G.R. No. 180836 August 8, 2010 1.

8, 2010 1. Declaring plaintiff Lolita Urma, Melba Mamuad, Marcela Urma-Caingat, Hipolito Martin, Edmund Urma and Albina
Urma-Mamuad to be the absolute owners of one-eight (1/8) of each of the property covered by O.C.T. No. P-1630
equivalent to Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy-seven (10, 777 sq. m.) square meters;
GILBERT URMA, TEOFILO URMA, DANTE URMA, and JERRY URMA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ORLANDO BELTRAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 11, Tuao, Cagayan, LOLITA URMA, 2. Ordering defendant Teofilo Urma to vacate the property which he is occupying equivalent to one-half (1/2) of the
MELBA R. MAMUAD, MARCELA URMA CAINGAT, HIPOLITO MARTIN, EDMUND URMA, ALBINA URMA MAMUAD, property covered by O.C.T. No. P-1630 and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
CIANITA AGUSTIN FAUSTO MADAMBA, and LAUREANO ANTONIO, Respondents.
3. Ordering the other defendants, namely Gilbert Urma, Dante Urma and Jerry Urma to vacate the portions of the
DECISION property covered by O.C.T. No. 1630 which they have occupied and are still occupying and surrender possession
thereof to the plaintiffs;
MENDOZA, J.:
4. Ordering the partition of the remaining 21,559 square meters covered by O.C.T. No. 1630 as well as the entire
1 property covered by O.C.T. No. 1812 in favor of all the parties in equal shares.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing 1] the September 18, 2007 Judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Tuao, Cagayan (RTC), in Civil Case No. 354-T, deciding the case in favor of the private respondents;
and 2] its December 10, 2007 Order2 denying petitioners Motion For New Trial. Costs de oficio.

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by the respondents against the petitioners for partition, quieting of title, recovery of
ownership, and damages over two parcels of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1812 and No. P-1630.
The petitioners and respondents are blood relatives being the nearest of kin of the deceased spouses Laureano Urma
(Laureano) and Rosa Labrador-Urma (Rosa). They are the children of Laureanos brother who predeceased him.
The petitioners claim ownership of the lot they are occupying by virtue of a deed of sale allegedly executed by Laureano on
April 10, 1985 in favor of petitioner Teofilo Urma, and in agreement with respondent Marcela Urma-Caingat. On the other hand,
six (6) of the respondents claim ownership over portions of the subject property by virtue of a deed of donation executed in
their favor by Rosa in February 1996.
SO ORDERED.3
In the belief that their counsel committed gross negligence in handling their case, the defendants filed a Motion For New
Trial.4 They argued that their counsel should not have joined the motion for a judgment on the pleadings because their answer
contained specific denials and defenses which tendered an issue. They likewise claimed that they were uneducated and "not
too familiar with the niceties of the law and legal procedures." Hence, they should not be bound by the mistakes and omissions
of their counsel.5
On December 10, 2007, the RTC issued the questioned Order6 denying petitioners Motion For New Trial on the ground that
the same was without factual or legal basis and that there were no irregularities committed during the trial.

During the pre-trial proceedings of the case, both parties agreed that the only matter to be resolved was the validity of the
absolute deed of sale, which as claimed by the petitioners was executed by Laureano in 1985 over one-half of the property
covered by OCT No. P-1630. If the said deed of sale was valid, the subsequent deeds of donation executed by Rosa in favor of
the respondents would be without force and effect.
The parties also agreed that the thumb mark of Laureano affixed on the notarized deed of sale be subjected to a dactylascopic
examination by an expert from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Said examination would entail comparison of the
thumb mark on the questioned absolute deed of sale with the genuine specimen thumb mark of Laureano in his Voters
Registration Record on file with the Office of the Election Registrar.
Upon orders of the trial court, the NBI performed the examination and found that the questioned fingerprint was not identical
with the genuine specimen thumbmark. Hence, the NBI concluded that the absolute deed of sale supposedly executed by
Laureano was a spurious document.
The RTC reasoned out that the parties, through their respective counsels, agreed during the pre-trial that the only issue of fact
around which the whole case revolved was the genuineness of the deed of absolute sale dated April 10, 1985 allegedly
executed by Laureano in favor of Teofilo Urma; that said document be examined by the NBI; that both parties would accept the
result of the dactyloscopic examination to be conducted; and that said result would be the basis of the judgment to be
rendered. It was further stipulated that if the NBI report would state that Laureano indeed executed the deed of sale, the
judgment would be in favor of the petitioners. Otherwise, the decision should favor the respondents.
Aggrieved, petitioners came straight to this Court, through a petition for review under Rule 45, anchored on the following
ARGUMENTS:
IT WAS CLEAR ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE COURT A QUO TO HAVE
RENDERED JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS MOTU PROPIO7

In its decision dated September 18, 2007, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondents by declaring them the absolute owners of
IN DENYING THEIR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, THE COURT A QUO HAS LIKEWISE ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
portions of the disputed land and ordering the petitioners to vacate said portions. In the same ruling, the RTC also ordered the
ABUSE OF DISCRETION8
partition of the remaining portions of the subject property among all the parties in equal shares. Specifically, the dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
PETITIONER TEOFILO URMA IS THE OWNER IN FEE SIMPLE OF ONE-HALF PORTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
IN VIEW OF THE ISSUANCE OF A TCT FOR SAID PORTION.9
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1
In the Resolution of April 13, 2009, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to submit their respective
memoranda.10
In advocacy of their position, the petitioners in their memorandum argue that the Rules of Court provides that a judgment on
the pleadings is proper only when the answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations in the complaint.
According to the petitioners, the answer filed by their former counsel raised specific denials/affirmative defenses thereby
tendering an issue on litigable matters. Hence, judgment on the pleadings was not proper.
Petitioners further argue that the judgment of the RTC was merely based on the result of the dactylascopic examination
conducted by the NBI forensic expert who was not even presented in open court. Thus, they were not accorded the opportunity
to cross-examine him. Moreover, since the NBI handwriting examiner was not qualified as an expert witness, the NBI report is
inadmissible in evidence and cannot be used against them.
The petitioners also lament that the RTC denied their Motion For New Trial without conducting any hearing on said motion.
They claim that, in fact, with the execution of the deed of sale by Laureano in favor of Teofilo Urma, OCT No. P-1630 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-5950 and T-5951 were issued in the names of Laureano Urma and
Teofilo Urma, respectively. The RTC, however, was not apprised of the cancellation of OCT No. P-1630 because their former
counsel did not present any evidence.
RESPONDENTS POSITION
The respondents counter that the petition should be dismissed since under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be raised. They claim that the petition on its face does not state any special or important reason that merits the
discretionary jurisdiction of the Court to review this case. Petitioners issues refer to 1) the actions of their former counsel, and
2) the reliance by the RTC in the result of the dactylascopic examination, which obviously are not questions of law.
Respondents also assert that during the pre-trial stage, the Rules of Court allows stipulation or admission of facts and
documents to avoid unnecessary proof. Thus, the RTC has the discretion to put evidentiary value on the report of the NBI
expert who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties.
For the respondents, it would be pointless to go to trial or to conduct a new trial because it was already ascertained that the
deed of sale was a product of forgery.
THE COURTS RULING
The petition fails.
As correctly argued by the respondents, the petitioners are questioning the procedural decisions of their former counsel and
the reliance by the RTC on the result of the dactylascopic examination. The petitioners claim that their substantive and
procedural rights were violated due to their former counsels mistake or negligence in handling their case.
Thus, the petitioners pray for the reopening of Civil Case No. 354-T so that the evidence pertaining to the authenticity of the
subject deed of sale would be evaluated again. This is obviously a question of fact which was already ruled upon by the RTC
with the holding that it was not executed by Laureano Urma. In other words, it would entail another review of the evidence.
It has always been held that it is not the function of this Court to re-examine or weigh the evidence submitted by the parties all
over again. This Court is definitely not the proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts.
At any rate, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts and agreed to abide by its terms and the results thereof. The trial court
also acted on the basis of their stipulations and rendered judgment accordingly. Considering that the stipulation of facts has not
been set aside, the Court agrees that it would be pointless to hold a new trial. It would only prolong the litigation and
unnecessarily delay the final disposition of the case. The situation at hand is not substantially different from the case of Jesus
D. Morales & Carolina Nuqui v. Court of Appeals,11 where it was written:
Ostensibly, the heart of the matter lies in whether or not the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale is valid. And on this
score, there is little doubt that its legitimacy had been duly established. The burden was on the private respondents to impugn
the genuineness of their signatures on the document which having been notarized is imbued with the character of a public
document; yet they were unable to present a single shred of countervailing evidence. Moreover, the validity of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale has been strengthened by the findings of the NBI that the signatures of the private
respondents were genuine, findings with which the private respondents themselves agreed to abide pursuant to the Stipulation
of Facts.
xxx xxx xxx
For another, since private respondents undertook in the Stipulation of Facts to recognize the ownership of the petitioners and
immediately vacate the subject property, together with the tenants, should the genuineness of the signatures in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement With Sale be upheld, which has become the case, and since the Stipulation of Facts has not been set
aside, it is perfectly appropriate for the Court to affirm the petitioners ownership and to order the private respondents eviction
from the subject property. The appellate courts suggestion that the petitioners institute a new, separate action to recover
possession of the subject property is inconsistent with the foregoing considerations and contravenes the avowed policy to
achieve just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of cases.
The Court has stated on several occasions that the pre-trial forms part of the proceedings, and matters dealt with therein may
not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be
inconsequential and worthless.12
With regard to the petitioners argument that they should be excused from the procedural blunder committed by their former
counsel, the Court finds it bereft of merit. The petitioners were not denied due process and their rights were not violated when
their counsel, Atty. Raul Morales, agreed that the only issue that needed to be resolved was the authenticity of the deed of sale
in favor of petitioner Teofilo Urma.
There was nothing amiss in entering into such stipulations. The petitioners only cried foul when the examination result turned
out to be unfavorable to them. It was clearly stipulated that the parties would abide by the results of the NBI dactylascopic
examination. Both parties agreed to submit the questioned document to the NBI where one of its examiners would be assigned
to conduct the examination. Thus, the parties did not reserve any right to question the expertise of the NBI examiner.
Apparently, there was no stipulation either that he would be cross-examined on the result.
Granting that their counsel made a mistake in entering into such stipulations, such procedural error unfortunately bound them.
The Court has consistently held that the mistake or negligence of a counsel in the area of procedural technique binds the client
unless such mistake or negligence of counsel is so gross or palpable that would require the courts to step in and accord relief
to the client who suffered thereby. Without this doctrinal rule, there would never be an end to a suit so long as a new counsel
could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or
learned.131avvphi1
Finally, the Court finds the judgment of the RTC correct, fair and judicious considering that both parties, being the nearest of
kin of the deceased spouses Laureano and Rosa, were given their rightful shares in the subject property. As mentioned earlier,
the judgment declared each of the respondents the absolute owner of one-eight (1/8) of the property covered by OCT No. P-
1630 equivalent to 10,777 square meters by virtue of the notarized deeds of donations 14 executed in their favor by Rosa on
2
February 22 and 23, 1996. The remaining 21,559 square meters covered by OCT No. P-1630 as well as the entire property be found at the residence of appellants. Appellant William G. Friend admitted to the sheriff that he returned the vehicle
covered by OCT No. P-1812 was ordered partitioned in favor of all the parties in equal shares. to the dealer, Drive Motors, Inc.

Appellants failed to file their answer within the reglementary period. On May 18, 2001, appellee filed a motion to
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the September 18, 2007 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
declare appellants in default. In its Order dated July 11, 2001, the RTC granted appellees motion and declared appellants
Tuao, Cagayan, is hereby AFFIRMED.
in default. Appellee presented its evidence ex parte.[4]

SPS. WILLIAM G. FRIEND G.R. No. 165767

and MARIA RENEE FRIEND
and JOHN DOE,
On November 29, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 115, issued an Order disposing as follows:
Petitioners, Present:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff Union Bank of the Philippines, and against
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),
defendants Spouses William G. Friend and Maria Renee Friend who are ordered to:
- versus - Quisumbing,
1. Pay Union Bank of the Philippines the sum of PESOS: SIX HUNDRED FORTY THREE THOUSAND
Ynares-Santiago,
FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO PESOS & 04/100 (P643,472.04);
Carpio, and
2. Reimburse Union Bank the sum equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the total amount due from
Azcuna, JJ.
defendants as attorneys fees;
UNION BANK OF THE
3. The equal sum to twenty-five percent (25%) of the total amount due from defendants as liquidated
PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
damages;
Respondent.
4. The costs of suit.
November 29, 2005
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SO ORDERED.[5]
DECISION
Thereafter, Atty. Simon D. Victa representing petitioners filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals. After the appeal was filed,

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: petitioners changed their counsel. Their appeal was anchored on the alleged error of the trial court in declaring them in default and in finding

them liable under the loan-mortgage agreement.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the June 1, 2004 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74499 which

affirmed with modification the November 29, 2001 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 115; and the October 21, 2004 On June 1, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision upholding the findings of the trial court and ruling thus:

Resolution[3] denying the motion for reconsideration:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order dated November 9, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION as follows:

The facts are as follows: (1) The award of attorneys fees is hereby DELETED.

(2) The award of liquidated damages is hereby REDUCED to P50,000.00.

Spouses William G. Friend and Maria Renee Friend (hereafter appellants) incurred a loan from Union Bank of the
SO ORDERED.[6]
Philippines (hereafter appellee) in the original amount of Eight Hundred Eighteen Thousand One Hundred Thirty Six
Pesos (P818,136.00). The money was used to purchase a Hyundai Starex Van in January 1999. A Promissory Note was
executed by appellants promising to pay to the order of appellee.

