ISAE v Quisimbing G.R. No. 128845.

June 1, 2000
J. Kapunan

Facts:
The ISM, under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the disparity in wages that they got
compared to that of their foreign teaching counterparts.
These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or foreign hire.
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?
Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local hire. The School grants
foreign-hires certain benefits to the foreign hires such as housing, transportation, and 25%
more pay than locals under the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.
The first was grounded on leaving his home country, the second was on the lack of tenure
when he returns home.
The negotiations between the school and the union caused a deadlock between the parties.
The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole Secretary Quisimbing denied the
unions mfr.
He said, The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of
parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on
reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial
distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial
distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure,
having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good
compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.
The union appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory and racist.
The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin. They were paid local
salaries.

Issue:
Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause

Held: Yes, Petition granted

Ratio:
Public policy abhors discrimination. The Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all people to human dignity
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."
International law prohibits discrimination, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The latter
promises Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction
of any kind.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor
of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment
opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
In this jurisdiction, there is the term equal pay for equal work, pertaining to persons
being paid with equal salaries and have similar skills and similar conditions. There was no
evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-
hires.
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and
capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the
common good.[
For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also
cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and
limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits
accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to
justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-
hires and local-hires.
Obiter:
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. It does
not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with
local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the
School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. The housing and other
benefits accorded foreign hires were not given to local hires, thereby such admixture will
nbot assure any group the power to exercise bargaining rights.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2)affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as
substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and
(4) similarity of employment status.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003]

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major

General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside
the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) dated 18 November
[1]

1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution
dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the
confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second
Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for
the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative,
for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further
proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA

Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1
(EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth
of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the
power (a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and the power (h) to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of this order. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman
Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired. [2]

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of

alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
(Ramas). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings
and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The
relevant part of the Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located
at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot
located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly
at P700,000.00.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises
of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of
Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO,
RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the possession of
Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding
team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000
US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command,

Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that
Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and
stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas,
Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses
respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the
residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and
owned by MGen Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible
means of income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere
secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military
equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of
respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also
impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence of these money because
these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the
members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna,
the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known.

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny
and analysis by the Boards consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an
unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against
respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted

and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. [3]

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under
Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No. 1379) against Ramas.
[4]

Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco
I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as
defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano
(Dimaano) as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a
confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a
clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The
Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his
other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage
of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such
officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close
associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. [5]

The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous
inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated
RA No. 1379. The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the
[6]

forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and equipment in favor of the

State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and
Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas
contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista
Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of
proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of
any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other
items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her
employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November
1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine
Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial, the court set the case for trial on the
[7]

merits on 9-11 November 1988.

On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due
to its lack of preparation for trial and the absence of witnesses and vital
documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April
1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the
complaint in order to charge the delinquent properties with being subject to
forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x
x.
[8]

Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan

proceeded with petitioners presentation of evidence on the ground that the
motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when petitioner would file
the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject
matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the
existing complaint.The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the
case had been pending in court, petitioner should proceed to present its
evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement
of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner
manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the absence of other
witnesses or lack of further evidence to present.Instead, petitioner reiterated
its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already
presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully
acquired the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for
over a year mainly because of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner
would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in fact the case
had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to
prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to
present further evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to present further
evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its evidence, the
Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however,
hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private
respondents might take under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to
proceed to trial because it had no further evidence to present. Again, in the
interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which
to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned
petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic
v. Migrino. The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have
[9]

jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere

position held without a showing that they are subordinates of former President
Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint,

without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack
of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and
land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman,
who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such
appropriate action as the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax
liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a
Joint Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January
1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following

grounds:

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the
Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and Republic v.
[10]

Migrino which involve the same issues.

[11]

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases

was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case
against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

 A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
PETITIONERS EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR
FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF
CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY
CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN
RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS
WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING
BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE
PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING
OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE
RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO,
189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v.

Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to this case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in

Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or waived by
respondents with the filing of their respective answers with
counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper

considering that they were filed after commencement of the
presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even
before the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence
and rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY,
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES
CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO
WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS
EVIDENCE.[12]

The Courts Ruling

First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

 This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this
Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino.
[13] [14]

The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction
to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and
Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth
and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired. The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary
[15]

recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be

taken based on its findings. The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board
[16]

pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 to conduct

investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the
purposes of this order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to
wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in
regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President

Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President
may assign to the Commission from time to time.

x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two
categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel
who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former
President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate
or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their
powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft
[17]

and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. [18]
 Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas
case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category
of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over
him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former
President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army.Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive
orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a
subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in
the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a
subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a
showing that he enjoyed close association with former President
Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is
contemplated within the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express
the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here
and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President
Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates,
business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a

particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds
of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].

