1. Aratuc vs.

COMELEC

FACTS:
The instant proceedings are sequels of the Courts decision in GR no. L-48097 wherein Aratuc et al sought the
suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by the respondent Board in Cotabato City.
The petitioners in the instant case filed complaints re allege irregularities in the election records in the voting centers
in the whole of Lanao Del Sur, Marawi, parts of Lanao del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat. Before
the start of the hearings, the canvass was suspended but after the supervisory panel presented its report, COMELEC filed
its order of suspension and directed the resumption of the canvass to be done in Manila. The petitioners presented their
objection with supporting handwritten report of finger print experts.
Soon after, the COMELEC rendered its resolution declaring the final result of the canvass. Hence, this instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:
NO. Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, the Commission on Elections shall have direct
control and supervision over the board of canvassers. Also, it was stated under administrative law that a superior body or
office having supervision or control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.
The petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

2. Fabian vs, desierto

FACTS:
PROMAT participated in a government bidding including that of FMED. Also, private respondent entered into an
amorous relationship with the petitioner. Later on, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the
parties when petitioner tried to terminate their agreement, causing the petitioner to file an administrative case against him.
Soon, Graft Investigator Eduardo Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct. The
case was then elevated into an appeal before the Ombudsman who inhibited himself and transferred the case to the Deputy
Ombudsman which then rested in favour of Agustin and the Order exonerated the private respondents from administrative
charges. Fabian then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the supreme court.

RULING:
NO. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize on appeal to this Court. From decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman on administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the prescription in Sec. 30, article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this court. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to give this court a measure
of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging
its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily hinder the court.

3. Torres vs. specialized packaging

FACTS:
The petitioners came to be employees of the Specialized Packaging Development Corporation (SPDC). In three
separate complaints, they charged SPDC and the alleged labor recruiters with illegal dismissal, non-payment of premium,
overtime, 13th month pay and night differential. The cases were then consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter Nambi
who later on rendered a decision in favour of the petitioners due to the failure of the respondents to file their position paper
before the deadline.
Soon after, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was appeaed by the SPDC to the NLRC, which set aside the ruling
and ordered the case to be remanded to LA Nambi for further proceedings. The LA then issued a second decision finding
petitioners employment to be illegally terminated. The case was appealed to the CA who then dismissed the case finding
the verification and certification against forum shopping to be either effective or insufficient.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the verification and the certification against forum shopping executed by only two of the 25 petitioners
have already satisfied the requirements under section 4 and 5 of Rule 7.

RULING:
The requirement for verification has been substantially complied. The two signatories are unquestionably real
parties in interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
petition. However, for petitions for certiorari, a certification against forum shopping is required under section 3 of Rule 46 of
the rules of Court. The lack of a certification against forum shopping is generally not cured by its submission after the filing
of the petition.
4. G. R. NO. 147678-87, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, versus EFREN MATEO y GARCIA,
Appellant, July 7, 2004

FACTS:

Ten (10) informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac against appellant Efren Mateo alleging
that he did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge
with said Imelda C. Mateo in their house against her consent. The trial ensued following a plea of not guilty entered by
appellant to all the charges. At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its decision, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape. However, the Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial court and
recommends an acquittal of appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express provision in the
constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death.

RULING:
The case was REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same
occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

x x x x x x x x x

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not
necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in
favour of the accused.

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of
unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would appear
to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of
inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e.,
the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic
review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.

5. G. R. No. UDK-13384 The People of the Philippines versus Rodolfo Bunaladi, October 18, 2004

FACTS:
Accused Bunaladi was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 13. The trial court rendered its Decision on 5 May 2004, convicting the accused and imposing upon him the penalty
of death by lethal injection. Accused timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the factual findings of the trial court,
and at the same time praying that in the event the judgment of conviction is not set aside, the penalty of death be not
imposed in view of the age of the accused who was more than seventy (70) years old at the time of rendition, of the trial
court's judgment. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court, in its Order dated 2 June 2004, partly
reconsidered its decision and lowered the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. In the same Order, the trial court also
directed the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court "for automatic review."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant case deserves to be dismissed.

RULING:
The case was dismissed. Section 3(d), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that no notice
of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial Court and that the same shall be
automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in Section 10 thereof. In this case, however, the penalty imposed
by the trial court after reconsidering its decision is reclusion perpetua. Under Section 3(c) of Rule 122, an appeal to the
Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua is duly interposed by
filing a notice of appeal. A review of the records of the case shows that no notice of appeal was filed by the accused. Hence,
the Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case.
6. People v. Rocha

G.R. No. 173797 August 31, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EMMANUEL ROCHA alias "Nopoy" and RUEL RAMOS alias "Aweng," Accused-Appellants.

Facts: On or about the 28th day of September, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with several others, robbed the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). On 14
November 2006, accused-appellant Rocha, having been detained for more than seventeen years, filed a Motion
to Withdraw Appeal, stating that he intends to apply for parole. He also manifested that his co-accused on this
case, Romeo Trumpeta and Estaquio Cenita, had already withdrawn their appeal.

On 28 February 2007, accused-appellant Ramos followed suit and filed his own Manifestation with Motion to
Withdraw Appeal. He likewise manifested that he had already served fourteen years in prison and that all his
other co-accused had already withdrawn their appeal, and applied for executive clemency to avail himself of
parole.

Issue: whether or not the Motions to Withdraw Appeal of accused-appellants Rocha and Ramos should be granted.

Ruling

The granting of a Motion to Withdraw Appeal is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.1avvphi1 In the
case at bar, we see no reason to deny accused-appellants Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Plaintiff-appellees
allegation that the Motion was for the purpose of evading the penalty of reclusion perpetua and trifling with our
judicial system is unsubstantiated, as the Court of Appeals imposition of reclusion perpetua, unlike an imposition
of the death penalty, may be entered by said appellate court even without another review by this Court. Neither
should we deny the Motions just because of accused-appellants intention to apply for executive clemency, since
the granting of such executive clemency is within the prerogative of the Executive Department, and not of this
Court.

7. Cuyos v. Garcia

G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988

ALFREDO CUYOS y TULOR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. NICOLAS P. GARCIA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, San Fernando, Pampanga and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, with homicide with multiple
serious physical injuries and damage to property, through reckless imprudence. Petitioner was driver of a cargo
truck which had collided with a Volkswagen automobile in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death of
one (1) person and physical injuries to four (4) other people.

Before trial could commence, however, petitioner filed " Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance
for Trial" , alleging lack of jurisdiction over the case on the part of the Municipal Court. Petitioner's argument
was that the amended criminal complaint alleged that the Volkswagen car involved in the accident had suffered
damages amounting to P18,000.00,

Issue: whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the
criminal case against petitioner.

Ruling:
Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. 77-1848. Under B.P. Blg. 129, the criminal case
against petitioner falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Under Section 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding
four (4) years and two (2) months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value,
or amount thereof Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence they should have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does
not exceed twenty thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)

Since the maximum fine imposable in the present case is P54,000.00, and the maximum imprisonment imposable
(for the homicide through reckless imprudence) is six (6) years, clearly, the criminal charge involved falls outside
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and consequently within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
of San Fernando, Pampanga.

8. NOPA v. Hon. Presiding Judge

G.R. No. 179878 December 24, 2008

NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOPA), petitioner,

vs.
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 52, BACOLOD CITY, and
ANICETO MANOJO CAMPOS, respondents.

Facts:

On 17 March 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-10773, against NOPA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City. According
to the Complaint, Campos and NOPA entered into two separate contracts denominated as Molasses Sales
Agreement. Campos allegedly paid the consideration of the Molasses Sales Agreement in full, but was only able
to receive a partial delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement as to the quality of the products being
delivered.

On 17 August 2005, more than six years after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the correct filing fee. According to NOPA, Campos deliberately
concealed in his Complaint the exact amount of actual damages by opting to estimate the value of the unwithdrawn
molasses in order to escape the payment of the proper docket fees.

On 22 June 2007, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the appellate court, attaching
thereto an Amended Petition for Certiorari in compliance with the requirements of the Court of Appeals deemed
to have been violated by NOPA. The Court of Appeals denied the said Motion in the second assailed Resolution
dated 16 August 2007.

NOPA claims that this Court has in several cases allowed pleadings with a Verification that contains the allegation
"to the best of my knowledge" and the allegation "are true and correct," without the words "of his own
knowledge," citing Decano v. Edu,9 and Quimpo v. De la Victoria.10 NOPA claims that the allegations in these
cases constitute substantial compliance with the Rules of Court, and should likewise apply to the case at bar.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

RULED THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENTS WHEN PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE IN ITS VERIFICATION THAT THE
ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OR BASED
ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND FAILURE TO ATTACH THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ON ITS
PLEADINGS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Ruling:
NOPA is mistaken. NOPA cited cases promulgated before 1 May 2000, when Section 4 of Rule 7 was amended
by A.M. No. 00-2-10. Before the amendment, said Section 4 stated:

SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.

As amended, said Section 4 now states:

SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

Clearly, the amendment was introduced in order to make the verification requirement stricter, such that the party
cannot now merely state under oath that he believes the statements made in the pleading. He cannot even merely
state under oath that he has knowledge that such statements are true and correct. His knowledge must be
specifically alleged under oath to be either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records.

9. Topacio v. Justice Ong

G.R. No. 179895 December 18, 2008

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO, petitioner,

vs.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN GREGORY SANTOS ONG and THE OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.

Facts:

On July 9, 2007, Ong immediately filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Petition for the
"amendment/ correction/ supplementation or annotation of an entry in [his] Certificate of Birth," docketed as S.P.
Proc No. 11767-SJ, "Gregory Santos Ong v. The Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, et al."3

Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified Letter-Request/Complaint4 of September 5, 2007, implored respondent Office

of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the latters
capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Invoking paragraph 1, Section 7, Article VIII
of the Constitution5 in conjunction with the Courts Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,6 petitioner
points out that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan
and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship requirement from the time of his appointment as such in October
1998.

The OSG, by letter of September 25, 2007, informed petitioner that it "cannot favorably act on [his] request for
the filing of a quo warranto petition until the [RTC] case shall have been terminated with finality."7 Petitioner
assails this position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside from Ongs continuous
discharge of judicial functions.

Issue:

whether the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for quo warranto

Ruling:

the Court rules in the negative.

The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action
on the filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A decision is not
deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it.19
The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or
agents. In the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the government is
upheld within the limits set by law.20

The pertinent rules of Rule 66 on quo warranto provide:

SECTION 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position
or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground
for the forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. The Solicitor General or
a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established
by proof, must commence such action.

SEC. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with permission of court.
The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the action is
to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of another person; but in such
case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an
amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and upon whose
relation the same is brought. (Italics and emphasis in the original)

In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an action
for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons.21

10. Sari-sari Group v. Piglas-Kamao

G.R. No. 164624 August 11, 2008

SARI-SARI GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC. (formerly MARIKO NOVEL WARES, INC.), petitioner,
vs.
PIGLAS KAMAO (Sari-Sari Chapter), RONNIE S. TAMAYO, JOSE DEL CARMEN, JOCYLENE
PADUA, VICKY BERMEO and ELIZABETH MATUTINA, respondents.

Facts:

On February 11, 1994, respondents Tamayo, Del Carmen, and Padua filed amended complaints of unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal against petitioner. On March 28, 1994, respondents filed six supplemental
complaints for illegal dismissal, non-payment of premium pay for holiday and rest day for the years 1992 and
1993, and non-payment of 13th month pay for the year 1994 as well as for moral and exemplary damages.12

During the pendency of the appeal, respondents Bermeo, Matutina, and Padua separately filed their respective
manifestations and Motions to Dismiss, The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA but dismissed the claims of
Bermeo, Matutina and Padua as they had executed quitclaims. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied by the NLRC. Respondents then appealed to the CA.

Lastly, the CA ruled that the release and quitclaims executed by respondents Padua, Bermeo and Matutina did
not preclude them from assailing their termination. The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, herein the instant petition.

Issue:
 1. Whether or not The Court of Appeals seriously erred in taking cognizance of the petition insofar as
the four other alleged petitioners therein were concerned, considering only Jose Del Carmen signed
and verified the petition.

Ruling: The lone Verification of respondent Jose del Carmen is sufficient compliance with the requirements of
the law. On the other hand, the lack of a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, unlike that of Verification is
generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. The submission of a certificate
against forum shopping is thus deemed obligatory, albeit not jurisdictional.
The rule on certification against forum shopping may, however, be also relaxed on grounds of "substantial
compliance" or "special circumstances or compelling reasons. In the case at bar, respondent Jose del Carmen
shares a common interest with the other respondents as to the resolution of the labor dispute between them and
the petitioner. They collectively sued the petitioner for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practices and have
collectively appealed the NLRC decision. Similarly, there is sufficient basis for Jose del Carmen to speak on
behalf of his co-respondents in stating that they have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in
another court or tribunal, nor is there any other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the
same issues. Thus, even if only respondent Jose del Carmen signed the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, the
rule on substantial compliance applies. The CA therefore did not commit any error in entertaining the appeal of
the respondents.

11. ALTRES vs. EMPLEO (December 10, 2008; 573 SCRA 583)

FACTS: In July 2003, Mayor Quijano sent notices of numerous vacant career positions in the city government to the CSC.
The city government and the CSC thereupon proceeded to publicly announce the existence of the vacant positions.
Petitioners and other applicants submitted their applications for the different positions where they felt qualified.

Toward the end of his term, Mayor Quijano issued appointments to petitioners.

The SangguniangPanglungsodthen issued Resolution No. 04-242[3] addressed to the CSC Iligan City Field Office
requesting a suspension of action on the processing of appointments to all vacant positions in the city government until
the enactment of a new budget.

The SangguniangPanglungsod subsequently issued Resolution No. 04-266[4] which, as per its policy against midnight
appointments, directed the officers of the City Human Resource Management Office to hold the transmission of all
appointments signed or to be signed by the incumbent mayor.

Respondent city accountant Empleo did not thus issue a certification as to availability of funds for the payment of salaries
and wages of petitioners hence the CSC Field Office for Lanao del Norte and Iligan City disapproved the appointments
issued to petitioners.

On appeal by Mayor Quijano, CSC Regional Office No. XII in CotabatoCity,dismissed the appeal, it explaining that its
function in approving appointments is only ministerial.

Petitioners thus filed with the RTC of Iligan City a petition for mandamus against respondent Empleo or his successor in
office for him to issue a certification of availability of funds. Branch 3 of the Iligan RTC denied petitioners petition for
mandamus.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration in which they maintained only their prayer for a writ of mandamus which the
trial court also denied.

Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required respondents to comment thereon within ten (10) days from
notice, and at the same time required petitioners to comply, within the same period.

Petitioners filed a Compliance Report and Respondents duly filed their Comment, alleging technical flaws in petitioners
petition.

Respondents assail as defective the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the petition as it
bears the signature of only 11 out of the 59 petitioners, and no competent evidence of identity was presented by the
signing petitioners. They thus move for the dismissal of the petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not Petitioners certification against forum shopping is defective since it was not signed by all the
petitioners and the insufficiency of personal knowledge by the party executing the same.

RULING:The signing of the verification by only 11 out of the 59 petitioners already sufficiently assures the Court that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation; that the
pleading is filed in good faith; and that the signatories are unquestionably real parties-in-interest who undoubtedly have
sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition.
With respect to petitioners certification against forum shopping, the failure of the other petitioners to sign as they could no
longer be contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing the case need not merit the outright dismissal of the petition
without defeating the administration of justice. The non-signing petitioners are, however, dropped as parties to the
case.

12. UNITED PARAGON MINING vs. CA (August 4, 2006; 497 SCRA 638, 647 - 648)

FACTS:Respondent Cesario F. Ermita (Cesario) was a regular employee working as a foreman of petitioner United
Paragon Mining Corporation (UPMC).

Cesario received a termination letter, informing Cesario that his employment as foreman is terminated effective thirty days
after his receipt of the letter. The termination was on account of Cesarios violation of company rules against infliction of
bodily injuries on a co-employee, it being alleged therein that Cesario inflicted bodily injuries on a co-employee, as well as
for unlawfully possessing a deadly weapon, a bolo, again in violation of company rules.

As a result of the termination, the matter was brought to the grievance machinery as mandated under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement existing at that time between UPMC and the United Paragon Supervisors Union. Having failed to
reach a settlement thereat, the parties agreed to submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration.

The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision in Cesarios favor, stating that although the procedural requirements in the
termination of an employee had been complied with, the termination of Cesario was unjustified because it was arrived at
through gross misapprehension of facts hence ordered Cesarios reinstatement.

UPMC moved for a reconsideration of the decision but the Voluntary Arbitrator denied the desired reconsideration
stressing that UPMCs management misapprehended the facts.

UPMC, thru its Personnel Superintendent Feliciano M. Daniel,elevated the case to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctionasserting that the Voluntary Arbitrator committed grave abuse of
discretion, erroneous interpretation of the law and denial of substantial justice.

The CA, without going into the merits of the petition, dismissed the same on grounds that(1)the petition for certiorari was
not the proper remedy in order to seek review or nullify decisions or final orders issued by the Labor Arbiter and (2) that
petitioner's ground of grave abuse of discretion, erroneous interpretation of the law and denial of justice are actually
dwelling on the appreciation of facts, which cannot be entertained in a petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition after finding that the proper remedy should have
been a PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI and not a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

2.Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition after finding that the petition lacks merit because it
dwelled on the appreciation of facts which is NOT PROPER in PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

RULING:

The recourse must have to be DENIED, no reversible error having been committed by the CA in its challenged decision.

Being not a real party-in-interest, Daniel has no right to file the petition on behalf of the corporation without any authority
from its board of directors.

Given the reality that the petition was filed by Daniel in behalf of and in representation of petitioner UPMC without an
enabling resolution of the latters board of directors, that petition was fatally defective, inclusive of the verification and the
certification of non-forum shopping executed by Daniel himself.

13. HEIRS OF SOFIA NANAMAN LONOY vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

(November 27, 2008; 572 SCRA 185)

FACTS:

Action for Reversion of Title

Spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and HilariaTabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land
situated in Tambo, Iligan City, upon which they likewise erected their residence. Living with them on the subject property
were Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio),Gregorios son by another woman.
 When Gregorio died, Hilaria administered the subject property with Virgilio.Hilaria and Virgilio executed a Deed of
Saleover the subject property in favor of Jose C. Deleste (Deleste).

Upon Hilarias death, Juan Nanaman (Juan), Gregorios brother, was appointed as special administrator of the estate
of the deceased spouses Gregorio and Hilaria (joint estate).Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular
administrator of the joint estate.

The subject property was included in the list of assets of the joint estate. However, Noel could not take possession of
the subject property since it was already in Delestes possession. Thus, Noel filed before the Court of First Instance
(CFI),an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property to the Estate, docketed as Civil Case No.
698.

Through the years, Civil Case No. 698 was heard, decided, and appealed all the way to the Supreme Court in Noel v.
Court of Appeals. The Court rendered its Decision in Noel, affirming the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the subject
property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria, such that the latter could only sell her one-
half (1/2) share therein to Deleste. Consequently, the intestate estate of Gregorio and Deleste were held to be the co-
owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in the same.

Petition for Nullification of the Emancipation Patents (Heirs of Deleste)

Deleste passed away sometime in 1992.The Heirs of Deleste, filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private respondents Emancipation Patents (EPs).

The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a Decisiondeclaring that the EPs were null and void in
view of the pending issues of ownership and the subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a
residential/commercial land.

On appeal, the DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD in its Decision. The DARAB held, that the EPs were valid,
since it was the Heirs of Deleste who should have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No. 698at the time the
subject property was placed under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer Program. The Heirs of Deleste filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision, but the Motion was denied by the DARAB in its Resolution
dated 8 July 2004.

Petition for Prohibition

A Petition for Prohibition, Declaration of Nullity of Emancipation Patents Issued by DAR and the Corresponding
[Original Certificates of Title] Issued by the [Land Registration Authority], Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) was filed by petitioners with the Court of Appeals. Arguing that they were deprived of their inheritance by
virtue of the improper issuance of the EPs to private respondents without notice to them, petitioners prayed that a TRO be
forthwith issued, prohibiting the DAR Secretary, the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the DARAB, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), as well as the RTC, from enforcing the EPs and OCTs in the names of private respondents . Petitioners
further prayed that judgment be subsequently rendered declaring the said EPs and the OCTs null and void.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition.

ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HASTILY DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS PETITION FOR
PROHIBITION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, LRA, AND DARAB ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REVIEWING [AND] OVERRULING JUDICIAL DECISIONS
CONSIDERING THAT THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER ACTS OF THE EXECUTIVE OR
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH BELONGS TO THE JUDICIARY AND NOT VICE VERSA.

RULING:
Prohibition is a legal remedy, provided by the common law, extraordinary in the sense that it is ordinarily available only
when the usual and ordinary proceedings at law or in equity are inadequate to afford redress, prerogative in character to
the extent that it is not always demandable of right, to prevent courts, or other tribunals, officers, or persons, from
usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law.
The writ of prohibition, is one which commands the person to whom it is directed not to do something which, by
suggestion of the relator, the court is informed he is about to do. The only effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all
action and to prevent any further proceeding in the prohibited direction.

In this case, the Petition for Prohibition filed by the petitioners reveal that the same is essentially more of an action
for the nullification of the allegedly invalid EPs and OCTs issued in the names of private respondents. The writ of
prohibition is only sought by petitioners to prevent the implementation of the EPs and OCTs. Such EPs and OCTs had
become indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time petitioners instituted their Petition for Prohibition, and may no longer
be judicially reviewed.

Private respondents EPs were issued in their favor and their OCTs were correspondingly issued and
subsequently registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Petitioners directly went to the Court of Appeals, instead
to the Regional Trial Court almost four (4) years after the issuance and registration thereof. Petitioners failed to vindicate
their rights within the one-year period from issuance of the certificates of title as the law requires.

After the expiration of the one-year period, a person whose property has been wrongly or erroneously registered
in anothers name may bring an ordinary action for reconveyance, or if the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree gives petitioners only one other remedy, i.e.,
to file an action for damages against those responsible for the fraudulent registration.

14.VICAR INTERNATIONAL vs. FEB LEASING (April 22, 2005; 456 SCRA 588)

FACTS:

A Complaint for unjust enrichment and damages, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati by petitioner, Vicar
International Construction, Inc. (Vicar), against Respondent FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation (now BPI Leasing
Corporation) and the Far East Bank and Trust Company. In turn, FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation filed a Complaint
against Vicar,Carmelita Chaneco Lim and one John Doe, for a sum of money, damages and replevin.

These Complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB by Vicar, a corporation engaged in the construction
business, for the purchase of certain heavy equipment. In obtaining the loans, Deeds of Absolute Sale with a lease-back
provision were executed by the parties. In those Deeds, Vicar appears to have sold to FEB the equipment purchased with
the loan proceeds and, at the same time, leased them back. For the total loan of P30,315,494, Vicar claims to have paid
FEB an aggregate amount of P19,042,908 in monthly amortizations.

Nevertheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance of about P22,000,000, despite the
extrajudicial foreclosure of sixty-three (63) subdivision lots. These lots, in Calamba, Laguna, were used by the corporation
as additional collateral. As a consequence, the auction sale produced P17,000,000 which, Vicar claims, should have been
applied to its loans.

In the course of the second (replevin) case, the trial court issued several Orders pertaining to the
possession/custody of eight (8) units of the subject equipment. In an Order dated August 2, 2002, the regional trial court
(RTC) quashed the property counterbond filed by Vicar and denied the latters Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which was
grounded on forum shopping. In an Order dated September 30, 2002, the RTC denied the corporations Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of the trial judge.

On October 3, 2002, Vicar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, to stop the implementation of
the Writ of Replevin issued against the subject equipment.

The Petition was, however, dismissed by the CA because the Verification and the Certification against forum
shopping had been executed by Petitioner Carmelita V. Lim without any showing that she had the authority to sign for and
on behalf of petitioner-corporation.

The day after receiving its copy of the Resolution, Vicar filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
Admission of the Attached Secretarys Certificate but the CA denied the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.

RULING:

The present Petition for Review is meritorious.

Petitioners assert that Carmelita V. Lim was duly authorized to execute, for and on behalf of Vicar, the Verification
and Certification against forum shopping. Attached to the Petition and signed by Petitioner Lim was the
Verification/Certification, in which was explicitly stated the authorization and affirmationwas supported by Vicars board of
directors, who unanimously approved a Resolution dated October 2, 2002.

Petitioners merely missed attaching to their Petition a concrete proof of Lims authority from Vicar to execute the
said Verification/Certification on its behalf. The latter, however, lost no time in submitting its corporate secretarys
Certificate attesting to the fact that, indeed, Petitioner Vicars board of directors had unanimously approved a Resolution
on October 2, 2002, authorizing its president and general manager, Carmelita V. Lim, to file the Petition and to execute
and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping.

The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after it had denied the Petition. Such swiftness of action
indicates that the Resolution -- authorizing Petitioner Lim to file the Petition and execute the Verification and the
Certification against forum shopping on behalf of Petitioner Vicar -- did exist at the time the Petition was filed.

The Court stresses once more that technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice.
While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more
urgent ideal. Rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice.
 Petition is GRANTED, and the appealed Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED
to the Court of Appeals, which is directed to continue the proceedings.

15. UY vs. WORKMENS COMPENSATION (April 28, 1980; 97 SCRA 255)

FACTS:

Ki Lam Uy, also known as Vicente Uy, was killed by robbers at the farm house (bodega) of private respondent
Lucy Perez.

Claimants-petitioners filed a Notice and Claim for Compensation in Death Cases before the Department of Labor
seeking to recover death compensation benefits for the death of their father, Ki Lam Uy, from private respondent, Lucy
Perez.

A copy of the claim was sent to private respondent, Lucy Perez, by the Chief of the Workmen's Compensation
Unit of the Department of Labor, requiring the said private respondent to submit to said office the enclosed Workmen's
Compensation Form No. 3, Employer's Report of Accident or Sickness.

For failure of private respondent to accomplish the required Employer's Report, the Acting Chief of the Workmen's
Compensation Unit, after processing the claim and the supporting evidence submitted by claimants-petitioners, issued an
Award, granting death compensation benefits to claimants-petitioners.

Private respondent's counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file his motion for reconsideration alleging that
the cause of the death of the deceased was not work- connected.

Private respondent filed the motion for on the grounds that the respondent did not fail to controvert the instant
claim for compensation; that the Hearing Officer gravely erred in not giving the private respondent an opportunity to
present evidence to rebut claimant's claim after reception of the latter's evidence and thereby violating the constitutional
mandate of due process.

