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FIRST DIVISION

NERWIN INDUSTRIES G.R. No. 167057


CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:

CORONA,C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
*
BRION,
BERSAMIN, and
PNOC-ENERGY VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, and Promulgated:
ESTER R. GUERZON,
Chairman, Bids and Awards
Committee, April 11, 2012
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Republic Act No. 8975[1] expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme
Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction,
or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the
Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether
public or private, acting under the Governments direction, from: (a) acquiring,
clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National
Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the
National Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or
operating any such contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such
contract or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract or project.

Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory


prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction against a government contract or project acts contrary to law.
Antecedents

The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 22, 2004,[2] viz:

In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an


invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80,
for the supply and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles
and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the countrys Rural
Electrification Project. The said contract consisted of four (4) components,
namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for
NEAs projected allocation for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the
said invitation, bidders, such as private respondent [Nerwin], were required to
submit their application for eligibility together with their technical proposals. At
the same time, they were informed that only those who would pass the standard
pre-qualification would be invited to submit their financial bids.

Following a thorough review of the bidders qualifications and eligibility,


only four (4) bidders, including private respondent [Nerwin], qualified to
participate in the bidding for the IPB-80 contract. Thereafter, the qualified bidders
submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the
lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract. NEA then conducted a
pre-award inspection of private respondents [Nerwins] manufacturing plants and
facilities, including its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability
to supply and deliver NEAs requirements.

In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP
No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October
4, 2000, NEA administrator Conrado M. Estrella III recommended to NEAs
Board of Directors the approval of award to private respondent [Nerwin] of all
schedules for IBP No. 80 on account of the following:

a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder;

b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of
Nerwin Industries (lowest responsive and complying bidder) and the
second lowest bidder in the amount of $1.47 million for the poles and
$0.475 million for the crossarms, is deemed substantial and extremely
advantageous to the government. The price difference is equivalent to
7,948 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms;

c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids of
Nerwin and the Tri-State Pole and Piling, Inc. approximately in the
amount of $2.36 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the
crossarms are equivalent to additional 12.872 pcs. of poles and 20.967
pcs. of crossarms; and

d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the woodpoles


and specified in the bid documents and as based on the pre-award
inspection conducted.

However, on December 19, 2000, NEAs Board of Directors passed Resolution


No. 32 reducing by 50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80 given the time
limitations for the delivery of the materials, xxx, and with the loan closing date of
October 2001 fast approaching. In turn, it resolved to award the four (4)
schedules of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to private respondent
[Nerwin]. Private respondent [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction, alleging
that the same was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder.

On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to
have filed a complaint, citing alleged false or falsified documents submitted
during the pre-qualification stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project to
private respondent [Nerwin].

Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials
sought the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel who, among others,
upheld the eligibility and qualification of private respondent
[Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier
opinion but the Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no
legal impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent
[Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders
relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to file a
complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an injunction,
which injunctive application was granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil
Case No. 01102000.

In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under


the Department of Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation
to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural
Electrification Project (O-ILAW project).

Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-
ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil
Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy
Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and Awards
Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a
portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a
TRO issue to enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the wooden poles.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that
the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government
infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the
mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president
had no authority to sign and file the complaint.[3]

On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to respondents reply,
the RTC granted a TRO in Civil Case No. 03106921.[4]

On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,[5] as follows:

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is hereby issued by this


Court:

1. DENYING the motion to consolidate;

2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;

3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S. Sinsuat


and Mariano H. Paps from appearing as counsel for the defendants;

4. DECLARING defendants in default;

5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.

Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the


defendant PNOC-EDC and its Chairman of Bids and Awards Committee Esther
R. Guerzon from continuing the holding of the subject bidding upon the plaintiffs
filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to answer for any damage or
damages which the defendants may suffer should it be finally adjudged that
petitioner is not entitled thereto, until final determination of the issue in this case
by this Court.

This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond by the
plaintiffs in the amount of P200,000.00.

Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict
compliance herein is enjoined. Furnish the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel copy of this order.

SO ORDERED.
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30, 2003,
and also to set aside the order of default and to admit their answer to the complaint.

On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents motions for


reconsideration, to set aside order of default, and to admit answer.[6]

Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special


civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had
thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from the
Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and
established jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and in disqualifying
respondents counsel from representing them.[7]

On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,[8] to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 30


and December 29, 2003 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
Civil Case No. 03106921, private respondents complaint for issuance of
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction before Branch 37 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion
on February 9, 2005.[9]

Issues

Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues:

I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act
8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on government projects.

II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on the
basis of Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary
injunction but not injunction as a final remedy.
III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is also
one for damages.

Ruling

The petition fails.

In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and
set aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued on July 20, 2003 and December 29,
2003, and why it altogether dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows:
It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent
Judges issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.

Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for


TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction
through the assailed order enjoining petitioners sought bidding for its O-ILAW
Project. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved
on November 7, 2000, thus, already existing at the time respondent Judge issued
the assailed Orders dated July 20 and December 29, 2003.

Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:

Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order,


Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No
court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any
person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the governments
direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
xxx
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies
instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by
bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving
such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is
of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a
temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable
injury will arise. xxx

The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD


1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining
orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National
Resources Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the
government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature
by the Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge.

Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the Supreme Court
had the same embodied in its Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 which
reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or
Mandatory Injunction in cases involving Government Infrastructure
Projects. Pertinent is the ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Allarde As
regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of
the Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction: The term
infrastructure projects means construction, improvement and rehabilitation of
roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication facilities,
irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, shore
protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital
buildings and other related construction projects that form part of the government
capital investment.

Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts of the
case, that would justify respondent Judges blatant disregard of a simple,
comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance
of injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects. Respondent
Judge did not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case
falls under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply,
i.e., when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such
that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise.

Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because, in
the first place, he should not have given due course to private respondents
complaint for injunction.Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other grounds proffered
by petitioners.[10]

The CAs decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its
discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents
notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the express provisions of
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the
bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued
the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.

Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide:


Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders,
Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except
the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of
its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting
under the governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following
acts:

(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or


location of any national government project;

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government


as defined under Section 2 hereof;

(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of


any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and

(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary


for such contract/project.

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted


by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those
claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This
prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the
government if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to
the relief sought.

If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and
void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to
the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without
prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.

Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining order,


preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in
violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.

The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left
for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to
them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act
No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of
the lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and
respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary
prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the
Government.

It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo,


the Presiding Judge of Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to which Civil Case
No. 03106921 had been raffled, was in fact already found administratively liable
for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as the result of his issuance of
the assailed TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The Court could
only fine him in the amount of P40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his
intervening retirement from the service. That sanction was meted on him in A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2133 entitled Sinsuat v. Hidalgo,[11] where this Court stated:

The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As
the CA explained in its above-stated Decision in the petition for certiorari,
respondent failed to heed the mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A.
No. 8975 against a government infrastructure project, which the rural
electrification project certainly was. He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded
this Courts various circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and injunctions
against government infrastructure projects in line with the proscription under R.A.
No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos and National Housing
Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818 expressly
deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation
or execution of a government infrastructure project.

Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty.
Caguioa v. Judge Lavia faulted a judge for grave misconduct for issuing a TRO
against a government infrastructure project thus:

xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding


of the law or openly manifesting a contumacious indifference thereto. In
any case, his disregard of the clear mandate of PD 1818, as well as of the
Supreme Court Circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith,
constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper
administration of justice. His claim that the said statute is inapplicable to
his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious TRO is but a
contrived subterfuge to evade administrative liability.

In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor


assiduously to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws. Moreover,
they should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules. Also, they are expected to keep
abreast of and be conversant with the rules and the circulars which
the Supreme Court has adopted and which affect the disposition of
cases before them.

Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity


and good faith in the performance of their judicial functions, a blatant
disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law obviates
this presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative
sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent.

The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of the


law for being patently in disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules
which judges are expected to know and apply properly.

IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of


the law, which are serious charges under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court. He having retired from the service, a fine in the amount of P40,000 is
imposed upon him, the maximum amount fixed under Section 11 of Rule 140 as
an alternative sanction to dismissal or suspension.[12]

Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment and
discussion of Nerwins other submissions superfluous and unnecessary, the Court
notes that the RTC did not properly appreciate the real nature and true purpose of
the injunctive remedy. This failing of the RTC presses the Court to use this
decision to reiterate the norms and parameters long standing jurisprudence has set
to control the issuance of TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on
conformity to them by all litigants and lower courts. Only thereby may the grave
misconduct committed in Civil Case No. 03106921 be avoided.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or


proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency
or person, to refrain from a particular act or acts. [13] It is an ancillary or preventive
remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests during
the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is established that:

(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually; or
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to
the applicant; or

(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is


attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.[14]

The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is indispensable.


