Paidewna 40, 1994

CHALLENGES TO THE HEGEMONY OF THE

SOKOTO CALIPHATE
A Preliminary
Examination

KABIRU SULAIMAN CHAFE

Introduction

Historiansof the Sokoto Caliphate have dealt almost exclusivelywiththe "succes-

ses" of thejihad. Virtuallynothinghas been writtenabout the "failures"of the cali-
phal systemor how farthe achievementsof the caliphal leadershipfellshortof their
aspirations. Indeed, this lack of balanced treatmenthas led some scholars to
conclude,quite rightly, that "the politicaleconomyof the Sokoto Caliphate is yetto
be written".1 A thoroughinvestigation of its politicaleconomydemonstrates thatthe
Sokoto Caliphate was already in decline when the European invasion began. This
declinecan be understoodin termsof the inabilityof the Caliphateto evolvea social
formationwhich embodied the ideals of the jihad. Thus, by the middle of the
nineteenthcentury,internalchallengeswere alreadyunderminingthe state and set-
tingin motiona process of declinewhichwas to become "intrinsic"by the timeof
the Britishinvasion. Because of these internalproblems,Caliphate forceswere not
able to mountany substantialresistanceto the European invasion.
Explanationsforthe fall of any social formationhave conventionallytriedto as-
sess the relativeimportanceof "internal"and "external"factorsin bringingabout its
declineand eventualcollapse. Studiesof the Sokoto Caliphate and its overthrowby
the Europeans at the turnof the twentiethcenturyare no exception.When discus-
sing the conquest, however,scholars have tended to attributethe fall of the Cali-
phate almostentirelyto externalforces,to the virtualexclusionof internalweaknes-
ses which may have contributedto its collapse. On occasion, what emergesis a
highlyromanticisedpictureof a caliphal systemwithits politicalmachineryin "per-
fectworkingconditionwhenthe Europeans struck".Most studies,it is true,do ack-
nowledgetheexistenceof seriousinternalproblemsin variouspartsof the Caliphate,
but these have usually been reduced to the "intrinsic"weakness of the Caliphate's
defences(the inevitableresultof its vast territorialextent),the rise of Mahdist ex-
pectationsand the agitationof "fanatics",or the "incompetence"of the Caliphate's
rulers.
Even Adeleye's Power and Diplomacyin NorthernNigeria 1804-1906, one of the
firstand still one of the most comprehensivestudiesof power relationswithinthe
Caliphate,as well as the system'sattemptsto defenditselfagainstimperialistencir-
clementand destruction, exhibitssome of thesecharacteristics.The book was in fact