The Acting Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Unit of the Department of Labor issued an order granting the
motion for reconsideration in view of the absence of an opposition thereto and set the case for hearing on the merits until
terminated and with no postponements.

After several hearings conducted, a decision was rendered which states among others, "that although the
respondent has failed to controvert the claim within the period provided for, a hearing of the case, with notice to all the
parties was conducted to determine the compensability of the claim".

A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent, thru counsel. Subsequently, an order denying said
motion for reconsideration was issued and likewise ordering the elevation of the entire records of the case to the
Workmen's Compensation Commission for review.

The respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission rendered a decision reversing the decision of the Hearing
Officer on the ground that the deceased, Ki Lam Uy was not an employee of private respondent, thereby absolving herein
private respondent from any liability.

A petition for review was filed by the petitioners.

Private respondent in her answer to the instant petition claims that the petition, not being verified by the
petitioners but by their counsel, is fatally defective.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for review is defective since it was not verified by the petitioners.

RULING:

The claim has no merit. In the past, it has been the constant rulings of this Court that lack of verification is merely
a formal defect.

The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply intended to secure an assurance that what are
alleged in the pleadings are true and correct and not the product of the imagination on a matter of speculation, and that
the pleading is filed in good faith. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional
requisite.

16. In-N-Out Burger, Inc. vs. Sehwani Inc., et. al

Facts:
Petitioner IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC., is a business entity incorporated under the laws of California. It is a signatory to the
Convention of Paris on Protection of Industrial Property and the TRIPS Agreement. It is engaged mainly in the restaurant
business, but it has never engaged in business in the Philippines.

Respondents Sehwani, Incorporated and Benita Frites, Inc. are corporations organized in the Philippines. Sometime in
1991, Sehwani filed with the BPTTT an application for the registration of the mark IN N OUT (the inside of the letter O
formed like a star). Its application was approved and a certificate of registration was issued in its name on 1993. In 2000,
Sehwani, Incorporated and Benita Frites, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement, wherein the former entitled the latter to
use its registered mark, IN N OUT.

Sometime in 1997, In-N-Out Burger filed trademark and service mark applications with the Bureau of Trademarks for the
IN-N-OUT and IN-N-OUT Burger & Arrow Design. In 2000, In-N-Out Burger found out that Sehwani, Incorporated had
already obtained Trademark Registration for the mark IN N OUT (the inside of the letter O formed like a star). Also in
2000, In-N-Out Burger sent a demand letter directing Sehwani, Inc. to cease and desist from claiming ownership of the mark
IN-N-OUT and to voluntarily cancel its trademark registration. Sehwani Inc. did not accede to In-N-Out Burgers demand
but it expressed its willingness to surrender its registration for a consideration.

In 2001 In-N-Out Burger filed before the Bureau of Legal Affairs an administrative complaint against the Sehwani, Inc. and
Benita Frites, Inc. for unfair competition and cancellation of trademark registration.

Issue;

Whether or not the Intellectual Property Office (an administrative body) have jurisdiction of cases involving provisions of
the IPC (e.g. unfair competition).

Held:

Yes, the IPO (an administrative body) has jurisdiction in cases involving provisions of the IPC (e.g. unfair competition)
due to the following reasons:

Section 10 of the Intellectual Property Code specifically identifies the functions of the Bureau of Legal Affairs, thus:

Section 10. The Bureau of Legal Affairs.The Bureau of Legal Affairs shall have the following functions:

10.1 Hear and decide opposition to the application for registration of marks; cancellation of trademarks; subject to the
provisions of Section 64, cancellation of patents and utility models, and industrial designs; and petitions for compulsory
licensing of patents;

10.2 (a) Exercise original jurisdiction in administrative complaints for violations of laws involving intellectual property
rights; Provided, That its jurisdiction is limited to complaints where the total damages claimed are not less than Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000): Provided, futher, That availment of the provisional remedies may be granted in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Xxx

Xxx

(vi) The cancellation of any permit, license, authority, or registration which may have been granted by the Office, or the
suspension of the validity thereof for such period of time as the Director of Legal Affairs may deem reasonable which shall
not exceed one (1) year;

Xxx

(viii) The assessment of damages;

Unquestionably, petitioners complaint, which seeks the cancellation of the disputed mark in the name of respondent
Sehwani, Incorporated, and damages for violation of petitioners intellectual property rights, falls within the jurisdiction of
the IPO Director of Legal Affairs.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the IPO Director of Legal Affairs had jurisdiction to decide the petitioners
administrative case against respondents and the IPO Director General had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the
judgment of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs.

17. Pajuyo vs CA G.R. No. 146364 June 3, 2004 COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents.
FACTS

: Petitioner Pajuyo paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a lot, where Pajuyo subsequently built a house.
In 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Guevarra executed a Kasunduan wherein Pajuyo allowed Guevarra to live in the
house for free, on the condition that Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra

promised that he would vacate the premises upon Pajuyos demand.

In 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded that the latter vacate the house. Guevarra
refused. Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra before the MTC. Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title
over the lot since it is within the area set aside for socialized housing. MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo, which
was affirmed by RTC. (MTC and RTC basically ruled that the Kasunduan created a legal tie akin to that of a landlord and
tenant relationship). CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that the ejectment case is without legal basis since both
Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the said lot. CA further stated that both parties are in pari delicto; thus, the court
will leave them where they are. CA ruled that the Kasunduan is not a lease contract, but a commodatum because the
agreement is not for a price certain.

ISSUE:

Can the decision of the Regional trial court be appealed to the Court of appeals.

HELD:

Decisions of the RTC in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction are appealable to the Court of appeals by petition for
review in cases involving questions of facts or mixed questions of facts and law while their decisions involving pure
questions of law are appealable directly to the supreme court by petition for review.

18. KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-
SAVAGE vs. JUDGE APRONIANO B. TAYPIN, Presiding Judge, RTC-BR. 12, Cebu City, CEBU PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Region VII, Cebu City, JUANITA NG
MENDOZA, MENDCO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ALFREDO SABJON and DANTE SOSMEA

G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners Savage, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the
factory of petitioners located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu.

The complaint was lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general manager of Mendco
Development Corporation (MENDCO), alleging that Savages products are the object of unfair competition involving
design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. Savage contends however, that there
was no existence of offense leading to the issuance of a search warrant and eventual seizure of its products.

Issue: Whether the respondent judge had authority/jurisdiction to issue the said searchwarrant

HELD:

YES, respondent judge has authority (Note: the search warrant issued was,however, NOT valid).The authority to issue
search warrants was not among thosementioned in the administrative orders. But the Court has consistently ruled that
asearch warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of itsancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action
which it may entertain pursuant to itsoriginal jurisdiction. The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all courtsand
may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. In the instant case, thepremises searched located in Talisay, Cebu,
are well within the territorial jurisdictionof the respondent court.Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the
designation of Special Courtsfor IPR. Administrative Order No. 113-95 merely specified which court could "try anddecide"
cases involving violations of IPR. It did not, and could not, vest exclusive jurisdiction with regard to all matters (including
the issuance of search warrants andother judicial processes) in any one court.

19. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES V. FASAP

Facts:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court presents a recurring question regarding the
Courts requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping.

Petitioners Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and Manolo Aquino, Jorge Ma. Cui, Jr. and Patricia Chiong, in their capacity as
Executive Vice-President Administration and Services, Manager International Cabin Crew and Assistant Vice-President
Cabin Services, respectively, are before the Court seeking the reversal of the resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. No. SP-56850, dated January 31, 2000, dismissing their appeal and the resolution of May 11, 2000, denying the
motion for reconsideration.

The facts on the conflict between PAL and respondents Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines
(FASAP) and Leonardo Bhagwani are not necessary for the Courts resolution of the petition. It is enough to state that on
May 14, 1997 FASAP and Leonardo Bhagwani filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension and illegal
dismissal against petitioners before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision holding that PAL committed unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal of Bhagwani and,
consequently, ordered the payment of damages. The NLRC later modified the decision by setting aside the finding that
PAL was guilty of unfair labor practice, but affirming the rest of the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition has merit.

HELD:

The petition is without merit.

The necessity for a certification of non-forum shopping in filing petitions for certiorari is found in Rule 65, Section 1, in
relation to Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. These provisions require it to be executed by the corresponding
petitioner or petitioners. As no distinction is made as to which party must execute the certificate, this requirement is made
to apply to both natural and juridical entities.[1] When the petitioner is a corporation, the certification should be executed
by a natural person. Furthermore, not just any person can be called upon to execute the certification, although such a
person may have personal knowledge of the facts to be attested to.[2]

This Court has explained that a corporation has no power except those conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those
that are implied or incidental to its existence. The exercise of these powers is done through the board of directors and/or
duly authorized officers and agents. Given these corporate features, the power of a corporation to sue in any court is
generally lodged with the board of directors. The board, in turn, can delegate the physical acts needed to sue, which may
be performed only by natural persons, to its attorneys-in-fact by a board resolution, if not already authorized under the
corporate by-laws.

20. ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. QUITAIN

315 SCRA 150 (1999)

Facts: P filed a complaint for eminent domain against D. Instead of filing an answer, D countered with a Motion to
Dismiss, alleging, among other things, that the choice of property to be expropriated was improper.

Issue: Whether the Motion to Dismiss should prosper.

Held: No. The issues raised by D are affirmative defenses that should be alleged in an answer, since they require
presentation of evidence aliunde. Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that if a defendant has any objections to the
filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he should include
them in his answer. Naturally, these issues will have to be fully ventilated in a full-blown trial and hearing. Dismissal of an
action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of due process if, from a consideration of the pleadings, it appears
that there are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits.

21. MARANAW HOTELS VS. CA

FACTS: In 1955, Sheryl Oabel began working with Maranaw Hotels in one of the latters hotel branches. In 1996, Maranaw
Hotels contracted the services of Manila Resource Development Corporation (MANRED), a manpower service provider.
Maranaw Hotels transferred Oabel to MANRED. Oable later filed a petition for regularization against MANRED and
MANRED thereafter dismissed her. Oabel filed a labor case against Maranaw Hotels, MANRED intervened deporting itself
as the real employer of Oabel. She lost in the labor arbiter but the NLRC reversed the decision of the arbiter. Maranaw
Hotels appealed before the Court of Appeals but the latter court dismissed the petition because apparently Maranaw Hotels
failed to append the board resolution authorizing their counsel to file said petition before the Court of Appeals. Maranaw
Hotels filed a Motion for Reconsideration with an appended Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and board resolution but
the CA denied the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition filed by Maranaw Hotels should prosper.

HELD: No. There is no substantial compliance in this case. The filing of a subsequent MFR appended by the Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping and the board resolution did not cure the defect. It negates the very purpose for which the
certification against forum shopping is required: to inform the Court of the pendency of any other case which may present
similar issues and involve similar parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural and juridical persons.

A lawyer acting for the corporation must be specifically authorized to sign pleadings for the corporation. Specific
authorization could only come in the form of a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors that specifically authorizes
the counsel to institute the petition and execute the certification, to make his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the
corporation.

22. Vda de Melencio vs. CA

FACTS: The subject property is a 30,351 square meter parcel of land particularly denominated as Lot No. 3368, located at
Suba-babas, Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, and part of total area of 30,777 square meters covered by TCT No. 20626
in in the name of the late petitioner Go Kim Chuan. The entire property was originally owned by Esteban Bonghanoy who
had only one child, Juana Bonghanoy-Amodia, mother of the late Leoncia Modia and petitioner Amodias. The entire property
was brought under the operation of the Torrens System. However, the title thereto was lost during the Second World War.

On July 10, 1964, the Amodias allegedly executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale
whereby they extra-judicially settled the estate of Esteban Bonghanoy and conveyed the subject property to respondent
Aznar Brothers Realty Company for a consideration of P10,200.00. On August 10, 1964, the said Extra-Judicial Partition of
Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act 3344 as there was no title on file at the Register of Deeds
of Lapu-Lapu City. Thereafter, AZNAR made some improvements and constructed a beach house thereon.

On February 18 1989, petitioners executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale, conveying the subject
property in favor of Go Kim Chuan for and in consideration of P70,000.00. Aznar then filed a case against petitioners
Amodias and Go Kim Chuan for Annulment of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 20626 alleging that the sale to Go Kim
CHuan was an invalid second sale.

ISSUE: Whether there is a valid certification and verification by only one of the plaintiffs.

HELD: Yes, the Court reiterated the ruling in the case of Iglesia Ni Cristo, 505 SCRA 828, that Commonality of interest is
material and crucial to relaxation of the Rules. The Rules may be reasonably and liberally construed to avoid a patent denial
of substantial justice, because it cannot be denied, that the ends of justice are better served when cases are determined on
the merits - after all parties are given full opportunity to ventile their causes and defenses - rather than on technicality or
some procedural imperfections.

The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping. The general rule is that the
certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court
has also stressed in a number of cases that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification.
This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions merely underscored its mandatory nature in that
the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.

23. Sheker vs. Estate of Alice

FACTS: Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina. Alice left a holographic will
which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The trial court issued an order for all creditors to
file their claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan Joseph Sheker filed a contingent money claim in the
amount of P206,250.00 representing the amount of his commission as an agent for selling some properties for Alice; and
another P275k as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.

Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Shekers claim alleging among others that the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is
void because the latter did not attach a certification of non-forum shopping thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and
other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate proceeding was initiated NOT by Alan Shekers money claim but
rather upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the Alice Shekers will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are
mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be
barred, subject to certain exceptions.

A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion for claims which is to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. And as a motion, its office is not to initiate new litigation,
but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not
an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question
that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.
24. Five Star Bus Company vs. CA

FACTS: One night in November 1991 at about 11pm, Ignacio Torres, while driving a bus owned by Five Star Bus Company
collided with a mini-van driven by Samuel King Sagaral II. Sagaral filed a civil action for damages against Five Star Bus
Company and Torres. The civil case dragged for four years by reason of the bus companys lawyers repeated request to
reset the hearing of the case. Until the trial court issued an order which considered the case submitted for resolution. The
bus companys lawyer filed for a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

The bus companys lawyer then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals but the latter court summarily
dismissed the petition because said petitions affidavit of non-forum shopping was not signed by the plaintiff or any of its
representatives but rather it was signed by the lawyer. The lawyer explained that his signing was an oversight and that he
was in a haste to submit the petition at the earliest possible time in order to protect his clients interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition filed by Five Star Bus Company should prosper.

HELD: No. Circular No. 28-91 issued by the Supreme Court requiring that the affidavit of non-forum shopping should be
executed and signed by the plaintiff is a strict requirement. Circular No. 28-91 has its roots in the rule that a party-litigant
shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different tribubals, for such practice works havoc upon orderly
judicial procedure. Forum shopping has been characterized as an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned as
trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It constitutes improper conduct which tends to degrade the administration
of justice. It has also been aptly described as deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the already heavily burdened
dockets of the courts.

But the Supreme Court has relaxed this rule several times prior to this case when there is substantial compliance, why is it
not relaxed in this case?

It is true that said Circular requires that it be strictly complied with but such merely underscores its mandatory nature in that
it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial
compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. In the case at bar however, the reasons provided by Five
Stars lawyer are flimsy and frail. Further, the case has been dragging on for years and such delay is mostly attributed to
Five Stars lawyer.

25. Docena vs. Lopesura

FACTS: Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees,
petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed ownership of the land based on the occupation
since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial judge in issuing orders and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed the
petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners.

ISSUE: WON it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners.

HELD: In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of demolition thereof
originated from an action for recovery brought against the spouses and is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership and the wife as point out was in the province of Samar whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a
rigid application of the rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husbands signing the certification in his behalf
and that of his wife is too harsh.

In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum shopping should be sign by all the petitioners in a case. However, in
the case at bar, such certificate signed by Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance
with the rules. The two petitioners in this case are husband and wife and their residence is the subject property alleged to
be a conjugal property. Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and
wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint
management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly
exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases.

Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA for further proceedings.

26. TIBLE and TIBLE COMPANY VS ROYAL SAVINGS 550 SCRA 562

FACTS: In 1977, Tible & Tible Company, Inc. (TTCI) obtained a loan amounting to P1.5 million from Royal Savings and
Loan Association. The loan matured however TTCI was not able to pay hence Royal savings sued TTCI. TTCI later entered
into a compromise agreement with Royal Savings but again TTCi was not able to comply with it.
In 1981, the properties of TTCI were awarded to Comsavings via a public auction sale where Comsavings was the highest
bidder. It, however, took ten years for the Deed of Sale to be issued in favor of Comsavings.
Upon issuance of the Deed, TTCI filed an action for Annulment of Deed of Sale. This was eventually dismissed. TTCIs
Motion for Reconsideration was also dismissed.
In 2002, TTCI filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that,
among others, that the Verification Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by one Almabella Menla Vda. de Tible,
but there is no Special Power of Attorney, Board Resolution nor Secretarys Certificate was attached thereto authorizing
said signatory to sign the Verification and Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping in behalf of the other petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition shall prosper.
HELD: No. The petition is defective. The signature of the widow in the verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping of
the petition for certiorari was not ratified by any special power of attorney, board resolution nor secretarys certificate
executed by her co-petitioners authorizing her to sign for and in their behalf.
But in the Motion for Reconsideration which TTCI filed after the CA denied the Petition, TTCI have already complied with
the requirement (theres now a special power of attorney executed in favor of the widow), will this cure the defect?
The subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a partys failure to comply therewith in the first instance.
In those cases where this Court excused the non-compliance with the requirement of the submission of a certificate of non-
forum shopping, it found special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict application of said Circular
clearly unjustified or inequitable.
The Supreme Court noted that there are two pre-requisites for the relaxation of the rules on the attaching of the Certification
of Non-Forum shopping:

1. justifiable cause or plausible reason for non-compliance; and

2. compelling reason to convince the court that outright dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly
administration of justice.

27. MARANAW HOTELS VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: In 1955, Sheryl Oabel began working with Maranaw Hotels in one of the latters hotel branches. In 1996, Maranaw
Hotels contracted the services of Manila Resource Development Corporation (MANRED), a manpower service provider.
Maranaw Hotels transferred Oabel to MANRED. Oable later filed a petition for regularization against MANRED and
MANRED thereafter dismissed her.
Oabel filed a labor case against Maranaw Hotels, MANRED intervened deporting itself as the real employer of Oabel. She
lost in the labor arbiter but the NLRC reversed the decision of the arbiter. Maranaw Hotels appealed before the Court of
Appeals but the latter court dismissed the petition because apparently Maranaw Hotels failed to append the board resolution
authorizing their counsel to file said petition before the Court of Appeals. Maranaw Hotels filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with an appended Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and board resolution but the CA denied the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition filed by Maranaw Hotels should prosper.
HELD: No. There is no substantial compliance in this case. The filing of a subsequent MFR appended by the Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping and the board resolution did not cure the defect. It negates the very purpose for which the
certification against forum shopping is required: to inform the Court of the pendency of any other case which may present
similar issues and involve similar parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural and juridical persons.
A lawyer acting for the corporation must be specifically authorized to sign pleadings for the corporation. Specific
authorization could only come in the form of a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors that specifically authorizes
the counsel to institute the petition and execute the certification, to make his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the
corporation.

28. BPI LEASING VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: For the calendar year 1986, BPI Leasing Corporation, Inc. (BLC) paid the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
a total of P1,139,041.49 representing 4% "contractors percentage tax" then imposed by Section 205 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), based on its gross rentals from equipment leasing for the said year amounting to P27,783,725.42.

On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued RR 19-86. Section 6.2 thereof provided that finance and leasing companies
registered under Republic Act 5980 shall be subject to gross receipt tax of 5%-3%-1% on actual income earned. This means
that companies registered under Republic Act 5980, such as BLC, are not liable for "contractors percentage tax" under
Section 205 but are, instead, subject to "gross receipts tax" under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC. Since BLC
had earlier paid the aforementioned "contractors percentage tax," it re-computed its tax liabilities under the "gross receipts
tax" and arrived at the amount of P361,924.44. BLC filed a claim for a refund with the CIR for the amount of P777,117.05,
representing the difference between the P1,139,041.49 it had paid as "contractors percentage tax" and P361,924.44 it
should have paid for "gross receipts tax."

The CTA dismissed the petition and denied BLCs claim of refund and held that RR 19-86, may only be applied prospectively
such that it only covers all leases written on or after January 1, 1987. The CTA ruled that, since BLCs rental income was
all received prior to 1986, it follows that this was derived from lease transactions prior to January 1, 1987, and hence, not
covered by the RR.

A motion for reconsideration of the CTAs decision was filed, but was denied. BLC then appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals. BLC submits that the Court of Appeals and the CTA erred in not ruling that RR 19-86 may be applied retroactively
so as to allow BLCs claim for a refund of P777,117.05. Respondents, on the other hand, averred that the petition be
dismissed on the ground that the verification and certification of non- forum shopping was signed by the counsel of record
and not BLC, which is in violation of SC Circular 28-91.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari substantially complies with SC Circular 28-91.

HELD: The SC agrees with the respondents contention that the petition should be dismissed outright for failure to comply
with SC Circular 28-91, now incorporated as Sec2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The court emphasized that lawyers must
be specifically authorized in order to sign the Certification for BPI Leasing Company. Specific authorization must come in
the form of a board resolution issued by the board of directors.

29. CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG VS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS: Petitioner filed with BIR a claim for tax refund of the full amount of the 20% sales discount it granted to senior
citizens for the year 1995. BIR inaction prompted petitioner to file petition for review before CTA in order to forestall the 2-
year prescriptive period. CTA dismissed/rejected refund as discount extended to Senior Citizens in granted as tax credit
and not refund. CTA reasoned that while petitioner may be qualified for a tax credit, it cannot be so extended on account of
its net loss in 1995. CA dismissed petition on the ground that the person who signed the verification and certification of
absence of forum shopping failed to adduced proof that he was duly authorized by the board of directors to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners president can sign the subject verification and certificate without the approval of its Board
of Directors.

HELD: Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court on Verification and Section 5, Rule 7 on Certification against forum shopping
are silent as to who are the authorized signatory should be. But in one case decided by the Supreme Court, it held that only
individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certification on behalf of the corporation.

30. MACTAN- CEBU INTERNATIONAL VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On April 16, 1952, the Republic, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation proceeding to the CFI of Cebu on
several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which included Lot 941, for the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport.
In 1953, appellee Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, the original defendant in the expropriation case.
Subsequently, a TCT was issued in her name
Then in 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic which was made to pay Chiongbian
an amount for Lot 941. Chiongbian did not appeal therefrom.Thereafter, absolute title to Lot 941 was transferred to the
Republic under a TCT.
In 1995, Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC of Cebu, alleging, that sometime in 1949,
the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to expand the Cebu Lahug Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire
by expropriation or negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot 941 owned
by Chiongbian. Since she and other landowners could not agree with the NACs offer for the compensation of their lands,
a suit for eminent domain was instituted, before the then CFI of Cebu against 45 landowners, including Chiongbian, entitled
Republic of the Philippine vs. Damian Ouano, et al. It was finally decided in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
Some of the defendants-landowners appealed the decision to the CA which rendered a modified judgment allowing them
to repurchase their expropriated properties. Chiongbian, on the other hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted the
compensation for Lot 941 upon the assurance of the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance
for the same price once the land would no longer be used as (sic) airport. Consequently, the TCT of Chiongbian was
cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of the Republic. Then, with the creation of the MCIAA, it was cancelled and
a TCT was issued in its name. However, no expansion of the Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-
in-interest. Thus, the purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Chiongbian and MCIAA was ordered to restore to plaintiff the
possession and ownership of the property denominated as Lot No. 941 upon reimbursement of the expropriation price paid
to plaintiff. The RD is therefore ordered to effect the Transfer of the Certificate Title from the defendant to the plaintiff.MCIAA
appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. MR was denied hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not it complies with the requirement of a certification of non- forum shopping laid down on the Rules.

HELD: We are not persuaded by CHIONGBIANs claim that the Verification and Certification against forum shopping
accompanying MCIAAs petition was insufficient for allegedly having been signed by one who was not qualified to do so. As
pointed out by the MCIAA, Colonel Cordova signed the Verification and Certification against forum shopping as Acting
General Manager of the MCIAA issued by the General Manager of MCIAA. Colonel Cordova did not sign the Verification
and Certification against forum shopping pursuant to his appointment as assistant General Manager of the MCIAA,
which was later disapproved by the Commission on Appointments.

31. Spouses Diu v. Ibajan

G.R. No. 132657 January 19, 2000

SPOUSES WILLIAM and JANE JEAN DIU, petitioners,

vs.
DOMINADOR IBAJAN, DEMETRIA IBAJAN, NELSON C. SY, VICENTE REALINO II and ROMEO
R. ALVERO, respondents.
 On 12 July 1996, the spouses Carmelito Ibajan and Finna Josep-Ibajan, joined by Dominador and
Demetria Ibajan, filed against William Diu and the Register of Deeds of Naval, Biliran, an action for the
annulment of certain deeds of sale with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Carmelito Ibajan and Finna Josep-Ibajan claimed to be the owners of the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 21540 while Dominador and Demetria Ibajan, upon the other hand, asserted to be the owners of the
building, partly commercial and partly residential, erected thereon. The plaintiffs averred that defendant
Diu had caused Carmelito Ibajan to sign a document, supposed to be a deed of real estate mortgage
covering the aforesaid lot but which turned out to be a deed of absolute sale. Diu, it was also alleged, had
caused the execution of a deed of absolute sale over the residential and commercial building by forging
the signature of Dominador Ibajan.1wphi1.nt

Shortly following the filing of Civil Case No. B-0952, William and Jean Jane Diu commenced, in a
complaint dated 22 July 1996, an action for forcible entry with damages before the Municipal Trial Court
of Naval, Biliran, docketed Civil Case No. 460, against Dominador Ibajan, Demetria Ibajan, Nelson C.
Sy, Vicente Realino II and Romeo Alvero. The plaintiffs in the ejectment suit alleged that the spouses
Ibajan, aided by the other defendants who falsely represented themselves to be agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation, unlawfully entered his property (the parcel of land involved in Civil Case No. B-
0952), took possession thereof and ejected their employees therefrom.

In another order, the court then caused the elevation of the records of the case of the RTC. The presiding
judge then directed the consolidation of the cases. Then after meticulously perusing the entire records of
the case, it noted that both the plaintiffs and defendants in their verification and certification on forum
shopping did allege that there is no pending similar action in any other court or agency of the government.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in its appreciation of forum shopping:

Ruling:

Yes, the court agrees that the RTC erred in its appreciation of forum shopping. The court has said that
there is forum shopping when as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, aparty seeks a favourable
opnion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another or when he repetitively avails himself of several
judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and cirumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues
either pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other court. In the case at bar, the two cases,
one for the annulment of deeds of sale and the other for ejectment although concerning the same property,
are distinct litigations, neither giving exactly the same parties nor identical issues.

