Professional Documents
Culture Documents
I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Douglas Lackey for the opportunity to relive these
issues in linguistics, having missed them first time around by several decades; my thanks to Profes-
sors Marcel den Dikken and Robert Fiengo for helpful comments while preparing this review; and
my respect for the late Professor Katz and his lasting contributions to linguistics and the philosophy
of language.
1
N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1965).
2
Page and chapter numbers in text refer to this title unless otherwise noted.
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by fellow linguists reproduced below help to illustrate). In their preface, Katz and
Postal explain that the major aim of their research is to provide an adequate
means of incorporating the grammatical and the semantic descriptions into one
integrated description (x), and in the process, succeeded in charting a future for
syntax at the dawn of the Chomskyan era in linguistics. Taking the account of
semantics developed by Katz and Fodor in their The Structure of a Semantic
Theory3 and the conception of generative grammar proposed by Chomsky in the
late 1950s and developed in the early 1960s, Katz and Postal set out to define the
elementary interface between syntax and semantics.
Indeed, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions addresses topics so
basic to linguistic theory that they are easily forgotten or perhaps too easily dis-
missed. What is the relationship between syntax and semantics? How do syntac-
tic transformations relate to sentential meaning, and in particular, what semantic
effects, if any, do transformations have? How should the linkage between seman-
tic and syntactic structures be described? In a position as controversial as it was
simple and methodologically a priori (32), Katz and Postal resolve the seman-
ticsyntactic interface in one direction. Syntactic transformations do not affect
meaning, a claim that would soon culminate in the Katz-Postal Hypothesis or
Katz-Postal Principle: the application of transformational rules to deep struc-
ture preserves meaning. And this position, for all the heat it generated between
the generative semantics of Lakoff4 and McCawley5 and the interpretative
semantics of Chomsky6 and Jackendoff,7 would become standard linguistic
theory, superseded only by successive developments internal to the growth of
Chomskyan linguistics.8
3
J. Katz and J. Fodor, The Structure of a Semantic Theory, Language 39 (1963): 170210.
4
G. Lakoff, On Generative Semantics. Semantics, ed. D. Steinberg and L. Jakobovitz. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1971; pp. 23296.
5
J. McCawley, The Role of Semantics in a Grammar, Universals in Linguistic Theory. ed. E. Bach
and R. Harms. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968; pp. 12469.
6
N. Chomsky, Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar. The Hague: Mouton, 1972.
7
R. Jackendoff, Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972).
8
In addition to precipitating the contentious debates concerning the correct formulation of deep struc-
ture semantics and its relation to transformations, the Katz-Postal principle itself is a product of an
intercine history. As early as 1960 Fodor had actually argued that most transformations do affect
meaning. In response Katz argued that many transformations do not. Joining forces, Katz and Fodor
(The Structure of a Semantic Theory) would argue that most, and perhaps all, transformations
have no effect on meaning. With the publication of An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descrip-
tions, Katz and Postal bring this claim to its sharpest conclusion. See J. Staal, Review of An
Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions, Foundations of Language 1 (1965): 13354, for dis-
cussion and references for this prehistory of the Katz-Postal principle and, of course, J. J. Katz,
Interpretive Semantics vs. Generative Semantics, Foundations of Language 6 (1970): 22059,
for a forceful exposition regarding the interpretive versus generative semantic dispute.
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AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF LINGUISTIC DESCRIPTIONS [1964]
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9
The Structure of a Semantic Theory.
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AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF LINGUISTIC DESCRIPTIONS [1964]
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do not affect a change in meaning, evidence that the projection rules transform-
ing these sentences operate only on the underlying phrase markers rather than any
surface forms. The example of negation in (8) might seem like a poor choice to
illustrate meaning preserving transformations, as sentences (7) and (8) clearly do
differ in meaningthe latter being the negation of the former. The point of this
comparison, however, is to demonstrate that it is only the semantic addition of
not that affects the meaning of the sentence. After all, since the possibility of
a meaningful difference like that between a sentence and its negation depends on
the possibility of choosing a difference in underlying meaning, the choice of
an underlying structure with a Neg morpheme must be optional. But since the
appearance of the auxiliary do in a negative construction is not optional, it
follows that do, and obligatory rules generally, cannot bring about a change in
meaning.
