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NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids
Petitioner, of Nerwin and the Tri-State Pole and Piling, Inc. approximately in the
- versus - amount of $2.36 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and crossarms are equivalent to additional 12.872 pcs. of poles and
ESTER R. GUERZON, Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, 20.967 pcs. of crossarms; and
Respondents.
G.R. No. 167057 d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the
woodpoles and specified in the bid documents and as based on the
April 11, 2012 pre-award inspection conducted.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
However, on December 19, 2000, NEAs Board of Directors passed
Republic Act No. 8975[1] expressly prohibits any court, except the Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the material requirements for IBP
Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), No. 80 given the time limitations for the delivery of the materials, xxx,
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to and with the loan closing date of October 2001 fast approaching. In
restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its turn, it resolved to award the four (4) schedules of IBP No. 80 at a
subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or reduced number to private respondent [Nerwin]. Private respondent
private, acting under the Governments direction, from: (a) acquiring, [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same
clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location of any was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder.
National Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract
or project of the National Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy
executing, implementing, or operating any such contract or project; appeared to have filed a complaint, citing alleged false or falsified
(d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) documents submitted during the pre-qualification stage which led to
undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for the award of the IBP-80 project to private respondent [Nerwin].
such contract or project.
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA
Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory officials sought the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel
prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or who, among others, upheld the eligibility and qualification of private
preliminary mandatory injunction against a government contract or respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said officials attempted to seek
project acts contrary to law. a revision of the earlier opinion but the Government Corporate
Counsel declared anew that there was no legal impediment to
Antecedents prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin].
Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders
The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of the relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent
Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 22, 2004,[2] viz: [Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for
the issuance of an injunction, which injunctive application was
In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No. 01102000.
an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known
as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty thousand In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to
(60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of be under the Department of Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ
crossarms needed in the countrys Rural Electrification Project. The 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles
said contract consisted of four (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project (O-ILAW project).
PIC or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEAs projected
allocation for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the said
invitation, bidders, such as private respondent [Nerwin], were Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the
required to submit their application for eligibility together with their O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila,
technical proposals. At the same time, they were informed that only docketed as Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries
those who would pass the standard pre-qualification would be invited Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R.
to submit their financial bids. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that
Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion of
Following a thorough review of the bidders qualifications and the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that
eligibility, only four (4) bidders, including private respondent a TRO issue to enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the wooden
[Nerwin], qualified to participate in the bidding for the IPB-80 poles.
contract. Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial
bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating
bidder for all schedules/components of the contract. NEA then that the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that
conducted a pre-award inspection of private respondents [Nerwins] government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs,
manufacturing plants and facilities, including its identified supplier in contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping,
Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEAs and the corporate president had no authority to sign and file the
requirements. complaint.[3]

In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to respondents
IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms reply, the RTC granted a TRO in Civil Case No. 03106921.[4]
dated October 4, 2000, NEA administrator Conrado M. Estrella III
recommended to NEAs Board of Directors the approval of award to On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,[5] as follows:
private respondent [Nerwin] of all schedules for IBP No. 80 on
account of the following: WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is hereby
issued by this Court:
a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder;
1. DENYING the motion to consolidate;
b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of
Nerwin Industries (lowest responsive and complying bidder) and the 2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;
second lowest bidder in the amount of $1.47 million for the poles and
$0.475 million for the crossarms, is deemed substantial and extremely 3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S. Sinsuat
advantageous to the government. The price difference is equivalent and Mariano H. Paps from appearing as counsel for the defendants;
to 7,948 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms;
4. DECLARING defendants in default;
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 2

5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety
injunction. of respondent Judges issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the
earlier TRO, for that matter.
Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the
defendant PNOC-EDC and its Chairman of Bids and Awards Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an
Committee Esther R. Guerzon from continuing the holding of the application for TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a
subject bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a bond in the amount of preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining
P200,000.00 to answer for any damage or damages which the petitioners sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same is a
defendants may suffer should it be finally adjudged that petitioner is palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on November 7,
not entitled thereto, until final determination of the issue in this case 2000, thus, already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the
by this Court. assailed Orders dated July 20 and December 29, 2003.

This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond by Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:
the plaintiffs in the amount of P200,000.00.
Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order,
Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No
strict compliance herein is enjoined. Furnish the Office of the court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary
Government Corporate Counsel copy of this order. restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials,
SO ORDERED. or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30, acts:
2003, and also to set aside the order of default and to admit their xxx
answer to the complaint. (b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents motions for xxx
reconsideration, to set aside order of default, and to admit answer.[6] This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies
instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed
Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders
special civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when
the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite irreparable injury will arise. xxx
the express prohibition from the law and from the Supreme Court; in
issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes
established jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and in PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition to courts from
disqualifying respondents counsel from representing them.[7] issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and
On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,[8] to wit: public utilities operated by, the government. This law was, in fact,
earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July in an administrative case against a Judge.
30 and December 29, 2003 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Civil Case No. 03106921, private respondents complaint Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the
for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary Supreme Court had the same embodied in its Administrative Circular
injunction before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is No. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or writs of
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in cases involving
Government Infrastructure Projects. Pertinent is the ruling in National
SO ORDERED. Housing Authority vs. Allarde As regards the definition of
infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs.
Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction: The term infrastructure
motion on February 9, 2005.[9] projects means construction, improvement and rehabilitation of
roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication
Issues facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and
Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues: sewerage systems, shore protection, power facilities, national
buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings and other related
I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis construction projects that form part of the government capital
of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining investment.
orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme
Court, on government projects. Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the
facts of the case, that would justify respondent Judges blatant
II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire disregard of a simple, comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of
case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the issuance only PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of injunctive writs relative to
of a preliminary injunction but not injunction as a final remedy. government infrastructure projects. Respondent Judge did not even
endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls
III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply,
that it is also one for damages. i.e., when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave
Ruling injustice and irreparable injury will arise.

The petition fails. Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in
default because, in the first place, he should not have given due
In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled course to private respondents complaint for injunction. Indubitably,
and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued on July 20, 2003 the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion
and December 29, 2003, and why it altogether dismissed Civil Case amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
No. 03106921, as follows:
Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other
grounds proffered by petitioners.[10]
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 3

The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross


The CAs decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its misconduct. As the CA explained in its above-stated Decision in the
discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin petition for certiorari, respondent failed to heed the mandatory ban
against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a government
contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of infrastructure project, which the rural electrification project certainly
Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding out by was. He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this Courts various
respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued the circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against
TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. government infrastructure projects in line with the proscription under
R.A. No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos and National
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide: Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed that
P.D. No. 1818 expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of a
Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory government infrastructure project.
Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in
mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Lavia faulted a judge for grave misconduct for
subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or issuing a TRO against a government infrastructure project thus:
private, acting under the governments direction, to restrain, prohibit
or compel the following acts: xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding
of the law or openly manifesting a contumacious indifference thereto.
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way In any case, his disregard of the clear mandate of PD 1818, as well as
and/or site or location of any national government project; of the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith,
constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national administration of justice. His claim that the said statute is inapplicable
government as defined under Section 2 hereof; to his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious TRO is but a
contrived subterfuge to evade administrative liability.
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation,
operation of any such contract or project; In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor assiduously
to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws. Moreover, they should
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules. Also, they are expected to keep abreast of and be
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity conversant with the rules and the circulars which the Supreme Court
necessary for such contract/project. has adopted and which affect the disposition of cases before them.

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and
instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed good faith in the performance of their judicial functions, a blatant
by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this
involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative
the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent.
amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of
the government if the court should finally decide that the applicant The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of
was not entitled to the relief sought. the law for being patently in disregard of simple, elementary and well-
known rules which judges are expected to know and apply properly.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is
null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance
award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a of the law, which are serious charges under Section 8 of Rule 140 of
rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty the Rules of Court. He having retired from the service, a fine in the
party may incur under existing laws. amount of P40,000 is imposed upon him, the maximum amount fixed
under Section 11 of Rule 140 as an alternative sanction to dismissal
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining or suspension.[12]
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment
effect. and discussion of Nerwins other submissions superfluous and
unnecessary, the Court notes that the RTC did not properly appreciate
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, the real nature and true purpose of the injunctive remedy. This failing
nothing was left for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact of the RTC presses the Court to use this decision to reiterate the
upon Nerwin obedience to them. The RTC could not have been norms and parameters long standing jurisprudence has set to control
unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 considering the issuance of TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on
that the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of the lower conformity to them by all litigants and lower courts. Only thereby may
courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with the grave misconduct committed in Civil Case No. 03106921 be
and respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of avoided.
preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts
and projects of the Government.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party
A. Hidalgo, the Presiding Judge of Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a particular act or
which Civil Case No. 03106921 had been raffled, was in fact already acts.[13] It is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a
found administratively liable for gross misconduct and gross litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests during the
ignorance of the law as the result of his issuance of the assailed TRO pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is established
and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The Court could only that:
fine him in the amount of P40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of
his intervening retirement from the service. That sanction was meted
on him in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133 entitled Sinsuat v. Hidalgo,[11] where (a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
this Court stated: part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 4

performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or or to decide controverted facts.[24] It is but a preventive remedy
perpetually; or whose only mission is to prevent threatened wrong,[25] further
injury,[26] and irreparable harm[27] or injustice[28] until the rights of
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or the parties can be settled. Judges should thus look at such relief only
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice as a means to protect the ability of their courts to render a meaningful
to the applicant; or decision.[29] Foremost in their minds should be to guard against a
change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is proper reliefs after a trial on the merits.[30] It is well worth
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction should issue only
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the to prevent the threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the applicant before the claim can be justly and thoroughly studied and
judgment ineffectual.[14] adjudicated.[31]

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals;


and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is
indispensable. In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower
Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,[15] the Court elaborated on this courts for their guidance.
requirement, viz:
SO ORDERED.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the
instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the
right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when
the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the
complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the
violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum
constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought.
Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are:
(a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act
sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or
a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain
an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the
perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be
protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted
by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.[16]

Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not


demanded, however, for, as the Court has held in Saulog v. Court of
Appeals,[17] it is enough that:

xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts
affording a present right which is directly threatened by an act sought
to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the right claimed is
necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact,
the evidence to be submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the
hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete but need only be
a sampling intended merely to give the court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the
case on the merits. This should really be so since our concern here
involves only the propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the
merits of the case still pending with the trial court.

Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private


respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible right to the
final relief prayed for in its complaint xxx.[18]

In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial
courts considering that conflicting claims in an application for a
provisional writ more often than not involve and require a factual
determination that is not the function of the appellate courts.[19]
Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be sound, that is,
the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the
grounds and in the manner provided by law.[20] When that is done,
the exercise of sound discretion by the issuing court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest
abuse.[21]

Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief


ought to be wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or
writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the merits without or
before trial. Granting an application for the relief in disregard of that
tendency is judicially impermissible,[22] for it is never the function of
a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case,[23]
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 5

MANILA INTERNATIONAL G.R. No. 143870 subject property and MIAA does not have a corresponding duty to
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, segregate Rivera Village from its Conceptual Development Plan.
Petitioner, Present:
A preliminary hearing on MIAAs affirmative defenses was conducted,
PUNO, after which the trial court issued an Order[6] dated October 12, 1998,
- versus - Chairman, denying the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, and/or writ of preliminary injunction and dismissing the petition for
CALLEJO, SR., lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
TINGA, and
NAZARIO, JJ.
RIVERA VILLAGE LESSEE In view of all the foregoing, the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Promulgated: restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is hereby
INCORPORATED, September 30, 2005 denied for lack of merit and the above-entitled petition is hereby
Respondent. ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
x------------------------------------------------------------x
SO ORDERED.[7]

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated August 23, The trial court held that PD 1818 bars the issuance of a restraining
2000 filed by the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in
assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2000 any case, dispute or controversy involving infrastructure projects of
which directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction the government or any public utility operated by the government. It
restraining petitioner from evicting the homeowners of Rivera Village also ruled that the petition failed to state a cause of action inasmuch
from their dwellings. as petitioner therein (respondent homeowners association) is not the
real party-in-interest, the individual members of the association being
The antecedents, culled from the petition and the assailed Decision, the ones who have possessory rights over their respective premises.
are as follows: Moreover, the lease contracts have already expired.

The then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was entrusted with As regards the contention that the lessees are entitled to possess the
the administration, operation, management, control, maintenance subject property by virtue of PD 1517, Proclamation No. 1967 and PD
and development of the Manila International Airport (MIA), now the 2016, which respectively identify parcels of urban land as part of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Among its powers was the power Urban Land Reform Zone, specify certain areas in Metro Manila,
to enter into, make and execute concessions and concession rights for including Rivera Village, as areas for priority development or urban
purposes essential to the operation of the airport. land reform zones, and prohibit the eviction of occupant families from
such lands, the trial court declared that the subject property has been
On May 25, 1965, the CAA, through its Director, Capt. Vicente C. reserved by MIAA for airport-related activities and, as such, is exempt
Rivera, entered into individual lease contracts with its employees from the coverage of the Comprehensive and Continuing Urban
(lessees) for the lease of portions of a four (4)-hectare lot situated in Development and Housing Program under Republic Act No. (RA)
what is now known as Rivera Village located in Barangay 199 and 200 7279.
in Pasay City. The leases were for a twenty-five (25)-year period to
commence on May 25, 1965 up to May 24, 1990 at P20.00[3] per Respondent filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, interposing
annum as rental. essentially the same arguments raised before the trial court. The
appellate court annulled and set aside the order of the trial court and
remanded the case for further proceedings. The dispositive portion of
On May 4, 1982, Executive Order No. (EO) 778 was issued (later the assailed Decision states:
amended by EO 903 on July 21, 1983), creating petitioner MIAA,
transferring existing assets of the MIA to MIAA, and vesting the latter WHEREFORE, the assailed October 12, 1998 Order is annulled, set
with the power to administer and operate the MIA. aside and reversed. The case is remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings.
Sometime in January 1995, MIAA stopped issuing accrued rental bills
and refused to accept rental payments from the lessees. As a result, A writ of preliminary injunction is issued restraining and preventing
respondent Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc. respondent MIAA from evicting the members of petitioner Rivera
(homeowners association), purportedly representing the lessees, Village Association from their respective lots in the Rivera Village.
requested MIAA to sell the subject property to its members, invoking Petitioner is ordered to post a bond in the amount of P500,000.00
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1517 or the Urban Land with the condition that petitioner will pay to respondent MIAA all
Reform Act and PD 2016. damages it may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court should
finally decided that petitioner is not entitled thereto. Upon approval
The MIAA, on February 14, 1996, denied the request, claiming that of the bond, the writ of preliminary injunction shall forthwith issue.
the subject property is included in its Conceptual Development Plan
intended for airport-related activities. SO ORDERED.[8]

Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with


prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction[4] against MIAA The appellate court foremost ruled that the case can be construed as
and the National Housing Authority (NHA). The petition, docketed as a class suit instituted by the Rivera Village lessees. The homeowners
Civil Case No. 97-1598 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch association, considered as the representative of the lessees, merely
109, sought to restrain the MIAA from implementing its Conceptual instituted the suit for the benefit of its members. It does not claim to
Development Plan insofar as Rivera Village is concerned. It also have any right or interest in the lots occupied by the lessees, nor seek
sought to compel MIAA to segregate Rivera Village from the scope of the registration of the titles to the land in its name.
the Conceptual Development Plan and the NHA to take the necessary
steps for the disposition of the property in favor of the members of On the issue of the expiration of the lease contracts and the
the homeowners association. application of PD 1517, Proclamation No. 1967 and PD 2016, the
Court of Appeals held that the expiration of the lease contracts
MIAA filed an answer[5] alleging that the petition fails to state a cause cannot adversely affect the rights acquired by the lessees under the
of action in view of the expiration of the lease contracts and the lack foregoing laws. Besides, the lease contracts were impliedly renewed
of personality to sue of the homeowners association. MIAA also by virtue of MIAAs acceptance of rental payments from May 25, 1990
claimed that the homeowners association is not entitled to a writ of up to December 1994. This resulted in an implied new lease under
mandamus because it does not have a clear legal right to possess the Article 1670 of the Civil Code.
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 6

Moreover, the appellate court construed Sec. 5(c) of RA 7279 to mean As presented and discussed by the parties, the issues are the
that if the government lot has not been utilized during the ten (10)- following:
year period for the purpose for which it has been reserved prior to
1983, then said lot is encompassed by the law and is subject to 1. Has PD 2016 modified PD 1818?
distribution to the legitimate and qualified residents of the area after
appropriate proceedings have been undertaken. 2. Did the petition filed by respondent with the trial court state a
cause of action against petitioner?
As to whether PD 1818 bars the issuance of an injunctive writ in this
case, the appellate court ruled that PD 1818 is a general law on the 3. Is petitioner obliged to dispose of the subject properties in favor of
issuance of restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. On the members of respondent association after appropriate
the other hand, PD 2016 is a special law specifically prohibiting the proceedings?
eviction of tenants from lands identified as areas for priority
development. Thus, the trial court can issue an injunctive writ if the 4. Is respondent entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
act sought to be restrained will enforce the eviction of tenants from injunction?[14]
urban land reform zones.

The court, however, declared that it cannot make a definitive ruling We first resolve the threshold question of whether respondent has
on the rights of the members of the homeowners association vis--vis personality to sue.
the MIAA Conceptual Development Plan, considering the need for a
full-blown trial to ferret out whether the claimed rights under the MIAA contends that the real parties-in-interest in the petition filed
pertinent laws have ripened to actual legal and vested rights in their with the trial court are the individual members of the homeowners
favor. association. Not having been brought in the name of the real parties-
in-interest, the suit was correctly dismissed by the trial court for
MIAA now seeks a review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. In failure to state a cause of action.
the instant petition, MIAA contends that the appellate court erred in
ruling that PD 2016, which prohibits the eviction of occupant families The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court) requires that every
from real property identified as areas for priority development or action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-
urban land reform zones, has modified PD 1818, which bars the in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
issuance of injunctive writ in cases involving infrastructure projects of judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[15]
the government, including public utilities for the transport of goods A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the
and commodities. plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to
state a cause of action.[16]
It argues that the petition filed by the homeowners association with
the trial court fails to state a cause of action because the homeowners The petition before the trial court was filed by the homeowners
association is not the real party-in-interest in the suit. Allegedly, the association, represented by its President, Panfilo R. Chiutena, Sr.,
Board Resolution presented by respondent shows that it was only the upon authority of a Board Resolution empowering the latter to file
board of directors of the association, as distinguished from the [A]ll necessary action to the Court of Justice and other related acts
members thereof, which authorized respondent to act as its necessary to have our Housing Project number 4 land be titled to the
representative in the suit. members of the Association.

