, and evidence that adds context and dimension
to the government's proof of the charges can have that tendency.
Relevant evidence is not confined to that which directly establishes
an element of the crime. As we have said:
[T]he trial court may admit evidence that does not directly establish
an element of the offense charged, in order to provide background
for the events alleged in the indictment. Background evidence may
be admitted to show, for example, the circumstances surrounding
the events or to furnish an explanation of the understanding or
intent with which certain acts were performed.
The burglary evidence in this case was relevant both to a possible
motive for the defendants' possession of firearms and to provide
crucial background evidence that gave coherence to the basic
sequence of events that occurred on the night of February 24.
JONES VS STATES
The evidence regarding the conduct of the appellant and the loss
of money from the billfold of Mr. Hess, the brace maker, and from
the owner of the Transmission Shop was admitted over the
objection that it was "irrelevant and immaterial, highly prejudicial.
It is at a time different and subsequent to the date alleged in the
indictment of December the 13th."
The evidence was offered and was admitted only for the purpose of
showing identity, intent, motive, malice or common plan or scheme.
It was so limited in the court's charge and the jury was instructed
that such evidence could not be considered for any purpose unless
they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed such other offenses.
The two collateral offenses show more than a similarity in results.
They show a common plan and systematic course of action. The
peculiar way in which the other business men lost their money
upon the same course of conduct by the appellant was a
circumstance that was available to the state to prove the
appellant's guilt of theft from the person of Hause. The
evidence showed system, not merely systematic crime, and the
court did not err in admitting it for the limited purposes stated.
"Where the existence of a plan or system of criminal action is in
issue, evidence of other or similar offenses committed by the
accused, both before and after the commission of the offense with
which he is charged, is admissible to show that the offense charged
was part of a common plan, scheme, or system. But to render such
evidence admissible, there must be more than a certain degree of
similarity in results between the crime with which he is charged and
the other crimes committed by him. There must indeed be such a
concurrence of common features between the several crimes as will
show logically that all of them might well have resulted from a
common plan or systematic course of action."
US VS JONES
Mr. Jones submits that the district court erred in admitting his
1994 conviction into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b).5 We review a district court's decision to admit evidence
under Rule 404(b) for an abuse of discretion; we ask whether:
(1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue
other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged,
(2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and
close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue, (3) the
evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant
committed the similar act, and (4) the probative
value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice.
First, we must determine whether evidence of the previous
conviction was relevant and probative on the issue of intent.
The most obvious justifiable situation in which prior convictions are
admissible in drug prosecutions on the issue of intent are in those
situations in which the defendant, while admitting possession of
the substance, denies the intent to distribute it.
An earlier conviction for drug trafficking was certainly relevant and
probative on, among other things, the issue of Mr. Jones' intent. It
evidenced his knowledge of the drug trade and the practices of
drug dealers in selling their deadly wares. It also was relevant and
probative with respect to the defendant's knowledge of the
commercial value of even small amounts of the drug and therefore
of his intent to sell the lesser amount. Accordingly, it certainly was
in the sound discretion of the district court to determine, given the
facts and circumstances presented by this case, that this evidence
was relevant and probative on the issues placed into contention by
Mr. Jones.
Next, the district court acted within its discretion in deciding that
the prior conviction was close enough in time and sufficiently similar
in circumstances to be relevant to the issue of intent. Mr. Jones'
prior conviction occurred six years before the charged offense; the
district court correctly noted that we have allowed similar prior
convictions that were even more temporally distant from the
charged conduct.8 We also have held that a prior conviction for
distribution of crack is admissible in a case where the charged act
involves distribution of cocaine, as the distinction between the two
drugs is a "distinction without substance" as "[b]oth crimes involve
the possession with intent to distribute a chemical composition of
cocaine."
US VS WALES
This is a case in point. The government wanted to prove Wales was
carrying two false driver's licenses. The only possible purpose for
this was to show Wales's criminal propensities, something the
character evidence rule forbids. The district judge at first excluded
the licenses, but changed his mind after Wales introduced
evidence that his passport and other documents were legitimate.
By pointing to his legitimate documents, the judge ruled, Wales
had "opened the door" to the fake ones. The majority agrees.