32. Domingo v. Rayala

Domingo vs. Rayala (596 SCRA 90)

Domingo vs. Rayala
546 Scra 90

Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual
harassment against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled her
ears. Rayala argued that his acts does not constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist, there must be a
demand, request or requirement of sexual favor.

Rayala accuses the Solicitor General of Forum Shopping because it filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision on CA-GR SP No. 61026 and then filed a comment in GR 155840 before the Supreme Court

Issue: Whether or not there was forum shopping

Ruling:

There was no forum shopping.

FORUM SHOPPING is an act of a party, against an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum,
of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action
for certiorari. It consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.

There is forum shopping when the following concur:

1. identity of the parties or at least of the parties who represent the same interest on both actions;
2. identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and
3. identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.

When the Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was merely exercising a right. That Rayala and
Domingo had by then already filed cases before the SC did not take away this right. Thus, when this Court directed
the Republic to file its Comment on Rayala's petition, it had to comply even if it had an unresolved motion for
reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for contempt.

33. Young v. Spouses Sy

G.R. 157745 September 26, 2006

Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.:

Forum Shopping; Litis Pendentia

Facts:

1. The case involves 2 petitions for review under Rule 45 which were consolidated. Both petitions originated from
a Complaint for Nullification of Second Supplemental Extra-judicial Settlement, Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale and
Tax Declaration filed by the petitioner Genalyn D. Young. In her complaint, she alleged that the extra-judicial
partition executed by her mother that adjudicated an unregistered parcel of land solely in favor of the latter, is
unenforceable, since at the time of the execution, she (petitioner) was only 15 years old and no court approval
had been procured; that the partition had been registered with the Register of Deeds; that Lilia Dy obtained a loan
from spouses Manuel Sy and Victoria Sy (respondents) and mortgaged the subject property; that the property was
foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder, respondent Manuel Sy; that a Certificate of Sale for this purpose had
been registered with the Register of Deeds; and that, thereafter, respondents obtained in their name a tax
declaration over the property in question.

2. The petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint, attaching the Supplemental
Complaint and she invoked her right, as co-owner, to exercise the legal redemption.

3. The RTC denied the Motion hence the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA denied the petition and held that the cause of action of the petitioner in the Supplemental
Complaint is entirely different from the original complaint; that the Supplemental Complaint did not merely
supply its deficiencies; and that, at any rate, in the event the trial court issues an adverse ruling, the petitioner can
still appeal the same, hence, the petition under Rule 65 is not proper. Hence, the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45.

3. While the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus (re: Supplemental Complaint) was pending in the CA, trial in
the RTC continued. On August 29, 2001, a day before the hearing slated for August 30, 2001, the petitioner filed
a Motion to Cancel Hearing, alleging that she was indisposed. On the day of the hearing, respondents, through
counsel, objected to the postponement and moved for the dismissal of the case for non-suit. The RTC sustained
the objection and issued the assailed August 30, 2001 Order dismissing the Complaint.

4. On top of the foregoing appeal, the petitioner, four months after filing her Notice of Appeal to the CA, filed
with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70610 to annul the same RTC
Orders that comprise the subject matter of the ordinary appeal. The petitioner raised essentially the same issues.
CA denied the petition and held that the dismissal of the case by the RTC on the ground of non prosequitur has
the effect of an adjudication upon the merits that may constitute an error of judgment correctible by ordinary
appeal and not by certiorari; that the petitioner actually chose the mode of ordinary appeal by filing a Notice of
Appeal on January 31, 2000; and that since the remedy of appeal was available, then the petition for certiorari,
being an extraordinary remedy, must fail.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping

YES, the Petitioner guilty of forum shopping

1. Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. There is forum shopping where
there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful would amount to res judicata.

2. The petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum
shopping. When the petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the
CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this Court by way of the instant
Petition.

3. The elements of litis pendentia are present between the two suits. Both suits are founded on exactly the same
facts and refer to the same subject matterthe RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for
failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights
asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one
forum may amount to res judicata in the other.

34. Santos v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 164439 January 23, 2006

JEFFREY L. SANTOS, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MACARIO E. ASISTIO III, Respondents.

Facts:

Jeffrey L. Santos ("Santos") and Macario E. Asistio III ("Asistio") were candidates for the position of Councilor
for the Second District of Caloocan City in the 10 May 2004 Elections. On 18 May 2004, the City Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Asistio as councilor-elect for the Second District of Caloocan City. Based on the Canvass
of Election Returns and the Statement of Votes, Asistio garnered 45,163 votes and secured the sixth and last slot
for the position of Councilor while Santos placed seventh with 44,558 votes.

On 28 May 2004, Santos filed with the COMELEC a Petition, docketed SPC No. 04-233, for Annulment of
Proclamation on the Basis of Erroneous Canvass/Tallies of Votes. Santos alleged that he was a victim of "dagdag-
bawas" and that his votes were reduced in the Statement of Votes while Asistios votes were increased. Santos
further alleged that based on the certified true copies of the NAMFRELs4 election returns as well as the
Certificates of Votes submitted by the poll watchers in the Second District of Caloocan City, he obtained 46,361
votes while Asistio garnered only 45,514 votes. Santos prayed for the nullification of the proclamation of Asistio
and for his declaration as the duly elected Councilor of the Second District of Caloocan City.

Issue: Whether Santos is guilty forum shopping.

Ruling:

Santos is Guilty of Forum-Shopping

Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum,
of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action
for certiorari.7 It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause
on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.8

In this case, Santos filed the petition for certiorari before this Court during the pendency of his motion for
reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. The petition clearly states that he is questioning the two
Resolutions issued by the COMELEC: the 29 June 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division in SPC No.
04-233 and the COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 7257.9 It was only when Asistio, in his Comment, called the
Courts attention that Santos now belatedly asserts that he only seeks to challenge COMELEC Resolution No.
7257 and not the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.10

Santos stated in his petition before this Court that on 9 July 2004, he filed a motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC First Divisions Resolution. However, he did not disclose that at the time of the filing of his petition,
his motion for reconsideration was still pending before the COMELEC En Banc. Santos did not also bother to
inform the Court of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the COMELEC En Banc. Had Asistio not
called this Courts attention, we would have ruled on whether the COMELEC First Division committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing SPC No. 04-233, which is one of the issues raised by Santos in this petition.
This act of Santos alone constitutes a ground for this Courts summary dismissal of his petition.

35. Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao

G.R. No. 164338 January 17, 2005

GUARANTEED HOTELS, INC., represented by URMA BALTAO CHIONGBIAN, petitioner,

vs.
JOSEFINA S. BALTAO, ROCIO P. BALTAO, GARY BALTAO and GINO BALTAO, respondents.

Facts: On November 4, 1996, Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. ("Sta. Lucia") and Guaranteed Homes,
Inc. entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA)5 for the purpose of developing a resort complex in Cabituagan,
Zambales. The JVA included a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 113916 which was allegedly registered in the
name of Guaranteed Hotels, Inc.

On August 28, 2001, the Testate Estate of Eugenio S. Baltao represented by Mariano Alejandro L. Baltao, Eugenio
L. Baltao III and Urma Chiongbian, and Guaranteed Hotels, Inc., represented by Urma Chiongbian, in her capacity
as a stockholder, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a derivative suit7 ("OLONGAPO CASE")
against Sta. Lucia and Guaranteed Homes, Inc. for Injunction, Annulment of Document and Damages with
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction.

The OLONGAPO CASE sought the annulment of the JVA insofar as the inclusion of TCT No. 11391 is concerned
because it was allegedly made without the consent or knowledge of Guaranteed Hotels, Inc.1awphi1.nt

On June 21, 2002, during the pendency of the OLONGAPO CASE, Guaranteed Hotels, Inc., represented by Urma
Chiongbian filed a second derivative suit before the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("MANILA CASE") against
Rocio, Josefina, Gary, Jaime and Gino, all surnamed Baltao as alleged stockholders and directors of Guaranteed
Hotels, Inc., and Alicia Pantig and Jane and John Does.8 The MANILA CASE, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-
102705 and raffled to Branch 469 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, sought to annul and set aside all
resolutions, corporate acts, and transactions of the defendants, herein respondents, from 1990 up to the present,
including but not limited to those where the respondents allegedly authorized Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. to enter
into joint venture agreements with Sta. Lucia and other corporations for the development of the properties of
Guaranteed Hotels, Inc.10

Issue: Whether or not petitioner engaged in forum shopping

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner, in filing the OLONGAPO and MANILA cases engaged in forum shopping. The elements
of litis pendentia are present between the two derivative suits filed by petitioner.

In the OLONGAPO CASE, petitioner sought the nullification of the JVA entered into by Guaranteed Homes, Inc.
and Sta. Lucia insofar as the inclusion of TCT No. 11391 is concerned. On the other hand, the MANILA CASE
sought for the annulment of the corporate acts of herein respondents including the resolution authorizing the
execution of the JVA.

While the reliefs prayed for in the two derivative suits were not similarly worded, it cannot be denied that their
objective is to bring about the annulment of the JVA. The OLONGAPO CASE directly attacked the JVA.
Petitioner, however, adopted another mode in the MANILA CASE. It indirectly assailed the JVA by putting in
issue the authority of the respondents to execute the same in the hope that, once established that the same
is ultra vires, the nullification of the JVA would follow as a matter of course. Plainly, the identity of the two
derivative suits is such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would amount to res judicata in the
other.l^vvphi1.net
We cannot allow the possibility of two regional trial courts ruling differently on the reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner. Consider this: If the trial court in the OLONGAPO CASE uphold the validity of the JVA while the
trial court in the MANILA CASE rules on the contrary, these two incompatible decisions will wreak havoc on
our judicial system.

The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals
of two separate, and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of
competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To
avoid the resultant confusion, we adhere strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these
rules results in the dismissal of a case.
36. Young v. Keng Seng

Facts:

John Keng Seng filed a complaint for accounting of general agency, injunction, turning over o f p r o p e r t i e s , a n d
d a m a g e s , w i t h t h e R T C ( b r a n c h 5 ) , B a c o l o d C i t y a g a i n s t t h e h e r e i n petitioners Emilio and Tita Young.

The Youngs filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. RTC Bacolod dismissed the case.

Months after, Keng Seng filed another complaint against Emilio Young for accounting and damages with the RTC (branch
44), Bacolod City.

Young again filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complainant failed to state g o o d , v a l i d
a n d / o r w o r t h w h i l e c a u s e o f a c t i o n a s a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t , w h i c h t h e c o u r t denied. Young filed
an MR, adding the following grounds - that Keng Seng had fatally failed to comply with the rule against forum
shopping, as he had in fact deli berately submitted afalse certification under oath as contained in the complaint in
the present suit.

The MR was granted and the case was dismissed. Keng Seng filed an MR, but the presiding judge inhibited himself from
hearing the case, so it was re-raffled to branch 54.

Presiding Judge Magallanes of RTC Branch 54 issued an order finding that Keng Seng had not violated the rule on
forum shopping. Young filed an MR but were denied.

CA also ruled that Keng Seng did not violate the rule on forum shopping - the first case was dismissed in March 1997, while
the second case was filed only in June 1997.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner can still raise the alleged violation of the rule on non forum shopping, even if h e f a i l e d t o c i t e i t
as a ground in his motion to dismiss the Second Case.

2. WON the CA erred in holding that respondent had not violated the rule on forum shopping.

Rulings:

1. NO, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections
not so included shall be deemed.

Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that defences and objections not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an
answer are deemed waived. However, courts shall nonetheless dismiss the claim when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, (3) the action is barred by prior judgment, or 4) the statute of limitations has
been crossed.

Applying these principles to the instant case, we hold that petitioner is barred from raising the ground of forum shopping in
the Court of Appeals and in this Court. If only for his failure to invoke such ground at the first opportunity in his Motion to
Dismiss filed in the trial court, his appeal should have been given short shrift and denied outright.

2. NO. It is said that forum shopping is committed by a party who, having received an adverse judgment in one forum, seeks
another opinion in another court, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari. More accurately, however,
forum shopping is the institution of two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to
ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs. It is an act
of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes. It degrades
the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets.

37. Philippine Nails and wires v. Malayan Insurance

Facts:
Petitioner filed on July 28, 1993 a complaint for recovery of the contractual liability of herein respondent under its Marine
Cargo Policy No. LP-0001-08287 and its Endorsement No. LP-0001-91399. Sought to be recovered therein was the sum
of P2, 698,637.00, representing the insured value of the lost or undelivered 377.168 metric tons of Prime Newly Hot Rolled
Steel Billets, including attorneys fees and costs.

Against the complaint, respondent filed a motion to dismiss dated August 10, 1993, on grounds of failure to state a cause
of action and improper venue. On August 16, 1993, petitioner filed its opposition to the said motion.

On September 8, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to admit its amended complaint, which the respondent court granted.
Meanwhile, the respondent court, presided over by the Honorable Aurelio Trampe, denied respondents motion to
dismiss. On October 18, 1993 respondent filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer on account of a pending
motion to dismiss. The respondent court granted the motion for extension, and gave respondent a non-extendible period of
ten (10) days from receipt of said order within which to file its answer. On the theory that respondents period to file a
responsive pleading had expired, petitioner sought to have respondent declared in default. Whereupon reception of
petitioners evidence ex parte followed on November 9, 1993.

The respondent Branch Sheriff served on respondent-insurers bank a notice of garnishment on February 22, 1994. On
February 23, 1994, respondent filed the instant petition for certiorari. On March 2, 1994, it filed with respondent court motion
to stay the execution, and to approve the supersedeas bond. On March 7, 1994, this court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining petitioner and the RTC from implementing the impugned February 4, 1994 order.

Issue:

WON respondent is guilty upon failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping and a statement showing the material
dates.

Rulings: The Petition before the CA was in fact filed within the prescribed period. In this light, we hold that the failure to
state the material dates was merely a procedural lapse that could be waived by the other partys failure to raise the matter
at the proper time.

We likewise hold that respondent is not guilty of forum-shopping. The test to determine whether a party violated the rule
against it is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another.

Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and
reliefs sought. While there is an identity of parties in the appeal and in the petition for review on certiorari filed before this
Court, it is clear that the causes of action and reliefs sought are unidentical, although petitioner may have mentioned in its
appeal the impropriety of the writ of execution pending appeal under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. Clearly,
there can be no forum shopping where in one petition a party questions the order granting the motion for execution pending
appeal, as in the case at bar, and, in a regular appeal before the appellate court, the party questions the decision on the
merits which finds the party guilty of negligence and holds the same liable for damages therefor. After all, the merits of the
main case are not to be determined in a petition questioning execution pending appeal and vice versa. Hence, reliance on
the principle of forum-shopping is misplaced.

38. Employees Compensation v. Court of Appeals

Facts: On November 19, 1988, the deceased was infront of the Office of the Criminal Investigation of the Mandaluyong
Police Station and was talking with another policeman, PFC. Ruben Cruz, when another policeman, Pat. Cesar Arcilla, who
had just arrived, immediately got off the car holding his service firearm and approached the deceased and without saying
any word, he fired three successive shots which sent him slumped to the ground. The deceased, however, although critically
wounded, drew his side firearm and fired back, twice hitting fatally Cesar Arcilla. Both fell, fatally wounded, and were rushed
to the Mandaluyong Medical Center, but Sgt. Alvaran was pronounced dead upon arrival. Cesar Arcilla, died in the same
hospital, the day after.

Previous to that shooting incident, it was learned that the same, stemmed from a family feud, wherein Sgt. Alvaran's son,
stabbed the patrolman's nephew, a day before (November 18, 1988). Such quarrel was aggravated when the latter fired
shots on the air and uttered defamatory words before the relatives of the former.

The appellant subsequent filed a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626, as amended. The System [GSIS] denied
the claim on the ground that at the time of the accident the deceased was supposed to be at the Pasig Provincial Jail as
2nd Shift Jailer and with a specific duty to perform.

Appellant requested a reconsideration of the respondent's [GSIS] ruling saying that the contingency happened in the police
station where her husband is a member although at that time of the contingency her husband was assigned at the Pasig
Provincial Jail.

Respondent [GSIS], nonetheless, took a firm stand prompting appellant to elevate her case to this Commission for review.

On July 31, 1991, petitioner Commission affirmed the holding of the GSIS that the death of private respondent's husband
is not compensable under P.D. 626, as amended. On appeal, respondent Court reversed petitioner Commission via its
assailed Decision.
Issue: Did petitioner engage in "forum-shopping" in filing this petition?

Rulings: Petition should be denied. Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the other.

There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all
the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.

The test therefore in determining the presence of forum-shopping is whether in the two (or more cases) pending, there is
identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or causes of action and (c) reliefs sought.

39. Coca-cola Bottlers v. Social Security

Facts: Petitioner Company and Dr. Climaco entered into a Retainer Agreement for one year, with a monthly compensation
of P3, 800.00. In the contract, is the provision that no employee-employer relationship shall exist between the company and
Dr. Climaco while the contract is in effect. In case of its termination, Dr. Climaco shall be entitled only to such retainer fee
as may be due him at the time of termination.

Meantime, Dr. Climaco inquired with the DOLE and the SSS whether he was an employee of the company. Both agencies
replied in the affirmative. As a result, Dr. Climaco filed a complaint before (NLRC). In his complaint, he sought recognition
as a regular employee of the company and demanded payment of his 13th month pay, bonus and all other benefits.

During the pendency of the complaint, the company terminated its Retainer Agreement with Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco
filed another complaintfor illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, in each of the complaints, ruled in favor of Petitioner
Company.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Arbiter disposition. On petition for review before the CA, the NLRC ruling was reversed.
The appellate court ruled that using the four-fold test, an employer-employee relationship existed between the company
and Dr. Climaco. Petitioners elevated the case through a petition for review on certiorari.

On April 12, 1995, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Dr. Climaco opposed the motion.

In view of the statements of Dr. Climaco in his opposition to the companys motion to dismiss, petitioners again, on March
1, 1996, moved for the dismissal of Dr. Climacos complaint, this time on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia

Issue:

1. WON respondent Climaco is guilty of forum shopping, which thereby called for the outright dismissal of his petition before
the Social Security Commission.

2. WON the petition should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia as there are other actions pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action.

Rulings:

1. Petitioners posit that since the issues before the NLRC and the SSC are the same, the SSC cannot make a ruling on the
issue presented before it without necessarily having a direct effect on the issue before the NLRC. It was patently erroneous,
if not malicious, for Dr. Climaco to invoke the jurisdiction of the SSC through a separate petition. Thus, petitioners contend,
Dr. Climaco was guilty of forum shopping.

The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two (2) competent tribunals of
two (2) separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals,
may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached.

2. The elements of litis pendentia are absent. Petitioners contend that the petition of Dr. Climaco before the SSC is defective
because there were pending actions between the same parties and involving the same issues in different fora.

For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1) identity of the parties or at least such as representing the same interests in
both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of
the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.

In the case under review, there is no litis pendentia to speak of. As previously explained, although the parties in the cases
before the NLRC and the SSC are similar, the nature of the cases filed, the rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in each
tribunal, are different.

40. Ao-As v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
The Lutheran Church in the Philippines (LCP) is a religious organization duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on May 8, 1967.

During the 1976 LCP national convention, a resolution was passed dividing the North Luzon district (NLD) into two districts:
the NLD Highland District (NLHD) and the NLD Lowland District (NLLD), thereby increasing the number of directors from
seven (7) to nine (9).

Since the addition of two or more districts, an eleven (11) member board of directors representing the five (5) districts
managed the LCP without any challenge from the membership until several years later when certain controversies arose
involving the resolutions of the Board terminating the services of the LCP business manager and corporate treasurer since
1979, Mr. Eclesio Hipe.

Aside from the present case, SEC-SICD Case no. 3556 entitled "Excelsio Hipe, et. al. vs. Thomas Batong, et. al." and SEC-
SICD Case No. 3524, "Domingo Shambu, et. al. vs. Thomas Batong, et. al." respectively, sought to declare null and void
Board Resolution Nos. LCP-BD-6-89 and LCP-BD-7-89; and SEC-SICD Case No. 3550.

On January 23, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss alleging again the FORMULA OF CONCORD. Again, the SEC-
SICD denied.

On September 14, 1992, [the Batong group] filed their Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently denied.

On September 23, 1992, [the Batong group] filed with the SEC En Banc a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a temporary
restraining order alleging that the SEC-SIDC acted with grave abuse of discretion in creating the management committee.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals reversibly erred in ruling that SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 is a case of forum shopping.

Rulings:

The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and the relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity
of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

As the present jurisprudence now stands, forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2)
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved
(res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes
of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata ). If the forum shopping is not considered
willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned
above. However, if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be
dismissed with prejudice.

The six grounds originally relied upon by the Ao-As group in SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 are entirely different from the causes
of action in NLRC Cases No. 03-01935-90 and 04-01979-90, Civil Cases No. 133394-CV and 131879-CV, and SEC-SICD
Cases No. 3556 and 3524. It is true that the causes of action in the latter cases were included as additional grounds in
SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 for the appointment of the management committee and for accounting "of all funds, properties
and assets of LCP which may have come into their possession during their incumbency as officers and/or directors of LCP."
However, the creation of a management committee and the prayer for accounting could not have been asked for in the
labor (NLRC Cases No. 03-01935-90 and 04-01979-90) and forcible entry (Civil Cases No. 133394-CV and 131879-CV)
cases.

41. G.R. No. 89070 BENGUET ELECTRlC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, PETER COSALAN and BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
INC., respondents. May 18, 1992

FACTS:

COA issued a memorandum to Peter Cosalan, General Manager of Beneco noting that cash advances received by
officers and employees of petitioner Beneco in the amount of P129, 618. 48 had been virtually written off in the books of
Beneco. Soon, COA issued another Memorandum, also addressed to Cosalan inviting attention to the fact that the audit
of per diems and allowances received by officials and members of the Board of Directors of Beneco showed substantial
inconsistencies with the directives of the NEA. The Audit Memorandum once again directed the taking of immediate action
in conformity with existing NEA regulations. Later on, Petitioner Beneco received the COA Audit Report on the financial
status and operations of Beneco which noted and enumerated irregularities in the utilization of funds amounting to P37
Million released by NEA to Beneco, and recommended that appropriate remedial action be taken.
Having been made aware of the serious financial condition of Beneco and what appeared to be mismanagement,
respondent Cosalan initiated implementation of the remedial measures recommended by the COA. The respondent
members of the Board of Beneco reacted by adopting a series of resolutions including one which resulted in the ouster of
respondent Cosalan as General Manager of Beneco and his exclusion from performance of his regular duties as such, as
well as the withholding of his salary and allowances. Aggrieved, Cosalan filed a complaint before the NLRC challenging the
legality of the board resolutions. NRLC rendered a decision reinstating Cosalan as well as the payment of his backwages
an allowances. Respondent Board members appealed to the NLRC, and there filed a Memorandum on Appeal. Petitioner
Beneco did not appeal, but moved to dismiss the appeal filed by respondent Board members and for execution of judgment.
By this time, petitioner Beneco had a new set of directors. They moved for reconsideration of the NLRC decision, but without
success. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion in accepting and giving due course to
respondent Board members' appeal although such appeal had been filed out of time; and that the NLRC had acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding petitioner alone liable for payment of the backwages
and allowances due to Cosalan and releasing respondent Board members from liability therefor.

RULING: Yes. There, was, therefore, no reason grounded upon substantial justice and the prevention of serious miscarriage
of justice that might have justified the NLRC in disregarding the ten-day reglementary period for perfection of an appeal by
the respondent Board members. Accordingly, the applicable rule was that the ten-day reglementary period to perfect an
appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, that failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period renders the
assailed decision final and executory and no longer subject to review. 7 The respondent Board members had thus lost their
right to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have forthwith dismissed their appeal
memorandum.

The Court believe and so hold, further, that not only are Beneco and respondent Board members properly held solidarily
liable for the awards made by the Labor Arbiter, but also that petitioner Beneco which was controlled by and which could
act only through respondent Board members, has a right to be reimbursed for any amounts that Beneco may be compelled
to pay to respondent Cosalan. Such right of reimbursement is essential if the innocent members of Beneco are not to be
penalized for the acts of respondent Board members which were both done in bad faith and ultra vires. The liability-
generating acts here are the personal and individual acts of respondent Board members, and are not properly attributed to
Beneco itself.

42. G.R. Nos. 79937-38 SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners, vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL
CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents. February 13, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati for the consignation of a premium
refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy
Po Tiong. Subsequently, Private filed a complaint in the RTC of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as
additional defendants for the payment of damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit.

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to
raise his objection which was disregarded by Judge Jose Castro. The complaint underwent a number of amendments to
make way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The
respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. On the
other hand, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the reassessment of docket
fees. The Court of Appeals then rendered a decision dismissing the petition. Hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.

RULING:

Yes. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The same rule applies to
permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no
case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.

43. G.R. No. 75919 MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE
MAISIP, respondents. May 7, 1987
FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation against City Land
Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. The docket fee paid upon
filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where
the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages
sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of
P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.
When the under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of this Court together with
similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court. Soon after, the Court issued an order ordering
the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated and directed the plaintiffs
to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified
the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00.Still no amount of damages
were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted. The other party filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. Hence this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint should be admitted.

RULING:
No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was
not paid for the original complaint, its as if there is no complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint
duly filed which can be amended. So, any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void.
Manchesters defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited. The Supreme Court ruled
that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for damages and for specific
performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.
Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body of the complaint. Its
omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the
happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions,
answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from
the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment
of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with
this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.

44. G.R. No. 179878 NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOPA), Petitioner, versus HON.
PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 52, BACOLOD CITY, and ANICETO
MANOJO CAMPOS, Respondents. December 24, 2008

Facts:

Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10773, against
NOPA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City. More than six years after NOPA filed its
Answer, NOPA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the correct filing fee which
was denied by the RTC. NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied by the RTC. After that, NOPA
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of the RTC. On 23 May 2007, the Court of
Appeals issued Resolutions dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED
THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS WHEN
PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE IN ITS VERIFICATION THAT THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE TRUE AND
CORRECT OF HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND FAILURE TO ATTACH THE
NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ON ITS PLEADINGS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Ruling:

No. A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the partys knowledge and belief produces
no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied.
 The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no effect on the substantial rights of a litigant. The alleged
deficiency in the payment of docket fees by Campos, if there is any, would not inure to the benefit of NOPA.