In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,
[15]
the Court elaborated on this requirement, viz:

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the


instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the
property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be
entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of
the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum
constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly,
the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be
protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of
that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right
not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to
restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the
perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected
by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is
enforceable as a matter of law.[16]

Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not demanded,


however, for, as the Court has held in Saulog v. Court of Appeals,[17] it is enough
that:

xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a
present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And
while a clear showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be
conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify
preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete
but need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the
merits. This should really be so since our concern here involves only the
propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of the case still
pending with the trial court.

Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private


respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for in its complaint xxx.[18]

In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts
considering that conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more
often than not involve and require a factual determination that is not the function of
the appellate courts.[19] Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be
sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the
grounds and in the manner provided by law.[20] When that is done, the exercise of
sound discretion by the issuing court in injunctive matters must not be interfered
with except when there is manifest abuse.[21]

Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be
wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that
tend to disposeof the merits without or before trial. Granting an application for
the relief in disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible,[22] for it is never
the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case,
[23]
or to decide controverted facts.[24] It is but a preventive remedy whose only
mission is to prevent threatened wrong,[25] further injury,[26] and irreparable
harm[27] or injustice[28] until the rights of the parties can be settled. Judges should
thus look at such relief only as a means to protect the ability of their courts to
render a meaningful decision.[29] Foremost in their minds should be to guard against
a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs
after a trial on the merits.[30] It is well worth remembering that the writ of
preliminary injunction should issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and
irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can be justly and thoroughly
studied and adjudicated.[31]

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals;


and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower courts
for their guidance.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
MANILA INTERNATIONAL G.R. No. 143870
AIRPORT AUTHORITY,

Petitioner, Present:

PUNO,

- versus - Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and

NAZARIO, JJ.

RIVERA VILLAGE LESSEE


HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Promulgated:

INCORPORATED, September 30, 2005

Respondent.

x------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated August
23, 2000 filed by the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA),
assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2000
which directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining petitioner from evicting the homeowners of Rivera
Village from their dwellings.

The antecedents, culled from the petition and the


assailed Decision, are as follows:

The then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was entrusted with


the administration, operation, management, control, maintenance
and development of the Manila International Airport (MIA), now the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Among its powers was the
power to enter into, make and execute concessions and concession
rights for purposes essential to the operation of the airport.

On May 25, 1965, the CAA, through its Director, Capt. Vicente
C. Rivera, entered into individual lease contracts with its employees
(lessees) for the lease of portions of a four (4)-hectare lot situated in
what is now known as Rivera Village located in Barangay 199 and
200 in Pasay City. The leases were for a twenty-five (25)-year period
to commence on May 25, 1965 up to May 24, 1990 at P20.00[3] per
annum as rental.

On May 4, 1982, Executive Order No. (EO) 778 was issued


(later amended by EO 903 on July 21, 1983), creating petitioner
MIAA, transferring existing assets of the MIA to MIAA, and
vesting the latter with the power to administer and operate the
MIA.
Sometime in January 1995, MIAA stopped issuing accrued
rental bills and refused to accept rental payments from the lessees.
As a result, respondent Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners
Association, Inc. (homeowners association), purportedly
representing the lessees, requested MIAA to sell the subject
property to its members, invoking the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Act and PD 2016.

The MIAA, on February 14, 1996, denied the request, claiming


that the subject property is included in its Conceptual Development
Plan intended for airport-related activities.

Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus and


prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction[4] against MIAA and the National Housing Authority
(NHA). The petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1598 in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, sought to restrain
the MIAA from implementing its Conceptual Development Plan
insofar as Rivera Village is concerned. It also sought to compel
MIAA to segregate Rivera Village from the scope of the Conceptual
Development Plan and the NHA to take the necessary steps for the
disposition of the property in favor of the members of the
homeowners association.

MIAA filed an answer[5] alleging that the petition fails to state a


cause of action in view of the expiration of the lease contracts and
the lack of personality to sue of the homeowners association. MIAA
also claimed that the homeowners association is not entitled to a
writ of mandamus because it does not have a clear legal right to
possess the subject property and MIAA does not have a
corresponding duty to segregate Rivera Village from its Conceptual
Development Plan.
A preliminary hearing on MIAAs affirmative defenses was
conducted, after which the trial court issued an Order[6] dated
October 12, 1998, denying the prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The dispositive portion
of the Order reads:

In view of all the foregoing, the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is hereby denied
for lack of merit and the above-entitled petition is hereby ordered
dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The trial court held that PD 1818 bars the issuance of a


restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving
infrastructure projects of the government or any public utility
operated by the government. It also ruled that the petition failed to
state a cause of action inasmuch as petitioner therein (respondent
homeowners association) is not the real party-in-interest, the
individual members of the association being the ones who have
possessory rights over their respective premises. Moreover, the lease
contracts have already expired.

As regards the contention that the lessees are entitled to


possess the subject property by virtue of PD 1517, Proclamation No.
1967 and PD 2016, which respectively identify parcels of urban
land as part of the Urban Land Reform Zone, specify certain areas
in Metro Manila, including Rivera Village, as areas for priority
development or urban land reform zones, and prohibit the eviction
of occupant families from such lands, the trial court declared that
the subject property has been reserved by MIAA for airport-related
activities and, as such, is exempt from the coverage of the
Comprehensive and Continuing Urban Development and Housing
Program under Republic Act No. (RA) 7279.

Respondent filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,


interposing essentially the same arguments raised before the trial
court. The appellate court annulled and set aside the order of the
trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the assailed October 12, 1998 Order is annulled, set


aside and reversed. The case is remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings.

A writ of preliminary injunction is issued restraining and preventing


respondent MIAA from evicting the members of petitioner Rivera Village
Association from their respective lots in the Rivera Village. Petitioner is
ordered to post a bond in the amount of P500,000.00 with the condition
that petitioner will pay to respondent MIAA all damages it may sustain
by reason of the injunction if the court should finally decided that
petitioner is not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the bond, the writ of
preliminary injunction shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The appellate court foremost ruled that the case can be


construed as a class suit instituted by the Rivera Village lessees.
The homeowners association, considered as the representative of
the lessees, merely instituted the suit for the benefit of its members.
It does not claim to have any right or interest in the lots occupied
by the lessees, nor seek the registration of the titles to the land in
its name.
On the issue of the expiration of the lease contracts and the
application of PD 1517, Proclamation No. 1967 and PD 2016, the
Court of Appeals held that the expiration of the lease contracts
cannot adversely affect the rights acquired by the lessees under the
foregoing laws. Besides, the lease contracts were impliedly renewed
by virtue of MIAAs acceptance of rental payments from May 25,
1990 up to December 1994. This resulted in an implied new lease
under Article 1670 of the Civil Code.

Moreover, the appellate court construed Sec. 5(c) of RA 7279


to mean that if the government lot has not been utilized during the
ten (10)-year period for the purpose for which it has been reserved
prior to 1983, then said lot is encompassed by the law and is
subject to distribution to the legitimate and qualified residents of
the area after appropriate proceedings have been undertaken.

As to whether PD 1818 bars the issuance of an injunctive writ


in this case, the appellate court ruled that PD 1818 is a general law
on the issuance of restraining orders and writs of preliminary
injunction. On the other hand, PD 2016 is a special law specifically
prohibiting the eviction of tenants from lands identified as areas for
priority development. Thus, the trial court can issue an injunctive
writ if the act sought to be restrained will enforce the eviction of
tenants from urban land reform zones.

The court, however, declared that it cannot make a definitive


ruling on the rights of the members of the homeowners
association vis--vis the MIAA Conceptual Development Plan,
considering the need for a full-blown trial to ferret out whether the
claimed rights under the pertinent laws have ripened to actual legal
and vested rights in their favor.
MIAA now seeks a review of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals. In the instant petition, MIAA contends that the appellate
court erred in ruling that PD 2016, which prohibits the eviction of
occupant families from real property identified as areas for priority
development or urban land reform zones, has modified PD 1818,
which bars the issuance of injunctive writ in cases involving
infrastructure projects of the government, including public utilities
for the transport of goods and commodities.