This "opening the door" doctrine has a certain common-sense
appeal, but where is it to be found in the Rules of Evidence? I'm
aware of no authority for admitting inadmissible evidence just
because we think turnabout is fair play. Perhaps it would be
sensible to let the licenses in, but lots of violations of the Rules
seem equally sensible. It may seem sensible to admit hearsay
whenever the declarant is unavailable at trial. It may seem sensible
to let witnesses be impeached with evidence of their past lies. But.
It may seem sensible to allow defendants to prove their good
character using specific acts. But rules are rules. The basic policy
judgments were made by their drafters; when we rely on common
sense in admitting evidence contrary to the Rules, we're simply
substituting our own judgments for theirs.
In fact, the drafters considered the very issue presented in this case-
-whether the prosecution may introduce evidence of a defendant's
bad character once the defendant has introduced evidence of his
good character. Rules 404(a)(1) and 405 allow such bad character
evidence, but only in the form of reputation or opinion, not specific
instances of conduct. The majority opinion directly contravenes this
specific judgment.
EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES
US VS LECOMPTE
Rule 414 provides in relevant part:(a) In a criminal case in which
the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation,
evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered
for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
In light of the strong legislative judgment that evidence of prior
sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible, we think the
District Court erred in its assessment that the probative value of
T.T.'s testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. The sexual offenses committed against T.T.
were substantially similar to those allegedly committed against
C.D. By comparison, the differences were small. In particular, the
District Court itself acknowledged that the time lapse between
incidents may not be as significant as it appears at first glance,
because defendant was imprisoned for a portion of the time
between 1987 and 1995, which deprived defendant of the
opportunity to abuse any children. Moreover, the danger of
unfair prejudice noted by the District Court was that presented by
the unique stigma of child sexual abuse, on account of which
LeCompte might be convicted not for the charged offense, but for
his sexual abuse of T.T. This danger is one that all propensity
evidence in such trials presents. It is for this reason that the
evidence was previously excluded, and it is precisely such holdings
that Congress intended to overrule.
HABIT
PEOPLE VS DARTON
It has long been the rule that evidence of habit is generally
admissible to demonstrate specific conduct on a particular occasion.
In this case, Coppola's wife testified that Coppola carried between
$500 and $1,000 in cash at all times and detailed the manner in
which he would carry bills of various denominations in his right and
left pants pockets. Gardner testified that Coppola had a habit of
ordinarily carrying $400 to $500 in spending money and carrying
$500 to $1,500 on business trips. In our view, that testimony
evidenced a deliberate and repetitive practice sufficient to allow
the inference of its persistence and County Court acted within its
discretion in receiving it.
REYES VS MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.
The evidence of Reyes' prior convictions was admitted for the sole
purpose of showing that he had a character trait of drinking to
excess and that he acted in conformity with his character on the
night of the accident by becoming intoxicated, we conclude that
the prior convictions were inadmissible character evidence under
Rule 404.
The suggestion that the prior convictions constituted evidence of
Reyes' "habit" of excessive drinking is equally unpersuasive. Rule
4068allows the introduction of evidence of the habit of a person
for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity
with his habit on a particular occasion
Character and habit are close akin. Character is a generalized
description of one's disposition, or one's disposition in respect to a
general trait, such as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness.
"Habit," in modern usage, both lay and psychological, is more
specific. It describes one's regular response to a repeated specific
situation. If we speak of character for care, we think of the person's
tendency to act prudently in all the varying situations of life, in
business, family life, in handling automobiles and in walking across
the street. A habit, on the other hand, is the person's regular
practice of meeting a particular kind of situation with a specific type
of conduct, such as the habit of going down a particular stairway
two stairs at a time, or of giving the hand-signal for a left turn, or of
alighting from railway cars while they are moving. The doing of the
habitual acts may become semi-automatic.
We do not undertake here to prescribe the precise quantum of
proof necessary to transform a general disposition for excessive
drinking into a " habit" of intemperance; we simply find that four
prior convictions for public intoxication spanning a three and one-
half year period are of insufficient regularity to rise to the level of
"habit" evidence. Consequently, we hold the evidence to be
inadmissible under Rule 406 as well.
