COMELEC V. NOYNAY
The conversion by a lawyer
In 1996, the Commission on Elections filed criminal cases against certain
individuals for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The cases were
filed with a Regional Trial Court in Samar presided over by Judge Tomas
Noynay. Judge Noynay however dismissed the said cases as he ruled that
the RTC has no jurisdiction over the said cases because said criminal
offenses were punishable with less than six years imprisonment. He said
that said cases should be filed with the MTC.
Atty. Jose Balbuena, member of COMELECs legal department, filed a
motion for reconsideration. He cited a case entitled: Alberto Naldeza vs
Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996 (245 SCRA
286). According to Atty. Balbuena, in the said case he cited, the Supreme
Court has already settled the issue and Atty. Balbuena even copied in toto
the said ruling by the Supreme Court in his motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tomas Noynay is correct in dismissing the
case.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court admonished Judge Noynay for dismissing
the case as the same was contrary to Section 32 of B.P. 129 as well as
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that election cases
are within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts except certain cases
(which were not the cases filed by COMELEC in this case).
Section 32 of B.P. 129, on the other hand, provides that as a
rule, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount
of fine EXCEPT otherwise provided by special law. The Omnibus Election
Code is a special law which provides that election offenses, regardless of
penalties, are under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.
Judge Noynay was not able to follow these rules. It is a judges duty to be
studious of the principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to
the integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to
maintain professional competence.
On the other hand, Atty. Balbuena is also admonished for being reckless in
citing cases. The Supreme Court said that the passage cited by Balbuena
in his Motion was not the actual decision of the Supreme Court in the said
case cited but rather the memorandum of the court administrator which
was quoted in the said case. Further, his citation of Naldeza vs Lavilles,
Jr. was wrong. Not only did he spell Naldeza wrong (as the correct
spelling was NALDOZA), he also cited the wrong SCRA. It should have
been 254 SCRA 286 and not 245 SCRA 286.
Balbuena is reminded of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
BARNACHEA VS QUICHO
FACTS:
Barnachea filed a complaint for breachof lawyerclient relations against
respondent Atty . Edwin T . Quiocho. Complainant engaged the legal
services of respondent for the latter to cause the transfer under her
name of the title over a property previously owned by her sister ,
Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. However , despite the lapse of almost
two months, respondent failed to secure title over the property in favor
of complainant. The latter demanded that respondent refund to her the
amount of P41,280.00 and return the documents which she earlier
entrusted to him. Complainant received a letter from respondent
informing her that he had failed to cause the transfer of the
property under her name and that he was returning the documents
and title she had entrusted to him and refunding to her the amount
of P41,280.00. Respondent told complainant that he needed more
time to fund the check. However, respondent failed to fund the check
despite the demands of complainant.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RULING: YES.
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client
that may come to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and
property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to
a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the registration of a
deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the
transfer of title over real property under the name of his client if not
utilized, must be returned immediately to his client upon demand therefor .
The lawyers failure to return the money of his client upon demand
gave rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said money
in violation of the trust reposed on him.
funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of
professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.
The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and
is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character . A lawyer is
duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.The profession, therefore, demandsof an
attorney an absolute abdication of every personal advantage
conflicting in any way , directly or indirectly , with the interest of his
client. In this case, respondent miserably failed to measure up to the
exacting standard expected of him.
In view of the foregoing, He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for 1 year with a stern warning that a repetition ofthe same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely .
GOMEZ V. PRESIDING JUDGE
Counsel for petitioner beg the indulgence of this Honorable Court in asking
for the extraordinary relief of seeking a declaration of mistrial of the libel
case tried in the lower court through the special civil action for certiorari as
they were impelled by their conviction that petitioner performed a moral
and legal obligation in writing the letter which was the basis for libel, as
she did, which disclosed the price fixing and price rigging of oil products by
the private complainant, Mr. Marieto Tan, for his private benefit (in Criminal
Case No. 85-49, RTC-Ozamiz City).
While counsel for petitioner are aware that their first bounden duty as
officers of the Court is to honor and follow Court rules issued for the
orderly and efficient administration of justice (Banogon vs. Zerna, 154
SCRA 593; Toledo vs. Burgos, 168 SCRA 513), they are equally burdened
by their foremost obligation to prevent any miscarriage of justice in
accordance with their convictions. Herein counsel had perused the
available pleadings and court processes in the libel against petitioner, and
were fully convinced thereof and impelled by their desire to legally assist
the latter to substantiate her innocence for the crime of libel. If they had
overstretched the parameters of the conduct required of lawyers in trying
to protect their client's liberty by resorting to this judicial process
of certiorari, herein counsel had acted in good faith and beg the kind
indulgence of this Honorable Court for such action.
Contrary to the representations of the Office of the Solicitor General,
herein counsel were candid in the presentation of the factual and
procedural antecedents based on pleadings given to them by their client.
Counsel disclosed in the petition in page 10 thereof that there is already an
Entry of Judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49.
Herein counsel similarly disclosed that -
"Moreover, up to this date, Atty. Pactolin refused to surrender the records