Also, there is no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of Appeals exercise of discretion in the case
at bar. While the payment of docket fees is jurisdictional, it is nevertheless unmistakably also a technicality. There was
therefore no grave abuse of discreti on on the part of the Court of Appeals warranting this Courts reversal of the exercise
of discretion by the former.

45. G.R. No. 175914 RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, versus
HON. PABLO C. FORMARAN III, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court Branch 21, Naga City, as Pairing Judge
for Regional Trial Court Branch 22, Formerly Presided By HON. NOVELITA VILLEGAS-LLAGUNO (Retired 01 May
2006), ROMEO Y. TAN, ROBERTO L. OBIEDO and ATTY. TOMAS A. REYES, Respondents. February 10, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner obtained a loan in the total amount of P95,700,620.00 from respondents Tan and Obiedo, secured by
real estate mortgages over five parcels of land, all located in Naga City. When petitioner was unable to pay the loan when
it became due and demandable, respondents Tan and Obiedo agreed to an extension of the same thru a Memorandum of
Agreement which was signed by the parties. Still, the petitioner failed to pay his indebtedness. Respondents Tan and Obiedo
presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale before the Registry of Deeds of Naga City, as a result of which, they were able to
secure TCTs over the five parcel of land in their names.
Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and damages. Petitioner paid
the sum of P13, 644. 25 for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the office of the Clerk of Court which initially
considered the case as action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Consequently, the RTC decreed on the matter of docket
fees requiring the petitioner as well as respondent Tan to pay additional filing fees. Petitioner filed for partial reconsideration
which was soon denied by the Court. Petitioner had not yet conceded, and it filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which
thereafter denied the said petition and affirmed the order of the trial court. Hence this instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a grave and serious reversible error in affirming the assailed Orders
of the Regional Trial Court which are clearly contrary to the pronouncement of this Honorable Court in the case of
Spouses De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104796, March 6, 1998, not to mention the fact that if the said judgment
is allowed to stand and not rectified, the same would result in grave injustice and irreparable damage to herein petitioner in
view of the prohibitive amount assessed as a consequence of said Orders.

RULING:
No. A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would still be determined in
accordance with the value of the real property involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable
value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or
estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the
Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the
same.
In sum, the Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against respondents is the recovery
of title to and possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily involving real property, the docket fees for which
must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

46. TACAY vs. RTC OF TAGUM (December 20, 1989; 180 SCRA 483)

FACTS:

These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of
possession (acciones publiciana) against 3 defendants, namely: Antonia Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay.

Pineda was the owner of 790 sqm land evidenced by TCT No. T-46560. The previous owner of such land has
allowed the 3 defendants to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance. Pineda, having himself the need to use the
property, has demanded the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefore, but such were
refused.

The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant alleging that it did not specify the
amounts of actual, nominal, and exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that being bars the
determination of the RTCs jurisdiction in deciding the case.

The Motions to Dismiss were denied but the claims for damages in the complaint were expunged for failure to
specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and temporary
restraining order against the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed value of the property are relevant in the
determination of the courts jurisdiction in a case for recovery of possession of property?
RULING: Determinative of the courts jurisdiction in a recovery of possession of property is the nature of the action (one of
accion publicaina) and not the value of the property, it may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying
claim for actual, nominal or exemplary damages and such action would fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTC. The court acquired jurisdiction upon the filing of the complaint and payment of the prescribed docket fees.

47. ORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION vs. CA (October 15, 1991; 202 SCRA 753)

FACTS: Original Development and Construction Corporation (ODECOR) sued Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation
(HIGC), and the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMC) for breach of contract and for damages. ODECOR
accused the two of divesting its customers which resulted to massive losses for the corporation.

In ODECORs claim for damages it asserted its claim for actual, consequential, exemplary and moral damages,
the amount of which will be proved at the trial; that for actual damages its claiming P2,272,193.10 but the rest appears to
be unspecified amount of damages which the trial court could not assess. ODECOR paid the docket fee for the claim for
the actual damages specified as well as the docket fees for the unspecified damages.

HIGC then moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over it because of non-payment of the proper docket fees.

The trial court did not order the dismissal of the case but rather directed the Clerk of Court to issue a certificate of
reassessment of the proper docket fee and if there is a deficiency ODECOR should pay the same. In the assessment, the
Clerk of Court determined that the claim for attorneys fee which was stated in the body of the complaint was not reiterated
in the PRAYER of the complaint hence, the docket fees paid by ODECOR could not have included payment for the fees for
the claim of attorneys fee. ODECOR was then ordered to amend its complaint.

In its amended complaint, ODECOR restated substantially all its allegations in the first complaint except that it
specified its claim for attorneys fees as equivalent to 25% of the total monthly liability and other expenses of litigation and
costs of the suit.

HIGC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The
CA ruled in favor HIGC and enjoined the trial court from hearing the case.

ODECOR then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: No. The claims for the other damages (other than actual) are vague. The terms used by ODECOR in its claims
i.e. the amount of which will be proved at the trial and the demand for attorneys fees as equivalent to 25% of the total
monetary liability and other expenses of litigation and costs of this suit are not definite enough to be the basis of the
computation of the proper docket fees.

While it is not required that the exact amounts be stated, the plaintiff must ascertain, in his estimation, the sums
he wants and the sums required to determine the amount of such docket and other fees. Thus, it is evident that the
complaint did not state enough facts and sums to enable the Clerk of Court of the lower court to compute the docket fees
payable and left to the judge mere guesswork as to these amounts, which is fatal.

48. BELLO vs. UBO (September 30, 1982; 117 SCRA 753)

FACTS: A land dispute arose between Bello and Ubo. Bello is claiming ownership over the property that Ubo and her son
have been occupying for years even paying taxes therefor. Ubo and her son (Porferio Regis) claimed that they inherited
said land.

Bello then filed a civil suit against Ubo and Regis. Summons were issued by the court.

A certain Patrolman Castulo Yobia served the summons. What he did was go to where Ubo and her son was
residing. Ubo and Regis initially refused to accept the same. But Yobia explained the nature of the Summons; that there is
a civil case filed against them; that they need to find a lawyer to assist them. Ubo and Regis then reluctantly signed the
summons. Thereafter, he detached the copy of the complaint and handed it to Ubo and Regis. He however took back the
same afterwards; he also held on to the copy of the summons and afterwards returned to his police station.

Despite signing the summons, Ubo and Regis did not file any responsive pleadings nor did they appear in court.
Eventually, the trial court declared them in default and decided in favor of Bello.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a proper service of summons in the case at bar.

RULING: No. A police officer is not one of those enumerated as a person authorized to serve summons. The list provided
in the Rules of Court is exclusive. Yobia was not a sheriff or a court officer of the province where service was made; and
neither was he a person who, for special reasons, was specially authorized to serve the summons by the judge who
issued the same.

Furthermore, even assuming that Yobia could be considered as a proper person to serve the summons, still there
was no valid and effective service since he brought back the summons with him together with the copy of the complaint.
Since there is no valid service of summons, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Ubo and Regis.
Therefore, the ex parte proceedings that took place as well as the decision favoring Bello is null and void.

49. MONTALBAN vs. MAXIMO (March 15, 1968; 22 SCRA 1070)

FACTS: August 15, 1958. Plaintiffs commenced suit against Fr. Gerardo Maximo. Plaintiffs' cause of action for damages
sprang from a motor vehicle accident. Paul Hershell Montalban, son of plaintiffs, suffered injuries. On this same day that
the complaint was filed, summons was served on defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo at the parish church of Concepcion,
Malabon, Rizal, through Fr. Arsenio Bautista a priest in the same parish church. Fr. Arsenio Bautista sent a letter to
Macario M. Ofilada, Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila, informing him that defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo
left for Europe on August 7, and "will be back on the first week of November."
The lower court declared defendant in default, on plaintiffs' motion. Defendant, answered the foregoing letter
expressing regret that he could not comply with plaintiffs' request, because he (defendant) was not aware of the said civil
case, and that, in the criminal action arising out of the same incident, said defendant was acquitted by the Municipal Court
of Manila.
Deputy Sheriff Liberato C. Manalo of Rizal notified defendant of the issuance of the writ of execution, and demanded
payment of the amount set forth therein. The Sheriff's return to the writ shows that in response to such demand, defendant
alleged that he was then "financially hard up" and that the Sheriff found no property that could be subject to execution. An
alias writ of execution was issued. Copy thereof was received by defendant. The Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on a
residential house located in Caloocan City and purportedly belonging to defendant.
Two years and two months after defendant admittedly learned of the lower court's decision from counsel for plaintiffs
herein, said defendant filed a verified motion in the same case praying for the annulment of the entire proceedings. His
ground is this: Summons was not duly served upon him "as provided under Sec. 7, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court;" accordingly,
the lower court "did not acquire jurisdiction over his person"; and "the trial and decision by default" are "null and void." The
court denied this motion and the defendant's move to reconsider was rejected by the court.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there was a valid service of summons over the defendant;
Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
RULING:

A question of transcendental importance which necessarily involves an inquiry into procedural due process is
whether summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom may be validly
effected by substituted service under Section 8, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court. A head-on collision of views becomes
inevitable considering the diametrically opposing positions taken by plaintiffs, on the one hand, and defendant, on the other.
For, plaintiffs make the point that even with defendant temporarily abroad, substituted service is valid under Section 8 by
leaving a copy of the summons "at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein."
The jurisdiction of courts to render judgments in personam was grounded on their de facto power over defendant's
person. Jurisdiction was based on the power to seize and imprison defendant. If a defendant was absent from the territory,
the fact that he was a citizen would not enable the court's officers to seize him and service could not represent this power.
Hence, his presence within the territorial jurisdiction was a prerequisite to the rendition of a judgment personally binding
against him.
There should be no doubt, therefore, that in suits in personam, courts have jurisdiction over residents temporarily
out of the country.

50. FILMERCO COMMERCIAL CO. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

(April 9, 1987; 147 SCRA 194)

FACTS:

Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc., (Filmerco) obtained two separate loans from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI).
As security for the payment of the obligation stated in the promissory notes, spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel
executed a deed of continuing suretyship wherein the Miguels bound themselves jointly and solidarily with Filmerco for the
payment of the latter's obligation under the loan-accounts.

The loans remained outstanding even after they became due and demandable. Hence BPI filed a complaint for
recovery of a sum of money against Filmerco and spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Rizal.
 Upon motion of the plaintiff, the defendants were declared in default for failure to file an answer within the
reglementary period.

The plaintiff filed a motion for execution of judgment before the lower court. This motion was granted and a writ of
execution was issued against Filmerco and the Miguels. Pursuant to the writ of execution, respondent Sheriff Villapana
levied on and attached alleged properties of Filmerco and the Miguels.

The defendants filed a motion to set aside the decision, writ of execution, notice of levy/attachment and to restrain
the holding of the auction sale. The motion was premised on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
defendants because no valid summons was served on them. Subsequently, the lower court issued an order denying the
aforesaid motion.

The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and without waiting for the resolution of the aforesaid motion for
reconsideration, the defendants filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
injunction and preliminary restraining order against the lower court's decision and orders.

The appellate court dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

The petitioners submit that no valid summons was served upon them. Therefore, they contend that the lower
court had not acquired jurisdiction over their persons thus resulting in the nullity of its decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were served valid summons so as to bring their persons within the jurisdiction of
the court.

RULING:

In the case at bar, there is no question that personal service of summons upon the defendants could not be made
because they moved out from their given address and their whereabouts were unknown as indicated in the sheriff's return.
Hence, the court resorted to substituted service of summons provided for under Section 8, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules
of Court.

... The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service, hence it is not
sufficient "to leave the copy at defendant's former dwelling house, residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after
his removal therefrom."

The Court found that no valid service of summons upon the defendant spouses was effected since copies of the
summons was left to a proper person.

51. Sps. MIRANDA Vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Luneta Motor Company (hereinafter LMC) filed suit against the spouses Lucila and Pablo D. Java, et al., with the former
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, which docketed the same as Civil Case No. 63117. LMC sought to recover one
"Thames" jeep and the sum of P9,403.00, plus interest and attorney's fees from defendants.

On March 11, 1966, LMC moved to declare the Java spouses in default for failure to file their answer within the
reglementary period, notwithstanding notice. The trial court granted the motion.

judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in annulling the judgment in Civil Case No. 63117
for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

HELD: In declaring the judgment in Civil Case No. 63117 null and void, the appellate court found from the Sheriff's Return
of Service,8 that summons was served on the spouses Java by substituted service without effort at personal service. The
court a quo held that the said service was invalid and the lower court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
defendants (private respondents herein) in Civil Case No. 63117, thus, the execution sale of the "Thames" vehicle, as well
as the sale of Lot 8015 to LMC, and the subsequent sale by the latter to petitioners were null and void.

52. JOSE V. BOYON

FACTS: This case arose from a complaint for specific performance against respondents Helen and Romeo Boyon to
compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of controverted sale. The CA held that the trial
court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC never
acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First, the sheriff failed to
comply with the requirements of substituted service of summons, because he did not specify in the Return of Summons the
prior efforts he had made to locate them and the impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them by personal
service. Second, the subsequent summons by publication was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit for specific
performance and therefore an action in personam. Consequently, the Resolution and the Orders were null and void, since
the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction over respondents.

ISSUE: Whether there was valid service of summons.

HELD: Petition has no merit. In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying
availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service
failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or
Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that since service of summons,
especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort
to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional
grounds.

53. VENTURAZA V. C.A

FACTS: On 22 September 1985, petitioners filed a "Motion to Set Aside Decision and to Declare Past Proceedings Null
and Void for Lack of Jurisdiction," alleging that there had been no proper and valid service of summons upon them in
accordance with either Section 7 or Section 8 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court 5 and that the court a quo never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners, considering that the address where the summons was served is the residence
of Violeta S. Venturanza's father, Augusto Soan, and not the residence or dwelling house of the petitioners, and that since
April 1985, petitioners had been already residing at Aurora Street, Pasay City. 6 In an order dated 20 October 1985, the
court a quo denied the motion, for lack of merit. Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid service of summons.

HELD: It is further required by law that an effort or attempt should first be made to personally serve the summons and after
this has failed, a substituted service may be caused upon the defendant, and the same must be reflected in the proof of
service. The substituted service should be availed of only when the defendant cannot be served promptly in person.
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure
of such efforts. It is only when a defendant can not be personally served with summons within a reasonable time that a
substituted service may be availed of, the same to be effected in the following manner: a) by leaving copies of the summons
at the defendants' dwelling house or residence, with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or b)
by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business, with some competent person in charge thereof.

54. keister v. Navarro

FACTS: Special civil action of prohibition to prevent respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal from enforcing his Order dated March 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 10392 requiring the petitioner to answer the complaint
and from proceeding with the trial of the case, on the ground that the Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner.
On December 1, 1967, the summons, with the complaint attached thereto, was served purportedly upon petitioner at "c/o
Chuidian Law Office, Suite 801, JMT Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal." The receipt of service was signed by one Vicente
Basallote, Clerk of said Chuidian Law Office.

On December 15, 1967, the petitioner, thru his counsel, filed a special appearance questioning the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of petitioner and moved to dismiss the complaint. It was asserted that the Court had acquired no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because the summons was improperly served at the Chuidian Law Office,
Suite 801, JMT Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal and not at the residence or place of business of the petitioner, contrary
to the requirements of Section 8 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: whether or not jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the court a quo over the person of the petitioner.

HELD: The court finds the petition meritorious. Service of summons upon the d efendant is the means by which the court
may acquire jurisdiction over his person. In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such service are null
and void. The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service, hence it is not sufficient
"to leave the copy at defendants former dwelling house, residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after his removal
therefrom." 22 They refer to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is
made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. Similarly, the terms "office" or "regular place of
business" refer to the office or place of business of defendant at the time of service. Note that the rule designates the
persons to whom copies of the process may be left.

55. Cezar V. Ricafort Bautista

FACTS: Private respondent Specified Material Corp filed a complaint for collection of sum of money (P1,860,000 plus 3%
monthly interest) against petitioner due to the latters failure to pay the construction materials it purportedly purchased
under a credit line from Specified.

Cezar had expressed willingness to pay Specified as long as an inventory is made and the parties conflicting records as
to materials delivered and actual materials used are reconciled. After Cezar failed to show up in meetings for verification
of documents, Specified sent a final demand letter and later on filed the complaint. Sheriff Marquez served the summons
to Robles, an alleged employee of Cezar.

As Cezar failed to answer the complaint, the respondent judge declared him in default. Specified filed an amended
complaint, raising the obligation to P2,005,000, a copy of the which was personally received by Cezar. Cezar, by way of
special appearance, filed a motion to set aside decision arguing that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person. After RTC denied the motion, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment and preliminary injunction with CA,
which was dismissed. SC also denied the certiorari due to non-compliance with procedural requirements.

After SCs resolution became final and executory, Specified moved for execution however the scheduled hearing on was
reset after Cezar filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Re-Set Hearing.

Issue: W/N RTC acquired jurisdiction

Held: Yes. A court can acquire jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent either through service of summons or
voluntary appearance. The service of summons is intended to give official notice to the defendant or respondent that an
action had been commenced against it.

Whenever practicable, summons must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person and he refuses to
receive and sign it, by tendering the summons to him.

It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be
made. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and
the fact that such efforts failed in the proof service. In the case, the sheriffs return is patently defective for failure to state
impossibility of personal service.

However, the defect in service was cured and the RTC acquired jurisdiction by virtue of Cezars voluntary through his
motion for re-setting the courts hearing on the motion for execution.

An appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or respondent. A voluntary appearance is a
waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. The defendant may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by
such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person. Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed.

56. Biaco vs. PCRB

FACTS: Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in the Philippine Countryside
Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank. As security for the
payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land which
the real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco. When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned
loans on its due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written demand,however, proved futile. Respondent
bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank). The RTC
ruled against them; a writ of execution was served on the spouses. Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial
Court decision contending, among others, that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served
on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made. The CA affirmed RTC
decision invoking that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner?

HELD: No. The Court ruled that validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction
over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the
court is recognized and made effective. In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB
undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem.
As such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is vested with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

57. E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd vs. Benito

FACTS: Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office address at Davao City and with branch offices at Paraaque,
MM and Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development
Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter
into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation
regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati. Private respondent, as plaintiff,
filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the RTC Makati for failure
of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no
substantial developments therein. Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its
Branch Manager at the stated address at Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons
was duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. at their new office Villa
Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the summons.
Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. It contends that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons
was improperly served upon its employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons
named in Section 11, Rule 14 RoC upon whom service of summons may be made. plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. the trial court issued an Order denying defendant's
Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. defendant, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
alleging that Sec.11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on
persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word "manager" was changed
to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director. Defendant's Motion
for Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of summons on its
Branch Manager.

HELD: No. the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is "restricted, limited and exclusive" following the
rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee
intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Under
the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The designation of persons
or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly
specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of
only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any
of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

58. Litton Mills, Inc. vs. CA

59. Signetics Corp. vs. CA

FACTS: Signetics was organized under the laws of the United States of America. Through Signetics Filipinas Corporation
(SigFil), a wholly-owned subsidiary, Signetics entered into lease contract over a piece of land with Fruehauf Electronics
Phils., Inc. (Freuhauf). Freuhauf sued Signetics for damages, accounting or return of certain machinery, equipment and
accessories, as well as the transfer of title and surrender of possession of the buildings, installations and improvements on
the leased land, before the RTC of Pasig (Civil Case No. 59264). Claiming that Signetics caused SigFil to insert in the lease
contract the words "machineries, equipment and accessories," the defendants were able to withdraw these assets from the
cost-free transfer provision of the contract. Service of summons was made on Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corp. on the
basis of the allegation that Signetics is a "subsidiary of US PHILIPS CORPORATION, and may be served summons at
Philips Electrical Lamps, Inc., Las Pias, Metro Manila and/or c/o Technology Electronics Assembly & Management (TEAM)
Pacific Corporation, Electronics Avenue, FTI Complex, Taguig, Metro Manila," service of summons was made on Signetics
through TEAM Pacific Corporation. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over its person. Invoking Section 14, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court and the rule laid down in Pacific Micronisian Line, Inc.,
v. Del Rosario and Pelington to the effect that the fact of doing business in the Philippines should first be established in
order that summons could be validly made and jurisdiction acquired by the court over a foreign corporation. The RTC denied
the Motion to dismiss. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The petitioner argues that what was effectively alleged in
the complaint as an activity of doing business was "the mere equity investment" of petitioner in SigFil, which the petitioner
insists, had theretofore been transferred to TEAM holdings, Ltd.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court, had correctly assumed jurisdiction over the petitioner, a foreign corporation, on its claim
in a motion to dismiss, that it had since ceased to do business in the Philippines.

HELD: YES. Signetics cannot, at least in this early stage, assail, on the one hand, the veracity and correctness of the
allegations in the complaint and proceed, on the other hand, to prove its own, in order to hasten a peremptory escape. As
explained by the Court in Pacific Micronisian, summons may be served upon an agent of the defendant who may not
necessarily be its "resident agent designated in accordance with law." The term "agent", in the context it is used in Section
14, refers to its general meaning, i.e., one who acts on behalf of a principal. The allegations in the complaint have thus been
able to amply convey that not only is TEAM Pacific the business conduit of the petitioner in the Philippines but that, also, by
the charge of fraud, is none other than the petitioner itself. The rule is that, a foreign corporation, although not engaged in
business in the Philippines, may still look up to our courts for relief; reciprocally, such corporation may likewise be "sued in
Philippine courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines" (Facilities Management Corporation v. De la
Osa), provided that, in the latter case, it would not be impossible for court processes to reach the foreign corporation, a
matter that can later be consequential in the proper execution of judgment. Hence, a State may not exercise jurisdiction in
the absence of some good basis (and not offensive to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice) for effectively
exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem, quasi in rem or in personam.

60. Jose vs. Boyon

FACTS: Petitioners lodged a complaint for specific performance against respondents to compel them to facilitate the transfer
of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The RTC issued a summons to respondents. As per return
of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve personally to
re respondents failed. Meanwhile, petitioners filed before the RTC an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect summons
by publication and the judge issued an order granting the same. The respondents were declared in default and as a
consequence of the declaration of default, petitioners were allowed to submit their evidence ex parte. Helen Boyon, who
was then in United Sates, was surprised to learn from her sister of the resolution issued by the court. Respondents filed an
Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. The
court issued an order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted respondent supposed loss of standing in court.
Once again, the respondents raised the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion for reconsideration and the
same was denied. The petitioners moved for the execution of the controverted judgment which the judge granted.
Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari which held that the trial court had no authority to issue
the questioned resolution and orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not summons by publication can validly serve in the instant case.

HELD: In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons, such service
may be done personal or substituted service, where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines.
However, extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in
rem. That is, the action against the thing itself instead of against the defendants person if the action is in rem or an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose is to subject the individuals interest in a piece of property to the
obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in rem. In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for
specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or
possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover, court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance
is an action in personam. Hence, summons by publication cannot be validly served.

61. PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation under Singapore. Respondent is a corporation organized under existing Philippine
laws, for selling and leasing laboratory instruments. Respondent entered into an agreement with the Perkin Elmer
Instruments Asia PTE LTD appointed respondents as sole distribution agreement. The respondent filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money and damages. The RTC denied the respondents prayer. Petitioner appealed, but the Court of
Appeals affirms the RTCs decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is a proper service of summons and acquisition of jurisdiction.

2. Whether or not there is a proper venue for respondents in civil case.

HELD:

1. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over
the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the manner
required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authorit. The proper
service of summons differs depending on the nature of the civil case instituted by the plaintiff or petitioner,
whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because jurisdiction over the person of the
defendants is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons can
be made upon the defendant. In the case at bar, there is no proper service of summons because the territorial
service of summons was not proper for actions in personam and the attachment of the property does not
constitute or even convert to quasi in rem.
2. It is a proper venue for civil case base on Distribution Agreement, it was stipulated that if the dispute arise it will
be resolved either in Singapore or in the Philippines.

62. OBANA VS COURT OF APPEALS

63. MONTALBAN VS MAXIMO

FACTS: August 15, 1958. Plaintiffs commenced suit against Fr. Gerardo Maximo. Plaintiffs' cause of action for damages
sprang from a motor vehicle accident. Paul Hershell Montalban, son of plaintiffs, suffered injuries. On this same day that
the complaint was filed, summons was served on defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo at the parish church of Concepcion,
Malabon, Rizal, through Fr. Arsenio Bautista a priest in the same parish church.

Fr. Arsenio Bautista sent a letter (dated August 21) to Macario M. Ofilada, Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, informing him that defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo left for Europe on August 7, and "will be back on the first week
of November."

The lower court declared defendant in default, on plaintiffs' motion of September 13, 1958.

Upon plaintiffs' evidence, the court rendered judgment sentencing defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs themselves wrote defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo, at the Malabon Catholic Church, informing the latter of the
lower court's decision.

Defendant, answered the foregoing letter expressing regret that he could not comply with plaintiffs' request, because he
(defendant) was not aware of the said civil case, and that, in the criminal action arising out of the same incident, said
defendant was acquitted by the Municipal Court of Manila.

Deputy Sheriff Liberato C. Manalo of Rizal notified defendant of the issuance of the writ of execution, and demanded
payment of the amount set forth therein. The Sheriff's return to the writ shows that in response to such demand, defendant
alleged that he was then "financially hard up"4 and that the Sheriff found no property that could be subject to execution.
An alias writ of execution was issued. Copy thereof was received by defendant. The Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on
a residential house located in Caloocan City and purportedly belonging to defendant.

The Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on a residential house located in Caloocan City and purportedly belonging to
defendant.

Two years and two months after defendant admittedly learned of the lower court's decision from counsel for plaintiffs
herein, said defendant filed a verified motion in the same case praying for the annulment of the entire proceedings. His
ground is this: Summons was not duly served upon him "as provided under Sec. 7, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court;"
accordingly, the lower court "did not acquire jurisdiction over his person"; and "the trial and decision by default" are "null
and void."

The court denied this motion and the defendant's move to reconsider was rejected by the court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there was a valid service of summons over the defendant;
Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
RULING:

A question of transcendental importance which necessarily involves an inquiry into procedural due process is
whether summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom may be validly
effected by substituted service under Section 8, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court. A head-on collision of views becomes
inevitable considering the diametrically opposing positions taken by plaintiffs, on the one hand, and defendant, on the
other. For, plaintiffs make the point that even with defendant temporarily abroad, substituted service is valid under Section
8 by leaving a copy of the summons "at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein."

The jurisdiction of courts to render judgments in personam was grounded on their de facto power over
defendant's person. Jurisdiction was based on the power to seize and imprison defendant. If a defendant was absent from
the territory, the fact that he was a citizen would not enable the court's officers to seize him and service could not
represent this power. Hence, his presence within the territorial jurisdiction was a prerequisite to the rendition of a
judgment personally binding against him.