Unlike the addition of not, the addition of do is semantically inert as it
merely supports the third person present tense morpheme s. As the authors
point out, the ungrammatical sentence
If do actually had meaning, [9] would differ in meaning from [8]. . . . [t]he fact that transfor-
mations sometimes introduce meaningless elements is another strong argument for the view that
P1 [projection rules] operate on underlying P-markers. For this condition automatically ensures
that these meaningless elements are never present in P-markers which are to be semantically inter-
preted. This makes it unnecessary to associate null semantic dictionary entries with elements like
do, which would be required if meaningless elements are present in P-markers which are to be
semantically interpreted. (45)
Moreover, though the authors do not make this point, the sentence
though ungrammatical, means the same as (7), requiring only the present tense
marker to be affixed to the auxiliary rather than the main verb to become
grammatical. In this way, sentences involving obligatory additions like do,
stylistic deletions, and alternative word orders, exemplify syntactic transforma-
tions where the semantic interpretation of the transformed sentence is identical
to the semantic interpretation provided by the underlying P-markers, an indica-
tion that transformations only act upon underlying P-markers and hence do not
affect meaning.
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AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF LINGUISTIC DESCRIPTIONS [1964]
Thus there are three possibilities; first, that no correctly formulated singulary transformation has
an output with a semantic interpretation distinct from its input and that those transformations in
the literature which violate this claim are incorrect; second, that all singulary transformations affect
meaning and those in the literature which do not are incorrect; third, that some do and some do
not affect semantic interpretation and it is some specific feature of the particular transformations
that determines which do and which do not. (32)
Arguing from the a priori grounds of simplicity (though the form of this argu-
ment would equally suggest, reasons Staal10 in a review, that there are no animals
which are mammals either as the latter are a specific subclass of the former11),
Katz and Postal definitively side with the first alternative. As with passives noted
earlier, Katz and Postal exploit the technique of introducing individually distinct
question (Q) and imperative (I) morphemes into the underlying P-marker struc-
ture of question and imperative sentences so as to derive syntactic surface forms
semantically equivalent to the underlying P-markers. Indeed, after showing how
interrogatives, imperatives and negatives each differ in underlying structure to
match their distinct surface interpretations, Katz and Postal conclude that all sen-
tences with distinct meanings whose derivations involve only singulary transfor-
mations have distinct underlying P-markers (117). But now having demonstrated
that all singulary transformations preserve meaning (either merely by producing
10
Review of An Integrated Theory.
11
The full passage reads: One argument offered to establish this conclusion with respect to singu-
lary transformations . . . runs as follows. Either all, or none, or some singulary transformations
affect meaning. The first two alternatives are clearly preferable, because they make no reference
to specific features of a class of transformations. This argument would establish with equal cogency
that either all, or no animals are mammals, since only these two views make no reference to spe-
cific features of a class of animals. In fact, this argument would seem to enable us to avoid the
term some altogether in theoretical statements (138). That said, Staal does recognize that
Despite these a prioris the authors provide some sound semantic data which favour the general-
ization that no singulary transformations affect meaning (138) and proceeds to substantively
discuss particle inversions, deletions, and so on.
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In other words, besides assuming a certain set of universal grammatical vocabulary, we assume
also a certain set of universal phrase structure rules. We claim that the grammars of all languages
introduce elements like Noun Phrase, Verb Phrase, etc. In other words, elements like Noun Phrase
and Verb Phrase will dominate among other things, sequences of universal elements like Rel and
Comp plus the lexical head constituents of these major categories, i.e., elements like Noun and
Verb. (48)
Indeed, the remainder of chapter 3 formulizes this approach and deploys a single
level of P1 projection rulesaccompanied by these more abstract P-marker
structuresto provide the correct semantic interpretation of sentences involving
embedded transformations. In essence, these nonterminal symbols allow for the
semantics of the sentence to be coordinated with the syntax by restricting the
distribution of embeddings to replacing these specified dummy elements (157).