of the aforementioned case, so that accused-petitioner experienced
extreme difficulties in filing the instant petition. And consequently,
accused-petitioner stands helpless in determining the material dates of
receipt of all orders, judgments, and other processes of the trial court,
Court of Appeals, and that of this Honorable Court, all of which were
addressed to Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin. xxx"
Hence, it could not be stated that herein counsel misrepresented on the
procedural antecedents in this case.
Rather, when counsel did institute the present petition, they were invoking
the equity jurisdiction of this Honorable Court such that procedural rules be
set aside to serve the ends of justice, as the liberty of a person is at stake.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this
Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and
law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted
to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They
do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations
that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of their rights, and the exertion of their
utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing be taken away or be
withheld from them, save by the rules of law legally applied (Canon 15,
Canons of Professional Ethics), they should not forget that they are
officers of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice (Canon 12,
Canons of Professional Responsibility). They should not, therefore, misuse
the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10,
Id.) or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12, Id.).
BUENASEDA V. FLAVIER
In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and
corruption against Dr. Brigida Buenaseda and several other government
officials of the Department of Health (DOH). The Ombudsman (then
Conrado Vasquez), ordered the suspension of Buenaseda et al. The
suspension was carried on by then DOH Secretary Juan Flavier, being the
officer in charge over Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
questioning the suspension order. NCMH submitted its Comment on the
Petition where they attached a Motion for Disbarment against the lawyers
of Buenaseda et al.
Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the
suspension order, which is a lawful order from a duly constituted authority.
NCMH maintains that such advice from the lawyers constitute a violation
against the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenasedas
lawyers as he maintained that all the Ombudsman can do is to recommend
suspensions not impose them. The Sol-Gen based his argument on
Section 13 (3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of
the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend
government officials. Whether or not a Motion for Disbarment may be filed
in a special civil action.
HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The
Supreme Court clarifies that what the Ombudsman issued is an order of
preventive suspension pending the resolution of the case or investigation
thereof. It is not imposing suspension as a penalty (not punitive
suspension). What the Constitution contemplates that the Ombudsman
may recommend are punitive suspensions.
Anent the issue of the Motion for Disbarment filed with the Ombudsman,
the same is not proper. It cannot be filed in this special civil action which is
confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose
of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial
officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members of the
bar separate and apart from the present special civil action. However, the
lawyers of Buenaseda were reminded not be carried away in espousing
their clients cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be
respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession
and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession.
SANGALANG V. IAC.
FACTS:
The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty.
J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda
Sangalang.
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among
other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory language." On March
2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration,
particularly, . . . The Court not only put to serious question its own integrity
and competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and
corruption undeniably pervading the judiciary . . . disparaging,
intemperate, and uncalled-for. His suggestions that the Court might have
been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only
unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court's
honor and integrity.
Issue: Whether or not the counsels act constitutes malpractice in violation
of the Codes (CPR) provision on the use of scandalousoffensive or
menacing language or behavior before the courts.
Held: In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it,
and to the records alone, and not to outside influences, much less, the
influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as aformer judge of an inferior
court, should know better that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his
success will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party. He should
be aware that because of his accusations, he has done an enormous
disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of
theadministration of justice in general.
Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the
Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad
hominem . In that event, it is the Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor
and dignity . . . and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession."
The Court in their "show-cause" Resolution, they sought to hold Atty.
Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to insulting language amounting
to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71,
of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice
as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
GO V. ABROGAR
On November 5, 1999, petitioner, now represented by Atty. Caneda, Jr.,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the October 7, 1999 decision. When
the RTCdenied the motion,6 petitioner through his new lawyer filed a
Notice of Appeal on November 5, 1999. On February 8, 2000, the RTC
issued an Order denying the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the
reglementary period had
already expired on November 4, 1999, or one day before petitioner filed
his Notice of Appeal, considering that the Registry Return Card showed
that Atty. Ronald Javier received a copy of the decision on October 20,
1999. The decision having become final and executory, upon motion by
the Bank, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution against
petitioner.On March 6, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition andMandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals toassail the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and
the Notice of Appealand the granting of the issuance of a Writ of