In order to secure the obligation, a chattel mortgage, embodied in the same promissory note, was constituted on said
Hyundai Starex Van.
Appellants defaulted in the payment of their obligation. Despite repeated demands to pay the obligation or, in the
alternative, to turn over the subject vehicle for foreclosure, appellants did not comply. Due to such non-compliance,
appellee instituted an action for collection of sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin.
The writ of replevin was issued on September 11, 2000 ordering the sheriff of the RTC, Branch 115 to take custody of
the Hyundai Starex Van. Unfortunately, the sheriff was not able to implement said writ because the vehicle could not
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated October 21, 2004. Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I.
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that petitioners were not denied due process for
being declared as in default and for being denied the opportunity to present evidence. Corollarily, whether or not
petitioners are bound by the negligence of their counsel.
3
 II.
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that petitioners Sps. Friend are liable under the
loan-agreement.[7]
Petitioners seek the reversal of the trial courts and Court of Appeals decision invoking counsels negligence in failing to file an
answer in the trial court. Petitioners insist that their case is an exception to the general rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
They aver that they were not able to present evidence in their behalf and were thus deprived of their constitutional right to be heard.
The petition lacks merit.
The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. [8] Otherwise, there would be no end to a suit so long as a new
counsel could be employed who would allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned.[9]
However, this rule admits certain exceptions, such as: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice
so require.[10] Indeed, there have been instances when this court had accorded relief to the client who suffered by reason of their lawyers gross
or palpable mistake or negligence.[11] The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in
support of ones defense. Where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can
present its side or defend its interest in due course, there is no denial of procedural due process. [12]
In the case at bar, while petitioners former counsel failed to file an answer to the complaint filed by Union Bank, however, he
seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court. Under the Rules of Court, in ordinary appealed cases to the Court of
Appeals, the appellant may include in his assignment of errors any question of law and fact that has been raised in the court below and which
is within the issues framed by the parties.[13] Petitioners were thus afforded the chance to raise their defenses as the case is opened for
comprehensive review by the appellate court.
In Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad,[14] we held that:
... [T]o sustain petitioners arguments that it was denied due process of law due to negligence of its counsel
would set a dangerous precedent. It would enable every party to render inutile any adverse order or decision through
the simple expedient of alleging gross negligence on the part of its counsel. The Court will not countenance such a
farce which contradicts long-settled doctrines of trial and procedure.[15]
We find no reason to depart from this ruling. Besides, there is no compelling reason to relax the rules in favor of petitioners, who
are not entirely blameless. Petitioners should have taken a more active role in the proceedings of the case against them. Litigants represented
by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. [16]
Anent the second issue raised by petitioners, suffice it to say that the factual findings and conclusion of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect and will not generally be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing that
the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances that would warrant a different disposition of the case. [17]
In this case, it is not disputed that petitioners executed a Promissory Note with a Chattel Mortgage in favor of Union Bank. The
action sought by the bank in the trial court was the payment of the amount loaned to petitioners. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals,
the trial courts decision did not even mention the vehicle but rather, ordered the payment of petitioners existing obligation, damages and cost
of suit. Thus, it matters not that the subject vehicle was already sold to a third party because the suit was grounded on the promissory note
executed by the petitioners.
Petitioners argument that it was Drive Motors Incorporated (Drive Motors), through its owner and general manager, Aimee
Dumaran, which facilitated their monthly payments to Union Bank and that Union Bank was informed about the transfer of the vehicle,
4

deserves no consideration. The obligation to pay the bank rests primarily on petitioners and not on Drive Motors or Dumaran who merely
acted as an intermediary. Their unqualified reliance on Dumaran could not exculpate them from their predicament.
By their own admission, in late 1999, petitioners had been informed that the checks issued by Drive Motors in payment for the
van bounced.[18] Prudence dictates that petitioners should have talked directly with a representative of Union Bank to check on the status of
their car loan. Instead, petitioners chose to take Dumarans word that she will settle the problem. As signatories to a valid and subsisting
promissory note, petitioners are directly liable to Union Bank for the amount of the loan, regardless of their possession or ownership of the
subject vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 1, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74499
and its Resolution dated October 21, 2004, are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 143783 December 9, 2002
DANTE SARRAGA, SR. and MARIA TERESA SARRAGA, petitioners,
vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Spouses Dante Sarraga, Sr. and Maria Teresa Sarraga, petitioners, were the absolute owners of three (3) parcels of land, one
of which is Lot 416-B, situated in Poblacion, Cagayan de Oro City, and the other two, Lots 1053-A and 1053-B, in Lapasan,
same city.
Sometime in the early 1980s, petitioners mortgaged their lots to Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino),
respondent, as security for a loan in the amount of P3,618,714.59.
Petitioners defaulted in the payment of their loan. Consequently, Banco Filipino foreclosed the mortgage.
On June 29, 1984, Banco Filipino was placed in conservatorship by the Central Bank of the Philippines. On January 25, 1985,
it was ordered closed and placed under receivership and liquidation.
On April 9, 1985, or before the expiration of the period for the redemption of the lots, petitioner Dante P. Sarraga sent a letter to
Banco Filipinos receiver-liquidator offering to redeem the same.
On July 2, 1985, Deputy Receiver Arnulfo B. Aurellano wrote petitioners that "at this stage of the liquidation of the bank, we are
not yet selling the aforesaid properties."
Since petitioners were not allowed to redeem their lots within the period prescribed by law, titles thereto were consolidated in
the name of Banco Filipino.
On October 10, 1986, petitioners received a letter from Banco Filipino recognizing their intention to redeem their lots. Later,
Banco Filipino, through its liquidators, started negotiating with petitioners on the terms of redemption.
Finally, on October 30, 1990, Mr. Renan Santos, then Banco Filipinos liquidator, wrote petitioners allowing them to repurchase
the lots for P8,506,597.73, with 12% interest per annum, under the terms stipulated therein.1 The terms include, among others,
that petitioners may pay by installments and that upon full payment of the repurchase price, Banco Filipino shall execute
the corresponding deed of sale for the three (3) lots in their favor.2 They were likewise granted the power to manage and
administer the building located in Lot 416-B. The terms were later embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement3 (MOA) signed
by the parties.
On May 16, 1991, Banco Filipino formally conveyed to petitioners the two (2) lots (Lots 1053-A and 1053-B) located in
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
On October 30, 1992, petitioners paid in full the total repurchase price for the three (3) lots. However, Banco Filipino refused
to execute the corresponding deed of sale and turn over Lot 416-B to petitioners.
Instead, Banco Filipino, on April 5, 1993, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, a
complaint4 against petitioners for quieting of title, recovery of ownership and possession, accounting and damages, docketed
as Civil Case No. 93-186.
On April 27, 1993, petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. 5 They were represented by Atty. Florentino G. Dumlao, Jr.
who formally entered his appearance as their counsel of record.
However, prior to the pre-trial, Atty. Dumlao suffered a mild stroke, incapacitating him from participating actively in the
proceedings, prompting petitioners to hire the services of another counsel, Atty. Rogelio Bagabuyo. While the latter appeared
for the petitioners during the hearing and signed pleadings for them, Atty. Dumlao remained petitioners counsel of record. As
such, the trial court continued to serve pleadings, motions, processes, and other documents upon Atty. Dumlao.
On June 1, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision,6 the dispositive portion of which states:
"Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. Declaring the sale and conveyance of the two (2) parcels of land (denominated as Lots 1035-A and 1053-B)
situated in Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, as valid and title thereto shall pertain to defendant spouses
Sarraga;
2. Declaring plaintiff Banco Filipino to be the true and lawful owners of Lot 416-B and the building therein (formerly
known as the Lucar Building but now as Executive Centrum) situated along J.R. Borja Street, Cagayan de Oro City;
3. Ordering defendant spouses Sarraga to immediately relinquish and surrender possession of Lot No. 416-B and
the building thereon to plaintiff Bank; and
5
 4. All other claims of plaintiff Bank as well as counterclaims by the defendants are dismissed.
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."7
On July 1, 1998. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,8 signed by both Attys. Dumlao and Bagabuyo.
On September 3, 1998, the trial court issued an order9 denying petitioners motion. On September 10, 1998, the order was
received by Ms. Llerna Guligado, a newly-hired clerk at the office of Atty. Bagabuyo. Owing to her lack of work experience in a
law office, she merely left the court order on her desk and eventually it was misplaced. She failed to bring the matter to the
attention of Atty. Bagabuyo when she resigned on September 15, 1998. The day before, or on September 14, 1998, Atty.
Bagabuyo was appointed Senior State Prosecutor in the Department of Justice. Due to his excitement and relocation to Manila,
he failed to apprise Atty. Dumlao on the status of the case.
Concerned that no action had been taken on their motion for reconsideration of the Decision, petitioners, on December 7,
1998, verified its status. In the trial court, they found that the records of the case were already transmitted to the Court of
Appeals due to a partial appeal interposed by Banco Filipino.
This prompted petitioners to file with the trial court a notice of appeal which was denied for being late.
Eventually, they filed a petition for relief from judgment.10 During the hearing, they came to know that the order dated
September 3, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was served upon Atty. Bagabuyo only.
On February 12, 1999, the trial court issued an order11 dismissing the petition for relief on the ground that it was filed out of
time. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. 12
They then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA GR-SP No. 53765, ascribing to the trial court
grave abuse of discretion for dismissing their petition for relief from judgment.
On June 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision13 dismissing the petition, thus:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, we hold that public respondent did not err much less act with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the disputed orders, for which reason, the herein petition has to
be, as it is hereby DISMISSSED.
"SO ORDERED."14
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issues for our resolution are: 1) whether there was a valid service of the trial courts order denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Bagabuyo; 2) whether Atty. Bagabuyo was negligent which prevented petitioners from
filing a timely notice of appeal; and 3) if so, whether such negligence is binding upon petitioners.
Petitioners maintain that Atty. Bagabuyo is not their counsel of record since he did not file with the trial court a formal
appearance. Consequently, the service upon him of the trial courts order denying their motion for reconsideration is not valid.
Such posture is untenable. It is undisputed that petitioners were represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Dumlao and Bagabuyo.
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, 15 service of the trial courts order denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration may be made upon either counsel. 16
The Court of Appeals correctly found that indeed petitioners counsel was Atty. Bagabuyo, thus:
"We find no merit in the first ground invoked by petitioners. As explained by the court a quo in its May 24, 1999 order-
"The records of this case show that Atty. Rogelio Zosa B. Bagabuyo did not merely enter his appearance orally at every
hearing which he attended. He filed several pleadings in this case as counsel for the defendants in which he indicated his
address. The first pleading that he filed x x x was a MOTION TO HEAR SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AS IF A
MOTION TO DISMISS HAD BEEN FILED, dated November 28, 1994, which he signed alone as counsel for Defendants and
in which he indicated his address as Suite 201, Travellers Life Building, corners Tiano & J.R. Borja Streets, City of Cagayan de
Oro. Atty. Bagabuyo, since he started appearing in this case, acted alone, signed pleadings alone, made decisions alone,
without in any way indicating to the court and the adverse party that he had to defer to the judgment of Atty. Dumlao on any
matter pertaining to the instant case. He presented the defendant Dante Sarraga and the latters witness, Mr. Gaudencio
Beduya, at the trial of this case and terminated the presentation of the defendants evidence without consulting, or intimating to
the court and the adverse party that he had to consult Atty. Dumlao on the matter. The MEMORANDUM FOR THE
DEFENDANTS dated April 8, 1996 was signed by him alone as counsel for the defendants. Atty. Rogelio Zosa Bagabuyo
signed as lead counsel the defendants Motion for Reconsideration dated 26 June 1998 and the Urgent Rejoinder to Plaintiffs
Opposition To Our Motion for Reconsideration dated 03 August 1998, in which he indicated his address as 14th-10th Streets,
Macasandig, City of Cagayan de Oro. He signed alone as counsel for the defendants an URGENT MOTION TO CANCEL
SCHEDULED HEARING ON 31 July 1998 dated 28 July 1998 in which he indicated his address as 72 corners 14th-
10th Streets, Macasandig, City of Cagayan de Oro. (Annex "F," Petition, pp. 196-197, rollo).
"Given the foregoing circumstances and the court a quos further observation that Atty. Bagabuyo had been the one actively
handling the case for the defendants since the pre-trial stage, x x x it is simply absurd for petitioners to even suggest that
service upon Atty. Bagabuyo of a copy of the Order dated September 3, 1998 which denied their Motion for Reconsideration of
the judgment was ineffective or did not bind them. To be sure, Section 2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
provides that (i)f any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them x x x.
The obvious meaning of said rule is that if a party is represented by more than one lawyer, service of pleadings, judgments and
other papers may be made on any one of them.
Obviously, Atty. Bagabuyo was negligent which prevented petitioners from filing a timely notice of appeal. Atty. Bagabuyo knew
that his clerk has no work experience in a law firm. He should have supervised her office performance very closely considering
the importance of his legal calling. Time and again this Court has admonished law offices to adopt a system of distributing and
receiving pleadings and notices, so that the lawyers will be promptly informed of the status of their cases. Thus, the negligence
of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers is binding upon the latter. 17
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client. However, the application of the general
rule to a given case should be looked into and adopted according to the surrounding circumstances. 18Thus, exceptions to the
said rule have been recognized by this Court: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the
interests of justice so require.19 In such cases, courts must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.
Here, we find that the negligence of Atty. Bagabuyo falls under the said exceptions. Indeed, he committed gross negligence.
Petitioners were deprived of their right to appeal when he failed to inform them immediately of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts decision. Ultimately, this will result in the deprivation of their property, specifically Lot 416-B.
In Apex Mining, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,20 this Court ruled:
6
"If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a result thereof is so serious
that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to
give the client another chance to present his case. Similarly, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully and
fairly presenting his case as a result of his lawyers professional delinquency or infidelity the litigation may be reopened to allow
the party to present his side. Where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in
the clients being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be
set aside on such ground.
"In view of the foregoing circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present
evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made suffer for the lawyers mistakes and should be afforded another
opportunity, at least, to introduce evidence on their behalf. To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather
than rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous
lawyers."
Petitioners cannot be faulted for failing to verify the status of their case with the trial court since a client has the right to expect
that his lawyer will protect his interest during the hearing of his case.
"A client may reasonably expect that his counsel will make good his representations and has the right to expect that his lawyer
will protect his interests during the trial of his case. For the general employment of an attorney to prosecute or defend a case or
proceeding ordinarily vests in a plaintiffs attorney the implied authority to take all steps or do all acts necessary or incidental to
the regular and orderly prosecution and management of the suit, and in a defendants attorney, the power to take such steps
as he deems necessary to defend the suit and protect the interests of the defendant."21
Undoubtedly, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition for relief. Considering the circumstances
obtaining here, petitioners should not be made to suffer the consequences of their counsels negligence. Hence, the period
within which to file their petition for relief should be reckoned from their actual receipt of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration, which is December 7, 1998. Accordingly, the petition for relief filed on December 16, 1998 was well within the
sixty-day period prescribed in Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Both lower courts actually sacrificed justice for technicality. This Court has consistently ruled that it is a far better and more
prudent course of action for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to
attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a
false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. 22 Hence, it
would be more in accord with justice and equity to allow the appeal by petitioners to enable the Court of Appeals to review the
trial courts decision.
The fundamental purpose of procedural rules is to afford each litigant every opportunity to present evidence in their behalf in
order that substantial justice is achieved. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the
rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. The
dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities.23
Hence, in cases where a party was denied this right, we have relaxed the stringent application of procedural rules in order to
allow a party the chance to be heard. This policy applies with equal force in case of appeals. It has been consistently held that
the dismissal of appeal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. 24
"x x x, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very
aims. Verily, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may even stay the dismissal of appeals grounded merely on
technicalities, especially in this case where petitioners appeal appears prima facie worthy of the CAs full consideration on the
merits."25
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 20, 2000 in CA-GR SP
No. 53765 is SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City is DIRECTED to grant the petition for
relief filed by petitioners and to GIVE DUE COURSE to their notice of appeal in Civil Case No. 93-186.
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 135378 : June 23, 2005]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES, Petitioner, v. ANGELITO AMBROSIO, ROMAN OZAETA III and WARREN
QUE, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On April 14, 2004, the Court promulgated a decision sentencing accused-appellant Warren Que to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thereafter, the following incidents transpired:
1. A letter dated June 14, 2004 was filed through mail on June 17, 2004 by accused-appellant Warren Que,
praying for the reconsideration of the Court's Decision dated April 14, 2004, stating that his lawyer abandoned
him in the course of his appeal and that he is poor and cannot afford to hire another lawyer.
2. On July 28, 2004, the Court issued a Resolution considering said letter as a motion for reconsideration of
the decision and denying the same for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Based on the
Report of the Clerk of Court of the Second Division, the registry return card evidencing the date of receipt of
the decision by Atty. Nestor Ifurung, Que's counsel of record, shows that he received it on May 3, 2004; while
proof of personal service on the Bureau of Corrections on behalf of appellant Que shows the date of receipt of
said decision as April 21, 2004.
3. Another letter dated September 5, 2004 was sent to the Court by appellant Que alleging that he was only
notified of the Court's Decision dated April 14, 2004 on May 24, 2004. Be that as it may, the letter-motion for
reconsideration was still filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period as it was filed only on June 17, 2004,
while the last day for filing a motion for reconsideration, reckoned from May 24, 2004, would have been on
June 8, 2004. Que reiterated his claim that his counsel of record, Atty. Nestor Ifurung, negligently handled and
abandoned his case and requested that his lawyer be required by the Court to explain why he failed to file a
motion for reconsideration of the decision.
4. Acting on Que's letter dated September 5, 2004, the Court, on December 13, 2004, issued a Resolution
requiring Atty. Ifurung to comment on Que's allegation.
5. Subsequently, the Court received Atty. Ifurung's Compliance wherein he stated that (a) he cannot be
deemed negligent as shown by his well-prepared brief for his client; (b) he is convinced of his client's
innocence, but at the time he received the Court's decision, he was and still is suffering from a number of
physical ailments; and (c) he already presented in the Appellant's Brief all the legal arguments against the
judgment of conviction, and upon reading the Court's Decision, he honestly believed that the Court was not
likely to reverse its decision upon a motion for reconsideration and, thus, decided not to file one. It is noted
that no medical certificate was attached to Atty. Ifurung's Compliance to substantiate his claim of physical
ailments.
7
6. The Court then received an undated third letter from Que wherein it appears that he misunderstood the
Court's Resolution dated December 13, 2004 to mean that the Court already ruled Atty. Ifurung to be guilty of
neglecting his duty to defend his client. Que further stated that since his lawyer was found to have abandoned
him during the course of the trial of his case, he (Que) presumed that the Court is giving him another chance
to prove his innocence. He then inquires what the Court's basis was for affirming his conviction, while his two
co-accused were acquitted. Lastly, he again begged that his case be re-examined and reconsidered.
The above circumstances deserve the special attention of the Court.
a matter of routine, would refuse to reverse or modify its decision. It is a fact that the Court has modified its
own decision if there were good reasons presented in a motion for reconsideration.
Under similar circumstances where the facts on record clearly reveal the misconduct committed by a judge or
a lawyer, the Court had, in previous cases,5 seen it proper to forego the filing of an administrative case and
instead imposed sanctions on the person responsible for the misdeed in the disposition of the main case. Here,
Atty. Ifurung had clearly been remiss in the performance of his duties, prejudicing the rights of his client. His
conduct definitely merits sanction by the Court.rbl r l l lbrr