[T]he term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close
association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate
family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative,
business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.

xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official
or employee during the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a
prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue
of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
(Emphasis supplied)

Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army

with the rank of Major General does not suffice to make him a subordinate of
[19]

former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The
PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close
associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were
close to him. Such close association is manifested either by Ramas complicity
with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the
deposed President or by former President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas
own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not
convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board
Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the
investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No.
1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting
within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and
corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former
President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this
contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with
the following recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted

and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. [20]

Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private

respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of
violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to EO Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments
proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and
limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to
address such specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended
Complaint do not show that the properties Ramas allegedly owned were
accumulated by him in his capacity as a subordinate of his commander-in-
chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned
and suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and
other legitimate income without showing that Ramas amassed them because
of his close association with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in
fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that
Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close association with former
President Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed
Forces of the Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie evidence
showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is
submitted that such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board
should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective of the
investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019
and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a; (Emphasis supplied)
[21]

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima

facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a subordinate of
former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1 clearly [22]

premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten
wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was
not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court outlined the cases that fall
[23]

under the jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14, 14-A: [24] [25] [26]

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the
respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute covers:

(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth under Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
 owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority and influence,
connections or relationships; and

(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the

acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a)
of Executive Order No. 1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not
otherwise falling under the foregoing categories, require a previous authority of
the President for the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in
accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction
over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized
investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their
assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state
prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate
and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its
amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed
on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman,
while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the
Solicitor General. The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No.
[27]

6770) vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation

and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after
25 February 1986. [28]

After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued
this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a
subordinate of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with
the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to
investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1
and its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and
even the Amended Complaint state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019
and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to the
Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of
ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:

[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the
PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any
action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates
that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.

Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in

the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with
counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no
jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative
or prosecutorial powers never granted to it.PCGGs powers are specific and
limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole
task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and
cronies. Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a
[29]

case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG
to investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as
soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case
was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only
filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held
that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the
proceeding. Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this
[30]

case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an action. [31]

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by

the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still
conduct the proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and
if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan. The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under
[32]

RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel. [33]

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the

case before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case,
we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the
presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years
before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its
Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to
present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to
prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still
delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions
for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the
presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for
Leave to Amend the Complaint. The motion sought to charge the delinquent
[34]

properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with being subject to

forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x
x.
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of
petitioners evidence since petitioner did not state when it would file the
amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the
continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11
October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28
September 1989, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing
its view on the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events
because this case has been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon
has been due to the inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-
trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military
to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal
interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its alleged
failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of
the developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation
where a case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a
five-month pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the
plaintiff Republic.
[35]

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting

a preliminary investigation on the unexplained wealth of private respondents
as mandated by RA No. 1379. The PCGG prayed for an additional four
[36]

months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted

this request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March
1990. However, on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of
the result of the preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted.
Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with
the presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of what lies ahead
insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x. Still on the date set,
[37]
petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner
filed its Re-Amended Complaint. The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that
[38]

a case already pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the
court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to
blame for failure to complete the presentation of its evidence. The
Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners
delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a
Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition
of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court
in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since
the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against
private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case
before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties

confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore
inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners
case since these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against
private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its
case against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in
evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos
residence a search warrant captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins
witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The
raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines;
40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications
equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land
titles.
 Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team
conducted the search and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the
successful EDSA revolution. Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
[39]

government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1

announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking
power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people. Petitioner asserts
[40]

that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the

1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an
illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification
of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of
Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from
Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their
seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly
stated in President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the
EDSA Revolution was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution. The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
[41]

government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty

obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in
the Philippines, assumed under international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was
bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum,
that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary
government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24
March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution);
and (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the
interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection
accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in
effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent
and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973
Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during
the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill
of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during
the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno: [42]

A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established

government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it or as a
sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence. In Kelsen's book, General
Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever the legal order
of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by
the first order itself.