1 Watts 1982: 51.

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100 KabiruSulaimanChafe

something of a conceptualbreakthrough whenit appearedin 1971.Adeleyedid not

portray theSokotojihad as a racialor tribalstrugglebutas a revolutionarymove-
mentin thecontextof theregion'ssocio-political dynamics. Accordingly,he exam-
inedtheinternal dynamics ofthejihadwhichlaid thefoundations fortheemergence
of a muchlargerpoliticalentitythanhad previously existedin thearea. Whenit
cameto discussing theCaliphate'sdeclineand collapse,however, Adeleyegavevery
littleprominence to theroleof internalfactorsand concentratedinsteadon theex-
ternalforceswhichbrought aboutitsfall.2
Suleiman'sIslamicStateand theChallenges ofHistorylateradopteda similarpo-
sition,thoughstatingit moreexplicitlyand in muchstronger terms:"In fact,at no
timein itshistory was theCaliphate'slegitimacyeverchallenged,and on theeve of
the Britishinvasionit was not essentiallya statein absolutedecline".3Johnston
attributedthecollapseof Sokoto'shegemony in partto theincompetence of Sultan
Abdurrahman dan Atiku,whoproved"inept"and lackedhispredecessors' "qualities
ofleadership".4Masonadvanceda similarargument abouttheemirate ofBida:
Whilethegrowing oftheBritish
authority Companywas themostimportant influence
external in
Nupein thereignofEtsuMaliki(1882-1895),thediminished oftheKinghimself
prestige was the
mostconspicuousoftheKingdom'sinternal Theexplanation
developments. forthiswouldseemto
lieintheEtsu'sowncharacter
as muchas inexternal
events.5
Otherstudies,however, havebeenmoresolidlygrounded For example,
historically.
it has been demonstrated thatthe collapseof internalcohesionin the Muri and
Fombinaemirates (Adamawa)was theresultpftheendemicstruggle amongvarious
dynastic for
groups politicalpower and In
influence.6 other as
emirates well,casesof
civilstrifehave been amplydocumented. Indeed,it is quiteclear evenfromthe
existingliterature
thattheCaliphate,by thelast quarterof thenineteenth century,
had begunto exhibitsignsofpoliticaldisintegration.
Onlybyinvestigating thesalientfeatures oftheCaliphate'spoliticaleconomycan
the significanceof theseinternalpoliticalproblemsbe fullyunderstood.Several
questionshavestillto be adequatelyanswered: Whatdid theconceptof theSokoto
Caliphaterepresent? How did its measure
policies up to its statedideals?How far
didtheCaliphateera represent a departure fromthepast?Whatwas thesignificance
ofitsachievements or lackofthem?

TheSocio-political
BasisoftheCaliphate
anditsProgrammes

The SokotoCaliphatesystemwas based squarelyon thestrength of itsidealsand

programmes, which the mujahhidun within
articulated an Islamicreligiousframe-
work.In thecourseoftheirattackson theHausa kingdoms, theleadersofthejihad
offered
an alternative
setofpolitical,economicand socialprinciples
whichtheycal-

2 Adeleye1971:esp. 112-13.
3 Suleiman1987:145.
4 Johnston1967:218-22.
5 Mason1973:338.
6 Hamman1983:545-79;Abubakar1970:392-^06.

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 Challengesto the Hegemonyof the Sokoto Caliphate 101

