Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:

ABN # 65 648 097 123

Vietnam: Party Factions,
Leadership and Policy Issues

Carlyle A. Thayer
July 22,2017

[client name deleted]

We are preparing several reports about Vietnamese domestics politics. We request
your assessment of the following issues:

Q1. How important is the position of Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City Party
Committee, and what do you make of the decision in May to assign Nguyen Thien
Nhan to this position?

ANSWER: The Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh municipal
party committee is important for two reasons: first, the secretary is invariably a
member of the Politburo and second, Ho Chi Minh City is the largest city in Vietnam.
It is often a stepping stone for higher office. For example, Truong Tan Sang, although
reprimanded for not taking action in a mafia-linked scandalwhen he was head of the
city party committee, later became president of the country.
Nguyen Tien Nhan was a high flyer who rose from deputy chair of the Ho Chi Minh City
People's Committee to Minister of Education and Training under Prime Minster
Nguyen Tan Dung. Nhan holds a PhD in cybernetics at the University of Magdeburg in'
the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany). He later earned a Master in
Public Administration from the University of Oregon. He also attended a project
investment assessment short-course at Harvard. Despite Nhan's education and
university teaching background, he did not perform up to standard as minister and
was kicked upstairs as Deputy Prime Minister. Then he was transferred to head the
Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) because party statutes required that this post be held
by an incumbent member of the Politburo. Previously retired Politburo members
headed the VFF. This post gave Nhan wide experience is dealing with Vietnam's mass
organizations and official people's organizations. Nhan likely replaced Dinh La Tang as
CPV secretary in Ho Chi Minh City because he was a senior member of the Politburo
(one of seven incumbents) who could be transferred without causing a reshuffle in
other top leadership posts. As noted, he has served Ho Chi Minh City before and his
background makes him suitable for the bustling cosmopolitan city.

Q2. Do you think there are any factions remaining in the Communist Party following
last January's congress, or has it become more unified under Trong? Maybe, can you
explain briefly how these factions are detectable?
 2

ANSWER: The use of the term faction is problematic. lt is generally a heuristic

framework - a way of ordering analysis that is useful but inherently not proven.
Analysts use the terms reformer and conservative to describe factions. Alexander
Vuving first posited three factions than four: ideologues, middle of the roaders,
opportunist rent seekers and reformist modernizers. These categories describe policy
dispositions not factions in my assessment.
The most fundamental fact is that no outside analyst of Vietnamese politics, and many
in Vietnam, have no idea what the voting alignments are on specific issues within the
politburo. The present Politburo reflects a pull back from individual leadership as
exemplified by former prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung's political style to consensus-
based collective leadership. ltwould appearthat hierarchy and seniority play a role in
shaping consensus.
Analysts such as Vuving read the tea leaves of political blogs and mine the rumor mills
to detect factions with the Communist Party of Vietnam.
To use a term coined by David Brown, a Vietnamese-speaking former American
diplomat, "an anything but Dung" coalition formed in advanced of the 12th party
congress. They manipulated the rules on leadership selection and Dung was forced to
reti re.

The starting point for an analysis of factionalism lies in the selection of delegates to
the five yearly national party congresses. They are elected by provincial party
congresses and party committees within central blocs, such as the Ministry of Public
Security or the Vietnam People's Army. These delegates elect the Central Committee.
My research on all Central Committees since the L976 4th party congress following
reunification, reveals that there is continuity in sectoral representation on the Central
Committee. Distinct sectoral groupings include: senior party leaders such as
incumbent Politburo members and other party members holding national level party
posts; party officials who hold senior positions in the government and state apparatus
including mass organizations; provincial party leaders; and the military. There are also
a number of members who do not fit these categories.

The Central Committee elects the Politburo. Vietnam seeks equilibrium. The Politburo
elected in January 2016 totalled 19 members, somewhat larger than normal. lt
included 12 new members including some who rose up the ranks under Nguyen Tan
Dung.

I reject Zachary Abuza's constant invocation of a power struggle at the top level in
Vietnam to explain political jockeying. His research is based on Vietnamese political
blogs. The term "power struggle" is not defined to differentiate personal ambition
from an organized attempt to overturn the leadership and assume (or seize) power.
Different sectors may give rise to patron-client relations. Personalities also play a role.
It may well be that factions are not permanent alignments but transitory coalitions on
specific issues.