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more
popularly known as the people power revolution that the Filipino people tore
themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented
rise to power of the Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an
inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical
reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising
when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved
inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. It has been said that the locus of
positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and from there is derived
the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of
government without regard to the existing constitution.

xxx

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to
constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr.
Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the
organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and her
control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers
of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the
Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect,
had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
 To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained
operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders
issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) before
the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which
direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere
executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and
search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could validly
question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because
there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed
the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom
Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, petitioner Baseco, while conceding
[43]

there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, questioned the continued
validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution
in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the
Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly
recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus:

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the
validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be
dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to
issue them have received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already
mentioned, the Provisional or Freedom Constitution recognizes the power and duty of
the President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover
ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and
protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets
or accounts. And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution treats of, and ratifies the authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders
under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986.

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution
were fully aware that the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of
Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include specific
language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following
discourse by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission is instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the
arguments in defense of the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which all of us have been given a
copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the Commission is doing is
traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister
Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On
the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters
are the results and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG
should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or
exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM
for special protection? The answer is clear. What they are doing will not
stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are asking for protection,
for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands,
but let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an
allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for,
and let me elaborate and give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the
CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of
the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We
cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the same
time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of
Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of law. The New Society word
for that is backsliding. It is tragic when we begin to backslide even before we
get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained.
The committee report asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of
Rights for six months after the convening of Congress, and Congress may
even extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What
the committee report is asking for is that we should allow the new government
to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The
practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a vested right to its
practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would
be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties
is an argument that is very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch
Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim by
 another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly
disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an
auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right,
the search and seizure clause will be sold. Open your Swiss bank account to
us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in
your private safe.
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the
hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the
ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the
due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something
positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale
to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation
will survive and grow strong, only if it would become convinced of the values
enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is
to delete all of Section 8 of the committee report and allow the new
Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has
two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument that
what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the
law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even
without the support of Section 8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has
only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me
conclude with what another Christian replied when asked to toy around with
the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of
law for my nations safety sake. I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit
of law for our nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the

amendment excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the
Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section
26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution
[44]

were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand
the test of due process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in
force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting
sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all
sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during
the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant
and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de
jure government, assumed responsibility for the States good faith compliance
with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory.Article 2(1) of the
Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.Under Article 17(1) of the
[45]

Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its
Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although
the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding
document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration
as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on
the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
[46]

international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.

[47]

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the

Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government
could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the
Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that
the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law,
and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of
international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same
way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good
faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March
1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary government became
subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such
directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The Provisional Constitution served as
[48]

a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the

absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,
directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as
these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary
government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the
Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did
not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application,
specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with
respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the
warrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated
items not included in the warrant, thus:

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

AJ AMORES

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons.
What else, aside from the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars,
some jewelries, land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house
of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also seized
other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that
the reason why they also brought the other items not included in the search
warrant was because the money and other jewelries were contained in
attach cases and cartons with markings Sony Trinitron, and I think three (3)
vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes
were containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out
that they contained money.

xxx

Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why
your team seized this money instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided
to bring along also the money because at that time it was already dark and
they felt most secured if they will bring that because they might be
suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor.[49]

Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag

Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was
applied before the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
 Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of
five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir

AJ AMORES

Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the
house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU
elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other
properties or contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for
instance, the communications equipment and money. However, I did not
include that in the application for search warrant considering that we have
not established concrete evidence about that. So when
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that
only weapons were in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.[50]

xxx

Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-
16 and how many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the
fiscals office who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a
Memorandum Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant,
like for instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
 A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring
along also the jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it
was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not really know
their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken
because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.

xxx

Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included
in the search warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was
discovered to be contained in attach cases. These attach cases were
suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the
course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team
leader also decided to take this considering that they believed that if they will
just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your
raiding team, like Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.[51]
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did
not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles
that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly
describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own
authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without
showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and
seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these
[52]

items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are
contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person
[53]

from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such
person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure
warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to
Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March
1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the
Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and
referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for
a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret
walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution
is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty
and security in the first petition for a writ ofAmparo filed before this Court.

This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section
191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact
and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001,
entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents."

This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop
herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their
right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective
Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal
and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section
6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the
Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or
persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein
petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty,
and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.5

While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat
Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and
Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein
respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific
matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all
other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after
hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and
equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under
the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:

WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with
the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of
the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice
Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at
2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners
(herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:

ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.

The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are
hereby REQUIRED:

1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this
decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection
with their case, except those already on file herein;

2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.

