Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CORONA,C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
*
BRION,
BERSAMIN, and
PNOC-ENERGY VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, and Promulgated:
ESTER R. GUERZON,
Chairman, Bids and Awards
Committee, April 11, 2012
Respondents.
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DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8975[1] expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme
Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction,
or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the
Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether
public or private, acting under the Governments direction, from: (a) acquiring,
clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National
Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the
National Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or
operating any such contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such
contract or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract or project.
The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 22, 2004,[2] viz:
In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP
No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October
4, 2000, NEA administrator Conrado M. Estrella III recommended to NEAs
Board of Directors the approval of award to private respondent [Nerwin] of all
schedules for IBP No. 80 on account of the following:
b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of
Nerwin Industries (lowest responsive and complying bidder) and the
second lowest bidder in the amount of $1.47 million for the poles and
$0.475 million for the crossarms, is deemed substantial and extremely
advantageous to the government. The price difference is equivalent to
7,948 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms;
c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids of
Nerwin and the Tri-State Pole and Piling, Inc. approximately in the
amount of $2.36 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the
crossarms are equivalent to additional 12.872 pcs. of poles and 20.967
pcs. of crossarms; and
On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to
have filed a complaint, citing alleged false or falsified documents submitted
during the pre-qualification stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project to
private respondent [Nerwin].
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials
sought the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel who, among others,
upheld the eligibility and qualification of private respondent
[Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier
opinion but the Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no
legal impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent
[Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders
relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to file a
complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an injunction,
which injunctive application was granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil
Case No. 01102000.
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-
ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil
Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy
Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and Awards
Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a
portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a
TRO issue to enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the wooden poles.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that
the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government
infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the
mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president
had no authority to sign and file the complaint.[3]
On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to respondents reply,
the RTC granted a TRO in Civil Case No. 03106921.[4]
This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond by the
plaintiffs in the amount of P200,000.00.
Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict
compliance herein is enjoined. Furnish the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel copy of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30, 2003,
and also to set aside the order of default and to admit their answer to the complaint.
SO ORDERED.
Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion
on February 9, 2005.[9]
Issues
I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act
8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on government projects.
II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on the
basis of Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary
injunction but not injunction as a final remedy.
III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is also
one for damages.
Ruling
In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and
set aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued on July 20, 2003 and December 29,
2003, and why it altogether dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows:
It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent
Judges issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.
Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the Supreme Court
had the same embodied in its Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 which
reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or
Mandatory Injunction in cases involving Government Infrastructure
Projects. Pertinent is the ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Allarde As
regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of
the Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction: The term
infrastructure projects means construction, improvement and rehabilitation of
roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication facilities,
irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, shore
protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital
buildings and other related construction projects that form part of the government
capital investment.
Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts of the
case, that would justify respondent Judges blatant disregard of a simple,
comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance
of injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects. Respondent
Judge did not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case
falls under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply,
i.e., when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such
that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise.
Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because, in
the first place, he should not have given due course to private respondents
complaint for injunction.Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other grounds proffered
by petitioners.[10]
The CAs decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its
discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents
notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the express provisions of
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the
bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued
the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and
void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to
the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without
prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left
for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to
them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act
No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of
the lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and
respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary
prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the
Government.
The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As
the CA explained in its above-stated Decision in the petition for certiorari,
respondent failed to heed the mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A.
No. 8975 against a government infrastructure project, which the rural
electrification project certainly was. He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded
this Courts various circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and injunctions
against government infrastructure projects in line with the proscription under R.A.
No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos and National Housing
Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818 expressly
deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation
or execution of a government infrastructure project.
Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty.
Caguioa v. Judge Lavia faulted a judge for grave misconduct for issuing a TRO
against a government infrastructure project thus:
Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment and
discussion of Nerwins other submissions superfluous and unnecessary, the Court
notes that the RTC did not properly appreciate the real nature and true purpose of
the injunctive remedy. This failing of the RTC presses the Court to use this
decision to reiterate the norms and parameters long standing jurisprudence has set
to control the issuance of TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on
conformity to them by all litigants and lower courts. Only thereby may the grave
misconduct committed in Civil Case No. 03106921 be avoided.
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually; or
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to
the applicant; or
xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a
present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And
while a clear showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be
conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify
preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete
but need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the
merits. This should really be so since our concern here involves only the
propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of the case still
pending with the trial court.