led the "structures of Muslimgovernment" as opposedto whattheytermedthe

"structures ofnon-Muslim government".7
Thejihad itselfwas a responseto thepoliticaland socio-economic problems crea-
tedby theseemingly endlessand indecisive warsamongtheHausa states,compul-
sorymilitary exercises, oppressive taxes and levies,arbitrary seizuresof property,
and thegenerally unpredictable behaviourof thesarauta(titled)class.8The roleof
theshari'ain thejihad shouldin turnbe assessedin thecontextof its socialpro-
grammes and thealignment of scholarswithone or otherof thetwobroadsocial
in theCentralSudanat thetime.Thusthemallamswhosupported theji-
groupings
had werealignedwiththe peasants,thosewho opposedit withthesarauta.The
whoconstituted thecoreof thejihad,however, tookpart
peasantsand pastoralists
in themovement primarily because it articulated their socio-political grievances, not
becauseofitsspiritual appealto them.
In thecourse of their strugglesagainstthepre-jihad socialformations and during
theformative of the the mujahhidun - in particular the Shehu,his
years Caliphate,
-
Abdullahidan Fodio and his son MuhammadBello laid out thespecific
brother
whichwerelargelyresponsible forthe
politicaland socio-economic programmes
which the jihad enjoyed and forthe initial cohesion
political of
widespread support
thenewcaliphalsystem.9 These can be grouped under three broad headings: politi-
cal, socio-economic and intellectual.10
The politicalprogrammes of the Sokoto Caliphateare set out in a numberof
workswritten by the Shehu, Abdullahi dan Fodio and MuhammadBello.11One of
theirmostimportant features was to outline thepoliticalstructures of caliphalad-
ministration. The Caliphate was to be led by the Caliph as the amir al-muminin
(Commander of theFaithful), assisted by his wazirai (advisers), alkalai (judges),a
morals), thesa'i (in charge of the markets),
muhtasib (theofficer chargedupholding
thewalial-shurta and
(policechief),Hmamai, military commanders.12
theleadership oftheCaliphatedidnotspecify all theoffices to be filled,
Although
it is clearthattheShehucategorically the
rejected proliferation of politicaltitlescha-
racteristic of thepvQ'jihad Hausa and
kingdoms planned to abolish parasiticsarauta
titlesin favourof a more streamlined politicalsystem consonant with the Islamic
theoryof politicaladministration drawnlargelyfromtheMalikischoolofjurispru-
dence.13 The Shehuwas also vehemently opposedto thehereditary traditions of the
and
Hausa kingdoms emphasised scholarship and unquestioned morality as
pre-jihad
theprincipal criteriafor office.
Kitab al-farq bayna
7 This distinctionwas clearly outlined by the Shehu Usman dan Fodio in his
wa ahl-al-kufr;see Usman dan Fodio 1960: 558-79.
wilayatahl-al-Islam bayna wilayat
8 Chafe 1990b: 31-62.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid. _ _ ...... , ., ,
ala ai-waa
11 The major worksby the Shehu on theseissues includeKitab al-jarq; Bayan wujubal-nijra
li
wa bayan wujubnasba\imam wa iqmatal-jihad; Kitab al-nasa'ih al-ummaal-muhammadiyya bayab
hukumal-faraqal-shaytaniyya; and Masa'l muhimmayahtaj ila ma'arofatoha ahl al-sudan.Those by
Bello
Abdullahiinclude:Diya al hukkam;Diya al-siyasat;and Diya al-sultan.Those by Muhammad
include Usual al-siyasaand Al-ghaythaal-wablfisirat al-imanal-adl.
12 Last 1971: 48-53.
13 Usman dan Fodio 1960.

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102 KabiruSulaimanChafe

The socio-economicprogrammesof the Sokoto jihad seem to have been crucial

fortransforming mutuallyantagonisticsocietiesinto a singlepoliticalcommunity.14
These programmesthemselvesdealt withall the crucialsectorsof the agrarianecon-
omy: land and land tenure,agricultureand animal husbandry,craftsand otheroc-
cupations,commodityproductionand trade,and labour.15The demographicchanges
that characterisedthe Central Sudan duringthe early nineteenthcenturywere also
guidedto some extentby theseprogrammes.
On land tenure,Abdullahi dan Fodio's Ta'alim al-radifi ashab al-ikhtisasbi ma-
wat al-aradi was the principalreferencepoint, settingout the principlesregulating
the access of all membersof the Communityto land.16The overridingprinciplewas
to be the Community'swelfare.All its memberswere to be guaranteedaccess to
land, and the accumulationof land in orderto depriveothersof it was prohibited.
However, controlover land was interpretedas a rightof "ownership",which was
implicitlyconferredon land broughtundercultivation.Some land was set aside for
publicuse, includingroads and cattletrails,commonpasturesforgrazing,and forest
reservesforgatheringfirewood.
The crucialimportanceof agricultureand livestockproductionforthe survivalof
the Communitywas explicitlyrecognisedin the Shehu's Anwa mal-Allah}1although
it was Muhammad Bello who formulateda specificpolicy forpromotingeconomic
development.Bello's firstprioritywas the establishmentof ribata't (sing, ribat),
heavilyfortified frontierposts whose purposewas to defendthe Caliphate againstits
enemies.At the same time,theseribata'twere to be developedas centresof agricul-
turalproductionwherethe nomadic Fulani would be encouragedto settle.18 The ri-
bata't were also intendedto become manufacturing for
centres, the leaders of the
earlyCaliphate were concerned to fosterall formsof productiveactivitywhich con-
tributedto the economic developmentof the Community.In his policy guidelines,
Muhammad Bello called on the nuwab(his officialsin the metropolitandistrictsand
the emirsof thevariousemirates)to:
... encouragetheartisansand thosewhopractisetradeswhichareindispensableto thepeople:far-
mersandsmiths, tailorsanddyers, andgrocers,
physicians butchersandcarpenters,andall sortsof
tradeswhichcontribute to theprooerorderof thisworld.The rulermustallocatethesetradesmen
^
to everyvillageandeverylocality.
As is clear fromBello's instructions,
the leaders of the Caliphate triedto encourage
trade as well as production.Detailed commercialregulationswere issued,including
the introductionof standardweightsand measuresto be used in the sale of grain,
fruitand meat.20Profiteering, hoardingand the creationof artificialshortageswere
all declaredillegal,withpersistentoffendersto be expelledfromthe Caliphate.21In