It argues that the petition filed by the homeowners association


with the trial court fails to state a cause of action because the
homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest in the suit.
Allegedly, the Board Resolution presented by respondent shows that
it was only the board of directors of the association, as
distinguished from the members thereof, which authorized
respondent to act as its representative in the suit.

MIAA also stresses that the subject property has recently been
reserved by MIAA for airport-related activities and, as such, Sec.
5(c) of RA 7279 applies. Under the said law, lands which are used,
reserved or otherwise set aside for government offices, facilities and
other installations are exempt from the coverage of the law.

Moreover, MIAA avers that the Court of Appeals should not


have granted injunctive relief to respondent, considering that the
grant of an injunction would inflict greater damage to petitioner and
to the public.

Respondent filed a Comment[9] dated November 20, 2000,


arguing that MIAA is mandated by law to dispose of Rivera Village
to the homeowners thereof. Under existing laws, the homeowners
have the right to possess and enjoy the property. To accept MIAAs
pretense that the property has been recently reserved for airport-
related activities and therefor exempt from the coverage of RA 7279
will allegedly violate the right of the homeowners as bona
fide tenants to socialized housing.

Respondent further argues that PD 1818 is inapplicable to this


case because it has established a clear and unmistakable right to
an injunction. Besides, PD 2016 which protects from eviction
tenants of lands identified for priority development, is a later
enactment which should be deemed to prevail over PD 1818.

In the Resolution[10] dated January 24, 2001, the petition was


given due course and the parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda.

Accordingly, MIAA submitted its Memorandum[11] dated March


20, 2001, while respondent filed its Memorandum[12] dated April 20,
2001. For its part, NHA manifested that it is adopting the
memorandum of MIAA as its own insofar as the same is germane
and material to NHAs stand.[13]

As presented and discussed by the parties, the issues are the


following:

1. Has PD 2016 modified PD 1818?

2. Did the petition filed by respondent with the trial court state a cause
of action against petitioner?

3. Is petitioner obliged to dispose of the subject properties in favor of the


members of respondent association after appropriate proceedings?
4. Is respondent entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction?[14]

We first resolve the threshold question of whether respondent


has personality to sue.

MIAA contends that the real parties-in-interest in the petition


filed with the trial court are the individual members of the
homeowners association. Not having been brought in the name of
the real parties-in-interest, the suit was correctly dismissed by the
trial court for failure to state a cause of action.

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court) requires


that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.[15] A case is dismissible for lack of personality to
sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest,
hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. [16]

The petition before the trial court was filed by the homeowners
association, represented by its President, Panfilo R. Chiutena, Sr.,
upon authority of a Board Resolution empowering the latter to file
[A]ll necessary action to the Court of Justice and other related acts
necessary to have our Housing Project number 4 land be titled to
the members of the Association.

Obviously, the petition cannot be considered a class suit


under Sec. 12, Rule 3[17] of the Rules of Court, the requisites
therefor not being present in the case, notably because the petition
does not allege the existence and prove the requisites of a class
suit, i.e., that the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons and the parties are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court,
and because it was brought only by one party.

In Board of Optometry v. Colet,[18] we held that courts must


exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the
exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties.
For while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable
to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were
otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by their self-
appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due
process.

There is, however, merit in the appellate courts


pronouncement that the petition should be construed as a suit
brought by the homeowners association as the representative of the
members thereof under Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.Where the action is allowed to


be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a
fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A
representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an
executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules.
An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed
principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when
the contract involves things belonging to the principal. [Emphasis
supplied.]

It is a settled rule that every action must be prosecuted or


defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Where the action
is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative acting
in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary must be included in the title
of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. The
name of such beneficiaries shall, likewise, be included in the
complaint.[19]

Moreover, Sec. 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that


facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity
must be averred in the complaint. In order to maintain an action in
a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence,
that is, he or she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a
legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person. The party
bringing suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the
representative character that he claims. If a complaint is filed by
one who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is
not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the
court does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. It must be
stressed that an unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal
effect.[20]

In this case, the petition filed with the trial court sufficiently
avers that the homeowners association, through its President, is
suing in a representative capacity as authorized under the Board
Resolution attached to the petition. Although the names of the
individual members of the homeowners association who are the
beneficiaries and real parties-in-interest in the suit were not
indicated in the title of the petition, this defect can be cured by the
simple expedient of requiring the association to disclose the names
of the principals and to amend the title and averments of the
petition accordingly.

Essentially, the purpose of the rule that actions should be


brought or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest is to
protect against undue and unnecessary litigation and to ensure
that the court will have the benefit of having before it the real
adverse parties in the consideration of a case. This rule, however, is
not to be narrowly and restrictively construed, and its application
should be neither dogmatic nor rigid at all times but viewed in
consonance with extant realities and practicalities. [21] As correctly
noted by the Court of Appeals, the dismissal of this case based on
the lack of personality to sue of petitioner-association will only
result in the filing of multiple suits by the individual members of
the association.

What is more decisive to the resolution of the present


controversy, however, is a matter not addressed by the parties in
the case before this Court, that is, the fact that the petition filed
before the trial court is for mandamus to compel MIAA to
segregate Rivera Village from the scope of its Conceptual
Development Plan and the NHA to take the necessary steps for
the disposition of the subject property in favor of the members of
the homeowners association.

Parenthetically, while the procedural rule is that a party is


required to indicate in his brief an assignment of errors and only
those assigned shall be considered by the appellate court in
deciding the case, it is equally settled that appellate courts have
ample authority to rule on matters not assigned as errors in an
appeal, if these are indispensable or necessary to the just resolution
of the pleaded issues.[22]

For instance, the Court has allowed the consideration of other


grounds not raised or assigned as errors specifically in the following
instances: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the
contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest
of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not
specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court
and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue
submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court
ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely
related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors
on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly
assigned is dependent.[23]

In this case, although the propriety of the filing of a petition for


mandamus was no longer raised as an issue before this Court,
MIAA asserted in its answer[24] to the original petition that the
homeowners association is not entitled to a writ of mandamus
because it has not shown any legal right to possess the subject
property and a correlative obligation on the part of MIAA to
segregate the property from its Conceptual Development Plan. MIAA
averred:

28. Petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of


mandamus. For a writ of mandamus to issue, it is essential that
petitioner has a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. The legal right
of petitioner to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and
certain. The corresponding duty of respondent to perform the required
act must also be clear and specific (Cf. Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203,
210 [1968]).

29. Petitioner, in view of the expiration of the lease contracts of its


individual members, has failed to show that it has the legal right to
possess the subject property.

30. There is therefore no corresponding duty on the part of


respondent MIAA to segregate the property from the scope of its
Conceptual Development Plan.[25]
The question of whether the homeowners association is entitled to
the issuance of a writ of mandamus was again raised in the
memorandum[26]filed by MIAA with the Court of Appeals. MIAA
alleged:

Appellant is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus.


For a writ of mandamus to issue, it is essential that the appellant has a
legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of
respondent to perform the act required. The legal right of appellant to the
thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain. The
corresponding duty of respondent to perform the required act must also
be clear and specific (cf. Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203, 210 [1968]).

In view of the expiration of the lease contracts of its individual


members, appellant has failed to show that it has the legal right to
possess the subject property. There is therefore no corresponding duty
on the part of the MIAA to segregate the property from the scope of its
conceptual development plan.[27]

The question of whether mandamus is the proper remedy was


clearly raised in the trial court and the Court of Appeals although it
was largely ignored by both courts. This issue being indispensable
to the resolution of this case, we shall rule on the matter.

A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioners legal


right to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be
compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right which
is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. [28]
In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is
essential that, on the one hand, petitioner has a clear legal right to
the claim that is sought and that, on the other hand, respondent
has an imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of him.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel
compliance with

a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt


exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to
command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate. Thus, it
is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right
but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right
to relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.

