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[G.R. No. 116018.

November 13, 1996]

NELIA A. CONSTANTINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,


AURORA S. ROQUE, PRISCILLA S. LUNA and JOSEFINA S.
AUSTRIA, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at


Balagtas, Bulacan. Among her heirs are respondents Aurora S. Roque,
Priscilla S. Luna and Josefina S. Austria. Sometime in 1984, the heirs of
Josefa Torres, as vendors, and petitioner Nelia A. Constantino, as vendee,
entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land with a total land area of two
hundred and fifty (250) square meters. The lot, owned in common by the
Torres heirs, is being occupied by petitioners mother and sister. An adjoining
lot, also co-owned by the heirs, is being occupied by spouses Severino and
Consuelo Lim. Pursuant to their agreement, the heirs authorized petitioner to
prepare the necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale.
After having the document drafted - with several spaces left blank
including the specification as to the metes and bounds of the land - petitioner
asked the heirs to affix their signatures on the document. The heirs signed the
document with the understanding that respondent Aurora S. Roque, one of
the heirs, would be present when the latter would seek permission from the
Bureau of Lands and have the land surveyed.
However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property
was subsequently surveyed, subdivided and then covered by TCT Nos. T-
292265 and T-292266. Petitioner did not furnish the heirs with copies of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale nor of the subdivision
plan and the certificates of title. Upon securing a copy of the deed from the
Registry of Deeds, the respondents learned that the area of the property
purportedly sold to petitioner was much bigger than that agreed upon by the
parties. It already included the portion being occupied by the spouses
Severino and Consuelo Lim.
On 2 June 1986, private respondents sent a letter to petitioner demanding
the surrender to them of the deed of settlement and conveyance, the
subdivision plan and the certificates of title; but to no avail. On 25 June
1986 respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan an action for
annulment of the deed and cancellation of the certificates of title, with prayer
for recovery of damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.[1]

Petitioner controverted the allegations of respondents by presenting the


Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale dated 10 October
1984 wherein respondents agreed to divide and adjudicate among themselves
the inherited property with an area of one thousand five hundred and three
(1,503) square meters. In the same document, they caused the subdivision of
the property into two (2) lots according to Plan No. PSD-03-009105 identified
as Lot 4-A with an area of one thousand ninety-six (1,096) square meters, and
Lot 4-B with an area of four hundred and seven (407) square meters, and
acknowledged the sale to petitioner of said Lot 4-B. As a consequence, on 18
March 1985, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-292265 in the name of
the heirs of Josefa Torres and TCT No. T-292266 in the name of petitioner.
In reply, private respondents reiterated that all the heirs signed the
document before the land was surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as
yet no definite area to be sold that could be indicated in the deed at the time
of the signing. They also claimed that they were not notified about the survey
and the subdivision of the lot and therefore they could not have agreed on the
area supposedly sold to petitioner. The respondent heirs insist that they could
not have agreed to the extent of the area actually reflected in the deed
because it included the portion being occupied by the Lim spouses, which was
already the subject of a previous agreement to sell between them and their
predecessor.
The trial court entertained serious doubts with respect to the preparation
and due execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale
taking into account that (a) while petitioner claimed that all the heirs signed
before the notary public and in her presence, she was not able to enumerate
all the signatories to the document; (b) while petitioner claimed that the
document was signed only after the survey of the land was completed, or on
10 October 1984, such fact was negated by her own witness who testified that
the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984; and, (c) while petitioner
alleged that the document was signed and notarized in Manila no explanation
was offered why the same could not have been signed and notarized in
Bulacan where notaries public abound which could have been less
inconvenient to the parties concerned. Additionally, the trial court relied
heavily on the assertions of respondents as reflected in their demand letter
that they did not give their consent to the sale of Lot 4-B.
Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court on 27
September 1990 ordered the annulment and cancellation of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-
292266 and Subdivision Plan No. PSD-03-009105. It also ordered petitioner
to pay private respondents P50,000.00 for moral damages, P15,000.00 for
attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit. [2]

On 16 March 1994 respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision of


the trial court, and on 20 June 1994 denied the motion to reconsider its
[3]

decision. [4]

