E-FILED 2017 JUN 29 3:27 PM SCOTT - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SCOTT COUNTY

BREAN WOODS, individually, and )

BECCA FREDERICK, individually, and )
KIMBERLY STUMPF, as parent and )
next friend of J.L.G., a minor, and all )
others similarly situated, )
) Case No. LACE128389
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) RULING ON DEFENDANTS
) MOTIONS TO DISMISS
STATE OF IOWA, IOWA GENERAL )
ASSEMBLY, IOWA DEPARTMENT )
OF EDUCATION, and IOWA )
GOVERNOR TERRY BRANSTAD, )
)
Defendants. )

On May 31, 2017, the Defendants Motions to Dismiss came before the Court for oral

argument. The Plaintiffs were represented by Attorneys Meghan Corbin, Cathy Cartee, and

Chase Cartee. The Defendants were represented by the Solicitor General for Iowa, Attorney Jeff

Thompson. After having considered the written and oral arguments of counsel and the applicable

law, the Court enters the following ruling on the pending motions.

BACKGROUND FACTS

In Iowa, school funding is governed by Iowa Code chapter 257. Chapter 257 establishes a

school funding formula to determine the amount of money school districts can spend per pupil.

Public schools are funded through a combination of state school foundation aid, state

supplemental funding, local property taxes, and local option sales taxes. A major purpose of

chapter 257 is to gradually narrow the funding gap between the highest- and lowest-spending

school districts.

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The funding formula in chapter 257 distinguishes between the state cost per pupil and the

district cost per pupil. See Iowa Code 257.9257.10. The formula applies to every school

district. The state cost per pupil establishes the funding floor for school districts. The formula for

determining the district cost per pupil includes, in part, the individual school districts prior

budget. If, after applying the district cost per pupil formula, the district cost is less than the state

cost, the district cost per pupil is increased to the state cost per pupil. As a result, for the

historically lower-spending school districts, the district cost per pupil equals the state cost per

pupil. If, after applying the formula, the district cost per pupil exceeds the state cost per pupil,

the district cost per pupil is limited to a certain percentage of the state cost per pupil. This

percentage is intended to decrease year to year in order to reduce the disparity between the

highest- and lowest-spending districts. Any district cost per pupil that exceeds the state cost is

paid out of local taxes.

At present, the difference between the district cost per pupil of the highest-spending

district and the lowest-spending district is approximately 2.65%. Currently, historically higher-

spending districts may spend as much as $175 per pupil more than the state cost per pupil.

The Davenport Community School District is one of the historically lower-spending

school districts. Based on the funding formula, the Davenport Community School Districts

district cost per pupil equals the state cost per pupil. During the 20152016 school year,

Davenport Community Schools were permitted to spend $6,446.00 per pupil. For the 20162017

school year, Davenport Community Schools were permitted to spend $6,591.00.

The Plaintiffs in this case are current and former students of the Davenport Community

School District. Plaintiffs assert that Davenport Schools are permitted to spend approximately

$175 less per pupil and approximately $2.7 million less in the aggregate than districts at the

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highest funding levels pursuant to the school funding formula in chapter 257. Plaintiffs assert

that there are a total of 171 school districts in Iowa that enroll students similarly situated to

Plaintiffs that are eligible to spend more money per pupil than Davenport schools pursuant to the

funding formula.

Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants are in control of the school funding formula in

chapter 257, and that the funding formula led to the inequities in school funding in the State.

Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants had the authority to change the funding formula but declined

to do so. Plaintiffs further contend that because of the inequity in funding, the Davenport

Community School District has been forced to make significant cuts in its operating budget,

resulting in fewer educational programs, increased class sizes, and diminished resources and

classroom supports.