Q3. What would you say are the major political issues in Vietnam nowadays?
of domestic
ANSWER: The major political issues facing Vietnam currently are a mix
and foreign policy concerns. At the domestic level these issues include: anti-

,
 3

corruption, streamlining the party bureaucracy, privatization and reform of state-

owned enterprises, raising economic growth about 6% of GDP, reducing public debt,
land access, environmental issues and peaceful evolution of the political system.
Externally, there two clusters of foreign policy issues: how to safeguard Vietnam's
sovereignty in the South China Sea and how to balance relations with the major
powers - China, United States, Russia, lndia and Japan.

Q4. Would you agree that environmentalism has united activists against the
government, especially after the Formosa spill, and what are your thoughts on the
new level of environmental activism?
ANSWER: Environmentalism in Vietnam has a long pedigree dating back to the anti-
bauxite protests. There have been several much more minor controversies arising
from pollution, for example pollution by a South Korean company in Ho Chi Minh to
the Formosa dead fish controversy that led to mass protests last year. Quite clearly
the government's claim to legitimacy based on performance has come under
challenge by its tardy response to the Formosa incident. The bauxite issue led to cross-
cutting support by groups that normally pursued single issues. Some Catholic priests
and members of the banned Unified Buddhist Ghurch of Vietnam, for example,
supported the broad coalition of environmental activists, retired party and
government officials, media and some National Assembly deputies,
These types of coalitions eventually dissipate and do not form an existential threat to
one--party rule.
Q5. By most accounts the government is strapped for cash. The budget deficit hasn't
dropped in years, and public debt as percentage of GDP is around the 65% mark. As a
result, it appears that the government is cutting investment in major infrastructure
projects and public services and, at the same time, raising taxes. Do you think this
combination could be a recipe for greater disaffection amongst ordinary people, and
why?
ANSWER: The government is aware of these problems and has mapped out a response
in its Socio-Economic Development Strategy, 2011-2020. This strategy focuses on
macro-economic stability, structural reforms, social equity and environmental
sustainability. The strategy highlights three "breakthrough areas" including
infrastructure (and reforming market institution and promoting human resource and
skills development for industry). lt is clear that progress has been mixed and Vietnam
needs to step up reforms.

As the World Bank highlighted in April this year, productivity growth continues to
decline along with the growth of the labour force. This means that the GDP growth
target of 6.70/, will not be met. This would threaten to undermine gains in poverty
reduction and thus impact negatively on substantial sections of the rural population
including ethnic minorities. These trends when coupled with corruption by local
officials could spark a public reaction such as occurred in Thai Binh province in 1997.
Cutbacks to infrastructure such as energy/power, transport, sanitation and
telecommunications will impact on the urban population. Vietnam has reached lower
middle-income status and middle class city dwellers will be disaffected if their
standards of living fall.
 4

On a theoretical level there are multiple sources of political legitimacy, including but
not limited to legal-rational (elections and rule of law), nationalism, charismatic
leadership, traditional leadership and performance. The CPV's claim to legitimacy
increasingly rests on performance and a decline in overall living standards in both rural
and urban areas would put the CPV under pressure.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam: Party Factions, Leadership and Policy
lssues," Thoyer Consultoncy Bockground Brief , July 22,2017. All background briefs are
posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list
type, UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.

Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
 Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:
ABN # 65 648 097 123
Vietnam: Nguyen Thien Nhan as
Party Chief in Ho Chi Minh City
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 25,2017

Q1. Do you think the choice of Nguyen Thien Nhan as Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) party
secretary was a result of the Party's shift to "consensus-based collective leadership"?
Dinh La Thang was said to be individualistic, like Nguyen Tan Dung, whereas Nhan
has kept his head low and "avoids saying or doing anything that offends anyone,"
according to an analyst. Was he chosen because he will stick to the consensus?

ANSWER: Nhan's appointment resulted after the Politburo decided to remove Dinh
La Thanh after a prolonged period of consideration of his case file. The decision
would have been made by the Politburo collectively because it was an internal party
matter.
Dinh La Thang's rise was unexpected. He was not on the initial list of candidates
approved by the Politburo for election at the 12th party congress. His name was put
on the ballot and he won but not by an impressive majority of the vote. His elevation
to the Politburo came as a surprise to many Vietnamese party members as did his
unexpected appointment as party chief in Ho Chi Minh City. Thang was dismissed
because he did not exercise effective control over a network of corrupt officials.