Execution. Petitioner claims that he should not be bound by the receipt of
the decision by Atty. Javier who was no longer his counsel when the latter
received the decision Moreover, under Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, an attorney may withdraw his representation by written consent
of his client filed in court. Otherwise, notice and hearing on the withdrawal
are necessary. Therefore, even if Atty. Javier had already written a letter to
petitioner withdrawing hisservices as counsel, it did not become effective
until after the submission bypetitioner of the letter officially terminating Atty.
Javiers services on October
29, 1999. In fact, petitioner even stated in the letter that his termination
ofAtty. Javiers services was effective only beginning October 29, 1999.
Thisconstitutes an admission by petitioner that when Atty. Javier received
thedecision, he was still considered by petitioner as his counsel.Petitioner
also argues that he should not be bound by the acts of Atty. Javierwhom
he claimed was grossly negligent in the handling of his case, even tothe
extent of calling him incompetent or that his actions were intentionally
done. This argument has already been discredited as Atty.
Javier wasabsolved of all negligence in connection with the case by the
Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP), after conducting an investigation
upon a complaint filed by petitioner himself. The IBP furnished this Court a
copy of the resolutiondismissing the complaint which the Court noted in a
Resolution dated May 8,2002 and thereafter the Court declared the
case closed and terminated.Considering that petitioners contention is that
he should not be made to sufferthe consequences of his counsels
negligence, his argument has no leg tostand on since Atty. Javier was
declared not negligent in the first place.Petitioners particular attack
against an RTC Judge is a serious accusationthat erodes trust and
confidence in our judicial system. This Court will nothesitate to sanction
persons who recklessly and nonchalantly impute illmotives that
are nothing more than unfounded speculations. The
above"suspicious" circumstances enumerated, whether taken
together orseparately, are plainly unjustified as they fail to even
remotely show theexistence of a grand conspiracy against petitioner. For
all their derogatoryimplication, they are clearly unsubstantiated and
disrespectful to a member ofthe Bench. The Court is also dismayed that
such baseless attacks were assisted bycounsel, who is an officer of the
court. Under Canon 11 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility, A
LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAINRESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS. Inparticular, he shall not
attribute to a judge motives not supported by therecords or by evidence. A
lawyer should submit grievances against a Judge tothe proper authorities
only. Atty. Caneda, Jr. should have known better than topermit the
irresponsible and unsupported claim against Judge Abrogar to beincluded
in the pleadings. Allowing such statements to be made is against alawyers
oath of office and goes against the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility. Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Atty. Gregorio D.
Caneda, Jr. areSTRICTLY WARNED not to make disrespectful statements
against a Judge
Maceda v. Vasquez
Facts:
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12
of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September
18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed
by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public
Attorneys Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of
Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying that all civil and criminal
cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a
period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January
31, 1998, when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had
been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been
submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner
similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February,
April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning
January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been
granted by the Supreme Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide
the aforementioned cases.
Issue:
whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal
complaint for the alleged falsification of a judges certification submitted to
the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be
made first to the Supreme Court
Held:
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by
the Supreme Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests
in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
US V. BALLENA
On the 21st of September, 1909, there was tried in the Court of First
Instance of the subprovince of Masbate criminal case No. 163, entitled
"United States vs. Ana Ramirez," in which the defendant was charged with
the crime of perjury. The basis of this prosecution was the false
testimony given by the defendant in a certain criminal case tried in that
court wherein one Ciriaco Pellejera was defendant, charged with homicide,
in that the said Pellejera did, by means of blows, cause the death of the
husband of Ana Ramirez. In this homicide case Ana Ramirez was called
as a witness, and, after being duly sworn, testified that her husband died
of fever and that during his illness, which lasted more than two weeks,
she observed no contusions or other injuries on his body. She denied
having testified under oath before the provincial fiscal in the town of
Dimasalang, contrary to her testimony in this case, and she also denied
having been in the house of one Jose Largo for the purpose of testifying
with reference to the death of her husband. Whereas, as a matter of fact,
she did testify, under oath, before the said fiscal, in that town, that her
husband died as a direct result of the blows inflicted by Pellejera and that
his death occurred within three days after having received these blows.
Ana Ramirez was found guilty as charged and sentenced accordingly.
In the trial of this perjury case one Estefania Barruga, mother of the
defendant Ana, was a witness for the defendant, and at the instigation of
one Leoncio Ballena she testified that the fiscal, Senor Bailon, at the time
he was in Dimasalang making the investigation into the cause of the death
of Ana's husband, attempted to rape her daughter Ana, and,asked for the
hand of the girl in marriage, but she did not desire to accept this
proposition of the fiscal because he was a married man.
Subsequently thereto, and on the 29th of September, 1909, the fiscal
filed an information in the Court of First Instance of that province against
the said Leoncio Ballena, charging him with the crime of subornation of
perjury.
Upon this complaint the defendant was duly tried, found guilty, and
sentenced to six months' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P500, to the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to the
accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs. From this