On December 19, 2016, Plaintiffs Brean Woods and Becca Frederick filed a Petition

against Defendants that alleged three causes of action that are all predicated on a claim that the

funding formula codified in Iowa Code chapter 257 is unconstitutional. In response to

Defendants Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Petition on April 10, 2017. The

Amended Petition added Kimberly Stumpf as parent and next friend of J.L.G., a minor, as a

Plaintiff and now asserts four causes of action: Count I: Violation of Equal Protection under the

Law; Count II: Violation of Due Process; Count III: Violation of Civil Rights; and Count IV:

Violation of Constitutional Guarantees of Funding.

Defendants have filed two Motions to Dismiss the Plaintiffs Amended Petition. The

Motion to Dismiss filed May 16, 2017, seeks to dismiss the Amended Petition based on a lack of

standing and a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Motion to Dismiss

filed May 24, 2017, seeks to dismiss the Amended Petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

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based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs resist the motions. Counsel for both sides

agreed to orally argue and submit both motions to the Court at the hearing held on May 31st.

ANALYSIS

I. Sovereign Immunity

The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar and is judicial, not

constitutional or statutory in origin. Segura v. State, 889 N.W.2d 215, 220 (Iowa 2017). In

1855, the Iowa Supreme Court noted It is well settled, too, that no action of any kind can be

sustained against the government itself for any supposed debt, unless by its own consent, under

some special statute allowing it. Chance v. Temple, 1 Iowa 179, 201 (1855). The general

principle of sovereign immunity is [t]hat there could be no legal right against the sovereign

authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Lee v. State, 815 N.W.2d 731, 737

(Iowa 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the State is immune from suit unless the

State waives its immunity or Congress abrogates the States immunity in legislation. Id. at 737

38. Early cases of sovereign immunity arose in tort. Id. at 737. Iowa courts determined that

sovereign immunity could be impliedly waived, and also that consent to suit or waiver of

sovereign immunity need not always be restricted to legislative enactment. State v. Dvorak, 261

N.W.2d 486, 489 (Iowa 1978). A plaintiff cannot avoid sovereign immunity by naming

individual defendants because the suit is still, in effect, against the State:

While a suit against state officials is not necessarily a suit against the state, within
the rule of immunity of the state from suit without its consent, that rule cannot be
evaded by bringing an action nominally against a state officer or a state board,
commission, or department in his or its official capacity when the real claim is
against the state itself, and the state is the party vitally interested. If the rights of
the state would be directly and adversely affected by the judgment or decree
sought, the state is a necessary party defendant, and if * * * it has not consented to

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be sued, the suit is not maintainable.

Megee v. Barnes, 160 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Iowa 1968) overruled on other grounds by Kersten Co.,

Inc. v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117 (Iowa 1973).

All of the cases the Defendants cite involve lawsuits in which the plaintiff is seeking

monetary relief against the State. Lee, 815 N.W.2d at 743 (The cloak of immunity granted to

the State precludes state employees from suing the state for monetary relief when denied self-

care leave under the FMLA.); Kersten Co., Inc., 207 N.W.2d at 122 (holding that when a State

enters into a contract, the State may be sued for breach of the contract); Megee, 160 N.W.2d at

816 (involving a plaintiff seeking to compel University of Iowa officials to pay her breach of

contract claim). The Defendants have not cited, and the Court is not aware of, any cases to

support the proposition that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars constitutional claims for

declaratory relief.

Here, the Plaintiffs have raised three constitutional claims seeking declaratory judgment,

and one civil rights claim pursuant to which they are seeking damages. Constitutional claims

necessarily involve state action and require plaintiffs to sue the state or a state actor. See, e.g.,

King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 25, 31 (Iowa 2012) (noting that equal protection claims require

state action, and [s]ubstantive due process prevents the government from engaging in

conduct that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered

liberty). The Plaintiffs are not seeking damages with regard to their constitutional claims. For

that reason, and because the Defendants have not shown that sovereign immunity applies to

constitutional claims, the Court finds Counts I, II, and IV do not fall under the jurisdictional bar

of sovereign immunity. Because Count III is dismissed as discussed below in Part III.C, the

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Court declines to address the sovereign immunity issue as to Count III. The Defendants Motion

to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is DENIED.

