Paras v.

Comelec
GR 123169, 4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49) En Banc, Francisco

Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City
who won during the 1994 barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay, which was approved by
the Comelec. Petition signing was scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at least
29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement
provided by law. The Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but
which was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioners opposition. To prevent
the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanatuan City a
petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF), with the trial court
issuing a restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted
the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to
explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the
barangay recall election was without Comelec approval.

In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled the
recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent
prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that no recall can take place within one
year preceding a regular local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on
the first Monday of May 1996. He cited Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo to
support the argument, the Court in which case considered the SK election as a regular
local election.

Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular

local election in a recall proceeding

Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. Further, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. The too
literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance.
A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but
in the spirit that vivifieth. In the present case, Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed
together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject of a recall election. The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot
be considered a regular election, as this would render inutile the recall provision of the
Local Government Code. It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall
provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election
where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested
and be filled by the electorate.
The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become moot and
academic, as the next regular elections involving the barangay office concerned were
seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 12 January
1996, enjoining the recall election, was made permanent.