Nhan was appointed because he was one of the junior incumbents of the Politburo,
No major reshuffle of senior posts was necessary. He did not blot his copybook as
head of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and indeed gained valuable experience in
working with mass organizations. Because of his previous service in Ho Chi Minh City
his appointment was welcomed locally.

This assessment is not incompatible with the analyst you quote. Nguyen Tan Dung
could operate individually because the office of the prime minister grew in
importance within Vietnam's political system as Vietnam integrated into the global
economy. The state bureaucracy that Dung commanded arguably grew more
powerfulthan the party in everyday decision-making.
Nhan was not in a position of comparable power. Under the principle of democratic
centralism he was free to express his opinions within the Politburo but bound by
consensus once a decision had been made.

Q2. When the Central Committee voted on the matter in May, Nhan name's was just
one of many considered. One source claims he was backed by Truong Tan Sang - who
acts as a special adviser to party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong. Nhan was
 2

chosen because of his southern ties, which would allow the north to carry more say
in the south (in effect, expandingthe Party's reach) and because Nhan is seen bythe
public as one of the few "clean" Politburo members. What is your assessment?

ANSWER: Vietnam's L9-member Politburo had two choices: appoint one of the
seven incumbent senior member sor appoint one of twelve new members'

ln the past, the top leadership was appointed to balance regions -

north, centre, and
south; in addition, the party secretaries of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City were given de
facto slots on the Politburo. Over time regional considerations were blurred; in
recent years the Politburo was once top heavy with southerners.
Nguyen Thien Nhan must have performed his duties as chair of the Vietnam
Fatherland Front satisfactorily to be moved to Ho Chi Minh City. Nhan's southern ties
would have enhanced his qualifications to head the party committee in Vietnam's
largest city. I don't agree with the assertion that "the north" would be able "to carry
more say in the south (in effect, expanding the Party's reach)." lt is clear from
Vietnam's political history that the Vietnam Communist Party, and its previous
iterations, was the only political party in Vietnam to span three regions under French
colonial rule. Seating on the Central Committee included representatives from the
north (Tonkin), centre (Annam) and south (Cochinchina)from the very beginning.
Nhan's selection was to find the best senior party leader to head a bustling
cosmopolitan city and implement the party's program. lt also makes political sense
to appoint a person familiar with the south. Nhan was born in Ca Mau about as far
south as you can get. Besides, Vietnamese political culture values education and
higher degrees, Nhan fits the bill and his father was a professor as well.

Q3. lt has been reported that Truong Tanb Sang supported Truong Hoa Binh; andit
seems that Nhan was the compromise choice.

ANSWER:Truong Hoa Binh is a new member of the current Politburo. He was born in
Long An province south of Ho Chi Minh city and held local posts (police and
procuracy) before being elevated to Deputy Minister of Public Security and then'
head of the People's Supreme Court in Hanoi.
Nhan as a compromise sounds eminently reasonable.

Suggested citation:Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam: Nguyen Thien Nhan as Party Chief in

" ,
Ho Chi Minh City, Thoyer Consultoncy Background Brief July 25, 20L7. All
background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself
from the mailing list type, UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply
key.

Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
 Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:
ABN # 65 648 097 123
Vietnam: Explaining Uptick in
Arrests of Activists & Bloggers
Carlyle A. Thayer
August 1,2017

I have never seen so many activists have been arrested and sentenced at a short time
as it is taking place in Vietnam for the past month. How do you explain this situation?

Do you think there has been a trend of intensified crackdown on activists for the past
time because the U.S under the time of president Trump does not pay attention to
human right issue in Vietnam?
Do you thinkthe decision to withdraw from TPP by president Trump make Vietnam
more confident on crackdown on activists/dissidents without being concerned on its
commitment on TPP?
Are there any domestic factors influence to the decision on intensifying crackdown on
democracy movement and activists?
Do you agree that the intensified crackdown on dissidents give Vietnam a very bad
image in the international community?

I am doing this feature "Vietnam human right worsens for the U.S's ignorance". So
could you pls give me your comments?
ASSESSMENT: There are at least five factors that explain the recent arrests and trials
of activists and bloggers in Vietnam.
The first factor is the bureaucratic routine of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). All
of those arrested were well known to the MPS. lts bureaucratic routine would have
been to open a file and systematically gather information on what an individual has
said in public, including posts on blogs and Facebook, as well as a list of associates.
The MPS then would have approached family members, friends and work colleagues
to advise them that the person under suspicion was a bad person and they should
dissuade him/her to stop anti-state activities. The MPS would have called in the
person of concern to interrogate them in an attempt to intimidate. lf the activist or
blogger continued the person's file would be set up the chain of command for action.

