1. "Process selection" is treated in Chapter 15, "Learning Activities .

" processes are learned from the activities

that student engage in as they interact with content.

2- Becarrse so rnrrch of the literature in.this area des not make a distinction betu,een
conient and knoN'ledge, we u'ill use the two tems interchangeably in this section.

ln a vety real senser the disciplines' tlre traditio"ll

-::lt:-:t:--'?'l^l!'"
*tl*l
curriculttrn, are "the Ptt;:;"; o'"tott" of learning-its consunlnration' '(l)ewge
,or/' n l88). Ilisto;it"li;-;hty are thc result o[ seeking Practical sr''cial ends'
O"ir"f ^,u"i
this clear when he writes:

*tl*l
curriculttrn, are "the Ptt;:;"; o'"tott" of learning-its consunlnration' '(l)ewge
,or/' n l88). Ilisto;it"li;-;hty are thc result o[ seeking Practical sr''cial ends'
O"ir"f ^,u"i
this clear when he writes:

ln a vety real senser the disciplines' tlre traditio"ll

-::lt:-:t:--'?'l^l!'"
*tl*l
curriculttrn, are "the Ptt;:;"; o'"tott" of learning-its consunlnration' '(l)ewge
,or/' n l88). Ilisto;it"li;-;hty are thc result o[ seeking Practical sr''cial ends'
O"ir"f ^,u"i
this clear when he writes:

lL is ?ertittent 'c
noie that it the history o{ ihe ro'ce the scienc*s greugrad.
ually out fofl i""1ut 'ot;'t cccuPati,ons'.Physics devcloyc'd 5lswly c'tt
Ziii.'rir"- "f
',,d';;1 aachines chentistry Etctu o7't of processes of
dving, bbaching, metal vorking' etc '-' g"i-""' ' tncatts literally
2q7*1: aeasuing'
"')';"tl'*i-"it 't n'''b"i' in cou'ti"g rc ke cp trock of
things attd ;,' *"o'u'i'g is eten ntore ;mpo1t1'nt today than it Litncs tultetr
;,*i,;nut'nd for thei ?ur?oses (Devey 19I6' p' 2OI)'
But while the stores oF knorvledge knowl't as the disciPliircs lrave qro\vl) out
o[ useful ,o"irl ottt'p'tions' theii P-resent data and organization are based
;;,;;; 'i',.1,-,".t"iul conduct of iht ""tt'prise
o[ discovery [andl knowing
,r'. rp""A"; ;;;'*;' g" (D"*"y.1916' p' l9o)' Thus' for Dewey' thc subiect
rnatter disciplines "'
it Lto* them assume a sp-eciirl status as bodies of
fi:;"'i;; ;la"i.J'i" r.'*a tion orga n ized to promotc Fu rther d iscovcry'
''*ii]o'"J",",'.ir"* ir rr'ared by"Phe,ir, who maintains that the cisciplinc is
" #;1 5;;ltl ,.,J.ig.,;fic"r,r e.o,,gh to serve as rhc basis for thc organization
"r-i""*i"Jg".i
rt. *-tk* his "g''ictt on empirical and 1;ragmatic grottlrds'
disciplines ptove themselves by-their yrodtrctiveness- They ore tl* visible
of thinking that haie proten fruitftl' They have a.risctt
eviclences of ways
Ly th, *se'of conclys and"*ethods thit have generctive pouer (Phenix
1964, P. 48)-
For Phenix and Dewey, then, a discipline is an organization of concepts and
-;;;ir-;i;te chief chittcteri'tic is their Power to
'en"-tn.tt
1:". i<,norniiedge' -"o;;;;r,
however, have proposed different-co.,.eptio.t ot,the.discipline- Probablv
the most common i''the position that a discipline is simply a defined area
;J*i'; i'.*., ii.,".y, chemistry, or zoology)' Moie complex is Broudy's (1961'
;. ;;';:i,i"", .i,t i.t i.,voires the idlntification o[ four asperts oF a discipline

Similar to Dewey's and Phenix's conceptions is that of Foshay (1968, p.65):

"A discipline is a rvay of making k,rorv.lcdge. A disciplinc rnay be characterizcd
by the phenomena it pr:rporti to deal with, rts domain; by the ru.les it uses for
assertinS generalizations as frutir; and by its history." Finllly, King and Brorvnell
(1966, o 58) conceive of the tern "discipline" as meaning a commr:nity, "the
co?s oF human beings 'azith a common intellecrual comrnitment who rnakc a
contribution to human thought and to human affairs."

We might continue tliis litany of definitions almost indeGnitely since thc

cffort to de6ne the signi6cant characteristics oI disciplines has occupied thinkers
for many centuries. Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, among the greatest
rninds, have all grapplcd w'ith thc complexities o[ the ordering of arrd the relationships
among the disciplines. It is significanr to notc, however, that no de6nition
or combination of de&nitions has adequately solved the riddle o[ tlre structure
of man's knorvledgc.

PROBLEMS IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE

Three central issues which define the problem of the disciplines have been
identified by Schwab (1964a and I 964b) as ( I ) the structure of the disciplines,
(2) the syntactical structure of each discipline, and (3) the substantive structure
of each disciplinc. The first issue, the problem of the structure of the
disciplines, is defned as "the problem of determining the membership and
organization of the disciplines, o[ identifying the significantly different disciplines,
and of locating their relations to one another" (Schwab I964b, p. 11).
Such questions as the following are treated in this area: Is the knowledge of
mathematics significantly different from the knowledge of "things" (e.g., as in
physics or chemistry)? Is there a difference, in kind between "practical" and
"theoretical" knox.ledge? Or is "practical knowledge simply the application of
theoretical knowledge? Does individual behavior and group behavior differ in
such a way that psychology and sociology constitute different disciplines, or are
individual and group behavior so related that psychology and sociology constitute
branches of the same science It is worth repeating for emphasis here that
these questions address themselves to the organization of the collectire disciplines
into the total architecture of knowledge.