In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts
considering that conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more
often than not involve and require a factual determination that is not the function of
the appellate courts.[19] Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be
sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the
grounds and in the manner provided by law.[20] When that is done, the exercise of
sound discretion by the issuing court in injunctive matters must not be interfered
with except when there is manifest abuse.[21]
Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be
wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that
tend to disposeof the merits without or before trial. Granting an application for
the relief in disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible,[22] for it is never
the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case,
[23]
or to decide controverted facts.[24] It is but a preventive remedy whose only
mission is to prevent threatened wrong,[25] further injury,[26] and irreparable
harm[27] or injustice[28] until the rights of the parties can be settled. Judges should
thus look at such relief only as a means to protect the ability of their courts to
render a meaningful decision.[29] Foremost in their minds should be to guard against
a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs
after a trial on the merits.[30] It is well worth remembering that the writ of
preliminary injunction should issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and
irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can be justly and thoroughly
studied and adjudicated.[31]
The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower courts
for their guidance.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
MANILA INTERNATIONAL G.R. No. 143870
AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO,
- versus - Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
NAZARIO, JJ.
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated August
23, 2000 filed by the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA),
assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2000
which directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining petitioner from evicting the homeowners of Rivera
Village from their dwellings.
On May 25, 1965, the CAA, through its Director, Capt. Vicente
C. Rivera, entered into individual lease contracts with its employees
(lessees) for the lease of portions of a four (4)-hectare lot situated in
what is now known as Rivera Village located in Barangay 199 and
200 in Pasay City. The leases were for a twenty-five (25)-year period
to commence on May 25, 1965 up to May 24, 1990 at P20.00[3] per
annum as rental.
In view of all the foregoing, the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is hereby denied
for lack of merit and the above-entitled petition is hereby ordered
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
SO ORDERED.[8]
MIAA also stresses that the subject property has recently been
reserved by MIAA for airport-related activities and, as such, Sec.
5(c) of RA 7279 applies. Under the said law, lands which are used,
reserved or otherwise set aside for government offices, facilities and
other installations are exempt from the coverage of the law.
2. Did the petition filed by respondent with the trial court state a cause
of action against petitioner?
The petition before the trial court was filed by the homeowners
association, represented by its President, Panfilo R. Chiutena, Sr.,
upon authority of a Board Resolution empowering the latter to file
[A]ll necessary action to the Court of Justice and other related acts
necessary to have our Housing Project number 4 land be titled to
the members of the Association.
In this case, the petition filed with the trial court sufficiently
avers that the homeowners association, through its President, is
suing in a representative capacity as authorized under the Board
Resolution attached to the petition. Although the names of the
individual members of the homeowners association who are the
beneficiaries and real parties-in-interest in the suit were not
indicated in the title of the petition, this defect can be cured by the
simple expedient of requiring the association to disclose the names
of the principals and to amend the title and averments of the
petition accordingly.
and (2) proof that the members of the homeowners association are
qualified to avail of the benefits under PD 1517 as mandated by
Sec. 6[30] of the same law.
Resort to mandamus is evidently premature because there is
no showing that the members of the homeowners association have
already filed an application or proposal with the NHA to acquire
their respective lots. There is still an administrative remedy open to
the members of the homeowners association which they should
have first pursued, failing which they cannot invoke judicial action.
[31]
For the foregoing reasons, the prayer for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction must perforce be denied. Preliminary
injunction is a mere ancillary remedy which cannot stand
separately or proceed independently of the main case. Having
declared that the petition filed before the trial court was correctly
dismissed, the determination of the homeowners associations
entitlement to a writ of preliminary injunction is already moot and
academic.[37]
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
BERSAMIN,
CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING
SYSTEM (CBS), INC., doing
business under the name and
style DXBR Bombo Radyo
Manager, Norberto P.
Respondents.
December 1, 2010
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DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza
(petitioners) appeal the adverse decision dated October 28, 2002 (dismissing their
petition for certiorari and prohibition to challenge the grant by the trial judge of
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction after reconsidering his earlier
self-inhibition),[1] and the resolution dated January 29, 2003 (denying their motion
for reconsideration), both promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 69729 entitled City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides
Theresa B. Plaza, the latter in her personal capacity and as representative of her
co-defendant v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc., doing business
under the name and style DXBR Bombo Radyo Butuan, represented by its
Manager, Norberto P. Pagaspas, and the Hon. Rosarito F. Dabalos, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 2, of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.