The second factor is that Vietnam will be hosting the APEC Summit at the end of the
year and the MPS does not want a repeat of 2006 when Vietnam last hosted an APEC
Summit, At that time Block 8406 emerged calling for democracy and human rights, On
the eve of the summit Block 8406 called on leaders who attending to make protests
to the Vietnamese government about human rights. The MPS cordoned off the streets
where Block 8406 members lived to limit contact with foreigners. After the summit
 2

the police arrested, tried and imprisoned Block 8406 activists. The timing of the arrests
and trials indicates the MPS is taking pre-emptive action far in advance of the APEC
Summit to intimidate other would be activists from making public protests on the
internet or in street demonstrations.
The third factor is a likely assessment by the MPS that the Trump Administration will
make only routine protests about the arrest of activists and bloggers. This assessment
would have been borne out by Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc's May meeting with
President Trump at the White House. The only public comments by the U.S. have been
remarks by outgoing Ambassador Ted Osius and a statement by the U.S. Embassy in
Hanoi.

It should be recalled that human rights in Vietnam formed one part of nine
cooperative areas listed in the 2013 joint statement on comprehensive partnership.
There is an annual bilateral human rights dialogue and the U.S. is providing Vietnam
legal assistance to bring its domestic laws into conformity with its international
obligations. Human right also featured in the joint statement issued by President
Trump and Prime Minister Phuc. lt is unlikely the two leaders addressed this issue in
depth or at all in their brief half hour meeting through an interpreter. The joint
statement was hammered out in advance and it skated over human rights in a
perfunctory matter. There was no apparent linkage between U.S. arms and military
technology sales and human rights.
The TransPacific Partnership has little relevance for human rights; its most sensitive
sections dealt with the right of workers to form their own associations and labor
standards, Vietnam could easily have accommodated these requirements by ensuring
that so-called independent labor associations only focused on the terms and
cond itions of workplace employment.

The fourth factor is the timing of these preemptive arrests and trials. The MPS has
calculated that there is enough time for this issue to die down or there is enough time
to take action to mitigate the consequences, such a releasing one or more activists in
advance of the APEC Summit. Vietnam can say it is doing so on health grounds or as a
result of good behavior of the prisoner. lt is conceivable that the security authorities
would allow the former prisoner to leave Vietnam into exile in the U.S. or elsewhere.
The fifth factor is related to Vietnam's relations with China. Several years ago, as a
result of public demonstrations and a war of words on the internet by Vietnamese and
Chinese netizens, the leaders of the two countries agreed "to steer public opinion."
Many of the recent arrests have included bloggers who have been critical about
Chinese behavior in the South China Sea and the response by the Vietnamese
government. Chinese Embassy officials in Hanoi, from the Ambassador on down,
would have lost no time in urging Vietnam to take action against those who "hurt the
Chinese people" or affect China's interests. All of this predates the current Repsol case
which has made public protests about China and the Vietnamese government
response even more sensitive. By cracking down on anti-China activists and bloggers
Hanoi is signaling to Beijing that Vietnam is committed to maintain workmanlike
bilateral relations. Even more sensitive, is the challenge public protests have on the
Vietnamese government and how it handles relations with China. lt is obvious that
there has been a news blackout in Vietnam on this issue.
 a
J

A minor theme revolves around the Formosa Plastics dead fish issue and its impact on
relations with Taiwan. The Hanoi government, having secured compensation, has
every reason to keep a lid on this issue because of the importance of relations with
Taiwan under a new government.
All five factors interact with one another at the strategic level and set the context for
explaining the current upsurge in arrests, trials and imprisonment of Vietnamese
activists and bloggers.
Vietnam's actions against activists have been condemned by the United Nations.
Vietnam's human right record could also feature in discussions between Vietnam and
the European Union on a free trade agreement. Conceivably, several U.S. legislators
could raise human rights issues on the floor of Congress. The bottom line is that
Vietnam's recent spate of arrests, trials and imprisonment of activists and bloggers is
unlikely to cause irreparable damage to Vietnam's bilateral relations with the United
States, EU members, Japan or Australia.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam: Explaining Uptick in Arrests of

Activists & Bloggers" Thoyer Consultancy Bockground Brief , August t, 20L7. All
background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself
from the mailing list type, UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.

Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
 Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:
ABN # 65 648 097 123
Vietnam: Do Recent Arrests
Signal Chaos at the Top?

