The Future Cannot Begin: Temporal Structures in Modern Society

Author(s): NIKLAS LUHMANN

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Social Research, Vol. 43, No. 1, Interaction Between European and American Social
Science (SPRING 1976), pp. 130-152
Published by: The New School
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The FutureCannot /
Begin:Temporal /
Structuresn /
Modern /
SOCety / BY
BY NIKLAS
NIKLAS LUHMANN
LUHMANN

The Historyof the Future

Tx he historyof thefuturedoes not reachback veryfar. Human

life,of course,providesalwaysfor an immediatefutureas well
as foran immediatepast. This immediatetime,thistimeat hand
of conditionedand conditioningevents,has been distinguished
froma moredistantpastand a moredistantfuture,bothof which
tend to fusein the darknessof a mythictime. Philosophy,later,
reconceptualizedthis view by a two-leveltheoryof time,distin-
guishingeternaltime and the time of changingevents.1 Given
thisconceptionof time,medievalphilosophersfeltno need to re-
flecta differenceofexistenceand perpetuation,seeingcreationand
preservation as one identicalact of God. And theyimplied that
the meresuccessionof thoughtsand eventsproducedthe idea of
timebut could not change,as such,therelationbetweenGod and
His creatures.
It was only the structuralchangefromtraditionalto bourgeois
societyin theseventeenth and eighteenthcenturieswhichdissolved
thisoldernotionand replacedit by a temporalstructurethatcon-

iFor Neo-Platonic origins, cf. the texts edited by S. Sambursky and S. Pines,
The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences
and Humanities, 1971). Cf. also Pitirim A. Sorokin, Socio/ and Cultural Dynamics,
4 vols. (New York: BedminsterPress,1937),2: 473 ff.
 TEMPORAL STRUCTURES 131

tainsin itselfthe possibilityof highercomplexity. ArthurLove-

"
joy claimsfortheeighteenthcenturya temporal izingof thechain
2
of being." This meansa restructuring of the "seriesrerum"in
the senseof a developmentfromsimple to complex forms. The
retrogressive timereckoning"beforeChrist"gained commonac-
ceptancein the eighteenthcentury.3 By this inventionthe past
was deliveredfromthenecessityof beinggroundedin a beginning
event. It thenbecameopen forlimitlesshistoricalresearch. But
if the pastno longerhas a fixedtimeof beginningwhichsetsinto
motiontimeitselfand createsthe best of possibleworldsand de-
finesthe naturalforms,whatwill happen to the future? If there
is any unityin timeitself,any fundamentalchangein the concep-
tion of past cannotremainwithoutconsequencesforthe percep-
tion of future.
I have to add thatthistemporalization of beingnot onlyevapo-
rated the natural forms;with this,it destroyedthe basis of the
Aristotelianconceptionof negation as deprivation(steresis,pri-
vatio) too.4 The problemof negativityhad to be reformulated as
a universalcategory. Since then,any experienceand any action
impliesnegationas a requisiteof selectivedetermination, and the
futurebecomes a storehouseof possibilitiesfromwhich we can
choose only by means of negation.
Future itself,and thismeans past futuresas well as the present
future,mustnow be conceivedas possiblyquite different fromthe
past. It can no longerbe characterizedas approachinga turning
point where it returnsinto the past or where the order of this
world or even time itselfis changed. It may contain,as a func-
tional equivalent for the end of time, emergentpropertiesand
not-yet-realized possibilities. It becomes an open future.
2 Cf. Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A
Study of the History of an
Idea (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1936).
s Cf. Adalbert Klempt, Die Skularisierung der universalhistorischenAuffassung
(Gttingen: Musterschmidt,1960), pp. 81 ff.
* This was, to be sure, only one of the traditional notions of negation (the dis-
cussion of differentnotions of negation was very complex in late medieval and early
modern times); but its abolition did necessitate,nevertheless,the reconstructionof
the meaning of negation as such.
132 SOCIAL RESEARCH

There are controversiesabout the exact birthdate of thismod-

ernconceptionof future.5Some authorsthinkof the seventeenth
century,othersof the secondhalfof the eighteenth.6 This second
view seems to be geared to the fact that the second half of the
eighteenthcenturychangesits expectationsabout comingevents
froma pessimisticto an optimisticvision, frommoral decay to
progress.7The last possibledate is the FrenchRevolution,which
changedthe meaningof revolutionfromturningback to moving
forwardand put into commonuse the word avenir. In the pro-
ceedingsof the InstitutNational, I found the phrase: Le temps
presentest gros d'avenir*apparentlycurrentat thattime (1798).
The wordingtempspresent - presenttime- is interesting in it-
self. In whatsensecan timebe present? One possibleinterpreta-
tion mightbe thatthe phrase"presenttime,"by adding stressto

Cf. Robert Nisbert, Social Change and History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1969), pp. 106 ff.
Cf. Reinhart Koselleck,"Historia Magistra Vitae," in Manfred Riedel, ed., Natur
und Geschichte (Stuttgart,1967), pp. 196-220; and Reinhart Koselleck, "Vergangene
Zukunftder frhenNeuzeit," in Festgabe fr Carl Schmitt (Berlin, 1968), pp. 551-
566.
*Cf. Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth CenturyPhilosophers
(New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1932).
8 So Henri Grgoire, Sur les moyens de perfectionnerles sciences politiques,
Mmoires de l'Institut National (Classe des sciences morales et politiques), Vol. I
(Paris, 1798), pp. 552-556. Future is perceived, in this political context at least,
as close at hand (prochainementl). Actually,neither the word avenir nor the phrase
Le tempspresentest gros d'avenir had been invented during the French Revolution.
The phrase servesas motto in Louis Sbastien Mercier'sbook VAn deux mille quatre
cent quarante: Rve s'il en fut jamais (London, 1772). Mercier refers to Leibniz.
Checking Leibniz, we find a characteristicdifference.He does not speak about "the
present time" but only about the present as such and uses the phrase only to show
that monads have a temporal dimension. For example: Essais de Theodice 360
(in C.J. Gerhardt,ed., Die philosophischenSchriftenvon GottfriedWilhelm Leibniz
[Hildesheim: Olms, 1961],6: 329): "C'est une des reglesde mon systmede l'harmonie
que le present est gros de l'avenir." Or Principes de la Nature et de la Grace,
fondes en raison 13 (Gerhardt 6: 604): "Le present est gros de l'avenir, le future
se pouvoit lire dans le pass, l'loign est exprim dans le prochain." Or Letter to
Bayle, without date (Gerhardt 3: 66): "Le present est toujours gros de l'avenir ou
-
chaque substance doit exprimer ds present tous ses estais futurs" thus: no open
future! Or Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement (Gerhardt 5: 48): "Le present est
gros de l'avenir et charg du pass."
 TEMPORAL STRUCTURES 133

