TITLE OF THE CASE PONENTE FACTS ISSUE - RULING

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, G.R No. 187167

AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA

HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. Present:

ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF

THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF CORONA, C.J.,

LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA CARPIO,

BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE VELASCO, JR.,

ALFERES, CZARINA MAY LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, BRION,

SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR PERALTA,

BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, BERSAMIN,

ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE DEL CASTILLO,

PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN ABAD,

MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN VILLARAMA, JR.,

DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PEREZ,

PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON MENDOZA, and

ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, SERENO, JJ.

GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN

FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO,

ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH

KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE,

MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY,

MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI,

MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA

PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT,

MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT

REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY

RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV,

CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE

ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA

CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE

TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO,

MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and

MARCELINO VELOSO III,

Petitioners,

- versus -

HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO

ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON.

ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY

AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,

HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF

THE NATIONAL MAPPING &

RESOURCE INFORMATION
AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO

DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Promulgated:

TO THE UNITED NATIONS,

Respondents. July 16, 2011

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby
territories.

The Antecedents

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines
as an archipelagic State.3

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was
prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Complying with these requirements
under UNCLOS , RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal,
as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x
x legislators,9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA
9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in
violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary
treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free
policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13 On the merits,
respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine
territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.

The Issue

whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS
III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles
from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as
geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of
UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47.

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit
the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose)
territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, 25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law.26

Far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to
classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent
with Article 12136 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of
regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.37

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitutions Delineation of Internal Waters

Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution39 or as archipelagic
waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms
this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters
and of their bed and subsoil.

1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by

the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as
archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
 2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as
well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxxx

4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other
respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by
the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein.

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to
grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and
conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, 43 thus
automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. 44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.

The demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime
delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse
to be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui
generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants
new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical
miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this
zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas,
as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
 EDGARDO NAVIA,[1] RUBEN G.R. No. 184467
DIO,[2] and ANDREW BUISING,
Petitioners,
Present:

CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
behalf and in representation of
BENHUR V. PARDICO Promulgated:
Respondent. June 19, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------------x
s
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Factual Antecedents

On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation[8] (Asian Land) arrived at the house of
Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival
of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her
house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them
immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong.Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that
he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of
electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.[9]

Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale
Subdivision.[10] The supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat. At the security office,
Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. Soon, Navia arrived and Buising informed him that the complainant was not keen in
participating in the investigation. Since there was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a
statement to the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him.[13] His mother Lolita also signed
the logbook below an entry which states that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong
left the security office.

Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him.

The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben, but only to be told that
petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to
the barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo[28] before the RTC of
Malolos City. The trial court issued the challenged Decision[35] granting the petition.

ISSUE: WON the issuance of the writ of amparo is proper in the case therein.
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Bens disappearance as alleged in Virginias petition and proved during the
summary proceedings conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.
 Our Ruling

Virginias Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be dismissed.

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity. [40]

Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not dispute his identity as the same person
summoned and questioned at petitioners security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso
facto established Bens inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty and security. Article 6[41] of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[42] recognizes every human beings inherent right to life, while Article 9[43] thereof ordains
that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security
cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation of
life, liberty and security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.[44]

It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs coverage, said Rules does not, however, define extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis[46] when this Court defined enforced
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition of enforced disappearances, as the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.[47]

thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information
on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof
are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by,
or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation
of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens
disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petition
whether as responsible or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or
entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity,
still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards
at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not
work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or
governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the
disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced
disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely:
JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-
2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90%
of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and
live-in partners."3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It
took effect on March 27, 2004.4

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City
for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats
of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.7

ISSUE: A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative
of the equal protection clause.

The Ruling of the Court

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals
that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had
originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 an amalgamation of two measures,
namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships
Act"63 providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time
giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was
eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in
the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
We find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such,
did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse
to whom the State extends its protection.

R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men
to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the
accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality." 70

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution
48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that
"violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and
women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social
mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men." 72

The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all
human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role
and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN
itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties therefor and for other Purposes."

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices
against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not
discriminate against men.82 Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it
is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party
to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women."84Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he
paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will
require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."85

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children
in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments
of which the Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5,
1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October
6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before
the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and women. 88 The Philippines
likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said
Conventions and their respective protocols.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against domestic
violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we
keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its
fulfillment."118Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.