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It also says that you said you have lost faith in CSIS and DAV.
Do you'mind if we ask if the article is accurate in what it says you said?
ANSWER: ln 2015 the DAV told me, only after I asked, that I was not being invited to
their 2016 South China Sea conference because their agreement with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs was to have a diversity of speakers. As I had spoken to all the
conferences up to 20L6,1 was not invited.
This year CSIS informed me in April that I was not being invited because the.ir
funders/sponsors (DAV) wanted a diversity of speakers and therefore anyone who
spoke last year would not be invited. I spoke at all CSIS SCS conferences except 2015
and 2OL7.
My concerns are based on information received in 2016 about the reasons why I was
not invited by the DAV. These came from Vietnamese officials who took up my case.
Depending on who I spoke to the reasons varied. My experience suggested to me that
factors other than the explanation given to me by DAV might have played a role.
It appears to me that CS|S rolled over this year.
For the record, I accept that it is the prerogative of the DAV and CSIS to invite
whomever they want. ln the case of CSIS it appears that the DAV has the dominant
say.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, "CSIS 7th lnternationat Conference on the South
China Sea I 3," Thayer Consultoncy Medio Release,July 18, z}tl.All background briefs
2
are posted on Scribd.com (search forThayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list
type, UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
Friday, July 74, 20L7
I
i
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,::+:=::::=:l:
S Carl Thayer
t]:i::,:,,::::::,::::::::::::::::
trong m6t H6i Nghi eidn D6ng do CSIS td chfc d Hoa Thinh Ddn.
(Hinh: FB Carl Thayer).
Hi Giang/Ngudi ViCt
Vdi nhffng ai quan tdm ddn tranh chdp Bi6n D6ng, HOi Nghi Bidn D6ng
drJQc Trung Tdm Nghi6n Cfu Chi6n Lddc vir Qu6c Td (Center for
Strategic and International Studies - CSIS) td chfc hing n5m tai Hoa
Thinh Ddn li m6t srt ki6n quan trong.
M6t tuen trUdc ngiry khai mac Hoi Nghi Bidn D6ng cua CSIS nim ndY,
drlOc td chfc vdo ngay 18 thdng B6y, gido sU Carl Thayer, m6t di6n
gia thr/dng xuy6n c6 m5t tqi h6i nghi, post 16n trang Facebook cua
minh tdm hinh chup d hQi nghi nbm 2016. Di kdm hinh ld ddng chti
thich thodng chtit ngfim ngii:
"H'inh niry chUp l0c t6i n6i chuyQn tai budi H6i Thao Bidn D6ng d CSIS
tai Hoa Thinh D6n. T6i kh6ng drlQc mdi nEm nay bdi Hoc Vi6n Ngo?i
Giao Vi6t Nam, nhb tii trO cua ho, kh6ng mudn mdi nhfrng di6n gi6
trlng n6i chuyen d cdc hdi nghi tn/dc d6y vi cbn phai c6 stJ'da d?ng'.
Nbm ngodi t6i cfrng kh6ng dt/Qc mdi ddn cu6c hQi nghi Bidn Dong d
Nha Trang do Hoc Vi6n Ngoai Giao Vi6t Nam td chfc v6i l,i do'vi6n
d5n' lir v'i nhu cbu ttJdng tU. Sd dT t6i ding chfr "vi6n d5n" li v'i dE c6
nhClng lf do trdi ngt/dc nhau dd giai thich vi6c t6i kh6ng dUQc mdi."
"Ho dUa ra m6t lf do md hb li n5m nay kh6ng mdi ngUdi Uc nio c6,
hay t6i sE kh6ng dUQc mdi vdi trI cdch m6t ngUdi 0c IGS Carl Thayer: li
ngfdi M! sinh s6ng d Uc - NVl. Cfrng c6 giai thlch le tfii d5 ldm phat
ldng m6t gi6i chfc cao cdp v'i m6t l'.i do nio kh6n9 16. T6i dodn c6 16 li
vi biri di6n v5n cua t6i vE'V6'n DE Bi6n D6ng vd Nhdn Quybn tai Vi6t
Nam'trong nudi nQi thio cria C6ng Dong NgUdi Vi6t tai Uc, vlo thdng
Sdu n5m 20L6. Di nhi6n cUng c6 th6m lf do nffa lir vi toi ph6 phdn
Trung Qudc rdt nSng n6, vd nhU th6, dudc xem nhU li phe nhi cua
Vi6t Nam r6i, n6n ho mudn dinh tiEn dd mdi them nhffng hoc gia khdc
vio qu? dao cua hg."