thenotionof thepresent, compensates fora lossof meaningand

durationin thepresentitself.9In fact,if we havean almostin-
finitehistoricalpast,structured and limitedonlybyouractualin-
terests,and if we havean open future,the presentbecomesthe
turningpointwhichswitches theprocessof timefrompastinto
future.The FrenchRevolutionsymbolizes and provesthepossi-
bilityofthisunderstanding byitspractice.The Germans, on the
otherhand,join by writingZeitgedichte - time poems - in the
senseof poemsof politicalactuality.10
However, thepunctualization ofthepresent precededtheopen
futurebymorethana hundredyears;it wasnotitsconsequence.
Already in theearlyseventeenth centurytheunityofexistence and
was
preservation split and thepresent wasconceivedas discontinu-
ous, dependingon secondary causesforits endurance. Hence-
forth, actualityhas to be thought ofas instantaneous
change.The
transformation of timeperspectives began by reconceptualizing
thepresent.It led,then,toa seriesofreliefmeasures: to thecon-
ceptofsystem, toincreasing interestinmechanisms andin security,
and,duringtheeighteenth century, to theinterpretationof exis-
tenceas sentiment.But onlytheeconomicand politicalbreak-
throughof the bourgeoissocietyprovidedthe backgroundfor
solvingtimeproblems bytemporal means:byextending thetime
horizons of pastand futureand by orienting thepresenttoward
theirdifference. To putit in theromantic wayofLamennais:"I
flyfromthepresent bytworoutes,thatofthepastand thatofthe
future." u
If thisis enoughevidence - and it would be easyto produce
-
more thatwiththeriseofbourgeois societythestructureoftime

o On the psychologicallevel we have some evidence for this dual understanding

of the present: either as a very short or as a rather long duration. See Thomas J.
Cottle and Stephen L. Klineberg, The Present of Things Future: Explorations of
Time in Human Experience (New York: Free Press, 1974), p. 108.
10Cf. Jrgen Wilke, Das "Zeitgedicht*':Seine Herkunft und frhe Ausbildung
(Meisenheim am Gian: A. Hain, 1974).
ii I take this quotation from Georges Poulet, Studies in Human Time, translated
by Elliott Coleman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 26.
134 SOCIAL RESEARCH

has changeddrasticallyin the directionof highertemporalcom-

plexity,thenwe mustexpectthatthischangewill have its impact
on everysocial structureand on everyconcept. Nothingwill re-
tain itsold meaning. If thereis formalcontinuityin institutions
or terminologies, thisonlywill conceal the factthateverysingle
formhas gained highercontingency and higherselectivity.12
We have been reactingto the consequencesof this change for
a long time. We observethe "loss of the stable state,"18and we
know thata fasterrate of change requiresmore anticipatorybe-
havior- literally,more actingbeforethe event,more future-ori-
ented planning.14 However,we still do not have a satisfactory
conceptof time. The prevailing"solution"to thisproblemis the
distinctionof severaldifferent notionsof time.15 Still,we lack a
satisfactory theory that would be able to correlatevariationsin
social structureand variationsin temporalstructure. This de-
ficiency is not onlya problemof functionalist theory;it has older
arid deeper roots.16

Toward a Concept of Time

It is now a verycotmonview thattimeis an aspectof thesocial

constructionof reality. This view suggeststhatthereare several

12In fact,a new WrterbuchGeschichtlicheGrundbegriffe which began to appear

in Germany in 1972 tries to make this point.
ia So the formulaof Donald A. Schon, Beyond the Stable State (New York: Norton,
197).
i* See only F. E. Emeryand E. L. Trist, Towards a Social Ecology: Contextual Ap-
preciationof the Future in the Present (London and New York: Plenum Press, 1973),
p. 88.
16 See, for example, the much discussed distinctionof the linear dimension and
the modalities of time by J. Ellis McTaggart, "The Unreality of Time," Mind 17
(1908): 457-474, reprinted in his Philosophical Studies (New York and London:
Longmans, 1934), pp. 110-131. For the German historisch-geisteswissenschaftliche
tradition, cf. Martin Heidegger, "Der Zeitbgriffin der Geschichtswissenschaft,"
Zeitschriftfr Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 160 (1916): 173-188.
i Cf. Herminio Martins,"Time and Theory in Sociology,"in John Rex, ed., Ap-
proaches to Sociology: An Introduction to Major Trends in British Sociology (Lon-
don and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 246-294.
 TEMPORAL STRUCTURES 135

times,a pluralityof Temporalgestalten or of social times.17This

conception disconnects time and chronology. Accordingly,we
mayhave severaltimesand one integrating chronology.But there
remainquestionsto be asked: Are we allowed to reduce the unity
of time to the unityof chronology? Don't we fall back, by as-
suminga pluralityof times,upon the pre-Aristotelian notion of
time as movementor process? Is thereany progressbeyond the
classicaldefinitionof time as measureof movement?
To avoid an uncontrolledfusionof the notionsof timeand of
movement,I proposeto definetimeas theinterpretation of reality
withregardto thedifference betweenpastand future. This defini-
tion presupposes,of course,thatdaily lifegivesthe experienceof
change and containsin itselfthe point of departurefor its own
"timing." I could provethispresupposition by phenomenological
analyses. This of
experience change, however, is not yet really
time,as Husserlhimselfcame to see in his lateryears. It is per-
vasiveand unavoidable. If you do not see or hearanychange,you
will feelit in yourself. It is the dowryof organiclifeforits mar-
riagewithculture. And it predetermines the universalityof time
on the cultural level. But it remains by and large open for
culturalelaborationand variation,preciselybecause it is a uni-
versalpredispositionfortemporalizingexperience.
This conceptualapproachoffersseveralimportantadvantages:
It beginsby makinga clear distinctionbetweenmovement,
process,or experienceof changeon theone hand,and thecultural
constitutionof time as a generalizeddimensionof meaningful
realityon the other.
Thus, chronologycan be conceivedas a standardizedscheme
of movementand of time. It fulfillsseveral functionsat once:
first,comparingand integratingmovementsthat are not simul-