Carlyle A. Thayer
August 2,2017

Q1. What are your thoughts on the arrest of Trinh Xuan Thanh? Some said it might
lead to a cleansing within the party involving current and former top officialsWhat is
your assessment?
ANSWER: Vietnamese public security officials had no choice but to issue an
international arrest warrant against Trinh Xuan Thanh. He stood at the apex of a multi-
million dollar corruption network involving a subsidiary of Petrovietnam. This
corruption case received widespread publicity in Vietnam and many of Thanh's
associates were arrested.

Public security officials prefer to go after the ring leader and mete out heavy
punishment. Other accomplishes are given less severe sentences on the basis of their
cooperation with police authorities. The media campaign of this corruption scandal
was obviously approved and implemented at the highest levels.

Massive corruption has been like rust eating away at the authority if not legitimacy of
the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). This has been openly acknowledged by top
party officials for well over a decade. One of former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung's
decisions on coming to office for the first time was to set up an anti-corruption unit
under his supervision. Nonetheless, major corruption scandals emerged, such as
Vinashin and Vinalines. There was also corruption in the banking sector. The current
anti-corruption campaign is addressing the failure of effective oversight under Dung.
The anti-corruption campaign is a necessity for Vietnam's top party officials, Not only
is the CPV's authority undermined, but Vietnam international reputation is devalued,
ln Vietnam, anti-corruption cases are not conducted within the framework of "the rule
of law" but by "rule by law." Each major corruption case is judged not only on the
financial loss to the state but also on its impact on political stability. lliken anti-
corruption campaigns to campaigns to end prostitution, they are never ending
because human greed is involved and officials willtake risks.

Q2. Many developments have recently occurred in Vietnam's politics such as Repsol,
the detention of Trinh Xuan Thanh, Tram Be or the temporary replacement of Dinh
The Huynh with Tran Quoc Vuong. Do they signal chaos within the party at the highest
level?
 2

ANSWER: The simultaneity of these events puts some stress on the Politburo to take
action. I view these events as discrete. For example, the decision to pursue Trinh Xuan
Thanh and to arrest Tram Be were made well before the Repsol case. Dinh The Huynh
would have been involved in decisions to investigate Thanh and Be well before their
recent arrests. Huynh's illness was first rumored in May when he didn't attend the
fifth plenum of the party Central Committee. Since Huynh occupied a number of
important party posts it was necessary to put someone into an acting position.
The Repsol case blew up in midJuly and the key officials handling this were party
Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong, Ngo Xuan Lich (defense minister), To Lam (public
security minister) and Pham Binh Minh (foreign minister). China's alleged threat to
attack Vietnam's features in the South China Sea unless Repsol stopped drilling was
unprecedented. lt is obvious that Vietnam needs some time to respond effectively,
including activating discussions with China. ln the past, such as during the HD 981
crisis, party to party ties were an important conduit. ln this respect Huynh's illness
comes at a time when his skills were likely to have been called upon.

Q3. As Dinh The Huynh is on leave to treat his illness, do you think Nguyen Phu Trong
will stay on as party Secretary General untilthe nex! congress?
ANSWER: There is not much precedent to go on to answer this question. ln 1996 Do
Muoi was re-elected party Secretary General at the eighth congress until a
replacement was found. When Do Muoi was re-elected for a third term he was 79; the
two-term and 65 year retirement age limits were not in effect then. The leadership
transition took place in late 1997 when Le Kha Phieu was elevated to the top party
post. lf a transition is planned along similar lines then the upcoming sixth party plenum
later this year would be an important indicator.
The anti-corruption campaign and recent arrests, coupled with a crackdown on
activists and bloggers, is a clear indication that "law and order" issues are becoming
increasingly prominent. Who stands to benefit? ln my opinion party Secretary General
Trong, those in the party apparatus (Secretariat and Central lnspection Committee)
and the Minister for Public Security, To Lam

I do not agree with the speculation that a power struggle is underway in Vietnam. The
coalition that blocked Nguyen Tan Dung's ambitions now benefits from collective
leadership. The CPV generally seeks equilibrium and stability. I last met Secretary
General Trong in November 2016 and I came away with the impression that he was
firmly in control and likely to serve out his third term. Whether or not Trong does so
or retires early will be his decision.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam: Do Recent Arrests Signal Chaos at the
Top?" Thayer Consultoncy Bockground Brief , August 2,20L7 . All background briefs are
posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list
type, UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.

Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.