MIAA also stresses that the subject property has recently been Obviously, the petition cannot be considered a class suit under Sec.
reserved by MIAA for airport-related activities and, as such, Sec. 5(c) 12, Rule 3[17] of the Rules of Court, the requisites therefor not being
of RA 7279 applies. Under the said law, lands which are used, reserved present in the case, notably because the petition does not allege the
or otherwise set aside for government offices, facilities and other existence and prove the requisites of a class suit, i.e., that the subject
installations are exempt from the coverage of the law. matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable
Moreover, MIAA avers that the Court of Appeals should not have to bring them all before the court, and because it was brought only
granted injunctive relief to respondent, considering that the grant of by one party.
an injunction would inflict greater damage to petitioner and to the
public. In Board of Optometry v. Colet,[18] we held that courts must exercise
utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception to
Respondent filed a Comment[9] dated November 20, 2000, arguing the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no
that MIAA is mandated by law to dispose of Rivera Village to the difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the
homeowners thereof. Under existing laws, the homeowners have the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as
right to possess and enjoy the property. To accept MIAAs pretense those who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed
that the property has been recently reserved for airport-related representatives would certainly claim denial of due process.
activities and therefor exempt from the coverage of RA 7279 will
allegedly violate the right of the homeowners as bona fide tenants to There is, however, merit in the appellate courts pronouncement that
socialized housing. the petition should be construed as a suit brought by the
homeowners association as the representative of the members
Respondent further argues that PD 1818 is inapplicable to this case thereof under Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
because it has established a clear and unmistakable right to an
injunction. Besides, PD 2016 which protects from eviction tenants of Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.Where the action is allowed to be
lands identified for priority development, is a later enactment which prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a
should be deemed to prevail over PD 1818. fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A
In the Resolution[10] dated January 24, 2001, the petition was given representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an
due course and the parties were required to submit their respective executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules.
memoranda. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed
principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except
Accordingly, MIAA submitted its Memorandum[11] dated March 20, when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
2001, while respondent filed its Memorandum[12] dated April 20, [Emphasis supplied.]
2001. For its part, NHA manifested that it is adopting the
memorandum of MIAA as its own insofar as the same is germane and It is a settled rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended
material to NHAs stand.[13] in the name of the real party-in-interest. Where the action is allowed
to be prosecuted or defended by a representative acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary must be included in the title of the case and
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 7

shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. The name of such property and a correlative obligation on the part of MIAA to segregate
beneficiaries shall, likewise, be included in the complaint.[19] the property from its Conceptual Development Plan. MIAA averred:

Moreover, Sec. 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that facts 28. Petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or the authority of For a writ of mandamus to issue, it is essential that petitioner has a
a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of
in the complaint. In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, respondent to perform the act required. The legal right of petitioner
the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he or she or to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain. The
it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a corresponding duty of respondent to perform the required act must
natural or an artificial person. The party bringing suit has the burden also be clear and specific (Cf. Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203, 210
of proving the sufficiency of the representative character that he [1968]).
claims. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party
as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such complaint 29. Petitioner, in view of the expiration of the lease contracts of its
is not deemed filed and the court does not acquire jurisdiction over individual members, has failed to show that it has the legal right to
the complaint. It must be stressed that an unauthorized complaint possess the subject property.
does not produce any legal effect.[20]
30. There is therefore no corresponding duty on the part of
In this case, the petition filed with the trial court sufficiently avers that respondent MIAA to segregate the property from the scope of its
the homeowners association, through its President, is suing in a Conceptual Development Plan.[25]
representative capacity as authorized under the Board Resolution
attached to the petition. Although the names of the individual The question of whether the homeowners association is entitled to
members of the homeowners association who are the beneficiaries the issuance of a writ of mandamus was again raised in the
and real parties-in-interest in the suit were not indicated in the title memorandum[26] filed by MIAA with the Court of Appeals. MIAA
of the petition, this defect can be cured by the simple expedient of alleged:
requiring the association to disclose the names of the principals and
to amend the title and averments of the petition accordingly. Appellant is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. For a
writ of mandamus to issue, it is essential that the appellant has a legal
Essentially, the purpose of the rule that actions should be brought or right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest is to protect against respondent to perform the act required. The legal right of appellant
undue and unnecessary litigation and to ensure that the court will to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain. The
have the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in the corresponding duty of respondent to perform the required act must
consideration of a case. This rule, however, is not to be narrowly and also be clear and specific (cf. Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203, 210
restrictively construed, and its application should be neither dogmatic [1968]).
nor rigid at all times but viewed in consonance with extant realities
and practicalities.[21] As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, the In view of the expiration of the lease contracts of its individual
dismissal of this case based on the lack of personality to sue of members, appellant has failed to show that it has the legal right to
petitioner-association will only result in the filing of multiple suits by possess the subject property. There is therefore no corresponding
the individual members of the association. duty on the part of the MIAA to segregate the property from the
scope of its conceptual development plan.[27]
What is more decisive to the resolution of the present controversy,
however, is a matter not addressed by the parties in the case before
this Court, that is, the fact that the petition filed before the trial court The question of whether mandamus is the proper remedy was clearly
is for mandamus to compel MIAA to segregate Rivera Village from the raised in the trial court and the Court of Appeals although it was
scope of its Conceptual Development Plan and the NHA to take the largely ignored by both courts. This issue being indispensable to the
necessary steps for the disposition of the subject property in favor of resolution of this case, we shall rule on the matter.
the members of the homeowners association.
A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioners legal right
Parenthetically, while the procedural rule is that a party is required to to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled
indicate in his brief an assignment of errors and only those assigned is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right which is indubitably
shall be considered by the appellate court in deciding the case, it is granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law.[28]
equally settled that appellate courts have ample authority to rule on
matters not assigned as errors in an appeal, if these are indispensable In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that,
or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues.[22] on the one hand, petitioner has a clear legal right to the claim that is
sought and that, on the other hand, respondent has an imperative
For instance, the Court has allowed the consideration of other duty to perform that which is demanded of him. Mandamus will not
grounds not raised or assigned as errors specifically in the following issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with
instances: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists.
the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office
complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that
to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically which is already established. Unless the right to relief sought is
assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are unclouded, mandamus will not issue.
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which
the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) In this case, the Court of Appeals itself conceded that no definitive
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an ruling as regards the rights of the individual members of the
error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but homeowners association could yet be made considering the need for
upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is a full determination of whether their claimed rights under the
dependent.[23] pertinent laws have ripened into actual legal and vested rights. The
appellate court even outlined the requisites under PD 1517 which
In this case, although the propriety of the filing of a petition for have yet to be complied with, namely: (1) the submission to the NHA
mandamus was no longer raised as an issue before this Court, MIAA of a proposal to acquire the subject property as required under Sec.
asserted in its answer[24] to the original petition that the 9[29] of PD 1517;
homeowners association is not entitled to a writ of mandamus
because it has not shown any legal right to possess the subject
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 8

and (2) proof that the members of the homeowners association are Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that parties-in-interest without
qualified to avail of the benefits under PD 1517 as mandated by Sec. whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined
6[30] of the same law. either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Thus, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua
Resort to mandamus is evidently premature because there is no non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an
showing that the members of the homeowners association have indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be
already filed an application or proposal with the NHA to acquire their dismissed. The plaintiff is mandated to implead all indispensable
respective lots. There is still an administrative remedy open to the parties, and the absence of one renders all subsequent actions of the
members of the homeowners association which they should have first court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
pursued, failing which they cannot invoke judicial action.[31] absent parties, but even as to those present. One who is a party to a
case is not bound by any decision of the court; otherwise, he will be
We note that while respondent alleges that its members enlisted deprived of his right to due process.[36]
themselves with the NHA in order to avail of the benefits of the law,
the NHA, in its answer[32] to the petition, denied this allegation for For the foregoing reasons, the prayer for the issuance of the writ of
being self-serving. Whatever rights the members of the homeowners preliminary injunction must perforce be denied. Preliminary
association may have under the relevant laws are still in substantial injunction is a mere ancillary remedy which cannot stand separately
doubt or dispute. Hence, the petition for mandamus was or proceed independently of the main case. Having declared that the
appropriately dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. petition filed before the trial court was correctly dismissed, the
determination of the homeowners associations entitlement to a writ
So, too, should the prayer for the issuance of a writ of prohibition of preliminary injunction is already moot and academic.[37]
contained in the same petition be denied. Writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are prerogative writs of equity and their Besides, as earlier noted, the right of the members of the
granting is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the courts to be homeowners association to possess and purchase the subject
exercised on equitable principles. Said writs should only be issued property is still uncertain considering that they have not completed
when the right to the relief is clear.[33] As our findings in this case the process for the acquisition of their lots as outlined in PD 1517.
confirm, the homeowners association failed to establish a clear legal
right to the issuance of the writs of mandamus and prohibition prayed Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive
for. rights and interests. The writ of preliminary injunction is issued by the
court to prevent threatened or continuous irreparable injury to
There is, moreover, another ground for the dismissal of the petition parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
filed before the trial court which appears to have been overlooked by adjudicated. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the
the parties in this case. merits of the case can be heard fully. The writ is issued upon the
satisfaction of two requisites, namely: (1) the existence of a right to
In the original petition filed before the trial court, the homeowners be protected; and (2) acts which are violative of said right. In the
association averred that although EO 903 transferred to MIAA the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief
properties and assets of MIA, such transfer was made subject to what constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to
the homeowners association claims to be the existing rights of its protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainants right is
members.[34] MIAA dismissed this allegation as an erroneous doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of
conclusion of law.[35] irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a
ground for an injunction.[38]
We cite the complete text of the relevant provision of EO 903 to fully
understand the import thereof and its effect on the present With this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other
controversy. Section 3 thereof states: issues raised in this petition.