II. Standing

A plaintiff must show that he or she has standing prior to proceeding with a lawsuit.

Standing is the legal requirement that a plaintiff have sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable

controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698

N.W.2d 858, 86364 (Iowa 2005). The doctrine of standing has two elements: A plaintiff must

(1) have a specific personal or legal interest in the litigation and (2) be injuriously affected.

Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Iowa 2008). The first element . . . is aligned with the

general concept of standing that a party who advances a legal claim must have a special interest

in the challenged action, as distinguished from a general interest. Id. at 419 (quoting City of

Des Moines v. PERB, 275 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Iowa 1979)). The second requirement . . . means

the plaintiff must be injured in fact. Id. This means that the plaintiff must show some specific

and perceptible harm from the challenged action, distinguished from those citizens who are

outside the subject of the action but claim to be affected. Id. (quoting United States v. Students

Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n. 14 (1973)).

[C]ases involving actions by private persons to enforce public rights may be brought

under the personal-interest alternative to the first element. Id. at 420. [W]e require the litigant

to allege some type of injury different from the population in general. Id. Further, [t]h[e] injury

component . . . captures more than economic loss and includes conservational and other

intangible interests. Id.

Plaintiffs Brean Woods and Becca Frederick are Scott County residents and former

students of Davenport Schools. These two Plaintiffs assert they have standing because they are

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raising constitutional claims regarding their right to a free appropriate education. Further, these

Plaintiffs contend they have standing because they are recent graduates of the Davenport

Community Schools.

Plaintiffs Woods and Frederick have not established a specific and perceptible harm. The

Court finds that because these are former, and not current, students of the Davenport School

District, they cannot allege an injury distinguished from a general interest of other members of

the community. Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Brean Woods and Becca Frederick

lack standing to pursue this claim and are therefore DISMISSED.

Plaintiff Kimberly Stumpf is a Scott County resident and is the parent of J.L.G., a minor

and current student at Davenport schools. This Plaintiff asserts that because J.L.G. is a current

student, Stumpf has an individual interest in school funding. The Court finds that Plaintiff

Kimberly Stumpf, as parent and next friend of J.L.G., a minor, has alleged an injury different

from the population in general, and therefore has standing to pursue this claim. The Court will

next address whether the claims asserted by Plaintiff are sufficient to survive the Defendants

Motion to Dismiss.

III. Failure to State a Claim

Defendants claim that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. A motion to dismiss is sustainable only when it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff

would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be proved in support of the

claims asserted. Haupt v. Miller, 514 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Iowa 1994). Therefore, a dismissal at

this stage must rest on legal grounds. Mlynarik v. Bergantzel, 675 N.W.2d 584, 586 (Iowa

2004).

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The Court consider[s] only the facts alleged in the petition or those of which judicial

notice may be taken in determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief

may be granted. Id. The Court views the plaintiffs allegations in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff with doubts resolved in that partys favor. Haupt, 514 N.W.2d at 911. Facts alleged in

the petition are recognized as true. Mlynarik, 675 N.W.2d at 586. To satisfy Iowas notice

pleading requirements, the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a pleading shall

contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and a

demand for judgment for the type of relief sought. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.403(1).

A. Count I: Equal Protection

Article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution provides:

All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General Assembly
shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which,
upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.

Iowa Const. art. I, 6.

[A]ny equal protection claim, whether in the education context or elsewhere, requires an

allegation of disparate treatment, not merely disparate impact. King, 818 N.W.2d at 24. To

allege a viable equal protection claim, plaintiffs must allege that the defendants are treating

similarly situated persons differently. Id. Unless a suspect class or a fundamental right is at

issue, equal protection claims are reviewed under the rational basis test. Id. at 25.