In his Compliance, Atty. Nestor Ifurung admitted that he decided not to file a motion for reconsideration, as he
believed that filing said motion would merely be an exercise in futility. His decision not to file a motion for
reconsideration was apparently made without conferring with and without the acquiescence of his client,
accused-appellant Que.
It should be emphasized that this is a criminal case involving appellant's conviction for selling a regulated drug
without authority of law for which he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Imprisonment
for twenty years and one day to forty years would unquestionably wreak havoc on appellant's life, not to
mention that of his entire family. Thus, considering the gravity of the penalty, accused should have been
vigorously defended to the end by his counsel of record.
With Atty. Ifurung's admission that he decided on his own not to file a motion for reconsideration, and with the
assertion of Que that he cannot afford to hire another lawyer, the Court is fully convinced that appellant was
deprived of legal assistance in the filing of his motion for reconsideration. Accused-appellant not having been
properly represented by counsel, he is entitled to be given an opportunity to file an appropriate motion for
reconsideration, duly assisted by counsel.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) RECALL and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated July 28, 2004 denying accused Que's letter motion for
reconsideration;

After the promulgation of the Court's Decision of April 14, 2004, the remedy of a motion for reconsideration
(2) FIND Atty. Nestor Ifurung guilty of being remiss of his duties as counsel for accused-appellant Warren Que
was still available to Que but his counsel of record admittedly abandoned this remedy. The fact that Que never
and REPRIMAND him for his omission. Let copies of this Resolution be FURNISHED to the Integrated Bar of the
ceased to send letters to the Court imploring that his case be reconsidered shows that he definitely wishes to
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant;
exhaust the remedy of a motion for reconsideration. It is a lawyer's sworn duty to present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law in support of his client's cause. A lawyer owes such commitment to his
client despite his personal views.1 As held in Ong v. Atty. Grijaldo,2 to wit: (3) APPOINT the Public Attorney's Office as counsel de oficio for accused Que;

. . . he [the lawyer] owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
(4) REQUIRE the Division Clerk of Court to FURNISH the Public Attorney's Office with a copy of this Resolution
and the Court's Decision dated April 14, 2004; andcralawlibrary
(5) REQUIRE the Public Attorney's Office to file a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated April 14,
2004 in behalf of accused Que within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof.

Appellant Que was entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and he was only right in expecting his SO ORDERED.
lawyer to fully exhaust such remedies. Unfortunately, in this case, his counsel withheld such remedy from him.
The Court cannot countenance the fact that Que was prejudiced by the fact that he was not duly represented
by counsel when he filed his letter-motion for reconsideration, dated June 14, 2004. G.R. No. L-19295 November 20, 1923

In Amil v. Court of Appeals,3 the Court held that where the negligence of the lawyer of a party is so gross that EMILIO G. MAPUA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
said party was deprived of his day in court, as a result of which he is deprived of property without due process
FELIX MENDOZA, PRUDENCIO NAVOA, and ISABEL PELAYO, defendants-appellants.
of law, said case should be considered an exception to the general rule that a client is bound by the mistakes
of his counsel. What is involved in the present case is not property but the very liberty of the accused-
appellant. Thus, there is more reason for the Court to consider this as a case that comes under the exception Hipolito de Jesus for appellants.
to the general rule. Ramon Sotelo for appellee.