A principle purpose behind the exclusion of character evidence, as
we have said, is the prejudicial effect that it can have on the trier of
fact. This concern is especially compelling here where the character
evidence relates to one of the critical issues in the case, I. e., the
contributory negligence of Reyes. Finding the introduction of the
prior convictions to be extremely prejudicial, we feel that the error
affected the substantial rights of Reyes
BURDEN OF PROOF
BJDC CONSTRUCTION VS LANUZO
The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury
has the burden to establish the allegation with competent evidence.
If the action based on negligence is civil in nature, the proof required
is preponderance of evidence.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence is given on either side. The burden of proof
is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of
the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court, but it
may rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the
essential allegations but raises affirmative defense or defenses,
which if proved, will exculpate him from liability.
MANONGSONG VS ESTIMO
We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the
general rules of evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases, as
explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals: . . . Simply put,
he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof,
and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never
parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima
facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of
plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with
plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the defendant's. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it;
at bottom, it means probability of truth.
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION
DATALIFT MOVERS VS BELGRAVIA REALTY
The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields respondent
Belgravia, as lessor, from being questioned by the petitioners as
lessees, regarding its title or better right of possession as lessor
because having admitted the existence of a lessor-lessee
relationship, the petitioners are barred from assailing Belgravia's
title of better right of possession as their lessor. HECaTD
Section 2, Rule 131, of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances
of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular
thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it;
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them.
Conclusive presumptions have been defined as "inferences which
the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow them to be
overturned by any contrary proof however strong." As long as the
lessor-lessee relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia
exists as in this case, the former, as lessees, cannot by any proof,
however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that
Belgravia has valid title to or better right of possession to the
subject leased premises than they have.
The apparent error made by the MeTC will, however, not affect the
result of the judgment rendered in this case. In fact, the application
of the rule on conclusive presumption under the afore-quoted
Section 2, Rule 131 strengthens the position of the MeTC that the
petitioners may be validly ordered to vacate the leased premises for
nonpayment of rentals. Likewise, the logical consequence of the
operation of this conclusive presumption against the petitioners is
that they will never have the personality to question whether an
implied new lease was created between PNR and the respondents,
because so long as there is no showing that the lessor-lessee
relationship has terminated, the lessor's title or better right of
possession as against the lessee will eternally be a non-issue in any
proceeding before any court
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS
ZAFRA VS PEOPLE
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this
burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the
accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF A WITNESS
RAMOS VS SPS. DIZON
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for
evidence to be considered, the same must be formally
offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular
document to identified and marked as an exhibit does
not mean that is has already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v.
Aviles [186 SCRA 385], we had the occasion to make a
distinction between identification of documentary
evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that
the first is done in the course of the trial and is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an
exhibit while the second is done only when the party
rests its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt
to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will
advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he
chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized
by the Rules to consider the same.
However, in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA 403]
citing People v. Mate [103 SCRA 404], we relaxed the
foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally
offered to be admitted and considered by the trial
court provided the following requirements are
present, viz: first, the same must have been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the
same must have been incorporated in the records of
the case. (Underscoring supplied.)
In this case, we find and so rule that these
requirements have been satisfied. The exhibits in
question were presented and marked during the pre-
trial of the case thus, they have been incorporated into
the records. Further, Elpidio himself explained the
contents of these exhibits when he was interrogated by
respondents' counsel.
RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINATION
DELA PAZ VS IAC
"The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his
adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no
less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The
express recognition of such right of the accused in the
Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties
in civil case less constitutionally based, for it is an
indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the
fundamental law. xxx Until such cross-examination has
been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be
considered as complete and may not, therefore, be
allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by
the court in deciding the case
But we have also ruled that it is not an absolute right
which a party can demand at all times. This Court has
stated that:
"the right is a personal one which may be waived
expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus,
where a party has had the opportunity to cross examine
a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony
given on direct examination of the witness will be
received or allowed to remain in the record.
"The conduct of a party which may be construed as an
implied waiver of the right of cross-examine may take
various forms. But the common basic principle
underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver
is that the party was given the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to
take advantage of it reasons attributable to himself
alone.