Antecedents[2]
In February, 2002, City Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza) wrote to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Butuan City to solicit its support for her decision to deny the
application for mayors permit of respondent Bombo Radyo/Consolidated
Broadcasting System (CBS), and to eventually close down CBSs radio station. She
justified her decision by claiming that CBSs operating its broadcasting business
within the Arujiville Subdivision, a residential area, had violated the Citys zoning
ordinance. Her letter pertinently reads:
Bombo Radyo renewed its TUP only in 1995 and 1996. They have failed to renew
their TUP up to today.
This office has received numerous complaints against Bombo Radyo for violation
of private rights, inciting people to go rise against the government, malicious
imputations, insinuations against people not of their liking, false or fabricated news, etc.
The list is so long to enumerate. Copies of the petitions, manifestos from various groups
is hereto attached for your perusal.
Thus, for violation of the city zoning ordinance, the expiration of their TUP, which
was never renewed since 1997, failure to secure ECC and the numerous complaints
against the station of the residents within the immediate vicinity of their premises and
the threat they are causing to the peace and order of the City, I have decided to deny
their application for a mayor's permit and thereafter to close the radio station.
This is not a decision calculated to deprived (sic) Radio Bombo of its freedom of
speech or expression. This is just a simply matter of whether or not Radyo Bombo has
complied with existing laws and ordinances.
On February 19, 2002, CBS and its manager, Norberto Pagaspas, filed a complaint
for prohibition, mandamus, and damages against the petitioners in the Regional
Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC), [4] with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from closing its
station, or from disturbing and preventing its business operations. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5193, was raffled to Branch 2, presided by Judge
Rosarito P. Dabalos.
On February 20, 2002, Judge Dabalos voluntarily inhibited and directed the return
of Civil Case No. 5193 to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle. [5] He cited
the circumstances that might affect his objectivity and impartiality in resolving the
controversy as his justification, to wit:
xxx
a) That the undersigned was the object of its (plaintiff's) attacks and
criticism which are judgmental and not inquisitorial in the comments over the
air;
The court is aware of press freedom is enshrined in our constitution but such
freedom should not be abused because in every right there is a concomitant obligation.
Let therefore this case be returned immediately to the office [of the] Clerk of
Court VI for re-raffling.
SO ORDERED.
On the same day, Judge Victor Tomaneng, Presiding Judge of Branch 33,
issued an order also inhibiting himself from handling Civil Case No. 5193, and in
his capacity as Vice Executive Judge (in lieu of Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo,
Jr., then on sick leave) directed the assignment of Civil Case No. 5193 to Branch 5
without raffle,[6] viz:
xxx Considering that the Executive Judge Hon. Cipriano B. Alvizo, the Presiding
Judge of RTC-Branch 4 and Acting-Designate Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3, but who is
now in Cebu City for medical treatment, it would be impractical to include his courts in
the re-raffling of cases for the reason that the case is for prohibition, mandamus,
injunction, etc., that needs immediate action. The herein Vice-Executive Judge who is
the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 33, could not also act on this case on the ground of
'delicadeza' considering that defendant Hon. Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza is his
'kumadre' plus the fact that before becoming judge he was the legal counsel of the LDP
party here in Butuan City, in the election of 1992 and 1995, which is the political party of
the Plazas. RTC-Branch 1, being the exclusive Family Court cannot also be included in any
raffle.
In view of the foregoing, and on the ground of expediency, the Clerk of Court is
ordered to send this case to RTC-Branch 5, without raffle anymore, it being the only
practical available court in this jurisdiction as of this moment.
Civil Case No. 5193 was forwarded to Branch 5, presided by Judge Augustus L.
Calo, who recused because his wife had been recently appointed
by Mayor Plaza to the Citys Legal Office. Judge Calo ordered the immediate return
of the case to the Clerk of Court for forwarding to Vice Executive Judge
Tomaneng.
Without any other judge to handle the case, Judge Tomaneng formally
returned Civil Case No. 5193 to Judge Dabalos, stating in his letter that Judge
Dabalos reason for inhibition did not amount to a plausible ground to inhibit.