3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts,
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to
the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian)
who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days
from notice of this decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent
AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and
made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive.

SO ORDERED.10

Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein
respondents:

Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006,
several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the
residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they
were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by
the barangay hall.11

On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots,
entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo,
replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and
nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to
the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then
forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and
told her to stay.12

Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning
de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all
members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized
brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being
forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangaycouncilors, Pablo Cunanan and
Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being
blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he
learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he
estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and
abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his
abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.14

The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside
Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside
him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house.
Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left
open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and
other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was
brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room.
The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was
not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many
soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered none,
they hit him.15

In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him
up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when
interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold
was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other
soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of
combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas
corpus case filed in connection with the respondents' abduction.16 While these officials interrogated
him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When
the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only
at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17

On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat
him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his
forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a
burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped.
They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they
warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him.18

The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then
made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to
check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He
passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to
break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo
church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to
Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers
spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought
him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed
repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-
called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was
killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo
was detained.20

For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated.
When the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards
got drunk.21

Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by
steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything
there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that
eighteen people22 had been detained in thatbartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23

For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were
kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The
house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their
house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU."24

At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took
their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had
a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next
day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines,
including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents'
urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned
a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del
Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While
there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take
care of them.25

One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several
other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren
stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26

From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the
Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about
three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of
the house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was
already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking
if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if
he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he
were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not
believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man.27

Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
 Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa
akin?"

Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't
sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa
mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa
magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na
sumuko na sa gobyerno."28

Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At
about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them
- brought them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in
the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond
relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents
acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies,
they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.29

When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with
the four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw
Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as
Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for
him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them
strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that
they would not be given another chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan
by his picture.32

One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The
medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of
this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their
dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon
waking up.33

After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman
instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee
from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who
abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.34

After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry
Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them.
Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put
on him and he was kept in the barracks.35

The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It
was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers,
hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the
rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the
University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had
been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her
parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other
captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with
"Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by
his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At
times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their
chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped,
their families would all be killed.37

On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should
be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of
November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the
hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to
Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond
was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He
got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in
his affidavit.38

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a
camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed
in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there,
battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach
with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made
to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.39

Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers
brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought
to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin.
The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he
coddled NPA members in his house.40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was
brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man
of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before
Raymond's eyes.41

From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a
safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was
in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They
stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.42

In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel
were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed
and experienced in the camp,viz:

Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na
inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man
kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng
isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y
sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.

Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo
mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang
hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
 Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng
kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at
binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong
isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.

Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga
bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan
nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.

May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa
akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.

xxx xxx xxx

Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw
siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan.
Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig
ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong
sinisilaban si Manuel.

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw

pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng
mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.

Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni
Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si
Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay
magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami
kinakadena.43

On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise
poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he
would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot
adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to
use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as
cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44

Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed.
They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved
their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could
get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone
was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had
saved Php1,400.00 between them.

There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them
while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the
guards. Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but
they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session.
At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke
and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their
sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from
captivity.45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they
related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their
house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his
shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When
Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told
that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol,
Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.

At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was
separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of
Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to
represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along
Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and
made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where
Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red
vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once
outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where
Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46

Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo.
Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an
organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was
involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after
their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination.
His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of
physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days
after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took
photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the
examination.47

Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with
the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the
abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:

13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly
abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military.
This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by
petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt.
Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito
Palparan, as Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members
of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti
dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The
respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals
dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding
General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan,
then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort
Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to
establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated
June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence
establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers,
although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers
and ordered them to release the latter.48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner)
Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and
was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that:

7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional
operations, neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor
in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of
National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department
(bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this
case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with
Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a
Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive
addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action
in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the
AFP:

(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the
person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or
persons responsible;

(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;

(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as
well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or
disappearance;

(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and

(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49

Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the
Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National
Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following:

3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have
caused to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.

3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher
headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the
concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the
Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB
PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.
 3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the
concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in
whose favor the Writ of Amparohas been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished
Higher headquarters.

3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition
for the Writ ofAmparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain
Cadapan and Empeo pending before the Supreme Court.