17Cf. PitirimA. Sorokinand RobertK. Merton,"Social Time: A Methodological

and FunctionalAnalysis,"AmericanJournalof Sociology42 (1937):615-629;Pitirim
A. Sorokin,Sociocultural Space,Time (NewYork:Russell& Russell,1964),
Causality,
pp. 171*ff-;GeorgesGurvitch,The Spectrumof Social Time, translatedby Myrtle
Korenbaum(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel,1964),esp. pp. 20 ffon multipletimes.
136 SOCIAL RESEARCH
18
taneouslypresent; second, establishingrelationsbetween past
and futurein thedouble senseoffixedand unchangeabledistances
and movementof chronologicalunits (dates, not events!) from
futureto past;and third,linkingtheexperienceofchangein daily
lifeto the relationalstructureof time. These multiplefunctions
are interconnected by the use of one standardizedmovementfor
creating distance between dates. Not time,as Aristotlewould
have it,but chronologymakesdistance. It servesas an evolution-
ary universalwhich combinesverysimple rules for its use with
highlycomplex functions - like money.
We shouldavoid,then,anyconfusionofchronology and time.
The approachthatI would like to proposearticulatesthe temporal
dimensionas the relationbetweenpastand future. Thereby,the
currentconceptionsof pastand futurecome to be regardedas the
decisivefactorsin the constitutionof time. Complexity-in-time,
forexample,correlateswiththe possibledivergenceof past states
and futurestates. Increasingcomplexity-in-time will, then,have
its impact on the prevailinginterpretations of past and of fu-
ture. The historyof thefuture,outlinedin the beginningof this
paper, illustratesthis point.
The relationof pastand futurewill not have the same form
in everysociety. We can suppose that thereare correlationsbe-
tweenthisrelationand othervariablesof the societalsystem. We
mayformulatethehypothesis thatincreasingsystemdifferentiation
correlateswith increasingdissociationof past and future. High
discontinuity may,on theotherhand,shortenthe timeperspective
in the sense that a more distantpast and a more distantfuture
become irrelevant. There is some empiricalevidenceto support
thisproposition19- much to the surpriseof studentsto whom the

is The primaryfunctionof primitivetime-reckoningseems to be the integration

of recurrentecological changes and social normsregulatingbehavior. Cf. Daniel M.
Maltz, "Primitive Time-Reckoning as a Symbolic System,"Cornell Journal of Social
Relations 3 (1968): 85-112.
io Cf. Lucien Bernot and Ren Blancard, Nouville: Un village franais (Paris:
Institut d'ethnologie, 1953), pp. 321-332; Johan Galtung, "Images of the World in
the Year 2000: A Synthesisof the Marginals of the Ten Nations Study," 7th World
 TEMPORAL STRUCTURES 137

growing importance of timein modernsocietymeanssimplyan

extension in
of time thechronological sense.
This bringsus back to mycentralthesisand suggeststhe
formulation oftime(in fact,I wouldmaintain:
thattherelevance
relevanceas such)dependsuponthecapacityto mediaterelations
betweenpastand futurein a present.20All temporalstructures
a
relateto present. The of
endurance the presenthad to be
shaken,as we haveseen,beforemodernsocietycouldreconstruct
its own temporality.

The Futureas TemporalHorizon

Time itselfand itsconceptualization are changedbythemech-

anismsofsociocultural evolution.This facthasconsequences for
thewaywe see and conceptualize our future.Sociological analy-
finds
sis,therefore, itself a
facing problem that has twosides:Its
conceptof futureshouldbe reasonablyadequate forscientific
procedures and it shouldbe adequatein respectto its own his-
toricalsituation.Bothconditions of adequacydefinediverging
requirements,particularly forour ownverylateand highlycom-
plex society.
To workoutthecomplexities ofthisproblemitwillbe usefulto
distinguishthreedifferent of
ways conceptualizing thefuture:the
chronologicalconception, thetheoryof modalities, and phenom-
enologicalanalysis.
The chronological conceptionpresupposes identityand con-
tinuityoftimeandknowsofonlyone principle ofdifferentiation:

Congress of Sociology,Varna, 1970 (Ms.); Margaret J. Zube, "Changing Concepts of

Morality 1948-1969," Social Forces 50 (1972): 385-393.
20This does not mean that the present can be explained
by its function. There
is always the primordial fact of a specious present mediating time and reality. We
have, therefore,following George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Present
(Chicago: Open Court, 1932), p. 88, to distinguish functional presents and the
specious present. A present without function (i.e., without context) is by that fact
reduced to a specious present.
138 SOCIAL RESEARCH

dates. The futureis the seriesof dateswhichwill come afterthe

present. This chronologicalconceptionsuggeststhat the future
will begin where the presentends. A thoroughanalysisshows,
however,thatwe cannot thinkof two immediatelyconnectedin-
stantsof timewithoutthinkingan intervalseparatingthem.21 Al-
readymedievalauthorsconcludedthatbeginningand endingcan-
not be, exceptas a propertyof the instantaneouspresent.22We
know,furthermore, fromculturalcomparisonas well as fromem-
piricalinvestigationsthatin dailylifewe experiencetimeas rather
discontinuous,that futureis disconnectedfromthe presentand
thatonly a fewsocietiesand in thosesocietiesonly a fractionof
theirmembersfeelobliged to glossover thesediscontinuities and
to level themout by a kind of mathematicalcalculation.23
The theoryof modalitieshas been used since the Middle Ages
to formulatea two-levelconceptionof reality,reflecting different
modesin whichbeingand nonbeingcan presentthemselves.The
temporalmodesare: past,present,and future. They are distinct
modes,ofcourse,but thereis again a kindof idealizingand equal-
izingat work. It is presupposedthat thesethreemodes of time,
at least as modes,are on an equal footing. This may be due to
linguisticrequirements.We have the choice betweenthesethree
tenses. Whereaschronology dependson mathematical calculation,
the theoryof modalitiesdependson language.Its prototypeseems
to be: speakingabout something. However,in our historicalsit-
uation- at the "presenttime"!- it may be required not only to
question the "galilean" idealizations24but also the linguistic
schemeswhichwe use and on whichwe continueto depend. The
theoryof temporalmodalitiesleaves as open and undecidablethe
21Aristotle, Bookvi,236a.
Physics,
22See the chapterDe incipitet desinitof the Regule SolvendiSophismataof
WilliamHeytesbury (14thcentury)as presentedby CurtisWilson,WilliamHeytes-
bury:MedievalLogicand theRise ofMathematical Physics(Madison:Universityof
WisconsinPress,1956),pp. 29 ff.
23Cf. Sorokinand Merton,"Social Time"; Cottleand Klineberg,The Presentof
ThingsFuture,pp. 108 ff.
2*Ut.EdmundHusserl,Ute Knsis aer europaiscnenwissenscnajien una aie trans-
zendentalePhilosophie,in Husserliana,Vol. IV (Den Haag: Nijhoff,1954).
 TEMPORAL STRUCTURES 139