The Court sees the need to correct the injustice caused to accused-appellant Que by Atty. Ifurung's refusal to
file a motion for reconsideration due to his belief that "this Honorable Tribunal will not likely reverse its
decision upon a motion for reconsideration."4 The Court deems it proper to rebuke Atty. Ifurung for having MALCOLM, J.:
preempted this Court in resolving a motion for reconsideration. It should never be presumed that the Court, as
8
Emilio G. Mapua, the plaintiff in this case, recovered in the lower court on a default judgment, from the defendants jointly and
severally, the sum of P38,200, representing double the amount which he had lost in a game of monte, with legal interest from
January 30, 1922, and with costs. The defendants appeal and assign six errors.
The record before us and ancillary records in other cases are perfect examples of professional carelessness, closely akin to
gross negligence in pleading and practice. This will partially explain why the court has had the case under advisement for so
long a period of time, and why it is now necessary to pick our way as best we may through an accumulation of uncertain data
to as just a conclusion as is possible.
Records Nos. 19413 1 and 18133, 2 the first a civil action brought by Felix Mendoza, one of the instant defendants, against
Emilio G. Mapua, the instant plaintiff, and the second, and original action in mandamus brought by Emilio G. Mapua, the
present plaintiff, against Felix Mendoza, one of the instant defendants, and Judge of First Instance Harvey, disclose that in
these proceedings, Mapua set up a counterclaim for P38,200. But this was denied by the trial court and this denial was
sustained here on the ground that a joint debt may not be set up against a separate demand. Encouraged, nevertheless, by
this intimation, Mapua instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Felix Mendoza, and
Prudencio Navoa and his wife Isabel Pelayo (No. 19295).
The situation can best be visualized by making first a statement of the case which will disclose the outstanding proceedings
and dates. Then our next task will be to apply the procedural law to the facts; after which, we shall be in a position to give
attention to the merits of the controversy.
Turning directly to the record and the bill of exceptions, the following is noted:
Plaintiff's complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on January 30, 1922. Summons were issued and served
on the defendants that same day. As is customary, the latter were required to enter their appearance in the office of the clerk of
the Court of First Instance of Manila within twenty days after the service of the summons, and to answer the complaint of the
plaintiff within the time fixed by the rules of the court, which is ten days after appearance. The attorneys for the defendants,
however, waited until February 21st of the same year to enter their appearance. On the supposition that this appearance was
in time, and this point is not questioned, the defendants then had ten days within which to demur or answer.
No action having been taken by the attorneys for the defendants up to and including the last day permitted by the law and the
rules, on March 6, 1922, the attorney for the plaintiff moved for a default judgment, and on this motion the trial judge noted as
of March 8, 1922, "Como se pide." The proper orders for default were made on March 9 and March 11, 1922.
It appears that the attorneys for the defendants had presented in court on March 7, 1922, a motion for a bill of particulars,
without, however, proving service on the attorney for the plaintiff. On March 13, 1922, the attorneys for the defendants renewed
their motion for a bill of particulars and asked that the declaration of default be set aside. Copy of this unverified motion was
received by the attorney for the plaintiff. Said motion was amended and amplified on March 17, 1922, in another motion which
was subscribed to by counsel before a notary public.
In the meantime, however, trial was had on March 14, 1922, without the presence of the defendants, and the case for the
plaintiff was submitted. The trial court thereupon rendered judgment and handed down an appropriate order on the motions to
raise the default against the defendants. The decision set out the complaint and the various steps in the proceedings, made
findings of fact based on the testimony for the plaintiff, and, in conformity with the Gambling Law, Act No. 1757, gave sentence
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants for P38,200, with legal interest and costs, as above indicated. The
subsequent order on the motions to set aside the default against defendants stated various reasons leading to the conclusion
that there was no ground for allowing said motions.
On appeal in this court, after the passage of considerable time, the bill of exceptions and the briefs were finally presented and
the case was placed on the December, 1922, calendar. It then came to the knowledge of the court, through a motion filed by
attorneys for the appellants after the case was submitted for decision, that the stenographic notes had not yet been written up
and elevated to the appellate court. The evidence, however, is now before us.
The law applicable to the foregoing incidents in this case is full and clear. Abridging its provisions somewhat for the appropriate
sections of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Court are, of course, familiar to the profession; the Code provides, in
part, that the only pleadings allowed on the part of the defendant are (1) the demurrer to the complaint, and (2) the answer.
(Sec. 89.) The defendants had ten days after they had entered their appearance to serve and file their demurrer or answer to
the complaint. (Rules of Court of First Instance of the Philippine Islands, No. 5.) The court could, however, in its discretion,
have allowed an answer or other pleading to be made after the time limited by the Rules of the Court for filing the same. (Code
of Civil Procedure, secs. 2, 110; Unson vs. Abrera [1909], 14 Phil., 146.) But if a defendant fails to appear at the time required
in the summons or to answer at the time provided by the Rules of the Court, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff, order
judgment for the plaintiff by default and shall proceed to hear the plaintiff and his witnesses, and to render final judgment.
(Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 128.)
It is perfectly obvious that the defendants did not file their demurrer or answer to the complaint within the period fixed by the
Code and the Rules. Nor did they make proper representations to secure additional time within which to present an answer or
other pleading. Judgment by default was thus properly rendered, unless there was some special reason for taking the case out
of the general rule. lawphil.net
For a motion to set aside a default judgment to prosper, the moving party must show by an affidavit of merits that if the default
is set aside, he has a just and valid defense to present. Motions to set aside judgments by default are addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. (Coombs vs. Santos [1913], 24 Phil., 446; Daipan vs. Sigabu [1913], 25 Phil., 184.)
The situation here is somewhat complicated by the action of counsel for the defendants in filing a motion for a bill of particulars
instead of presenting either a demurrer or an answer. They assert that as this motion was pending when the order of the
default was made, it should be construed as tolling the time for them to demur or answer. It is, however, not incumbent upon us
to settle the interesting question of whether the pendency of a motion to make the plaintiffs plead more definitely, or to file
specifications, so as to furnish the adverse party with complete information as to the claims which he is required to meet, in
conformity with section 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, extends the time to demur or answer. While it is generally irregular
to enter judgment by default while a motion remains pending and undisposed of, yet, where such motion is filed out of time, it
would not reversible error to enter a judgment by default. (There can be noted the cases of Naderhoff vs. Geo. Benz & Sons
[1913], 25 N. Dak., 165; 47 L.R.A., 853; D.S. Register & Co. vs. Pringle Brothers [1990], 58 Fla., 355; Shinn vs. Cummins
[1884], 65 Cal., 97; Higley and Higley vs. Pollock [1891], 21 Nev., 198; Plummer vs. Weil [1896], 15 Wash., 427, holding that
the motion filed by the defendant for a bill of particulars, is sufficient ipso facto to extend the time for answering.)
Without deciding, therefore, if the application for a bill of particulars extends the time for the defendants to demur or answer, it
is sufficient to say that the application for such an order must be seasonably made. Here, as the defendants neither demurred
nor answered, or filed their motion for a bill of particulars in time, and as their motion to set aside the default judgment showed
no meritorious defense and was in itself defective, we reach the conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial judge in proceeding as he did and in refusing to set aside his order of default against the defendants.
On the merits, little need be said. The complaint alleged, and the plaintiff proved to the satisfaction of the court, that in a game
of monte conducted by Felix Mendoza, Prudencio Navoa and Isabel Pelayo, the plaintiff was the loser to the extent of P19,100
as disclosed by the checks of record. Our Gambling Law permits any person who loses any money or valuable consideration
or thing in any gambling house, or at any prohibited game such as monte, or his heirs, executors, administrators, or judgment
creditors to recover within three years thereafter the money, consideration, or thing, together with an additional sum equal to
the value thereof from the persons in charge of the game, or in control of the gambling house. The only doubtful point is as to
the liability of Isabel Pelayo; but as to her, construing the provisions of articles, 1406 and 1411 of the Civil Code in relation with
sections 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the Gambling Law, we decide that she is jointly and severally liable with her codefendants.
(See Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil, vol. 9, p. 645.) Moreover, no specific assignment of error is made or argued to this
end.
9
While the records under consideration disclose that the plaintiff Emilio G. Mapua is a gambler who, not content to accept his
loses without murmur, has seen fit to take advantage of the law to recoup himself, and while his action engenders no
sympathy, we have, nevertheless, to apply the law, and in so doing find present to reversible error which would warrant us in
disturbing the appreciation of the case as made by Judge Harvey.
Judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
A.C. No. 492 September 5, 1967
OLEGARIA BLANZA and MARIA PASION, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AGUSTIN ARCANGEL, respondent.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to take disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Agustin
Arcangel for professional non-feasance. They complain that way back in April, 1955, respondent volunteered to help them in
their respective pension claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they
handed over to him the pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed
that since then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and when they finally asked for the return of their
papers six years later, respondent refused to surrender them.
Respondent answered these accusations before Fiscal Raa to whom this case was referred by the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. He admitted having received the documents from complainants but explainer that it
was for photostating purposes only. His failure to immediately return them, he said, was due to complainants' refusal to hand
him the money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing said documents from the photostat
service. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over, on December 13, 1961, the documents,
their respective photostats and the photostat service receipt to the fiscal.
Finding respondent's explanation satisfactory and considering that he charged complainants nothing for his services, Fiscal
Raa recommended the former's exoneration, or at most, that he be reprimanded only. The Solicitor General, however, feels
that respondent deserves at least a severe reprimand considering (1) his failure to attend to complainants' pension claims for
six years; (2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite repeated demands upon him, and (3) his failure to return
to complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her documents.
At the hearing of the case before this Court on October 21, 1963, only respondent, thru counsel, appeared. In lieu of oral
arguments, therefore, respondent submitted his memorandum, annexing therewith an affidavit executed by Olegaria Blanza
asking for the dismissal of the administrative case.1
Respondent first submits that he was not obliged to follow up complainants' pension claims since there was no agreement for
his compensation as their counsel. Respondent, however, overlooks the fact that he volunteered his professional services and
thus was not legally entitled to recover fees.2 But having established the attorney-client relationship voluntarily, he was bound
to attend to complainants' claims with all due diligence.
Nevertheless, We find the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary action against respondent
attorney. There is no clear preponderance of evidence substantiating the accusations against him. 3
Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning the documents has not been controverted by
complainants. On the contrary, they admitted4 that respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did
not give him any money therefor. Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually returned by respondent during
the fiscal's investigation with him paying for the photostating costs himself. And the condition of the photostats themselves
they appear to have been in existence for quite some time5 supports respondent's allegation that they remained in
possession of the photostat service for the failure of the owners (respondents and/or complainants), to withdraw the same
upon payment of the corresponding costs. Hence, complainants themselves are partly to blame for the delay in filing their
respective claims.1awphl.nt
As for the alleged failure of respondent to return all her documents to complainant Pasion, the former denies this. Fiscal Raa
made no findings on the matter. The affidavit of Mrs. Blanza pardoning respondent cannot prejudice complainant Pasion
because res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Still, there is equiponderance of evidence which must necessarily redound
to respondent's benefit. Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to substantiate her charges in the hearing set for October
21, 1963 but she let it go. Neither she nor her counsel of record appeared.
But while We are constrained to dismiss the charges against respondent for being legally insufficient, yet We cannot but
counsel against his actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than
merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community,
looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this case,
he volunteers his professional services. Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have
complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their pension claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, respondent should
have forthwith terminated their professional relationship instead of keeping them hanging indefinitely. And altho We voted that
he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the high standards of his chosen
profession require of him.
Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed. So ordered.
G.R. Nos. L-25739 and L-25886 January 31, 1969
DIONISIO PALTENG, DIONISIO VALDEZ, ANDRES CALIGUIRAN, REGIDOR BASILIO, ERNESTO BRITOS, and
SIMPLICIO CADIENTE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (Special Fourth Division), FLORENTINA RESPICIO and
ROSA MALLABO, respondents.
Alejandro C. Mira for petitioners.
Eligio A. Labog for respondents Florentina Respicio and Rosa Mallabo.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petitions for review of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the undocketed cases Nos. 1174 and 1204, CFI,
Isabela, entitled "Florentina Respicio vs. Dionisio Palteng, et al.", for failure of therein defendants to pay the docket fees, and
denying said defendants' motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's dismissal order.
It may be gathered from the pleadings herein submitted that petitioners, Dionisio Palteng, et al., were the defendants in two
separate ejectment cases originally filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Gamu, Isabela, by Florentina Respicio and Rosa
Mallabo. Receiving an unfavorable verdict, defendants (through Attorney Pacifico Capuchino) appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Isabela where the two cases, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 1174 and 1204, were jointly tried de novo.
10
 On 31 May 1962, judgment was rendered on the two cases, ordering the defendants once more (1) to vacate the lands
subject of the actions; (2) defendant Dionisio Palteng to pay damages to the plaintiffs for the produce of the land that the latter
failed to receive since 1957; and (3) all of them to pay attorneys' fees.
Defendants in due time notified the trial court of their intention to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. And, on 25
August 1962, the notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal, submitted for the defendants by Atty. Teodulo E.
Mirasol, were approved. Accordingly, the records of the cases were transmitted to the appellate court.
entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the
discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney
shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such
judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the disputed resolutions of the Court of Appeals, and without prejudice to whatever action
may lie against the attorneys, these petitions are dismissed, with costs against the petitioners.

On 20 July 1965, however, the Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the two cases for failure of defendants to pay the A.C. No. 5092 August 11, 2004
necessary docketing fees, notwithstanding the Court's requirement therefor. When sometime later the dismissal order came to
the knowledge of Atty. Mirasol, who allegedly was not notified thereof, the latter made inquiries, and it was found out that the
LUCILA S. BARBUCO, complainant,
Court of Appeals' notice to pay the fees had been sent to Atty. Pacifica T. Capuchino, who was defendants' counsel of record
vs.
in the trial court. Thereupon, defendants moved for reconsideration of the resolution of dismissal of the Court of Appeals, and,
ATTY. RAYMUNDO N. BELTRAN, respondent.
upon its denial, the present petition was filed.

In claiming that the dismissal of their appeal constituted a grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals, petitioners
contend that the service of notice to pay the docket fees on Atty. Capuchino (who must have failed to inform the defendants of
the requirement) was ineffective and not binding on them, because such notice should have been served upon Atty. Mirasol,
who signed and submitted the notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. In other words, it is the contention of DECISION
petitioners that, for purposes of the appeal, it is Atty. Mirasol who should have been considered the counsel of record and upon
whom notices and processes should have been served.

There is no merit to this argument. For it is not denied that Atty. Capuchino was petitioners' counsel of record in the trial court;
and that while it is true that it was Atty. Mirasol who filed the notice of appeal, appeal bond and the record on appeal, it is
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
equally a fact that there had been no formal relief of Atty. Capuchino as counsel for the defendants (petitioners) and no formal
substitution by Atty. Mirasol. The situation is that, on record, defendants-appellants stood represented by two lawyers who, in
view of the absence of notification to the contrary, are considered their attorneys in the appeal (Section 2, Revised Rule 46). A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. 1 While a lawyer may decline to render services for a person for
Considering that, where a party is represented by two attorneys, service of notice or pleading on either of them is sufficient to valid reasons, once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he begins to owe fidelity to that cause and must always be
bind such party, 1 there was no abuse of discretion in the Court of Appeals' ruling that there had been proper and adequate mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve his client with competence and diligence, and champion the
notice to defendants (petitioners) to pay the docket fees, a requirement that they failed to observe. And as failure to pay the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.2
docket fee is a ground for dismissal of an appeal, 2 the Court of Appeals clearly acted correctly in issuing the resolutions in
question.1awphil.t
On July 9, 1999, Lucila S. Barbuco filed a Sworn Complaint3 against Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran for malpractice of law,
negligence and dishonesty.
If Atty. Mirasol had been engaged to replace Atty. Capuchino, the provisions of Section 2, Rule 46, and of Section 26, Rule
138, should have been complied with:
It appears that on March 31, 1998, complainant, through her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of respondent for the
purpose of filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 21, in
Sec. 2. Attorneys and guardians. Attorneys and guardians ad litem of the respective parties in the court below the case entitled, "Alexander Bermido, Plaintiff versus Lucila Barbuco, Defendant." On August 6, 1998, complainant, through
shall be considered as the attorneys and guardians of the same parties respectively in the Court of Appeals. When Benito B. Sy, gave respondent the total sum of P3,500.00 for payment of the docket fees.
others are appointed notice thereof shall be served immediately on the adverse party and filed with the Court.
Complainant's appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58180, was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution4 dated
September 25, 1998 for failure to file Appellant's Brief, pursuant to Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