Sec. 3. Creation of the Manila International Airport Authority.There is WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
hereby established a body corporate to be known as the Manila Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil
International Airport Authority which shall be attached to the Case No. 97-1598 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is ordered
Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The principal office DISMISSED.
of the Authority shall be located at the New Manila International
Airport. The Authority may establish such offices, branches, agencies SO ORDERED.
or subsidiaries as it may deem proper and necessary; Provided, That
any subsidiary that may be organized shall have the prior approval of
the President.

The land where the Airport is presently located as well as the


surrounding land area of approximately six hundred hectares, are
hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and
administration of the Authority,
subject to existing rights, if any. The Bureau of Lands and other
appropriate government agencies shall undertake an actual survey of
the area transferred within one year from the promulgation of this
Executive Order and the corresponding title to be issued in the name
of the authority. Any portion thereof shall not be disposed through
sale or through any other mode unless specifically approved by the
President of the Philippines. [Emphasis supplied.]

As can clearly be seen from the foregoing provision, while it is true


that the ownership and administration of the airport and its
surrounding land was assigned to MIAA subject to existing rights,
which we may here understand to be the rights granted under PD
1517, EO 903 specifically requires the approval of the President of the
Philippines before any disposition by sale or any other mode may be
made concerning the property transferred to MIAA.

The Executive Secretary as representative of the President of the


Philippines is, therefore, an indispensable party in actions seeking to
compel the sale or disposition of properties of the MIAA. Section 7,
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 9

CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN and CITY MAYOR LEONIDES In view of the foregoing premises, I am forwarding this matter to the
THERESA B. PLAZA, the latter in her personal capacity and as Sangguniang Panlungsod to solicit your resolution of support on the
representative of matter.
her co-defendant,
Petitioners, This is not a decision calculated to deprived (sic) Radio Bombo of its
-versus - freedom of speech or expression. This is just a simply matter of
CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM (CBS), INC., doing business whether or not Radyo Bombo has complied with existing laws and
under the name and style DXBR Bombo Radyo ordinances.
Butuan, represented by its
Manager, Norberto P. Thereupon, the Sangguninang Panlungsod adopted Resolution-057-
Pagaspas, and HON. ROSARITO F. DABALOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, 2002 to strongly support the decision of the City Mayor to deny the
BRANCH 2, OF AGUSAN application of Consolidated Broadcasting System Development
DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Corporation (Bombo Radyo-Butuan) for a Mayors Permit and
Respondents. thereafter close the radio station. [3]
G.R. No. 157315
On February 18, 2002, the Citys licensing officer served on CBSs
Promulgated: station manager a final/last notice of violation and demand to cease
December 1, 2010 and desist illegal operation, with a warning that he would recommend
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x the closure of its business in case of non-compliance.

Petitioners City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides On February 19, 2002, CBS and its manager, Norberto Pagaspas, filed
Theresa B. Plaza (petitioners) appeal the adverse decision dated a complaint for prohibition, mandamus, and damages against the
October 28, 2002 (dismissing their petition for certiorari and petitioners in the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC),[4] with
prohibition to challenge the grant by the trial judge of the application prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
for a writ of preliminary injunction after reconsidering his earlier self- injunction to restrain the petitioners from closing its station, or from
inhibition),[1] and the resolution dated January 29, 2003 (denying disturbing and preventing its business operations. The case, docketed
their motion for reconsideration), both promulgated by the Court of as Civil Case No. 5193, was raffled to Branch 2, presided by Judge
Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 69729 entitled City Government of Rosarito P. Dabalos.
Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, the latter in her
personal capacity and as representative of her co-defendant v. On February 20, 2002, Judge Dabalos voluntarily inhibited and
Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc., doing business under directed the return of Civil Case No. 5193 to the Office of the Clerk of
the name and style DXBR Bombo Radyo Butuan, represented by its Court for re-raffle.[5] He cited the circumstances that might affect his
Manager, Norberto P. Pagaspas, and the Hon. Rosarito F. Dabalos, objectivity and impartiality in resolving the controversy as his
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 2, of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. justification, to wit:

Antecedents[2] xxx
a) That the undersigned was the object of its (plaintiff's) attacks and
In February, 2002, City Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza) wrote to the criticism which are judgmental and not inquisitorial in the comments
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Butuan City to solicit its support for her over the air;
decision to deny the application for mayors permit of respondent b) That the undersigned was shouted at disrespectfully by one of
Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), and to plaintiff's reporters/news gatherers in the vicinity of the Hall of
eventually close down CBSs radio station. She justified her decision by Justice;
claiming that CBSs operating its broadcasting business within the
Arujiville Subdivision, a residential area, had violated the Citys zoning c) That plaintiff's commentaries are making pronouncements on legal
ordinance. Her letter pertinently reads: matters, substantive and procedural, based on its perception and not
on laws;
In 1994, Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System
manifested their intention to operate on their current site at Arujiville d) That in its commentaries in attacking public officials as well as
Subdivision which is a residential area. They were informed that they private individuals, words which are disrespectful and indecent are
cannot situate their business in the area as it violates our zoning used.
ordinance. However, they have pleaded and was agreeable to
operate in the area by virtue of a Temporary Use Permit (TUP) xxx. and the net effect and result of its commentaries over the air causes
confusion on the minds of the public, including the young that the
The TUP allowed them to operate in the area but only for a very court and government offices and public officials will lose their
limited period. As a matter of fact, the TUP was good only for one credibility and respect which are due them.
year, which can be renewed every year for a maximum of five (5)
years or until 1999. Thus, right from the beginning they have been The court is aware of press freedom is enshrined in our constitution
informed and forewarned that they cannot operate in the area but such freedom should not be abused because in every right there
forever and that they have to relocate to a proper area. is a concomitant obligation.
Bombo Radyo renewed its TUP only in 1995 and 1996. They have
failed to renew their TUP up to today. Let therefore this case be returned immediately to the office [of the]
Clerk of Court VI for re-raffling.
This office has received numerous complaints against Bombo Radyo
for violation of private rights, inciting people to go rise against the SO ORDERED.
government, malicious imputations, insinuations against people not
of their liking, false or fabricated news, etc. The list is so long to On the same day, Judge Victor Tomaneng, Presiding Judge of Branch
enumerate. Copies of the petitions, manifestos from various groups 33, issued an order also inhibiting himself from handling Civil Case No.
is hereto attached for your perusal. 5193, and in his capacity as Vice Executive Judge (in lieu of Executive
Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr., then on sick leave) directed the
Thus, for violation of the city zoning ordinance, the expiration of their assignment of Civil Case No. 5193 to Branch 5 without raffle,[6] viz:
TUP, which was never renewed since 1997, failure to secure ECC and
the numerous complaints against the station of the residents within xxx Considering that the Executive Judge Hon. Cipriano B. Alvizo, the
the immediate vicinity of their premises and the threat they are Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 4 and Acting-Designate Presiding Judge
causing to the peace and order of the City, I have decided to deny of RTC-Branch 3, but who is now in Cebu City for medical treatment,
their application for a mayor's permit and thereafter to close the it would be impractical to include his courts in the re-raffling of cases
radio station. for the reason that the case is for prohibition, mandamus, injunction,
etc., that needs immediate action. The herein Vice-Executive Judge
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 10

who is the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 33, could not also act on this and their counsel did not appear, CBSs counsel manifested that he
case on the ground of 'delicadeza' considering that defendant Hon. was desisting from his earlier request with the Court for the
Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza is his 'kumadre' plus the fact that designation of another judge to hear Civil Case No. 5193. Judge
before becoming judge he was the legal counsel of the LDP party here Dabalos noted the manifestation but reset the hearing of the
in Butuan City, in the election of 1992 and 1995, which is the political application for preliminary injunction on March 12, 2002, to give the
party of the Plazas. RTC-Branch 1, being the exclusive Family Court petitioners an opportunity to show cause why the writ prayed for
cannot also be included in any raffle. should not issue. For the purpose of the resetting, Judge Dabalos
caused a notice of hearing to be served on the petitioners.[11]
In view of the foregoing, and on the ground of expediency, the Clerk
of Court is ordered to send this case to RTC-Branch 5, without raffle Upon receipt of the notice of hearing, the petitioners moved to quash
anymore, it being the only practical available court in this jurisdiction the notice and prayed that the TRO be lifted, insisting that Judge
as of this moment. Dabalos had already lost his authority to act on Civil Case No. 5193 by
virtue of his inhibition.[12]
Civil Case No. 5193 was forwarded to Branch 5, presided by Judge
Augustus L. Calo, who recused because his wife had been recently Nonetheless, Civil Case No. 5193 was called on March 12, 2002. The
appointed by Mayor Plaza to the Citys Legal Office. Judge Calo parties and their respective counsel appeared. At the close of the
ordered the immediate return of the case to the Clerk of Court for proceedings on that date, Judge Dabalos granted CBSs prayer for a
forwarding to Vice Executive Judge Tomaneng. writ of preliminary injunction,[13] to wit:

Without any other judge to handle the case, Judge Tomaneng WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing as the defendants did not
formally returned Civil Case No. 5193 to Judge Dabalos, stating in his introduce any evidence in spite of the order of the Court to show
letter that Judge Dabalos reason for inhibition did not amount to a cause why no writ of preliminary injunction be issued and the
plausible ground to inhibit. Judge Tomaneng instructed Judge Dabalos repeated directive of the court in open court for the defendants to
to hear the case unless the Supreme Court approved the inhibition.[7] present evidence which the defendants firmly refused to do so on
flimsy grounds, the Court resolves to issue a writ of preliminary
On February 21, 2002, Judge Tomaneng issued a TRO,[8] to wit: injunction as the complaint under oath alleges that plaintiff is a
grantee of a franchise from the Congress of the Philippines and the
The Court believes that there is a need to maintain the status quo act threatened to be committed by the defendants curtail the
until all the other issues in the complaint shall have been duly heard constitutional right of freedom of speech of the plaintiff which the
and determined without necessarily implying that plaintiff is entitled Court finds that it should be looked into, the defendants' refusal to
to the prayers for injunction. The Court hereby resolves in the controvert such allegations by evidence deprived the Court [of] the
meantime to grant a temporary restraining order. chance to be guided by such evidence to act accordingly that it left
the court no alternative but to grant the writ prayed for, the City
WHEREFORE, defendants City Gov't of Butuan and City Mayor Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza,
Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, police their attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities and/or any
authorities and/or any person acting upon the Mayors order and person acting upon the Mayor's order or instructions or under her
instruction under her authority are hereby enjoined to cease, desist authority are hereby enjoined to cease and desist and to refrain from
and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADYO BOMBO or from closing or padlocking RADYO BOMBO or from preventing, disturbing
preventing, disturbing, or molesting its business operations, including or molesting its business operations, including but not limited to the
but not limited to the use and operation of its building, structures and use and operation of its building, structures, broadcasting facilities
broadcasting facilities, and the ingress or egress of its employees and the ingress or egress of its employees therein upon plaintiff's
therein. putting up a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 duly approved by this
court which injunction bond shall be executed in favor of the
As this Court cannot issue a seventy-two (72) hour Temporary defendants to answer for whatever damages which the defendants
Restraining Order because of the incoming delay on Monday, may sustain in connection with or arising from the issuance of this
February 25, 2002, a temporary restraining order is hereby issued writ if, after all the court will finally adjudge that plaintiff is not
effective for twenty (20) days from issuance (Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1997 entitled thereto.
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure).
This order is without prejudice to the findings of the court after a
Meanwhile, let this case be set for summary hearing on March 11, formal hearing or a full blown trial.
2002 at 8:30 in the morning to resolve the pending application for
injunction and for the defendants to show cause why the same shall Furnish copies of this order to the Hon. Supreme Court and the Hon.
not be granted. Court Administrator.

IT IS SO ORDERED. SO ORDERED.[14]

On February 25, 2002, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to lift or Following CBSs posting of P200,000.00 as the required injunction
dissolve temporary restraining order in Branch 2 (sala of Judge bond, Branch 2 issued the writ of preliminary injunction on March 15,
Dabalos). 2002,[15] commanding and directing the provincial sheriff to:
On February 26, 2002, Judge Dabalos referred his order of inhibition
in Civil Case No. 5193 to the Court Administrator for consideration, xxx forthwith enjoin the City Government of Butuan and the Hon. City
with a request for the designation of another Judge not stationed in Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees,
Butuan City and Agusan del Norte to handle the case.[9] police authorities and/or any person acting upon the mayor's order
or instruction or under her authority to cease and desist and to refrain
Consequently, CBS requested the Court to designate another judge to from closing or padlocking RADIO BOMBO or from preventing
hear its application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, disturbing or molesting its business operations, including the use and
the hearing of which Judge Tomaneng had set on March 11, 2002.[10] operation of its building, structures, broadcasting facilities and the
ingress and egress of its employees therein. Copies of the writ of
In the meanwhile, or on March 8, 2002, the petitioners filed their preliminary injunction, bond and other pertinent documents thereto
answer to the complaint, alleging affirmative and special defenses be served on the defendants and thereafter make a return of your
and praying for the dismissal of the complaint, the lifting of the TRO, service of this writ within the period required by law and the Rules of
the denial of the prayer for preliminary injunction, and the granting Court.
of their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys
fees, and litigation expenses. Thus, the petitioners commenced in the CA a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for TRO or writ of preliminary
During the hearing on March 11, 2002 of CBSs application for the injunction).
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, at which the petitioners
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 11

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition upon a Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall
finding that Judge Dabalos had committed no grave abuse of sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested
discretion in acting upon CBSs application for preliminary injunction, as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
given the peculiar circumstances surrounding the raffling and either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
assignment of Civil Case No. 5193, and the urgent need to resolve the counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of
application for preliminary injunction due to the expiration of Judge civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
Tomanengs TRO by March 13, 2002. The CA held that the writ of trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
preliminary injunction had properly issued, because the petitioners when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
had threatened to defeat CBSs existing franchise to operate its radio written consent of all parties-in-interest, signed by them and entered
station in Butuan City by not issuing the permit for its broadcast upon the record.
business.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
Issues from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those
Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari, with the mentioned above.
petitioners contending that:[16]
The self-inhibition of Judge Dabalos was one taken in accordance with
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT the second paragraph of Section 1. Our resolution herein turns,
JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF therefore, on the proper interpretation and application of the second
DISCRETION WHEN, ON MARCH 12, 2002, WITHOUT SUFFICIENT paragraph.
NOTICE TO PETITIONERS, HE AGAIN TOOK COGNIZANCE OF AND RE-
ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD The second paragraph of Section 1 (unlike the first paragraph) does
ALREADY EFFECTIVELY INHIBITED HIMSELF FROM HEARING THE not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition. This
SAME IN TWO EARLIER ORDERS HE HAD ISSUED DATED FEBRUARY 20 means that the determination of the grounds is left to the sound
AND FEBRUARY 26, 2002 RESPECTIVELY. discretion of the judge, who must discern with only his or her
conscience as guide on what may be just and valid reasons for self-
II. ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ROSARITO DABALOS COULD inhibition. The vesting of discretion necessarily proceeds from the
VALIDLY RE-ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 5193 AFTER reality that there may be many and different grounds for a judge to
HE HAD EARLIER ISSUED TWO ORDERS VOLUNTARILY INHIBITING recuse from a case, and such grounds cannot all be catalogued in the
HIMSELF FROM HEARING SAID CASE, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED Rules of Court. Thus did the Court cogently point out in Gutang v.
IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE Court of Appeals:[18]
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION WITHOUT REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO xxx The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that
PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW WHETHER SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT the decision on whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion
HAS A CLEAR RIGHT THERETO. and conscience of the trial judge based on his rational and logical
assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought
Ruling before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside
of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the
The appeal lacks merit. We find that the CA did not commit any error matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that
in upholding the questioned orders of the RTC. could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for
inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead
I to preference or predilections are many and varied.
Judge Dabalos lawfully re-assumed
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193 In his case, Judge Dabalos clearly discerned after the return of Civil
Case No. 5193 to him by the Vice Executive Judge that his self-doubt
In its decision, the CA ruled that Judge Dabalos did not gravely abuse about his ability to dispense justice in Civil Case No. 5193 generated
his discretion in re-assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193 in by the airing of criticisms against him and other public officials by CBSs
the light of the obtaining circumstances cogently set forth in its commentators and reporters would not ultimately affect his
assailed decision, to wit:[17] objectivity and judgment. Such re-assessment of the ground for his
self-inhibition, absent a showing of any malice or other improper
Seemingly, petitioners lost sight of the reality that after the motive on his part, could not be assailed as the product of an unsound
respondent judge issued his order of inhibition and directed the exercise of his discretion. That, it seems to us, even the petitioners
return of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle to conceded, their objection being based only on whether he could still
another judge, Vice-Executive Judge Victor A. Tomaneng, noting that re-assume jurisdiction of Civil Case No. 5193.
there is no other judge to handle the case, directed the return thereof
to the public respondent in view of the extreme urgency of the We hold that although a trial judge who voluntarily inhibits loses
preliminary relief therein prayed for. Under the circumstances then jurisdiction to hear a case,[19] he or she may decide to reconsider the
obtaining, the respondent judge could do no less but to act thereon. self-inhibition and re-assume jurisdiction after a re-assessment of the
So it is that he proceeded with the scheduled hearing on the circumstances giving cause to the inhibition. The discretion to
application for preliminary injunction on March 11, 2002 and reconsider acknowledges that the trial judge is in the better position
thereafter reset it for continuation the following day to afford the to determine the issue of inhibition, and a reviewing tribunal will not
petitioners an opportunity to oppose the application and show cause disturb the exercise of that discretion except upon a clear and strong
why the writ prayed for should not issue. The urgency of the action finding of arbitrariness or whimsicality.[20] Thus, Judge Dabalos re-
demanded of the respondent judge is further accentuated by the fact assumption of jurisdiction was legally tenable, having come from his
that the TRO issued by Judge Tomaneng was then about to expire on seizing the opportunity to re-assess the circumstances impelling his
March 13, 2002, not to mention the circumstance that Executive self-inhibition upon being faced with the urgent need to hear and
Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr., who happened to be around, advised the resolve CBSs application for preliminary injunction. Such action was
respondent judge to resolve the issues to the best of his discretion. commendable on his part, given that the series of self-inhibitions by
xxx the other RTC Judges had left no competent judge in the station to
hear and resolve the application. It can even be rightly said that a
The petitioners disagree, and insist that Judge Dabalos lost the refusal by Judge Dabalos to re-assess and reconsider might have
authority to act upon CBSs application for preliminary injunction by negated his sacred and sworn duty as a judge to dispense justice.
virtue of his prior self-inhibition from hearing Civil Case No. 5193.
We cannot sustain the petitioners insistence. In this connection, the urgency for the RTC to hear and resolve the
application for preliminary injunction factually existed. In fact, CBS
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which contains the rule on had communicated it to the Court in its letter dated March 5,
inhibition and disqualification of judges, states: 2002,[21] to wit:
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 12