In this case, the Court of Appeals itself conceded that no


definitive ruling as regards the rights of the individual members of
the homeowners association could yet be made considering the
need for a full determination of whether their claimed rights under
the pertinent laws have ripened into actual legal and vested rights.
The appellate court even outlined the requisites under PD 1517
which have yet to be complied with, namely: (1) the submission to
the NHA of a proposal to acquire the subject property as required
under Sec. 9[29] of PD 1517;

and (2) proof that the members of the homeowners association are
qualified to avail of the benefits under PD 1517 as mandated by
Sec. 6[30] of the same law.
Resort to mandamus is evidently premature because there is
no showing that the members of the homeowners association have
already filed an application or proposal with the NHA to acquire
their respective lots. There is still an administrative remedy open to
the members of the homeowners association which they should
have first pursued, failing which they cannot invoke judicial action.
[31]

We note that while respondent alleges that its members


enlisted themselves with the NHA in order to avail of the benefits of
the law, the NHA, in its answer [32] to the petition, denied this
allegation for being self-serving. Whatever rights the members of the
homeowners association may have under the relevant laws are still
in substantial doubt or dispute. Hence, the petition for mandamus
was appropriately dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

So, too, should the prayer for the issuance of a writ of


prohibition contained in the same petition be denied. Writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are prerogative writs of equity
and their granting is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the
courts to be exercised on equitable principles. Said writs should
only be issued when the right to the relief is clear. [33] As our findings
in this case confirm, the homeowners association failed to establish
a clear legal right to the issuance of the writs of mandamus and
prohibition prayed for.

There is, moreover, another ground for the dismissal of the


petition filed before the trial court which appears to have been
overlooked by the parties in this case.

In the original petition filed before the trial court, the


homeowners association averred that although EO 903 transferred
to MIAA the properties and assets of MIA, such transfer was made
subject to what the homeowners association claims to be the
existing rights of its members.[34] MIAA dismissed this allegation as
an erroneous conclusion of law.[35]

We cite the complete text of the relevant provision of EO 903 to


fully understand the import thereof and its effect on the present
controversy. Section 3 thereof states:

Sec. 3. Creation of the Manila International Airport Authority.There


is hereby established a body corporate to be known as the Manila
International Airport Authority which shall be attached to the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications. The principal office of the
Authority shall be located at the New Manila International Airport. The
Authority may establish such offices, branches, agencies or subsidiaries
as it may deem proper and necessary; Provided, That any subsidiary that
may be organized shall have the prior approval of the President.

The land where the Airport is presently located as well as the


surrounding land area of approximately six hundred hectares, are
hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and
administration of the Authority,

subject to existing rights, if any. The Bureau of Lands and other


appropriate government agencies shall undertake an actual survey of the
area transferred within one year from the promulgation of this Executive
Order and the corresponding title to be issued in the name of the
authority. Any portion thereof shall not be disposed through sale or
through any other mode unless specifically approved by the
President of the Philippines. [Emphasis supplied.]

As can clearly be seen from the foregoing provision, while it is


true that the ownership and administration of the airport and its
surrounding land was assigned to MIAA subject to existing rights,
which we may here understand to be the rights granted under PD
1517, EO 903 specifically requires the approval of the President of
the Philippines before any disposition by sale or any other mode
may be made concerning the property transferred to MIAA.

The Executive Secretary as representative of the President of


the Philippines is, therefore, an indispensable party in actions
seeking to compel the sale or disposition of properties of the MIAA.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that parties-in-
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Thus, the presence of all indispensable parties is a
condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is
precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that
the action should be dismissed. The plaintiff is mandated to
implead all indispensable parties, and the absence of one renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to
those present. One who is a party to a case is not bound by any
decision of the court; otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to
due process.[36]

For the foregoing reasons, the prayer for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction must perforce be denied. Preliminary
injunction is a mere ancillary remedy which cannot stand
separately or proceed independently of the main case. Having
declared that the petition filed before the trial court was correctly
dismissed, the determination of the homeowners associations
entitlement to a writ of preliminary injunction is already moot and
academic.[37]

Besides, as earlier noted, the right of the members of the


homeowners association to possess and purchase the subject
property is still uncertain considering that they have not completed
the process for the acquisition of their lots as outlined in PD 1517.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting
substantive rights and interests. The writ of preliminary injunction
is issued by the court to prevent threatened or continuous
irreparable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied and adjudicated. Its sole objective is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. The writ is
issued upon the satisfaction of two requisites, namely: (1) the
existence of a right to be protected; and (2) acts which are violative
of said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of
the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction
is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the
complainants right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.
The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual
existing right is not a ground for an injunction. [38]

With this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the


other issues raised in this petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.


The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2000 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 97-1598 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City is ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN G.R. No. 157315


and CITY MAYOR LEONIDES
THERESA B. PLAZA, the latter in
her personal capacity and as
representative of
Present:
her co-defendant,
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,
Petitioners, BRION,

BERSAMIN,

VILLARAMA, JR., and


-versus -
ARANAL-SERENO, JJ.

CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING
SYSTEM (CBS), INC., doing
business under the name and
style DXBR Bombo Radyo

Butuan, represented by its

Manager, Norberto P.

Pagaspas, and HON. ROSARITO F.


DABALOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, Promulgated:
RTC, BRANCH 2, OF AGUSAN

DEL NORTE AND BUTUANCITY,

Respondents.

December 1, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza
(petitioners) appeal the adverse decision dated October 28, 2002 (dismissing their
petition for certiorari and prohibition to challenge the grant by the trial judge of
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction after reconsidering his earlier
self-inhibition),[1] and the resolution dated January 29, 2003 (denying their motion
for reconsideration), both promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 69729 entitled City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides
Theresa B. Plaza, the latter in her personal capacity and as representative of her
co-defendant v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc., doing business
under the name and style DXBR Bombo Radyo Butuan, represented by its
Manager, Norberto P. Pagaspas, and the Hon. Rosarito F. Dabalos, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 2, of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.

Antecedents[2]

In February, 2002, City Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza) wrote to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Butuan City to solicit its support for her decision to deny the
application for mayors permit of respondent Bombo Radyo/Consolidated
Broadcasting System (CBS), and to eventually close down CBSs radio station. She
justified her decision by claiming that CBSs operating its broadcasting business
within the Arujiville Subdivision, a residential area, had violated the Citys zoning
ordinance. Her letter pertinently reads:

In 1994, Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System manifested their


intention to operate on their current site at Arujiville Subdivision which is a residential
area. They were informed that they cannot situate their business in the area as it
violates our zoning ordinance. However, they have pleaded and was agreeable to
operate in the area by virtue of a Temporary Use Permit (TUP) xxx.
The TUP allowed them to operate in the area but only for a very limited period. As
a matter of fact, the TUP was good only for one year, which can be renewed every year
for a maximum of five (5) years or until 1999. Thus, right from the beginning they have
been informed and forewarned that they cannot operate in the area forever and that
they have to relocate to a proper area.

Bombo Radyo renewed its TUP only in 1995 and 1996. They have failed to renew
their TUP up to today.

This office has received numerous complaints against Bombo Radyo for violation
of private rights, inciting people to go rise against the government, malicious
imputations, insinuations against people not of their liking, false or fabricated news, etc.
The list is so long to enumerate. Copies of the petitions, manifestos from various groups
is hereto attached for your perusal.

Thus, for violation of the city zoning ordinance, the expiration of their TUP, which
was never renewed since 1997, failure to secure ECC and the numerous complaints
against the station of the residents within the immediate vicinity of their premises and
the threat they are causing to the peace and order of the City, I have decided to deny
their application for a mayor's permit and thereafter to close the radio station.

In view of the foregoing premises, I am forwarding this matter to the Sangguniang


Panlungsod to solicit your resolution of support on the matter.

This is not a decision calculated to deprived (sic) Radio Bombo of its freedom of
speech or expression. This is just a simply matter of whether or not Radyo Bombo has
complied with existing laws and ordinances.

Thereupon, the Sangguninang Panlungsod adopted Resolution-057-2002 to


strongly support the decision of the City Mayor to deny the application of
Consolidated Broadcasting System Development Corporation (Bombo Radyo-
Butuan) for a Mayors Permit and thereafter close the radio station. [3]
On February 18, 2002, the Citys licensing officer served on CBSs station manager
a final/last notice of violation and demand to cease and desist illegal operation,
with a warning that he would recommend the closure of its business in case of
non-compliance.

On February 19, 2002, CBS and its manager, Norberto Pagaspas, filed a complaint
for prohibition, mandamus, and damages against the petitioners in the Regional
Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC), [4] with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from closing its
station, or from disturbing and preventing its business operations. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5193, was raffled to Branch 2, presided by Judge
Rosarito P. Dabalos.

On February 20, 2002, Judge Dabalos voluntarily inhibited and directed the return
of Civil Case No. 5193 to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle. [5] He cited
the circumstances that might affect his objectivity and impartiality in resolving the
controversy as his justification, to wit:

xxx

a) That the undersigned was the object of its (plaintiff's) attacks and
criticism which are judgmental and not inquisitorial in the comments over the
air;

b) That the undersigned was shouted at disrespectfully by one of


plaintiff's reporters/news gatherers in the vicinity of the Hall of Justice;

c) That plaintiff's commentaries are making pronouncements on legal


matters, substantive and procedural, based on its perception and not on laws;

d) That in its commentaries in attacking public officials as well as private


individuals, words which are disrespectful and indecent are used.
and the net effect and result of its commentaries over the air causes confusion on the
minds of the public, including the young that the court and government offices and
public officials will lose their credibility and respect which are due them.