questionwhetherthe beginningshouldbe conceivedof as remotio

of the past and positioof the presentor as remotioof the present
and positio of the future.25And the main question would be
whetherthe treatment of the presentas one of the modesof time
is adequate.26
The theoryof modalitiesseemsto offera rationalmodel forthe
factthatmeaningis alwayssomethingwhichpreservesits identity
by referringinto horizonsof furtherexplorationand modifica-
tion.27 If thisis true,we shallhave to use phenomenologicalanaly-
sis to findour wayback to theoriginsof time. This meansto con-
ceive of futureas well as of past as time horizonsof the present.
The present,then,gets a special statusby its functionof inte-
gratingtimeand realityand of representing a setofconstraints
for
temporalintegrationof futureand past.
Now, this conceptualredispositionmakes it necessaryto state
moreclearlywhatit meansto conceiveof the futureas a temporal
horizonof the present. The most importantconsequenceis sig-

25 See again William Heytesburyin Wilson, William Heytesbury.

26There are close parallels to the difficulties
Kant ran into by equalizing the three
(!) modalities of necessity,possibility,and actuality (substitutingthis for the tradi-
tional pairs of necessariumI contingensand possibile impossibile) as differentmodes
of cognition. The problem consistsin the differentiation of completelyconditioned
possibility and actuality. Cf. Ingetrud Pape, Tradition und Transformationder
Modalitt (Hamburg: Meiner, 1966), 1: 224 ff. See also Nicolai Hartmann, Mglich-
keit und Wirklichkeit,2nd ed. (Meisenheim am Gian: WestkulturverlagA. Hain,
1949), esp. pp. 223 ff. Kant felt unable to think of the possible as becoming actual
by the addition of something,because the addition would then be somethingwhich
is not possible (Kritik der reinen VernunftB. pp. 283 ff). For the same reasons we
feel unable to think of the future as beginning to become a present.
27For the notion of horizon, see Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phnom-
enologie und PhnomenologischenPhilosophia, Vol. I, in Husserliana Vol. III (Den
Haag: Nijhoff,1950), pp. 48 ff,100 ff,199 ff;Erfahrungund Urteil: Untersuchungen
zur Genealogie der Logik (Hamburg: Ciaassen & Goverts, 1948); Erste
Philosophie,
Vol. II, in Husserliana, Vol. VIII (Den Haag: Nijhoff,1959), pp. 146 ff;Analysen zur
passiven Synthesis,in Husserliana, Vol. XI (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 3 ff.
George Herbert Mead hits upon this metaphor without mentioning Husserl; cf.
Mead, The Philosophy of the Present,p. 26: "There is nothing transcendentabout
this powerlessnessof our minds to exhaust any situation. Any advance which makes
toward greaterknowledge simplyextends the horizon of experience,but all remains
within conceivable experience."
140 SOCIAL RESEARCH

naled by the titleof thispaper :The futurecannotbegin. Indeed,

theessentialcharacteristic ofan horizonis thatwe can nevertouch
it,nevergetat it,neversurpassit,but thatin spiteof that,it con-
tributesto the definitionof the situation.Anymovementand any
operationof thoughtonlyshiftsthe guidinghorizonbut neverat-
tains it.
If we characterizeprocessesor activitiesas beginningor end-
ing,we use a terminology whichbelongsto the present. If we use
theseexpressions toreferto distantdates- forexample: theRoman
Empire began to fall- we referto a past presentor to a future
present.This iterativeuse of temporalmodalitieswhichgoes back
at least to Augustineis necessaryfora theoryof time thatdiffer-
entiatestimeand chronology. But this is not enough. We can,
in addition,formulatea distinctionbetweenfuturepresentsand
thepresentfuture;and we can speak,ifnecessary, about thefuture
offuturepresents, thefutureof pastpresents(modo futuriexact),
and so on.28 This iterativeuse of modal formshas alwaysbeen a
29
problemforthetheoryofmodalities; forexample: whynot "the
futureof futures"like "the heaven of heavens" (coelum coeli)}
Only phenomenological analysiscan justifythe selectionof mean-
ingfulcombinationsof modal forms. It showsthatall iteration
of temporalformshas to have its base in a present.30
If we accept this distinctionof the presentfutureand future
presents, we can definean open futureas presentfuturewhichhas
roomforseveralmutuallyexclusivefuturepresents. Open future
is, of course,onlya vague metaphor. In a sense,the opennessof
the futurewas a topic of logical and theologicaldiscussionssince
Aristotle'sfamouschapterix peri hermeneias.*1But it has been
28For further see NiklasLuhmann,"Weltzeitund Systemgeschichte,
elaboration,
in his Soziologische Aufklrung (Opladen,1975),2: 150-169.
29See onlyAlexisMeinong,ber Mglichkeitund Wahrscheinlichkeit: Beitrge
zur Gegenstandstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie (Leipzig:Barth,1915).
soThis is, of course,the mainidea of GeorgeHerbertMead. Mead himselfuses
the formulation "past pasts"in the senseof pastsof past presents.Cf. Mead, The
Philosophyof the Present,p. 7.
si For the medievaldiscussionde futuriscontingentibus and its importancefor
churchpolicy,see Thomas Aquinas,In I. Peri Hermeneiaslect. xm, xiv; Qua-
 TEMPORAL STRUCTURES 141