regard, worthy of mention is that even the Vice Executive Judge,


If not for the temporary restraining order issued on February 21, 2002 acknowledging that CBS had stood to suffer grave
by the Honorable Judge VICTOR A. TOMANENG, Vice-Executive Judge
and Presiding Judge of Branch 33 of said court xxx violent injustice and irreparable injury should its radio station suffer closure,
confrontations would have continued between supporters of plaintiff had issued ex parte the TRO.
RADIO BOMBO BUTUAN, on the one hand, and the loyalists of City
Mayor LEONIDES THERESA PLAZA (including some city employees) led It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the evidence
by the Mayor herself and her husband, former Mayor DEMOCRITO of CBS should have first been required before Judge Dabalos issued
PLAZA II, on the other hand. the writ of preliminary injunction. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly
xxx lays the burden on the shoulders of the petitioners, as the parties
As set forth in the temporary restraining order, the hearing on the against whom the TRO was issued, to show cause why the application
application for a writ of preliminary injunction is set on Monday, for the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue,[31] thus:
March 11, 2002 because the twenty-day lifetime of the temporary
restraining order would expire on March 13, 2002. A repeat of the Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
violent scenario of February 21 may occur unless the application is exception. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing
heard as scheduled by a Regional Trial Court Judge who had not and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall
inhibited himself. xxx appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application
Verily, Judge Dabalos decision to hear the application for preliminary that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before
injunction pending the Courts resolution of the query on whether or the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application
not another Judge sitting outside the City of Butuan should take for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary
cognizance of Civil Case No. 5193 did not constitute or equate to restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days
arbitrariness or whimsicality. He had reasonable grounds to do so in from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as
the context of the tight circumstances that had developed in Civil Case herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must
No. 5193 following his self-inhibition. Surely, his decision to order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and
reconsider did not proceed from passion or whim, but from his place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the
faithful adherence to his solemn oath to do justice to every man. He same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be
thereby neither violated any law or canon of judicial conduct, nor granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
abused his juridical authority. xxx

II.
Petitioners to adduce evidence after granting of TRO In fine, Judge Dabalos properly directed the petitioners to first
present evidence why the application for the writ of preliminary
injunction should not be granted. By their refusal to comply with the
The petitioners submit that Judge Dabalos improperly resolved CBSs directive to show cause by presenting their evidence to that effect,
application for preliminary injunction by not first requiring the the petitioners could blame no one but themselves.
applicant to adduce evidence in support of the application.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm
We do not agree with the petitioners. the decision dated October 28, 2002 promulgated by the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 69729.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.
a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a particular
act or acts.[22] It may also require the performance of a particular act SO ORDERED.
or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory
injunction.[23] Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one that commands a
party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory
injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct
a wrong in the past.[24]

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the


instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the
right or the property sought to be protected.[25] It is proper only
when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in
the complaint,[26] which must aver the existence of the right and the
violation of the right,[27] or whose averments must in the minimum
constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief
sought.[28] Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the
injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima
facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right;
and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ
to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a
right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never
arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of
action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by
statute.[29] Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a
right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a
matter of law.[30]

While it is true that CBS was not required to present evidence to prove
its entitlement to the injunctive writ, the writ was nonetheless
properly granted on the basis of the undisputed facts that CBS was a
grantee of a franchise from the Legislature, and that the acts
complained against (i.e., refusal of the Mayors permit and resulting
closure of the radio station) were imminent and, unless enjoined,
would curtail or set at naught CBSs rights under the franchise. In this
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 13

JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C. and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al.
BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA would not be able to pass through the said road; that La Paz Road was
DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C. restored by the residents to make it passable but Fil-estate excavated
DATARIO, AIDA the road again; that JCHA reported the matter to the Municipal
A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY and Government and the Office of the Municipal Engineer but the latter
NELSON A. LOYOLA, failed to repair the road to make it passable and safe to motorists and
Petitioners, pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road
caused damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of
- versus - precious hours to them, to the commuters and motorists because
traffic was re-routed to narrow streets that caused terrible traffic
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., congestion and hazard; and that its permanent closure would not only
FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING AND prejudice their right to free and unhampered use of the property but
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY, would also cause great damage and irreparable injury.
ENRIQUE RIVILLA,
MICHAEL E. JETHMAL Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a
and MICHAEL ALUNAN, Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction
Respondents. (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and intimidating them
x-------------------------------------------x in their use of La Paz Road.
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC.,
FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING AND On February 10, 1999, a TRO was issued ordering Fil-Estate, et al, for
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY, a period of twenty (20) days, to stop preventing, coercing,
ENRIQUE RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL and MICHAEL ALUNAN, intimidating or harassing the commuters and motorists from using
Petitioners, the La Paz Road. [6]

- versus - Subsequently, the RTC conducted several hearings to determine the


JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C. propriety of the issuance of a WPI.
BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA
DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C. On February 26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss[7]
DATARIO, AIDA arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it
A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY and was improperly filed as a class suit. On March 5, 1999, JCHA, et al.
NELSON A. LOYOLA, filed their comment[8] on the motion to dismiss to which respondents
Respondents. filed a reply.[9]

G.R. No. 152272 On March 3, 1999, the RTC issued an Order [10] granting the WPI and
required JCHA, et al. to post a bond.
G. R. No. 152397
On March 19, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion for
Present: reconsideration[11] arguing, among others, that JCHA, et al. failed to
satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a WPI. On March 23,
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed their opposition to the motion.[12]
PERALTA,
ABAD, The RTC then issued its June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order, denying both
MENDOZA, and the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by Fil-
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Estate, et al.

Promulgated: Not satisfied, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA to annul (1) the Order dated March 3, 1999
March 5, 2012 and (2) the Omnibus Order dated June 16, 2000. They contended that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X improperly filed as a class suit. With regard to the issuance of the WPI,
Before the Court are two (2) consolidated petitions assailing the July the defendants averred that JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had
31, 2001 Decision[1] and February 21, 2002 Resolution[2] of the Court a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and further
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543, which annulled and set aside claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens registered private road and
the March 3, 1999 Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, there was neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over
Bian, Laguna (RTC), granting the application for the issuance of a writ it.[13]
of preliminary injunction, and upheld the June 16, 2000 Omnibus
Order[4] denying the motion to dismiss. On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered the decision partially granting the
petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
The Facts:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The Order
On January 20, 1999, Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. dated March 3, 1999 granting the writ of preliminary injunction is
(JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE but the portion of the Omnibus
other neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), Order dated June 16, 2000 denying the motion to dismiss is upheld.
instituted a complaint[5] for damages, in its own behalf and as a class
suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana SO ORDERED.[14]
Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use
of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (Fil-Estate), Fil-estate
Ecocentrum Corporation (FEEC), La Paz Housing & Development The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action
Corporation (La Paz), and Warbird Security Agency and their when JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that they had been using
respective officers (collectively referred as Fil-Estate, et al.). La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years and that their right was
violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road. It sustained
The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and the RTC ruling that the complaint was properly filed as a class suit as
motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila it was shown that the case was of common interest and that the
and Calamba; that they used the entry and exit toll gates of South individuals sought to be represented were so numerous that it was
Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way public road impractical to include all of them as parties. The CA, however,
known as La Paz Road; that they had been using La Paz Road for more annulled the WPI for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove their clear and
than ten (10) years; that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 14

present right over La Paz Road. The CA ordered the remand of the Paz Road, not being part of the Juana Complex I, was excluded from
case to the RTC for a full-blown trial on the merits. the donation. Subsequently, La Paz became a shareholder of FEEC, a
consortium formed to develop several real properties in Bian, Laguna,
Hence, these petitions for review. known as Ecocentrum Project. In exchange for shares of stock, La Paz
contributed some of its real properties to the Municipality of Bian,
In G.R. No. 152272, JCHA, et al. come to this Court, raising the including the properties constituting La Paz Road, to form part of the
following issues: Ecocentrum Project.
(A)
Fil-Estate, et al. agree with the CA that the annulment of the WPI was
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT A FULL- proper since JCHA, et al. failed to prove that they have a clear right
BLOWN TRIAL ON THE MERITS IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE over La Paz Road. Fil-Estate, et al. assert that JCHA, et al. failed to
NATURE OF THE LA PAZ ROAD, HAD DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED prove the existence of a right of way or a right to pass over La Paz
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN Road and that the closure of the said road constituted an injury to
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION. such right. According to them, La Paz Road is a torrens registered
private road and there is neither a voluntary nor legal easement
(B) constituted over it. They claim that La Paz Road is a private property
registered under the name of La Paz and the beneficial ownership
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT THE thereof was transferred to FEEC when La Paz joined the consortium
PETITIONERS FAILED TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE for the Ecocentrum Project.
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, HAD DECIDED
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS Fil-Estate, et al., however, insist that the complaint did not sufficiently
OF THE SUPREME COURT.[15] contain the ultimate facts to show a cause of action. They aver the
bare allegation that one is entitled to something is an allegation of a
conclusion which adds nothing to the pleading.
In G.R. No. 152397, on the other hand, Fil-Estate, et al. anchor their
petition on the following issues: They likewise argue that the complaint was improperly filed as a class
suit for it failed to show that JCHA, et al. and the commuters and
I. motorists they are representing have a well-defined community of
interest over La Paz Road. They claim that the excavation of La Paz
The Court of Appeals declaration that respondents Complaint states Road would not necessarily give rise to a common right or cause of
a cause of action is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. action for JCHA, et al. against them since each of them has a separate
and distinct purpose and each may be affected differently than the
II. others.
The Court of Appeals pronouncement that respondents complaint The Courts Ruling
was properly filed as a class suit is contrary to existing law and The issues for the Courts resolution are: (1) whether or not the
jurisprudence. complaint states a cause of action; (2) whether the complaint has
been properly filed as a class suit; and (2) whether or not a WPI is
III. warranted.