The court is aware of press freedom is enshrined in our constitution but such
freedom should not be abused because in every right there is a concomitant obligation.

Let therefore this case be returned immediately to the office [of the] Clerk of
Court VI for re-raffling.

SO ORDERED.

On the same day, Judge Victor Tomaneng, Presiding Judge of Branch 33,
issued an order also inhibiting himself from handling Civil Case No. 5193, and in
his capacity as Vice Executive Judge (in lieu of Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo,
Jr., then on sick leave) directed the assignment of Civil Case No. 5193 to Branch 5
without raffle,[6] viz:

xxx Considering that the Executive Judge Hon. Cipriano B. Alvizo, the Presiding
Judge of RTC-Branch 4 and Acting-Designate Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3, but who is
now in Cebu City for medical treatment, it would be impractical to include his courts in
the re-raffling of cases for the reason that the case is for prohibition, mandamus,
injunction, etc., that needs immediate action. The herein Vice-Executive Judge who is
the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 33, could not also act on this case on the ground of
'delicadeza' considering that defendant Hon. Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza is his
'kumadre' plus the fact that before becoming judge he was the legal counsel of the LDP
party here in Butuan City, in the election of 1992 and 1995, which is the political party of
the Plazas. RTC-Branch 1, being the exclusive Family Court cannot also be included in any
raffle.

In view of the foregoing, and on the ground of expediency, the Clerk of Court is
ordered to send this case to RTC-Branch 5, without raffle anymore, it being the only
practical available court in this jurisdiction as of this moment.
Civil Case No. 5193 was forwarded to Branch 5, presided by Judge Augustus L.
Calo, who recused because his wife had been recently appointed
by Mayor Plaza to the Citys Legal Office. Judge Calo ordered the immediate return
of the case to the Clerk of Court for forwarding to Vice Executive Judge
Tomaneng.

Without any other judge to handle the case, Judge Tomaneng formally
returned Civil Case No. 5193 to Judge Dabalos, stating in his letter that Judge
Dabalos reason for inhibition did not amount to a plausible ground to inhibit.
Judge Tomaneng instructed Judge Dabalos to hear the case unless the Supreme
Court approved the inhibition.[7]

On February 21, 2002, Judge Tomaneng issued a TRO, [8] to wit:

The Court believes that there is a need to maintain the status quo until all the
other issues in the complaint shall have been duly heard and determined without
necessarily implying that plaintiff is entitled to the prayers for injunction. The Court
hereby resolves in the meantime to grant a temporary restraining order.

WHEREFORE, defendants City Gov't of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B.
Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities and/or any person acting
upon the Mayors order and instruction under her authority are hereby enjoined to
cease, desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADYO BOMBO or from
preventing, disturbing, or molesting its business operations, including but not limited to
the use and operation of its building, structures and broadcasting facilities, and the
ingress or egress of its employees therein.

As this Court cannot issue a seventy-two (72) hour Temporary Restraining Order
because of the incoming delay on Monday, February 25, 2002, a temporary restraining
order is hereby issued effective for twenty (20) days from issuance (Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure).
Meanwhile, let this case be set for summary hearing on March 11, 2002 at 8:30 in
the morning to resolve the pending application for injunction and for the defendants to
show cause why the same shall not be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

On February 25, 2002, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to lift or


dissolve temporary restraining order in Branch 2 (sala of Judge Dabalos).
On February 26, 2002, Judge Dabalos referred his order of inhibition in Civil
Case No. 5193 to the Court Administrator for consideration, with a request for the
designation of another Judge not stationed in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte
to handle the case.[9]

Consequently, CBS requested the Court to designate another judge to hear its
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the hearing of
which Judge Tomaneng had set on March 11, 2002.[10]

In the meanwhile, or on March 8, 2002, the petitioners filed their answer to the
complaint, alleging affirmative and special defenses and praying for the dismissal
of the complaint, the lifting of the TRO, the denial of the prayer for preliminary
injunction, and the granting of their counterclaims for moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.

During the hearing on March 11, 2002 of CBSs application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, at which the petitioners and their counsel did not
appear, CBSs counsel manifested that he was desisting from his earlier request
with the Court for the designation of another judge to hear Civil Case No. 5193.
Judge Dabalos noted the manifestation but reset the hearing of the application
for preliminary injunction on March 12, 2002, to give the petitioners an
opportunity to show cause why the writ prayed for should not issue. For the
purpose of the resetting, Judge Dabalos caused a notice of hearing to be served
on the petitioners.[11]

Upon receipt of the notice of hearing, the petitioners moved to quash the notice
and prayed that the TRO be lifted, insisting that Judge Dabalos had already lost his
authority to act on Civil Case No. 5193 by virtue of his inhibition.[12]

Nonetheless, Civil Case No. 5193 was called on March 12, 2002. The parties and
their respective counsel appeared. At the close of the proceedings on that date,
Judge Dabalos granted CBSs prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction,[13] to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing as the defendants did not introduce any
evidence in spite of the order of the Court to show cause why no writ of preliminary
injunction be issued and the repeated directive of the court in open court for the
defendants to present evidence which the defendants firmly refused to do so on flimsy
grounds, the Court resolves to issue a writ of preliminary injunction as the complaint
under oath alleges that plaintiff is a grantee of a franchise from the Congress of the
Philippines and the act threatened to be committed by the defendants curtail the
constitutional right of freedom of speech of the plaintiff which the Court finds that it
should be looked into, the defendants' refusal to controvert such allegations by evidence
deprived the Court [of] the chance to be guided by such evidence to act accordingly that
it left the court no alternative but to grant the writ prayed for, the City Government of
Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees,
police authorities and/or any person acting upon the Mayor's order or instructions or
under her authority are hereby enjoined to cease and desist and to refrain from closing
or padlocking RADYO BOMBO or from preventing, disturbing or molesting its business
operations, including but not limited to the use and operation of its building, structures,
broadcasting facilities and the ingress or egress of its employees therein upon plaintiff's
putting up a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 duly approved by this court which
injunction bond shall be executed in favor of the defendants to answer for whatever
damages which the defendants may sustain in connection with or arising from the
issuance of this writ if, after all the court will finally adjudge that plaintiff is not entitled
thereto.
This order is without prejudice to the findings of the court after a formal hearing
or a full blown trial.

Furnish copies of this order to the Hon. Supreme Court and the Hon. Court
Administrator.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Following CBSs posting of P200,000.00 as the required injunction bond,


Branch 2 issued the writ of preliminary injunction on March 15, 2002,
[15]
commanding and directing the provincial sheriff to:

xxx forthwith enjoin the City Government of Butuan and the Hon. City Mayor
Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities and/or
any person acting upon the mayor's order or instruction or under her authority to cease
and desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADIO BOMBO or from preventing
disturbing or molesting its business operations, including the use and operation of its
building, structures, broadcasting facilities and the ingress and egress of its employees
therein. Copies of the writ of preliminary injunction, bond and other pertinent
documents thereto be served on the defendants and thereafter make a return of your
service of this writ within the period required by law and the Rules of Court.

Thus, the petitioners commenced in the CA a special civil action


for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction).

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition upon a finding that
Judge Dabalos had committed no grave abuse of discretion in acting upon CBSs
application for preliminary injunction, given the peculiar circumstances
surrounding the raffling and assignment of Civil Case No. 5193, and the urgent
need to resolve the application for preliminary injunction due to the expiration of
Judge Tomanengs TRO by March 13, 2002. The CA held that the writ of
preliminary injunction had properly issued, because the petitioners had
threatened to defeat CBSs existing franchise to operate its radio station
in Butuan City by not issuing the permit for its broadcast business.

Issues

Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari, with the petitioners
contending that:[16]

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ROSARITO
F. DABALOS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN, ON MARCH 12,
2002, WITHOUT SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO PETITIONERS, HE AGAIN TOOK COGNIZANCE
OF AND RE-ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD
ALREADY EFFECTIVELY INHIBITED HIMSELF FROM HEARING THE SAME IN TWO
EARLIER ORDERS HE HAD ISSUED DATED FEBRUARY 20 AND FEBRUARY 26,
2002 RESPECTIVELY.

II. ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ROSARITO DABALOS COULD VALIDLY RE-
ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD EARLIER ISSUED
TWO ORDERS VOLUNTARILY INHIBITING HIMSELF FROM HEARING SAID CASE, THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
WITHOUT REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW
WHETHER SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS A CLEAR RIGHT THERETO.

Ruling
The appeal lacks merit. We find that the CA did not commit any error in upholding
the questioned orders of the RTC.

Judge Dabalos lawfully re-assumed

jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193

In its decision, the CA ruled that Judge Dabalos did not gravely abuse his
discretion in re-assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193 in the light of the
obtaining circumstances cogently set forth in its assailed decision, to wit: [17]

Seemingly, petitioners lost sight of the reality that after the respondent judge issued his
order of inhibition and directed the return of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court
for re-raffle to another judge, Vice-Executive Judge Victor A. Tomaneng, noting that
there is no other judge to handle the case, directed the return thereof to the public
respondent in view of the extreme urgency of the preliminary relief therein prayed for.
Under the circumstances then obtaining, the respondent judge could do no less but to
act thereon. So it is that he proceeded with the scheduled hearing on the application for
preliminary injunction on March 11, 2002 and thereafter reset it for continuation the
following day to afford the petitioners an opportunity to oppose the application and
show cause why the writ prayed for should not issue. The urgency of the action
demanded of the respondent judge is further accentuated by the fact that the TRO
issued by Judge Tomaneng was then about to expire on March 13, 2002, not to mention
the circumstance that Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr., who happened to be
around, advised the respondent judge to resolve the issues to the best of his discretion.
xxx
The petitioners disagree, and insist that Judge Dabalos lost the authority to
act upon CBSs application for preliminary injunction by virtue of his prior self-
inhibition from hearing Civil Case No. 5193.
We cannot sustain the petitioners insistence.

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which contains the rule on
inhibition and disqualification of judges, states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case
in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee
or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties-in-interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

The self-inhibition of Judge Dabalos was one taken in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1. Our resolution herein turns, therefore, on the
proper interpretation and application of the second paragraph.

The second paragraph of Section 1 (unlike the first paragraph) does not
expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition. This means that the
determination of the grounds is left to the sound discretion of the judge, who
must discern with only his or her conscience as guide on what may be just and
valid reasons for self-inhibition. The vesting of discretion necessarily proceeds
from the reality that there may be many and different grounds for a judge to
recuse from a case, and such grounds cannot all be catalogued in the Rules of
Court. Thus did the Court cogently point out in Gutang v. Court of Appeals:[18]
xxx The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision
on whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the trial
judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the
case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of
pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for
adjudication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of
objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors
that lead to preference or predilections are many and varied.

In his case, Judge Dabalos clearly discerned after the return of Civil Case No.
5193 to him by the Vice Executive Judge that his self-doubt about his ability to
dispense justice in Civil Case No. 5193 generated by the airing of criticisms against
him and other public officials by CBSs commentators and reporters would not
ultimately affect his objectivity and judgment. Such re-assessment of the ground
for his self-inhibition, absent a showing of any malice or other improper motive on
his part, could not be assailed as the product of an unsound exercise of his
discretion. That, it seems to us, even the petitioners conceded, their objection
being based only on whether he could still re-assume jurisdiction of Civil Case No.
5193.

We hold that although a trial judge who voluntarily inhibits loses


jurisdiction to hear a case,[19] he or she may decide to reconsider the self-inhibition
and re-assume jurisdiction after a re-assessment of the circumstances giving cause
to the inhibition. The discretion to reconsider acknowledges that the trial judge is
in the better position to determine the issue of inhibition, and a reviewing tribunal
will not disturb the exercise of that discretion except upon a clear and strong
finding of arbitrariness or whimsicality.[20] Thus, Judge Dabalos re-assumption of
jurisdiction was legally tenable, having come from his seizing the opportunity to
re-assess the circumstances impelling his self-inhibition upon being faced with the
urgent need to hear and resolve CBSs application for preliminary injunction. Such
action was commendable on his part, given that the series of self-inhibitions by
the other RTC Judges had left no competent judge in the station to hear and
resolve the application. It can even be rightly said that a refusal by Judge Dabalos
to re-assess and reconsider might have negated his sacred and sworn duty as a
judge to dispense justice.

In this connection, the urgency for the RTC to hear and resolve the
application for preliminary injunction factually existed. In fact, CBS had
communicated it to the Court in its letter dated March 5, 2002,[21] to wit:

If not for the temporary restraining order issued on February 21, 2002 by the Honorable
Judge VICTOR A. TOMANENG, Vice-Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of Branch 33 of
said court xxx violent confrontations would have continued between supporters of
plaintiff RADIO BOMBO BUTUAN, on the one hand, and the loyalists of City Mayor
LEONIDES THERESA PLAZA (including some city employees) led by the Mayor herself and
her husband, former Mayor DEMOCRITO PLAZA II, on the other hand.

xxx

As set forth in the temporary restraining order, the hearing on the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction is set on Monday, March 11, 2002 because the twenty-day
lifetime of the temporary restraining order would expire on March 13, 2002. A repeat of
the violent scenario of February 21 may occur unless the application is heard as
scheduled by a Regional Trial Court Judge who had not inhibited himself. xxx

Verily, Judge Dabalos decision to hear the application for preliminary injunction
pending the Courts resolution of the query on whether or not another Judge
sitting outside the City of Butuan should take cognizance of Civil Case No. 5193
did not constitute or equate to arbitrariness or whimsicality. He had reasonable
grounds to do so in the context of the tight circumstances that had developed
in Civil Case No. 5193 following his self-inhibition. Surely, his decision to
reconsider did not proceed from passion or whim, but from his faithful adherence
to his solemn oath to do justice to every man. He thereby neither violated any law
or canon of judicial conduct, nor abused his juridical authority.
II.

Petitioners to adduce evidence after granting of TRO


The petitioners submit that Judge Dabalos improperly resolved CBSs application
for preliminary injunction by not first requiring the applicant to adduce evidence
in support of the application.

We do not agree with the petitioners.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or


proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an
agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. [22] It may
also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known
as a preliminary mandatory injunction.[23] Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one that
commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory
injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in
the past.[24]

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the


instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the
property sought to be protected.[25] It is proper only when the applicant appears to
be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, [26] which must aver the
existence of the right and the violation of the right,[27] or whose averments must in
the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought.
[28]
Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that
the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is
violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right
not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain
an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration
of an act prohibited by statute. [29] Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction,
means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law.[30]

While it is true that CBS was not required to present evidence to prove its
entitlement to the injunctive writ, the writ was nonetheless properly granted on
the basis of the undisputed facts that CBS was a grantee of a franchise from the
Legislature, and that the acts complained against (i.e., refusal of the Mayors
permit and resulting closure of the radio station) were imminent and, unless
enjoined, would curtail or set at naught CBSs rights under the franchise. In this
regard, worthy of mention is that even the Vice
Executive Judge, acknowledging that CBS had stood to suffer grave

injustice and irreparable injury should its radio station suffer closure, had
issued ex parte the TRO.

It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the evidence of CBS should
have first been required before Judge Dabalos issued the writ of preliminary
injunction. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on the shoulders
of the petitioners, as the parties against whom the TRO was issued, to show cause
why the application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue, [31] thus:

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No


preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before
the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective
only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must
order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the
injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not
the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding
order.

xxx

In fine, Judge Dabalos properly directed the petitioners to first present


evidence why the application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not be
granted. By their refusal to comply with the directive to show cause by presenting
their evidence to that effect, the petitioners could blame no one but themselves.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm the
decision dated October 28, 2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 69729.

Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

JUANA COMPLEX I G.R. No. 152272


HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA,
BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN,
DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA
DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY,
FLORENCIA M. MERCADO,
LEOVINO C. DATARIO, AIDA

A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M.
DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY
and NELSON A. LOYOLA,

Petitioners,

- versus -

FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC.,

FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM


CORPORATION, LA
PAZHOUSING AND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, WARBIRD
SECURITY AGENCY,

ENRIQUE RIVILLA,

MICHAEL E. JETHMAL

and MICHAEL ALUNAN,

Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC.,

FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM


CORPORATION, LA
PAZHOUSING AND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, WARBIRD
SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE
RIVILLA, MICHAEL E.
JETHMAL and MICHAEL
ALUNAN, G. R. No. 152397
Petitioners,

Present:
- versus -

JUANA COMPLEX I
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, PERALTA,
BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN,
DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA ABAD,
DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY,
FLORENCIA M. MENDOZA, and
MERCADO, LEOVINO C. PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
DATARIO, AIDA

A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M.
DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY
and NELSON A. LOYOLA,

Respondents.