discussedwithrespectto the limitsof logic and human cognition

- and not as the technique of
in its applicationto futureevents
defuturizing thefutureby the binarycode of logic.
Whereastheancientsstartedwithgeneralizations of theirevery-
day world by means of cosmological and theologicalassumptions
and thoughtnotof"the" futurebut ofcomingeventsand thepossi-
bilityof theirprivativenegation,32 we experienceour futureas a
generalizedhorizonof surpluspossibilitiesthathave to be reduced
as we approachthem. We can thinkof degreesof opennessand
call futurizationincreasingand defuturizationdecreasing the
openness of a presentfuture. Defuturizationmay lead to the
limitingconditionwhere the presentfuturemergeswith the fu-
turepresentsand onlyone futureis possible. Actually,the struc-
ture of our societypreventsdefuturizationfromgoing this far.
But thereare techniquesof defuturization whichreactexactlyto
this condition. Leon Brunschvicghas drawn our attentionto
the factthat the statisticcalculus defuturizesthe futurewithout
identifying it with only one chain of events.33And indeed, the
new interestin chance,gamesof hazard,and statisticscomingup
in the seventeenthand eighteenthcenturiescorrespondsclosely
to an emerginginterestin the futureand to the idea thatit may
be a rationaland even a securestrategy to preferthe insecureover
the secure.84 There are waysto make use of the futurewithout
beginningit and withoutreducingit to one chainofdatable future
presents.

estionesdisputatele
de Vertateq. II, art. 12; Summa Theologiaei q. 14 art. 13;
WilliamOckham,Tractatusde praedestinatione et de praescientia
Dei et de futuris
contingentibus,edited by PhilotheusBoehner(St. BonaventuraN.Y.: Franciscan
St. Bonaventure
Institute, College,1945);Leon Baudry,ed., La Querelledes futurs
contingents(Louvain 1465-1475)(Paris: J. Vrin,1950).
82Cf. Paulus Engelhardt,"Der Menschund seine Zukunft:Zur Fragenach dem
Menschenbei Thomas von Aquin," in Festchrift fr Max Mller (Freiburg-
Mnchen,1966),pp. 352-374.
s Leon Brunschvicg,L'expriencehumaineet la causalitphysique(Paris:Alean,
1949),p. 355.
84Cf. ErnestCoumet,"La Thoriedu Hasardest-ellene par Hasard?,"Annales:
Economies,Socits,Civilisations
25 (1970): 574-598,
142 SOCIAL RESEARCH

Temporal IntegrationRedefined: Technologyand

Utopian Schemes

By now,we are advancedfarenoughto redefinethe problemof

temporalintegration. One possibleinterpretation would be that
temporalintegration is achievedbychangingwishfulthinkingand
fancifulperspectivesinto morerealisticones,adaptingto the out-
comeofthepastso faras it has structured thepresent.35This view
evaluatesrealismas maturity.But whyso? If lower-class children
abandon certain educational and occupational aspirations,this
maybe so much the betterforthem. It would be rational,how-
ever,onlyinsofaras realityitselfis rational. To identifytemporal
integrationwithrealisticorientationpresupposesa perfectworld
- realitassiveperfectio.This is a well knowntraditionalpremise,
but it does not differentiatetime and realityfar enough to use
-
temporalintegrationas a means to control not necessarilyto
change- reality.
There have been societieswhichhad to use realityas rationality
control. Our society,however,has to use rationalityas reality
control. Its structureand its environmentare too complex for
adaptiveprocedures,86 and thereis not enough timeavailable for
adjustment. Under the conditionof high complexity,time be-
comes scarce. Time has to be substitutedforrealityas the pre-
dominantdimensionwhile futureobtrudesitselfas the predom-
inanthorizon. Such a societywill need formsand proceduresof
temporalintegration which,above all, combinethe presentfuture
and futurepresentsand considerthe past only as the set of facts
whichwe are no longerable to preventfromexistingor becoming.
The prevailingconceptionof the presentfutureseemsto be a
8T
Utopianone withan optimisticor a pessimisticovertone. The
85See,forexample,Cottleand Klineberg, The Presentof ThingsFuture,pp. 70 ff.
and FredE. Emery,On Purposefulsystems(Londonana L,m-
se RsselL. Ackoff
cago:Aldine,1972),esp. pp. 30 ff,pursuea similarintentionby distinguishinggoal-
seekingand purposefulsystems.
87In one importantsensethe reference to "utopias"is misleadingnere Decause
the
originally literary device of a utopia was inventedjust becausecriticswerenet
 TEMPORAL STRUCTURES 143

futureservesas a projection screenforhopesand fears. Its Uto-

pian formulation warrants rationalbehaviortowarddifferent
(predictableand unpredictable) futurepresents, at least in the
formofcoherent negation.The future is expectedtobringabout
the communist society or the ecologicaldisaster,emancipation
fromdomination or l'hommeintegralediscussedby Sartreand
Merleau-Ponty.38 This is the futurethatcannotbegin. It re-
mainsa presentfutureand at leastan infalliblesignof thepres-
enceofcritics. It movesawayifwe tryto approachit. It doesnot
vanish,however, as longas thestructural conditions ofthepresent
societyendure,butitmayresettle withnewsymbols andmeanings,
iftheold onesare wornout bydisappointments and newexperi-
ences. Our recentexperiences seemto showthattheseUtopian
futuresspeedup their change maychangeso quicklythatthey
and
neverwillhavea chanceto be testedand to getconfirmation in a
present.
Technologies, on theotherhand,orientthemselves to future
presents.Theytransform themintoa stringof anticipated pres-
ents. Theypostulate and anticipate causalor stochastic linksbe-
tweenfuture eventsin orderto incorporate themintothepresent
present.This implies two important reductions of complexity.
The firsttransforms thecharacter of eventswhichare emerging
recombinations of independent contingencies intoa carrierfunc-
tionoftheprocessofdetermination. The secondbringsintore-
liefa sequentialpattern, a chainof interconnected events;it se-
quentializes complexity by abstracting more or less frominter-
feringprocesses.39 A futuredefuturized by technology can be