Giir thuy6t cua gido st/ Carl Thayer ld 6ng kh6ng dUQc Ha NOi (phe
ndm hHu bao ban td chfc H6i Nghi Bidn D6ng cua CSIS) mdi di6n
thuydt v6 d6 tdi md 6ng r5t am tudng, chi vi d5
dung cham d6n van dii
nh6n quy6n cua Vi6t Nam, co l,i chut nio kh6ng?
Vi 6ng ti6t 16: "Chu tich ki6m tdng gidm d6c cua CSIS, 6ng John
Hamre, CtE trdnh n6 c6u hoi ndy trong sudt sdu n5m qua.Ch6ng h?n,
vio thdng Bay n5m ngodi, CSIS c6ng b6 rEng H6i Thao Bidn D6ng ki
thf Sdu d5'dr/dc thtJc hi6n v6i s{ h6 trd chung cho CSIS'. C6ng bd niry
kh6ng chi qud md h6 ch6ng n6i 16 dtJdc di6u gi, md cdn li m6t stJ'b6p
m6o sd thf t' m6t cdch tr5ng trdn, theo m6t ngu6n tin mu6n drldc giff
kin. Dd chr?ng minh di6u minh n6i, ngubn tin niy dd cung cdp cho t6i
[Greg Rushford - NV] tii ligu m6t cua nQi b0 CSiS, cho bi6t chinh xdc
ti6n ddn tr] d5u."
Kf gia Greg Rushford kh5ng dinh:"Nhfrng ban ghi nh6, email vi nhi6u
tii li6u khdc cho thdy tdng giSm ddc CSIS, 6ng John Hamre CIE c6 m6t
'thi6n thbn' bi mdt d Ha NQi. Va'thi6n th}n' niy c6 ti6ng n6i quan
trong trong vi6c ai cft/gc mdi vd ai kh6ng dUgc mdi ddn tham dU cdc
h6i nghi hirng hii hing n5m cua CSIS. Nha hiro t6m bf mEt crla CSIS
ld m6t ddn vi cua 86 Ngoai Giao Vi6t Nam. Theo trang web chfnh thr?c,
ddn vi niy c6 t6n lb Hoc Vi6n NgoAi Giao Vi6t Nam, ldm vi6c trt/c ti6p
vdi 86 TrUdng Ngoai Giao Pham Binh Minh vd Eirng CQng San Vi6t
Nam. Pham Binh Minh, hi6n la Ph6 thu tUdng Vi6t Nam, la thenh vi6n
cao cdp cua DAng, nEm chrSc b6 trUdng ngoai giao tr] ndm 207L."
Ky gi6 Greg Rushford cho bi6t "Kd tr] n5m 20L2, chinh phu Vi6t Nam
da tAng cho CSIS hdn $450,000 M! kim Od td chrSc cdc h6i nghi Bidn
D6ng hlng n5m. Tdng GiSm E6c John Hamre nh6't quydt ttJ chdi tra ldi
nhffng c6u hoi li6n quan d6n vi6c niy, drlQc li6n tuc gt/i d6n."
Kh6ng nhfrng vi lSnh dao cao c6'p nhdt cua CSIS kh6ng tr6 ldi bdo ch[,
trong do co td New York Times, vE ngu6n tiri trd, md website cua
CSIS, v5n theo 6ng Greg Rushford, cfing rdt md hb vE di6m ndy. E6u
Clo tr6n website cua CSIS ghi rSng Hoc Vi6n Ngoai Giao Vi6t Nam (the
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam - DAV) c6 t5ng cho CSIS "tr6n $5,000
thuydt vE d6 tdi mir 6ng rd't am ttjdng, chi vi dE dung
cham d6n va.n dii
nhdn quyi3n cua Vi6t Nam, co l,i ch(indo kh6ng?
co It nh6't ri, mOt ngtrdi d6ng ,i vdi suy nghr niy cua 6ng, ring
nha
c3m quy6n Hd N6i kh6ng thich vdn d6 vi pham nh6n quyen
-'- t -- cua ho bi
nhdc ddn.
Bdn tay d6'u kfn cria Hi N6i
Ki' gidr Greg Rushford, mot ph6ng vi6n di6u tra ky cuu
d vilng Hoa
Thinh D6n, trong birn tfdng trinh .,How Hanoi,s Hidden
Hand Hetps
shape a Think Tank's Agenda in washington,, (Bin
tay d6.u kfn cua Hi
N6i anh hudng d6n nghi trinh cua m6t vi,0n nghi6n
cdtu d Hoa Thinh
Ddn nhrJthd niro?), phd bi6n ngiy ll thdng Biy,2oL6,
dda ra nh6n
x6t cua 6ng vi3 sr/ thi6u minh bach cua CSIS vii ngu6n
tei trd cua t6
chfc cung nhu stj xung dOt quy6n rdi d6n trr ngu6n tii tro.