Plaintiff asserts that Iowa Code chapter 257 denies the Plaintiff equal protection both on

its face and as applied to the Plaintiff and others similarly situated because Davenport

Community Schools get less money per pupil than other schools in the State. Plaintiff does not

assert she is part of a suspect class, but instead asserts chapter 257 violates a fundamental right

namely the right to a public education.

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Defendants contend that the broad funding authority granted to the General Assembly

does not require dollar-for-dollar spending parity amongst school districts. The school financing

formula in chapter 257 creates a differential of approximately 2.65% between the historically

highest-spending and lowest-spending schools, as compared to the approximately 25%

differential that existed before the implementation of the current chapter 257. Defendants argue

that any difference in per-pupil spending between districts does not create a constitutional

infirmity as a matter of law. Defendants also contend the differential in per-pupil spending is de

minimus and insufficient in itself to create a constitutional deprivation. Finally, Defendants argue

that the right to education is not a fundamental right and further that Plaintiff has not alleged she

was subject to disparate treatment.

Whether the right to education is a fundamental right remains an open question in Iowa.

King, 818 N.W.2d at 26. Because Iowa Courts do not currently recognize the right to education

as a fundamental right, the statute here must only pass rational basis review. Id. at 2526. Under

the rational basis test, we must determine whether the classification is rationally related to a

legitimate governmental interest Id. at 27 (quoting Ames Rental Prop. Assn v. City of Ames,

736 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Iowa 2007)). The classification is valid unless the relationship between

the classification and the purpose behind it is so weak the classification must be viewed as

arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 2728.

In order to show the statute lacks a rational basis, the plaintiff must negate every

reasonable basis upon which the classification may be sustained. Id. at 28 (quoting Bierkamp v.

Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 57980 (Iowa 1980)). Since the State does not have to produce

evidence, and only a plausible justification is required . . . there are certainly occasions where a

rational basis test can be applied on the pleadings without taking evidence. Id. If from the

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pleadings it is apparent that the Plaintiff cannot meet the rational basis test, there is no reason

for the case to proceed further. Id. at 28.

In Exira Community School District v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787 (Iowa 1994), the Iowa

Supreme Court was presented with equal protection and due process challenges based on a

provision in the states open enrollment statute. The challenged provision required the school

district of residence to pay tuition to the district into which the student had open enrolled. King,

818 N.W.2d at 23 (discussing Exira). About 10% of Exiras students open enrolled into another

district, resulting in a financial shortfall in the district due to the amount of money being paid out

pursuant to the statute. The Court applied the rational basis test to the statute and found that the

plaintiffs equal protection claim failed. The Court in Exira found that a funding mechanism

that assured roughly the same amount of per-pupil funding regardless of the district did not treat

students differently or violate equal protection, even if it meant that the Exira district could not

sustain itself and eventually may have to close. Id. at 2324.

Given this foundation, the Court finds that Iowas funding provision in chapter 257

plainly satisfies the rational basis test. As discussed further in Part III.D., the Iowa Constitution

gives the General Assembly broad authority to control school funds in the State. In order to

decrease the disparity in school funding, the Iowa General Assembly created the funding formula

in chapter 257. The intent of Iowa Code chapter 257 is to equalize educational opportunity, to

provide a good education for all the children of Iowa, to provide property tax relief, to decrease

the percentage of school costs paid from property taxes, and to provide reasonable control of

school costs. Iowa Code 257.31(10). While this funding formula may not result in dollar-for-

dollar parity between districts, students are guaranteed roughly the same amount of funds for his

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or her education. For these reasons, the Court grants the Defendants Motion to Dismiss Count I

of Plaintiffs Amended Petition.

B. Count II: Due Process

Pursuant to the Iowa Constitution, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law. Iowa Const. art. I, 9. The Iowa Supreme Court

discussed substantive due process in King:

Substantive due process prevents the government from engaging in conduct that
shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. With a substantive due process claim, we follow a two-stage analysis.
First, we determine the nature of the individual right involved, then the
appropriate level of scrutiny. If the right at issue is fundamental, strict scrutiny
applies; otherwise, the state only has to satisfy the rational basis test. When the
rational basis test applies, there need only be a reasonable fit between the
legislatures purpose and the means chosen to advance that purpose.