SEC. 26. Change of attorneys. An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the
written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without
the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he
ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on
the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse
party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and
attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be
Complainant found out that her appeal had been dismissed only on June 4, 1999, when her son went to the Court of Appeals
to verify the status of the case.
When asked to comment on the charges filed against him,5 respondent Beltran averred that the docket fees were paid on time
and that on September 22, 1998, he filed the Appellant's Brief6 with the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal was dismissed.
On October 19, 1998, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, 7 on the ground that he received the notice to file brief on
June 25, 1998; however, on June 26, 1998, he met a vehicular accident which physically incapacitated him for several days;
11
and that as a result of the accident, he suffered head injuries which caused him to lose track of deadlines for the filing of
pleadings.
On March 9, 1999, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied on the ground that the brief for defendant-appellant was filed
forty-three (43) days late.8
On November 22, 1999, the complaint against respondent Beltran was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.9
After hearing, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, submitted on October 6,
2003 her findings and recommendation that respondent Beltran be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5)
years.
On October 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-234 affirming the recommendation of
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala but modified the recommended period of suspension from five (5) years to six (6) months
only.
After a careful review of the records and evidence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. Respondent's conduct relative to the belated filing of the Appellant's Brief falls
below the standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their client's cause.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief within
the reglementary period certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of FORTY THREE (43) days
resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered physical injuries as a result thereof cannot serve to
excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a member of a law firm composed of not just one lawyer.
This is shown by the receipt he issued to complainant and the pleadings which he signed for and on behalf of the Beltran,
Beltran and Beltran Law Office. As such, respondent could have asked any of his partners in the law office to file the
Appellant's Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for Extension of Time to file the said pleading.
In B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,10 we ruled that the confusion in the office of the law firm following the
death of one of its partners is not a valid justification for failing to file the brief. We further ruled in the said case that upon
receipt of the notice to file the brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate.
The failure to timely file a pleading is by itself inexcusable negligence on the part of respondent. Complainant's liability is
further compounded by his failure to maintain an open line of communication with his client, in violation of the provisions of
Rule 18.04, which reads:
A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information.
Clearly, respondent's series of inadvertence prejudiced the case of the complainant. We can not overstress the duty of a
lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients.11
Every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that every case that a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer's fidelity to
the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him. He is mandated to
exert his best efforts to protect the interest of his client within the bounds of the law. The Code of Professional Responsibility
dictates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence and he should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him.12
WHEREFORE, Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran is found guilty of negligence and malpractice and is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to all the
courts.
A.C. No. 6504 August 9, 2005
GEORGE C. SOLATAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES and JOSE C. CAMANO, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
The present case focuses on a critical aspect of the lawyer-client relationshipthe duty of loyalty. The fidelity lawyers owe their
clients is traditionally characterized as "undivided." This means that lawyers must represent their clients and serve their needs
without interference or impairment from any conflicting interest.
This administrative case traces its roots from the manner by which Attys. Jose C. Camano and Oscar A. Inocentes responded
to the efforts of complainant, George C. Solatan, to lease a certain Quezon City apartment belonging to the attorneys clients.
On the basis of acts branded by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as "bordering on technical extortion," accepting
funds and giving unsolicited advice to an adverse party, and casting doubts as to the procedure of levy, the IBP resolved 1 to
recommend the suspension of Atty. Camano from the practice of law for one (1) year. It likewise recommended the reprimand
of Atty. Inocentes, whom it held liable for the aforementioned acts of his associate, under the principle of command
responsibility.
Only Atty. Inocentes has elected to contest the resolution of the IBP, as he questions the propriety of his being held
administratively liable for acts done by Atty. Camano.2 However, the recommendation to suspend Atty. Camano shall also be
passed upon by virtue of Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.3
Attys. Inocentes and Camano were both engaged in the practice of law under the firm name of Oscar Inocentes and
Associates Law Office. Atty. Inocentes held office in his home located at No. 19 Marunong St., Central District, Quezon City,
while Atty. Camano was stationed at an "extension office" of the firm located in 3rd/F, 956 Aurora Blvd., Quirino Dist., Quezon
City.
12
The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Andres and Ludivina Genito (spouses Genito),
owners of an apartment complex (the Genito Apartments) located at 259 Tandang Sora cor. Visayas Avenue, Quezon City,
when the Genito Apartments were placed under sequestration by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
on 9 July 1986.4 The law office represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan, and subsequently,
with authority from the PCGG.5 in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments.6
Complainants sister, Gliceria Solatan, was a tenant in Door 10, Phase B of the Genito Apartments. It appears from the records
that Gliceria Solatan left for the United States in 1986, and since then, the apartment was either intermittently used by
members of her family or placed under the charge of caretakers. 7 In August 1987, a complaint for ejectment for non-payment of
rentals was filed against Gliceria Solatan.8 On 3 March 1988, in a judgment by default, a Decision9 was rendered ordering
Gliceria Solatan to vacate the premises of the apartment, pay the spouses Genito the amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred
Pesos (P30,600.00) as unpaid rentals from February 1986 to July 1987 with interest at 24% per annum from 20 August 1987
until the premises are vacated, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fees, and costs of the suit.10
Complainant was occupying the subject apartment when he learned of the judgment rendered against his sister. On 10 May
1988, prior to the implementation of a writ to execute the judgment, complainant and his mother, Elvira Solatan, approached
Atty. Inocentes at his home office. Complainant informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange the execution of a lease
contract by virtue of which complainant would be the new lessee of the apartment and thus make possible his continued stay
therein. Atty. Inocentes referred complainant and his mother to his associate, Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of the
ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito apartments. After the exchange, complainant went to Atty. Camano at the
satellite office of Atty. Inocentess firm. From here on out, events quickly turned sour. Different versions of subsequent events
were presented. The facts reproduced hereunder are by and large culled from the findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Siegfred B. Mison.
During the meeting with Atty. Camano, a verbal agreement was made in which complainant and his mother agreed to pay the
entire judgment debt of Gliceria Solatan, including fifty percent of the awarded attorneys fees and One Thousand Six Hundred
Pesos (P1,600.00) as costs of suit provided that Atty. Camano would allow complainants continued stay at Door 10, Phase B
of the Genito Apartments. As partial compliance with the agreement, complainant issued in the name Atty. Camano a check for
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) representing half of the P10,000.00 attorneys fees adjudged against complainants sister.
Complainant and his mother failed to make any other payment. Thus, the sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano and some
policemen, enforced the writ of execution on 22 June 1988 and levied the properties found in the subject apartment. An
attempt at renegotiation took place at the insistence of complainant, resulting in Atty. Camanos acquiescence to release the
levied properties and allowing complainant to remain at the apartment, subject to the latters payment of costs incurred in
enforcing the writ of execution and issuance of postdated checks representing installment rental payments. Complainant, thus,
issued four (4) checks drawn on Far East Bank and Trust Company dated the fifteenth (15th) of July, August, September, and
October 1988 each in the amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P3,400.00).11 Half of the amount represented
complainants monthly rental, while the other half, a monthly installment for the payment of Gliceria Solatans judgment debt.
On 28 June 1988, acting on the advice of Atty. Camano, complainant presented an Affidavit of Ownership to the sheriff who
then released the levied items to complainant. However, a Northern Hill 3-burner gas stove was not retuned to complainant.
The stove was in fact kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments wherein he temporarily stayed 12 and,
thereafter, turned over the same to a certain Recto Esberto, caretaker of the Genito Apartments. 13
On 1 August 1988, complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Inocentes and Atty.
Camano.14 After formal investigation, and despite conflicting testimonies on the tenor and content of agreements and
conversations, several disturbing facts were revealed to have been uncontrovertedAtty. Camanos acceptance from
complainant of attorneys fees and the costs of implementing the writ of execution, possession of complainants levied Northern
Hill oven, and advice to complainant on how to recover the latters levied items. Thus, IBP Investigating Commissioner Siegfred
B. Mison, made the following recommendations, viz:
Based on the facts revealed in their respective Memoranda, the penalty of six (6) months suspension is therefore
recommended to be imposed on Respondent Camano for committing the following acts that adversely reflects (sic) on his
moral fitness to continue to practice law[:]
1. He received money (P5,000 then P1,000) from the adverse party purportedly for attorneys fees and for reimbursement of
sheriffs expenses. Such act of accepting funds from the adverse party in the process of implementing a writ, borders
on technical extortion particularly in light of the factual circumstances as discussed.
2. He gave unsolicited advice to the adverse party in suggesting the filing of an Affidavit of Ownership over the levied
properties, a suggestion evidently in conflict with [the interest of] his own client, supposedly, the Genitos.
3. He failed to turn over the gas stove to either party thereby casting doubt as to the procedure of the levy.
Based on the facts revealed, the penalty of Reprimand is therefore recommended to be imposed on Respondent Inocentes for
committing the following acts that adversely reflects (sic) in his fitness to continue to practice law[:]
1. He allowed Camano to perform all the aforementioned acts, either by negligence or inadvertence which are inimical
to the legal profession. He cannot claim ignorance or feign innocence in this particular transaction considering that the
Complainants themselves went to his office on different occasions regarding this transaction. Ultimately, he exercised
command responsibility over the case and had supervisory control over Respondent Camano inasmuch as he
received periodic reports either by phone or in person from the latter.
2. The letter disclaimer executed by Mr. Genito filed by Respondent Inocentes does not mitigate any liability whatsoever since
the wrongdoing done against the profession cannot be undone by a mere letter from a third party. 15 (Emphasis supplied.)
The IBP Board of Governors approved the aforequoted recommendation, with the modification of an increase in Atty.
Camanos period of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year, in a resolution stating, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the of
the Investigating Commissionerfinding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, with modification, and for accepting funds from adverse party in the process of implementing a writ borders on
technical extortion, for giving unsolicited advice to the adverse party a suggestion evidently in conflict with [the interest of] his
own client and for casting doubts to the procedure of the levy, Atty. Jose C. Camano is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year, likewise, Atty. Oscar Inocentes is hereby REPRIMANDED for he exercised command responsibility over
the case inasmuch as he received periodic reports either by phone or in person.16
The IBP held that Atty. Camanos act of giving unsolicited advice to complainant is a culpable act because the advice conflicted
with the interest of his clients, the spouses Genito. The rule on conflicting interests, established in Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, deals with conflicts in the interests of an attorneys actual clients among themselves, of existing
and prospective clients, and of the attorney and his clients. It states that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is retained.17 An attorney has no power to act as counsel or
legal representative for a person without being retained.18 To establish the professional relation, it is sufficient that the advice
and assistance of an attorney are sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession. 19 At the time the questioned
statement was made, Atty. Camano had called the police to restrain complainant from surreptitiously pulling out the levied
properties from the apartment complex by virtue of which the latter was brought to the police station for questioning. The
statement was made in response to complainants insistence at the police station that the levied properties were owned by him
and not by the judgment debtor.20 No employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant case.
13
More fitting, albeit, to the mind of this Court, inapplicable to the case, is Canon 15 of the same Code which encompasses the
aforementioned rule. In general terms, Canon 15 requires lawyers to observe loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with their clients.21 Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest
conflicting with that of his client resulting in detriment to the latter may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, far be it that every
utterance of an attorney which may have afforded an individual some relief adverse to the formers client may be labeled as a
culpable act of disloyalty. As in every case, the acts alleged to be culpable must be assessed in light of the surrounding
circumstances.
While the levy was made on chattel found in the apartment of the judgment debtor, Gliceria Solatan, the complainant was the
true owner of the properties. Consequently, the latter had a right to recover the same. In fact, considering the circumstances,
the questioned statement is in consonance with complainants foremost duty to uphold the law as an officer of the court. The
statement of Atty. Camano in such a context should not be construed by this Court as giving advice in conflict against the
interest of the spouses Genito as in fact the latter have no interest over the incorrectly levied properties.
We, thus, note that the act of informing complainant that the levied properties would be returned to him upon showing proof of
his ownership thereof may hint at infidelity to the interest of the spouses Genito, but, in this circumstance, lacks the essence of
double dealing and betrayal of the latters confidence so as to deserve outright categorization as infidelity or disloyalty to his
clients cause. Nonetheless, after having noted the foregoing, we remain convinced with the propriety of meting the one (1)
year suspension from the practice of law on Atty. Camano, as recommended by the IBP, based on his other culpable acts
which tend to degrade the profession and foment distrust in the integrity of court processes.
On the other hand, Atty. Inocentes seeks to distance himself from the events that transpired and the reprimand resulting
therefrom by asserting that he was incorrectly punished for Atty. Camanos acts when his mere participation in the fiasco was
to refer complainant and his mother to Atty. Camano.
Law practitioners are acutely aware of the responsibilities that are naturally taken on by partners and supervisory lawyers over
the lawyers and non-lawyers of the law office. We have held that lawyers are administratively liable for the conduct of their
employees in failing to timely file pleadings.23 In Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Zoilo R. Ferrer, et al.,24 partners in a
law office were admonished for the contemptuous language in a pleading submitted to court despite, and even due to, the fact
that the pleading was not passed upon by any of the partners of the office. We held therein that partners are duty bound to
provide for efficacious control of court pleadings and other court papers that carry their names or the name of the law firm. 25
We now hold further that partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary
diligence in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by the persons over which they are
exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose the occurrence of violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by persons under their charge. Nonetheless, the liability of the supervising lawyer in this regard is
by no means equivalent to that of the recalcitrant lawyer. The actual degree of control and supervision exercised by said
supervising lawyer varies, inter alia, according to office practice, or the length of experience and competence of the lawyer
supervised. Such factors can be taken into account in ascertaining the proper penalty. Certainly, a lawyer charged with the
supervision of a fledgling attorney prone to rookie mistakes should bear greater responsibility for the culpable acts of the
underling than one satisfied enough with the work and professional ethic of the associate so as to leave the latter mostly to
his/her own devises.
While Atty. Camanos irregular acts perhaps evince a need for greater supervision of his legal practice, there is no question
that it has been Atty. Inocentes practice to allow wide discretion for Atty. Camano to practice on his own. It does constitute
indifference and neglect for Atty. Inocentes to fail to accord even a token attention to Atty. Camanos conduct which could have
brought the then impending problem to light. But such is not equivalent to the proximate responsibility for Atty. Camanos acts.
Moreover, it appears from the records that Atty. Inocentes is a former judge and a lawyer who, as of yet, is in good standing
and it is the first time in which Atty. Inocentes has been made to answer vicariously for the misconduct of a person under his
charge. An admonition is appropriate under the circumstances.

However, it is precisely because of such participation, consisting as it did of referring the complainant to his associate lawyer,
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated 16 April 2004 is
that Atty. Inocentes may be held administratively liable by virtue of his associates unethical acts. His failure to exercise certain
AFFIRMED in respect of the sanction meted out on Atty. Camano. Atty. Inocentes is hereby ADMONISHED to monitor more
responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. The term "command
closely the activities of his associates to make sure that the same are in consonance with the Code of Professional
responsibility," as Atty. Inocentes suggests, has special meaning within the circle of men in uniform in the military; however, the
Responsibility with the WARNING that repetition of the same or similar omission will be dealt with more severely.
principle does not abide solely therein. It controls the very circumstance in which Atty. Inocentes found himself.

No pronouncement as to costs.
We are not unaware of the custom of practitioners in a law firm of assigning cases and even entire client accounts to
associates or other partners with limited supervision, if at all. This is especially true in the case of Attys. Inocentes and Camano
who, from the records, both appear to be seasoned enough to be left alone in their work without requiring close supervision SO ORDERED.
over each others conduct and work output. However, let it not be said that law firm practitioners are given a free hand to
assign cases to seasoned attorneys and thereafter conveniently forget about the case. To do so would be a disservice to the
A.C. No. 959 July 30, 1971
profession, the integrity and advancement of which this Court must jealously protect.

PEDRO OPAREL, SR., complainant,

That the firm name under which the two attorneys labored was that of Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office does not
vs.
automatically make Atty. Inocentes the default lawyer acting in a supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano. It did, however,
ATTY. DOMINADOR ABARIA, respondent.
behoove Atty. Inocentes to exert ordinary diligence to find out what was going on in his law firm. It placed in Atty. Inocentes the
active responsibility to inquire further into the circumstances affecting the levy of complainants properties, irrespective of
whether the same were in fact events which could possibly lead to administrative liability. Moreover, as name practitioner of the R E S O L UT I O N
law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm
should act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. 22 It is not without reason or consequence that Atty.
Inocentess name is that which was used as the official designation of their law office.