sentence and judgment the defendant appealed, and now insists that the
testimony given by Estefania Barruga in that perjury case was immaterial
to the issues involved therein. If this contention be true, the defendant is
not guilty.
There are certain well-defined and indispensable requisites which must
be established in every case of subornation of perjury before an accused
person, charged with the commission of this crime, can be convicted.
Every essential element constituting the crime of perjury must be
established by competent testimony. The prosecution must show the
nature of the proceedings in which the alleged perjury was committed, the
court, or officer, in which, or before whom, the false oath was taken; that
the witness was duly sworn; that the testimony was material, and false;
that the defendant knowingly and willfully procured another to swear
falsely, and that the witness suborned did testify under circumstances
rendering him guilty of perjury.
In the case at bar the record shows beyond any question of a doubt that
the witness Barruga, after being duly sworn, did knowingly and willfully
testify falsely in a criminal case before a duly constituted tribunal; that this
witness so testified at the instigation of the defendant Ballena; and that
the defendant knew that the testimony given by the witness Barruga
was false. The witness so informed the defendant. Notwithstanding this
information, the defendant strongly insisted that by the witness Barruga
testifying that the fiscal committed those acts would be the only way to
save her daughter from imprisonment. The defendant not. only knowingly
and willfully induced this witness to swear falsely, but he did so
maliciously, as it appears from the record that he was an enemy of the
fiscal at that time, the fiscal having prosecuted him previous to this trial.
So the only question to be determined is, as we have said, Was the
testimony of Barruga material to the issues involved in that criminal case
against her daughter for perjury? Materiality is an essential element in the
crime of perjury. (U. S. vs. Estrafia, 16 Phil. Rep., 520.) It, therefore,
necessarily follows that materiality is likewise an indispensable requisite in
the crime of subornation of perjury, as the latter is derived from the former.
"The term 'material matter' means the main fact which was the subject of
the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact,
or circumstance, which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony
relative to such inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of any
witness who testifies," (Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Estrana, supra.)
In the criminal case in which the witness Barruga gave that false
testimony, the main question involved was whether or not Ana Ramirez
testified before the provincial fiscal that her husband died as a result of
the blows inflicted by Ciriaco Pellejera, as she had testified in the trial of
the case against Pellejera that she did not so testify before the fiscal. It is
clear that the false testimony of Ana Ramirez against Pellejera was
material. In the trial of the case against Ana for perjury there was
presented a question of fact as to whether or not Ana testified, under
oath, before the fiscal in that investigation that her husband did in fact die
as a result of the wounds inflicted by Pellejera. The court found this to be
true. It was important to know whether or not the fiscal, at the time Ana
testified before him, attempted to rape her or asked her mother for
permission to marry her. If the fiscal had committed these acts they
would have constituted a strong circumstance showing the innocence of
Ana. The fiscal was the moving party in the perjury case and it was upon
his sworn complaint that Ana was prosecuted. If he should have
attempted to prosecute Ana after having committed these acts the court
would not only have disbelieved the fiscal, testifying as a witness, but it
would have looked upon the whole prosecution as a fabrication.
PNB V UY TENG PIAO
a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
FACTS
- Defendant-appellant, Uy Teng Piao, was sued by PNB for non payment
of obligations at the CFI of Manila and said court rendered judgment in
favor of PNB on September 9, 1934 for the sum of P17,232.42 with
interest of seven percent per annum from June 1,1924. The court ordered
the defendant appellant to deposit the money due with the clerk of the
court within three months from thedate of judgment. In case of failure to
pay, the mortgage properties should be sold at auction in accordance with
law and theproceeds to be applied to the payment of the judgment.- The
defendant failed to comply with the payment order and the properties were
auctioned by the sheriff of Manila for a total of P1,300 with PNB as the
buyer.-
On February 11, 1925, PNB secured from defendant a waiver of the
latters right to redeem one of the proper
ties described as TCTno. 8274 and thereafter sold the same to one
Mariano Santos for P8,600.- The other property, TCT No. 7264 was
likewise resold and the proceeds was credited to the account of Uy. The
total amountgenerated with the resale of the lots amonted to P 11, 300.-
On August 1, 1930, PNB instituted another court action for the recover of
the balance of the judgment amounting to P11,574.38with interest at seven
percent per annum.- The defendant claimed that in exchange for his
waiver of his right to redeem the first property resold by PNB, the bank
would notcollect from him the balance of the judgment.- The CFI ruled that
there was in fact a condonation made by the bank through one of its
officer, a certain Mr. Pecson.- Hence this appeal
ISSUES
1. WON PNB condoned the balance of the judgment2.
Also, with the complaint he filed, the most basic tenet of the system of
government separation of power - has been lost. He should know that
not even the President of the Philippines can pass judgment on any of the
Courts acts.
Blanza v. Arcangel
FACTS:
Atty. Agustin Arcangel, respondent, volunteered to help Olegaria Blanza
and Maria Passion, complainants, in their respective pension claims in
connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for
this purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent documents and also
affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed
that since then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims
and refused to surrender the papers when asked by the complainants six
years later.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent be reprimanded for professional non-feasance.
RULING:
No. The Court found the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the
taking of disciplinary action against respondent. But the Court cannot but
counsel against his actuations as a member of the Bar. A lawyer has a
more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying
with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of the law, he is
necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. His
conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this
case, he volunteers his professional services.