Judge Tomaneng instructed Judge Dabalos to hear the case unless the Supreme
Court approved the inhibition.[7]
The Court believes that there is a need to maintain the status quo until all the
other issues in the complaint shall have been duly heard and determined without
necessarily implying that plaintiff is entitled to the prayers for injunction. The Court
hereby resolves in the meantime to grant a temporary restraining order.
WHEREFORE, defendants City Gov't of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B.
Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities and/or any person acting
upon the Mayors order and instruction under her authority are hereby enjoined to
cease, desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADYO BOMBO or from
preventing, disturbing, or molesting its business operations, including but not limited to
the use and operation of its building, structures and broadcasting facilities, and the
ingress or egress of its employees therein.
As this Court cannot issue a seventy-two (72) hour Temporary Restraining Order
because of the incoming delay on Monday, February 25, 2002, a temporary restraining
order is hereby issued effective for twenty (20) days from issuance (Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure).
Meanwhile, let this case be set for summary hearing on March 11, 2002 at 8:30 in
the morning to resolve the pending application for injunction and for the defendants to
show cause why the same shall not be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Consequently, CBS requested the Court to designate another judge to hear its
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the hearing of
which Judge Tomaneng had set on March 11, 2002.[10]
In the meanwhile, or on March 8, 2002, the petitioners filed their answer to the
complaint, alleging affirmative and special defenses and praying for the dismissal
of the complaint, the lifting of the TRO, the denial of the prayer for preliminary
injunction, and the granting of their counterclaims for moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
During the hearing on March 11, 2002 of CBSs application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, at which the petitioners and their counsel did not
appear, CBSs counsel manifested that he was desisting from his earlier request
with the Court for the designation of another judge to hear Civil Case No. 5193.
Judge Dabalos noted the manifestation but reset the hearing of the application
for preliminary injunction on March 12, 2002, to give the petitioners an
opportunity to show cause why the writ prayed for should not issue. For the
purpose of the resetting, Judge Dabalos caused a notice of hearing to be served
on the petitioners.[11]
Upon receipt of the notice of hearing, the petitioners moved to quash the notice
and prayed that the TRO be lifted, insisting that Judge Dabalos had already lost his
authority to act on Civil Case No. 5193 by virtue of his inhibition.[12]
Nonetheless, Civil Case No. 5193 was called on March 12, 2002. The parties and
their respective counsel appeared. At the close of the proceedings on that date,
Judge Dabalos granted CBSs prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction,[13] to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing as the defendants did not introduce any
evidence in spite of the order of the Court to show cause why no writ of preliminary
injunction be issued and the repeated directive of the court in open court for the
defendants to present evidence which the defendants firmly refused to do so on flimsy
grounds, the Court resolves to issue a writ of preliminary injunction as the complaint
under oath alleges that plaintiff is a grantee of a franchise from the Congress of the
Philippines and the act threatened to be committed by the defendants curtail the
constitutional right of freedom of speech of the plaintiff which the Court finds that it
should be looked into, the defendants' refusal to controvert such allegations by evidence
deprived the Court [of] the chance to be guided by such evidence to act accordingly that
it left the court no alternative but to grant the writ prayed for, the City Government of
Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees,
police authorities and/or any person acting upon the Mayor's order or instructions or
under her authority are hereby enjoined to cease and desist and to refrain from closing
or padlocking RADYO BOMBO or from preventing, disturbing or molesting its business
operations, including but not limited to the use and operation of its building, structures,
broadcasting facilities and the ingress or egress of its employees therein upon plaintiff's
putting up a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 duly approved by this court which
injunction bond shall be executed in favor of the defendants to answer for whatever
damages which the defendants may sustain in connection with or arising from the
issuance of this writ if, after all the court will finally adjudge that plaintiff is not entitled
thereto.
This order is without prejudice to the findings of the court after a formal hearing
or a full blown trial.
Furnish copies of this order to the Hon. Supreme Court and the Hon. Court
Administrator.