Ngoii vi6c CSIS kh6ng n6i 16 ngubn ti6n tiri trd, ph6ng sU di6u tra cua
Greg Rushford cdn vach ra li c6 mQt s6 xung dQt quyEn ldi khi 6ng
Murray Hiebeft, m6t cd vdn tdi cao cia CSIS tUng lirm 5n d Viet Nam.
Trong phbn cu6i ph6ng sU di6u tra khd dai, k,i gia Greg Rushford
vi6t: "DQc gia s6 ttl njt ra kdt luSn vE nhffng g) Hd Ndi de dat dtJdc khi
tai tro cho CSIS. Trong nhfng nEm dugc dG cAp trong biri vi6t niy,
chrldng tr'inh nghi srJ vE Vi6t Nam d Hoa Thinh Ddn c6 nhUng phbn
chinh. He NQi mudn tao ra m6t bHu kh6ng khf trao ddi i ki6n dd thfic
ddy quan hC ngoai giao vi an ninh chdt ch6 hdn vdi Hoa Ky. Cdc nhi
ph6n t[ch cua CSIS cfing mu6n di6u cl6. Ha NQi mudn Tdng th6ng
Barack Obama tdi thdm Vi6t Nam, dd gi[rp quan he d6i b6n th5t
ch5t th6m, CSIS c0ng ung ho chuy6n di d6. He NOi mudn Washington
dd b6 l6nh c6'm bdn vfi khf nguy hi6m cho chd d0 cOng sErn. Cdc nhi
phSn tfch cua CSIS c0ng chia se quan didm 5y. Vi Vi6t Nam mu6n co
srr h6 trd cua My ddi vdi hop dbng thrldng mai Quan he ddi tac xuy6n
Thdi Binh DUdng. CSIS c0ng cd vU di6u d6. DI nhi6n lSnh dao cua CSIS
co thd l5p lu6n r5ng vi6c thtic ddy mQt quan hO chflt ch6 hdn giira Mi
vi Vi6t Nam cfrng li di6u hgp ly."
Vdn d6 nim d ch6, Greg Rushford vach ra: "NhUng tr6n tdt ci moi thf
khdc, nhir cEm quy6n Vi6t Nam mu6n gidi tri thrlc rJu tri co thd anh
hufdng ddn chfnh sdch d6i ngoai d Hoa Thinh D6n ngo6nh m5t Id di cdc
vu vi phAm nh6n quy6n d He NQi. Dang COng S6n hidu rEng sr/ s6ng
cdn cua n6 phu thuQc vbo vi6c ti6p tgc dln dp nhfrng ngrldi bdt Cfbng
chinh ki6n 6n hda. Vir nhU t6i de tr./dng trinh trUdc d6y vE cdch Ha NOi
mua 6nh hrldng vir chuydn di Viet Nam lich stJ cua Tdng Thdng Obama,
nhi/ng lSnh dao cua CSIS dd cdn thEn 0d kh6ng lim phEt ldng gi6i
chrlc cao c6'p Ha N6i, khi c6 nhfrng cdu hoi vE tinh hinh ti nh6n chfnh
tri tEi Vi6t Nam."
"Tif ch6i kh6ng l6n ti6ng trddc vi6c nhfrng c6ng d6n can dim Vi6t Nam
bi b5t giam chi v'i thr/c hi6n quyEn tuf do ng6n lu6n, m6t quy6n t{ do
phd qudt cua con ngtrdi, ch6c ch5n Ii mQt sai lEm dao dr?c," 6ng
Rushford kdt luqn
Truf6c tinh trang CSIS, vi6n nghi6n cfu uy tfn hirng dEu nr/6c MV bi
vach ra li cld nh6n ti6n dd lirm ngd vB vdn dE vi ph?m nh6n quyEn tai
Vi6t Nam, ffid gido sd Carl Thayer lai ngang nhi6n di6n thuy6t vE di6u
nly, thi gia thuydt vi th6 mir 6ng kh6ng dUOc mdi di6n thuydt ndm nay
li di6u c6 thd tin drt'Qc.
T16 ldi c6u hoi cim trJdng c0a minh trUdc vigc kh6ng drldc mdi ddn
tham dLr hQi nghi v6 m6t dE tei 6ng r6't am tUdng, Gido Sr/ Carl Thayer
phdt bidu: "T6i kh6ng 16 Vi6t Nam sE dtlgc ai, nhUng t6i thi d5 m6't
niEm tin vio c6 CSIS l5n Hoc Vien Ngoai Giao Vi6t Nam."
TiEn bEc 16 rdng dd mua dr/Qc nhi6u th[i. Trong trUdng hdp niy, n6
mua dUOc sU im lSng trddc nhffng diEu mb con ngr/di binh thtldng nio
c0ng thdy bdt nh5n.