able to use thefutureof theirown societyas projectionscreen. The turningpoint

can be datedexactly:in 1768Mercierbeganto writehis l'An deux millequatrecent
quarante.
38A comprehensive of such imaginary
presentation approachesto futureis Fred
L. Polak,The Image of theFuture,2 vols. (New York:Oceana Publications, 1961).
However,it doesnotpayenoughattentionto thehistorical of timeitself.
variability
Cf. also WendellBell and JamesA. Mau, "Imagesof the Future:Theoryand Re-
search Strategies,"in Bell and Mau, eds., The Sociology of the Future: Theory, Cases,
and AnnotatedBibliography(New York:RussellSage Foundation,1971),pp. 6-44.
s A harshcriticism
of thetechnocratic of timehas been formulated
conception by
144 SOCIAL RESEARCH

used as a feignedpresentfromwhichwe chooseour presentpresent

to make it a possible past for futurepresents. To justifythe
choice and, more important,to justifythis whole procedureof
technicaldefuturizationwe use values. Values, then, have the
functionof guaranteeingthe qualityof presentchoice in spite of
technicaldefuturization. Any refinement, however,of techno-
logical forecasting and controlwill make future presentsso much
moresurprising, becauseit multipliesdefeasibleassumptionsabout
the presentfuture. It requires,therefore, in its present,corre-
spondingmechanismsof copingwithsurprise:learningpotential,
planned redundancies,and the generalizedability to substitute
functionalequivalents.
Technologyand Utopianschemesare, of course,verydifferent
approachesto the future. Their difference suggestsoptions and
polemical behavior. Many ideological discussionsand political
confrontations of our day draw theirresourcesfromthis bifurca-
tion. If you embarkon the vessel named Utopia, you will be-
come highlycriticalin respectto technology, and rightlyso, even
if you are preparedto use technologyto get your vessel offthe
shores. If, on the otherhand,you set out to improvetechnology
you mayget annoyed,and again rightlyso, with people who use
the futureas a substituteforrealityand interfere withyourwork
withoutcontributingto it. Each side tries to totalize its own
perspective on thefutureand suppresstheother.40But thetotality

Herbert G. Reid, "The Politics of Time: ConflictingPhilosophical Perspectivesand

Trends," The Human Context 4 (1972): 456-483; "American Social Science in the
Politics of Time and the Crisis of Technocorporate Society: Toward a Critical Phe-
nomenology,"Politics and Society 3 (1973): 207-243.
40This is, of course,what Habermas has in mind when he unveils the use of tech-
nology and systemstheoryas ideology. Cf. JrgenHabermas, Technik und Wissen-
schaft als "Ideologie" (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968); Jrgen Habermas and Niklas
Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaftoder Sozialtechnologie- Was leistet die System-
forschung?(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971). See also Robert Boguslaw, The New
Utopians: A Study of System Design and Social Change (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1965); Joseph Bensman and Robert Lilienfeld, Craft and Con-
sciousness: Occupational Technique and the Development of World Images (New
York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 282 if; Robert Lilienfeld, "SystemsTheory as an Ideology,"
Social Research 42 (Winter 1975): 637-660.
 TEMPORAL STRUCTURES 145

is the differenceitself:the difference of the presentfutureand

futurepresents. This differenceitselfis a historicalfact,pro-
duced and reproducedby thestructureof our society. We cannot
avoid it or circumventit as long as we continue to live in this
highlycomplexsociety. But thisdoes not mean thatwe have to
pursue these pointlesspolemics.
Still, criticaldiscussionand polemics have the importantad-
vantageof being presentbehavior. Any attemptto replace them
by posing the problemof temporalintegrationwould defer the
solutionof thisprobleminto the futureand would, thereby,slide
offinto eitherUtopianor technicalchannels. Again, the prob-
lem of temporalintegration,too, would become eithera Utopian
or a technicalproblemand, thus,perpetuateitself.
An open and indeterminate futureseemsto suggesta shiftfrom
cognition to action, as Marx would have it, or today frompre-
dictingto creatingthe future.41This sounds like: If you can-
not see, you have to act! But both,predictionand action,have
theirUtopianand their technicalaspects. Substitutingthe one
forthe otherdoes not solve the problemof temporalintegration.
The complexsocietyof our day has to use bothwaysforreducing
the complexityof its future;it has ratherto sequentializepredic-
tionsand actionsinto complexself-referential patterns. There is
no problemof choice between predictionand action, but there
maybe a problemof social and structurallimitationsforthe com-
binationof predictionsand actions.

Social Communicationas a NontemporalExtensionof Time

It should be clear by now thatwe can expect temporalintegra-

tionand, forthatmatter,integrationof Utopianschemesand tech-
nologyonly as a presentperformance.Therefore,older societies
which thoughtof themselvesas living in an enduringor even
4i So Bettina J. Huber, "Some
Thoughts on Creating the Future," Sociological In-
quiry 44 (1974): 29-39.
146 SOCIAL RESEARCH

eternalpresentdid not experienceour problem. Only in modern

times,and only by shorteningthe time span of the present,does
theproblemof perseverance, or conservation and
get itsactuality,42
only then do Utopian schemes and technologydiverge. By re-
structuringtime in the last 200 years,the presenthas become
specializedin the functionof temporalintegration;however,it
does not have enough time to do thisjob.
It is at this point that we can grasp the importanceof the
theoreticalcontributionsof George Herbert Mead43 and Alfred
Schutz44concerningthe interrelationsbetween temporal and
social experience. Both authorswereawareof the factthatsocial
communicationdefinesthepresentforthe actors(because it com-
mits the actorsto the premiseof simultaneity)and providesin
additionthe chancefora nontemporalextensionof time. "The
fieldof mind,"in the wordsof Mead, "is the temporalextension
of the environment of the organism/'and the mechanismswhich
accomplishthisare social ones.45 But then,the environmentof
systems can be also used as a nontemporalextensionof time.
Otherpersonsare sociallyrelevantonlyinsofaras theypresent,
in communication, different pastsand/ordifferent futures. They
transform in a highlyselectiveway distanttemporalrelevances
into presentsocial ones. And it is thisselectivitythatcan be sub-
-
mittedto social control forexample,by the twinmechanismsof
trustand distrust.46This nontemporalextensionof timeby com-
municationconstitutestimehorizonsforselectivebehavior- that
is, a past thatcan neverbe reproducedbecause it is too complex
and a futurethatcannotbegin. And it is again thistemporalcom-