SO ORDERED.[14]
xxx forthwith enjoin the City Government of Butuan and the Hon. City Mayor
Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities and/or
any person acting upon the mayor's order or instruction or under her authority to cease
and desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADIO BOMBO or from preventing
disturbing or molesting its business operations, including the use and operation of its
building, structures, broadcasting facilities and the ingress and egress of its employees
therein. Copies of the writ of preliminary injunction, bond and other pertinent
documents thereto be served on the defendants and thereafter make a return of your
service of this writ within the period required by law and the Rules of Court.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition upon a finding that
Judge Dabalos had committed no grave abuse of discretion in acting upon CBSs
application for preliminary injunction, given the peculiar circumstances
surrounding the raffling and assignment of Civil Case No. 5193, and the urgent
need to resolve the application for preliminary injunction due to the expiration of
Judge Tomanengs TRO by March 13, 2002. The CA held that the writ of
preliminary injunction had properly issued, because the petitioners had
threatened to defeat CBSs existing franchise to operate its radio station
in Butuan City by not issuing the permit for its broadcast business.
Issues
Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari, with the petitioners
contending that:[16]
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ROSARITO
F. DABALOS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN, ON MARCH 12,
2002, WITHOUT SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO PETITIONERS, HE AGAIN TOOK COGNIZANCE
OF AND RE-ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD
ALREADY EFFECTIVELY INHIBITED HIMSELF FROM HEARING THE SAME IN TWO
EARLIER ORDERS HE HAD ISSUED DATED FEBRUARY 20 AND FEBRUARY 26,
2002 RESPECTIVELY.
II. ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ROSARITO DABALOS COULD VALIDLY RE-
ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD EARLIER ISSUED
TWO ORDERS VOLUNTARILY INHIBITING HIMSELF FROM HEARING SAID CASE, THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
WITHOUT REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW
WHETHER SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS A CLEAR RIGHT THERETO.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit. We find that the CA did not commit any error in upholding
the questioned orders of the RTC.
In its decision, the CA ruled that Judge Dabalos did not gravely abuse his
discretion in re-assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193 in the light of the
obtaining circumstances cogently set forth in its assailed decision, to wit: [17]
Seemingly, petitioners lost sight of the reality that after the respondent judge issued his
order of inhibition and directed the return of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court
for re-raffle to another judge, Vice-Executive Judge Victor A. Tomaneng, noting that
there is no other judge to handle the case, directed the return thereof to the public
respondent in view of the extreme urgency of the preliminary relief therein prayed for.
Under the circumstances then obtaining, the respondent judge could do no less but to
act thereon. So it is that he proceeded with the scheduled hearing on the application for
preliminary injunction on March 11, 2002 and thereafter reset it for continuation the
following day to afford the petitioners an opportunity to oppose the application and
show cause why the writ prayed for should not issue. The urgency of the action
demanded of the respondent judge is further accentuated by the fact that the TRO
issued by Judge Tomaneng was then about to expire on March 13, 2002, not to mention
the circumstance that Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr., who happened to be
around, advised the respondent judge to resolve the issues to the best of his discretion.
xxx
The petitioners disagree, and insist that Judge Dabalos lost the authority to
act upon CBSs application for preliminary injunction by virtue of his prior self-
inhibition from hearing Civil Case No. 5193.
We cannot sustain the petitioners insistence.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which contains the rule on
inhibition and disqualification of judges, states:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case
in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee
or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties-in-interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The self-inhibition of Judge Dabalos was one taken in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1. Our resolution herein turns, therefore, on the
proper interpretation and application of the second paragraph.
The second paragraph of Section 1 (unlike the first paragraph) does not
expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition. This means that the
determination of the grounds is left to the sound discretion of the judge, who
must discern with only his or her conscience as guide on what may be just and
valid reasons for self-inhibition. The vesting of discretion necessarily proceeds
from the reality that there may be many and different grounds for a judge to
recuse from a case, and such grounds cannot all be catalogued in the Rules of
Court. Thus did the Court cogently point out in Gutang v. Court of Appeals:[18]
xxx The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision
on whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the trial
judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the
case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of
pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for
adjudication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of
objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors
that lead to preference or predilections are many and varied.
In his case, Judge Dabalos clearly discerned after the return of Civil Case No.
5193 to him by the Vice Executive Judge that his self-doubt about his ability to
dispense justice in Civil Case No. 5193 generated by the airing of criticisms against
him and other public officials by CBSs commentators and reporters would not
ultimately affect his objectivity and judgment. Such re-assessment of the ground
for his self-inhibition, absent a showing of any malice or other improper motive on
his part, could not be assailed as the product of an unsound exercise of his
discretion. That, it seems to us, even the petitioners conceded, their objection
being based only on whether he could still re-assume jurisdiction of Civil Case No.