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 18,2017
[client name deleted]
We know you were not invited to the 7th international conference on the South China
Sea hosted by the Center for Strategic and lnternational Studies and sponsored by the
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the Foundation for East Sea Studies. What
questions do you think the speakers should address?
QUESTION 2: What is the legal basis for Chinese warnings to foreign military aircraft
and ships as they transit the Spratly islands in South China Sea? China has not
promulgated any baselines that are required for a territorial sea. What is the basis in
international law for Chinese alerts that foreign aircraft are entering a "military alert
zone"?
QUESTION 3: ln May this year it was reported, "Norinco CS/AR-1 55mm anti-frogman
rocket launcher defense systems with the capability to discover, identify and attack
enemy combat divers had been installed on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly lslands."
What activities by "enemy combat divers" provoked this response? ls the
emplacement of rockets on Fiery Cross a violation of the self-restraint clause in the
2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea?
QUESTION 4: When the Arbitral Tribunal issued its Award on July 12,201,6 Vietnam's
Foreign Ministry said it would issue a statement on the Award. Has any such statement
been issued? lf not, why not?
QUESTION 5: What precisely are Vietnam's claims to the Spratly lslands? ln particular
does Vietnam claim all of the land features (artificial islands) occupied by China? lf not,
which ones does Vietnam claim? Does Vietnam claim any land features also claimed
by the Philippines? lf so, which ones?
QUESTION 6: Last year it was reported that Vietnam deployed launchers for the lsraeli-
manufactured Extended Range Artillery rockets (EXTRA), on several land features in
the Spratlys. Are these reports accurate and do you consider this a violation of the
2
self-restraint clause in the 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea.?
QUESTION 7: What were the activities of Vietnamese special forces (so-called enemy
combat divers by China)that led China to emplace a defensive rocket system on Fiery
Cross Reef?
QUESTION 9: ls the Arbitral Tribunal Award "dead in the water" as a result China's
refusal to comply and the decision by President Duterte to set it aside? Doesn't this
undermine a rules-based regional order?
QUESTION 10: Chinese legal specialists and academics must have been taken aback by
the unanimous decision of the Arbitral Tribunal. What re-evaluation if any has taken
place in China? ls China gradually advancing a new legal basis for its claims in the South
China Sea?
QUESTION 11: China was roundly condemned by the Arbitral Tribunal for massive
damage to the coral reef system and for failure to protect the marine environment.
What are the consequences of continued neglect and inaction on this issue?
QUESTION L2: Why haven't China and ASEAN member states commenced
cooperation in the five areas mentioned in the 2002 DOC? Does China still insist that
the effective implementation of the DOC is a prerequisite for a Code of Conduct?
QUESTION 13: lt appears that there are at least two major impediments to an ASEAN-
China Code of Conduct in the South China Sea - geographic scope and legally binding
nature. What geographic area should the COC cover? And should national legislatures
ratify the COC and deposit copies with the United Nations?
QUESTION 14: ls the naval balance of power in the South China Sea shifting in China's
favor? lf so, aren't China's seven artificial island bases a fait accompli?
QUESTION L5: ln order for the United States to exert the effective influence of sea
power on developments in the South China Sea, how important is access - rotational
or otherwise - to bases and facilities in the Philippines?
QUESTION 16: When President Barack Obama lifted the lnternational Trafficking in
Arms Regulations (ITAR or arms embargo) against Vietnam he said, "As will all our
defense partners, sales will need to still meet strict requirements, including those
related to human rights." Does this policy still apply under President Donald Trump?
QUESTION 17: Are the actions by the Trump Administration in the South China Sea
such as conducting freedom of navigation patrols, overflights by bombers and
maritime patrol aircraft, and joint exercises with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force a lot of "sound and fury signifying nothing"?
QUESTION 18: Can the Trump Administration assemble a coalition of the willing or
likeminded states to push back against China's assertiveness in the South China Sea.
lf so, who would be part of this coalition and how specifically should they push back?
a
J
QUESTION L9: China argues that the United States has not ratified UNCLOS it really
as
has no standing in South China Sea maritime disputes. For example, if China interfered
with U.S. freedom of navigation patrols the Spratly islands, the U.S. would not be able
to avail itself of dispute settlement mechanisms in UNCLOS. Shouldn't the U.S.
conduct freedom of navigation patrols with states like Australia and Japan who have
ratified UNCLOS. Would the threat of legal action deter Chinese assertiveness?
QUESTION 20: What is the status of the U.S. National Security Strategy mandated by
the U.S. Congress? What should this strategy include? As a follow on, what should be
the essential components of the new U.S. Maritime Strategy?
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, "CSIS 7th lnternational Conference on the South
China Sea: Twenty Question s," Thoyer Consultancy Bockground Brief , July 18, 20L7. All
background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself
from the mailing list type, UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.