The case of the herein petitioner, Savory Luncheonette,
easily falls within the confines of the jurisprudence
given above. Private respondents through their counsel,
Atty. Amante, were givennot only but five opportunities
to cross-examine the witness, Atty. Morabe, but despite
the warnings and admonitions of respondent court for
Atty. Amante to "The right of a party to cross-examine
the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is
inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the
accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of
such right of the accused in the Constitution does not
render the right thereto of parties in civil case less
constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of
the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law.
xxx Until such cross-examination has been finished, the
testimony of the witness cannot be considered as
complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form
part of the evidence to be considered by the court in
deciding the case." But we have also ruled that it is not
an absolute right which a party can demand at all times.
This Court has stated that: "the right is a personal one
which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-
examination. Thus, where a party has had the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to
cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed
to remain in the record.
"The conduct of a party which may be construed as an
implied waiver of the right of cross-examine may take
various forms. But the common basic principle
underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver
is that the party was given the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to
take advantage of it reasons attributable to himself
alone.
In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to cross-
examine Loreto was through no fault of the
respondents. As can be gleaned from the record, Loreto
was available for cross-examination from the time she
finished her direct testimony on March 12, 1984 to
November 7, 1984, the last scheduled hearing of the
case before her death on December 1, 1984. The
petitioners not only kept on postponing the cross-
examination but at times failed to appear during
scheduled hearings. The postponement of the trial on
May 23, 1984 to a later date due to the correction of
the stenographic notes of Loreto's testimony may be
justified, but the same cannot be said for the
subsequent postponements requested by the
petitioners. The scheduled trials before November 7,
1984, did not push through, because of the petitioners'
fault. It may also be recalled that at the scheduled
hearing on September 14, 1984 neither the petitioners
nor their counsel appeared leading to the presentation
of evidence ex parte. And also during the scheduled
hearing on September 18, 1984, when the petitioners
were allowed to cross-examine Loreto despite the fact
that the case was already deemed submitted for
decision, the petitioners again failed to appear. cdll
Under these circumstances, we rule that the petitioners
had waived their right to cross-examine Loreto.
Through their own fault, they lost their right to cross-
examine Loreto. Her testimony stands.
In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to cross-examine Loreto
was through no fault of the respondents. As can be gleaned from
the record, Loreto was available for cross-examination from the
time she finished her direct testimony on March 12, 1984 to
November 7, 1984, the last scheduled hearing of the case before
her death on December 1, 1984. The petitioners not only kept on
postponing the cross-examination but at times failed to appear
during scheduled hearings. The postponement of the trial on May
23, 1984 to a later date due to the correction of the stenographic
notes of Loreto's testimony may be justified, but the same cannot
be said for the subsequent postponements requested by the
petitioners. The scheduled trials before November 7, 1984, did not
push through, because of the petitioners' fault. It may also be
recalled that at the scheduled hearing on September 14, 1984
neither the petitioners nor their counsel appeared leading to the
presentation of evidence ex parte. And also during the scheduled
hearing on September 18, 1984, when the petitioners were
allowed to cross-examine Loreto despite the fact that the case was
already deemed submitted for decision, the petitioners again failed
to appear. cdll
Under these circumstances, we rule that the petitioners had
waived their right to cross-examine Loreto. Through their own
fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto. Her testimony
stands.
IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTYS WITNESS
CHUA GAW VS GAW
That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that
the calling party will not be bound by the formers testimony. The
fact remains that it was at his instance that his adversary was put on
the witness stand. Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an
adverse witness, although the calling party does not vouch for the
witness veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is
not contradicted or remains unrebutted.
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound
by the latters testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him
by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to
what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides that the party
calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does
not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight,
but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from
rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.
This, Concepcion failed to do as in her own testimony, she failed to
discredit the Suy Ben Chuas testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber
became his sole property.
In arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will
be considered, regardless of the party who offered them in
evidence. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the
case and should be given its proper weight, and such evidence
becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or
contradict his testimony.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
TAN SHUY VS MAULAWIN
According to Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court,there are
two ways of proving the due execution and authenticity of a private
document, to wit:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it
is claimed to be. (21a)
As reproduced above, the trial court found that the due execution
and authenticity of the pesadas were "established by the plaintiff's
daughter Elena Tan and sometimes by plaintiff's son Vicente
Tan." The RTC said
On cross-examination, [Vicente] reiterated that he and her [sic]
sister Elena Tan who acted as their cashier are helping their father
in their business of buying copras and mais. That witness agreed that
in the business of buying copra and mais of their father, if a seller is
selling copra, a pesada is being issued by his sister. The pesada that
she is preparing consists of the date when the copra is being sold to
the seller. Being familiar with the penmanship of Elena Tan, the
witness was shown a sample of the pesada issued by his sister Elena
Tan. . .
. . . . He clarified that in the "pesada" (Exh. "1") prepared by Elena
and also in Exh. "2", there appears on the lower right hand portion
of the said pesadas the letter "pd", the meaning of which is to the
effect that the seller of the copra has already been paid during that
day. He also confirmed the penmanship and handwriting of his sister
Ate Elena who acted as a cashier in the pesada being shown to him.
He was even made to compare the xerox copies of the pesadas with
the original copies presented to him and affirmed that they are
faithful reproduction of the originals.
In any event, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the
due execution and authenticity of the pesadas. As found by the CA,
Tan Shuy "could have easily belied the existence of . . . the pesadas
or receipts, and the purposes for which they were offered in
evidence by simply presenting his daughter, Elena Tan Shuy, but no
effort to do so was actually done by the former given that scenario."
The pesadas having been admitted in evidence, with petitioner
failing to timely object thereto, these documents are already
deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. We hereby
uphold the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in that
the pesadas served as proof that the net proceeds from the copra
deliveries were used as installment payments for the debts of
respondents.
SUERTE-FELIPE VS PEOPLE
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All
other public documents are evidence, even against a third person,
of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter.
Thus, entries in the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body are
deemed prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, i.e., that a
body has been properly identified as that of Godofredo Ariate.
This prima facie evidence of identification cannot be rebutted by
an extremely meticulous fault-finding inquiry into the chain of
custody of the body of the victim, as such body cannot be easily
replaced or substituted by ill-minded persons. What petitioner is
asking of us is not to be sedulous anymore, but to be paranoid and
unreasonably mistrustful of the persons whom our very rules
require us to trust. Petitioner's criticism of the identification of the
body of the victim miserably fails to inject any reasonable doubt in
our minds, not when petitioner is even loath to say that the body
autopsied was not that of Godofredo Ariate but that of some other
person.
We must stress at this point that there was no indication of any
impropriety or irregularity committed by the medico-legal officer
in this case with respect to the autopsy on the body of the late
Godofredo Ariate. Dr. Lagat's duty was to perform the autopsy and
not to obsessively investigate the authenticity of the signature
appearing on all requests presented to him. Thus, Dr. Lagat, as a
medico-legal officer, enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties.
PATULA VS PEOPLE
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a
public document and a private document for the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, viz.:
Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines
how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A
public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or
because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a
notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities
required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing
authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In
contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or
instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of
a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official
or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in
the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its
acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication
of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically:
(a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of
Section 21, 28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the
genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not
been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; 29 (c)
when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been
admitted; 30 or (d) when the document is not being offered as
genuine. 31
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
were private documents because private individuals executed or
generated them for private or business purposes or uses.
Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four
exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence
against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their
authentication in the manner provided in Section 20 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or hand writing
of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it
is claimed to be.
BARTOLOME VS IAC
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 22. Evidence of
execution not necessary. Where a private writing is more than
thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations
or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution
and authenticity need be given." We agree with the appellate court
that the first two requirements ordained by Section 22 are met by
Exhibit 4. It appearing that it was executed in 1917, Exhibit 4 was
more than thirty years old when it was offered in evidence in 1983.
It was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is
an heir of the person who would naturally keep it.