5193.
In this connection, the urgency for the RTC to hear and resolve the
application for preliminary injunction factually existed. In fact, CBS had
communicated it to the Court in its letter dated March 5, 2002,[21] to wit:
If not for the temporary restraining order issued on February 21, 2002 by the Honorable
Judge VICTOR A. TOMANENG, Vice-Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of Branch 33 of
said court xxx violent confrontations would have continued between supporters of
plaintiff RADIO BOMBO BUTUAN, on the one hand, and the loyalists of City Mayor
LEONIDES THERESA PLAZA (including some city employees) led by the Mayor herself and
her husband, former Mayor DEMOCRITO PLAZA II, on the other hand.
xxx
As set forth in the temporary restraining order, the hearing on the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction is set on Monday, March 11, 2002 because the twenty-day
lifetime of the temporary restraining order would expire on March 13, 2002. A repeat of
the violent scenario of February 21 may occur unless the application is heard as
scheduled by a Regional Trial Court Judge who had not inhibited himself. xxx
Verily, Judge Dabalos decision to hear the application for preliminary injunction
pending the Courts resolution of the query on whether or not another Judge
sitting outside the City of Butuan should take cognizance of Civil Case No. 5193
did not constitute or equate to arbitrariness or whimsicality. He had reasonable
grounds to do so in the context of the tight circumstances that had developed
in Civil Case No. 5193 following his self-inhibition. Surely, his decision to
reconsider did not proceed from passion or whim, but from his faithful adherence
to his solemn oath to do justice to every man. He thereby neither violated any law
or canon of judicial conduct, nor abused his juridical authority.
II.
While it is true that CBS was not required to present evidence to prove its
entitlement to the injunctive writ, the writ was nonetheless properly granted on
the basis of the undisputed facts that CBS was a grantee of a franchise from the
Legislature, and that the acts complained against (i.e., refusal of the Mayors
permit and resulting closure of the radio station) were imminent and, unless
enjoined, would curtail or set at naught CBSs rights under the franchise. In this
regard, worthy of mention is that even the Vice
Executive Judge, acknowledging that CBS had stood to suffer grave
injustice and irreparable injury should its radio station suffer closure, had
issued ex parte the TRO.
It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the evidence of CBS should
have first been required before Judge Dabalos issued the writ of preliminary
injunction. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on the shoulders
of the petitioners, as the parties against whom the TRO was issued, to show cause
why the application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue, [31] thus:
xxx
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M.
DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY
and NELSON A. LOYOLA,
Petitioners,
- versus -
ENRIQUE RIVILLA,
MICHAEL E. JETHMAL
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
Present:
- versus -
JUANA COMPLEX I
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, PERALTA,
BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN,
DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA ABAD,
DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY,
FLORENCIA M. MENDOZA, and
MERCADO, LEOVINO C. PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
DATARIO, AIDA
A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M.
DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY
and NELSON A. LOYOLA,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
March 5, 2012
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court are two (2) consolidated petitions assailing the July 31,
2001 Decision[1] and February 21, 2002 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543, which annulled and set aside the March
3, 1999 Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Bian,
Laguna (RTC), granting the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, and upheld the June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order [4] denying the motion to
dismiss.
The Facts:
The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and
motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba;
that they used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by
passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road; that they had
been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years; that in August 1998, Fil-
estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so
JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said road; that La Paz Road was
restored by the residents to make it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road
again; that JCHA reported the matter to the Municipal Government and the Office
of the Municipal Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road to make it passable
and safe to motorists and pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz
Road caused damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious
hours to them, to the commuters and motorists because traffic was re-routed to
narrow streets that caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard; and that its
permanent closure would not only prejudice their right to free and unhampered use
of the property but would also cause great damage and irreparable injury.
On February 26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss [7] arguing
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed
as a class suit. On March 5, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed their comment[8] on the motion
to dismiss to which respondents filed a reply.[9]
On March 3, 1999, the RTC issued an Order [10] granting the WPI and
required JCHA, et al. to post a bond.
The RTC then issued its June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order, denying both the
motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by Fil-Estate, et al.