In conkast, the second problern that Schwab identifies has to do with the
sytttactical slrTlctTie of each discipliae. The syntactical structure concerns itself
"with concrete descriptions of the Eiads of evidence required by the discipline,
how far the kinds oI data required are actually obtainable, wl]at sorts of secondbest
substitutes may be employed, rvhat problems of interpretatio.j are posed,
and how these problerns are overcome" (Schwab 1964a, p. 23). In short, the
syntax of a discipline deals with its rnodus operandi, but it is important ro poinr
out that n'rodus operandi is not reduceable to an abstracted "method of inquiry"
-e.g., a conception like the popular version of the "five-step scienti6c rrfethod."

The complexiey of slmtax as nrodus cperandi is made clcar by Schrvab (1964a,

p. 3l): ,i ry.,i"* cannot be described c.\cc:pt ihrough rcfer,:nce tc the concrere
srrbjecc matier involved in concretc irrquiries." For era,nlrlc, rvlrile science sceks
the rrrosc generalized forms o[ knorvlcdgc (e.g., 1;hysics :itlcrnpts.to gcrrcrate
l-rroad com"prehensive theories that cxplairr vast rangcs cf pl'.ysical plrctronrena),
history de"l, i., prriicula( details, Thus cach enterl)rise gencrates Problems of
inquiiy peculia; io itselI which givc direction to rlrc kinds o[ c;uestions it asks,
tl,e t;"al o[ data it seeks, its canons of evidcnce, and its verification Proccdures.
Because of the number and varicty of thc 6elds of incruiry and the sometimes
iniricate differences amonS them, there exists, according to Schn'ab, a u,ide
variety o[ syntaxes and combinatior:s of syntaxes, This intricatc relationship
berween the context (meanings generated by a disciPline) and rhe syntax
(rnodes of thought employed to handle meaninqs) is, irr prir:ciple, thc same
kind of interconnectedness claimed in a 1>revious sectior'r tor coritelr( and 1:rocess.
The rrecessity of this connectior) will bc made clearer in the follort'irrg iraragraphs,
which deal witlr the third major issue tlrat defines the architcctonics oF
.o.,i..rt, the problem o[ the substantivc structure of each Cisciplinc.
The sttbstant;ye strltclt res o[ the disciplines addresses itse lf to cluestions
inherent in the naturc of the data and conceptions that identify the 1>ou'ers and
limits of a particular iield of inquiry. For example, thc colrcepts of "clement"
and 'tompound" constittrtc substantivc structures pcculiar to the discipline of
chemistry, rvhile "id,'t"ego," and "supercgo" rcPresent substantive structures of
(Freudian) psychology. Tlrc substantive structures of each disciplirre funcrion
to guide inquiry in the disciplinc and to render cornl;rehensible the disl:arate
data that constitute its subject matter. Moreover, the structures take on meaning
and are understood in terms of their relationships to one another. For example,
in physics "it is impcssible to discuss work without discussing force; and force
cannot be discussed r,i,'ithout conce(n for momentum. Further, not onc of these
can be defined by mere pointing. Pushing, pulling or lifting are \r'avs o[ applying
force but do not correspond to'force'as this conception appears in classical
mecha"nics" (ScLw,ab l96ab, p. 35). Thus, the substantive str:u,chtres (plural)
of a iiscipline are interrelated in such a way that they may collectively be said
to represent the substantive strLctilre (singular) of the discipiine.
It is important to point out that the substantive structure(s) of a given discipline
never constitute a literal and finished.description of a fixed reality. For
example, \1,e are aware that the na.ive concepts developed by fledgling disciplines
are ]ater abandoned or revised in favor o[ more sop]risticated structures as the
discipline matures (e.g,, the concept o[ oxidation supplanting the phlogiston
theory in chemistry). At the samd time, sorne disciplines entertain and accornmodate
cor:rpetir:g substantive structures all of which have their ou,n usefulness
u.,d g"."r^tir. p*". (e.g., psychoanalytic, behavioral, and 1>erceptual .structures
in psychology). Situation-s such aa these point up the inventive, tentative, and
revisionary character of knor"ledge, an importanI concept of u,hich curriculunr
planners should be arvare.
Jerome Bruner, a prominent 1>roponent o[ the structural viewppint,'explains

rvhy knr'rrvledge c3nilot be conceived of in ternrs of absolute truth:

Knowle,Tge is a ntodel ue construci ro Eive ,nennirg and stntcttre to
regularities in experiencz. The organizing idecs ct' n,ry bod1, of knctwledge
c:e inventions t'or rertdering experience ecotonical and connected- We
invent coriceprs srich as force in physics, the bond ir chenittry, rtotives in
?sycholo&y, stTle in literaiure as means to thc enci of corrupre'Letisiot.
(Bruner 1963, D. 12O).
What is the significance of these threc prob)crn areas to the task of conrenr
selection? The implications are numerous, o[ course; however, we will menticn
only a few o[ the most imporrant. With respect to rhe firsr problem area (rhe
organization of the disciplines) we quote Schwab:
To identify the disciplines that constitt te conterliporarl knowledge and
. nastary of the world, is to idettify the s-ubject ntatter of 'edrtcation. . . 'fo locate the relations of tiese d.isciplines to ofle
anorhel is ta d.etermine
uiut may be joined together for puryoses of instuctior and uhat shotlil
be held a?art . . . (Sclzwab l96ab, p. 1l).
With respect to the second and third problern areas (rhc syntactical and sub,
stantive structures of each discipline), we mav noie rhe important implication
that curriculum planners need to consider the relationship of content and
process in developing curriculurn content. Furthermore, "to know what structures
underlie a given body of knowledge is ro know whar problems we shall
face in imparting this knowledge" (Schwab 1964b, p. l3). Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, we should note the revisionary and plural character of substantive
and syntactical structures; the tentative nature of the disciplines points
up the need to avoid the dogmatic and inculcative approach to content (an
approach which, unfortunately, now characterizes most curricula). To inculcate
a particular version of history, a particular literature, or a particular view ot
science (i.e., to treat selecred content as absolute fact or trurh) not only does vio-
Ience to the nature of the content, but promotes narro,rrness and divisiveness, the
very opposite of openness and community whicli are the desiderata of education.
THE DISCIPLINES: UNITY OR DIVERSITYT
Are the disciplines each part of an interrelated totality which we can point to as
constituting man's knowledge? Or is each d;scipline an autonomous body of substantive
and s)rntactic structures that deal independently with a particular vecror
of reality) King and Brownell (t966) argue that man's age-old fascination with
lhe idea of oneness and the traditional domination of philosophy (the "queen
of disciplines") are mainly responsible for the repeated (but unsrrccessFul)
attempts to bring all the domains of knowledge into a uni6ed, coherent sysrem.
They point crut, for exarnple, that Aristotle (Greek philosopher, 384-3.22 a.c.),
using the principle of "6nal causes," attempted to organize all the disciplines
into just three classes: the theoretical (e.g., physics and nrathemadcs), the
pracrical (e.g., ethics and politics), and the productive (e.g., art and engineering).
Centrrries later, Ren6 Descartes (French philosopher, 1596-165O) tried

ro uniFy rhe (li5ciplines under the urnbcclla of a unjversal logic-a ierlrrctive

method resring on self-evidenr 6rst principle'. Thus, he viewcd the discipiirres
as a philosophical unity, a sysrern in whi,:h "1>hiiosophy as a *lrole is Iikc a tree
*hor..oots-are metaphysics, whose trunk js plrysics, ani rvhose branchcs
are all the other sciences." Later, Auguste Conrpte (Frcnch philoso2her, l79B-
1857) atternpted to unify the sciences using 'the organizational principle of
subject matter. He constructcd a hierarchy iit which eacir discipline was ciassified
acc<.,rding ro rhe complexity of the substances that rverc its subject oI study.
Thus physics, because it was concerncd with tlre simplest physical structures
preceded chemistry, which was conccrned with combinations o[ pl',ysical struciures,
the. came biology (combinations of chemicals). and finallv at thc top,
sociology (combinations of biologicals). It is interesting that some curricular
prerequisites (e.g., physics betorc chemistry and chemistry kfore biology) rhat
are based on this organization of the d.isciplines persist cven today in nrany
schools. Of course, none o[ these efforts to l:ui]d a uni6cd system of knorvledge
has been successful, and the more knowledge we acquire, the clearer it becornes
that
There is an intperalive in the indisycnsable distinctions among tlze
various disciplines of ktowledge. . We conchrde that no imposed.,
monolithic tnity can ?resently accozlnt fo, . [the) . . distirrctive
aspects of tbe rnodgrn disciVlines With rcspect to tha ctoiathun
and tl* schools, oily a phrralisnt of knowlcdgc seetns platsible (King and
Brownell 1966, p?. 60,61)-
Although these authors de6ne pluralism as "diversity-in-unity," they enrpha-.
size the "autonomy and diversity of the various disciplines of knowledge" and
view the school as "a microiosm of the realm of knowledge" (King and Brownell
1966, pp.62,63). Thus, they advocate the use of the separate disciplines as the
content of the curriculum.
But another view ot' the disciplines, one advocating the relatedness of knowledge,
would argue that King and Brownell's conclusions are not warranted.
Even.i{ the possibility of a "monolithic unity" of knowledge could be disproved
(the authors have shown'only that "monolithic unity" has not yet been demonstrated),
it by no means follows rhat a highly significar]t netv!,ork of relationships
does not exist among many of the disciplines or that alvareness of these
relationships is not vital to an understanding of the disciplines. Levit argues For
the existence of in terdiscipl inary relationships :
over nan/ cenluries of human eisterce, eztrettely taried rehtions alnoii ta
things . . . have been foutd or established. . . . Stated in terrns of subject
nattar, these detelaTtments heve been rcfle.cted in the retolutionizing of
those discipliaes uhich are o?en to inquiry lfl exteflsions, modifiutions,
and intcrtuinings of their concepts, procedures, and objects ol stidy . . .

ffor examyb,f the phenomena and prirciples of phTs;ology continr+e to be

reinterpreAa as lhey are brought into upanding theoretical aru1 practiul
relatiorts with the nuterials and pinciples af physics and biophysics,
cheinistrT, anqtony, embryobgy, ginetici, e.olog), psl,chology, an'd ntany
other areqs of inqil-iry (I*rit 197 1, pp. 175-17_7). 'r"

I
The Architectotrics of Cntc;t 335
()n the basis ol Levit's argument, it almost seems that the direct opposite o,
King and Bro.rneil's conclusion is warranted': The more knov;lcdgc rve acquire,
rhe clearer the interrclacionships betvveen the diriplines Lrccon:el Of cour.e.
Levit does noi make this claim. He adrr,its thar "rhere are discontindii;es; not
everything is related to everything else in everl' possible way" (Levit I971, p.
176). Nevertheless, it seems clear that ielationships betrveen disciplines must be
a ftctor to consider as curriculum planners slect and-organize content-

CURRICULLIM CONTENT: UNITY OR DIVERSITY?