14 Chafe1990b:53; Chafe1990a.
15 Chafe1990b:42-53.
16 A translation
is published
as an appendix in Zahredeen
1976.
17 SheikhUthmanb. Fudi, Anwamal Allah,NorthernHistoryResearchScheme,AhmaduBello
Zaria[NHRS/ABU],
University, p. 193/1.
18 Muhammad Bello,Al-ribata
wa al-hirasa,NHRS/ABU,p. 12/2.
19 Muhammad Bello,Usulas-siyasa.See tooYamusa1975:41.
20 Uthmanb. Fudi,Sirajal-ikhwan,NHRS/ABU,K4/11.
21 Uthmanb. Fudi,Tanbihal-ikhwan, inNAK O/AR.

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 Challengesto the Hegemonyof the Sokoto Caliphate 103

addition,the rulersof the emirateswere expectedto visitthe marketsin theirterri-

toryregularly,investigateconditionsand correctabuses, on the basis of the Shehu's
injunctionthat "the reportof a thingis not the same as actual observation".22 More
the
generally, principlesgoverning commercial transactions were to be honesty, fair
dealing and mutual agreement. Third partieswere required to witnesssales involving
personalproperty,such as houses.23
When determining the Caliphate's fiscalpolicies,its leaders abolished all the ex-
ploitativetaxes, levies and seizures which had characterisedthe pre-jihadHausa
kingdoms.Instead, state revenueswere restricted to those sanctionedby the shari'a:
the fifth,the tithe,poll tax, land tax, booty taken in war and unclaimedproperty.24
All the revenuesconstituting the Public Treasurywere to be spenton promotingthe
commonwelfareof the Community.Officialswere strictly forbiddento use theirpo-
sitionsforthe accumulationof privatewealth,and it was illegalto offerthemgifts.25
The Caliphate's policies with respectto slaverywere less explicitlydefined.The
leaders of thejihad had condemnedthe practiceof sellingMuslims into slaveryin
the Hausa kingdomsand triedto stampout the practiceafterthejihad. They did ac-
cept the impositionof slaveryon "non-believers",who were definedas enemiesof
the Caliphate,but theirultimateobjectivewas to integrateslaves into the Caliphate
community.Similarly,theywere criticalof all typesof forcedlabour, which they
consideredillegal.
The leaders of thejihad were also concernedto promoteIslamic learningin the
Caliphate,whichis not surprisingsince all of themwere renownedIslamic scholars
and prolificwriters.In the course of theircampaignsagainstan unjustsocial system,
theyhad undertakenmanypreachingtoursthroughoutthe Rima riverbasin, popu-
larisingthe tenetsof Islamic science wherevertheywent. Once in power, theyem-
phasised the need forIslamic educationnot only in religiousbut also in public life.
For civic rightsand responsibilitiescould only be observedif the membersof the
Communityhad an adequate grasp of Islamic sciences.In the view of the leadership,
social and educationalprogrammeswenthand in hand.