WON a lawyer can appear as both counsel and witness in the same case
HELD
1. No. There was no evidence presented except the uncertain testimony of
the defendant, that the bank did in fact agree to thecondonation. Even if
the SC grants that Mr. Pecson did agree to the condonation, there is not
evidence presented that Mr. Pecsonwas authorized by the bank through its
board of directors or persons authorized by the said board to bind the bank
to theagreement.2. Yes (No). The SC held that the appearance of a lawyer
as both counsel and witness in a trial is not strictly prohibited. The
SChowever stated that it would be preferable if the lawyer in this case can
appear only as one or the other. In other words, if they areto testify as
required by the case, they should withdraw from the active management of
the case. This is embodied in Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics.

MAGSALANG V. PEOPLE: Khalyxto Maglasang was convicted in the

court in San Carlos, Negros Occidental. His counsel, Atty. Castellano, filed
for a petition for certiorari through registered mail. Due to non-compliance
with the requirements, the court dismissed the petition and a motion for
reconsideration. Atty. Castellano then sent a complaint to the Office of the
President where he accused the five justices of the 2nd division, with
biases and ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments.
He accused the court of sabotaging the Aquinoadministration for being
Marcos appointees, and robbing the Filipino people genuine justice and
democracy. He also said that the SC is doing this to protect the judge who
was impleaded in the petition and for money reasons. He alleges further
that the court is too expensive to be reached by ordinary men. The court is
also inconsiderate and overly strict and meticulous. When asked to show
cause why he should not be cited in contempt, Castellano said that the
complaint was constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the
erroneous and very strict practices of the justices concerned. He also said
that the justices have no jurisdiction over his act and that they should just
answer the complaint. The SC found him guilty of contempt and improper
conduct and ordered to pay P1, 000 or imprisonment of 15 days, and to
suffer six months suspension.

Issue: Whether or not the Atty. Castellanos acts constitute a violation of

the provisions of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.

Held: Yes. The court found his comments scurrilous and contumacious.
He went beyond the bounds of constructive criticism. What he said are not
relevant to the cause of his client. They cast aspersion on the Courts
integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies before
it.

The explanation of Castellano in his negligence in the filing of the petition

for certiorari did not render his negligence excusable. It is clear that the
case was lost not by the alleged injustices Castellanoirresponsibly
ascribed to the members of the Court, but his inexcusable negligence and
incompetence.

As an officer of the court, he should have known better than to smear the
honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client.