Just a glancc at the offerings o[ a modern multiversity ("universiry" seems so

inappropriate a rvord today) suggests that the proposals of King and Brou'nell
are wiCely accepted. A fantastic diversity of specialized offerings emanate from
a profusion of specializcd schools, departments, centers, and institutes. Much
the same condition ensues in modcrn secondary schools, which include in their
curricula content ranging from cosmology to cosmetology. But that the diversiry
approach to content is adequate to the educational needs of individuals and
so.iieties is a highly aiguable proposition. In fact, many schools'curricula have
sustained consiJerabte criticism precisely because of the fragmentation (and
irrelevance to life) deriving from the "pluralistic" disciplines approach.
If there is any substance at all to the argument that people in societies need
ro make sense out o[ their existence, it would appear that an integration of
knowledge is a necessary condition. This does not mean that the "integrity" of
the "disciplines" is at stake; it does mean that, in the general education (as
opposed to professional training) of human beings, the disciplines function
most often as resources for content (not as the content) in the cievelopment of
an educated Weitar-scharn*18. As Foshpy (1970, p. 351) so aPtly notes: to teach
subjects separately leaves the problem of integration of knowledge to the -student
himself to carq' out, more or less unaided-" Our confidence that unaided
integration can take place is bolstered neither by experience nor by the plea of
King and Brownell (1956, p. 142) tor "some faith that in the plurality of
knowledge freedom rvill lead to order."
Harki"g back to the points made on the nat-ure of classification: classification
criteria ,niy u^ry according to the purposes of classifying; they are not necessarily
inheient in the objects being classified. Exacting delineation and separation
of the disciplines may be necessary in order to meet the demands of research
or profession:rl rraining; but developing the consftucts that enable one to build
,ialle co.,ceptions of the meaning o[ one's existence in the cosmos may demand
organizationil patterns based on different criteria, e.g', -"social problems" in
g.i..^], and ,.pollution,' in particular. In this instance, the relevant materials
Fro- .i',.*irt.y, birlogy, psy.hology, ethics, anthropology, hittory,'and other
disciplines might be organized (and interrelated) to fulfill this particular
'P tlrPose. dbr;orrly, rhe alternatives available are not limited to a choic between the
disciplines as a rnonolithic unity and the disciplines as unrelated segments oF

i:norvledge. Br.rt moving away from the highly.disciplineceniered crganization

of contcnt (thar we k,.';';;j'i;' i'' f"g*J''t'rio1 a"i ll:l"l:l^'^" :i l:T],*tll
736 Content
reouire a radical rerhinkirg of traditionil caregories o[ knorvleJge- Currioriu&
}]*.,;i';;;;-; t; "3,r,.1y
aware, ror example, rhar tire.record of. man,s
Iisciplines Form for purPoses of retricval'
knowledge aPPears in dtscrprtnes t":"'. ::' i'::i:';i,-;^ ;'r;,:;;; -re,s;c.e-:rcl'i' p16-
fessional traininq, or othe"t"t"'that nray have littlc to do rvith its organiza-
#;;; i""*ffi. r". the liberally educated individual. ],:st as there arc_rnauy
wavs of classifyiirg Postagc "'-p'atrd students' therc arc many l\'avs o[ cate-
""!r)r"";;;;;. BJ*" oT the oiher a!tcrnatives to the disciplines organization
3f .o.,3.r, are discrrssed in detail in Chapter l7'
LOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOCICAL CONTENT
ORGANIZATION
The issue involved in the distinction between- the logical and
,psvchoiogicat
;;;";;;;t oi ,*uj.o' matter3 is similar to that involved in tlre prcviously
riiiussed disrinction between content and L'o*Iedge' We a,te.concerned here
;i,h ;;;;;;gs that accrue to learners as a consequence o[ tlreir transactions
*iii-, .""r."a orrirrged' in Tarticular organiL'ationql Patterns that have been idcri'
tified as lcgical an1 psycitotog;caL A Iogical organization o! :ubje-ct matter in
larse measute corresponds to i'h" we hi'e becn defining as a "discipline'" Put
;;;;;;;;; i, ;, ,,'d;; artificiat arrangerne'r of the fruits or rcsults of racial
"'i"'i."../iBode 1927, P' 47)' In a logical "'q"i."'io-":^X:1::tf]:: propositions,
and conceptions .,"t'g"i"d ratioially so that one follows from another
;;Jl;;;y;i'o,t "r, in a #u-tu'llv supporting fasLion (Dewey I916' p' 190)'
Thus, a logical exposiiion of physics, for example' T'qht l"gli w;1!-le6nitions
or *r,."., ?o..., .id energ-y fio* which *orld be deduced other more complex
;;";;;; ;f th. op"rrf,tns of the physical world' This arrangement of con'
terLt ordinarily bears no relation to tie (psychological)- sequence o-r order by
which the "x!".ime.rtr,
trials, hypotheses,- and errors of Ph)'sicists in tLe past
Lrroupht the ,r^etwork o[ interrelated concepts into being' A' logical arran-gement
"i"..r?""* "Uriortty is extremely useful,in a
-number
o[ instances' not the least
.f *{i.f, iS the propagation of i'"ther knowledge' Ell "- Bode (1927' p' 54)
"r.* tri" ;;;.;ih;" scholarship,,, arrd *e rnay well ask whether the logical
,..rrro"*.t, is the optimal one fi:r PulPoses of general education' -
O^",f.i. point we
-*ight obt".re that a logical organization of subject matter
t, ;;;;;;"'ri. detachedlobjective. It ,epresents a 'tatalog;e of results . - . with
^ -"i.fr"ti"n'of dara to show that the inferences i're sound" (Bode 1927, P'47)'
; ;r.h.ifical organizarion, in contrait, takes as its organizing.principle the
I.ui.re., ani He.rce ussumes a distinctly hurnan dimension- To illustrate what
tLis rnighr mean in a concrete situation let irs adapt an example frpm Dewey
[ieri, [n lg]iB4). The a'erage child is most ]i]ely not particularly concerned
,*if, gJtg."phy ", it is organizJd for its own sake by geographers' Introduced
3. For a corit(asting view of this issue, see Goodlad (1968, P' 318)'