The Court of Appeals conclusion that full blown trial on the merits is Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an
required to determine the nature of the La Paz Road is contrary to act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. A
existing laws and jurisprudence.[16] complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential
JCHA, et al. concur with the CA that the complaint sufficiently stated elements of a cause of action, namely:
a cause of action. They, however, disagree with the CAs
pronouncement that a full-blown trial on the merits was necessary. (1) the legal right of the plaintiff,
They claim that during the hearing on the application of the writ of (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
injunction, they had sufficiently proven that La Paz Road was a public (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
road and that commuters and motorists of their neighboring villages right.[18]
had used this road as their means of access to the San Agustin Church,
Colegio De San Agustin and to SLEX in going to Metro Manila and to The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is
Southern Tagalog particularly during the rush hours when traffic at determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the
Carmona Entry/Exit and Susana Heights Entry/Exit was at its worst. defendant.[19] Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
JCHA, et al. argue that La Paz Road has attained the status and action.[20] To be taken into account are only the material allegations
character of a public road or burdened by an apparent easement of in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other
public right of way. They point out that La Paz Road is the widest road matters aliunde are not considered.[21]
in the neighborhood used by motorists in going to Halang Road and
in entering the SLEX-Halang toll gate and that there is no other road The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting
as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity. For residents of San a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the
Pedro, Laguna, the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of
Halang is along Rosario Avenue joining La Paz Road. said complaint.[22] Stated differently, if the allegations in the
complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
Finally, JCHA, et al. argue that the CA erred when it voided the WPI maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the
because the public nature of La Paz Road had been sufficiently proven defense that may be asserted by the defendant.[23]
and, as residents of San Pedro and Bian, Laguna, their right to use La
Paz Road is undeniable. In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint
sufficient to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.s averments
In their Memorandum,[17] Fil-Estate, et al. explain that La Paz Road in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road. These
is included in the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their allegation that
Title (TCT) Nos. T-120008, T-90321 and T-90607, all registered in the they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2) an
name of La Paz. The purpose of constructing La Paz Road was to easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said roads.
provide a passageway for La Paz to its intended projects to the south, There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity
one of which was the Juana Complex I. When Juana Complex I was and it is the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang
completed, La Paz donated the open spaces, drainage, canal, and that the commuters and motorists may use. Second, there is an
lighting facilities inside the Juana Complex I to the Municipality of alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, et al. when
Bian. The streets within the subdivisions were then converted to they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists
public roads and were opened for use of the general public. The La from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 15

and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in accordance as public road right-of-way for more than ten years. A mere allegation
with the relief sought therein. does not meet the standard of proof that would warrant the issuance
of the injunctive writ. Failure to establish the existence of a clear right
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction is
class suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit. a sufficient ground for denying the injunction.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one parties can fully prove their respective positions on the issues.
of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it
is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the Due process considerations dictate that the assailed injunctive writ is
court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully not a judgment on the merits but merely an order for the grant of a
protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the provisional and ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo until the
benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to merits of the case can be heard. The hearing on the application for
protect his individual interest. issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is separate and distinct
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the from the trial on the merits of the main case. [29] The evidence
subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest submitted during the hearing of the incident is not conclusive or
to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an
impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the
the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class decision of the case on the merits.[30] There are vital facts that have
and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.[24] yet to be presented during the trial which may not be obtained or
presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and writ.[31] Moreover, the quantum of evidence required for one is
motorists who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA: different from that for the other.[32]

The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the July 31, 2001
of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or general Decision and February 21, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous CA-G.R. SP No. 60543 are AFFIRMED.
individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying
their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming SO ORDERED.
that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they
were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and
excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be
represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that
it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually
as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents
of various barangays in Bian, Laguna and other barangays in San
Pedro, Laguna.
Anent the issue on the propriety of the WPI, Section 3, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court lays down the rules for the issuance thereof. Thus:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an
act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act


or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or


attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.

A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened


or continuous irremediable injury to parties before their claims can
be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.[25] The requisites for its
issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that
must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage.[26] For the writ to issue, the right
sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal right which
must be shown to be clear and positive.[27] This means that the
persons applying for the writ must show that they have an ostensible
right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.[28]

In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof
of violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right
to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal
right therein. As correctly ruled by the CA:

Here, contrary to the ruling of respondent Judge, private respondents


failed to prove as yet that they have a clear and unmistakable right
over the La Paz Road which was sought to be protected by the
injunctive writ. They merely anchor their purported right over the La
Paz Road on the bare allegation that they have been using the same
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 16

LAND BANK OF THE G.R. No. 182758 Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land
PHILIPPINES, Bank.
Petitioner,
Present: SO ORDERED.6

CARPIO, J., Chairperson, Listana filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration. In its 2 April
NACHURA, 2001 Order, the RTC denied the motion. Listana filed with the Court
- versus - PERALTA, of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ABAD, and In its 11 December 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the
MENDOZA, JJ. 29 January and 2 April 2001 Orders of the RTC.
HEIRS OF SEVERINO LISTANA, Promulgated:
Respondents. May 30, 2011 LBP filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 45 of the Rules of Court. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana,
CARPIO, J.: Sr.,7 the Court set aside the 11 December 2001 Decision of the Court
of Appeals and reinstated the 29 January and 2 April 2001 Orders of
The Case the RTC enjoining the PARAD from implementing the warrant of
arrest pending final determination of the amount of just
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules compensation for the property.
of Court. The petition challenges the 30 January 2008 Decision2 and
6 May 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. The Court declared void all proceedings that stemmed from Listanas
92701. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 4 August4 and 18 motion for contempt. The Court held that:
October5 2005 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 5,
Branch 51, Sorsogon City (RTC), in Civil Case No. 2001-6803. Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified
The Facts Motion for Contempt filed by the respondent with the PARAD were
invalid for the following reasons: First, the Rules of Court clearly
Severino Listana (Listana) owned a 246.0561-hectare parcel of land in require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court,
Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, covered by Transfer Certificate of which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated
Title No. T-20193. Listana voluntarily sold the property to the by the PARAD motu proprio, rather, it was by a motion filed by
government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform, under respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent.
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the
PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of stemmed from respondents Motion for Contempt, specifically the
Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for
determine the amount of just compensation for the property. In its the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
14 October 1998 Decision, the DARAB set the amount at
P10,956,963.25 and ordered petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is
(LBP) to pay Listana the same. GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
65276, dated December 11, 2001, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
On 18 June 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51,
issued a writ of execution ordering Land Bank Manager and Agrarian dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator of
Operations Center Head Alex A. Lorayes (Lorayes) to pay Listana the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order of
P10,956,963.25. Lorayes refused. Thus, on 2 September 1999, Listana arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the
filed with the PARAD a motion for contempt against Lorayes. case before Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, is
REINSTATED.
On 6 September 1999, LBP filed with the Regional Trial Court, Judicial
Region 5, Branch 52, Sorsogon City, acting as special agrarian court SO ORDERED.8
(SAC), a petition for judicial determination of the amount of just
compensation for the property. LBP challenged the amount set by the On 26 May 2004, LBP filed with the RTC a motion9 to withdraw the
DARAB and prayed that the amount be fixed at P5,871,689.03. P5,644,773.02 cash bond. LBP stated that:

The PARAD granted Listanas motion for contempt. In its 20 August


2000 Order, the PARAD cited Lorayes for indirect contempt and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, through counsel unto this
ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the DARABs 14 Honorable Court, respectfully avers:
October 1998 Decision.
1. That last February 1, 2001, LANDBANK posted cash bond covered
In its 25 October 2000 Order, the SAC dismissed LBPs petition for by Official Receipt No. 7135588 dated January 31, 2001 in the amount
judicial determination of the amount of just compensation for the of P5,644,773.02. [C]opy of the Order, Official Receipt and deposit slip
property. LBP appealed the 25 October 2000 Order. are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, and C;
2. That on August 5, 2003, the Supreme Court issued a Decision in
In its 27 November 2000 Resolution, the PARAD ordered the issuance G.R[.] No. 152611 entitled Land Bank of the Philippines versus
of an alias writ of execution, ordering LBP to pay Listana Severino Listana, the dispositive portion is quoted as follows:
P10,956,963.25. On 3 January 2001, the PARAD issued a warrant of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is
arrest against Lorayes. GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
65276, dated December 11, 2001, is REVISED [sic] and SET ASIDE. The
LBP filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with application for the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51,
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining PARAD from dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator of
implementing the warrant of arrest against Lorayes. In its 29 January the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order or
2001 Order, the RTC enjoined the PARAD from implementing the [sic] arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination
warrant of arrest pending final determination of the amount of just of the case before Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch
compensation for the property. LBP posted a P5,644,773.02 cash 52, is REINSTATED.
bond. The dispositive portion of the 29 January 2001 Order stated: SO ORDERED.
1. That on February 26, 200 [sic], an Entry of Judgment was issued
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial by the Supreme Court making the Decision in G.R. No. 152611 final
Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead is enjoined as and executory. Copy of the Entry of Judgment is hereto attached as
it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Annex D.
Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 17

WHEREFORE, premises considered it is most respectfully prayed that It is plain to see from the Supreme Courts decision that only the
the cash bond put up by Land Bank of the Philippines be released[.]10 Orders of the PARAD dated 20 August 2000 and 3 January 2001 for
the arrest of Lorayes were nullified.