There should be no doubt, therefore, that in suits in personam, courts have jurisdiction over residents temporarily
out of the country.

64. MONTEFALCON VS VASQUEZ

FACTS: In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support against respondent
Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she
prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he
signed as father. According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence
was born in1993. Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner
Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family. Vasquez was declared
in default for failure to answer the service of summons(substituted). The court ordered Vasquez to acknowledge Laurence
and to pay P 5000 monthly. In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed.
Appeal was granted by the court. Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court erred in tryingand deciding the
case as it "never" acquired jurisdiction over his person. The appellate court granted Vasquezs contention.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial court with jurisdiction
over his person.

HELD: Yes. To acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, service of summons must be personal, or if this is not
feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service. It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are
contractual employees. They go back to the country once their contracts expire, and wait for the signing of another contract.

65. TOYOTA CUBAO, INC VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by private respondent Danilo Guevarra. The
repair cost of P76,800.47 was paid by means of BPI Check No. 17819, dated 12 March 1991, drawn by Guevarra in favor
of Toyota. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored, i.e., "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds
(`DAIF')." Petitioner thereupon requested that Guevarra should make good the check. When Guevarra failed to heed the
demand, petitioner filed a civil case for collection of the unpaid account.

On 07 January 1993, the trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his address in 29 Burgos Street, Calamba,
Laguna. On 02 February 1993, Process Server Antonio Rimas of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, submitted
to the trial court a return on the service.

On 23 February 1993, petitioner, claiming that Guevarra had failed to file an ANSWER within the reglementary period,
moved to declare Guevarra in default. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. A writ of execution levied on
Guevarras Toyota Corolla was served on Guevarra personally but he refused to sign the receipt thereof, expressed surprise
over it, and stated that he was not aware of any case instituted against him. He filed a certiorari petition (CA-G.R. SP No.
38048) before the Court of Appeals, for the nullification of the ex-parte judgment of 06 January 1994. Guevarra claimed that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a defective service of summons on him. The appellate
court, finding merit in the petition, annulled and set aside the default judgment, the writ of execution, the levy upon execution
and the sale at public auction of the vehicle. It held, in its now assailed decision of 28 June 1996, that the substituted service
of summons effected on private respondent was not valid and that, consequently, the proceedings had before the trial court
were nugatory and without legal effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a proper service of summons.

HELD: The summons must be served to the defendant in person. [Section 7, Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court.] It is only
when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made.
[Section 8, Ibid.] Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant
personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service.

71. Dasmarinas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes

Facts:

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, the American President Lines, Ltd. sued Dasmarias Garments, Inc. to recover the sum
of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.

In its answer dated December 1, 1987, Dasmarias Garments, Inc. specifically denied any liability to the plaintiff (APL), and
set up compulsory counterclaims against it.

At the hearing, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of H.
Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be issued
addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei. Five days later APL filed
an amended motion stating that since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one China
policy,"

The motion was opposed by Dasmarias. It contended that (a) the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek that
a foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the
witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine Court;" and (c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony
of a witness must be taken orally in open court and not by deposition."

By Order dated March 15, 1991, the Trial Court resolved the incident in favor of APL. The Court opined that "the Asian
Exchange Center, Inc. being the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take the testimonies of plaintiff's
witnesses residing there by deposition, but only upon written interrogatories so as to give defendant the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses by serving cross-examination."

Dasmarias sought reconsideration by motion filed June 25, 1991 but was denied. Dasmarias instituted a special civil
action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals to nullify the orders of the Trial Court, however, it was denied again. Once again
Dasmarias has availed of the remedy of appeal. It has come to this Court and prays for the reversal of the Appellate Court's
Decision of September 23, 1992 and Resolution dated December 11, 1992. Once again, it will fail.

Issue:

WON foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy,' before the AECI, a private entity
not authorized by law to take depositions.

Rulings:

Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such a person or officer
as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.

In the case at bar, the RTC has issued a commission to the Asian Exchange Center thru Director Roces. It also appears
that the commission is to be coursed through the DFA to course all requests for the taking of deposition of witnesses residing
abroad to enable it and the Phil Foreign Service establishments to act on the matter in a judicious and expeditious manner
to avoid delay in the deposition-taking.

That the deposition-taking will take place in a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of the one-China
Policy is inconsequential. What matters is that the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by authority of the
Phil DFA and in virtue of a commission duly issued by the Phil Court, in accordance with the Phil Rules of Court, pursuant
to which opportunity for cross-examination of the deponent will be fully accorded to the adverse party.

Depositions may be used, without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under certain
conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules
of Court.

(c) xxx or (2) that the witness is out of the province and at a greater distance than 50 kms from the place of trial or hearing, or
is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition xxx.

72. Sales vs. Sabino

Facts:

In RTC Pasig City, Cyril Sabino filed an amended complaint for damages against, among others, Jowel Sales, driver of the
vehicle involved in the accident which ultimately caused the death of Sabinos son, Elbert.

Before any responsive pleading could be filed, Sabino, notified the defendants that he will take the deposition of one
Buaneres Corral before the Clerk of Court, RTC- Pasig City.

On Dec. 27, 1995 and resumed on Jan. 3, 1996, the deposition on oral examination of Buaneres Corral was taken before
the Clerk of Court of Pasig, in the presence and with the active participation of Sales counsel, Atty. Villacorta, who even
lengthily cross-examined the deponent. In the course of trial, respondent had the deposition of Buaneres Corral marked as
her Exhibits DD and EE with submarkings.

Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation, Sabino made a Formal Offer of Exhibits, among which are Exhibits DD
and EE. Also offered in evidence as Exhibit BB is a certification from the Bureau of Immigration attesting to the May 28,
1996 departure for abroad of Buaneres Corral via Flight No. PR 658.

Sales opposed the admission of Exhs. DD and EE and asked that they be expunged from the records on the ground that
the jurisdictional requirements for their admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the ROC were not complied with.

The TC admitted, among other evidence, Sabinos Exhibits DD, EE and BB.

Sales MR was denied by the court so he went on certiorari to the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
TC in admitting in evidence the deposition (Exhibits DD and EE).

CA affirmed the TC and effectively denied due course to and dismissed Sales recourse, explaining that Sales active
participation, through counsel, during the taking of subject deposition and adopting it as his own exhibits, has thereby
estopped him from assailing the admissibility thereof as part of Sabinos evidence. Sales filed this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the requirements of Sec. 4, Rule 24 (now Sec. 3) ROC were satisfied by Sabino when it presented
a certification attesting to the fact that deponent has left the country but silent as to WoN at the time his deposition was
offered in evidence deponent is in the Philippines
2. Whether or not Sales in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of his deposition waived any and all objections
in connection therewith
Rulings:

1. YES. While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a substitute
for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit differently, a deposition is not to be used when the
deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral
testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay. However, depositions
may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the existence of certain
conditions is first satisfactorily established. 5 exceptions for the admissibility of a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23.
Among these is when the witness is out of the Philippines.

2. NO. As a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition is anchored on the ground that such testimony is
hearsay, i.e., the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time his testimony
is offered. But it matters not that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for
normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time the testimonial evidence
is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing. In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during the
taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to object to its admissibility as evidence
in the trial proper. In participating, therefore, in the taking of the deposition, but objecting to its admissibility in court as
evidence, petitioner did not assume inconsistent positions. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of
the deposition just because he participated in the taking thereof.

73. Cariaga v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

The accused is an employee of Davao Light & Power Co. Inc., and as such he has access to the said company, with intent
to gain, with grave abuse of confidence and without the knowledge and consent of the owner, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away electrical equipment, supplies and materials totalling P7, 038.96
belonging to the Company.

The Court finds accused Jonathan Cariaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft, qualified by grave abuse of confidence,
under Article 310, in relation to Article 309, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged, aggravated by the use of motor
vehicle which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance

On appeal by Cariaga, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals reasoned out that
the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who did not testify in open court during the criminal proceedings against petitioner
is admissible in evidence and properly considered by the trial court.

Issue:

WON the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga without him taking the witness
stand since it violates the fundamental right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face.

Rulings:

The sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who was not presented in court is inadmissible.
Section 47 of Rule 130 reads: That testimony or deposition at a former proceeding - The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties
and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
More specific however is the rule prescribed in Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court in respect of the admissibility in
evidence in a criminal case of the previous testimony of unavailable witnesses which reads: Section 1. Rights of accused
at the trial - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled: f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or
cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.

74. Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the
pilferage of mail matter in the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer
assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter. Merete likewise described
the modus operandi of the group.
For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the NBI in apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati
Post Office.
At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra Building. The
passengers of the postal delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the driver. Pasicolan alighted from the
jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were
later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag to a
travelling bag. The two then secured the bag to the back of their motorcycle. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela
arrested the two accused and brought them to their headquarters.
Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the
presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the
NBI at that time.
Court finds the three accused, as principals, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft
Issue:
WON Respondent Honorable Court erred in admitting as evidence of petitioners guilt the letters signed by the accused
during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, in utter disregard of his constitutional right.
Rulings:
The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in admitting in evidence the letters signed by him because he was
asked to sign them during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. The following provisions of the
Constitution are invoked by petitioner:

Article III, 12(1). - Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.

17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Petitioners counsel says that the signing of petitioners and his co-accuseds names was not a mere mechanical act but one
which required the use of intelligence and therefore constitutes self-incrimination.
To the effect that the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against himself extends to any attempt to compel
the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparing it with the handwriting in a document in
a prosecution for falsification. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a
purely mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and attention.

75. DBP v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Ir e n e C an a da l l a ob ta i ne d a l o a n of P 10 0 ,0 0 0 f rom p et i t io n er D e v e lo pm en t B a nk of t h e P hi l i pp i n es
( D BP ) f or p ur po s es of f i n anc i n g h er pi g ge r y bus i n es s . As s ec ur i t y, C an a da l l a ex ec ut e d a D e ed of
Re a l Es t at e M ort g ag e o v er t wo p ar c e ls of l an d c o v er e d b y T CT No . T - 7 6 09 a nd O CT No . P - 4 22 6 .
O n 1 0 A u g us t 19 7 9, C an a da l l a pr oc ur ed a no th er lo a n i n t h e am o un t of P 15 0, 0 0 0, wh ic h was s ec ur ed
b y a m ort ga g e o ver t h e s am e t wo p ar c els of l a nd a n d a t h ir d parc e l c o ver e d b y O CT N o. P - 6 6 79 .
S inc e t he p i gg er y b us i nes s a l l eg e d l y s uf f ere d s t ro n g r e vers es , C a na d a ll a f ai l e d t o c om pl y wi t h her
ob l i ga t io ns t o t h e D B P . D B P ex tr aj u d ic i a l l y f orec l os ed t h e m ort ga g es . P ro p ert i es wer e s o l d at p ub l ic
auc t io n t o th e D B P, wh ic h em er ge d as t he o n l y b id d er.

Ca n ad a l la was ab l e t o r ed e em th e f or ec lo s ed pr o pe rt y c o v ere d b y T CT N o. T - 7 6 09 . As t o t h e
pr o p ert i es c o v er ed b y O CT N os . P - 4 2 26 an d P- 66 7 9, s h e h a d s ix years t o re d eem t h e s a m e.

S ubs e qu e nt l y, s h e a l l eg e d l y as s i gn e d h er r i gh t t o r ed e em h er pro per t ies t o h er da u gh t e r, R os a l i nd a

A. C an a d al l a - G o. G o o f f er ed to r e d eem t he pr op er ti es f or P 52 6 ,8 8 2. 40 . In r es p ons e, t he D B P ad v is e d
G o t ha t t he ac c e p ta b le r ed em pt io n p r ic e was P 1, 8 14 , 70 0 .5 8. W hen G o f a i l ed to r ed e em th e
pr o p ert i es , th e D B P c ons o l id a te d its t i tl es o ver th e s u bj ec t p ro p ert i es a n d n e w c e rt if i c at es of t it l e
wer e is s u ed in its n am e.

G o f i l ed wi t h t h e R e gi o na l T r i a l C o ur t ( RT C) o f Mak a ti C i t y a S u pp l e m enta l Com p la i nt f or t he Ex erc is e

of R i gh t of R e dem pt i on a n d De t er m in at i on of Re d em pti o n Pr ic e , N u l l if ic at i o n of C on s o li d at i on ,
A nn u lm ent of T it l es , wi t h Dam ag es , P lus I nj u nc t i o n an d T em por ar y Res tr a in i ng O r de r. T her e af ter ,
th e D B P f il e d i ts Com m ent.

Dur i n g th e h e ar in g , G o o bj ec te d t o t h e Com m ent r e as o n i ng th at it was no t u n der oa t h as req u ir ed b y

S ec t i on 2 , Ru l e 2 6 of t he R u les of Co ur t, a n d th at it f ai l e d t o s t at e t he re as ons f or th e a dm is s i o n or
de n i al of m att ers f o r w h ic h a n a dm is s i o n was re q ues te d .

Issue:

W O N m atters re q ues t ed t o b e adm i tt ed u nd er R u le 2 6 of t h e Ru l es of C o urt wh ic h ar e m ere

r e it er at i ons of t h e a l l eg a ti o ns i n t h e c om pl a in t a n d ar e s p ec if ic a l l y d e ni e d i n t h e a ns wer m a y b e
de em ed im pl ie d l y a dm it t ed o n t he gr o u nd t h at t h e r es p o ns e t h er et o is n ot un d er o at h.
Rulings:

W e hav e he l d in P o v. Co ur t of Ap p ea ls t h at a p ar t y s ho u ld n ot b e c om pe l le d t o a dm it m att ers of f ac t

a lr e a d y a dm itt e d b y h i s p l ea d i ng an d t o m ak e a s ec on d d e n ia l of t hos e a lr e ad y d e n ie d i n h is a ns wer
to t h e c om pl a in t.

Un d er S ec t i o n 1 of R u l e 2 6 of th e R u l es of Co urt , t h e s c o pe of m at ters th a t a p ar t y m a y r eq u es t t h e
ad v ers ar y to a dm it ar e ( 1) t he g e nu i n en es s o f an y m at er i a l an d r e l e va n t doc um en t des c r i be d i n a nd
ex h i b it e d wi t h t he r eq ues t; an d ( 2 ) th e tr ut h of a n y m at er i a l a nd r e le v a nt m att er of f a c t s et f or th in
th e r eq u es t . T he r u le au t hor i zi n g a par t y t o c a ll o n t he o th er par t y t o m ak e a n a dm is s i o n im pl i es t he
m ak in g of d em an ds f o r a dm is s i o n of r el e v an t an d m at er i al m att ers of f ac ts an d n ot f or a dm is s i o n of
m atters of l a w, c o nc lu s i ons , or o p in i o ns .

S inc e t he af or e - q u ot e d a l le g at i ons a r e m att ers of la w or o p i ni o n, t he y a re im pr o per m att ers a nd

c an n ot t h eref ore b e d e em ed im pl i e d l y adm it t ed un d er Ru l e 2 6.

76, 78, 79 (CONSOLIDATED CASES)

G. R. N0. 102390. REY LANADA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA
HEMEDEZ, respondents. February 1, 2002

G. R. No. 102404. NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and FRANCIS SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ, respondents. February 1, 2002

FACTS:
The Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) declared a strike on account of alleged unfair labor practices committed by Nestle
Philippines, Inc. (Nestle) and put up a picket line in front of the companys Cabuyao, Laguna factory. NLRC issued a TRO
enjoining the UFE to desist from blocking, barricading and obstructing the points of ingress and egress from Nestles
Cabuyao plant. To enforce the TRO, Nestle sought the assistance of the Philippine Constabulary and the fire brigade of
Cabuyao.
Seeking to transfer its products from the Cabuyao factory to its warehouse in Taguig during the strike, Nestle hired 6
cargo trucks from brothers Constancio and Jesus Alimagno. Alexander Asinas of the UFE and Francis Santos of Nestle
agreed to constitute a panel to discuss said transfer of products, as the matter was not covered by the TRO. However, in
bad faith, Santos instead ordered the PC to disperse the strikers at the barricades in front of the plant gate so that the trucks
can get out of the plant. The PC and the fire brigade began hitting the strikers with truncheons and water cannons. With
gate cleared, the cargo trucks began leaving the compound.
Meanwhile, Dr. Vied Vemir Garcia Hemedez was on his way home. He arrived at the Nestle factory while the dispersal
was ongoing so he stopped his car. At that time, one of the cargo trucks, driven by Pacifico Galasao, was leaving the Nestle
compound at full speed. To avoid stones being thrown at his direction, the truck driver drove in a crouching position.
However, he lost control of the truck and bumped the car of Dr. Hemedez resulting to his death.
. Spouses Rogelio and Eliza Hemedez, parents of Dr. Hemedez, sued Nestle, Jesus Alimagno, Francis Santos, Pacifico
Galasao, and PC/Capt. Rey Laada for damages. After defendants filed their answers to the complaint, the Hemedez
spouses served the defendants a request for admission of the truth of the facts set forth in their complaint and the
genuineness of each of the documents appended thereto. Through their respective counsel, defendants filed their verified
answer to the request for admission. The Hemedez spouses moved to strike out said answers and to declare the matters
sought to be admitted as impliedly admitted, contending that defendants themselves and not their counsel should personally
answer the request for admission. TC denied the spouses motion as well as the MR. Hence, the instant consolidated
petitions for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the counsel of a party to whom a written request for admission is addressed under Section 1, Rule
26 of the Rules of Court, answer such request for his client?

RULING:
No. Section 21 of Rule 138 states that an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client. Petitioner
has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized exceptions as found in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code
which enumerates the instances when special powers of attorney are necessary, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on pre-
trial where the parties and their attorneys are both directed to appear before the court for a conference; so that for counsel
to appear at the pre-trial in behalf of his client, he must clothe the former with an adequate authority in the form of a special
power of attorney or corporate resolution. On the other hand, Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that (a)ttorneys have authority
to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters
of ordinary judicial procedure.

77. G.R. No. 131466. CRISTINA DIMAN, CLARISSA DIMAN, GEORGE DIMAN, FELIPE DIMAN and FLORINA
DIMAN, petitioners, vs. HON, FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS
 PIAS, BRANCH 255; HEIRS OF VERONICA V. MORENO LACALLE, REPRESENTED BY JOSE MORENO
LACALLE, respondents. November 27, 1998

FACTS: The heirs of Veronica Moreno filed before the RTC of Las Pinas a complaint for "Quieting of Title and Damages"
against Cristina Diman, Clarissa Diman, George Diman, Felipe Diman and Florina Diman. After joinder of the issues, the
Dimans served a request for admission of the truth on several matter. However, there was no response on the part of the
other party. The Dimans then filed with the Court a Manifestation with Motion to Require Plaintiffs to Answer Request for
Admission as well as a Motion for Summary Judgment which was denied by the trial court. The Dimans moved for
reconsideration and submitted a supplement to motion for reconsideration. Again the Trial Court rebuffed the
Dimans. Aggrieved, the Dimans commenced a special civil action of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in the Court of
Appeals. But once again their efforts met with failure. Hence, this instant case.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
RULING: YES. A Trial Court has no discretion to determine what the consequences of a party's refusal to allow or make
discovery should be; it is the law which makes that determination; and it is grave abuse of discretion for the Court to refuse
to recognize and observe the effects of that refusal as mandated by law. Particularly as regards request for admission under
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the law ordains that when a party is served with a written request that he admit : (1) the
genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request, or (2) the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request, said party is bound within the period designated in the request,
to file and serve on the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either (10 denying specifically the matters of
which an admission is requested or (2) setting forth in details the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny
those matters. If the party served does not respond with such sworn statement, each of the matters of which an admission
is requested shall be deemed admitted.
It is also the law which determines when a summary judgment is proper. It declares that although the pleadings on
their face appear to raise issues of fact -- e.g., there are denials of, or a conflict in, factual allegations -- if it is shown by
admissions, depositions or affidavits, that those issues are sham, fictitious, or not genuine, or, in the language of the Rules,
that "except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the Court shall render a summary judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant as
the case may be.
Considering these circumstances, including the outlandish grounds of opposition advanced by the Heirs against the
Dimans' motions for summary judgment and for demurrer to evidence, no less than the obviously mistaken grounds cited
by the Trial Court for denying said motions, this Court has no hesitation in declaring that it was indeed grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Trial Court to have refused to render a summary judgment or one on demurrer to evidence. In
no sense may the Trial Court's errors be considered, as the Court of Appeals did in its judgment of September 9, 1997, as
mere errors of judgment correctible by appeal, untarnished by any capriciousness or whimsicality.

80. G.R. No. 172175 SPS. EXPEDITO ZEPEDA AND ALICE D. ZEPEDA, petitioners, vs. CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION, respondent. October 9, 2006

FACTS:

Spouses Expedito and Alice Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification of foreclosure proceedings and loan
documents with damages against respondent Chinabank before the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur. They alleged that
they obtained a loan in the amount of P5,800,000.00 from respondent secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T- 23136. Petitioners subsequently encountered difficulties in paying
their loan obligations hence they requested for restructuring which was allegedly granted by Chinabank. However, they
were shocked when the respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the subject property where it emerged as the highest
bidder.

Respondent bank filed a motion to dismiss but it was denied by the trial court. As a result, it filed an answer with
affirmative defences and counterclaim which was denied by the trial court for lack of merit. Aggrieved, respondent bank filed
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which was granted by the Court of Appeals ruling that the trial court gravely abused
its discretion in issuing its orders. It ruled that compelling reasons warrant the dismissal of petitioners complaint because
they acted in bad faith when they ignored the hearings set by the trial court to determine the veracity of Chinabanks
affirmative defenses; they failed to answer Chinabanks written interrogatories; and the complaint states no cause of action.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was later on denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the complaint states a cause of action; and (2) Whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure
of petitioners to answer respondents written interrogatories as provided for in Section 3(c), Rule 29 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

(1) Yes. The Court found out that the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action for nullifying the
foreclosure of the mortgaged property. The fact that petitioners admitted that they failed to redeem the property and that
the title was consolidated in respondent banks name did not preclude them from seeking to nullify the extrajudicial
foreclosure. Precisely, petitioners seek to nullify the proceedings based on circumstances obtaining prior to and during the
foreclosure which render it void.
(2) Yes. In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not just a particular question.
Clearly then, respondent bank should have filed a motion based on Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29. Section 5 of
Rule 29 reads:

SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party willfully fails to
appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to
interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may
strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a
judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other,
including attorneys fees.

Due to respondent banks filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for ruling that the motion to expunge
was premature for lack of a prior application to compel compliance based on Section 3.

86. GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (June 11, 1992; 209 SCRA 732)

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Garcia filed an action for damages against private respondent spouses, William and Ma. Jajorie
Uy, before the RTC for padlocking the commercial stalls rented by petitioner from private respondents at Virra Mall
Shopping Center, Greenhills, San Juan.

Private respondents failed to file their answer within the reglementary period. Private respondents filed an
appearance with motion for extension of time to file answer. The trial court denied the motion for having been filed out of
time. Subsequently, petitioner moved to declare the former in default and for reception of his evidence ex-parte. The trial
court granted petitioners motion and set the reception of evidence and a copy of the order was served on and received by
private respondents.

Petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte and the trial court issued a judgment of default against private
respondents. Petitioner then filed an ex-parte motion for execution pending appeal which the trial court granted and
accordingly issued the writ upon petitioners filing of a bond.

Private respondents appealed to respondent Court of Appeals, challenging the validity of the writ of execution
because it was granted without proper notice to them and without hearing.

Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting private respondents petition for certiorari and set aside the order
of the trial court granting the writ of execution. A motion to reconsider thedecision was denied hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a defendant declared in default regains ipso facto his standing in court as to be entitled to notice
of proceedings subsequent to a final judgment or order rendered against him.
Whether or not a party who has been declared in default entitled to notice of a motion for execution pending
appeal of a judgment by default.

RULING:

The Supreme Court found the petition devoid of merit.

The Court holds that a party declared in default is entitled to notice of the motion for execution pending appeal.
This interpretation is consistent with the nature and effects of being in default as well as with what has been
jurisprudentially laid down with respect to executions pending appeal.

"The remedy of the defaulted party is to file a motion to set aside the order of default if no judgment has been
rendered yet. If there is already judgment, the defendants recourse is to file a motion for new trial, or a petition for relief
from judgment, or appeal the judgment, or file a special civil action for certiorari. This is the reason why a defaulted
defendant is entitled to notice of final orders or judgments.

Consistent with this right to notice of final order or judgment is the right to notice of the motion for execution
pending appeal of the default judgment. Without such notice, the various recourses available to the defaulted party after
judgment would be rendered illusory.
87. MALANYAON vs. SUGA (May 7, 1992; 208 SCRA 436)

FACTS:

Private respondents, filed a Petition for Annulment of Proceedings, Injunction with Application for Preliminary
Injunctions and Restraining Order with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, against petitioner Jaime Malanyaon
and Emma Perfecto.

After filing said petition, respondent judge issued a corresponding restraining order against petitioner which led
the latter to file an urgent motion to disqualify respondent judge from further sitting in judgment that there is a client-lawyer
relationship between said judge and private respondent's counsel Atty. Vicente de Lima as shown by the latter's
appearances in Special Proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte.

Petitioner was personally served in his office a notice of hearing on the pre-trial and contempt proceedings.
However, petitioner felt chilly and went to see his doctor who ordered him to stay in bed for a couple of days as he had
just been released from Mother Seton Hospital where he was confined. Thereafter, petitioner immediately sent a letter to
the respondent judge requesting for the deferment of his appearance on the scheduled hearing but said letter was not
filed on time due to the stormy weather.

Upon petitioner's failure to appear at the hearing of he was declared in default and ordered arrested. Petitioner's
counsel filed a motion to lift the Order of Arrest against his client which was denied. Thereafter, petitioner was airlifted and
confined at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center where he was operated for a gall bladder dysfunction.

Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion to Lift his Order of Arrest, to set aside the order of default and to reset the
hearing on account of his illness and subsequent surgical operation.

Respondent judge lifted the Order of Arrest of the petitioner but denied his motion to set aside the order of default
and the resetting of the scheduled hearing. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Petitioners motion to lift the
order of default in spite of the fact that the former had already lifted the order of arrest against the latter after finding
petitioner's absence in the hearing excusable due to the Petitioner's illness as supported by the affidavit of the his
physician stating the severity of his illness which caused the him not to attend the scheduled hearing.

RULING:

The respondent court's act of ordering petitioner's arrest is patently illegal. There is nothing in the Rules which
authorizes the trial court to order the arrest of the party in default. A party declared in default merely loses the right to be
notified of subsequent proceedings and the right to take part in the trial, 11 until the order of default is lifted.