subject through a globe' the poles, continetts' o:*::t' sas' etc'' all 3f
,"f. fr""" .,"**, ,*o b. i"...r.d, tlie student rvitl probably respond, at best,
ff';";;;;-n"u" ."li"d verbal learo-ing.because the data' abstraciions' and
,rlt".r.1r.r.r." of the.logically organized tib;""t are enrirely, unclnn1tci,"v.i;!
lffi;;;;j;, i;;;?.;,, l"'1"'ot'i"t"c e.'pe'i"''"' on the other ha.nd' t;e
lr.,i.g ;ot", oE?. st,,dy of 'geographv migirt consist "U"t1:i"il11,:t:-'T?: ;'i;;; i"p,ir;ii"*"i."L,iu*'to tie
loc,tion of th-e school; ", ,ll.
rt,r.., th. introduction of the points of the comi:ass bec-orrres-a nalural"con-
;;,;;-;r.i, i,., ..,.rr, m'ight evolve rhe const,ruction of a map of the
*f a;r,.1., based upon the gathe"ring oF atl manner of empirical geographical
}ffi; rh":;;;;.iiri" t."."iig experience has grown outo; a consid-
Ln of th" learners' psychological lo"itio" in space.and time' the,learning is
;';;r;;p; to re8ect th"
"p*ptoptintion
of persoaal meanin-g and' in effect'
rt"r"* t.p.', the learnert^ e*|erie,,ce' Fro1, thll ::!tg :::::t:.,::,:
fi"..f;;;i;;r"", ro move &o- the rnaterials of his own concrere world
,i"r"*"r.r"f ";. "r the communicared content and information oF bool<s
;;;;;;:; il; farthest-reaching outcome of this grocess-occurs when
"".*.,
"is enlarged and worked ot'*i i"to ratio'nally oi logical]1 otg"J.i.'-"i ';;i";-;;J
"'" *r,r, relatively speaking' is expert in the subiect"
)ewey, 1916, P- 18a)'
ftr;r'ir,"t poi.tt i, an important one to make' A psychological organization of
,*.r,t i, noi'illogical"; nJr does-it imply sacri6ci"g ihe 1"th".t1?-r"t^yt^:,1-*:
i;'ii. t"p"'ncialit] oF content th't "esii's
in organizati:T -b'i:1::cxtrerne
[ir.fr*..i, to pupils' "needs," "inrterests," or 'lactivities', fsfcnot-ogcll::9i1,
ffiffi';,"t*ti., g".,..a1 means taking into accotrnt the,concrete, empirical
;;;";;.i-l.a.r,i,ig Lugi" ""a o"ly tiltt' moving tolvard the {1d11tive
and
ii"k;; i,rl;* ir th. ir.nifo.mation of the leerner's Present exlperience
THE DISCIPLINES AND INFORMAL CONTENT
i1E ." tt rrrquiries into the nature and organization of the forrnal content of the

i'dir"iplirr.nl' were to yield a satis[acror;iao'*1,.t1 3*-9fnl::.*-*#ll;l #iy;;i.r;;";,'hk k;wledge, nJ.

".. still leFt.with the uncorn[ortable
:.i# ;h:ffi;;;;;J;.;, ioa.,f,J in the organized'disciplines by no rneans
ifi;;;';';,,;;;;;;;;" total record o[ Information produced and used
Knowledge about consumer products, &om foods to ilt-1'Ti:.1-t]:. "J-"itl'.t,:;

ir^i"# ilii;;,' ;;;; ",ia ;" *li"t';'"'r"t.'o'i'l f::Y::'"*-:Sl

;p ;; :;;, ;;;li;;.,' ;;;., nd the ruture,
a

i
* :l' :