Petitioner faults respondent Court of Appeals: (a) for disregarding


documentary evidence already presented, marked and identified on a purely
technical ground, and (b) for concluding that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale did not reflect the true intent of the parties.
Petitioner argues that the trial court should not have denied her motion to
admit formal offer of evidence merely on the basis of technicality such as late
filing, citing Siguenza v. Court of Appeals. We are not persuaded. Indeed, we
[5]

held in Siguenza that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense as they are used only to help secure, not override,
substantial justice. Yet the holding is inapplicable to the present case as the
trial court had a reasonable basis for denying petitioners motion -

On February 6, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, defendants counsel, manifested in


Court that he has (sic) no more witness to present. He asked that he be given 15 days
to make a formal offer of evidence and which the Court granted. At the scheduled
hearing of April 03, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado x x x x was not in Court. Atty.
Veneracion, plaintiffs counsel, called the attention of the Court that Atty. Mercado has
(sic) not yet filed and/or complied with the Court Order dated February 06, 1990,
which is to file his formal offer of evidence. On motion of Atty. Veneracion,
defendants right to file a formal offer of evidence was deemed waived. Atty.
Veneracion waived the presentation of rebuttal evidence considering that the
defendant can (sic) no longer make a formal offer of evidence.

On May 11, 1990, the Court was in receipt of a motion to admit formal offer of
exhibits filed by the defendant thru counsel, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, on May 02,
1990. Considering that the same was filed out of time and the plaintiffs having filed
their memorandum already, the motion to admit formal offer of exhibits was denied
(underscoring supplied).

The trial court was correct in holding that petitioner waived the right to
formally offer his evidence. A considerable lapse of time, about three (3)
months, had already passed before petitioners counsel made effort to formally
offer his evidence. For the trial court to grant petitioners motion to admit her
exhibits would be to condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with
a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the
speedy administration of justice.
Petitioner also insists that the real intent of the parties was to make the
entire Lot 4-B the subject matter of the sale. She claims that during cross-
examination respondent Aurora S. Roque admitted that she signed in behalf
of her co-heirs a receipt for P30,000.00 as partial payment for the lot occupied
by Ka Baring and Lina (relatives of petitioner) and Iling (Consuelo
Lim). Moreover, according to petitioner, the assertions of private respondents
to petitioner contained in the demand letter should not necessarily be true and
that the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale was
not affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the
subject matter thereof was situated, citing Sales v. Court of Appeals. [6]

These other arguments of petitioner are barren and futile. The admission
of respondent Roque cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence that
there was as yet no meeting of the minds on the land area to be sold since
private respondents were still awaiting the survey to be conducted on the
premises. Obviously, the trial court only lent credence to the assertions in the
demand letter after having weighed the respective evidence of the parties. But
even without the letter, the evidence of respondents had already amply
substantiated their claims.
We ruled in the Sales case that the extrinsic validity of a document was
not affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the
subject matter thereof was located. What is more important under the Notarial
Law is that the notary public has authority to acknowledge the document
executed within his territorial jurisdiction. The ruling in Sales is not applicable
to the present case. Our concern here is not whether the notary public had the
authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial
jurisdiction but whether respondents indeed appeared before him and signed
the deed. However, the quantum of evidence shows that they did not.
The trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized
in Manila when it could have been notarized in Bulacan. This additional detail
casts doubt on the procedural regularity in the preparation, execution and
signing of the deed. It is not easy to believe that petitioner and the ten (10)
Torres heirs traveled all the way to Manila to have their questioned document
notarized considering that they, with the exception of respondent Roque, are
residents of Balagtas, Bulacan, where notaries public are easy to find.
Consequently, the claim of private respondents that they did not sign the
document before a notary public is more plausible than petitioners feeble
claim to the contrary.
Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed
prior to the survey, or before determination of the area to be sold, worthy of
credit as against the contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey
or on 10 October 1984. As found by the trial court, such contention was
contradicted by petitioners own witness who positively asserted in court that
the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984 or six (6) days after the
signing. Quite obviously, when respondents affixed their signatures on the
deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be prepared left
several spaces blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of the
property to be sold. The heirs were persuaded to sign the document only upon
the assurance of petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant to their
understanding, would be present when the property would be surveyed after
obtaining permission from the Bureau of Lands. As it surfaced, the supposed
understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner to induce respondents to sign
the deed without which the latter would not have given their conformity
thereto. Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank
[7]

spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed and subdivided, and then
causing the issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge,
much less consent. Thus all the elements of fraud vitiating consent for
purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a) It was employed by a contracting
party upon the other; (b) It induced the other party to enter into the contract;
(c) It was serious; and, (d) It resulted in damages and injury to the party
seeking annulment. [8]