Without them, the syntactic component would otherwise fail to provide a single
formal object capable of being semantically interpreted by P1 rules alone.
With the framework for deriving both singulary and generalized transforma-
tions in place, chapter 4 is devoted to defusing a variety of counterexamples to
the claim that all projection rules are restricted to underlying P-markers. The first
problem for this proposal is that such projection rules appear incapable of always
uniquely determining the correct semantic interpretation of a sentence. Of course,
one prominent example where surface semantic interpretations appear to be
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AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF LINGUISTIC DESCRIPTIONS [1964]
misaligned from their underlying P-markers is the case of (singulary) passive sen-
tences incorporating quantified expressions and pronouns. As Katz and Postal
note, Chomsky12 himself argued that quantified sentences like
are not synonymous on the basis that in the former case, the languages known by
various individuals need not be identical, while in the latter case it is the same
two languages known by everyone. Yet Katz and Postal argue that both sentences
are subject to the same ambiguity: (12) can be interpreted as selecting two spe-
cific languages, or equally, as specifying any two languages whether they are the
same pair or not.13
In any event, Katz and Postal reason that even if the sentences (11) and (12)
do differ in semantic interpretation, this does not entail that the same underlying
P-markers can transformationally give rise to semantically distinct sentences.
Only if one assumes that both sentences have the same underlying form could
any difference in meaning be attributed to the operation of a transformational rule.
But, as the authors point out, their analysis explicitly allows for the underlying
representations of sentences to include dummy morphemes (like Q and I), and in
this case, the proper treatment of passives specifically calls for the base P-marker
to include a passive dummy morpheme. In this way, passive sentences are not
derived from active sentences, but rather passive sentences are derived from
underlying sentences already including passive P-marker elements. The observa-
tion that sentences like (11) and (12), then, might be interpreted differently is no
threat to their theory as this is accommodated by the fact that sentences derived
from different underlying P-markers are supposed to yield different semantic
interpretations or can be countered by noting that both sentences can be ambigu-
ously interpreted suggesting that they are semantically equivalent paraphrases of
each other. Either way, it would seem, the Katz-Postal Principle is preserved:
either two distinct surface readings are derived from two distinct underlying
12
N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (The Hague: Mouton, 1957).
13
To be sure, Chomsky (Aspects) concedes that while many speakersand in particular himself
consider the sentences to be nonsynonymous, we might maintain that in such examples both inter-
pretations are latent (as would be indicated by the identity of the deep structures of the two
sentences in all respects relevant to semantic interpretation), and that the reason for the opposing
interpretation is an extraneous factoran overriding consideration involving order of quantifiers
in surface structuresthat filters out certain latent interpretations provided by the deep structures.
In support of this view, it may be pointed out that other sentences that derive from these (e.g.,
there are two languages that everyone in the room knows) may switch interpretations, indicating
that these interpretations must have been latent all along (224).
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forms, or one ambiguous underlying P-marker structure gives rise to one ambigu-
ously interpretable surface form. Indeed, this same technique is pursued through-
out the exposition of all apparent counterexamples: whatever contribution
[singulary transformations] may appear to make must be regarded as due to some
inherent feature of the underlying phrase markers.14 None of negative transfor-
mations, imperatives, or questions is derived from simple declarative forms as
each is independently derived from different underlying P-markers, resulting in
correspondingly distinct surface interpretations.
Of course, this analysis stands in contrast to earlier syntactic treatments pre-
sented by Chomsky whereby the transformational component of the grammar is
responsible for syntactically deriving negatives, questions, and imperatives from
a single underlying form. Does this mean, Katz and Postal rhetorically ask, that
there are not any passive, negative, or imperative transformations? No. But
instead of introducing the morphemes that transform declarative sentences into
questions and imperatives, transformationslike the negative examples in (7)
and (8)only reposition preexisting morphemes, with the attendant effect that
the repositioning of these morphemes is obligatory rather than optional. Rather
than complicate the transformational process whereby surface forms are derived
from underlying P-markers, the P-markers themselves are structurally enriched.