Cf. Hans Blumenberg, Selbsterhaltungund Beharrung: Zur Konstitution der

neuzeitlichenRationalitt (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaftenund der
Literature in Mainz, Wiesbaden, 1970).
43Mead, The Philosophy of the Present.
44See above all Alfred Schutz, Der sinnhafteAufbau der sozialen Welt (Vienna:
J. Springer,1932).
48Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, p. 25.
46For a more extensive treatment,see Niklas Luhmann, Vertrauen: Ein Mech-
anismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexitt,2nd ed. (Stuttgart:F. Enke, 1973).
 TEMPORAL STRUCTURES 147

plexitythat makes selectivitynecessaryfor meaningfulbehavior

and communication.
These considerations bringus back to the rootsof evolutionary
interdependencies betweensocial and temporalstructures.Since
thiscan be regardedas achieved knowledge,we cannot affordto
fallbackon muchsimplernotionsof thefutureas mostsocial fore-
castingdoes. The conceptionof interdependency, however,is in
itselftoo vague and indeterminateto serve as a frameworkfor
furtheranalysis. Neither Mead nor Schutz had adequate suc-
cessors. The next step,indeed,is a difficult one. It requiresthe
conceptualizationof limitationsand of gains that mightresult
fromnovel combinations.
In view of the factsour societyhas produced in its bourgeois
phasewe should be able to calculate the limitsof the meaningful
extensionof time; we should know the social correlatesof a high
differentiation of temporalhorizons;we should be able to antici-
pate change in temporalstructuresas a consequence of social
a
change- forexample,as a consequenceof an eventualdecline of
themonetarymechanism;we shouldbe able to estimatethedegree
ofheterogeneity of temporalstructureswe can toleratein different
subsystemsof our society;we should know how the shrinking
temporalhorizonsof familiesaffectthe economy,and how we can
avoid thewell knownnegativeimpactwhichthe timeperspectives
of a growingeconomyhave on the politicalsystem;47and, last but
not least,we shouldknowwhatis impliedifwe relyon clocksand
datesto integratethedifferent timeperspectives ofdifferent
sectors
of the societyand what dysfunctional consequences we have to
expectif we use chronologyto fulfillthisimportantfunction.
It is sure thatwe cannot reduce this set of complex questions,
involvingthe future,to a single one: how to begin the future.
It is difficultto see how we could proceed in elaboratingthese
questionsor even answeringthem. Systemstheoryseems to be
the only conceptual frameworkwhich has sufficient complexity.
47For a classical statement,see Alexis de Tocqueville, L'Ancien rgime et la rvolu-
tion, 5th d. (Paris, 1866).
148 SOCIAL RESEARCH

So far,however,systems theoryhas used onlyverysimple,chrono-

logicalnotions of time and future,conceivingof the futuresimply
as thestateofthesystemat a latertime.48Only environment, but
not time,is recognizedas a set of possible restraintson system
states. Abstracting fromtime is, of course,quite legitimateas a
scientificprocedure;but thenwe mustrefrainfromusing tempo-
ral notionsin presentingthe results.
In comparisonwith the conceptualelaborationof problemsof
time,systems theoryis muchmoreadvancedin itsconceptualcom-
plexity. It is the theoryof time that is laggingbehind,not the
theoryof systems.Not only social sciencebut also the theoryof
historysuffers fromthisdeficiency.If the theoryof time could
be advanced,theremightappear highlysuggestivepossibilitiesof
researchin correlationsbetweensystemstructuresand temporal
structures.
The theoryof time has to transform its vague idea of "every-
thingis possiblein the long run," based on a chronologicalcon-
ceptionof time,intoa conceptof temporalstructures withlimited
possibilitiesof change. It is a prerequisiteof correlationsthat
both variablesare reduced contingenciesin the sense that they
cannotassumeany shape whatever. We have, therefore, to look
fortime-inherent of possiblecorrelations(substituting
restrictions
thisforolder notionsof the substanceor essenceof time) before
we set out to establishcorrelationsbetweensystemstructures and
temporalstructures.These time-inherent restrictions
are, never-
theless,resultsof socioculturalevolution and not a priori as-
sumptionsabout the natureof the world or conditionsof cogni-
tion.
If we conceive of time as the relation between (more or less
differentiated) temporalhorizonsand if we use a conceptuallan-
guage thatallows for iterativemodalizations(presentfuture,fu-
turepresents,futureof pastpresents, etc.) and definethe function
of the presentand the functionof chronologyin theseterms,we
See as a rather typical example Ervin Laszlo, A Strategyfor the Future: The
SystemsApproach to World Order (New York: Braziller,1974).
 TEMPORAL STRUCTURES 149

mayhave a sufficient base to startthis kind of research. But we

have to remainaware of the factthata commitmentto thesecon-
ceptualizationsis a commitmentto "modern times." Older so-
cietiesdid not produce such an elaboratedframework, and they
did not need it to understandthemselves. They lived, forstruc-
turalreasonswe maybe able to explain,withina lessdifferentiated
time.

The Future of Systems

Social systemsare nontemporalextensionsof time. They make

the timehorizonsof otheractorsavailable withinone contempo-
rarypresent. This requiresforsocial systems a double relationto
time: a sequentialone conceivableas processor as action in terms
of meansand ends,and a structuralone conceivableas the differ-
ence betweensystemand environment.With respectto time,the
difference of systemand environmentmeans thatno complexsys-
temcan relyexclusivelyon point-to-point relationsto its environ-
-
ment thatis, on instantaneousadjustmentby immediateexperi-
ence and immediatereaction.49It needs time forits own opera-
tions. This presupposesthatunder normalconditionsno single
eventwill changethewhole systemat once. Changingeverything
at once amountsto destruction. In otherwords:There is no con-
ceivable state of a complex systemwhich could be achieved by
changingeverything at once. The structuraltechniqueby which
a systemavoids this conditionof changingeverything at once is
differentiation- or more exactly:a matchingof internaland ex-
ternaldifferentiation.50 It is onlyat thisrathertaxingtheoretical
of
level the relationbetweenthe relationsof system /environment
Cf. Talcott Parsons, "Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology," in
John
C. McKinney and Edward A. Tiryakian, eds., Theoretical Sociology: Perspectivesand
Developments (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 27-68.
o Cf. W. Ross Ashby,Design for a Brain (New York:
Wiley, 1952). Cf. also Uriel
G. Foa, Terence R. Mitchell, and Fred E. Fiedler, "DifferentiationMatching," Be-
havioral Science 16 (1971): 130-142.
150 SOCIAL RESEARCH

and structure /processthat we are able to locate our problem.