Perhaps, another compelling reason for the annulment of the document of


settlement and conveyance is that the second page thereof clearly manifests
that the number of the subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A
and 4-B were merely handwritten while all the rest of the statements therein
were typewritten, which leads us to the conclusion that handwritten figures
thereon were not available at the time the document was formalized.
WHEREFORE, there being no error to warrant a reversal of the decision
and resolution in question of respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 22, the instant
petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992.]

DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN SUAREZ-DE


LEON and REGINIO I. SUAREZ, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALENTE RAYMUNDO,
VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION VITO and VIRGINIA BANTA, Respondents.

Villareal Law Offices, for Petitioners.

Nelson Loyola for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; PROPRIETARY INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN,
DIFFERENT AND ADVERSE FROM THEIR MOTHER. The legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the
legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different
from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their
mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not
barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

The ultimate issue before Us is whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels
of land co-owned by petitioners and registered in the name of petitioners deceased father. Marcelo Suarez,
whose estate has not been partitioned or liquidated, after the said properties were levied and publicly sold
en masse to private respondents to satisfy the personal judgment debt of Teofista Suarez, the surviving
spouse of Marcelo Suarez, mother of herein petitioners. chanrob les law l ibra ry

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of
several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977,
petitioners widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of
contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now
Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal amount
of about P70,000 as damages. 1

The judgment against petitioners mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become final and executory,
five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on
execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of
P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a certificate of sale which was subsequently registered
or August 1, 1983.

On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action 2
against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203,
for the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property.
Therein, they alleged, among others, that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they
cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither
be levied nor sold on execution.

On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private respondents a final deed of sale 3 over the
properties.

On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed with Branch 151 a Motion for
Reconsideration 4 of the Order dated October 10, 1984, claiming that the parcels of land are co-owned by
them and further informing the Court the filing and pendency of an action to annul the auction sale (Civil
Case No. 51203), which motion however, was denied. chan roble s.com:c ralaw:re d

On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining private respondents from
transferring to third parties the levied parcels of land based on the finding that the auctioned lands are co-
owned by petitioners.

On March 1, 1985, private respondent Valente Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 a Motion to Dismiss
for failure on the part of the petitioners to prosecute, however, such motion was later denied by Branch 155,
Regional Trial Court, Pasig.

On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 an Ex-Parte Motion to Dismiss complaint for
failure to prosecute. This was granted by Branch 155 through an Order dated May 29, 1986,
notwithstanding petitioners pending motion for the issuance of alias summons to be served upon the other
defendants in the said case. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was later denied.

On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739 an Order directing Teofista
Suarez and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale; to desist from
removing or alienating improvements thereon; and to surrender to private respondents the owners
duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.

Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the Orders of
Branch 151 dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739.

On December 4, 1986 petitioners filed with Branch 155 a Motion for reconsideration of the Order 5 dated
September 24, 1986. In an Order dated June 10, 1987, 6 Branch 155 lifted its previous order of dismissal
and directed the issuance of alias summons. chanrobles law l ibra ry : red

Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated February 25, 1985, 7
May 19, 1989 8 and February 26, 1990 9 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 and further ordering respondent
Judge to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The appellate court rendered its decision on July 27, 1990, 10 the
dispositive portion of which reads: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned orders dated February 25,
1985, May 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled, further
respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203." 11

Hence, this appeal.

Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner and private respondents and the
developments subsequent to the filing of the complaint, We cannot but notice the glaring error committed
by the trial court.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and the manner of
publicly selling en masse the subject properties for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of
land should have been the subject of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case.

"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibra ry

Article 888 further provides:ch anroble s.com.p h : virt ual law l ibra ry

"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the
father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the
surviving spouse as hereinafter provided." c ralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides: jgc: chan robles .com.p h

"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a
portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.

The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to
that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through
their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from
instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its Resolution of August 28,
1990 are hereby REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that
portion which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said portion. chanrob les law l ibra ry

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29541 January 27,1989

CARLOS GABILA, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
PABLO PEREZ, RAMON PEREZ & MERCEDES PEREZ, defendants-appellees.