As Lyons, in a 1966 review observes, What [this] alternative treatment does in
effect is to transfer the choice (upon which depends the difference in meaning
between, e.g., a declarative and a corresponding interrogative or imperative sen-
tence) from the transformational to the phrase-structure rules. . . . In addition to
the negative element posited by Lees15 and Klima,16 Katz and Postal set up an
interrogative element Q, and an imperative element I, as optionally selected
morphemes in the phrase structure rules (119).
Recall that within Chomskys initial formulation of generative grammar, trans-
formations had the dual purpose of deriving semantically different (questions,
imperatives, negatives) sentences from a single underlying declarative form and
relating optional surface variants of the same underlying form to each other (e.g.,
particle inversion and passive transformations). But given that transformations
operate only over underlying P-markers and do not affect meaning, either the
semantic difference between questions, imperatives, negatives, and declaratives
must be explained away, or only the second function of transformations can be
preserved. As Katz and Postal conclude, It therefore seems reasonable to say in
general that the transformations are merely stylistic variants necessarily having
14
J. J. Katz, Recent Issues in Semantic Theory, Foundations of Language 3 (1967): 12494.
15
R. Lees, The Grammar of English Nominalizations. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1960.
16
E. Klima, Negation in English, The Structure of Language: Readings in The Philosophy of
Language. ed. J. Fodor and J. Katz. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964; pp. 24663.
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AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF LINGUISTIC DESCRIPTIONS [1964]
the same meaningnothing more remarkable than the syntactic analogue to free
allophonic variation (112).
Of course, once all of negatives, imperatives, interrogatives and passives
are each derived from different underlying base structures, the intuition that
such sentences are nevertheless somehow deeply related to each other must be
discharged. To this end, the authors develop a notion of similarity whereby
such sentences are related by structural resemblances rather than derived
transformations:
An alternative explanation can be offered in terms of the present theory of linguistic descriptions.
We claim that such pairs of sentences are related because their underlying P-markers are similar.
This notion of similarity must, of course, be made precise. . . . The only natural answer to this
question is that the morphemes like Q, I, Negative, Passive, wh, etc., which differentiate pairs felt
to be intuitively related . . . are universal markers specified within the theory of descriptions. . . .
Thus it can be stated in the theory of linguistic descriptions that the similarity underlying intu-
itions of syntactic relatedness among sets of sentences must be based either on identity of under-
lying structures or on the presence of universal morphemes, like Q, wh, Negative, etc. Such markers
then serve to characterize the range of elementary sentence types in natural language. (11819)
17
Syntactic Structures.
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is not, in the same way and for the same reason that
is grammatical.
With these examples, Katz and Postal sustain their overall thesis that the
semantic interpretation of a sentence is uniquely determined by the operation of
only a single level of P1 projection rules acting on underlying P-markers, with
ambiguous surface sentences merely the overlapping result of transformations
working on two distinct underlying structures. In this way, and as repeated
throughout the monograph, cases like quantified passives and nominal construc-
tions that appear to threaten their thesis, are not therefore counterinstance[s] but
rather a piece of supporting evidence for the position we are defending (122)
and by the same token (though space does not permit discussion) [f]ar from
being counterexamples to our view of semantic interpretation, the case of agen-
tive and objective verbal derivations is further strong support for this view (148).