Promulgated:

March 5, 2012

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court are two (2) consolidated petitions assailing the July 31,
2001 Decision[1] and February 21, 2002 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543, which annulled and set aside the March
3, 1999 Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Bian,
Laguna (RTC), granting the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, and upheld the June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order [4] denying the motion to
dismiss.

The Facts:

On January 20, 1999, Juana Complex I Homeowners Association,


Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and other
neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a
complaint[5] for damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the
regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions
who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (Fil-
Estate), Fil-estate Ecocentrum Corporation (FEEC), La Paz Housing &
Development Corporation (La Paz), and Warbird Security Agency and their
respective officers (collectively referred as Fil-Estate, et al.).

The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and
motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba;
that they used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by
passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road; that they had
been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years; that in August 1998, Fil-
estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so
JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said road; that La Paz Road was
restored by the residents to make it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road
again; that JCHA reported the matter to the Municipal Government and the Office
of the Municipal Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road to make it passable
and safe to motorists and pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz
Road caused damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious
hours to them, to the commuters and motorists because traffic was re-routed to
narrow streets that caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard; and that its
permanent closure would not only prejudice their right to free and unhampered use
of the property but would also cause great damage and irreparable injury.

Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a


Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to
enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and intimidating them in their use of La Paz
Road.
On February 10, 1999, a TRO was issued ordering Fil-Estate, et al, for a
period of twenty (20) days, to stop preventing, coercing, intimidating or harassing
the commuters and motorists from using the La Paz Road. [6]

Subsequently, the RTC conducted several hearings to determine the


propriety of the issuance of a WPI.

On February 26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss [7] arguing
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed
as a class suit. On March 5, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed their comment[8] on the motion
to dismiss to which respondents filed a reply.[9]

On March 3, 1999, the RTC issued an Order [10] granting the WPI and
required JCHA, et al. to post a bond.

On March 19, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion for


reconsideration[11] arguing, among others, that JCHA, et al. failed to satisfy the
requirements for the issuance of a WPI. On March 23, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed
their opposition to the motion.[12]

The RTC then issued its June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order, denying both the
motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by Fil-Estate, et al.

Not satisfied, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the CA to annul (1) the Order dated March 3, 1999 and (2) the Omnibus
Order dated June 16, 2000. They contended that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. With regard to the
issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that JCHA, et al. failed to show that
they had a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and further
claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens registered private road and there was
neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it.[13]

On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered the decision partially granting the
petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The


Order dated March 3, 1999 granting the writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE but the portion of the Omnibus Order
dated June 16, 2000 denying the motion to dismiss is upheld.

SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when
JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that they had been using La Paz Road for
more than ten (10) years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed
and excavated the road. It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint was
properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of common interest
and that the individuals sought to be represented were so numerous that it was
impractical to include all of them as parties. The CA, however, annulled the WPI
for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove their clear and present right over La Paz Road.
The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for a full-blown trial on the
merits.

Hence, these petitions for review.

In G.R. No. 152272, JCHA, et al. come to this Court, raising the following
issues:
(A)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT A


FULL-BLOWN TRIAL ON THE MERITS IS REQUIRED TO
DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE LA PAZ ROAD, HAD DEPARTED
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
SUPERVISION.

(B)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT


THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, HAD
DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.[15]

In G.R. No. 152397, on the other hand, Fil-Estate, et al. anchor their petition
on the following issues:

I.
The Court of Appeals declaration that respondents Complaint
states a cause of action is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence.

II.
The Court of Appeals pronouncement that respondents complaint
was properly filed as a class suit is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence.

III.

The Court of Appeals conclusion that full blown trial on the


merits is required to determine the nature of the La Paz Road is
contrary to existing laws and jurisprudence.[16]
JCHA, et al. concur with the CA that the complaint sufficiently stated a
cause of action. They, however, disagree with the CAs pronouncement that a full-
blown trial on the merits was necessary. They claim that during the hearing on the
application of the writ of injunction, they had sufficiently proven that La Paz Road
was a public road and that commuters and motorists of their neighboring villages
had used this road as their means of access to the San Agustin Church, Colegio De
San Agustin and to SLEX in going to Metro Manila and to Southern Tagalog
particularly during the rush hours when traffic at Carmona Entry/Exit and Susana
Heights Entry/Exit was at its worst.

JCHA, et al. argue that La Paz Road has attained the status and character of
a public road or burdened by an apparent easement of public right of way. They
point out that La Paz Road is the widest road in the neighborhood used by
motorists in going to Halang Road and in entering the SLEX-Halang toll gate and
that there is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity. For
residents of San Pedro, Laguna, the shortest, convenient and safe route towards
SLEX Halang is along Rosario Avenue joining La Paz Road.

Finally, JCHA, et al. argue that the CA erred when it voided the WPI
because the public nature of La Paz Road had been sufficiently proven and, as
residents of San Pedro and Bian, Laguna, their right to use La Paz Road is
undeniable.

In their Memorandum,[17] Fil-Estate, et al. explain that La Paz Road is


included in the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
T-120008, T-90321 and T-90607, all registered in the name of La Paz. The purpose
of constructing La Paz Road was to provide a passageway for La Paz to its
intended projects to the south, one of which was the Juana Complex I. When Juana
Complex I was completed, La Paz donated the open spaces, drainage, canal, and
lighting facilities inside the Juana Complex I to the Municipality of Bian. The
streets within the subdivisions were then converted to public roads and were
opened for use of the general public. The La Paz Road, not being part of the Juana
Complex I, was excluded from the donation. Subsequently, La Paz became a
shareholder of FEEC, a consortium formed to develop several real properties in
Bian, Laguna, known as Ecocentrum Project. In exchange for shares of stock, La
Paz contributed some of its real properties to the Municipality of Bian, including
the properties constituting La Paz Road, to form part of the Ecocentrum Project.

Fil-Estate, et al. agree with the CA that the annulment of the WPI was proper
since JCHA, et al. failed to prove that they have a clear right over La Paz Road.
Fil-Estate, et al. assert that JCHA, et al. failed to prove the existence of a right of
way or a right to pass over La Paz Road and that the closure of the said road
constituted an injury to such right. According to them, La Paz Road is a torrens
registered private road and there is neither a voluntary nor legal easement
constituted over it. They claim that La Paz Road is a private property registered
under the name of La Paz and the beneficial ownership thereof was transferred to
FEEC when La Paz joined the consortium for the Ecocentrum Project.

Fil-Estate, et al., however, insist that the complaint did not sufficiently
contain the ultimate facts to show a cause of action. They aver the bare allegation
that one is entitled to something is an allegation of a conclusion which adds
nothing to the pleading.

They likewise argue that the complaint was improperly filed as a class suit
for it failed to show that JCHA, et al. and the commuters and motorists they are
representing have a well-defined community of interest over La Paz Road. They claim
that the excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a common right or
cause of action for JCHA, et al. against them since each of them has a separate and
distinct purpose and each may be affected differently than the others.
The Courts Ruling
The issues for the Courts resolution are: (1) whether or not the complaint states a
cause of action; (2) whether the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit;
and (2) whether or not a WPI is warranted.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. A complaint states a cause
of action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:

(1) the legal right of the plaintiff,


(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.[18]

The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined


by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. [19] Thus, it must
contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the
plaintiffs cause of action.[20] To be taken into account are only the material
allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other
matters aliunde are not considered.[21]

The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a


cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render
a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. [22] Stated
differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the
defense that may be asserted by the defendant.[23]

In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient
to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.s averments in the complaint show
a demandable right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on
the basis of their allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10
years; and (2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said
roads. There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it
is the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the
commuters and motorists may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such
right committed by Fil-Estate, et al. when they excavated the road and prevented
the commuters and motorists from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al.
consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in
accordance with the relief sought therein.