3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish
the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those
responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity
in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the
findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process.50

Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA,
earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and
Merino, which averred among others, viz:

10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24th Infantry Batallion
detachment as detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay,
Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive;

11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay,
Bataan;

12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine
National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were
informed that none was reported to their good office;

13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged
beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such
beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to
detain Cadapan, Empeo and Merino.51

It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen
Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by
therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be
subsequently submitted.52

Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez,
Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City,
Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan,
Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan.53The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry
Division.54

On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7th Infantry
Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged
abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz;
CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA
Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to
determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged
elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if
any.57 Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the
usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the
Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his
territorial jurisdiction.58

Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn
statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00 in
the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo
Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other
sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned
and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six
persons.62

Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six persons were not known
to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that he was beside
Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single
question to the six persons.65

Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and
Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their
statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30,
2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.66 When the
Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He
began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006.67 He then gave his
report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.68

As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence,
the report is herein substantially quoted:

III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who
were forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly
disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the
civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela
Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).

a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit
"B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some
neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy.
Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only
implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the
Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any
participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel,
Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active
members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @
KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the
alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he
claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete chapel being
constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the
incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan.
That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that
they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU.

c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O")
states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member
of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much
aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active
supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER
BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February
2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he
learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that
the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a
criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA
Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him in support of their
brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo
brothers.

d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states
that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and
he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February
2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was
being informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the
two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The
only reason he knows why they implicated him was because there are those people who are
angry with their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their brother
@ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their
brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that incident.
Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.

e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states
that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a
farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further
that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA
BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006,
he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers
and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims
that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo
who are his brothers.
 f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G")
states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San
Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged
further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder
brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being
one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their
concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident which is the abduction
of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo
Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the
allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated
in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA
member.

IV. DISCUSSION

5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of
linking them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is
considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.

Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the
killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo,
this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a
form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the
Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean,
however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their
neighbors and as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village
from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of
the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the
CPP/NPA is concerned.

V. CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction
committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this investigation.
Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability.
It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated
from the case.

8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69

In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing
evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:
 I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND

GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED,
CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING

RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO
BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL
REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR
CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN
WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka
ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND
REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES
PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF
MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM
FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.

The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that
resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced
Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to
provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well
as all the stakeholders in the justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.

On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of
extralegal killing and enforced disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's
expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its
maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings"
and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances
or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances"
are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons
outside the protection of law."76

The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837,
de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its
description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.78 One of
them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state,
Yucatan,79 which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their
constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:
 The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and
preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant
hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state
governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation,
making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the
violation.80

Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing,
the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the
official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to
restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the
principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic
of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by
protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law
for the entire nation.82

The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various
forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of
the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the
world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history
conceived."84 What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation
of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of
personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial
review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the
constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of
administrative actions; and (5)Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the
agrarian reform process.85

In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to
protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In
general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of
constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.86 Other countries like Colombia, Chile,
Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ ofAmparo only to some
constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.87

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo,
several of the aboveAmparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial
power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause
accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo
casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas
corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S.
common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison.89

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of
injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under
Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a
writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions
- borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better
remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides
rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to
make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.91

The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in
the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run,
the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.

In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the
respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the
promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody
Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable
remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have
their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the
circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.

With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in
disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:

The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and
credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and
self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.94

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause
of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof
required.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(emphasis supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish
their claims bysubstantial evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

 Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper
and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.95

After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on
August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by
respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless
candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through
his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa
isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang
tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel."97 "May
naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis
ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang
mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi
ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100

We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's
affidavit and testimony, viz:

...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the
petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond
recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were
military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU
auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la
Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the
brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts
during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who
headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents
of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the
participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU
auxiliaries.

We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the
petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors
were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.

The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely
superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on
the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due
to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military
personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly
exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated...

Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was
aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command.
In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that
he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he
 wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal
role in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of
the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his
command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not
merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable
cause.

In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices
Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr.,
member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal
Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could
not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive
the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not
testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)

However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the
petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also
attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the
petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a
Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they
were detained for at least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and
then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the
Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more
or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to
face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to
the house of the petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to
relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario
warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join any rallies to
denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four
Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan
conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for
his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that
Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.

It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced
disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation of other military
personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly
established.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the
abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming.101

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not
corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and
testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and
medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the
physical injuries inflicted on respondents,103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture
they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort
Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be
the "Division Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in
said military facility.

In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the
Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana
Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz
was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly
based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding
her ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took
when she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained.107 She was also
examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on
her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she
suffered while in detention.108

With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during
detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from
the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and
candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other
evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in
the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation
of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.