Having defended the thesis that no additional level of P2 projection rules is
required to coordinate syntactic transformations involving even embedded
clauses with the underlying semantics determined by P-markers, and hence, that
neither singulary nor generalized transformations affect meaning, Katz and Postal
ask the reader to follow them beyond the confines of grammatical theory and con-
sider some aspects of linguistics generally.18 In chapter 5, they conclude the mono-
18
This move toward a simplification of projection rules, however, does immediately motivate an
important development within syntactic theory proper. On the basis of Katz and Postals elimina-
tion of P2 rules, in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax Chomsky (1965) eliminates the need for gen-
eralized transformations altogether on the basis that all the necessary ordering rules are accounted
for by singulary transformations operating over P-markers themselves enriched with postionally
designated embedded P-markers. Given that sequences of singulary transformations apply cycli-
cally from the most deeply embedded phrase structure to the least embedded, and coordinate
constructions like conjunction can somehow also be accommodated, Chomsky concludes that gen-
eralized phrase-markers formed in this way contain all the base phrase-markers that constitute the
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AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF LINGUISTIC DESCRIPTIONS [1964]
Given a sentence for which a syntactic derivation is needed, look for simple paraphrases of the
sentence which are not paraphrases by virtue of synonymous expressions; on finding them, con-
struct grammatical rules that relate the original sentence and its paraphrases in such a way that
each of these sentences has the same sequence of underlying P-markers. (157)
basis of the sentence, but it contains more information than a basis in the old sense since it also
indicates explicitly how these base Phrase-markers are embedded in one another. That is, the gen-
eralized Phrase-marker contains all of the information contained in the basis, as well as the infor-
mation provided by the generalized embedding transformations (1965, 134).
19
By contrast, it is worth noting that generative semanticistshaving identified deep structure with
generatively produced meaningswould pursue a different tactic: no matter how phrase-structure
distinct, all strings with similar meaning, e.g., the enemy destroyed the city and the enemys
destruction of the city or even the teacher used a car to drive to school and the teacher drove a
car to school, were to be derived from the same underlying conceptual (predicate logic) seman-
tics, and realized as syntactically different phrase structures through the application of transfor-
mations operating over these abstract semantic representations.
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English, but as a general framework for all of natural language. As Katz and Postal
remark, unless such notions as subject Noun Phrase and Verb are character-
ized in the general theory of the syntactic component, essentially identical pro-
jection rules will have to be included ad hoc in the semantic components of all
languages (159); so to for Q, I, Neg, Passive. Pursuing this line of reasoning to
its seemingly inevitable conclusion, the authors argue that not only should the
major constituents of English be considered universal features of language, but
that the grammatical coordination among constituents be regarded as universal
too. Insofar as English requires subject noun phrases to precede the verb, then
the underlying P-marker relationship between subject noun phrases and verbs
must, according to Katz and Postal, also follow this order in all languages. So
while this may reasonably lead them to conclude that The very real differences
of major constituent order found in the actual sentences of natural languages must
then be due to transformational operations (139), it is unclear why, of all lan-
guages, English should be honored as the universal template, particularly when
Katz and Postal make the point early on that while their examples are almost
exclusively drawn from English, theirs is a study primarily concern[ing] abstract
questions about the nature of language and are aware of the need to test our
theory against examples drawn from a wide variety of languages as soon as they
have been (properly) described (5).
According to Katz and Postal, linguistic universals are of two types: sub-
stantive and formal, reminding the reader that The aim of traditional univer-
sal grammar was in effect to provide the concepts or categories in terms of which
linguistic rules could be stated. Interest in the goal of specifying the form of lin-
guistic rules is recent and due to the influence of Chomsky (166). While formal
universals express the rules by which generalizations regarding the linguistic rela-
tionship among elements can be formulated, substitutive universals provide the
basic inventory of linguistic elements. These include features of phonological
description (consonant, vowel, aspiration, etc.), syntactic description (noun
phrase, verb, dummy morphemes, etc.) and semantic description (male, physical
object, etc.), with the last set characterizing a putatively universal language of
semantic markers (sometimes referred to as markerese and more fully detailed
in Katz and Fodor20). Of course, claims regarding the universality of semantic
elements were, and remain, controversial. No doubt, as John Lyons writes,
If it were true that there is an alphabet of universal semantic components in terms of which it
is possible to describe the structure of the vocabularies of all languages (which is what the authors
claim), the formulization of projection rules of semantic interpretation on the basis of such com-
ponents, or markers, would constitute a significant advance in the theory of linguistic descrip-
20
The Structure of Semantic Theory.