The failure to appear at the pre-trial hearing was uncontrovertedly due to illness, the default order may be set
aside on the ground of accident over which petitioner had no control as in the case at bar. Inasmuch as the respondent
judge had already lifted the order of arrest after finding petitioner's absence excusable, it therefore follows that said judge
should have also set aside the order of default. Thus, the basis for lifting petitioner's order of arrest should also apply to
the order of default since both orders were issued on petitioner's non-appearance.

88. CIRCLE FINANCING CORPORATION vs. CA (April 22, 1991; 196 SCRA 166)

FACTS: Spouses Roberto Jurado and Fortunata Jurado executed a deed of mortgage over real property
belonging to them in favor of Tacing Regoso as security for a loan obtained from the latter. The promissory note
evidencing the obligation stipulated payment thereof by the Jurados in eighteen (18) monthly installments.

With the spouses' consent, Tacing Regoso assigned all his rights and interests over the promissory note and the
deed of mortgage in favor of Circle Financial Corporation.

Circle Financial Corporation (Circle) sent a letter to the Jurado spouses, together with a statement of account,
demanding payment of P12,186.00, alleged to be the balance of their obligation. A subsequent letter, from Circle's
attorney, also demanded payment in the amount of P11,752.90.

The letters having gone unheeded, Circle requested the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to extrajudicially foreclose
the mortgage constituted over the Jurado's land. The Sheriff scheduled the auction sale and notice of the sale was
received by the Jurados. The spouses sent a letter to the Provincial Sheriff, advising them that the loan secured by the
mortgage had already been paid. A copy of the letter was given to Circle.
 The extrajudicial foreclosure sale nevertheless proceeded as scheduled, and the property was awarded to Circle
as the lone bidder. The Jurado spouses thereupon filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the
annulment of the foreclosure sale, and for recovery of damages. Circle filed an answer with counterclaim.

The Trial Court set the case for pre-trial and notices were sent to the parties and their counsel by registered mail.
On the day appointed for the pre-trial, there was no appearance by Circle or its co-defendants or any of their counsel.
Consequently, they were declared in default and evidence of the Jurado spouses were received ex parte. Thereafter, the
Trial Court rendered judgment against all the defendants.

Respondents filed a "Verified Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and Judgment," alleging that it had not
received notice of the pre-trial and drawing attention to what it claimed to be valid defenses set forth in its answer.

But the motion was peremptorily denied as "not meritorious". Circle appealed to the Court of Appeals but the
verdict of the Court of Appeals went against Circle.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the Trial Court's refusal to set aside the declaration of
default entered against Circle and the default judgment thereafter rendered.

RULING:

The Court declares correct the pronouncement of both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals that Circle's
motion for new trial was defective, not only because it failed to allege either by separate affidavit or in the body of the
motion itself, the particular facts claimed to constitute the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence entitling it to
relief, but also because it failed to demonstrate with any degree of persuasiveness, by affirmative averments, either in its
aforesaid motion or in any other pleading, that it had in its favor a meritorious defense to the action for annulment of the
foreclosure sale on the ground that the mortgage debt had been fully paid.

89. ALEX LINA vs. CA (April 9, 1985; 135 SCRA 637)

FACTS:

Private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. filed with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) a case for sum
of money with damages. Petitioner Alex Lina was served with summons together with a copy of the complaint. When no
answer or motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner, private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. filed a motion to declare him
in default. Thereafter, the motion was set for hearing.

Petitioner filed his opposition to the aforesaid motion inviting attention to the fact that he had filed a motion for
extension of time to file responsive pleading within the reglementary period. Respondent judge issued an order declaring
defendant (herein petitioner) in default and allowing plaintiff (herein private respondent) to adduce its evidence ex parte.

Defendant (petitioner) filed his answer to the complaint. Subsequently, respondent court rendered its decision in
favor of plaintiff (herein private respondent). Petitioner filed a motion to set aside decision. Thereafter, respondent judge
issued an order denying petitioner's motion to set aside decision.

Petitioner filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari/prohibition, which was denied in its decision.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the order of default was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Whether or not certiorari is proper in a case where judgment by default was rendered without an order of default
being furnished petitioner and where meritorious defenses exist, which are for the trial court to evaluate and which
evaluation was not done in this case.

RULING:

The Supreme Court agrees with respondent appellate court's affirmance of the questioned order of the trial court.
The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter largely addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.

Under the Rules of Court, there are remedies available to a defendant in the Regional Trial Court [Sec. 3, Rule
18; Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; Section 2 of Rule 38; and Sec. 2, Rule 41]

Petitioner in this case did not avail himself of any of the above remedies. Instead, he went to the appellate court
on certiorari/prohibition.
90. AKUT vs. CA (August 10, 1982; 116 SCRA 213)

FACTS:

Respondent Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. as plaintiff filed a complaint against herein petitioners as defendants
in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental claiming ownership of a parcel of land and to declare as null and void
the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of petitioners-defendants Heirs of Saturnina Akut.

Petitioners were served with summons, and after the expiration of the 15- day reglementary period for petitioners
to file their answer, respondent Insular Life filed a motion to declare petitioners in default. The next day, petitioners filed
their answer.

Petitioners filed a motion to set the hearing of respondent's motion to declare them in default and another motion
asking the trial court to accept and give due course to their answer.

The trial court issued an order declaring petitioners "in default for their failure to file answer within the
reglementary period and without further standing in the case, " denying their motion to admit answer, and ordering that the
case "be calendared for the ex-parte reception of evidence for the plaintiff at the next available [calendar] date." The trial
court denied reconsideration ruling that "the denial of a motion to lift order of default is merely interlocutory, there being no
judgment rendered as yet." But petitioners timely perfected their appeal to respondent Court of Appeals from the default
orders by record on appeal. In its resolution, respondent appellate court however, motu proprio, dismissed the appeal, "it
appearing that the appeal in this case being from an order declaring appellants in default which is interlocutory and not
appealable ... " The motion for reconsideration was denied per its Resolution; hence the present petition to set aside
respondent appellate court's dismissal of their appeal and to set aside the order of the trial court declaring them in default
for failure to file their answer within the reglementary period and to restore their original standing in the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioners in default and in denying
their motion to set aside the order of default.

RULING:

The Court finds merit in the petition.

In their motions which were duly supported by affidavit of merits, petitioners aver that their failure to file their
answer to the complaint within the 15-day reglementary period was due to accident, mistake or excusable negligence
citing as reasons their failure to get the services of counsel on time and the fact that two of the petitioners were then sick.
Petitioners further maintain that they have a valid and meritorious defense since the property in litigation was registered in
their name under Original Certificate of title, that they have been in actual and continuous possession of the land since
time immemorial and that the subsequent sale of said property and the issuance of the corresponding Transfer Certificate
of Titlein favor of their co-petitioner is valid and legal.

Under these undisputed circumstances, the Court finds petitioners to be entitled to relief from the order of default
and to have their full day in court, which they seek now instead of asking petitioners to needlessly wait until the trial court
shall have rendered a default and ex-parte judgment against them, as illogically contended by respondent in its comment.

91. Matute v. Court of Appeals

26 SCRA 768G.R. No. L-26751, G.R. No. L-26085, G.R. No. L-26106January 31, 1969(L-26751)

Facts:

On August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of both the petitioner and the
herein respondent Matias S. Matute, filed in Special Proceeding (settlement of the Matute estate) a petition praying for the
removal of Matias as co-administrator and his appointment in such capacity. Carlos alleged that for a period of more than
two years from the date of his appointment, said Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a true, just and complete account
of his administration and that he is not only incompetent but also negligent in his management of the estate under his charge
consisting of five haciendas. The respondent Matias opposed the allegation that it is completely without basis and false.
Records show that he made an accounting and the same was submitted to the court. That his competence to act as
administrator has been established to the satisfaction of the court. It appears that during the reception of evidence conducted
on December 29, 1965 by the probate court, Carlos S. Matute and the other heirs submitted their respective lists of exhibits
in support of their motion to ousts Matias. On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a written objection to the admission of the
movants exhibits on the ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of
supposed originals which never properly identified nor shown in court. four days later, the Counsel for Matias filed with leave
of Court a Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidencewhich avers that there is no sufficient evidence on record to
justify and support the motions for the removal of the herein co-administrator Matias S. Matute. The probate court issued
an order removing Matias S. Matute as co-administrator. Hence, the certiorari. The respondent contends that the disputed
order removing him as co-administrator is a patent nullity. Upon the other hand, the petitioner advances the reason in
support of the order of removal that the probate judge accorded the respondent all the opportunity to adduce his evidence
but the latter resorted to dilatory tactics such as filing a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence.

Issue: Whether or not Rule 33 regarding judgment on demurrer to evidence is applicable to special proceedings such that
its disregard by the probate court amounts to grave abuse of discretion.

Held: Yes. Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. The application of the above
cited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by the Rules. Instead of resolving the foregoing motion,
the probate judge issued the controverted order removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the
opportunity to adduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence
in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence. The Court view that the above
actuation of the probate judge constituted grave abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident order as nullity.

92. Continental Cement corporation V. C.A

FACTS:

The Municipality of Norzagaray filed a complaint for recovery of taxes against the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan. Before the expiration of the 15-day reglementary period to answer, the petitioner filed two successive
motions for extension of time to file responsive pleadings, which were both granted. The last day of the second extension
was May 28, 1985. On May 25, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the plaintiffs
lack of capacity to sue and lack of a cause of action. The motion was denied on July 16, 1985, "both for lack of merit and
for having been improperly filed." On July 25, 1985, the plaintiff moved to declare the petitioner in default for having filed
only the motion to dismiss and not a responsive pleading during the extension granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of default is proper.

HELD:

Accordingly, the court held that in issuing the order of default before the expiration of the period for the filing of its answer,
the trial court deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to be heard in its defense. The judgment by default thereafter
rendered, on the basis only of the evidence of the plaintiff, was therefore also invalid.

93. DENZO (Phils.)inc. v. intermediate appellate court

FACTS;

A fire broke out at the Nippondenso Building at Pasong Tamo Ext., Makati, Metro Manila. The building was owned by the
Kayamanan Development Corporation (hereafter, simply referred to as KAYAMANAN), and was then under lease to Denso
(Phils), Inc. (hereafter, simply DENSO). The fire caused extensive damage. A year or so later, KAYAMANAN instituted an
action against DENSO in the Regional Trial Court at Makati.

Summons was served on DENSO on June 10, 1985. It would seem, however, that the summons (together with the
accompanying copy of the complaint) was not referred by DENSO to its counsel until June 22, 1985. This prompted the
latter to file on June 25, 1985 a "MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER," pleading the late referral, the
need to attend to other legal work of equal importance, as well as the time requirement for study of the factual and legal
points involved in the action, and praying, in consequence, for an additional period of 15 days from June 25 within which to
present the requisite responsive pleading.

ISSUE: whether or not the order of default was proper.

HELD: NO

Petitioner's motion for extension of time to file answer was, therefore, improperly denied for lack of proof of service on the
respondent, said motion having been seasonably filed and, as already fully shown, there being no impediment to its being
heard ex-parte. No pretense is made that the motion was denied as having been filed merely for delay, but even if that
ground were read into the otherwise clear terms of the order of denial which do not even hint thereat, it would still be belied
by the fact that what was sought was only an extension of the original reglementary period as well as that prima facie
meritorious reasons were pleaded for the desired extension.

94. JOESTEEL CONTAINER V. COMMONWEALTH FINANCING.

FACTS:

The Commonwealth Financing Corporation filed an action against the Joesteel Container Corporation before the City Court
of Manila for the recovery of a certain amount of money, as deficiency on the proceeds of an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage executed by the defendant in favor of the Plaintiff. The summons, which ordered the defendant to answer the
complaint and enter into trial on August 12, 1965, and a copy of the complaint were served upon the defendant through its
General Manager on July 13, 1965. On the date set for the hearing of the case, or on August 12, 1965, counsel for the
defendant appeared before the court and asked for an extension of time to answer the complaint, but the motion was denied.
Then, on motion of the plaintiff, the defendant was declared in default and the Deputy Clerk of Court was commissioned to
receive the evidence. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had 20 days from service of summons on July 13, 1965, within
which to file an answer to the complaint and the period expired on August 2, 1965. On August 13, 1965, the defendant filed
a motion to lift the order of default, but his motion was denied. On August 21, 1965, a judgment by default was rendered
against the defendant. The defendant appealed, but the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the petition for relief.

Considering that the defendant had up to the date set for trial of the case within which to file an answer to the complaint or
on August 12, 1965, (Zenith Films, Inc. v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-26619, March 27, 1971. 38 SCRA 120), on which day the
defendant filed a motion for extension of time within which to file an answer, so that the City Court gravely abused its
discretion in declaring the defendant in default, the Court RESOLVED to SET ASIDE the order of default and the judgment
rendered by the City court of Manila in Civil Case No. 137730, entitled: "Commonwealth Financing Corporation, plaintiff,
versus Joesteel Container Corporation, defendant," and to REMAND this case to the court of origin for further proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in declaring defendant in default.

HELD:

CASE AT BAR. Where defendant had up to the date set for trial of the case within which to file an answer to the complaint
or on August 12, 1965, on which day the defendant filed a motion for extension of time within which to file an answer, the
trial court gravely abused its discretion in declaring defendant in default, and the order of default and judgment rendered by
the said court in the case should be set aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

95. NAGA DEVELOPMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Several days before the date of the aforesaid agreement, or, on July 21, 1962, the Pacific already made deliveries to the
job site at Naga City of roofing materials to be used in the construction of the mentioned Naga City public market. The total
value of the materials delivered plus the cost of installation from July 21, 1962 to October 19, 1962 amounted to
P250,312.76.

On July 19, 1963 the Pacific filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint against the Naga (docketed as civil
case 54547), alleging in essence that only P107,030 of the total obligation of the Naga refused to pay the balance thereof
in the amount of P143,282.76.

On August 5, 1963 the Naga filed a motion with the trial court requesting for an extension of 15 days, to expire on August
20, 1963, within which to file its, answer, counsel stating that The inability to prepare and finalize defendant's answer on
time is due to the burden of other equally if not more urgent professional work on the part of the undersigned counsel. The
said motion was granted. On August 16, 1963 the Naga filed another motion for an additional, extension of 10 days within
which to file its responsive pleading, counsel alleging this time that the extension . is requested for the reason that counsel
is presently verifying certain material facts and information relative to the transaction.

The court a quo however, denied the foregoing motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of default was proper.

HELD: YES

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the questioned orders of the trial court declaring the Naga
Development Corporation in default and denying its motion to set aside the said default order, is hereby affirmed.

The judgment by default, rendered by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, ordering the Naga Development
Corporation to pay the Pacific Merchandising Corporation the amount of P143,282.76 is hereby affirmed, with the
qualification that the Naga Development Corporation shall be allowed to prove, during the process of execution of the said
judgment, whatever payments it had made to the Pacific Merchandising Corporation, either before or after the filing of the
complaint, which constitute a proper deduction from the principal sum ordered to be paid.

96. Alpine Lending Investors vs. Corpuz

FACTS: A complaint for replevin was filed by respondent against Alpine Lending Investors (Alpine) and Zenaida Lipata. The
complaint alleges that Zenaida was respondents former neighbor who pretended to help respondent in securing a Garage
Franchise from the Land Transportation Office (LTO). Zenaida then used respondents registration papers and mortgaged
the vehicle to Alpine. Thereafter, Zenaida disappeared with the vehicle. The LTO showed respondent the Chattel Mortgage
Contract bearing her forged signature. Forthwith, respondent informed Alpine about the spurious mortgage and demanded
the release of her vehicle. Alpine promised to comply with her request on condition that Zenaida should first be charged
criminally. Respondent then caused the filing with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City complaints for falsification
of private document and estafa against Zenaida. Alpine when informed, still refused to turn over the vehicle to her. Instead
of filing an answer to respondents complaint, Alpine submitted to the RTC a motion to dismiss on the ground that it is not a
juridical person, hence, not a proper party in the case. The RTC denied Alpines motion to dismiss. RTC denied Alpines MR
and then directed respondent to file her amended complaint within ten (10) days. However, respondent filed her Amended
Complaint with an accompanying Motion to Admit Amended Complaint two (2) days late. RTC admitted the amended
complaint. Alpine filed a Motion to Expunge respondents motion to admit amended complaint on the ground that the latter
motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing. RTC denied Alpines motion to expunge for lack of merit. Alpine moved
for a reconsideration, but this was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in admitting respondents amended complaint.

HELD: The trial court was correct in admitting respondents amended complaint.
As earlier mentioned, what petitioner Alpine filed in Civil Case No. C-20124 was a motion to dismiss, not an answer. Settled
is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive
pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her complaint in Civil Case No. C-20124 as a matter of right. Following
this Courts ruling in Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., considering that respondent has the right to amend her complaint, it
is the correlative duty of the trial court to accept the amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other
words, the trial courts duty to admit the amended complaint was purely ministerial. In fact, respondent should not have filed
a motion to admit her amended complaint. It has always been the policy of this Court to be liberal in allowing amendments
to pleadings in order that the real controversies between or among the parties may be presented and cases be decided on
the merits without delay.

97. de Dios vs. Bristol Laboratories

98. Fortune Motors vs. CA

FACTS: In 1981, Joseph Chua and Edgar Rodrigueza executed separate surety agreements in favor of Fortune Motors
(Phils.) Corporation to cover obligations incurred by Fortune Motors whether they be enforced or thereafter made (from the
time of said surety contracts). In 1982, Fortune Motors secured cars from Canlubang Automotive Resources Corporation
(CARCO) via trust receipts and drafts made by CARCO. These were assigned to Filinvest Credit Corporation. Later
Filinvest, when the obligation matured, demanded payment from Fortune Motor as well as from Chua and Rodrigueza. No
payment was made. A case was filed. Rodrigueza averred that the surety agreement was void because when it was signed
in 1981, the principal obligation (1982) did not yet exist.

ISSUE: Whether or not the surety agreement is void.

HELD: No. Future obligations can be covered by a surety. Comprehensive or continuing surety agreements are in fact quite
commonplace in present day financial and commercial practice. A bank or financing company which anticipates entering
into a series of credit transactions with a particular company, commonly requires the projected principal debtor to execute
a continuing surety agreement along with its sureties. By executing such an agreement, the principal places itself in a
position to enter into the projected series of transactions with its creditor; with such suretyship agreement, there would be
no need to execute a separate surety contract or bond for each financing or credit accommodation extended to the principal
debtor.

99. United Overseas Bank vs. Rosemoore Mining

FACTS: Rosemoore Mining & Development Corporation (Hereon Rosemoor) in order to secure a credit facility amounting
to 80Million executed a mortgage agreement with United Overseas Bank Phils. (Hereon Bank) which covered six (6) parcels
of land all registered under Rosemoor. Rosemoor defaulted which caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties.
The bank was the highest bidder in all of the properties. Hence the filing of the case by Rosemoor before the Manila RTC
and Malolos RTC. (The issue of the case, filing of 2 actions in 2 different courts).

Manila RTC: (Personal Action) Rosemoor filed an action to receive the remaining proceeds of the loan. However, the bank
filed a motion to dismiss the case because it contends Rosemoor is violating forum shopping, having initiated a case in
Malolos RTC. However the motion to dismiss was denied, likewise it was dismissed by the CA holding that there was no
forum shopping.
Malolos RTC: (Real Action) Rosemoor second action was filed her to restrain the foreclosure of the properties mortgaged
to secure the loan which was not due yet. As it here, the bank filed a motion to dismiss the case due to violation of forum
shopping but the likewise it was denied by the RTC and CA.

Issue: Whether the venue of the filing of the cases resulted to forum shopping.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rosemoor, and affirming the ruling of the lower courts that there was no violation
of forum shopping. The Malolos case was filed for the purpose of restraining the Bank from proceeding with the consolidation
of the titles over the foreclosed Bulacan properties because the loan secured by the mortgage had not yet become due and
demandable. While the right asserted in the Manila case is to receive the proceeds of the loan, the right sought in the
Malolos case is to restrain the foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to secure a loan that was not yet due. Moreover, the
Malolos case is an action to annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It
is therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies. The
Manila case, on the other hand, is a personal action involving as it does the enforcement of a contract between Rosemoor,
whose office is in Quezon City, and the Bank, whose principal office is in Binondo, Manila. Personal actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiff resides, or where the defendants or any of the
principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. It was subsequent to the filing of the Manila case that Rosemoor
and Dr. Pascual saw the need to secure a writ of injunction because the consolidation of the titles to the mortgaged
properties in favor of the Bank was in the offing. But then, this action can only be commenced where the properties or a
portion thereof, is located. Otherwise, the petition for injunction would be dismissed for improper venue. Rosemoor,
therefore, was warranted in filing the Malolos case and cannot in turn be accused of forum-shopping.

100. Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. vs. CA

FACTS: Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. entered into a Dealership Agreement
for Sales and Services of the former's products in Samar and Leyte Provinces. The Dealership Agreement contained a
stipulation that All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed within the proper Courts of Quezon City. Five years
later, Unimasters filed an action in the RTC of Tacloban against Kubota, Reynaldo Go and Metrobank for damages and
breach of contracts, and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order. Kubota filed two motions One for the
dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue .The other prayed for the transfer of the injunction hearing its counsel
was not available. The court issued an order allowing the issuance of preliminary injunction and a motion denying the motion
to dismiss on the reason that Umimasters place of business is in Tacloban City while Kubotas principal place of business
is in Quezon City. In accord with the the Rules of Court, the proper venue would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City at
the election of the plaintiff. Hence,the filing in the RTC of Tacloban is proper. Kubota appealed both orders on the grounds
they were issued with grave abuse of discretion in a special action for certiorari and prohibition filed with the CA. Kubota
asserted that RTC of Tacloban had no jurisdiction was improperly laid. The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Kubota and
it held that: the stipulation respecting venue in its Dealership Agreement with UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the venue of
all suits arising thereunder only and exclusively to the proper courts of Quezon City. Subsequently, Unimasters filed a
motion for reconsideration but was turned down by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether the venue stipulations in a contract has the effect of limiting the venue to a specified place.

HELD: No. The Polytrade doctrine was applied in the case at bar. This doctrine enunciated that as long as the stipulation
does not set forth qualifying or restrictive words to indicate that the agreed place alone and none other is the venue of the
action, the parties do not lose the option of choosing the venue.

101. POLYTRADE VS BLANCO

FACTS: Polytrade filed a case against Blanco in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Blanco moved to dismiss the case
upon the ground of improper venue invoking Section 3, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which states that venue may be
stipulated by written agreement. According to Blanco, they agreed to sue and be sued in the courts of Manila. Blanco says
that because of such covenant he can only be sued in the Courts of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not venue was properly laid.

HELD: Venue was properly laid. An accurate reading of the stipulation the parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts
of Manila, does not preclude the parties from filing suits in the residence of the plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning
is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila
and Manila alone is the venue is totally absent therefrom.

102. PACIFIC CONSULTANTS VS SCHONFELD

FACTS: Klaus Schonfeld is a Canadian citizen and resident of New Westminster, British, Columbia. He had been a
consultant in the field of environmental engineering and water supply and sanitation.

PaciCon Philippines, the petitioner, is a corporation duly established and incorporated in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. The primary purpose of PPI is to engage in the business of providing specialty and technical services. PCIJ, a
Tokyo- based company decided to engage in consultancy services for water and sanitation in the Philippines. PCIJ
employed Schonfeld as Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation Department. Later on, Schonfeld received a
letter from PCIJ informing him that his employment has been terminated for the reason that PCIJ and PPI was not
successful in the water and sanitation sector in the Philippines.

Schonfeld filed a case against PPI and PCIJ. PPI moved for its dismissal on the ground that venue was improperly laid
and that the respondent is a Canadian citizen .

ISSUE: Whether or not venue is not properly laid.

HELD: The court ruled that the settled stipulations regarding venue is that whle they are considered valid and
enforceable. Venue stipulations in a contract do not as a rule, supersede the general rules set forth in Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court. In this case, they should merely be considered an agreement on national forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place. They are not exclusive, but rather, permissive.

Further, the application of the principle of forum non conveniens must be rejected. The bare fact that respondent is a
Canadian citizen does not warrant the application of the principle. The court ruled that Philippine courts may assume
jurisdiction over the case if it choose to do so, provided that the following requisites are met:

1. That the Philippine Courts is the one to which the parties may conveniently resort to,
2. That the Philippine Court is in the position to make intelligent decision as to the law and the facts, and
3. That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have a power to enforce its decision.

103. LEVITON INDUSTRIES VS SALVADOR

FACTS: Private respondent Leviton Manufacturing Co. Inc. filed a complaint for unfair competition against petitioners
Leviton Industries before the CFI of Rizal (RTC), presided by respondent Judge Serafin Salvador. The complaint
substantially alleges that plaintiff (Leviton Manufacturing) is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the State of New York, United States of America. The defendant Leviton Industries is a partnership organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines with principal office at 382 10th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City; while defendants
Nena de la Cruz Lim, Domingo Go and Lim Kiat are the partners, with defendant Domingo Go acting as General Manager
of defendant Leviton Industries. That plaintiff, founded in 1906 by Isidor Leviton, is the largest manufacturer of electrical
wiring devices in the United States under the trademark Leviton, which various electrical wiring devices bearing the
trademark Leviton and trade name Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. had been exported to the Philippines since 1954; that
due to the superior quality and widespread use of its products by the public, the same are well known to Filipino
consumers under the trade name Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. and trademark Leviton; that long subsequent to the use
of plaintiffs trademark and trade name in the Philippines, defendants (Leviton Industries) began manufacturing and selling
electrical ballast, fuse and oval buzzer under the trademark Leviton and trade name Leviton Industries Co.

That Domingo Go, partner and general manager of defendant partnership, had registered with the Philippine Patent Office
the trademarks Leviton Label and Leviton with respect to ballast and fuse under Certificate of Registration Nos. SR-1132
and 15517, respectively, which registration was contrary to paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 4 of RA 166, as amended,
and violative of plaintiffs right over the trademark Leviton; that defendants not only used the trademark Leviton but
likewise copied the design used by plaintiff in distinguishing its trademark; and that the use thereof by defendants of its
products would cause confusion in the minds of the consumers and likely to deceive them as to the source of origin,
thereby enabling defendants to pass off their products as those of plaintiffs. Invoking the provisions of Section 21-A of
Republic Act No. 166, plaintiff prayed for damages. It also sought the issuance of a writ of injunction to prohibit defendants
from using the trade name Leviton Industries, Co. and the trademark Leviton.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, drawing attention to the plaintiffs failure
to allege therein its capacity to sue under Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff (Leviton Manufacturing) herein respondents, failed to allege the essential facts bearing
its capacity to sue before Philippine courts.