With regard to the actual existence of Atty. Inocentess supervisory capacity over Atty. Camanos activities, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner based the same on his finding that Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on
the latters dealings with complainant. This finding is the linchpin of Atty. Inocentess supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano
and liability by virtue thereof.
FERNANDO, J.:
This administrative proceeding was started by Pedro Oparel, Sr., who identified himself as a pauper in his complaint filed with
this Court on August 27, 1970 against respondent Dominador Abaria, a member of the Philippine Bar. The charge was that
respondent, whose services were retained to assist complainant recover damages from his employer for injuries suffered,
14
acted dishonestly. Apparently, a settlement was reached, complainant having been made to sign a receipt in the sum of
P500.00 for his claim, out of which was deducted P55.00 as attorney's fees, when the truth, according to the complaint, was
that respondent did receive the much larger amount of P5,000.00. In a resolution of September 14, 1970, the respondent was
required to file an answer within ten days from notice. It was duly filed on October 19, 1970 with a vehement denial on the part
of the respondent, alleging that the complaint was "irresponsible, baseless and [should] not merit even the scantiest
consideration" of this Court. He further alleged that while complainant was asking only for P200.00, he was able to secure a
settlement from the employer in the sum of P500.00, admitting that he was given as fees the aforesaid AMOUNT of P55.00. He
accounted for the alleged sum of P5,000.00 by stating that P3,500 was spent by the employer for plaintiff's operation and
medical bills, another P1,000.00 given to complainant's family during his confinement in the hospital, and then the P500.00
received in cash by way of additional settlement. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
This Court, in a resolution of October 23, 1970, referred the matter to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Such report and recommendation was submitted on June 2, 1971. It was therein stated that the city fiscal of
Bacolod City, who was designated to act as investigator, as the parties were residents of the place, submitted on March 2,
1971 a report recommending dismissal due to the desistance of complainant. It appeared that when the case was called for
investigation on February 17, 1971, the complainant manifested that he was no longer interested in pushing through his
complaint against respondent. In his affidavit of desistance, he admitted that the administrative charge arose out of a
misunderstanding between him and respondent. He likewise admitted that there was no deception practiced on him by
respondent when he was made to sign the affidavit of September 20, 1966 wherein it appeared that the amount received by
him was P500.00, no mention being made therein of the other P4,500.00 which, as noted in the answer of respondent,
consisted of P3,500.00 for expenses incurred for complainant's operation and medical bills and P1,000.00 given to his family
for support while he was staying in the hospital. The Solicitor General agreed with such a recommendation and prayed that the
case be dismissed.
While it would appear that under the circumstances no case lies against respondent Dominador Abaria, it is not amiss to
impress on members of the Bar that the utmost care be taken to minimize occasions for any misunderstanding between them
and their clients. The relationship being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the latter being adequately and
fully informed of the mode and manner in which their interest is defended. They should not be left in the dark. They are entitled
to the fullest disclosure of why certain steps are taken and why certain matters are either included or excluded from the
documents they are made to sign. It is only thus that their faith in counsel may remain unimpaired.
Where, as did happen here, the client happens to be poor and unlettered, seeking to enforce what he considers his just
demands against an employer, it is even more imperative that matters be explained to him with all precision and clarity. More
than that, no effort should be spared for him to get fully what he is entitled to under the law. The same zeal should characterize
a lawyer's efforts as when he is defending the rights of property. As it is, there is even the fear that a lawyer works harder when
he appears for men of substance. To show how unfounded is such a suspicion, he must exert his utmost, whoever be his
client.
More specifically, in a case like the present, he should not invite loss of trust by inadvertence or even by a failure to use the
simplest and most understandable language in communicating matters. For he may lend himself to the suspicion that he is
lacking in candor and may be taking undue advantage of his client for his own profit and advantage in any dealing with the
adverse party. At any rate, with complainant having been satisfied with the explanation of respondent, he could not be justly
charged of being recreant to his trust for personal gain. The dismissal of this case is therefore warranted.
WHEREFORE, the administrative case filed by Pedro Oparel, Sr. against respondent Dominador Abaria is dismissed.
A.C. No. 5302 February 18, 2005
MARCIAL L. ABIERO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BERNARDO G. JUANINO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client at all times, mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must always
serve with competence and diligence, and never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. An attorney should endeavor to keep
his client informed of the status of his case and respond within a reasonable time to the latters request for information. Failure
to comply with these abiding precepts of ethical conduct renders counsel liable for violating the canons of his profession.
On July 20, 2000, an administrative complaint1 was filed by Marcial L. Abiero charging respondent Atty. Bernardo G. Juanino
with negligence in connection with a legal matter entrusted to him.
It appears that complainant engaged the services of respondent of the law firm P.C. Nolasco and Associates as counsel de
parte in NLRC NCR OCW Case No. 00-12-00904-95.2 On January 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio ruled in favor of
complainant by ordering the respondents to pay complainant his unpaid wages and unpaid vacation leave pay, to refund his
plane fare and to pay moral damages and attorneys fees.31vvphi1.nt
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the arbiters decision and dismissed the case for lack of basis. 4
For several times, complainant, either personally or through his designated agents, tried to follow up the status of the case.
Each time, respondent would advise him to call on a later date at which time he may have some news of any development with
the case.5
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review and paid the
corresponding docket fee.
When complainant verified with the Court of Appeals the status of the case, he found out that respondent never filed a Petition
for Review of his labor case. Consequently, the NLRC decision became final and executory. Thus, complainant filed this
administrative complaint against respondent.
On August 30, 2000, respondent was required to file his comment within 10 days from notice. 6 On September 25, 2000,
respondent requested for additional time to file comment.7 Subsequently, respondent filed a series of motions for extension to
file comment. On February 28, 2001, respondent was warned that no further extension shall be granted. 8 Notwithstanding, and
despite 11 extensions, respondent still failed to file his comment.
Consequently, on July 29, 2002, respondent was required to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held
in contempt for failure to comply with our directives.9
On September 2, 2002, respondent filed his Compliance with Motion for Final Twelve (12) Day Extension With No Further
Extension.10
Finally, on September 17, 2002, respondent filed his comment 11 together with a Motion to Admit Comment Filed One Day Late.
In a Resolution dated October 21, 2002, respondents Motion to Admit Comment Filed One Day Late was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 12
As summarized, respondent alleged by way of defense, the following:
15
(1) that complainant became respondents client after respondent handled these cases for complainants uncle Aniceto Encio The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and to exercise
and his family namely Criminal Case No. F-10088, POEA Case No. M-91-06-602, I.S. No. 93 E-17909 and POEA Case No. L- reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of the case.18 By his own admission, respondent
93-04-610; that respondent successfully handled these cases which led to the dismissal of the criminal case against Aniceto entertained the idea of filing a motion for execution, thus:
Encio and recovery of monetary awards in the other cases; (2) that NLRC NCR OCW Case No. 00-12-00904-95 was referred
by Aniceto Encio to respondent for handling; that herein complainant and Aniceto Encio requested respondent not to charge
I honestly believed then that since the other respondents did not appeal the Decision to the Commission of the NLRC, I could
them an acceptance fee for said case and instead offered to pay respondent 30% of any monetary award recovered in said
enforce the Decision (See THIRD REASON) against these other respondents who did not appeal. So undersigned went to
case; that on appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, the Decision of Labor Arbiter Carpio was reversed and
Honorable Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio and explained to him about my plan to file a Motion for Execution against the other
NLRC OCW Case No. 00-12-00904-95 was dismissed by the NLRC for lack of merit; (4) that at the time respondent
respondents who did not appeal the Decision to the Commission of the NLRC. I was not able to see him the first two times that
advanced the docket fees, complainant and respondent did not have any agreement that a Petition for Certiorari would be filed
I went as I was informed he was assigned to certain task force and when I saw him the third time, Honorable Labor Arbiter
with the Court of Appeals; (5) that weeks later, when complainant reimbursed respondent for the docket fees he had
Eduardo J. Carpio informed me that since decision was reversed on appeal and the complaint dismissed, there would be no
advanced, respondent advised complainant and his uncle that respondent intended to appeal the Decision of the NLRC to the
basis for filing a Motion for Execution to enforce Decision. I was dumbfounded as the period to file a Petition for Certiorari
Court of Appeals and so he filed a Petition for Extension of Time to File Petition ; (7) that there was an error in judgment on
already expired.19
respondents part when instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari as originally intended, respondent chose to pursue another
course of action, that of entertaining the idea of filing a Motion for Execution to enforce the Labor Arbiters Decision against the
other respondents who did not appeal said Decision; (8) that respondent pleads good faith in the subsequent course of action As a lawyer, respondent should know that he is not required to seek prior approval from the labor arbiter before he could file a
taken; that respondent entertained the idea that he could enforce the original Decision through a Motion for Execution; (9) motion for execution. Notwithstanding, he presented himself, not once, but thrice, before the office of the arbiter to discuss his
that respondent tried his best to win complainants labor case and in fact, he won it at the Labor Arbiters level; (10) that plan to file a motion for execution, only to discover that such recourse was not feasible. Worse, while respondent was waiting
respondent appeals to the sense of fairness of complainant; that in the 4 cases respondent handled for complainant and his for the arbiters opinion, the period to file the petition before the Court of Appeals continued to run, as in fact, it eventually
uncle, respondent won 3 cases for them especially the criminal complaint for Homicide against complainants uncle; that in said expired.
criminal case, respondent did not charge a single centavo for attorneys fees. 13
Failure to appeal to the Court of Appeals despite instructions by the client to do so constitutes inexcusable negligence on the
In his letter-reply filed on February 7, 2003, complainant averred the following statements originally in the vernacular: part of counsel. Once a lawyer consents to defend the cause of his client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must at all times
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and
perform his duties to his client with utmost diligence. Nothing less can be expected from a member of the Philippine Bar. For
it is not true that there was no acceptance fee because complainant paid respondent the amount of P1,500 plus the amount
having neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client, respondent did not serve his client with diligence and
of P500 per hearing but no receipts were issued for these payments; that there is no truth to respondents allegation that
competence. His inexcusable negligence on such matter renders him liable for violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
complainant was in the province because complainants uncle called respondent 3 times a week to follow-up the Petition for
Professional Responsibility.20
Review; that it was actually complainant who paid for the docket fees but respondent who physically paid the same to the Court
of Appeals; and that respondent made several promises to complainants uncle regarding the status of the Petition for Review
but nothing came out of said promises.14 As we held in the recent case of Barbuco v. Atty. Beltran,21 an attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his
ability and with utmost diligence. Thus, failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part,
especially if such failure took the form of filing a pleading after the deadline for filing the same has passed. Respondent has
The lone issue for resolution is whether respondent violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
indeed committed a serious lapse in judgment in failing to perform his professional duty to his client under the canons of his
profession.
In its Report and Recommendation, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),15 held that
there was no sufficient justification for respondents failure to file the petition for review with the Court of Appeals. It found that
The failure to timely file a pleading is by itself a sin of omission on the part of the respondent. However, complainants travails
respondent was aware of the period for filing said petition because he himself paid the docket fees and filed the Motion for
were further compounded by the failure of the respondent to maintain an open line of communication with his client in direct
Extension of Time to File the Petition for Review. His claim that he was pursuing another legal remedy in the labor case did not
contravention of Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to keep his client
justify his failure to file the petition for review within the prescribed period. Complainant had placed his trust in respondent to
informed of the status of his case and respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.22
handle his claims against his previous employer. Failure to comply with his legal duty as counsel of complainant in NLRC NCR
OCW Case No. 00-12-00904-95 has caused damage and prejudice to the latter. Thus, in failing to file the petition for review,
respondent was held to have breached Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Commission on Bar In Legarda v. Court of Appeals,23 counsels failure to exercise due diligence in protecting the interest of his client caused the
Discipline of IBP recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. 16 latter material prejudice. The moment counsel takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution
until its final resolution.l^vvphi1.net A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his clients cause makes him
unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter; he owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of which he is an
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
officer.24
Commissioner, thus:

We observed in Parias v. Atty. Paguinto25 that a lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his clients case.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding
to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
protect his clients interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also
respondents violation of Canons 17 & 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by failing to file the Petition for Certiorari,
give adequate attention to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his clients
Atty. Bernardo G. Juanino is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. 17
cause.1a\^/phi1.net

We agree with the findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner.

16
In Barbuco v. Atty. Beltran, Guiang v. Atty. Antonio,26 and Sps. Villaluz v. Judge Armenta,27 the Court suspended counsel for By Resolution of August 30, 2006,3 this Court, after noting the July 20, 2006 Memorandum of the Office of the Court
six months upon a finding that their failure to perfect an appeal was inexcusable and persuasively demonstrative of negligence Administrator (OCA) relative to respondents complaint against complainant, approved the recommendation of the OCA to
and malpractice, a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which declares that "a lawyer shall not dismiss the complaint for lack of merit, "the complaint being unsubstantiated and motivated by plain unfounded suspicion, and
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." for having been filed after the effectivity of his optional retirement" (underscoring supplied).

We cannot overstate the duty of a lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. He can do this Thus, spawned the present verified December 18, 1996 letter-complaint4 of complainant against respondent, for disbarment.
by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 28
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Incidentally, we note that respondent delayed the filing of the comment for more than two (2) years. Despite numerous
extensions, which were all granted, still, he filed the comment one (1) day late. By neglecting his duties to his client and to this
From the Report and Recommendation5 of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Randall C. Tabayoyong, it is gathered that
Court, respondent transgressed the canons of legal ethics enshrined in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such
despite the January 12, 2007 Order for respondent to file an answer to the complaint, he failed to do so, prompting the
misconduct should not be countenanced.1a\^/phi1.net
Commissioner to declare him in default.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Bernardo G. Juanino is found guilty of negligence and is
It is further gathered that after the conduct by the Investigating Commissioner of a mandatory conference on May 25, 2007, the
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING that a
parties were ordered to file their respective position papers. In compliance with the Order, complainant submitted his verified
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
position paper.6 Respondent did not.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
Defined as issues before the IBP were:
in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

(1) Whether . . . the complaint filed by respondent against the complainant before the Office of the Court
SO ORDERED.
Administrator in Admin Matter OCA IPI No. 06-1842-MTJ was malicious, false and untruthful.

A.C. No. 7828 August 11, 2008

(2) If in the affirmative, whether . . . respondent is guilty under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

JUDGE ALDEN V. CERVANTES, complainant,

On the first issue, the IBP Commissioner did not find respondents complaint against herein complainant false and untruthful, it
vs.
noting that respondents complaint was dismissed by this Court due to insufficiency of evidence which, to the IBP, merely
ATTY. JUDE JOSUE L. SABIO, respondent.
shows a "failure on the part of respondent to prove his allegations" against complainant.

DECISION
Noting, however, this Courts August 30, 2006 Resolution finding respondents complaint "unsubstantiated and motivated by
plain, unfounded" suspicion, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent "knowingly instituted not only a
CARPIO MORALES, J.: groundless suit against herein complainant, but also a suit based simply on his bare suspicion and speculation." (underscoring
supplied)
Judge Alden V. Cervantes (complainant) was the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna until
his optional retirement on November 23, 2005. Some of the cases lodged in his sala were ejectment cases filed by Extra- On the second issue, the IBP found that by filing the groundless bribery charge against complainant, respondent violated the
Ordinary Development Corporation (EDC) against the clients of Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio (respondent). It appears that proscription of the Code of Professional Responsibility against "wittingly or willingly promot[ing] or su[ing] any groundless suit"
respondent had filed motions for inhibition of complainant "on the basis of the fact that EDC gave him a house and lot putting including baseless administrative complaints against judges and other court officers and employees.
into serious doubt his impartiality, independence and integrity." The motions were denied.
The Investigating Commissioner thus concluded that
After the retirement of complainant, respondent, by Affidavit-Complaint dated April 6, 2006,1 sought the investigation of
complainant for bribery.
while the evidence on record is sufficient to show that the allegations in respondents affidavit-complaint against
herein complainant were false, the evidence nonetheless show[s] that respondent had knowingly and maliciously
In support of the charge, respondent submitted a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 6, 2006 of Edwin P. Cardeo,2 a utility instituted a groundless suit, based simply on his unfounded suspicions against complainant;7 (Underscoring
worker in the MTC of Cabuyao, stating that, inter alia, orders and decisions of complainant were not generated from the supplied)
typewriter of the court but from a computer which the court did not have, it having acquired one only on May 2, 2005; that there
had been many times that a certain Alex of EDC would go to the court bearing certain papers for the signature of complainant;
and that he violated Canons 10,8 11,9 & 1210 and Rule 11.0411 of the Code of Professional Responsibility under his oath of
that he came to learn that a consideration of P500.00 would be given for every order or decision released by complainant in
office.
favor of EDC; and that he also came to know that attempts at postponing the hearings of the complaints filed by EDC were
thwarted by complainant as he wanted to expedite the disposition thereof.