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AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF LINGUISTIC DESCRIPTIONS [1964]
tion. The principles of general phonetics and phonology derive their validity from the fact that
there is a language-neutral, homogeneous and physically describable substance. But what
grounds have we for believing in a common content substance whether conceptual or phenom-
enal, within which distinctions are drawn by the vocabularies?21
Clearly writing at a time before Fodors22 The Language of Thought and still later
mad dog versions of conceptual nativism (no less Fodors break with compo-
sitional meaning theories), Lyons continues, It remains to be seen how various
other meaning-relations between lexical items will be handled in terms of seman-
tic markers and projection rules, presumably of a different type. Only then shall
we be able to judge whether the treatment by Katz, Fodor and Postal of a
relatively restricted area of semantics contains anything of lasting value.23
Moving from language universals to models of speech production and recog-
nition, Katz and Postal see it as their task to explain how, at least in general terms,
phonetic representations of speech are both the articulatory product of and inter-
pretive basis for final derived P-markers. Yet while the final derived P-markers
provided by the syntactic component of the grammar determine how a sentence
will ultimately be phonologically realized, only the P-markers that underlie all
the others are relevant to semantic interpretation. Speech recognition and speech
production, then, are those mechanisms that are capable of recovering in real
timethrough the successive application of projection rulesunderlying P-
markers on the basis of final derived P-markers. Given that the relationship
between underlying and final derived P-markers may be mediated by multiple P-
marker derivations, it is suggested that, as a matter of psycholinguistic process-
ing economy, if the sequence of underlying P-markers can be obtained from the
final derived P-marker without depending on such intermediate structures, the
model ought to be constructed in such a way so as to avoid such dependence
(169), an assertion relevant to the initial wave of psycholinguistic work testing
the psychological reality of generative grammars that would soon to follow.
But processing models equipped with encoding and decoding mechanisms
attuned to the relationship between deep and surface structures would not only
serve speech recognition and production; they would also help explain language
learning. In the very last section of chapter 5, Katz and Postal close with a few
remarks on the significance of Chomskys work vis--vis behaviorist accounts of
language learning. Given that the surface output of final derived P-markers may
be radically different (173)that is transformationally distinct via permuta-
tions and deletionsfrom their underlying P-marker input, but base P-markers
21
Review of An Integrated Theory 124.
22
J. Fodor, The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1975.
23
Review of An Integrated Theory 124.
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are the basis for semantic interpretation, a learner bent on inducing the rules of
the language merely from the limited set of actual observed surface sentences is
working at an impossible disadvantage. Since only final derived P-marker struc-
tures are directly observable, a learner unable to recover deep P-marker structure
through the application of projection rules would be unable to coordinate the
underlying P-marker semantics of a sentence with its derived syntactic, and hence
phonological form. Quoting Chomsky, the authors emphasize that The fact that
all normal children acquire essentially comparable grammars of great complex-
ity with remarkable rapidity suggests that human beings are somehow especially
designed to do this, with a . . . hypothesis-formulating ability of unknown
character and complexity (172).
But, of course, Katz and Postal did not wait until the end to cite directly from
Chomsky; Chomskys presence is felt throughout the monograph. And just as
much as Chomsky is the immediate background to An Integrated Theory of Lin-
guistic Descriptions, in the preface to his Studies on Semantics in Generative
Grammar, Chomsky would begin
The three essays that follow take as their point of departure the formulation of grammatical theory
presented in such work as J. J. Katz and P. M. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descrip-
tions, 1964, and Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory Syntax, 1965. For ease of exposition, I refer to
this formulation as the standard theory. The essays deal with problems that arise within this
framework, and present a revision of the standard theory to an extended standard theory (EST).24
And while EST, like Standard Theory itself, would give way to decades of revi-
sions, reconsiderations, and eventually minimalist-inspired abandonments, the
force and clarity by which Katz and Postal addressed issues at the core of
generative linguistics in the early sixties would sustainand dividelinguistic
theory for years to come.
24
Studies on Semantics 5.
416