Not satisfied, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the CA to annul (1) the Order dated March 3, 1999 and (2) the Omnibus
Order dated June 16, 2000. They contended that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. With regard to the
issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that JCHA, et al. failed to show that
they had a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and further
claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens registered private road and there was
neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it.[13]
On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered the decision partially granting the
petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when
JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that they had been using La Paz Road for
more than ten (10) years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed
and excavated the road. It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint was
properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of common interest
and that the individuals sought to be represented were so numerous that it was
impractical to include all of them as parties. The CA, however, annulled the WPI
for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove their clear and present right over La Paz Road.
The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for a full-blown trial on the
merits.
In G.R. No. 152272, JCHA, et al. come to this Court, raising the following
issues:
(A)
(B)
In G.R. No. 152397, on the other hand, Fil-Estate, et al. anchor their petition
on the following issues:
I.
The Court of Appeals declaration that respondents Complaint
states a cause of action is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence.
II.
The Court of Appeals pronouncement that respondents complaint
was properly filed as a class suit is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence.
III.
JCHA, et al. argue that La Paz Road has attained the status and character of
a public road or burdened by an apparent easement of public right of way. They
point out that La Paz Road is the widest road in the neighborhood used by
motorists in going to Halang Road and in entering the SLEX-Halang toll gate and
that there is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity. For
residents of San Pedro, Laguna, the shortest, convenient and safe route towards
SLEX Halang is along Rosario Avenue joining La Paz Road.
Finally, JCHA, et al. argue that the CA erred when it voided the WPI
because the public nature of La Paz Road had been sufficiently proven and, as
residents of San Pedro and Bian, Laguna, their right to use La Paz Road is
undeniable.
Fil-Estate, et al. agree with the CA that the annulment of the WPI was proper
since JCHA, et al. failed to prove that they have a clear right over La Paz Road.
Fil-Estate, et al. assert that JCHA, et al. failed to prove the existence of a right of
way or a right to pass over La Paz Road and that the closure of the said road
constituted an injury to such right. According to them, La Paz Road is a torrens
registered private road and there is neither a voluntary nor legal easement
constituted over it. They claim that La Paz Road is a private property registered
under the name of La Paz and the beneficial ownership thereof was transferred to
FEEC when La Paz joined the consortium for the Ecocentrum Project.
Fil-Estate, et al., however, insist that the complaint did not sufficiently
contain the ultimate facts to show a cause of action. They aver the bare allegation
that one is entitled to something is an allegation of a conclusion which adds
nothing to the pleading.
They likewise argue that the complaint was improperly filed as a class suit
for it failed to show that JCHA, et al. and the commuters and motorists they are
representing have a well-defined community of interest over La Paz Road. They claim
that the excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a common right or
cause of action for JCHA, et al. against them since each of them has a separate and
distinct purpose and each may be affected differently than the others.
The Courts Ruling
The issues for the Courts resolution are: (1) whether or not the complaint states a
cause of action; (2) whether the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit;
and (2) whether or not a WPI is warranted.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. A complaint states a cause
of action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient
to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.s averments in the complaint show
a demandable right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on
the basis of their allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10
years; and (2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said
roads. There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it
is the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the
commuters and motorists may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such
right committed by Fil-Estate, et al. when they excavated the road and prevented
the commuters and motorists from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al.
consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in
accordance with the relief sought therein.
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class
suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is
one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court
finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the
interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any
party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual
interest.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject
matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the
parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court;
and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative
of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.[24]
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists
who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA:
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and
excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or
general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous
individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their
intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are
similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced
by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road.
Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents
in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as
parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These
individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Bian, Laguna and
other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
Anent the issue on the propriety of the WPI, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court lays down the rules for the issuance thereof. Thus:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of
violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz
Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein. As correctly ruled by the
CA:
Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the parties can
fully prove their respective positions on the issues.
Due process considerations dictate that the assailed injunctive writ is not a
judgment on the merits but merely an order for the grant of a provisional and
ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard. The hearing on the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is separate and distinct from the trial on the merits of the main
case. [29] The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not
conclusive or complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an
idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the
case on the merits.[30] There are vital facts that have yet to be presented during the
trial which may not be obtained or presented during the hearing on the application
for the injunctive writ.[31] Moreover, the quantum of evidence required for one is
different from that for the other.[32]
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 65276 dated December 11, 2001, which annulled the Orders dated January 29,
[1]
2001 and April 2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.[2]
R.A. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
(CARL). The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03, which was however rejected
by the respondent. Hence, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine
the just compensation of the land.