17
He accordingly recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P5,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Notice of Resolution,12 informs that on November 22, 2007, it adopted the following
Resolution adopting and approving with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents violation of Canons 10, 11 and 12 and Rule
11.04 of the Code of Professional responsibility for filing a groundless suit against complainant, Atty. Jude Sabio is
hereby REPRIMANDED with Stern Warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. (Emphasis in the original)
The Court finds the action taken by the IBP Board of Governors well taken.
Respondent ought to be aware that if a court official or employee or a lawyer is to be disciplined, the evidence against him
should be substantial, competent and derived from direct knowledge, not on mere allegations, conjectures, suppositions, or on
the basis of hearsay.13
No doubt, it is this Courts duty to investigate the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers. But it is also its duty to
shield them from unfounded suits which are intended to, among other things, harass them.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio, is FINED in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar questioned act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23426 March 1, 1968
LEOPOLDO SY-QUIA, HECTOR MORENO, ALEJANDRO DE SANTOS, PEDRO AGUIRRE, and HANS
INHELDERplaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARY A. MARSMAN, A. L. VELILLA A. V. SANTIAGO, E. G. VITO, H. A. DOORNBOSCH defendants-appellants.
De Santos & Delfino for plaintiffs-appellees.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Associates for defendants-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
This is an appeal by Mary A. Marsman, et al. from the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Pasig) in its Civil Case No. 6759.
Leopoldo Sy-quia Hector Moreno, Alejandro de Santos, Pedro Aguirre and Hans Inhelder commenced quo
warranto proceeding against Mary A. Marsman, A. L. Velilla, A. V. Santiago, E. G. Vito and H. A. Doornbosch in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, with the filing of a complaint alleging as follows:
1. Plaintiffs are all of age and residents of the Province of Rizal, except Leopoldo Sy-quia who is a resident of the
City of Manila, defendants are all of age and residents of the Province of Rizal, except H. A. Doornbosch who is a
resident of the City of Manila, Mary A. Marsman being a widow and all with place of business at the Marsman
Building, Buendia Avenue, Makati, Rizal, where they may be served with summons and a copy of this complaint.
2. Prior to December 29, 1960, defendants constituted the Board of Directors of Marsman Investment, Ltd., a
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the United Kingdom with principal offices
in London and Philippine offices at the Marsman Building, Buendia Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
3. On December 29, 1960, at the annual general meeting and extraordinary general meeting of stockholders of said
corporation held at its Philippine Offices (Marsman Building), there being a quorom and all prerequisites, formal as
well as essential for the holding of said meetings having been complied with, plaintiffs were duly elected, in
accordance with the British Companies Act of 1948 and the Articles of Association of said corporation, the governing
law on the matter, directors of said Marsman Investments, Ltd.
4. On January 4, 1961, as such directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd., plaintiffs held an organizational meeting at
the Marsman Building, site of its Philippine Offices, and, thereafter, plaintiffs, singly as well as collectively, demanded
of defendants, who were then within the premises, the vacation of their respective offices as such members of the
Board of Directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd. and the turning over of the same to plaintiffs, as well as all the
books, accounts, papers and other records of the corporation.
5. Defendants rejected this demand, as well as all other subsequent similar demands made by plaintiffs, and, to this
date, have been acting and posing as the lawful members of the Board of Directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd.
thereby usurping offices lawfully pertaining to plaintiffs.
6. For the enforcement and protection of their rights so grossly and wantonly violated by defendants, plaintiffs had to
retain undersigned counsel whose reasonable fee, until final determination of this case, is P15,000.00.
Plaintiffs thus prayed for the ouster of defendants as directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd. and their recognition and
institution instead of the latter; for attorneys' fees in the sum of P15,000.00 and costs.
Defendants moved for the dismissal of the action pointing to the pendency of other actions (Civ. Case No. 45935, CFI of
Manila and Civil Case No. Q-5934, CFI of Rizal), allegedly involving the same parties and over the same cause of action. Upon
its denial by the court, defendants filed an answer that reads:
1. With reference to the allegations in paragraph 1, defendants represent that (a) defendant Mary A. Marsman is now
deceased, the defendant having died on January 11, 1968 in Palo Alto, California; (b) defendant Alexander Sycip
was appointed by the probate court in Sp. Proc. No. 3883, of this Court executor of the estate of Mary A. Marsman;
and (c) defendant H.A. Doornbosch no longer resides in the Philippines.
2. They deny the allegation in paragraph 3 that on December 29, 1960 at the annual general meeting and
extraordinary general meeting of the stockholders or members of Marsman Investments, Ltd., "plaintiffs were duly
elected, in accordance with the British Companies Act of 1948 and the Articles of Association of said corporation, the
governing law on the matter, directors of said Marsman Investments, Ltd."
3. They have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation in paragraph 4
that on January 4, 1961, as such directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd., plaintiffs held an organizational meeting at
the Marsman Building, site of its Philippine Offices; and they deny the further allegation in paragraph 4 that
thereafter, plaintiffs, singly as well as collectively, demanded of defendants, who were then within the premises, the
18
 vacation of their respective offices as such members of the Board of Directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd. and the With regard to the plea of lack of knowledge or information set up in paragraph 3 of the answer, this Court's decision in
turning over of the same to plaintiffs, as well as all the books, accounts, papers and other records of the corporation. Warner Barnes vs. Reyes, 103 Phil. 662, 665, is authority for the proposition that this form of denial must be availed of with
sincerity and good faith, not for the purpose of confusing the other party, nor for purposes of delay. Yet, so lacking in sincerity
and good faith is this part of the answer that defendants-appellants go to the limit of denying knowledge or information as to
4. They deny the right of plaintiffs to attorney's fees.1wph1.t
whether they (defendant's) were in the premises (Marsman Bldg.) on January 4, 1961, as averred in paragraph 4 of the
complaint. Yet whether such a fact was or was not true could not be unknown to these defendants.
As affirmative defenses, it was contended that the complaint should be dismissed as far as Mary A. Marsman and H. A.
Doornbosch were concerned; the first having died on January 11, 1963, and the second having vacated his position as director
Very plainly, appellants here systematically adopted the tactic of trapping and confusing plaintiffs as to what facts they
of the corporation.
had to prove or what issues must be met. Even their so-called special defenses were likewise evasive, and did not touch the
heart of the controversy. Such strategy we can not sanction. It is violative of the policy of fair disclosure of facts required by the
Plaintiffs thereupon filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, claiming that defendants, by making general denials in Rules. Hence, we hold that no error was committed by the Court below in concluding that the answer tendered no issue, and
their answer, had in effect admitted all the material averments of the complaint. Over defendants' vigorous opposition, the court that judgment on the pleading was warranted.
below sustained plaintiffs' stand, reasoning that the mere repetition by defendants in their answer of the averments of the
complaint, even if prefaced by the phrase "that he denies", did not constitute specific denial of plaintiffs' cause of action; and
Defendants-appellants argue that if the answer tended to confuse plaintiffs, their remedy lay in a motion for particulars.
allegations in the answer according to the Court, are just negatives pregnant which amounted to admission of the averments of
But, the Rules placed on appellants the duty to be specific as to their contentions: what facts they denied and what facts they
the complaint. As the answer allegedly failed to tender an issue, plaintiffs were consequently declared the duly elected
know or believe to have actually happened. They did not do so. To require plaintiffs now to ask for particulars is to enable
directors of the Marsman Investments, Ltd. and defendants were ordered to turn over to them all the books, accounts, papers
defendants to delay the trial and disposition of the case by ignoring in their answer what the rules require. They would thus
and other records of the corporation. Plaintiffs' demand for attorneys' fees, however, was denied, for not being substantiated by
reap benefit from their own wrong.
evidence. Hence, this appeal by the defendants.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order and judgment appealed from are affirmed. Costs against appellants in all
We find this appeal to be without merit.1wph1.t
instances. So ordered.

A comparison of paragraph 3 of the complaint and paragraph 2 of the answer will show that the answer in effect denies
DM. CASE NO. 6876 March 7, 2008
each and every allegation of plaintiffs, with the result that the denial is general and not specific as required by the Rules
(Revised Rule 8, sec. 10) providing:
HEIRS OF LYDIO "JERRY" FALAME, namely: MELBA FALAME, LEO FALAME and JERRY FALAME, petitioners,
vs.
Sec. 10. Specific denial. The defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he
ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, respondent.
does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to
support his denial. Where a pleader desires to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so
much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where the defendant is without knowledge or RESOLUTION
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state,
and this shall have the effect of a denial.
TINGA, J.:

There is no difference between an averment that a defendant "denies each and every allegation" and a plea whereby the
On Petition for Review1 is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors dismissing the
defendant, as in this case, denies the recitals of the complaint reproduced in the answer. If the first mode of denial is and has
disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio "Jerry" Falame (complainants) against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent),
been declared a general denial,1 the second should be equally so held. For the answer before us, in reality, leaves in doubt all
docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191.
the averments of paragraph 3 of the complaint: defendants-appellants do not specify therein whether what they deny is that the
annual general meeting was held, or whether it is the fact that plaintiffs were elected directors, or whether the election was held
conformably to the British laws governing the matter. In their Complaint2 against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their father, the late Lydio "Jerry" Falame
(Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to represent him in an action for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694
(the first civil case) and entitled "Heirs of Emilio T. Sy, represented by Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio
In addition, the Rules require that besides specifying the allegations of fact not admitted, the answer should set forth the
'Jerry' Falame, Raleigh Falame and Four (4) John Does," in which Lydio was one of the defendants.3
matters relied upon in support of the denial;2 so that in effect, the Rules are no longer satisfied with mere denials, even if
specific, but demand that defendant manifest what he considers to be the true facts. Note that our Rules do not permit a party
to deny everything in his opponent's pleading, as it could under Rule 8, subsection (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [I Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the complaint in the first civil case.
Moran, Rules of Court, p. 280, 1963 Ed.]. The defendants-appellants do not aver any matters to support their denials. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to file their respective position papers, respondent used and
submitted in evidence the following: (1) a special power of attorney dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother,
Raleigh Falame, appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated 23 July 1988,
The rule, it is true, qualifies the requirement with the words "if practicable": but the defendants nowhere attempted to
executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the first civil case. 4
demonstrate why it was not practicable for them to aver the facts that negate or contradict the plaintiffs' allegations. Hence, the
denial in paragraph 2 of the answer are but general denials that operate as an admission of the facts pleaded in paragraph 3 of
the complaint. Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of the defendants in the first
civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser and counsel for his businesses until Lydio's death on 8
September 1996.5
19
However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, respondent filed a case against
complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first civil case, entitled "Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F.
Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporations, their
representatives, agents and persons acting in their behalf" and docketed as Civil Case No. 5568 (the second civil case) before
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint sought the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its
registration in the registry of deeds, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20241 issued as a consequence of the registration of the
deed of sale, and the real estate mortgage on the said property. Alternatively, it prayed for specific performance and
reconveyance or legal redemption and damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order. 6
Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil case wherein they were
impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the
spouses Falame's interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.7
Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements of fact in the complaint in the second civil
case to mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent violated paragraph (d), Section 20 8 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court,9 complainants asserted further.
Lastly, complainants alleged that the second civil case is a baseless and fabricated suit which respondent filed as counsel for
complainants' uncle against the heirs of respondent's deceased client. Specifically, they averred that respondent filed the case
for the sole purpose of retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the possession of the subject property from complainants who
are its true owners. Complainants concluded that respondent violated paragraph (g), Section 2010 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.11
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,12 respondent controverted complainants' allegations. He emphasizes that it was only
Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal services for him and on Lydio's behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who
paid him the attorney's fees. He also stated that he signed the jurat in Raleigh's affidavit, which was submitted as evidence in
the first civil case, believing to the best of his knowledge that there is good ground to support it. Insisting that he did not betray
the confidence reposed in him by Lydio as the latter's counsel in the first civil case, respondent maintained that he did not
reveal or use any fact he acquired knowledge of during the existence of the attorney-client relation in the first civil case as he
had never even conferred with nor talked to Lydio in the first place. Respondent likewise contended that he did not knowingly
make any misleading or untruthful statement of fact in the complaint in the second civil case and neither did he employ any
means inconsistent with truth and honor in the hearing of the case. 13
Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or transaction. Stressing the long
interval of twelve years separating the termination of the first civil case and his acceptance of the second civil case, respondent
pointed out that the first civil case was not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand
and Lydio and Raleigh on the other where physical possession of property was at stake. Respondent further averred that in
contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry
Jr., all surnamed Falame, and Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporation, as defendantsa case which arose from
the wrongful acts committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydio's death. 14
Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the trial court, the IBP had no jurisdiction over
the instant administrative case. He added that complainants filed this administrative case when Raleigh could no longer testify
in his own favor as he had died a year earlier.15
In their Position Paper16 dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges against respondent, complainants
claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.0317 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he represented the cause of the
spouses Falame against that of his former client, Lydio.18
On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and approving Investigating
Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan's report and recommendation for the dismissal of this administrative case, thus: 19
x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyer's oath was violated by the respondent and what
confidence was disclosed. The complainants may have in mind the prohibition against disclosure of secret
information learned in confidence, but there is no specification in the complaint what secret or information learned in
confidence under Civil Case No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed by respondent in Civil Case No. 5568. In
administrative complaints for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the complainant must specify in the
affidavit-complaint the alleged secrets or confidential information disclosed or will be disclosed in the professional
employment (Uy v. Gonzalez, 426 SCRA 422; 431). In the absence of such specification, the complaint must fail.
In the complaint, there is no specific charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility about the prohibition against representation of conflicting interest. So, the allegation in
paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of complainants' position paper stating: With all due respect, it is submitted that
respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility" cannot be countenanced. The
reason being that it is an elementary principle of due process to which the respondent is entitled that only those
charged in the complaint can be proved by the complainants. A charge not specified in the complaint cannot be
proved (Uy v. Gonzales, id.)
x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of sufficient bases.
xxx
Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or three years since the complainants became
owners of Lydio Falame's properties, is a suit against the complainants, not as representatives of Lydio Falame, but
as owners of their respective aliquot interests in the property in question (Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104; 107-108).
The complainants are sued not on the basis of the acts, rights, obligations and interest of Lydio Falame on the
material possession of the improvements found on Lot 345 litigated in Civil Case No. A-2694 nor even on such land
itself, but rather on the facts alleged in the second amended and supplemental complaint which give rise to their
cause of action against them.
While the complainants could not specify under what circumstances the respondent committed [the] alleged breach
of confidence, breach of secrecy or revelation of secret or confidential information[,] the respondent has shown that
he did not commit any violation of such duties or obligations of an attorney.
It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal services of the respondent for his and Lydio Falame's defense
in Civil Case No. A-2694.
xxx
The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent violated paragraph (d), Section 20 of Rule 139, Rules
of Court, and his lawyer's oath when he allegedly betrayed the trust and confidence of his former client by denying
knowledge of the fact that the land was owned by Lydio Falame and when he did not disclose to the Court that at
one time his present clients categorically declared and unconditionally recognized the full ownership of the late Lydio
Falame and complainant Melba Falame over subject matter of both cases equally lacks evidentiary basis.
xxx
It is beyond the competence of the complainants to conclude and is outside the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Commission to rule as to whether or nor (sic) the complaint in Civil Case No.5568 is baseless or fabricated. It is only
the Honorable Court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same and cannot be the subject of an
administrative complaint against the respondent.
20
 xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this complaint be dismissed on grounds of
prescription, the same having been filed four (4) years after the alleged misconduct took place and for lack of merit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.20
Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court reiterating their allegations in
the complaint and their position paper.21 They likewise assert that the IBP erred in holding that the instant administrative
complaint had been filed out of time since it was filed on 16 January 2004, or three (3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16)
days after the second civil case was filed on 23 October 2000. 22 In addition, in their Consolidated Comment (should be
Consolidated Reply),23 complainants invoke the Court's ruling in Frias v. Bautista-Lozada24to support their contention that
administrative complaints against members of the bar do not prescribe. 25
In his Comment,26 respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to him have never been proven by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases against lawyers, and that
complainants have the burden to prove their accusations as he enjoys the presumption of innocence.27 Respondent likewise
asserts that in accusing him of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility only in their position paper
and in the instant petition, complainants infringed his right to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him.28
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred by prescription. As early as 1947, the Court
held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,29 to wit:
The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance that the
facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred
by limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding x x x (5 Am. Jur. 434)30
This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-Lozada31where the Court held that Rule VII,
Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of administrative
complaints against lawyers, should be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra vires.32
Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs with the Investigating Commissioner's
opinion that some of the charges raised by complainants in their complaint are unsubstantiated.
There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. While this charge was not raised in the initiatory pleading, it was put forward in complainants' position paper
filed with the IBP and in the petition filed with the Court. In fact, respondent proffered his defenses to the charge in his position
paper before the IBP and likewise in his comment before the Court. In his very first pleading before the IBP, the answer with
motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio as his client. Such absence of attorney-client relationship is the essential element of
his defense to the charge of conflict of interest, as articulated in his subsequent submissions.
The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been adequately apprised of and heard on the issue. In
administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings. Actual adversarial
proceedings only become necessary for clarification when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who
give vague testimonies. Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit
evidence in support of their arguments.33
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that
of his present or former client.34 The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to contest for that which his
duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop. 35 The rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or
will be used.36 In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good
faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.37
The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation will be directly adverse
to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same
or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.38 In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. 39
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional
employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything which will injuriously affect his former
client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences
acquired in the previous relation.40
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the
client at all hazards and costs even to himself.41 The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any
other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client. 42
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the first civil case.
Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was established despite the fact that it was only Raleigh
who paid him. The case of Hilado v. David43tells us that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or
charged for.44
As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the
case. In the second civil case involving the same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued
the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the
property, committing acts which debase respondent's rights as a co-owner.
The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydio's death or through the completion of the specific task
for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed to that of Lydio. 45 Precedents
tell us that even after the termination of his employment, an attorney may not act as counsel against his client in the same
general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's
disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment.46 And while complainants have never been respondent's clients, they
derive their rights to the property from Lydio's ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil case.
For representing Raleigh's cause which is adverse to that of his former clientRaleigh's supposed co-ownership of the subject
property respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Having previously undertaken joint representation of Lydio
and Raleigh, respondent should have diligently studied and anticipated the
21
potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted. 47 Heretofore, respondent is enjoined to look at any
representation situation from "the point of view that there are possible conflicts"; and further, "to think in terms of impaired
loyalty" that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair loyalty to a client.48Considering, however, that this is
respondent's first offense, the Court resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to observe a higher degree of fidelity in
the practice of his profession.49
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and meted out the
penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession and to
bear in mind that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN,
VICTOR P. LAZATIN and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of the contentious and
adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship.
The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the law profession a unique position of trust and confidence,
which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of
protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as
one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named
corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et
al." 1
Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent
Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices
(hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included,
among others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and
incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance
of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity
holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of
trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire
information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA
Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the
companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. 2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG)
filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul
S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant. 3Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private
respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. 4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala,
Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the
Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed conspired
and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE,
COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition
of San Miguel Corporation shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing
roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA
Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has
approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name Edgardo J.
Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984. 5
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts with which their codefendants are charged, was
in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1 In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients, defendants-
ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and
Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed
under their respective names in Annex "A" of the expanded Amended Complaint as
incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such, they do not claim any
proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.
4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing
Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business purposes not related to the allegations of the
expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred any material interest therein and
therefore denies that the "shares" appearing in his name in Annex "A" of the expanded Amended
Complaint are his assets. 6
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations in the
complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. 7
22
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-
Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded
private respondent Roco. 8 The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October
18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the
disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the
submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its client covering their respective
shareholdings. 9
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of the
conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent
PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG
in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter
aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent
PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of
the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. 10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually
not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for
whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 11
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of
petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have
acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations
of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun
to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants
herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause against him. This in turn has allowed
the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in
relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco; full
disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated
November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by the
PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party defendants. In the
same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by
Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for
lack of merit. 12
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the respondent
Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the
following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who
undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law of
agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA
lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to
reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as
would make the classification reasonable under the equal protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor of
Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection clause.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of
this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of
their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the
identity of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the dropping of
party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration
to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law.
23
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which was
denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing
respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a favorable
treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them who
are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an
undertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal
under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained during
such lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the client is
not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment)
protected, because they are evidence of nominee status. 13
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as party-defendant
because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case No. 0033 as to Roco 'without
an order of court by filing a notice of dismissal'," 14 and he has undertaken to identify his principal. 15
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their
clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger fish" as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite
clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a deal with petitioners the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the
complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have
acted, i.e, their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations
of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be
debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they
have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants
herein. (Emphasis ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled "Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs.
Presidential Commission on Good Government" respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing
on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those subscription payments in corporations
included in Annex "A" of the Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of
assignment, some in the name of particular persons; some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers that, one,
their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all
the monies to these subscription payments of these corporations who are now the petitioners in this case.
Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank.
Now, these blank deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being held by the
nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment and some of
these assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our claim that some of the shares
are for Mr. Conjuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of thes e corporations are really just
paper corporations. Why do we say that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of
directors at the time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they
have no permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of
Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are some of the principal things that
we would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called themselves. 16
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being
prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously,
petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients
and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of
action as against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the object of which the
services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for
hire, 17 and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but
gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. 18 But the lawyer-client relationship is more than
that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he
possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. 19 A lawyer is also as independent as the judge
of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent. 20 Moreover, an attorney also
occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court 21 and exercises his
judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among
those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high
degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by reason of necessity and public interest 23based on the hypothesis that
abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. 24
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other
professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established and stable
tradition. 25 In Stockton v. Ford, 26 the U. S. Supreme Court held:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of attorney
and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously
guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the
court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that
confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing
it. 27
24
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August
7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made
by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions
of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as
to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional
responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the
case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery 30 Under this premise, the general rule in our
jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of this client. 31

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can
an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. 29

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
privilege does not attach until there is a client.

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself,
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party
suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions.
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the
very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:

In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of her client on
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense
the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the issue of the client's identity that the privilege
of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be
actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had
withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity
been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed
should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the
that she had advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember whether her client had
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect
been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's identity before a grand jury.
his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
Reversing the lower court's contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the circumstances of the case, and under
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney
the exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged.
does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or
chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig, 35 involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong
probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the
Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several constitutional and policy
lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused,
the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between legal representation without effective communication and
disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the "Sandino Gang," a gang involved in
stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses and suspects
incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal options produce documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa.
which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure
relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a under the facts and circumstances of the case, held:
situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain
25
 A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the person
invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would
implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.
2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects
federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorney-client privilege. "In
order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled
disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except
on the client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the client's
identity and the nature of his fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential
communications. 36
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and
circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, 37 prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to
the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by respondent corporation,
collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against defendant corporation and the
owner of the second cab, identified in the information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant
corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of
the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to him
and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of
the second cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The
court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired him to defend its
policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney is such cases is clearly the attorney for the policyholder
when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence contemplating that it would be used in an action
or claim against him. 38
xxx xxx xxx
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or assistance,
are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such
advice or aid; . . . And whenever the communication made, relates to a matter so connected with the
employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it was the ground of the address by the
client, then it is privileged from disclosure. . .
It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the attorney in this case
as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, and his address cannot be
disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him as service of the summons on him
has not been effected. The objections on which the court reserved decision are sustained. 39
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, 40 the lawyer involved was required by a lower court to disclose whether he
represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the court's request was to determine whether the unnamed
persons as interested parties were connected with the purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and
brought the question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court
held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he represented certain
persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in establishing by such evidence
their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the witness would compel him to
disclose not only that he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of communications made to
him in the course of such employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain
transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever gone to the length of compelling
an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the
transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his
client. 41
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said
name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
client's name is privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner, 42 a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers regarding
steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against
them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes understated. The clients
themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical
possibility that they had. No investigation was then being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney
of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another
amount of money representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore,
Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the
lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to
name the attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged communication. A petition was filed for the enforcement
of the IRS summons. For Baird's repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of
money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or
investigation into that client's income tax liability pending. The court emphasized the exception that a client's name is privileged
when so much has been revealed concerning the legal services rendered that the disclosure of the client's identity exposes him
to possible investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here money was
received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount
in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to the
government for but one purpose to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may
check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief
by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It
indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it
may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal
crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was
employed to advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should be done. 43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of
the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship
has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held
to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. 45
26
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the
client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case
falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said
client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated
earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be not attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly establishes in the case at
bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes
petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their
respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their
capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In
turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering
their client's shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal service to their
clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear
that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the
prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime." 47
An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an attorney for illicit purposes,
seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks
he might have previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall
within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception
because whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed
if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act, as in
the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in the second example and cannot use the
attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the
professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime. 48The reason for the second has been stated in
the cases above discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general,
exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such conditions no case has ever yet
gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature
of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his
client." 49 "Communications made to an attorney in the course of any personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and
which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to each other, are under the
seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged communications." 50 Where the communicated information, which
clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there would be not much in the information known
to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the client would open up other privileged
information which would substantiate the prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so inextricably linked to the
subject matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the
principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients,
apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained in In re
Grand Jury Proceedings 51 and Tillotson v. Boughner. 52 What these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the
general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative source of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a defendant's
counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the building of a case against the latter. Compelling
disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning
fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the
transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege. 53 It
follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity
which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their
clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from
compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the
nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so
intimate in this case the it would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much
"communication" as information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and
distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to charges of violating a principle
which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for negligence on the former.
The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to
keep clients informed and protect their rights to make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and
McCloy v. Boon, 54 the US Second District Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to
its client by helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client hesitated in proceeding
with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any
context comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of causation and damages, and
found in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v. Scheller 55 requiring strict obligation
of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and
sought payment quantum meruit of work done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to
pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement while settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client
found a new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the client to settle for less than what was originally offered.
Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon 56 famously attributed to Justice Benjamin
Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US
Court found that the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his client is
evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but extends even after the termination of
the relationship. 57
27
Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the lawyers are sworn to
uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual and
moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to accept respondents' position without denigrating the noble profession
that is lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the spontaneous
energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of life so share its passions
its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? . . . But that is not all. What a subject is this
in which we are united this abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see reflected,
not only in our lives, but the lives of all men that have been. When I think on this majestic theme my eyes
dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our mistress, we who are here know that she is a mistress only to
be won with sustained and lonely passion only to be won by straining all the faculties by which man is
likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary
duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the
client's name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the circumstances obtaining here
does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in
view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein petitioners and Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the financial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through
insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investment
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital
stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco
is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners
acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official
position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG documents
substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its
clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link "that would inevitably
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime."
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents alleged that the private respondent was dropped as
party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a nominee but also because of his
undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the interest of truth may require, which includes . . . the
identity of the principal." 59
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a statement made in
his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners have likewise made the same claim
not merely out-of-court but also in the Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel,
claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate lawyering." 60 Being "similarly situated" in this regard,
public respondents must show that there exist other conditions and circumstances which would warrant their treating
the private respondent differently from petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to sustain the PCGG's
dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the identities of the clients in question.
However, respondents failed to show and absolute nothing exists in the records of the case at bar that private
respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking happens to be the
leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to have
justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan
should have required proof of the undertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion" that private respondent did
indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for
the purpose, two of which were mere requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed certain clients which
petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and
private respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients which
the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions. 61
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the respondent court without
him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as species apart from the rest of the
ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No
such substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, in violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application of status
and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. 62 Those who fall within a
particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to the liabilities imposed.
. . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all
persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: "Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding the rest. 63
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion as
parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also
constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. 64 It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the same
exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their
clients but also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client
privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing
expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this
stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called to testify and examine as
witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere
witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position
clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of
attorney-client confidentiality.
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It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the
complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the
identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them when this Court could nip the problem in
the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The
case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be
allowed to continue a day longer.

While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not sanction acts which
violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division)
promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz,
Jose C. Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB
Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al."

SO ORDERED.

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