King, 818 N.W.2d at 31 (citations omitted).

To satisfy rational basis, [t]he legislature need not employ the best means of achieving

that interest. The plaintiff by contrast must negate every reasonable basis upon which the

governments act may be sustained. Id. at 31 (citations omitted).

In Exira, the Court found the financing provision of the open enrollment statute passed

rational basis review because it gave access to educational opportunities even though its

ultimate effect might mean the demise of some smaller schools. King, 818 N.W.2d at 32

(quoting Exira, 512 N.W.2d at 79596)). It is not for us to judge the wisdom of such a policy.

That was a legislative call. Exira, 512 N.W.2d at 795. Our clear duty is to interpret and apply

the law given to us, and not to develop or choose among schemes for public education. Id. at

796.

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Plaintiff asserts that Iowa Code chapter 257 violates due process both on its face and as

applied to the Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff has a fundamental right to a public education.

Defendants assert for the same reasons stated for the equal protection claim that Plaintiff has

failed to state a due process claim upon which relief could be granted.

Because the right to education is not recognized as a fundamental right in Iowa, the

rational basis test applies to chapter 257. The Court finds that chapter 257 satisfies the rational

basis test with regard to Plaintiffs due process claim. As noted in the discussion of Plaintiffs

equal protection claim, there is a reasonable fit between the legislatures goal of reducing the

funding disparity between districts and the funding formula in chapter 257. That it does not result

in dollar-for-dollar parity between districts is a result of the policy decision behind chapter 257.

Similar to Exira, it is not for the Court to judge the wisdom of such a policy. For this reason, the

Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot show a due process violation and Plaintiff has failed to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court grants the Defendants Motion to Dismiss

Count II of Plaintiffs Amended Petition.

C. Count III: Violation of Civil Rights

In Count III of the Amended Petition, Plaintiff alleges a violation of civil rights. The

Plaintiff does not establish what civil rights she claims were violated, and she does not identify

any state or federal constitutional provision or statutes as the basis for her claim. All Plaintiff

alleges is that Defendants actions herein alleged constitute an unfair and discriminatory practice

toward Plaintiff[] and other persons similarly situated, and that Plaintiff has suffered damages

as a result. Plaintiff filed an Amended Petition on April 10, 2017, but she did not further

elucidate her civil rights violation claim in that pleading.

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At oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff alleged that Iowa Code chapter 257

creates a spending disparity and this disparity leads to a disparate impact on the students at the

Davenport schools. Plaintiff mentioned the number of students of color and students with

disabilities at the Davenport Public Schools, but did not allege racial or disability discrimination.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs violation of civil rights claim fails to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted. Even under Iowas liberal notice pleading standard, the civil

rights claim fails to put the Defendants on notice as to what is being alleged, and does not show a

basis on which the Plaintiff would be entitled to relief. For all of these reasons, the Court grants

the Defendants Motion to Dismiss Count III of Plaintiffs Amended Petition.

D. Count IV: Education Clause

Regarding education of children in Iowa, the relevant portions of the Iowa Constitution

provide:

Controlmanagement. Section 1. The educational and school funds and lands,

shall be under the control and management of the General Assembly of this State.
....
Perpetual support fund. Section 3. The General Assembly shall encourage, by all
suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural
improvement. . . .

Iowa Const. art. IX, div. 2, 1, 3.

The Iowa Supreme Court has previously held that article IX, division 2, section 3 of the

Iowa Constitution is a funding provision, which allocated to the general assembly the authority

to provide money for education, and thereby to encourage [various forms of improvement] by

all suitable means. King, 818 N.W.2d at 14 (alterations in original). [T]he education clause

must be read in conjunction with the broad policy-making authority conferred by article IX,

division 1, section 15, which states that the general assembly shall have power after 1863 to

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provide for the educational interests of the state in any other manner that to them shall seem best

and proper. Id. at 17 (quoting Kinzer v. Dirs. of Indep. Sch. Dist., 105 N.W. 686, 687 (Iowa

1906)). Further it is an open question whether the education clause contains judicially

discoverable and manageable standards. Id. (quoting Des Moines Register and Tribune Co. v.