*,1- i;;:J ;,; ;i,; il; r*1 **,",.."d (and -"::,'::"* :';,.X*"i YUUllv dlru vrq arr^u. ^ r"v '-- --b :_t:l
':'::'f::::'it:'l:fl*
inforrnati,on-what we .t. c,lli"g""informal contenC'-may derive
o '",q1rt,ft:1
's
discipline lines and
"includes
isome of
the disciPlines, but it often cu?- acro:^ ' :- -r--,- ---:t^-- t ^ - ffi;;;;,r-;;;';ft"d i' th" disciplines.
some curriculum.writers (e"g.,
if.",r,",^g..;af,"""i ft"g and Brownell) 1t*Y"
that only the disciplines' organil
;;H"+1;l.r, rr" pro!"t to"t"''t for incl'ision in the curriculum; gthers (e'8''
Bode, Dervey, and Richn'rontl) would hol<'l that curriculum content be selected
frorn the total store "''l"i""t"ii"n
available a'rd l'e organized according tc
:'"'.iili;-, p.,rpo*'' B^oth of these 1>ositions o.rr conrcl'ti'
'ob"'iously'
l"ave farreaching
implications for the nature ct tlre 6nishecl cr'lrrlcrr'lum'
SCOPE Oi CUNNTCULUM' CONTENT
Scope is the term generally emp.loyed in the Ge)d to rcfcr to thc brcadth and
depth of ti:e content ot "'u"ittllt'i-'''
Th" word refers not only to thc ranSe o[
content arens rePresen;,-;;; t" the depth o[ trcatment each ares is accorded"
it";;;"r r"ltiott has raiscd ot'" of thc rnore prcvalent qucstions conccrning
;;J';;;;ii th" c"'i"luIn includc contcnr.i'o- both the discil'rlincs and
#ffii;;."ri-o,1,".-*po.,".i .1.,.r,;on5 e[ rotre include: What content
sho.rld a, srudents b. r";;tt;;;'r"r.,,i CE"slisl,, i,istory, an. arithmetic are
now gommon.) What t"-tt"t tft"'fd be incluJed in an elective 51<xJc) (Musjc
;; ;;; ;;;;liy ".. "ft;'J on this basis') And what content is outside the
;;;-"; .f ,l.Jr.hool "J'fo'la bc entircly cxcluded? (In most public schools'
ielieion is excluded')
If will be recalled Flom Chapter 2 that.thc *:l': "f"tl1:j,"-':i::"jll:^:::'li
curriculum r.r'as extrei-.rely.,^"o't, consisting nrainly oI rcacltng ano rcllglol] !n
;;;;;;; schooi, and L;l; ;"i Grcek in-thc "co"darv sc-hool' All students
*"r"l.q"1t"d to ,,'-,di oll of th" tottent in
^the
curriculurn' Since that timc' as
_.'irr.'"f *rdy notei, in"lai;oi." of a profusion of schooi srrbjccts has greatly
expanded the scoPe of .t.ait'tt'' tor""i" in the contemporary 1:ublic school'
;Idil ;;;;;il.f". ;"t lcarnerlo take ail the subjects offered' As a result'
it has become customary io t'e"t the question o[ scope as two related subilil;?
Lt."q"ir"a 6. .o*-o., .o,',,".,t and (2) elective or special content'
couMoN coIrrrENT" General educalion tends to suggest the desirability of a
;;;;;-."tp"s of content through which memL'ers of a social group come to
distinsuish themselves "' " to"I*"'ity w;th a common culture' This concept
#;'ffi;r;;;-;",*p*r.a as .r* i.,doctrination into a parochial social,unit (a
;;tid *ry b.. p".o.h;"I social unit) or broadly interPreted as a shared corPus
;; .:,;;";; uy *ii.r, p"opi" iu"*"''d -parochial
corisiderations o[ time and
oeomaDhv and gain *"*t""hip into tht worldwide community of civilized
fl"ri"l t r"g.' i' pr.f"..t'ce foi the broader interpretation' of course' seems
;;;;";J.nabli and it is on this bisis (rather than the narrow one) that the
;;;;;;,-i", the inclusion o[ common content in the general education curriculum
is made.
t ri.d*nb*rg (1959, P. 72 tr-) addresses himself to this issue when he discusses
the "Americanization" Gr ggne5al education) function ,of the public
;;. At itu *or.t, 'ire b.lie,res tha't the school turns students "iri{o an article
;A;;,i;-;"'i*air"a to fit esciently into a productive system and
4. See Chapter 18 for a comprehensive dism:sion of scopc and sequence in curriculuu
design.

)
trusied rcr to raise questions about thar. .. fsystem] in thc universe ot
valucs" (Friedenberg 1959, pp. T7, zB). Bur .vhai he believes "Americanization''
.', (g"1".r,-.drrcation) ought to be Coing, is dcrieioping a commrrnity o.f learrrcrs "rvirh a fairly tcugh and &rml;,
fixed lllii,-rsophicni oppr.rtu, for making a certain
kinrl o[ ser:se out of.rheir lirr"r, nnd .o,.rr-rr,ri"oting wirh othcr p.o1ii. --h,
mly !c assumed tc, have a L.asically similar apparatus" (Friedenbecg t959, p1r.
77, 76) Part of
-the curriculum plann,er,s taslq the,.r, would appeai to b" ih.
identification of the common content with wllich it is essential foi all iea..,ers to
interact if they are to develop the caregorles of thought and feeling, and tlrc
approaches to understanding,_ that dcfine rnembership in the human co*mu",ity. 'l his "common'' or "required"
aspect of the content shoulcl not be consrrued as
the advocatibn of conformity or t'he rejection of auronomy for individual5.
Nevertheless, it is clear that individuals (not incruding, o[ .rrrr", recluses)
exist in a comrnuniqy concexr and that the qualitv of the communiqy (including
its allowanccs for individual autonomy) lvilr <iepend ,r;*r, .o.rr*on.ide:rs
regard.ihg h uman rela tionships.
It has bcen noted thar a unique characteristic of American society anil colture
is its lack of comrn.nity (e-g., see Packard lgz2). rE rlrerc is any valfditv
in rhis analysis, there is ccrrainly urgenr cause to examinc ihe rneanings inhercnt
in the traditional American ideal of "irndividuality"; it may turn out, as rie have
suggested eailier, that the word is nothin.g more rhan a euPlrcmisnr for "selfin:
terest."
The comrnon content of traditional crrrricula has consisted rnainly of sutjects
sueh as reading, writing, arithmelic, American histor1,, and English- Chapter l7
presents in
-somc
detail a number of curriculum designs that-i:mbody i.;.iort
orher forrnulations of common content for general educaiion.
spEcrAL coNTENT. Curriculunr conrenr which is experienced by only a portion
oF the learners may be aimed either a't'vocational tiaining or liberal'education.
Content aimed at vocational training usually"is determin# by specialists in the
area who make their decisions on the basis oF (l) prior policy comrnitnenrs
which establish the training program, and (2) the settled goats and objectives
to be achieved in a particular program. Thus, special content for vocational
tmining will not concern irs tq any degree here. But special content tor liberal
education raises some highly problematic issues (most of which ari yet unresolved),
and these deserve our closest attention.
Some curriculum writers (e.g., Becker 1967) would advocate a common curriculum
{or all of generalfiL'eral education. Others, however, would argrre that
the "knowledge explosion," coupled with the variery of human poreniials inherent
in "individual differences" dictates the desirabiiity of a "smorgasbord"
of elective offerinip with no required content. Our notion of a IiberaJly educated
individual as one who is actualizing his individual potenrials while retaining
membership in the.human community leads us to conclude that a curriculuri
Eor a liberal/general education ought tr: contain both common and special content.
Reasons for the inclusion of coinmon content were presented,in rhe previous
ri
. 338 Cortet'