PROOFS OF DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF ANCIENT
WRITING. Under Section 21 of Rule 132, the due execution and
authenticity of a private writing must be proved either by anyone
who saw the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of
the handwriting of the maker, or by a subscribing witness. The
testimony of Dominador Bartolome on Exhibit 4 and Ursula Cid's
sworn statement in 1937 do not fall within the purview of Section
21. The signature of Maria Gonzales on the missing fourth page of
Exhibit 4 would have helped authenticate the document if it is
proven to be genuine. But as there can be no such proof arising
from the signature of Maria Gonzales in the deed of sale, the same
must be excluded.
NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS
ST. MARYS FARM, INC VS PRIME REAL PROPERTIES INC
It is of no moment that the checks were made payable to Rodolfo
Agana and not to the company which, according to the
petitioner, should have alerted the respondent to inquire further
into the extent of Agana's authority to transfer the subject
property. This was no longer necessary considering that
respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana's
authority to sell, evidenced by the notarized Certification. As
explained in the Bautista case:
When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney
that is duly notarized, we know it to be a public document where
the notarial acknowledgment is prima facieevidence of the fact of
its due execution. A buyer presented with such a document would
have no choice between knowing and finding out whether a
forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial
acknowledgment has removed that choice from him and
replaced it with a presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant
appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that he
executed the document, understood its import and signed it. In
reality, he is deprived of such choice not because he is incapable
of knowing and finding out but because, under our notarial
system, he has been given the luxury of merely relying on the
presumption of regularity of a duly notarized SPA. And he cannot
be faulted for that because it is precisely that fiction of regularity
which holds together commercial transactions across borders
and time.
In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who
has [in his] possession title to the property but whose capacity to
sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that
he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter's
capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on the notarial
acknowledgment found in the seller's duly notarized special
power of attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is
already the function of the notarial acknowledgment to establish
the appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution
and authenticity.
FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE
CHAN VS CHAN
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be
made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be
made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds
therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3)
days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by
the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene's request
for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for
trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny's hospital records. It is
when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that
Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence,
but more so to their disclosure. Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules
of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged
matters.
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED VS CIR
The Rules of Court, which is suppletory in quasi-judicial proceedings,
particularly Sec. 34 of Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence, is clear
that no evidence which has not been formally offered shall be
considered. Thus, where the pertinent invoices or receipts
purportedly evidencing the VAT paid by Atlas were not submitted,
the courts a quo evidently could not determine the veracity of the
input VAT Atlas has paid. Moreover, when Atlas likewise failed to
submit pertinent export documents to prove actual export sales
with due certification from accredited banks on the export proceeds
in foreign currency with the corresponding conversion rate into
Philippine currency, the courts a quo likewise could not determine
the veracity of the export sales as indicated in Atlas' amended VAT
return.
It must be noted that the most competent evidence must be
adduced and presented to prove the allegations in a complaint,
petition, or protest before a judicial court. And where the best
evidence cannot be submitted, secondary evidence may be
presented. In the instant case, the pertinent documents which are
the best pieces of evidence were not presented.
DIZON VS CA
Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a
court of record. As cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-
litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably,
no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted
by the BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require that
these documents must be formally offered before the
CTA. 34 Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence which reads:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified. The CTA and the CA rely
solely on the case of Vda. de Oate, which reiterated this Court's
previous rulings in People v. Napat-a and People v. Mate on the
admission and consideration of exhibits which were not formally
offered during the trial. Although in a long line of cases many of
which were decided after Vda. de Oate, we held that courts
cannot consider evidence which has not been formally
offered, nevertheless, petitioner cannot validly assume that the
doctrine laid down in Vda. de Oate has already been abandoned.
Recently, in Ramos v. Dizon, this Court, applying the said doctrine,
ruled that the trial court judge therein committed no error when
he admitted and considered the respondents' exhibits in the
resolution of the case, notwithstanding the fact that the same
were not formally offered. Likewise, in Far East Bank & Trust
Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court made
reference to said doctrine in resolving the issues therein.
Indubitably, the doctrine laid down in Vda. De Oate still subsists in
this jurisdiction. In Vda. de Oate, we held that:
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be
considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the
mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as
an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part
of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles [186
SCRA 385], we had the occasion to make a distinction between
identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an
exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of the trial and
is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while
the second is done only when the party rests its case and not
before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if
he believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In
the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not
authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
However, in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA 403] citing People v.