The Caliphate'sSocial Formation:Policyand Practice

Studies of the Sokoto Caliphate have paid a great deal of attentionto its pro-
grammes,but relativelylittleto how far theseprogrammeswere actuallyimplemen-
ted. Scholars have all too frequentlypresupposedthat the ideals of the Caliphate
were almost automaticallytranslatedinto practice,arguingthat, "since the Jihad
leaders were men of God, it is safe to assume that theypractisedwhat theyprea-
ched".26Some fifteen yearsago, forexample,Mahmud MuhammadTukur set out to
demonstratethe continuingrelevance of the Sokoto Caliphate systemwhich, he

22 Ibid.
23 Abdullahib. Fudi, Kifayatal-awamji al-buyu.
24 Uthmanb. Fudi 1960: 571.
25 Uthmanb. Fudi, Anwamat-Allah.
26 See Gusau 1990: 171-92; Zahredeen1990: 193-206.

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104 KabiruSulaimanChafe

believed,embodied socio-politicalvalues that would help Nigeria escape fromthe

politicalcrisiswhichthenbeset it.27But Tukur's studydid not posit any framework
forevaluatingthe natureand extentof politicalintegrationin the Sokoto Caliphate;
it merelyrelatedvarious conceptsof public administration to the writingsof Shehu
Usman dan Fodio, Abdullahi dan Fodio and Muhammadu Bello. More recently,
Ibrahim Suleiman set out to examine the nature of the Sokoto caliphal system,
whichhe regardedas the purestexample of an Islamic political systemin Nigeria's
history.28But in his discussionon the caliphal theoryof government - the shura,the
judicial system,the preservationof social morality,public welfareand the defenceof
Islam - he too concentratedon the ideals of the caliphal leadershipinstead of the
Caliphate'spractices.
To assess how farthe ideals of the leadershipwereactuallyput into practice,one
must bear in mind the political and social configurationof the Sokoto Caliphate.
Direct centraladministration was confinedto the metropolitandistrictsin the heart-
land of the Sokoto-Rima Basin, the regionformerly occupied by the pre-jihadking-
doms of Kebbi, Zamfara and Gobir. The emirateswhichcomprisedthe restof the
Caliphate owed the centralauthoritya looser formof allegiance. The policy pre-
scriptionsof the centralleadershipwere thus addressedlargelyto the metropolitan
districts,althoughtheywere also intendedto provideguidelinesforthe emirsas the
representativesof the Caliph in the emirates.In practice,the emiratestended to
evolve their own forms of government.Some emirates,notably Kano, Zazzau,
Katsina, Daura and Ilorin,were built on the foundationslaid by pre-existing politi-
cal centres.Otherssuch as Bauchi, Gombe, Muri, Fombina and Kontagora emerged
out of thejihad itself.Both typesof emirate,however,incorporatedmuchof the po-
liticalstructureof theprs-jihadHausa states.
One of the most strikingfeaturesof the caliphal systemwas the emergenceof new
politicalcentres,manyof whichalso became centresof agriculturalproduction,ma-
nufacturing and trade. Sokoto itselfwas transformed froma small hamletin 1809
into one of the largest cities in the Central Sudan, with a population of about
100,000 by the end of the century.29 The city became noted for its heterogeneous
wards and its many celebratedartisans,tradersand scholars.30Many other cities
such as Gusau, Kaura-Namoda, Gwadabawa and Illela grewup in the metropolitan
region,all withsubstantialpopulationsdrawnfromall partsof Westernand Central
Sudan and Sahel. Outside the Rima Basin, severalnew town were built,Bauchi, Ja-
lingo and Yola to name but three,all of whichgrewinto large cosmopolitansettle-
mentswhich drew traders,artisansand peasant cultivatorsfromall over theirre-
spectiveregions.
The economic basis of the Caliphate was provided by peasant agriculture,sup-
plementedby slave productionon royal agriculturalestates.The dominantformof
labour was thereforepeasant labour, supplementedby slave labour, clientlabour,
forcedlabour and wage labour, the latterbecomingparticularlyimportantby the