trusied rcr to raise questions about thar. .. fsystem] in thc universe ot

valucs" (Friedenberg 1959, pp. T7, zB). Bur .vhai he believes "Americanization''
.', (g"1".r,-.drrcation) ought to be Coing, is dcrieioping a commrrnity o.f learrrcrs "rvirh a fairly tcugh and &rml;,
fixed lllii,-rsophicni oppr.rtu, for making a certain
kinrl o[ ser:se out of.rheir lirr"r, nnd .o,.rr-rr,ri"oting wirh othcr p.o1ii. --h,
mly !c assumed tc, have a L.asically similar apparatus" (Friedenbecg t959, p1r.
77, 76) Part of
-the curriculum plann,er,s taslq the,.r, would appeai to b" ih.
identification of the common content with wllich it is essential foi all iea..,ers to
interact if they are to develop the caregorles of thought and feeling, and tlrc
approaches to understanding,_ that dcfine rnembership in the human co*mu",ity. 'l his "common'' or "required"
aspect of the content shoulcl not be consrrued as
the advocatibn of conformity or t'he rejection of auronomy for individual5.
Nevertheless, it is clear that individuals (not incruding, o[ .rrrr", recluses)
exist in a comrnuniqy concexr and that the qualitv of the communiqy (including
its allowanccs for individual autonomy) lvilr <iepend ,r;*r, .o.rr*on.ide:rs
regard.ihg h uman rela tionships.
It has bcen noted thar a unique characteristic of American society anil colture
is its lack of comrn.nity (e-g., see Packard lgz2). rE rlrerc is any valfditv
in rhis analysis, there is ccrrainly urgenr cause to examinc ihe rneanings inhercnt
in the traditional American ideal of "irndividuality"; it may turn out, as rie have
suggested eailier, that the word is nothin.g more rhan a euPlrcmisnr for "selfin:
terest."
The comrnon content of traditional crrrricula has consisted rnainly of sutjects
sueh as reading, writing, arithmelic, American histor1,, and English- Chapter l7
presents in
-somc
detail a number of curriculum designs that-i:mbody i.;.iort
orher forrnulations of common content for general educaiion.
spEcrAL coNTENT. Curriculunr conrenr which is experienced by only a portion
oF the learners may be aimed either a't'vocational tiaining or liberal'education.
Content aimed at vocational training usually"is determin# by specialists in the
area who make their decisions on the basis oF (l) prior policy comrnitnenrs
which establish the training program, and (2) the settled goats and objectives
to be achieved in a particular program. Thus, special content for vocational
tmining will not concern irs tq any degree here. But special content tor liberal
education raises some highly problematic issues (most of which ari yet unresolved),
and these deserve our closest attention.
Some curriculum writers (e.g., Becker 1967) would advocate a common curriculum
{or all of generalfiL'eral education. Others, however, would argrre that
the "knowledge explosion," coupled with the variery of human poreniials inherent
in "individual differences" dictates the desirabiiity of a "smorgasbord"
of elective offerinip with no required content. Our notion of a IiberaJly educated
individual as one who is actualizing his individual potenrials while retaining
membership in the.human community leads us to conclude that a curriculuri
Eor a liberal/general education ought tr: contain both common and special content.
Reasons for the inclusion of coinmon content were presented,in rhe previous
ri
. 338 Cortet'
Bode, Dervey, and Richn'rontl) would hol<'l that curriculum content be selected
frorn the total store "''l"i""t"ii"n
available a'rd l'e organized according tc
:'"'.iili;-, p.,rpo*'' B^oth of these 1>ositions o.rr conrcl'ti'
'ob"'iou

Bode, Dervey, and Richn'rontl) would hol<'l that curriculum content be selected
frorn the total store "''l"i""t"ii"n
available a'rd l'e organized according tc
:'"'.iili;-, p.,rpo*'' B^oth of these 1>ositions o.rr conrcl'ti'
'ob"'iously'
l"ave farreaching
implications for the nature ct tlre 6nishecl cr'lrrlcrr'lum'