Systems,then,in relationto theirenvironment, depend fortem-
poral reasonson a differentiation of structureand process. The
time perspectiveof modernsociety,on the other hand, projects
the difference of the presentfutureand futurepresents. Both
distinctions,workedout in verydifferent intellectualtraditions,
seem to converge. If thisis true,we can bringtogethersystems
theoryand phenomenologicalresearch.
In fact,the processof continuingcommunicationin social sys-
temsunder the conditionof contemporaneity is the prospectof
sequentialsocial presentsthatwill constitute forever new futures
and new pasts. They are and will remainpresentsbecause they
requirea simultaneousintegrationof the perspectives of different
actors. Structure,on the otherhand, establishesforour society
an open futurein the sense thatit providesforthe selectivityof
futurepresents.
Statedin more concreteterms,structuremakes it possibleand
even necessaryto postponechoicesand to use the presentfuture
as a kindofstorehousefordecisionsto be made later. At thesame
time,the presentsystemoperateson the premiseof continuingits
processes. As a systemit reproducesitspresentstepby step. This
sequentializingof presents, however,is meaningfulonlyas a chain
of choices,not as a chain facts. The processof communication
of
has its effectin producingand reproducingchoice situations.
Going further, we have to breakup thisgeneralnotionof post-
ponementof choicesand have to distinguishtwo essentiallydiffer-
ent forms:(1) deferment and (2) defermentof ne-
of gratification
gation. Both have theirfunctionaland institutionalcorrelates.
Defermentofgratification is a main prerequisiteforthe economic
systemas a condition capital investment.Defermentof nega-
for
tionis a main prerequisiteof the politicalsystemas a conditionof
trustin politicalpower. Both requireinstitutionalsupport,both
require a presentfuturefor theirpresentmotivation. Both re-
quire a workingintegrationof Utopianschemesand technology
 TEMPORAL STRUCTURES 151

and a kind of securitybase for trust.51Both would not survive

a considerableshrinkageof time horizons. Both may be endan-
geredby too higha fluctuationrate of Utopianschemesand tech-
nologicalinnovations. And, last but not least,do we not take too
much forgrantedthatit is and will remain possible,in spite of
changingstructuralconditions,to separatedefermentof gratifica-
tionand deferment of negationand to avoid spill-overeffects?Or
will a refusalto defergratifications any longer amount to a re-
fusal to defernegations;and finally,will the shrinkingof time
horizonsin the economyendangertrustin politics,politicalideol-
ogies,value schemes,etc?
All of these questions pertain to what we have come to call
brgerlicheGesellschaftand relate to the continuityor discon-
tinuityof its structuresunder changingconditions. The brger-
liche Gesellschafthas been a revolutionarysocietywith a strong
structuralemphasison time and correspondingsimplifications of
social and environmentalrelations.The principleof its future
was simplythe denial of its past52by the antistructural postulate
of equality.53The self-conception of thissocietyin its bourgeois
variantdid rely heavilyon time-usingand time-bindingmecha-
nismslike moneyand legal procedure. By now, we are aware of

Bi For the functionof securitybases in relation to generalized media of communi-

cation, see Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Power" and "On the Concept of
Influence," in his Sociological Theory and Modern Society (New York: Free Press,
1967), pp. 297-354, 355-382. Furthermore,Niklas Luhmatin, "Symbiotische Mech-
anismen," in Otthein Rammstedt, ed., Gewaltverhltnisseund die Ohnmacht der
Kritik (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1974),pp. 107-131.
52Cf. Joachim Ritter, Hegel und die franzsische Revolution
(Kln: West-
deutscher Verlag, 1957).
63A well known statement is Antoine de Condorcet,
Esquisse d'un tableau his-
torique des progrs de l'esprit humain (1794). For the continuing impact of this
idea and for empirical correlations between future orientation and emphasis on
equality, see James A. Mau, Social Change and Images of the Future: A Study of
the Pursuit of Progress in Jamaica (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1968). Since equality
implies freedom and freedom implies inequality, the postulate of equality cannot
referto reality,but only to time. Its only functionis to deny the relevance of the
past- e.g., the relevance of biographies and ascribed status for the access to educa-
tion (equality of opportunity)or to political elections.
152 SOCIAL RESEARCH

highlycomplex operatingconditionsand of the narrow limits

of effectivenessthesemechanismsare subject to. In its Marxist
or dialecticalvariant,thetheoryof societyhas to build its concept
of futureon negationsof the present;but there is much more
to negatein our presentsocietythan dialecticianscould ever use
for constructingor even bringingabout one and only one de-
sirable future:They have to focuson one centralproblem,thus
overstating and to discountcomplexityin orderto
centralization,
a
design strictly linear theorywhichcan be used to reconstruct or
even to change the "processof history."
There are manyreasons,then,to suspectthat the brgerliche
Gesellschaftwent veryfar in temporalizingrealityand that the
twinconceptionsof bourgeoisand Marxisttheorywere based on
thiscommonpresupposition.This does not decide the question
whetherthisis a temporary of the period
distortioncharacteristic
of transitioninto a new type of world society,or whetherthis
reflectslastingprerequisitesof highlycomplexsocietiesand/oran
accelerationof the evolutionaryprocesswithoutparallelsin pre-
vious history.We are certainlynot preparedto decide thisques-
tion withoutfurtherresearchon the conceptualas well as on the
empiricallevel. But we have the intellectualresourcesto go be-
yond the boring controversiesof Marxist versus bourgeois or
Utopianversustechnocratictheory,and the startingpositionsare
available forworkingout a systemstheoryof societywhichrecog-
nizesthefactthatthe futurecannotbeginand whichcompensates
by thehighercomplexityof itsconceptionof timeforwhatmight
appear as a loss of future.

#I am indebtedto S. Holmes,S. Seidman,and A. Vidichforcomments

on an
J.
earlierdraftof thispaper.