We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no
quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has
now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that
they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every
sense of the word"109 as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have
named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and
have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty
and security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once
again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to
security of person.111

Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often
associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against
torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security expressly
mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from
torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall under the general
coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court
ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy
under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation
of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the
right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the
exercise of that liberty"114 such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that
amounted to a deprivation of liberty"115 or being put under "monitoring and surveillance."116

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and
liberty, and aviolation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as
respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook
in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge...

At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her
person - houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the
state's power over a person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and
sanctity of the person himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court
in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is
to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the
security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to
give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858;
Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the
dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be
of home or of persons and correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the
Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right
against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is
closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his
personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and
reasons.119 (emphases supplied)

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive121 -
upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a
guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life
lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it
is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect
the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the
whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence."122 In a broad sense, the right to
security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs,
his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life
while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are
necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the
individual."123

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this
right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars
postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual
international human right.124 It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means
"freedom from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied)

In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the
rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from
being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one
person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or
past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the
"right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with
violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to
security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.127

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body
cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the
body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the
degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law,
physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity
or security of a person.129

Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to
vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it
constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person
includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically
proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.

Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not
involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the
sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed.

Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation
for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such
investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations.

An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this
case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically
abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the
application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied
heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:

...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time
when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure
his security and to investigate the circumstances in question.

... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural
obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.131 (emphasis
supplied)

The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement
that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and
liberty, viz:

...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights
and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights
conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms
include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.132

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right
to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of
person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III,
Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
"guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.133 As
the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights
to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection
to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders
to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of
investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and
be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests
that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the government.135

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been
interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article
9137 of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty
under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist
independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of
liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case
involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social
views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:

The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part
of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of
arrest and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first
sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right
to liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with
in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to
the right of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it
was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of formal
deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee
the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law,
States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just
because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under
an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An
interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the
personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally
ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.139(emphasis supplied)

The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and
prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements
following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a
similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and
persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state;Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the
abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v.
Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner and the harassment he
(complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v.
Zambia,144 involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not
only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the
State to afford protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of
person" under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on
disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by
state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for information and
investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a
violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the
substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very
purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed
control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take
effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a
prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken
into custody and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now
determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty
and security.

While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including
them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he
was caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam,"
who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.

This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to
pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by
virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the
end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay,
Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be
executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw

pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng
mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.148

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention.
With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced
and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in
those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and
Manuel Merino, among others.

Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by
private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will
as they are forced to limit their movements or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being
shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt
acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security.
Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,
actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the
failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the
abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation
of respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own
witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He
merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians
whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his
subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to
ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test
the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.

In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive
dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the
AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court
against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the
aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and
securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court.150 Petitioner AFP
Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of
respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused
to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of
the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to
provide results of the investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the
policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007,
respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through
the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.

Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a
violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.

In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the
apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on
the part of the military.

Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.

First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file with the court.

Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt.
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.

Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records
and charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if
any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who
attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.

With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by
respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites
for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order,
namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable
cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.152 In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving
and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and
affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by name,
with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be
produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners
in the abduction has not been shown.

Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not
be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable
intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such
as respondents.

Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:

Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action
is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying
or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action and which are in his possession, custody or control...

In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of
Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the
books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the
subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the
argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or
confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..."

Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the
investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of
the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as
soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters."

With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present
places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the
submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the
resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and
jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and
unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even death.

On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their
abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of
territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be
served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the
respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create
the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable
and necessary.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed
out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that
gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906,
October 7, 2008
Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were
suspected of being members of the New Peoples Army, were forcibly taken from their
home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After several
days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as
members of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they
were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist
insurgents. While in captivity, they met other desaperacidos (including the still-missing
University of the Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also
suspected of being communist insurgents and members of the NPA. After eighteen months
of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape
and file a petition for the writ of amparo.

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing
laws.

Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of ones person against
government intrusion. The right to security of person is freedom from fear, a guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian
sword of the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is
directed against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to
the rights and liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning to
protect, is borne out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights
abusesoften perpetrated by the armed forces against farmers thought to be communist
insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal
killings, enforced disappearances, and threats thereof, giving the powerless a powerful
remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that
has been embodied in positive law, gives voice to the preys of silent guns and prisoners
behind secret walls.