Ruling: Yes. We agree with petitioners that respondent Leviton Marketing Co., Inc. had failed to allege the essential facts
bearing upon its capacity to sue before Philippine courts. Private respondents action is squarely founded on Section 21-A
of Republic Act No. 166. Undoubtedly, the foregoing section grants to a foreign corporation, whether or not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, the right to seek redress for unfair competition before Philippine courts. But the said law is not
without qualifications. Its literal tenor indicates as a condition sine qua non the registration of the trade mark of the suing
foreign corporation with the Philippine Patent Office or, in the least, that it be an asignee of such registered trademark.
The said section further requires that the country, of which the plaintiff foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or
domicilliary, grants to Filipino corporations or juristic entities the same reciprocal treatment, either thru treaty, convention
or law,

All that is alleged in private respondents complaint is that it is a foreign corporation. Such bare averment not only fails to
comply with the requirements imposed by the aforesaid Section 21-A but violates as well the directive of Section 4, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must
be averred
In the case at bar, private respondent has chosen to anchor its action under the Trademark Law of the Philippines, a law
which, as pointed out, explicitly sets down the conditions precedent for the successful prosecution thereof. It is therefore
incumbent upon private respondent to comply with these requirements or aver its exemption therefrom, if such be the
case. It may be that private respondent has the right to sue before Philippine courts, but our rules on pleadings require
that the necessary qualifying circumstances which clothe it with such right be affirmatively pleaded.

104. BULAKHIDAS VS NAVARRO

FACTS: Bulakhidas, a foreign partnership, filed a complaint against a domestic corporation, Diamond Shipping
Corporation, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the recovery of damages allegedly caused by the failure of the
said shipping corporation to deliver the goods shipped to it by petitioner to their proper destination.The complaint alleged
that plaintiff is "a foreign partnership firm not doing business in the Philippines" and that it is "suing under an isolated
transaction." Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and that
the complaint does not state a valid cause of action against defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign corporation not engaged in business in the Philippines can institute an action before our
courts is already wen settled in this jurisdiction.

HELD: It is settled that if a foreign corporation is not engaged in business in the Philippines, it may not be denied the right
to file an action in Philippine courts for isolated transactions.

The object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation law was not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single
acts, but to prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without taking the steps necessary to render it
amenable to suit in the local courts. It was never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which
happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines, from securing redress in the Philippine courts.

105. ANTAM CONSOLIDATED VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: On 9 April 1981, Stokely Van Camp. Inc. filed a complaint against Banahaw Milling Corporation, Consolidated,
Inc., Tambunting Trading Corporation, Aurora Consolidated Securities and Investment Corporation, and United Coconut
Oil Mills, Inc. (Unicom) for collection of sum of money. In its complaint, Stokely alleged: (1) that it is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the state of Indiana, U.S.A. and has its principal office at 941 North Meridian
Street, Indianapolis, Indiana, U.S.A., and one of its subdivisions "Capital City Product Company" (Capital City) has its
office in Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A.; (2) that Stokely and Capital City were not engaged in business in the Philippines prior to
the commencement of the suit so that Stokely is not licensed to do business in this country and is not required to secure
such license; (3) that on 21 August 1978, Capital City and Coconut Oil Manufacturing (Phil.) Inc. (Comphil) with the latter
acting through its broker Rothschild Brokerage Company, entered into a contract (RBS 3655) wherein Comphil undertook
to sell and deliver and Capital City agreed to buy 500 long tons of crude coconut oil to be delivered in October/November
1978 at the c.i.f price of US$0.30/lb. but Comphil failed to deliver the coconut oil so that Capital City covered its coconut
oil needs in the open market at a price substantially in excess of the contract and sustained a loss of US$103,600; that to
settle Capital City's loss under the contract, the parties entered into a second contract (RBS 3738) on 3 November 1978
wherein Comphil undertook to buy and Capital City agreed to sell 500 long tons of coconut crude oil under the same
terms and conditions but at an increased c.i.f. price of US$0.3925/lb.; (4) that the second contract states that "it is a wash
out against RBS 3655" so that Comphil was supposed to repurchase the undelivered coconut oil at US $0.3925 from
Capital City by paying the latter the sum of US$103,600.00 which is the same amount of loss that Capital City sustained
under the first contract; that Comphil again failed to pay said amount, so to settle
Capital City's loss, it entered into a third contract with Comphil on 24 January 1979 wherein the latter undertook to sell and
deliver and Capital City agreed to buy the same quantity of crude coconut oil to be delivered in April/May 1979 at the c.i.f.
price of US$0.3425/lb.; (5) that the latter price was 9.25 cents/lb. or US$103,600 for 500 long tons below the then current
market price of 43.2 cents/lb. and by delivering said quantity of coconut oil to Capital City at the discounted price, Comphil
was to have settled its US$103,600 liability to Capital City; (6) that Comphil failed to deliver the coconut oil so Capital City
notified the former that it was in default; (7) that Capital City sustained damages in the amount of US$175,000; and (8)
that after
repeated demands from Comphil to pay the said amount, the latter still refuses to pay the same. Stokely further prayed
that a writ of attachment be issued against any and all the properties of Antam, et al. in an amount sufficient to satisfy any
lien of judgment that Stokely may obtain in its action.
In support of this provisional remedy and of its cause of action against Antam, et al., other than Comphil, Stokely alleged
that: 1) After demands were made by respondent on Comphil, the Tambuntings ceased to be directors and officers of
Comphil and were replaced by their five employees, who were managers of Tambunting's pawnshops and said
employees caused the name of Comphil to be changed to "Banahaw Milling Corporation" and authorized
one of the Tambuntings, Antonio P. Tambunting, Jr., who was at that time neither a director nor officer of Banahaw to sell
its oil mill; 2) Unicom has taken over the entire operations and assets of Banahaw because the entire and outstanding
capital stock of the latter was sold to the former; 3) All of the issued and outstanding capital stock of Comphil are owned
by the Tambuntings who were the directors and officers of Comphil and who were the ones who benefited from the sale of
Banahaw's assets or shares to Unicom; 4) All of the petitioners evaded their obligation to respondent by the devious
scheme of using Tambunting employees to replace the Tambuntings in the management of Banahaw and disposing of the
oil mill of Banahaw or their entire interests to Unicom; and 5) Respondent has reasonable cause to believe and does
believe that the coconut oil mill, which is the only substantial asset of Banahaw is about to be sold or removed so that
unless prevented by the Court there will probably be no assets of Banahaw to satisfy its claim. On 10 April 1981, the trial
court ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment in favor of Stokely upon the latter's deposit of a bond in the amount of
P1,285,000.00. On 3 June 1981, Stokely filed a motion for reconsideration to reduce the attachment bond. On 11 June
1981, Antam, et al. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Stokely, being a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the
Philippines, has no personality to maintain the suit. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order, dated 10 August 1981,
reducing the attachment bond to P500,000.00 and denying the motion to dismiss by Antam, et al. on the ground that the
reason cited therein does not appear to be indubitable. Antam, et al. filed a petition for certiorari before the Intermediate
Appellate Court. On 14 June 1982, the appellate court dismissed the petition. Antam, et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, they filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
temporary restraining order.

Issue: Whether Stokely Van Camp, Inc. has the capacity to sue, in light of three transactions it entered into with Comphil,
Antam, etc. without license.

Held: The transactions entered into by Stokely with Comphil, Antam, et al. are not a series of commercial dealings which
signify an intent on the part of Stokely to do business in the Philippines but constitute an isolated one which does not fall
under the category of "doing business." The only reason why Stokely entered into the second and third transactions with
Comphil, Antam, et al. was because it wanted to recover the loss it sustained from the failure of Comphil, Antam, et al. to
deliver the crude coconut oil under the first transaction and in order to give the latter a chance to make good on their
obligation. Instead of making an outright demand on Comphil, Antam, et al., Stokely opted to try to push through with the
transaction to recover the amount of US$103,600.00 it lost. This explains why in the second transaction, Comphil, Antam,
et al. were supposed to buy back the crude coconut oil they should have delivered to the respondent in an amount which
will earn the latter a profit of US$103,600.00. When this failed the third transaction was entered into by the parties
whereby Comphil, Antam, et al. were supposed to sell crude coconut oil to the respondent at a discounted rate, the total
amount of such discount being US$103,600.00. Unfortunately, Comphil, Antam, et al. failed to deliver again, prompting
Stokely to file the suit below. From these facts alone, it can be deduced that in reality, there was only one agreement
between Comphil, Antam, et al. and Stokely and that was the delivery by the former of 500 long tons of crude coconut oil
to the latter, who in turn, must pay the corresponding price for the same. The three seemingly different transactions were
entered into by the parties only in an effort to fulfill the basic agreement and in no way indicate an intent on the part of
Stokely to engage in a continuity of transactions with Comphil, Antam, et al. which will categorize it as a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines. Stokely, being a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines,
does not need to obtain a license to do business in order to have the capacity to sue.

111. Cokaliong Shipping v. Amin

Facts:

On May 5, 1992, petitioner filed a Complaint for Damages, with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Attachment, against Carlos
A. Go Thong Lines and Eugenio Manubag, Jr. The case was filed with the RTC of Cebu. The petitioner alleged that by
reason of defendants negligence, a collision took place on April 3, 1992 between its vessel, the M/V Filipinas Tandag and
Go Thong Lines vessel, the M/V Our Lady of Lourdes.
Defendants filed an Answer with Counterclaim, denying negligence on their part and alleging that the collision was caused
by the faulty, erratic and erroneous maneuvers of petitioners vessel.

On February 1, 1993, private respondent, as insurer of Go Thong Lines, filed a Complaint against herein petitioner .The
case was filed with the RTC of Makati, Branch 135, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-319.Respondent claimed
that it had paid the insured the amount of P2,420,325.59 and, by virtue thereof, had been subrogated to the rights of Go
Thong Lines against petitioner.

Petitioner filed on August 3, 1993 a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 93-319 (Makati Case) due to the pendency of Civil
Case No. 11660 (Cebu Case) on the ground that the two cases involved the same parties, the same causes of action and
the same issues. . But petitioners motion was denied by the trial court which held that there was no similarity of causes of
action

Issue:

WON the petition should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia as there are other actions pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action.

Rulings:

For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties
or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
As regards the first requirement, it is evident that petitioner is a party in both cases, i.e., as plaintiff in the Cebu Case and
as defendant in the Makati Case. Private respondent claims, however, that since it was not impleaded as a party in the
Cebu Case, there is no identity of parties to warrant the dismissal of its complaint in the Makati Case. This contention has
no merit. Private respondent filed the complaint in the Makati Case as a subrogee of Go Thong Lines.
As to the second requirement, a reading of the allegations of the respective complaints of the parties shows that the asserted
rights are founded on an identical set of facts which gave rise to one basic issue, that is, whether the collision between the
two vessels was due to the negligence of the employees of one vessel or those of the other vessel. Indeed in the Cebu
Case the parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved was whether the collision was due to petitioners negligence or
that of Go Thong Lines. This is the same issue raised in the Makati Case instituted by Go Thong Lines insurer against
petitioner.

112. Suntay v. Aqueous

113. FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes v. Trajano

Facts:

On February 13, 1986, private respondent filed a Petition for Certification Election with The Ministry of Labor and
Employment. The petitioner opposed the petition on the ground that a similar petition involving the same issues and the
same parties is pending resolution before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-49771.

Private respondent admitted: that as early as May 10, 1976, private respondent filed a similar petition for certification election
with the Ministry of Labor and Employment but the petition was denied by the MED Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor on
appeal, on the ground that the petitioner was a non-stock, non-profit medical institution, therefore, its employees may not
form, join, or organize a union pursuant to Article 244 of the Labor Code. Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court (docketed as G.R. No. L-49771) assailing the constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code. On
May 1, 1980, Batas Pambansa Bilang 70 was enacted amending Article 244 of the Labor Code, thus granting even
employees of non-stock, non-profit institutions the right to form, join and organize labor unions of their choice; and that in
the exercise of such right, private respondent filed another petition for certification election with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (NCR-LRD-N-2-050-86).

On April 17, 1986, the Med Arbiter issued an Order granting the petition, declaring that a certification election be conducted
to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of the petitioner.

Issue:

WON respondent Director gravely abused his discretion in granting the petition for certification election, despite the
pendency of a similar petition before the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 49771) which involves the same parties for the same
cause.

Rulings:

The Petition is devoid of merit. At the time private respondent filed its petition for certification election on February 13, 1986,
Article 244 of the Labor Code was already amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70.
In order that the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause may be availed of as a ground
to dismiss a case, there must be, between the action under consideration and the other action: (1) Identity of parties, or at
least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (3) the Identity on the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment
which may be rendered on the other action wig, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.

In the instant case, any judgment which may be rendered in the petition for certiorari pending before the Supreme Court (G.
R. No. L-49771) wig not constitute res judicata in the petition for certification election under consideration, for while in the
former, private respondent questioned the constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code before its amendment, in the
latter, private respondent invokes the same article as already amended.

114. Lamis Ents. v. Lagamon

Facts:

This concerns a Komatsu Bulldozer which was delivered to Neville Y. Lamis Ents. by Santiago Maningo as evidenced by a
Memorandum Agreement. In Civil Case No. 1395 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Maningo sought, among other
things, the payment of the value of the bulldozer from Neville Y. Lamis Ents. who moved to dismiss on the ground of
multiplicity of suits and improper venue.When the motion was denied, we granted the petition for certiorari and ordered the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 1395.

In granting the petition, We found that Civil Case No. 1395 was a duplication of Civil Case No. 35199 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal which Neville Y. Lamis Ents. had previously filed against Santiago Maningo. In Our decision We said,
among other things, that: "Similarly, the private respondent's claim for the purchase price of the tractor [the Komatsu
Bulldozer] is barred. This claim should have been set up in Civil Case No. 35199, of which, in one of the causes of action it
was alleged that there was a misdelivery of tractor for which reason the plaintiff therein asks for the delivery of the tractor
specified in the Memorandum Agreement."

In the instant petition, Neville Y. Lamis Ents. complains that Civil Case No. 147 is not only again duplicitous but it also
disregards Our decision in G.R. No. 57250. Hence We are asked to order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 147.

Issue:

WON Civil Case No. 147 should be dismissed.

Rulings:

The petition is impressed with merit. It is obvious that tile private respondent is embarked on a campaign of harrassment by
filing suit after suit against the petitioner.

While it is true, as We have said, that the private respondent's claim for the purchase price of the Komatsu tractor is barred
in Civil Case No. 35199 and in any suit for that matter, there is nothing in Our pronouncement to prevent the Rizal Court of
First Instance from deciding the question of possession in respect of the tractor. Therefore, litigation in any other case of
said possession is not only unnecessary and improper but it is also barred by Our decision in G.R. No. 57250.

115. United Coconut Planters Bank v. Beluso

Facts:

On 16 April 1996, UCPB granted the spouses Beluso a Promissory Notes Line under a Credit Agreement whereby the latter
could avail from the former credit of up to a maximum amount of P1.2 Million pesos for a term ending on 30 April 1997. The
spouses Beluso constituted, other than their promissory notes, a real estate mortgage over parcels of land in Roxas City,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-31539 and T-27828, as additional security for the obligation. The Credit
Agreement was subsequently amended to increase the amount of the Promissory Notes Line to a maximum of P2.35 Million
pesos and to extend the term thereof to 28 February 1998.

To completely avail themselves of the P2.35 Million credit line extended to them by UCPB, the spouses Beluso executed
two more promissory notes for a total of P350,000.00.

On 2 September 1998, UCPB demanded that the spouses Beluso pay their total obligation of P2,932,543.00 plus 25%
attorneys fees, but the spouses Beluso failed to comply therewith. UCPB foreclosed the properties mortgaged by the
spouses Beluso to secure their credit line, which already ballooned to P3,784,603.00.

On 9 February 1999, the spouses Beluso filed a Petition for Annulment, Accounting and Damages against UCPB with the
RTC of Makati City. On 23 March 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of the spouses Beluso
On 8 May 2000, the RTC denied UCPBs Motion for Reconsideration, prompting UCPB to appeal the RTC Decision with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. The Court of Appeals denied UCPBs Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit. UCPB thus filed the present petition

Issue:

WON the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error when it failed to order the dismissal of the
case because the respondents are guilty of forum shopping.

Rulings:

Rule 16, Section 5 bars the refiling of an action previously dismissed only in the following instances: SEC. 5. Effect
of dismissal. Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) of
section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim. (n)

When an action is dismissed on the motion of the other party, it is only when the ground for the dismissal of an action is
found in paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) that the action cannot be refiled. As regards all the other grounds, the complainant is
allowed to file same action, but should take care that, this time, it is filed with the proper court or after the accomplishment
of the erstwhile absent condition precedent, as the case may be

UCPB, however, brings to the attention of this Court a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Beluso on 15 January
1999 with the RTC of Roxas City, which Motion had not yet been ruled upon when the spouses Beluso filed Civil Case No.
99-314 with the RTC of Makati. Hence, there were allegedly two pending actions between the same parties on the same
issue at the time of the filing of Civil Case No. 99-314 on 9 February 1999 with the RTC of Makati. This will still not change
our findings. It is indeed the general rule that in cases where there are two pending actions between the same parties on
the same issue, it should be the later case that should be dismissed. However, this rule is not absolute. According to this
Court in Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals.

116. G.R. No. 95223. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE ROQUE
A. TAMAYO, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132 and EKMAN & COMPANY, INC., respondents. July
26, 1996

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,[1] dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by herein
petitioner Allied Banking Corporation to set aside two orders, dated October 8, 1984 and November 15, 1984, respectively,
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132, in Civil Case No. 7500. It appears that on October 8, 1981, private
respondent Ekman & Company Inc. (Ekman & Co.) obtained a loan in the amount of P5,700,000.00 from petitioner Allied
Banking Corporation (hereafter called Allied Bank). Private respondent executed a promissory note, secured by
US$750,000.00 deposited in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Hongkong. The transaction involves what is called in
banking parlance as a back-to-back loan.
Allied Bank filed a complaint for sum of money against private respondent Ekman & Co. in the CFI of Pasig, Rizal. Upon
the reorganization of the judiciary in 1983, the case was transferred to the RTC in Makati. Allied Bank alleged that after
applying private respondents dollar deposit to its indebtedness, there remained a balance of P387,936.08, exclusive of
interest and other charges owing to it but despite demands made on private respondent Ekman & Co., the amount had not
been paid. Thereafter, the case was dismissed by the RTC for failure of Allied Bank to prosecute its case. However, upon
petitioners explanation that it did not know that its case had been transferred to Makati as a result of the reorganization of
the courts, the RTC reconsidered its order and directed that summons be served on private respondent Ekman & Co.
It appears that private respondent itself had filed a complaint against petitioner, for accounting. The case was also
filed in the RTC of Makati. Ekman & Co. alleged that on April 8, 1981, it had obtained a loan in the amount of P5, 700,
000.00 from petitioner Allied Bank upon the security of a $750,000.00-dollar deposit which was earning 14.5% interest per
annum; that it asked Allied Bank for a statement of account and the return of its deposit which Allied Bank had applied to
the payment of the loan but Allied Bank refused the demand.
Petitioner Allied Bank moved to dismiss said case but it was denied by the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration
was also denied. Soon after, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which later on dismissed their
petition. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition of Petitioner Allied Bank.

RULING:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No. 7500, now pending before Branch 56 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati is ORDERED CONSOLIDATED with Civil Case No. 649 pending in Branch 136 of same
court, the two cases to be heard and decided by the latter court.
In the case at bar, not only was petitioners action in Civil Case No. 649 brought ahead of private respondents action,
it is also the appropriate case for determining the parties rights.Petitioners action (Civil Case No. 649) is for collection of a
sum of money, whereas private respondents action (Civil Case No. 7500) is simply for a statement of account apparently
to enable it to pay its obligation to petitioner. Private respondents claim is more in the nature of a defense to the action for
collection. As such it should be asserted in Civil Case No. 649 rather than in a separate action.

117. G.R. No. 157557 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION), Petitioner, vs.
RAMON YU, TEOFISTA VILLAMALA, LOURDES YU and YU SE PENG, Respondents. March 10, 2006
FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for reversion of the expropriated property which ws later on dismissed by the trial
court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no res judicata and remanded the case to the trial court. Hence
this petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the action barred by res judicata?

RULING: Yes. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.20Considering that the sale on which respondents based their
right to reversion has long been nullified, they have not an iota of right over the property and thus, have no legal personality
to bring forth the action for reversion of expropriated property. Lack of legal personality to sue means that the respondents
are not the real parties-in-interest. This is a ground for the dismissal of the case, related to the ground that the complaint
evidently states no cause of action.

Conclusiveness of judgment clearly exists in the present case, because respondents again seek to enforce a right
based on a sale which has been nullified by a final and executory judgment. Recall that the question of validity of the sale
had long been settled. The same question, therefore, cannot be raised again even in a different proceeding involving the
same parties.

118. G.R. No. 122181. JOSE A. LINZAG and the HEIRS of CRISTOBAL A. LINZAG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional Trial Court,Branch IV, Mati, Davao Oriental, PATRICIO S. CUNANAN,
ORLANDO SALVADOR, MANUEL P. BLANCO, JR., JOSE MANUEL SERRANO and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of
Mati, Davao Oriental, respondents. June 26, 1998
FACTS:
At the cadastral proceeding involving Lot No. 1222 before the then Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental sitting in
Mati, Davao Oriental, Cristobal Linzag filed his claim over said Lot. Another claimant, one Patricio Cunanan, likewise filed
a claim. One Orlando L. Salvador filed a motion to award Lot No. 1222, as an uncontested lot, in his favour. Soon, the
cadastral court, on the basis of the foregoing, issued an Order declaring that Salvador and his predecessors-in-interests
had been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of Lot No. 1222, in concept of an owner for a
period of at least 30 years; that Salvador was the successor-in-interest of original claimant Patricio S. Cunanan; and that
the lot was a non-contested lot. Petitioners filed an action for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages against
private respondents Patricio Cunanan and Orlando Salvador before the Court of First instance of Mati, Davao Oriental which
was later on dismissed by the trial court. Aggrieved, Petitioners appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the appeal on the ground of prescription. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an identity in the causes of action between this petition and Civil Case No. 571.

RULING: NO. In sum, the Court found that all the requirements for the application of res judicata are present in this
case. This petition should, therefore, be dismissed. The difference in the form of the actions instituted is immaterial. The
petitioners may not escape the effect of the doctrine by merely varying the form of his [sic] action (Filinvest Credit
Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 207 SCRA 59, 63; Sangalang vs. Caparas, 151 SCRA 53; Ibabao vs. Court
of Appeals, 150 SCRA 76, 85).

The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue
more than once. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity in them in law or estate. It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to
litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated (Ibabao vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra, at p. 85; Sangalang vs. Caparas, supra, at p. 59). As this petition is already barred by the judgment
in Civil Case 571, We see no other course of action but to resolve to dismiss this petition.

119. G.R. No. 156224 HEIRS OF PANFILO F. ABALOS, Petitioners, versus AURORA A. BUCAL, DEMETRIO,
BUCAL, ARTEMIO F. ABALOS, LIGAYA U. ABALOS, ROMULO F. ABALOS, JESUSA O. ABALOS,
MAURO F. ABALOS and LUZVIMINDA R. ABALOS, Respondents. February 19, 2008

FACTS:
The instant case arose when petitioners father, Panfilo, began to execute the said decision ordering for the partition
of the intestate estate of Panfilo. In opposition, respondents, who are children and in-laws of the now deceased Faustino,
filed on January 8, 1986 a case for Quieting of Title, Possession, Annulment of Document and Damages with Preliminary
Injunction. Soon, the trial court directed the parties to maintain the status quo and later on ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Due to the several proceedings, the controversy was narrowed down to only two (2) properties, namely: the fishpond
located at Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan, locally known as Duyao, and the fishpond located at Canaoalan, Binmaley,
Pangasinan, locally known as Pinirat. Eventually, the trial court rendered is decision partitioning the property to the parties.
Both Panfilo and respondents elevated the case to the CA, assigning the alleged errors of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision declaring the petition unmeritorious. Panfilo moved for reconsideration of the Decision but was
denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA seriously erred in failing to consider the finality of the Decision in Civil Case No. 15465.

RULING: NO. Even if res judicata requires not absolute but substantial identity of parties, still there exists substantial identity
only when the additional party acts in the same capacity or is in privity with the parties in the former action. In this case,
while it is true that respondents are legitimate children and relatives by affinity of Faustino it is more important to remember
that, as shown by their documents of acquisition, they became owners of the subject fishponds not through Faustino alone
but also from a third person (i.e., Maria Abalos). Respondents are asserting their own rights and interests which are distinct
and separate from those of Faustinos claim as a hereditary heir of Francisco Abalos. Hence, they cannot be considered as
privies to the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 15465. Unfortunately for petitioners, they relied solely on their untenable
defense of res judicata instead of contesting the genuineness and due execution of respondents documentary evidence.

Moreover, Panfilo erred in repeatedly believing that there was no necessity to implead respondents as defendants
in Civil Case No. 15465 since, according to him, the necessary parties in a partition case are only the co-owners or co-
partners in the inheritance of Francisco Abalos. On the contrary, the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition,
all other persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. Not only the co-heirs but also all persons claiming
interests or rights in the property subject of partition are indispensable parties. In the instant case, it is the responsibility of
Panfilo as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 15465 to implead all indispensable parties, that is, not only Faustino and Danilo but also
respondents in their capacity as vendees and donees of the subject fishponds. Without their presence in the suit the
judgment of the court cannot attain real finality against them. Being strangers to the first case, they are not bound by the
decision rendered therein; otherwise, they would be deprived of their constitutional right to due process.

Finally, it must be stressed that in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-
owner of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. An action for partition is at once an action
for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. It
is only properties owned in common that may be the object of an action for partition; it will not lie if the claimant has no
rightful interest over the subject property. Thus, in this case, only the shares in the lots which are determined to have been
co-owned by Panfilo, Faustino and Danilo could be included in the order of partition and, conversely, shares in the lots
which were validly disposed of in favor of respondents must be excluded therefrom. In this connection, the Court sees no
reason to depart from the findings of fact and the partition ordered by the appellate court as these are amply supported by
evidence on record. Furthermore, the rule is that factual issues are beyond our jurisdiction to resolve since in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure this Courts power is limited only to review questions of law when
there is doubt or difference as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.