Mate [103 SCRA 484], we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the
trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz.:
first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in
the records of the case.
SPOUSES RAGUDO VS FABELLA ESTATE
OFFER OF EVIDENCE; COURT SHALL CONSIDER EVIDENCE SOLELY
FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS OFFERED. With the reality
that those documents were never presented and formally offered
during the trial of the main case, their belated admission for
purposes of having them duly considered in the resolution of CA-
G.R. CV No. 51230 would certainly collide with Section 34, Rule
132, of the Rules of Court. To stress, it was only during the hearing
of the motion for execution pending appeal that said documents
were presented and offered in evidence. Sure, the trial court
admitted them, but the admission was only for the purpose for
which they were offered, that is, by way of opposition to FETA's
motion for execution pending appeal. It is basic in the law of
evidence that the court shall consider evidence solely for the
purpose for which it was offered. While the said documents may
have the right to stay in the records of the case for purposes of the
incidental issue of execution pending appeal, they do not have that
same right insofar as far as the main case is concerned, and ought
not be considered in the resolution thereof.
TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
CRUZ-AREVALO VS LAYOSA
As regards the exclusion of certain paragraphs in the affidavit of
complainant's witness, the rule is that evidence formally offered by
a party may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a party's
offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move
or request that it be attached to form part of the record of the case.
If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the record the
name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the
substance of the proposed testimony. These procedures are known
as offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence and are made for
purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered
against the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the
rejection of the excluded evidence. The appellate court will better
understand and appreciate the assignment of error if the evidence
involved is included in the record of the case.
PREPONDERANCEOF EVIDENCE
RAYMUNDO VS LUNARIA
Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in requiring them
to prove the existence of the subsequent verbal agreement by more
than a mere preponderance of evidence since no rule of evidence
requires them to do so. In support of this allegation, petitioners
presented petitioner Lourdes Raymundo who testified that she was
given 2/5 share of the commission pursuant to the verbal sharing
scheme because she took care of the payment of the capital gains
tax, the preparation of the documents of sale and of securing an
authority from the court to sell the property.
For their part, respondents counter that the appellate court did not
require petitioners to prove the existence of the subsequent oral
agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence. What
the appellate court said is that the petitioners failed to prove and
establish the alleged subsequent verbal agreement even by mere
preponderance of evidence.
Petitioners' abovecited allegation has no merit. By preponderance
of evidence is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one
side is superior to that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of
evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence". It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-CREDIBILTY OF
WITNESS
SPOUSES PARAGAS VS HERIS OF DOMINADOR BALACANO
GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN THE ASSESSMENT THEREOF. In the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, we are guided by the
following well-entrenched rules: (1) that evidence to be
believed must not only spring from the mouth of a credible
witness but must itself be credible, and (2) findings of facts and
assessment of credibility of witness are matters best left to the
trial court who had the front-line opportunity to personally
evaluate the witnesses' demeanor, conduct, and behavior while
testifying.
EQUIPOISE RULE
ABARQUEZ VS PEOPLE
FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT, RESPECTED; EXCEPTION. The rule
is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the
value and weight of the testimony of a witness. The exception is
if the trial court failed to consider certain facts of substance and
value, which if considered, might affect the result of the case.
This case is an exception to the rule.||
When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should
be resolved in his favor. Thus:
Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption of innocence stands as a fundamental principle of
both constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the prosecution has
the burden of proving every single fact establishing guilt. Every
vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be removed. The
defense of the accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict.
Within this framework, the prosecution must prove its case
beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even
speak at all. The presumption of innocence is more than
sufficient.
We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence on
an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof
loses. Hence:
. . . The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed
quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is
found lacking.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE VS QUIZON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; WHEN SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT
CONVICTION. Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides: "Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more
than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt." The foregoing elements
must all be obtaining in order to aptly warrant the conviction of an
accused. The circumstances proved must be congruous with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent
with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. It must be shown (a) that
there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been firmly established and (b) that the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court has once said: "xxx Like a tapestry
made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the guilty person."