The RTCs Ruling A reading of the Supreme Courts decision will show that the
nullification of the orders of the PARAD stemmed not from the
In its 4 August 2005 Order, the RTC denied LBPs motion to withdraw correctness of Lorayes refusal to execute the DARABs decision nor
the P5,644,773.02 cash bond. The RTC held that: from the entitlement of Land Bank to enjoin such execution. Rather,
it is grounded on the adoption of the improper mode of initiating the
The Court finds the Land Banks Motion without merit inasmuch as the contempt proceedings, and on PARADs lack of jurisdiction to decide
arguments raised therein are specious. Contrary to Land Banks the contempt charge. Hence, the absence of any pronouncement in
conclusion, this Court holds otherwise that the cash bond did not the Supreme Courts decision finally deciding the issue of whether or
become moot and academic upon the finality of the Supreme Courts not Land Bank is permanently entitled to enjoin the payment of
decision dated August 5, 2003. This is so because the underlying P10,956,963.25 to the Heirs of Listana. In fact, the dispositive portion
reason for the posting of the cash bond still remains despite the unequivocally upholds and reinstates only the court a quos grant of
decision of the Supreme Court upholding the unconstitutionality of the writ of preliminary injunction.
the order of arrest issued by PARAD. And that reason is the distinctive
fact that the cash bond was put up in order to secure any damages It must be stressed that it is the dispositive part of the judgment that
that the private respondent Listana may incur by reason of the actually settles and declares the rights and obligations of the parties,
issuance of the injunction order. The damages being referred to, that finally, definitively, and authoritatively, notwithstanding the
is the legal right of Mr. Listana to be justly and promptly paid of his existence of statements in the body that may tend to confuse.
expropriated property was not effectively extinguished by the mere
decision of the Supreme Court declaring the illegality of the order of Thus, notwithstanding its pronouncement that neither the PARAD nor
arrest issued by the PARAD against Mr. Alex Lorayes. In fact, the the DARAB had any authority to cite Lorayes in contempt and order
Courts ruling did not in any way, expressly or impliedly, ordered [sic] his arrest, the Supreme Courts decision cannot be used as basis to
the release of the cash bond in Land Banks favor despite that the release the injunction bond posted by Land Bank, inasmuch as the
latters petition was upheld with finality by the Supreme Court. decision upheld and reinstated the court a quos issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction. Without the injunction bond, the writ of
Indeed, the cash bond did not become moot and academic as clearly preliminary injunction would be invalid.
intentioned in the Supreme Courts decision dated August 5, 2003. A
simple reading of its dispositive portion would crystallize to anyones A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be
mind that the final resolution of the case, including all the issues granted only when, among others, the applicant, unless exempted by
interwoven therein, is conditioned on the final determination of the the court, files with the court where the action or proceeding is
just compenstaion case filed before Branch 52, RTC-Sorsogon and pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an
now pending before the Supreme Court. It clearly means therefore amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will
that the release of the cash bond to either party being one of the pay such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason
issues necessarily included in this case, would depend on the final of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should
termination of the main action the just compensation case. To this finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto.
date, the Supreme Court has not rendered a resolution pertaining
thereto. xxxx

In adopting this line of reasoning, this Court is merely upholding with In the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction is directed at the
consistency the tenor and intent of its Order dated January 29, 2001. PARADs orders to arrest Lorayes for refusing to comply with the
In issuing the injunction order against the PARAD, the Court did not DARABs decision ordering Land Bank to pay the amount of
only recognize the right of Mr. Alex Lorayes against illegal arrest but P10,956,963.25 as just compensation for the subject property.
at the same time protected the inherent right of Mr. Severino Listana
to be justly and promptly paid of his expropriated property, hence it As subsequently explained by the court a quo in its assailed Order, the
ordered the petitioner to post a cash bond in the amount of underlying reason behind its grant of the writ of preliminary
P5,644,773.02, the almost exact amount Mr. Listana could have injunction is the pendency of Land Banks action for judicial
collected as payment from Land Bank had it not for the injunction determination of just compensation. As long as the issue of just
order. At this juncture also, the Court would not be persuaded with compensation is not settled, it would be precipitate to rule one way
Land Banks contention that the cash bond be released it [sic] its favor or the other on the propriety of executing the DARABs decision.
for the reason that the same was drawn not from the agrarian fund
but advanced from its capital fund as part of litigation expenses. The Indeed, if the courts eventually uphold the DARABs valuation of the
internal operations of Land Bank is of no moment under the instant subject property, the injunction against the execution of the DARABs
case. When the injunctive order was issued; it was clear to Land Bank Decision would give rise to the Heirs right to collect damages, which
that the cash bond posted was precisely meant to secure the unpaid the injunction bond would answer for. It is only when the courts
balance due to Mr. Listana. To adhere to Land Banks contention finally strike down the DARABs computation of just compensation
would effectively defeat the purpose of the injunction bond and to that the injunction bond may finally be released.
subject again the landowner to another circuitous mode of collecting
compensation for his property in case the just compensation case be Clearly, the court a quo soundly exercised its discretion in refusing to
resolved in his favor. Therefore, in the interest of social justice, the release the injunction bond posted by Land Bank.13
Court deems it wise to preserve the status quo with regards [sic] to
the cash bond. It shall not be dissolved at the moment and shall stay LBP filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 May 2008 Resolution,
pending the final termination of the just compensation case.11 the Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.

Issue
LBP filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 October 2005 Order,
the RTC denied the motion. LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a LBP raises as issue that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the
petition12 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. withdrawal of the P5,644,773.02 cash bond.

The Court of Appeals Ruling


The Courts Ruling
In its 30 January 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed LBPs
petition and affirmed in toto the RTCs 4 August and 18 October 2005 The petition is unmeritorious.
Orders. The Court of Appeals held that:
ProvRem 2nd Exam cases_batch1 18

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr., the Court reinstated the states that, The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and
29 January 2001 Order of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the case exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
states: compensation to landowners. In Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Wycoco,18 citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court held that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, it was held that Special Agrarian
65276, dated December 11, 2001, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Courts are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51, categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of
dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator of just compensation; and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses
the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order of under R.A. No. 6657. x x x The DAR, as an administrative agency,
arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over
case before Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, is criminal cases. The valuation of property in eminent domain is
REINSTATED. essentially a judicial function which is vested with the Special Agrarian
Courts and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies.20
SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis supplied) (Emphasis supplied)

The dispositive portion of the 29 January 2001 Order of the RTC Thus, as a rule, the DARABs decision setting the amount of just
states: compensation is merely preliminary and not executory if challenged
before the SAC. Execution pending appeal of the DARAB decision is
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial allowed only on meritorious grounds.21 Even then, it is the SAC, not
Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead is enjoined as the DARAB, that can grant execution pending appeal because the SAC
it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. has original and exclusive jurisdiction over just compensation cases.
Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC The determination of the amount of just compensation is a judicial
Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land function that cannot be usurped by administrative agencies. In Apo
Bank. Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court held that:

SO ORDERED.15 It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is


essentially a judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting as
The dispositive portion of the 29 January 2001 Order of the RTC Special Agrarian Court. The same cannot be lodged with
clearly states that the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the administrative agencies and may not be usurped by any other branch
DARAB x x x is enjoined x x x from enforcing its order of arrest against or official of the government.23
Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before
RTC Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by Land In the present case, LBP filed with the SAC a petition for
Bank. Thus, LBP cannot withdraw the bond pending final determination of the amount of just compensation on 6 September
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. 1999. The PARAD issued the alias writ of execution and warrant of
arrest on 27 November 2000 and 3 January 2001, respectively. The
In its 14 October 1998 Decision, the DARAB set the amount of just writ of execution and warrant of arrest were invalid because the 14
compensation for the property at P10,956,963.25 and ordered LBP to October 1998 Decision of the DARAB setting the amount at
pay Listana the amount. On 18 June 1999, the PARAD issued a writ of P10,956,963.25 was merely preliminary and not executory.
execution ordering Lorayes to pay Listana the amount. Lorayes
refused and, later, LBP filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with In any event, the Court has reinstated the 29 January 2001 Order of
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. the RTC enjoining the PARAD from implementing the warrant of
arrest pending final determination of the amount of just
An applicant for preliminary injunction is required to file a bond compensation for the property. Land Bank of the Philippines v.
executed to the party or person enjoined, to the effect that the Listana, Sr. has long become final and executory and can no longer be
applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may disturbed. Consequently, LBP cannot withdraw the P5,644,773.02
sustain by reason of the injunction. Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules cash bond which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of
of Court states: preliminary injunction.

SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the
temporary restraining order. A preliminary injunction or temporary 30 January 2008 Decision and 6 May 2008 Resolution of the Court of
restraining order may be granted only when: Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92701.

xxxx SO ORDERED.

(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court
where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the
party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to
the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the
applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite
bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.

As correctly ruled by the lower courts, the P5,644,773.02 bond shall


answer for the damages Listana may sustain if the courts finally
uphold the P10,956,963.25 just compensation set by the DARAB. In
Republic v. Caguioa,16 the Court held that, The purpose of the
injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by
reason of the injunction in case the court finally decides that the
plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is usually conditioned
accordingly.17

The SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for
determination of the amount of just compensation of properties
acquired under RA No. 6657. Administrative agencies have no
jurisdiction over just compensation cases. Section 57 of RA No. 6657

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