27 Tukur1977.
28 Suleiman1987.
29 Usman1987.
30 Abubakar1982.

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 to theHegemony
Challenges oftheSokotoCaliphate 105

middleof the nineteenth century.Agriculturalproductionand livestockrearingwere

closelyintegrated; the commodity productionsectorexpandedrapidly,and extensive
commercialnetworkswere established,most of themfinancedby foreignmerchant
capital,firstfromNorthAfricaand thenincreasingly fromEurope in the latterpart
of thenineteenth century.31
The dominant unit of production in the Caliphate was the gandu (patrilineal
homestead), comprisingseveral generationsof kin, clients and slaves. The Cali-
phate's social formationexhibiteda close integrationof agriculturalproduction,
animal husbandry,handicraftmanufactureand trade.It cannot easilybe slottedinto
any concept of a mode of production,whether"tributary"or "slave". Nor is the
conceptof co-existing"modes of production"whichWatts has triedto apply to the
Caliphate's social formationpreciseenough to be analyticallyuseful.32 In particular,
my own research has led me to question the relevance of the concept of a "slave"
mode of production.Descriptionsof slaveryand its prevalencein early travellers'
accountsare highlymisleadingbecause theyfailto graspthe fluidityof the termand
how widelyit was used to referto the commonerclass in general.33
It was duringthe firsthalfof the nineteenth centurythatthe Caliphate leadership
articulatedits political,social and economicprogrammesand thatit came closestto
achievingsome of them.During its formativeyears,the Caliphate's chiefpriority
was necessarilypoliticalconsolidation,and its leadershipmay have been excusedfor
not makingmuch progresstoward the realisationof its broader objectiveof trans-
formingsocial and politicalrelationson Islamic lines. By the timeMuhammad Bello
died in 1837, however,the Caliphate had reached its territorial limits,and political
controlhad been consolidated. Thereafter, its failureto achieve its broader social
goals became increasingly glaring. So too did the decliningintellectualvigourof the
leadership.During this period, there was a conspicuous absence of new policies and
programmes,and no major work on state policy written by any of Muhammad
Bello's successorshas been recoveredto date. Nor are any of the emirsknown to
have writtenany workson statecraft.
Even during the formativeyears of the Caliphate, serious problems began to
emerge.Having establishedthe Caliphate's administration,the Shehu quickly be-
came disillusionedwithits failureto createa new social order.Retiringto Bodinga,
he publiclycriticisedthe Caliphate's politicaldegenerationat his Thursdayseminars,
condemningthe new bureaucratsand theirhangers-onfor turningthemselvesinto
anotheroppressiverulingclass.34Abdullahitoo became demoralisedby the failureto
establisha politicaland social systembased on thejihad's ideals and triedto retire
frompubliclife.
The Caliphatethusfellfarshortof achievingits ideals. It did transform the politi-
cal map of the CentralSudan and broughthithertoantagonisticcommunitiestoge-

31 Boahen1962;Newbury 1966;Lovejoy1984;LovejoyandBaier1975.
32 Watts 1982: Chap. 2. See too: Mohammed1983: Chaps 1-2. hor a moregeneraltheoretical
seeHindessandHirst1975.
discussion,
see Rodney
33 Chafe1992.Cf. Clapperton1829:171-72;Barth1859:I, 527-28.For a comparison,
1966,1968.
34 Hodgkin1974:100-01.