Isidra M. Ampig for plaintiff-appellant.

Castillo Law Offices for defendants-appellees.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao dated January 21, 1961
dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint, which the Court of Appeals certified to this Court because
only a question of law is involved.

On September 16, 1948, in the City of Davao, defendants-appellees Pablo, Ramon and Mercedes,
all surnamed Perez, executed in favor of plaintiff-appellant Carlos Gabila, a Deed of Sale of a parcel
of land registered in the name of their deceased father Mariano Perez under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 899 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao, which they inherited upon his demise. The deed of
Sale (Exh. A) reads:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This CONTRACT, made and executed in the place and date mentioned hereinbelow
by and between PABLO PEREZ, married; RAMON PEREZ, married, Filipina citizen,
and MERCEDES PEREZ, married, Filipino, all of legal age, and all residents of
Bunawan, Davao City, Philippines, hereinafter referred to as the VENDORS, and
CARLOS S. GABILA, also of legal age, married to Leonarda P. Gabila and a resident
of Ponciano St., Davao City, Philippines, hereinafter referred to as the VENDEE,
witnesseth:

WHEREAS, the VENDORS are the owners of one parcel of agricultural land situated
in Bunawan, City of Davao, Philippines, with all the improvements, which is more
particularly bounded and described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot No. 603 of the cadastral survey of Davao, Cadastral Case No.
1, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 317), situated in the municipality of Davao.
Bounded on the NW and NE, by Lot No. 511; on the SE, by the Licanan River and
Lot No. 602; and on the W, by Lot No. 502 and the Bunawan River, containing an
area of eighty-one thousand nine hundred and three square meters (81,903), more
or less.

their ownership thereto being evidenced by transfer Certificate of Title No. 899 of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Davao, issued in the name of the deceased,
MARIANO PEREZ, the father of the VENDORS, who died on October 11, 1942
and the herein vendors inherited said land from their deceased father, being the
legitimate children;
WHEREAS, the VENDEE has agreed to purchase the above- described property and
the VENDORS have agreed to sell the same to the VENDEE, subject to the terms
and conditions hereinbelow specified;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P2,500.00) Philippine Currency, to be paid in the manner
hereinbelow specified, the VENDORS hereby sell, transfer and convey unto the said
VENDEE, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, the above-described one
parcel of land, together with the buildings and improvements thereon, belonging to
the VENDORS, the aforementioned sum of P2,500.00 shall be paid in the manner as
follows:

a) P l,500.00 Philippine Currency, upon the signing of this contract;

b) The balance of P1,000.00, Philippine Currency, to be paid in ten (10) monthly


installments of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00) each the first installment to
become due and payable on October 14, 1948, and the succeeding monthly
installments to be paid on the same date every month thereafter until the total
amount is fully paid.

It is hereby agreed, covenanted and stipulated by and between the parties hereto
that the Vendors will execute immediately an Extra-Judicial Partition of all the
properties of their deceased father, and pay the corresponding estate and
inheritance taxes so that the above-described title could be cancelled and in its stead
a new transfer Certificate of title be issued in favor of the Vendee.

It is finally agreed, covenanted and stipulated that immediately upon the execution of
this document, the VENDEE takes immediate possession of the property sold and
will harvest the improvements inside of this land.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands this 16th
day of September, 1948 at Davao City, Philippines. (Italics ours.) (p. 1, Folder of
Exhibits.)

The Deed of Sale was duly signed and ratified before Notary Public Isidro Bastida of Davao City on
the same date, September 16, 1958, and possession of the land was immediately delivered to the
vendee. The monthly installments of the price of the sale were completely paid in due time.
However, the vendors took no steps to comply with their promise to execute an extrajudicial partition
of their father's properties so that his title to the land in question can be transferred in their names
and from them, to the vendee Gabila.

So, on August 28, 1958, Gabila filed this action praying that the defendants be ordered:

1) To execute an extra-judicial partition of all the properties of their deceased father


or otherwise settle his estate and pay the corresponding estate and inheritance
taxes, and execute the requisite instruments for the registration and transfer of the
title to him; and

2) To pay him Pl,000 as attorney's fees and expenses of the suit, plus costs.
The defendants alleged in their Answer that the deed of sale was intended merely to guarantee a
loan of P2,500 contracted by one of the defendants; that Mercedes Perez, one of the vendors, was a
minor when the deed of sale was made; that the deed of sale was not approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture; and, that the consideration of P2,500 was unconscionable.