On October 14, 1998, the DARAB rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
SO ORDERED. [4]
Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of
Land Bank to pay the respondent the aforesaid amount as just compensation in the
manner provided by law. [5]
On September 2, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD,
alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of Execution issued on
June 18, 1999.He argued that such failure of the petitioner to comply with the writ of
execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1999, petitioner Land Bank filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC),
for the determination of just compensation, as provided for in Section 16 (f) of the
CARL. [6]
On August 20, 2000, the PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for Contempt,
as follows:
SO ORDERED. [7]
Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order,
[8]
which was however denied by the PARAD on September 20, 2000. Thus, petitioner
[9]
filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD, manifesting its intention to appeal the decision
to the DARAB Central, pursuant to Rule XI, Section 3 of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of
Procedure. [10]
On the other hand, the Special Agrarian Court dismissed the petition for the
determination of just compensation filed by petitioner Land Bank in an Order dated
October 25, 2000.Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of said dismissal was likewise
denied.
In a Resolution dated November 27, 2000, PARAD Capellan denied due course to
petitioners Notice of Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for
the payment of the adjudged amount of just compensation to respondent. On January
[11]
3, 2001, he directed the issuance of an arrest order against Manager Alex A. Lorayes. [12]
Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain PARAD Capellan from issuing the order of arrest. The case was raffled to
[13]
Branch 51 of said court. On January 29, 2001, the trial court issued an Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
SO ORDERED. [14]
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order, which was
denied in an Order dated April 2, 2001. [15]
Thus, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65276. On December 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals
[16]
rendered the assailed decision which nullified the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENTERTAINING THE RESPONDENTS SPECIAL
CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE FINAL ORDER OF THE
RTC WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS SUBJECT TO APPEAL UNDER THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE RTC
FINAL ORDER OF INJUNCTION, CONSIDERING THAT:
As regards the first issue, petitioner submits that the special civil action
for certiorari filed by respondent before the Court of Appeals to nullify the injunction
issued by the trial court was improper, considering that the preliminary injunction issued
by the trial court was a final order which is appealable to the Court of Appeals via a
notice of appeal. [18]
On the substantive issue of whether the order for the arrest of petitioners manager,
Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid, Rule XVIII of the 2003 DARAB Rules reads,
in pertinent part:
SECTION 2. Indirect Contempt. The Board or any of its members or its Adjudicator
may also cite and punish any person for indirect contempt on any of the grounds and
in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In this connection, Rule 71, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
deals with the commencement of indirect contempt proceedings, provides:
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of
or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall
allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and
the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
xxxxxxxxx
1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for
commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a
special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by
the courts, has been for any party to file a mere motion without paying any docket or
lawful fees therefor and without complying with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this amended section.
xxxxxxxxx
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order
of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a
verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor and shall be
disposed of in accordance with the second paragraph of this section. [22]
Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt,
namely, (1) through a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the
court motu proprio.
In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with
indirect contempt.
More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, referring
to indirect contempt against quasi-judicial entities, provides:
Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. Unless otherwise provided by law,
this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or
agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such
rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish
for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been
committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefore.
(emphasis supplied)
The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all the questions
regarding the applicability of these rules to quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:
1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the former Rule 71 applied
only to superior and inferior courts and did not comprehend contempt committed
against administrative or quasi-judicial officials or bodies, unless said contempt is
clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in the
second paragraph of Sec. 580, Revised Administrative Code. The provision referred to
contemplates the situation where a person, without lawful excuse, fails to appear,
make oath, give testimony or produce documents when required to do so by the
official or body exercising such powers. For such violation, said person shall be
subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court, upon application of the
official or body with the Regional Trial Court for the corresponding sanctions.
(emphasis in the original)
[23]
Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect
contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in
the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to
decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the
Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not
with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr.
Lorayes with indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified Motion for
Contempt filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following
reasons: First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the
[24]
Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not
initiated by the PARAD motu proprio;rather, it was by a motion filed by
respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the
contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was
beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings
that stemmed from respondents Motion for Contempt, specifically the Orders of the
PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes,
are null and void.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276, dated December 11, 2001,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, Branch 51, dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial
Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order of arrest
against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before Regional
Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.