SCOPE Oi CUNNTCULUM' CONTENT

Scope is the term generally emp.loyed in the Ge)d to rcfcr to thc brcadth and
depth of ti:e content ot "'u"ittllt'i-'''
Th" word refers not only to thc ranSe o[
content arens rePresen;,-;;; t" the depth o[ trcatment each ares is accorded"
it";;;"r r"ltiott has raiscd ot'" of thc rnore prcvalent qucstions conccrning
;;J';;;;ii th" c"'i"luIn includc contcnr.i'o- both the discil'rlincs and
#ffii;;."ri-o,1,".-*po.,".i .1.,.r,;on5 e[ rotre include: What content
sho.rld a, srudents b. r";;tt;;;'r"r.,,i CE"slisl,, i,istory, an. arithmetic are
now gommon.) What t"-tt"t tft"'fd be incluJed in an elective 51<xJc) (Musjc
;; ;;; ;;;;liy ".. "ft;'J on this basis') And what content is outside the
;;;-"; .f ,l.Jr.hool "J'fo'la bc entircly cxcluded? (In most public schools'
ielieion is excluded')
If will be recalled Flom Chapter 2 that.thc *:l': "f"tl1:j,"-':i::"jll:^:::'li
curriculum r.r'as extrei-.rely.,^"o't, consisting nrainly oI rcacltng ano rcllglol] !n
;;;;;;; schooi, and L;l; ;"i Grcek in-thc "co"darv sc-hool' All students
*"r"l.q"1t"d to ,,'-,di oll of th" tottent in
^the
curriculurn' Since that timc' as
_.'irr.'"f *rdy notei, in"lai;oi." of a profusion of schooi srrbjccts has greatly
expanded the scoPe of .t.ait'tt'' tor""i" in the contemporary 1:ublic school'
;Idil ;;;;;il.f". ;"t lcarnerlo take ail the subjects offered' As a result'
it has become customary io t'e"t the question o[ scope as two related subilil;?
Lt."q"ir"a 6. .o*-o., .o,',,".,t and (2) elective or special content'
couMoN coIrrrENT" General educalion tends to suggest the desirability of a
;;;;;-."tp"s of content through which memL'ers of a social group come to
distinsuish themselves "' " to"I*"'ity w;th a common culture' This concept
#;'ffi;r;;;-;",*p*r.a as .r* i.,doctrination into a parochial social,unit (a
;;tid *ry b.. p".o.h;"I social unit) or broadly interPreted as a shared corPus
;; .:,;;";; uy *ii.r, p"opi" iu"*"''d -parochial
corisiderations o[ time and
oeomaDhv and gain *"*t""hip into tht worldwide community of civilized
fl"ri"l t r"g.' i' pr.f"..t'ce foi the broader interpretation' of course' seems
;;;;";J.nabli and it is on this bisis (rather than the narrow one) that the
;;;;;;,-i", the inclusion o[ common content in the general education curriculum
is made.
t ri.d*nb*rg (1959, P. 72 tr-) addresses himself to this issue when he discusses
the "Americanization" Gr ggne5al education) function ,of the public
;;. At itu *or.t, 'ire b.lie,res tha't the school turns students "iri{o an article
;A;;,i;-;"'i*air"a to fit esciently into a productive system and
4. See Chapter

4. See Chapter 18 for a comprehensive dism:sion of scopc and sequence in curriculuum design

trusied rcr to raise questions about thar. .. fsystem] in thc universe ot

valucs" (Friedenberg 1959, pp. T7, zB). Bur .vhai he believes "Americanization''
.', (g"1".r,-.drrcation) ought to be Coing, is dcrieioping a commrrnity o.f learrrcrs "rvirh a fairly tcugh and &rml;,
fixed lllii,-rsophicni oppr.rtu, for making a certain
kinrl o[ ser:se out of.rheir lirr"r, nnd .o,.rr-rr,ri"oting wirh othcr p.o1ii. --h,
mly !c assumed tc, have a L.asically similar apparatus" (Friedenbecg t959, p1r.
77, 76) Part of
-the curriculum plann,er,s taslq the,.r, would appeai to b" ih.
identification of the common content with wllich it is essential foi all iea..,ers to
interact if they are to develop the caregorles of thought and feeling, and tlrc
approaches to understanding,_ that dcfine rnembership in the human co*mu",ity. 'l his "common'' or "required"
aspect of the content shoulcl not be consrrued as
the advocatibn of conformity or t'he rejection of auronomy for individual5.
Nevertheless, it is clear that individuals (not incruding, o[ .rrrr", recluses)
exist in a comrnuniqy concexr and that the qualitv of the communiqy (including
its allowanccs for individual autonomy) lvilr <iepend ,r;*r, .o.rr*on.ide:rs
regard.ihg h uman rela tionships.
It has bcen noted thar a unique characteristic of American society anil colture
is its lack of comrn.nity (e-g., see Packard lgz2). rE rlrerc is any valfditv
in rhis analysis, there is ccrrainly urgenr cause to examinc ihe rneanings inhercnt
in the traditional American ideal of "irndividuality"; it may turn out, as rie have
suggested eailier, that the word is nothin.g more rhan a euPlrcmisnr for "selfin:
terest."
The comrnon content of traditional crrrricula has consisted rnainly of sutjects
sueh as reading, writing, arithmelic, American histor1,, and English- Chapter l7
presents in
-somc
detail a number of curriculum designs that-i:mbody i.;.iort
orher forrnulations of common content for general educaiion.
spEcrAL coNTENT. Curriculunr conrenr which is experienced by only a portion
oF the learners may be aimed either a't'vocational tiaining or liberal'education.
Content aimed at vocational training usually"is determin# by specialists in the
area who make their decisions on the basis oF (l) prior policy comrnitnenrs
which establish the training program, and (2) the settled goats and objectives
to be achieved in a particular program. Thus, special content for vocational
tmining will not concern irs tq any degree here. But special content tor liberal
education raises some highly problematic issues (most of which ari yet unresolved),
and these deserve our closest attention.
Some curriculum writers (e.g., Becker 1967) would advocate a common curriculum
{or all of generalfiL'eral education. Others, however, would argrre that
the "knowledge explosion," coupled with the variery of human poreniials inherent
in "individual differences" dictates the desirabiiity of a "smorgasbord"
of elective offerinip with no required content. Our notion of a IiberaJly educated
individual as one who is actualizing his individual potenrials while retaining
membership in the.human community leads us to conclude that a curriculuri
Eor a liberal/general education ought tr: contain both common and special content.
Reasons for the inclusion of coinmon content were presented,in rhe previous