In Reply, the plaintiff alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, Mercedes Perez
stated that she was of age, and plaintiff had no reason to doubt that statement. But, assuming that
she was under age at the time, she ratified the sale by her failure to repudiate it in due time; that the
allegation that the deed was only a guarantee for a P2,500 loan was not true because a part of the
purchase price was paid to the defendants in ten (10) monthly installments; that the price agreed
upon in 1948 was fair and reasonable; and, that the approval of the sale by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resource was not necessary.

After several continuances, the case was set for trial on November 12, 1960. Neither defendants nor
their counsel appeared despite due notice. For that reason, the lower court allowed the plaintiff to
adduce evidence ex partebefore a commissioner.

On January 21, 1961, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, dismissing the complaint. It held
that the defendants could not be ordered to execute an extrajudicial partition of all the properties of
their deceased father because the properties to be partitioned are not Identified in the complaint,
and, the defendants can no longer partition the land described in TCT No. 899, because it has been
sold to the plaintiff. The court held that the extrajudicial partition of the property should have been
done at the time of the sale, in the same instrument (Record on Appeal, pp. 20-21).

The appeal is meritorious. This action is not one for specific performance of the sale of the property
to the appellant, for the sale had been consummated by the payment of the price to the vendors-
appellees as stipulated in the deed, and by the delivery of the peaceful possession of the land to the
plaintiff-vendee. What the plaintiff seeks merely is the transfer of the title of the land in his name.

It is indubitable that the appellant, as vendee of the land, has a right to receive, and the appellees
the corresponding obligation to transfer to him, not only the possession and enjoyment of the land
but also the certificate of title. The trial court recognized that right of the appellant, but it professed to
be helpless to enforce it. In dismissing his complaint and, in effect, denying him a remedy, the trial
court forgot a maxim which is as old as the law itself. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right,
there is a remedy (Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 1948 Ed., p. 1307).

The defendants-appellees, as the only legal heirs of their father, the deceased Mariano Perez,
became the owners of the property in question upon his demise. The rights to the succession were
transmitted to them from the moment of his death (Art. 77, Civil Code).

Their sale to the appellant of the property described in TCT No. 899, which they inherited from their
father put an end to their co-ownership over it (Art. 1082 Civil Code). Consequently there is no
further need for them to partition it, the purpose of partition being to separate, divide, and assign a
thing held in common among those to whom it may belong (Art. 1079, Civil Code). The trial court
correctly observed that the defendants-appellees may no longer partition the land in question
because they had already sold it.

A careful examination of the deed of sale (Exh. A) reveals that it also serves the purpose of an
affidavit of adjudication of the lot in question to the defendants-appellees as heirs of the former
owner Mariano Perez. Their declaration therein that the registered owner of the land described in
TCT No. 899 Mariano Perez, who died on October 11, 1942, is the father of the vendors, that "the
vendors inherited said land from their deceased father, being the legitimate children" and that "the
Vendors are the owners" of said land (Exh. A) is, in effect, an adjudication of the land to themselves.
Such adjudication renders the stipulation in the deed of sale that "the Vendors will execute
immediately an Extrajudicial Partition of all the properties of their deceased father" (Exhibit A-1),
superfluous and unnecessary. It may be overlooked or deemed not written at all.

All that needs to be done now is to register on the TCT No. 899 of the late Mariano Perez the deed
of sale (Exh. A) which may also be treated as an affidavit of adjudication of the land to the vendors in
order that their father's title may be cancelled and a new one can be issued to their vendee, Carlos
Gabila.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The defendants-appellees, they have not
done so yet, are ordered to surrender and/or deliver TCT No. 899 to the plaintiff-appellant in order
that the latter may present it to the Register of Deeds of Davao for cancellation upon the registration
of the Deed of Sale dated September 16, 1948 made in his favor by the appellees. The Register of
Deeds of Davao shall thereupon cancel said TCT No. 899 of the late Mariano Perez and issue a new
title in the name of the plaintiff-appellant Carlos Gabila, subject to a lien in favor of any deprived
heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. The defendants-appellees are ordered to pay the estate
and inheritance taxes, if any, and they should present proof of such payment to the Register of
Deeds within sixty (60) days after the finality of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

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