With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class
suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is
one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court
finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the
interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any
party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual
interest.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject
matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the
parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court;
and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative
of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.[24]

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists
who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA:

The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and
excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or
general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous
individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their
intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are
similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced
by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road.
Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents
in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as
parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These
individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Bian, Laguna and
other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
Anent the issue on the propriety of the WPI, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court lays down the rules for the issuance thereof. Thus:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act


or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to
the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or


attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous


irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.[25] The requisites for its issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. [26]For the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected
must be a present right, a legal right which must be shown to be clear and positive.
[27]
This means that the persons applying for the writ must show that they have an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.[28]

In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of
violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz
Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein. As correctly ruled by the
CA:

Here, contrary to the ruling of respondent Judge, private respondents


failed to prove as yet that they have a clear and unmistakable right over the La
Paz Road which was sought to be protected by the injunctive writ. They merely
anchor their purported right over the La Paz Road on the bare allegation that
they have been using the same as public road right-of-way for more than ten
years. A mere allegation does not meet the standard of proof that would warrant
the issuance of the injunctive writ. Failure to establish the existence of a clear
right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction is a
sufficient ground for denying the injunction.

Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the parties can
fully prove their respective positions on the issues.

Due process considerations dictate that the assailed injunctive writ is not a
judgment on the merits but merely an order for the grant of a provisional and
ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard. The hearing on the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is separate and distinct from the trial on the merits of the main
case. [29] The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not
conclusive or complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an
idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the
case on the merits.[30] There are vital facts that have yet to be presented during the
trial which may not be obtained or presented during the hearing on the application
for the injunctive writ.[31] Moreover, the quantum of evidence required for one is
different from that for the other.[32]

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the July 31,


2001 Decision and February 21, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 60543 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 152611. August 5, 2003]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO


LISTANA, SR., respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 65276 dated December 11, 2001, which annulled the Orders dated January 29,
[1]

2001 and April 2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.[2]

Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of


246.0561 hectares, located in Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-20193. He voluntarily offered to sell the said land to the
government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), under Section 20 of
[3]

R.A. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
(CARL). The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03, which was however rejected
by the respondent. Hence, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine
the just compensation of the land.
On October 14, 1998, the DARAB rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the foregoing computation, the prior


valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby set aside and a new
valuation in the amount of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS AND 25 CENTAVOS
(P10,956,963.25) for the acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. The Land Bank of the
Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the same to the landowner in the manner
provided for by law.

SO ORDERED. [4]

Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of
Land Bank to pay the respondent the aforesaid amount as just compensation in the
manner provided by law. [5]

On September 2, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD,
alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of Execution issued on
June 18, 1999.He argued that such failure of the petitioner to comply with the writ of
execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1999, petitioner Land Bank filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC),
for the determination of just compensation, as provided for in Section 16 (f) of the
CARL. [6]

On August 20, 2000, the PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for Contempt,
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for contempt is hereby GRANTED,


thus ALEX A. LORAYES, as Manager of respondent LAND BANK, is cited for
indirect contempt and hereby ordered to be imprisoned until he complies with the
Decision of the case dated October 14, 1998.

SO ORDERED. [7]

Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order,
[8]
which was however denied by the PARAD on September 20, 2000. Thus, petitioner
[9]

filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD, manifesting its intention to appeal the decision
to the DARAB Central, pursuant to Rule XI, Section 3 of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of
Procedure. [10]

On the other hand, the Special Agrarian Court dismissed the petition for the
determination of just compensation filed by petitioner Land Bank in an Order dated
October 25, 2000.Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of said dismissal was likewise
denied.
In a Resolution dated November 27, 2000, PARAD Capellan denied due course to
petitioners Notice of Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for
the payment of the adjudged amount of just compensation to respondent. On January
[11]

3, 2001, he directed the issuance of an arrest order against Manager Alex A. Lorayes. [12]

Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain PARAD Capellan from issuing the order of arrest. The case was raffled to
[13]

Branch 51 of said court. On January 29, 2001, the trial court issued an Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the


DARAB or anyone acting in its stead is enjoined as it is hereby enjoined from
enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination
of the case before RTC Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the
Land Bank.

SO ORDERED. [14]

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order, which was
denied in an Order dated April 2, 2001. [15]

Thus, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65276. On December 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals
[16]

rendered the assailed decision which nullified the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENTERTAINING THE RESPONDENTS SPECIAL
CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE FINAL ORDER OF THE
RTC WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS SUBJECT TO APPEAL UNDER THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE RTC
FINAL ORDER OF INJUNCTION, CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE PARAD DID NOT ACQUIRE COMPETENT JURISDICTION OVER THE


CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS INASMUCH AS IT WAS INITIATED BY MERE
MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND NOT BY VERIFIED PETITION, IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 2, RULE XI OF THE NEW DARAB RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND OF RULE 71 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.

B. THE PARAD CONTEMPT ORDER CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FINAL AND


EXECUTORY, BECAUSE THE PARAD ITSELF DISALLOWED THE
PETITIONERS APPEAL TO THE DARAB CENTRAL OFFICE, IN DISREGARD
OF THE BASIC RULE THAT THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DETERMINES THE
MERITS OF THE APPEAL.

C. THE PARAD ORDER OF ARREST AGAINST LBP MANAGER ALEX


LORAYES WAS IN GROSS AND PATENT VIOLATION OF HIS PERSONAL,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS AGAINST UNJUST ARREST AND
IMPRISONMENT, INASMUCH AS, UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ONLY
JUDGES CAN ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST CITIZENS, AND THE
PROPER SUBJECT OF THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING WAS THE
PETITIONER ITSELF AND NOT THE LBP MANAGER, AND YET THE
CONTEMPT ORDER WAS AGAINST THE LBP MANAGER.

D. THE PARAD ORDER OF CONTEMPT WAS PATENTLY NULL AND VOID, AS


IT ATTEMPTED TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PARAD DECISION
THAT WAS ADMITTEDLY NOT FINAL AND EXECUTORY, AS THE MATTER
OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT WAS
ON APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS. [17]

As regards the first issue, petitioner submits that the special civil action
for certiorari filed by respondent before the Court of Appeals to nullify the injunction
issued by the trial court was improper, considering that the preliminary injunction issued
by the trial court was a final order which is appealable to the Court of Appeals via a
notice of appeal. [18]

Petitioners submission is untenable. Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy


for the protection of ones substantive right or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself
but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. Thus, it has been held that
an order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order. As
distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order
does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated
upon. [19]

Clearly, the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is in the nature of an interlocutory


order, hence, unappealable. Therefore, respondents special civil action
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the correct remedy under the
circumstances. Certiorari is available where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [20]

The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such,


it cannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The
proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal
from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order. However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari
where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate
and expeditious relief. [21]

On the substantive issue of whether the order for the arrest of petitioners manager,
Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid, Rule XVIII of the 2003 DARAB Rules reads,
in pertinent part:
SECTION 2. Indirect Contempt. The Board or any of its members or its Adjudicator
may also cite and punish any person for indirect contempt on any of the grounds and
in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In this connection, Rule 71, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
deals with the commencement of indirect contempt proceedings, provides:

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be


initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of
or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall
allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and
the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

xxxxxxxxx

The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. Justice Florenz D. Regalado,


Vice-Chairman of the Revision of the Rules of Court Committee that drafted the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure explains this requirement:

1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for
commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a
special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by
the courts, has been for any party to file a mere motion without paying any docket or
lawful fees therefor and without complying with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this amended section.

xxxxxxxxx

Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order
of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a
verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor and shall be
disposed of in accordance with the second paragraph of this section. [22]
Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt,
namely, (1) through a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the
court motu proprio.
In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with
indirect contempt.
More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, referring
to indirect contempt against quasi-judicial entities, provides:

Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. Unless otherwise provided by law,
this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or
agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such
rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish
for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been
committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefore.
(emphasis supplied)

The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all the questions
regarding the applicability of these rules to quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:

1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the former Rule 71 applied
only to superior and inferior courts and did not comprehend contempt committed
against administrative or quasi-judicial officials or bodies, unless said contempt is
clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in the
second paragraph of Sec. 580, Revised Administrative Code. The provision referred to
contemplates the situation where a person, without lawful excuse, fails to appear,
make oath, give testimony or produce documents when required to do so by the
official or body exercising such powers. For such violation, said person shall be
subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court, upon application of the
official or body with the Regional Trial Court for the corresponding sanctions.
(emphasis in the original)
[23]

Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect
contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in
the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to
decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the
Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not
with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr.
Lorayes with indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified Motion for
Contempt filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following
reasons: First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the
[24]

Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not
initiated by the PARAD motu proprio;rather, it was by a motion filed by
respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the
contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was
beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings
that stemmed from respondents Motion for Contempt, specifically the Orders of the
PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes,
are null and void.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276, dated December 11, 2001,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, Branch 51, dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial
Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order of arrest
against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before Regional
Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

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