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106 Kabiru Sulaiman Chafe

therwithintheconfinesof a popularideologicalframework. But it continuedto

operatelargelywithinthestructures of theold orderagainstwhichthejihad had
beenwagedin thefirstplace.Politicalofficewas stillbasedon hereditary principles
ratherthancompetence and piety.Manyelements of thesarautasystem survived as
thenewaristocracy appropriated vasttractsoflandwhichit workedwithslaveand
unpaidpeasantlabour.35 Bothagricultural and handicraft production increased, but
thecondition oftheproducers and theirrelationship to production remained largely
unchanged.36 So too didtheCaliphate'sclassstructure in general,thoughit was now
constructed on a different ideologicalbasis.
One of themajorobstaclesto theconsolidation and politicalintegration of the
Caliphate was slavery. In a socio-economic system characterised by thefeudal or tri-
butary mode of appropriation, the institutionof slavery took many different forms
of subordination and servility. To maintainslaveryas an important elementin the
Caliphate'ssocial formation requiredextensiveslave raidingin the emirates.But
slaveraidingbytheaffluent aristocracywas quiteantithetical to theidealsoftheca-
liphalsystem and its of
goal incorporating the diverse population groupsofthebilad
as-sudanintoan Islamiccommunity. The impactof slavery on thepoliticaleconomy
of theSokotoCaliphatehas yetto be studiedextensively. But it seemsclearthat
slave raidingin the emirates,particularly in Fombina,Muri, Bauchi, Gombe,
Jema'a,Zazzau and Bida,was largelyresponsible forthelow levelof politicalinte-
gration in the and
Caliphate significantly hindered thedevelopment ofitsproductive
forces.It mayevenhelpto explainthenatureof thecontemporary politicalcrisisin
Northern Nigeria,whichpitsthecaliphaltradition againstthosegroupswhichhad
resistedincorporation into the Caliphate.
The Caliphateera certainly witnessed increasedfoodproduction, a tremendous
in
growth commodity production, the extension of commercial networks and thewi-
deruse ofcurrencies. ButtheCaliphatedidnotfundamentally alterthestructures of
pre-jihadsociety or establish new social relationsof production. This failure even-
tuallyproducedseriouschallenges to theCaliphate'sauthority, someof whichwere
articulated in termsofthesameIslamicideologywhichhad earlierculminated in the
jihad.

InternalChallengesto the Caliphate'sHegemony

Throughout itslife,theSokotoCaliphatehad to contendwiththeopposition of so-

cietieswhichresistedtheirincorporation
intothecaliphalsystem. However, was
it
also confrontedby internal to
challenges its hegemony,some of them articulated
withinits ownIslamicreligiousframework. One of themostseriousof thesechal-
lengeswas posedbytheactivitiesofHayatub. Sa'id. Hayatuis saidto haveleftSo-
kotoduringthereignof SarkinMusulmiAbubakarAtiku(c. 1837-1842).37He set-

35 Lovejoy 1978: 341-68; Jumare1988.

36 Watts 1982: Chap. 2; Swindell1986: 75-111.
37 Tomlmsonand Lethem1927: II, 5.

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 Challengesto the Hegemonyof the Sokoto Caliphate 107