Dwyer, 542 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 1996)).

The Iowa Supreme Court has discussed challenges to the education clause of the Iowa

Constitution in other cases. In Kleen v. Porter, 23 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1946), the plaintiffs filed a

declaratory judgment asserting that two laws that appropriated money from the general fund to

school districts on a targeted basis to reimburse certain transportation expenses and bring all

districts up to a certain minimum level of per-pupil funding was unconstitutional. King, 818

N.W.2d at 16 (discussing Kleen). The plaintiffs asserted that pursuant to the Iowa Constitution,

these appropriations could only be made on a uniform statewide basis in proportion to the

numbers of youths between five and twenty-one years old in each district. Id.

The district court dismissed the action finding that the statutes did not violate sections 3

and 7 of Division 2 of article IX of the Iowa Constitution. Plaintiffs appealed. The Iowa Supreme

Court held that the enumeration requirement [of the Iowa Constitution] applied only to

appropriations from the permanent school fund established by article IX, division 2, not other

funding sources. Id. The Court found that the first sentence of section 3 give[s] the legislature

broad authority to augment the income from the permanent school fund without being subject to

the enumeration requirement in section 7. Id. Kleen saw the education clause as a grant of

broad funding authority to the general assembly. Id.

In King, the plaintiffs alleged that the education clause of the Iowa Constitution imposes

judicially enforceable obligations on Iowas legislature to promote education by all suitable

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means. Id. at 13. The plaintiffs contended that the States current education laws failed to set

minimum educational standards, failed to provide an effective education, and violated the

education clause. The Iowa Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs had not raised a violation of

the Iowa Constitution with regard to the education clause.

In King, the Court noted that [c]ourts are accustomed to dealing with questions of

financial discrimination. Id. at 18. However, the Court also noted Iowas education clause,

unlike the constitutions of most other states, does not mandate free public schools. Nor does the

education clause require that the states public education system be adequate, efficient, quality,

thorough, or uniform. Our founders did not make these choices. Id. at 2021 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The question here is whether the Plaintiff has alleged acts that would establish a violation

of the education clause of the Iowa Constitution. Plaintiff contends that the General Assembly

has not used all suitable means to encourage and promote the Plaintiffs education because it

has not resolved the funding inequities she asserts are caused by Chapter 257. Plaintiff contends

the funding inequity has caused Davenport schools to cut the districts operating budget,

resulting in fewer educational programs, increased class sized, and diminished resources and

classroom supports. Plaintiff also asserts that the funding inequities violate her fundamental

right to adequate public school education.

The Iowa Constitution grants the Iowa General Assembly broad authority to decide how

to allocate money to school districts. The general assembly has decided the best way to allocate

this money is through the funding formula in chapter 257. Here, Plaintiff is not alleging that the

amount of money Davenport Schools receives per pupil is inadequate to provide an education to

its students. The Court determines that the allegations in the Plaintiffs amended petition do not

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state a claim under article IX, division 2, sections 1 or 3 of the Iowa Constitution. For this and all

of the reasons previously discussed, the Court grants the Defendants Motion to Dismiss Count

IV of Plaintiffs Amended Petition.

RULING

For all of the above-stated reasons, it is the ruling of the Court that the Defendants

Motion to Dismiss all of the counts set forth in Plaintiffs Amended Petition is GRANTED.

Costs are assessed to the Plaintiff.

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State of Iowa Courts

Type: OTHER ORDER

Case Number Case Title

LACE128389 WOODS, BREAN, ET AL., V. STATE OF IOWA

So Ordered

Electronically signed on 2017-06-29 15:27:06 page 17 of 17