tiedin Fombina,wherehisheadquarters becamea rallying pointforhis supporters

fromall partsof theCaliphate.He thenraiseda verypowerful cavalrywithwhich
he raidedMandara and Bagirmi.38 In 1883,Hayatu recognisedthe Mahdi Mu-
hammadAhmadand was subsequently appointedas the Mahdi's khalifain the
Western and CentralSudan.39 Whenhe failedto obtainofficial recognition fromSo-
koto,Hayatuproclaimed a jihad in north-eastern Fombinaand preparedto attack
theCaliphate.40
werethemostseriousmanifestation
Hayatu'sactivities ofMahdismin theCentral
Sudanat theend of thenineteenth century, though such millenarian traditions had
beendeeplyrootedin thesocial fabricof Muslimsocietiesthroughout theregion
stretching fromthe Senegalvalleyto the modernSudan.41Mahdismherewas a
characteristicformof protestduringperiodsof social crisis,and its naturewas
shapedby socio-political as wellas by ideologicalfactors.Hayatu'smovement was
a
initially reactionagainst the failureof the Caliphate to live up to itsideals, though
it eventuallydegeneratedinto mere adventurism. Whateverformit took, the
Caliphatewas unableto curbitsgrowth. By 1890Hayatu,havingrepudiated all al-
legianceto theCaliphate, had established effectivecontrol over the whole of north-
easternFombina.He thenalliedhimself withRabeh b. Fadlallahwho at thetime
was engagedin theconquestof Borno.In theend,onlyBritishforceswerestrong
enoughto defeattheseadventurers.
Another majorchallenge was posedbyJibrilla Gaini,whoestablished an imamate
at Bormiin the upperGongola River,a territory whichhe carvedout fromthe
Emirateof Gombe.In 1888,he defeatedthecombinedforcesof Gombe,Bauchi,
Katagum,Missauand Hadejia,makinghimself thedominant powerin theBauchi-
Gomberegion.42 Disillusioned with the Caliphate, Jibrillaplannedto founda new
Community enshrining the ideals of an Islamic society and independent of both
Sokoto and the Mahdi. Unfortunately, relatively littleis known about the pro-
grammes of suchmovements as Jibrilla's or about thebasis of the supportwhich
theyenjoyed.SomestudiesoftheCaliphatehavedescribed themas "problems" and
theirfollowers simply as "fanatics". For example, when to
trying explain the move-
ment,Johnston arguedthat"Jibrilla and thepeopleof Bormiseemfirstand fore-
mostto havebeenfanaticalMoslems.Thiswas thecharacteristic whichled themto
createa societyof theirown."43 Johnston may not have fullyunderstood how far
suchmovements werea response to the perceived inadequacies of the caliphalsys-
tem,buthe did realisethatSokoto'sinability to helpGombe"showshowfarthere-
ligiousand politicalauthority of theSultanshad now declined".44 Jibrillatoo was
eventually defeatedbyBritish colonialforces, who took him prisoner in 1902 and ex-
iledhimto Lokoja,wherehe died.

38 Abubakar 1970: 408.

39 Al-Hajj 1971: 159.
40 Abubakar 1970: 410.
41 Hodgkin 1977: 206-23; Lubeck 1985: 370.
42 Tomlinsonand Lethem1927: 8.
43 Johnston1967: 205.
44 Ibid.: 206.

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108 KabiruSulaimanChafe

Frequentterritorial and successiondisputesin various partsof the Caliphate also

demonstrated its failureto transcendthepoliticalcultureof thepre-jihadHausa state
system.During the last quarterof the nineteenth century,severalemirateswererent
by such disputes.Where the centralauthorityintervened,its decisionswere almost
always contested.Even in the metropolitandistrict,SarkinMusulmiAburrahman's
authoritywas challenged by Talata Mafara in 1892, and Marafa's revolt was
supportedby Anka and otherdistrictsin Zamfara area. During the Kano civil war,
the SarkinMusulmfsorderswerecontestedby some of the warringfactions,and his
calls forthe neighbouring emiratesto restorecentralauthoritywereignored.
Only whenthe Caliphate'spoliticalproblemsare examinedin thecontextof its in-
ternaldynamicscan the reasonsforthe system'scollapse, and in particularits inabi-
lityto defenditselfagainstinternalor externalchallenges,be fullyunderstood.Ulti-
mately,the Caliphate's failureto transform pre-existing social and politicalrelations
was responsibleforthe internalchallengesto its hegemony.The activitiesof Hayatu
and Jibrillawere a reflectionof the Caliphate's political disintegration,not simply
the work of "fanatics" or "extremists",the termsin which some contemporary
scholars describe revolutionarysocial movementsarticulated within a religious
framework.When the collapse of the Caliphate is studiedin greaterdepth,we may
also be able to assess the impact of "internalfactors"on the inherentweaknessof
the Caliphate's militaryarrangements.And we may finallybe able to explain why
the Caliphatewas unable to organiseeffective resistanceto externalaggressionat the
turnof the twentieth century.

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