120. G.R. No. 121534. JUAN M. CASIL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. URBANO VICTORIO, SR.,
BRANCH 50, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA; and ANITA U. LORENZANA, respondents. January 28, 1998]
FACTS:
Private Respondent Anita U. Lorenzana is the lessee of a government property located on Bilibid Viejo Street, near
Quezon Boulevard, Manila. After the building on said land was destroyed by fire, Petitioner Juan M. Casil and private
respondent entered into a written agreement authorizing the former to develop and administer the property. They also
agreed that rentals from the tenants would be divided equally between them. Thus, buildings, stalls and cubicles were
constructed on the subject property and leased to tenants. Private respondent allegedly found that the tenants, except for
one or two, had been paying their rentals on time, but that petitioner was not properly remitting her share thereon. Thus,
she wrote the tenants informing them that she had already terminated her contract with petitioner and urging them to pay
directly to her. Petitioner countered by asking them to ignore private respondents letter.
Petitioner then filed a complaint against private respondent for Breach of Contract and Damages docketed as Civil
Case No. 94-72362 before Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. However, before submitting her answer, private
respondent filed before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, her own separate complaint against petitioner for
Rescission of Contract, Accounting and Damages. Petitioner countered with a motion to dismiss the Second Case on the
ground of litis pendentia. Subsequently, private respondent filed her opposition to said motion. Thereafter, Judge Urbano
C. Victorio, Sr. denied the motion. The Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed the petition for certiorari, thereby affirming
the trial courts denial of the said motion. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is Litis Pendentia in this case.

RULING: The court sustained the petitioner. In order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity
of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res adjudicata in the
other.
In this light, there is identity of subject matter and of causes of action, for the same evidence presented in the First
Case will necessarily be presented in the Second Case, and the judgment sought in the Second Case will either duplicate
or contradict any judgment in the First Case. It is beyond dispute, therefore, that a judgment in the First Case will
constitute res adjudicata to bar the Second Case.
As a final note, the following guidelines for the dismissal of a complaint on the ground of litis pendentia laid down by this
Court in Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals should be taken into account. Given, therefore, the pendency of
two actions, the following are the relevant considerations in determining which action should be dismissed: (1) the date of
filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed
was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the
action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties. Since the First Case was filed earlier, it will
be in accord with jurisprudence to abate the Second Case.

126. DELOS REYES vs. CA and SPOUSES CAIA (January 27, 1998; 285 SCRA 705)

FACTS:

The Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, dismissed a civil case for recovery of possession of real
property with damages filed by petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower court.

Petitioners seek the nullification of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of the
trial court dismissing the complaint of petitioners herein by imputing to the Court of Appeals the following errors: (1) in
reckoning the 30-year prescriptive period of real actions as provided under Art. 1141 of the Civil Code from the date of
issuance of the questioned TCT or annotation of the transaction when petitioners' mother, original owner of subject
property and when TCT No. 42753 was issued to Rodolfo Caia and Zenaida Caia and consequently holding petitioners
guilty of laches; and, (2) in not applying Arts. 1409, 1410, and 1422 of the Civil Code.

Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land measuring 13,405 square meters originally owned by the spouses
Genaro and Evarista delos Reyes. Evarista delos Reyes sold to spouses Catalina Mercado and Eulalio Pena 10,000
square meters of the property. The vendees were able to secure Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26184 covering not only
the 10,000 square meters of land bought by them but also the remaining 3,405 square meters left unsold. In turn, the
Pena spouses sold the whole property to a third party who later conveyed the same whole area to another party.
Eventually, the land was acquired by private respondents herein, Rodolfo Caia and Zenaida Caia, through a "Deed of
Exchange." Later, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42753 was issued in the name of the Caia spouses who since then
exercised full ownership and possession over the property.

Petitioners, filed an action against respondents for reconveyance of 3,405 square meters of the property covered
by TCT No. 42753 claiming that this portion was invalidly included by the Pena spouses in the titling of their 10,000
square meters they had bought from Evarista delos Reyes. However, the case was dismissed by the trial court on the
ground of laches. As already adverted to, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Can an action for reconveyance of real property covered by the Torrens system filed after more than thirty (30)
years prosper against the holder for value?

RULING:

The Supreme Court likewise dismissed the petition. Petitioners argue that their cause of action still subsists
because it accrued either when TCT No. 42753 was issued to Rodolfo Caia and his sister Zenaida Caia. This is incorrect.
A cause of action being an act or omission of one party in violation of the right of another arises at the moment such right
is violated. In the instant case, petitioners' cause of action accrued when the Pena spouses caused the registration in their
name of the entire 13,405 square meters instead of only 10,000 square meters they actually bought from Evarista delos
Reyes. For it was on this instance that the right of ownership of Evarista over the remaining 3,405 square meters was
transgressed and from that very moment sprung the right of the owner, and hence all her successors in interest, to file a
suit for reconveyance of the property wrongfully taken from them.

When respondents Rodolfo Caia and Zenaida Caia as fourth transferees in ownership dealt with the land in
question, they were not required to go beyond what appeared in the transfer certificate of title in the name of their
transferor. For all intents and purposes, they were innocent purchasers for value having acquired the property in due
course and in good faith under a clean title, i.e., there were no annotations of encumbrances or notices of lis pendens at
the back thereof. They had no reason to doubt the validity of the title to the property. Therefore it would be the height of
injustice, if not inequity, if a valid transaction transferring the subject property to them be set aside just to accommodate
parties who heedlessly slept on their rights for more than a third of a century. This is not conducive but anathema to good
order.

127. AGNAR vs. BERNAD (May 9, 1988; 161 SCRA 276)

FACTS:

Private respondents, the spouses Nicolas and Redempta Kintanar, as plaintiffs, filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, a civil action against the defendants-spouses, the herein petitioners, praying for the annulment of a Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale, damages, and attorneys fees with preliminary injunction. The petitioners, timely filed their answer
specifically denying the allegations in the complaint.
 The trial court, acting through the respondent Judge, issued an order denying the petitioners motion. The
respondent Judge based his order on a strict or literal construction of section 2, Rule 9, of the Revised Rules of Court
which, in essence, provides that defenses or objections, except the failure to state a cause of action, if not pleaded in a
motion to dismiss or in an answer, are deemed waived.

On appeal by certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the case, as stated at the outset, was certified to this Court for
resolution" Since the instant petition involves a pure question of law on the correct interpretation of section 2, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the affirmative defense of prescription may be validly set up for the first time in an amended
answer.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

Prescription and estoppel cannot be invoked against the State. If the plaintiffs complaint or evidence shows that
the action had prescribed, the action shall be dismissed. Prescription cannot be invoked as a ground if the contract is
alleged to be void ab initio, but where prescription depends on whether the contract is void or voidable, there must be a
hearing.

128. FERRER vs. ERICTA (August 23, 1978; 84 SCRA 705)

FACTS:

A complaint for damages dated December 27, 1974 but actually filed on January 6, 1975 (Civil Case No. Q-
19647) was filed by petitioners against respondents.

It was alleged that defendants Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider, were the owners or operators of a Ford pick-up car.
Said vehicle was allegedly driven by their son Dennis Pfleider, 16 y/o without proper official authority, the vehicle without
due regard to traffic rules and regulations thereby causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer, who was then a
passenger therein, which injuries paralyzed her and required medical treatment and confinement at different hospitals for
more than two (2) years. They prayed that defendants be ordered to reimburse them for actual expenses as well as other
damages.

Defendants put up the affirmative defense that defendant Dennis Pfleider exercised due care and utmost
diligence in driving the vehicle and alleging that Annette Ferrer and the other persons aboard said vehicle were not
passengers in the strict sense of the term, but were merely joy riders and that, consequently, defendants had no
obligation whatsoever to plaintiffs.

At the pre-trial, only plaintiffs-petitioners and their counsel were present. Consequently, defendants-private
respondents were declared in default and the plaintiff petitioners were allowed to present their evidence exparte.

Private respondents filed a motion to "set aside the order of default and subsequent pleadings" on the ground that
"defendants' failure to appear for pre-trial was due to accident or excusable neglect." This was opposed by petitioners. In
view of this, the motion of private respondents was denied by respondent Judg. Thereafter, respondent Judge rendered
judgment against private respondents, and ordered them to pay to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs for actual
expenses, hospitalization and medical expenses; for actual expenses for the care, medicines of plaintiff; for moral
damages; for exemplary damages; for attorney's fees; and costs of suit.

Respondents filed an MR of the decision and of the order denying the motion to set aside order of default, on the
ground that case states no cause of action and that the action has already prescribed, the case being filed only on Jan. 6,
1975, more than 4 years from date of accident on December 31, 1970", likewise appearing from the complaint and,
therefore, the action has already prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.

A Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 2 was subsequently filed by defendants-private respondents on

September10, 1975, alleging that their defense of prescription has not been waived and may be raised even at such stage
of the proceedings.

Respondents filed Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration alleging that their defense of prescription has not
been waived and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings to which the petitioners filed an Opposition thereto.

On September 23, 1975, respondent judge, without setting aside the order of default, issued an order absolving
defendants from any liability on the grounds that: (a) the complaint states no cause of action because it does not allege
that Dennis Pfleider was living with his parents at the time of the vehicular accident, considering that under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or incapacity the mother, are only responsible for the damages caused
by their minor children who live in their company; and (b) that the defense of prescription is meritorious, since the
complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the date of the accident, and the action to recover damages based on
quasi-delict prescribes in four (4) years.

Hence, the instant petition for mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private respondents' failure to allege the same
in their answer.

RULING:

No. the instant petition for mandamus is DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court sustained the dismissal of a counterclaim on the ground of prescription, although such
defense was not raised in the answer of the plaintiff. Thus, the Court held that where the answer does not take issue with
the complaint as to dates involved in the defendant's claim of prescription, his failure to specifically plead prescription in
the answer does not constitute a waiver of the defense of prescription. It was explained that the defense of prescription,
even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such defense raises issues of fact
not appearing upon the preceding pleading.

In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with the question of prescription. The
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19647 alleges that the accident which caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff occured on
December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the action for damages was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages
arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within four years. The four-year period begins from the day
the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the accident.

129. CASTILLO vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE MADRIGAL (June 27, 1991; 198 SCRA 556)

FACTS:

Petitioners spouses Mariano Castillo and Pilar Castillo, in their own behalf and in representation of the heirs of
Eduardo Castillo, filed a verified complaint before the Court of First Instance of Manila for annulment of contract and
transfer certificate of title and/or reconveyance with damages against private respondents heirs of Vicente Madrigal and/or
Susana Realty, Inc. and public respondent Register of Deeds of the City of Manila.

Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that: (a) the complaint states no cause of action; and
(b) the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed in toto.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not:

Petitioners' action for annulment of contract and transfer certificate of title and/or reconveyance with damages is
subject to prescription; and
The complaint states a cause of action against private respondents.

RULING:

The action for reconveyance is likewise imprescriptible because its basis is the alleged void contract of sale.

However, the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land alleges that some of the
defendants bought said land from their co-defendants who had a defective title thereto but does not allege that the
purchasers were purchasers in bad faith or with notice of the defect in the title of their vendors, there is a failure to state a
cause of action.
 By reason of this failure, private respondent is presumed to be an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith,
entitled to protection under the law.

Petition is DENIED.

130. RUIZ vs. CA (October 21, 1997; 79 SCRA 525)

FACTS:

The late Pedro V. Garcia was a businessman with substantial shareholdings in V. C. Ponce Co., Inc. consisting of
shares of stock and real properties. Sometime in 1977, an internal conflict developed and besieged the company,
engendering suits between respondent Garcia and V.C. Ponce Co., Inc. over the formers funds and assets.

Respondent Pedro V. Garcia engaged the legal services of herein petitioners, Attys. Vivencio M. Ruiz and Emilio
D. Castellanes, and an Agreement denominated as a Contract of Retainership was executed by them.

Respondent unilaterally terminated the said Contract of Retainership on the alleged ground that the petitioners,
his lawyers, failed to settle amicably his (Garcia) differences with V. C. Ponce Co., Inc. Petitioners were paid attorneys
fees up to the month of July, 1982. Thereafter, the petitioners Ruiz and Castellanes manifested their withdrawal as
counsel for Pedro V. Garcia and moved that their attorneys lien be put on record, in the cases involved. Such motion was
granted by the trial court.

Petitioners Ruiz and Castellanes brought their action For Collection of Sum of Money and for Specific
Performance.

While the said case was pending before the said lower court of origin, Pedro V. Garcia died. And so, after
notifying the trial court of the demise of their client, counsel moved for the dismissal of the case, invoking Section 21, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court.

The lower court issued an Order dismissing petitioners complaint.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals handed down its challenged Decision granting the dismissal of the case and
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding that the instant case for recovery of attorneys professional
fees which had not been adjudicated by final pronouncement is abated by the death of the defendant-client and should
therefore be dismissed in accordance with Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

Under the plain language of Section 21, Rule 3 of B.P. 129, it is beyond cavil that if the defendant dies before the
Court of First Instance or the Regional Trial Court has rendered a judgment, the action is dismissed and the plaintiff is
required to file a money claim against the estate of the deceased. But if the defendant dies after the said court has
rendered a judgment and pending appeal, the action is not dismissed and the deceased defendant is substituted by his
executor or administrator or legal heirs.

The core of petitioners argument is that action should not be dismissed since their complaint involves not just
monetary claim but also real properties, as well.

Petitioners contention is untenable. While they maintain that what they are claiming include real properties, their
Complaint is captioned as For Collection of Money and for Specific Performance. Obviously, the petitioners themselves,
who are lawyers, believed that their cause of action against the private respondent is in the nature of actio in personam.

Actio in personam is a personal action seeking redress against a particular person. Personal actions are such
whereby a man claims a debt, or personal duty, or damages in lieu thereof. In the present case, petitioners seek to
recover attorneys fees from private respondent for professional services they rendered to the latter. Attorneys fee is
basically a compensation. In its ordinary sense, the term (compensation) applies not only to salaries, but to compensation
by fees for specific service.

Viewed in proper perspective, an action to recover attorneys fees is basically a monetary claim, which under
Section 21, Rule 3 of B.P. 129 is an action that does not survive. Petition is DENIED.
131. LANDAYAN V. BACANI

Facts:

Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. He died
intestate in Urdaneta. On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse of Teodoro
Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document, entitled "Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition" whereby
they adjudicated between themselves the properties left by Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented himself in
said document as "the only forced heir and descendant" of the late Teodoro Abenojar.

On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan presided over by the
respondent Judge seeking a judicial declaration that they are legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar, and that private
respondents be ordered to surrender the ownership and possession of some of the properties that they acquired under the
deed of extra-judicial settlement corresponding to the shares of the petitioners and that the said deed of extra- judicial
settlement and the subsequent deed of donation executed in favor of private respondents, spouses Liberata Abenojar and
Jose Serrano, in consequence thereof be declared null and void.

As their affirmative and special defense, the private respondents alleged that the action of the petitioners had already
prescribed, the same having been filed more than 18 years after the execution of the documents that they seek to annul.

After a preliminary hearing on said affirmative defense, the respondent Judge issued an Order sustaining the contention
that the action is barred by prescription and dismissing the case as a consequence thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint based on prescription is proper.

HELD: The court finds the dismissal of the action filed by the petitioners to be precipitious and erroneous. Although the
principles relied upon by the respondent Judge are legally correct, he had unqualifiedly assumed the extra-judicial partition
to be merely a voidable contract and not a void one. This question may not be resolved by determining alone the ground
for the annulment of the contract. It requires an inquiry into the legal status of private respondent Severino Abenojar,
particularly as to whether he may be considered as a "legal heir" of Teodoro Abenojar and as such entitled to participate in
an extra-judicial partition of the estate of said deceased.

The Order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is ordered to try the case on the
merits and render the corresponding judgment thereon.

132. DULAY V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa
Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival,
shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her
minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents
Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"),
alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.

ISSUE: whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action.

HELD:

The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A
cause of action exist if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

The Court finds, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and
respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot
Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.
133. PARANAQUE KINGS V. COURT OF APPEALS.

FACTS:

Upon the very face of the plaintiffs Complaint itself, it therefore indubitably appears that the defendant Santos had verily
complied with paragraph 9 of the Lease Agreement by twice offering the properties for sale to the plaintiff for P15 M. The
said offers, however, were plainly rejected by the plaintiff which scorned the said offer as RIDICULOUS. There was therefore
a definite refusal on the part of the plaintiff to accept the offer of defendant Santos. For in acquiring the said properties back
to her name, and in so making the offers to sell both by herself (attorney-in-fact) and through her counsel, defendant Santos
was indeed conscientiously complying with her obligation under paragraph 9 of the Lease Agreement.

ISSUE: The legal issue presented before the for resolution is whether the aforequoted complaint alleging breach of the
contractual right of first option or priority to buy states a valid cause of action.

HELD: We do not agree with respondents contention that the issue involved is purely factual. The principal legal question,
as stated earlier, is whether the complaint filed by herein petitioner in the lower court states a valid cause of action. Since
such question assumes the facts alleged in the complaint as true, it follows that the determination thereof is one of law, and
not of facts. There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts.

134. MERILL LYNCH FUTURES V. COURT OF APPEALS.

FACTS:

Merrill Lynch Futures Inc (MLFI) is a nonresident corporation not doing business in the Philippines and duly organized and
existing under the laws of Delaware. It entered into a Futures Customer Agreement with Lara spouses. Orders were
transmitted to MLFI by Lara spouses through Merrill Lynch Philippines Inc., a Philippine corporation servicing MLFIs
customers. Lara spouses became indebted to MLFI, which the latter claimed from the Laras. The Laras refused on the
ground that the transactions were null and void, because Merrill Lynch Philippines had no license to operate as a commodity
or financial futures broker. MLFI filed a complaint with the QC RTC for recovery of said debt. Laras moved to dismiss on
the ground that MLFI had been doing business in the Philippines; hence MLFI is prohibited by law to maintain or intervene
in any action. Laras alleged they were not aware Merrill Lynch Philippines had no license to do business in this country.

ISSUE: Whether or not MLFI may sue in the Philippine Courts to establish and enforce its rights against Sps. Lara, in light
of the undeniable fact that it had transacted business in this country without being licensed to do so?

HELD:

(YES)

In other words, if it be true that during all the time that they were transacting with ML FUTURES, the Laras were fully
aware of its lack of license to do business in the Philippines, and in relation to those transactions had made payments to,
and received money from it for several years, the question is whether or not the Lara Spouses are now estopped to impugn
ML FUTURES capacity to sue them in the courts of the forum.

135. RAVA DEVELOPMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS.

FACTS:

This case arose from a contract of leases between Rava Development Corporation (RAVA, for brevity) and Wheels
Distributors, Inc. (WHEELS, for brevity), over a parcel of land with existing buildings and improvements thereon, situated at
No. 3, Aurora Boulevard, Quezon City.

During the existence of said lease, or on August 1, 1985, RAVA and Frabal Fishing & Ice Plant Corporation (FRABAL, for
brevity) effected a merger for the purpose of strengthening their economic stability and efficiency (Rollo, pp. 16, 85). As a
result of said merger RAVA was absorbed by FRABAL. Consequently, RAVA transferred the leased premises to FRABAL.

WHEELS filed a complaint against RAVA and FRABAL for specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court.
RAVA and FRABAL moved for the dismissal of the complaint, as well as the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction on
the ground that the respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the nature of, or subject matter of, the action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

HELD:
The contention of RAVA and FRABAL is untenable.

The rule is that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action is regarded as having
hypothetically admitted all the averments thereof. The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition as constituting a
cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer thereof (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]).

In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be considered. It is
error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the
allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants.

136. Del Bros vs. CA

137. D.C. Crystal vs. Laya

138. Marcopper Mining vs. Garcia

139. Banez Electric Light vs. Abra Electric

140. Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank

FACTS: Samuel Mathay, et.al. were former stockholders of Consolidated Mines Inc. (CMI).Petitioners filed a case for a
class suit against CMI containing six causes of action. Petitioners alleged that in violation of the Board resolution, the
defendants unlawfully acquired stockholdings in the defendant Bank in excess of what they were lawfully entitled, hence
depriving the petitioners of their right to subscribe at par value, in proportion to their equities established under their
respective "Pre-Incorporation Agreements to Subscribe" to the capital stock and that the Articles of Incorporation were
fraudulently amended by the defendants. The complaint was dismissed by the Trial Court on the ground that the class suit
could not be maintained because of the absence of a showing in the complaint that the plaintiffs-appellants were sufficiently
numerous and representative, and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The CA affirmed the ruling, hence,
the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant action is a class suit.

HELD: The action at bar is not a class suit.

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy
is one of common or general interest to many persons, and (2) that such persons be so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all to the court. The statute requires that the complaint should allege the existence of the
necessary facts, the existence of a class and the number of members in the said class so as to enable the court to
determine whether the members of the said class are so numerous as to make it impractical to bring them all to court. The
complaint in the instant case failed to state the number of said CMI subscribing stockholders that the trial court could not
infer nor make sure that the parties are indeed so numerous that they cannot practically appear in court and that the
plaintiffs are representative of the other stockholders. The statute also requires that the subject-matter of the controversy
be of common interest to numerous persons. In the instant case, the interest that appellants, plaintiffs and intervenors,
and the CMI stockholders had in the subject matter of this suit was several, not common or general in the sense required
by the statute. Each one of the appellants and the CMI stockholders had determinable interest; each one had a right, if
any, only to his respective portion of the stocks. No one of them had any right to, or any interest in, the stock to which
another was entitled.

141. U Dalandan VS Julio

FACTS: On September 24, 1932, during the lifetime of Clemente Dalandan and Victorina Dalandan, they executed a
notarial document whereby said Clemente Dalandan, sold, ceded, and transferred by way of pacto de retro sale to
Victorina Dalandan, fifty (50) plots or "salt beds" (banigan), which form part of the one hundred and fifty two (152 plots or
"banigan" found on six (6) parcels of land, situated at Las Pias, Rizal subject to the right of Clemente Dalandan to
repurchase the said fifty (50) plots or "banigan" for the same amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) within ten (10)
years from September 24, 1932, the date of said pacto de retro sale. Before the expiration of the expropriation, Clemente
and Victorina executed another notarial document waiving the 10 years period of redemption or repurchase to pay P4000
at anytime without any limitation as to the period of redemption or repurchase. The document also expressly provided that
in the event of death of Victorina Dalandan, the redemption price of P4,000.00 shall be paid to Engracio Santos and
Eleuterio Santos (both grandsons of Victorina Dalandan) at P1,500.00 each, and to Victoria Julio (daughter of Victorina
Dalandan), the amount of P1,000.00.

On December 1960, the defendants were notified in writing that the plaintiffs are now ready to pay the amount of
P4,000.00 to them but the defendants (in spite of the fact that they received the said notice in writing) refused to accept or
receive the said amount from the plaintiffs. Due to the refusal of, the defendants to accept the payment of P4,000.00, the
plaintiffs are forced to consign or deposit the amount of P4,000.00 in court. The defendants, filed a motion to dismiss the
case on the grounds that (1) the complaint states no cause of action; and (2) granting that it stated a cause of action, it is
already barred by the Statute of Limitations and/or laches.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid cause of action.

HELD: As a rule, the complaint should contain allegation of ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.

Neither is it proper to allege in a pleading inferences of fact from facts not stated, or incorrect inferences from facts stated,
for they are not the ultimate facts required by law to be pleaded. Legal conclusions need not be pleaded, because so far
as they are correct they are useless, and when erroneous, worse than useless. - (I Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court [1957 Ed.] P. 109.)

And to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint and no other should be
considered.

The allegation of nullity of a judgment in a complaint, being a conclusion and not a material allegation, is not deemed
admitted by the party who files a motion to dismiss. (Quiambao v. Peralta, G. R. No. L-9689, January 27, 1958.)

142. TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

FACTS: Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public
forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval Reservation
comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the US Government to the Philippine Government.
Wenceslao Tan with nine others submitted their application in due form.

The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a
general memorandum order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to some
conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing Gozon) promulgated on December
19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. On
the same date, OTL in the name of Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without the approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Director of Forestry .

Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that the OTL of Tan be revoked. On March 9,
1964, The Secretary of ANR declared Tans OTL null and void (but the same was not granted to Ravago). Petitioner-
appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the
motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available.

HELD: Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines. Considering that the President has the power to
review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure
on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.

143. SANTIAGO VS PIONEER SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK

FACTS: Emilia Santiago who is the petitioner in this case is the owner of a parcel of land located in Valenzuela, Manila.
On April 7 1983, she executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Construction Resources Corporation of the
Philippine (CRCP). On April 8 1983, CRCP executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the Disputed Property in favor of
FINASIA Investment and Finance Corporation to secure a loan of P1 Million. The mortgage contract specifically provided
that in the event of default in payment, the mortgagee may immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially or extrajudicially.
The promissory note evidencing the indebtedness.

On July 29, 1983, FINASIA executed in favor of Pioneer Savings an Outright Sale of Receivables without Recourse.
CRCP failed to settle its obligation and the bank opted for the foreclosure of the mortgage. The notice of auction sale was
scheduled and when this came to the knowledge of Santiago, she filed a complaint with the RTC of Valenzuela to
invalidate the REM. The RTC issued a TRO enjoining the sale at a public auction of the subject property. The petitioner
further assailed that she was not aware of any REM she had executed in favor of the defendant bank.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a cause of action.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the determination of the sufficiency of a cause of action must be limited to the facts
alleged in the complaint and no other should be considered. In this case, however, a hearing was held and documentary
evidence was presented, not on the Motion to Dismiss but on the question of granting or denying the plaintiffs application
for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The Counsel for the plaintiff admitted that evidence presented That being so, the trial
court committed no reversible error.

144. ASIA BANKING VS WALTER OLSEN

FACTS: February 6, 1920 the defendant Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc. obtained a loan of P200,00 from the plaintiff for the
purpose of purchasing a piece of land in Tondo. After the land had been purchased, the defendant corporation, Walter E.
Olsen & Co., Inc. executed in favor of its codefendants and of Mr. A. D. Gibbs a promissory note for the amount of
P200,00 and a mortgage upon the land to secure the payment of the P200,000 and a mortgage upon the secure of
payment of the P200,00.

On April 25, 1921, the defendant corporation Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc. through its president and treasurer, Mr. Walter E.
Olsen, one of the defendants, mortgaged the same land to the plaintiff to secure the payment of the loan of P200,000.

The complaint prays that judgment be rendered against defendants and each and every one of them jointly and severally
for the sum of P200,000, with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from November 4, 1920. All the defendants,
except Mr. Walter E. Olsen, subscribed a document wherein they agreed that a judgment be rendered prayed for in
complaint. The judgment appealed form dismisses the complaint as to the defendants Walter E. Olsen John W. Marker,
Louis McCall, B. A. Green and Theobald Diehl, sentencing the defendant Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc. to pay the plaintiff
within three months the sum of P200,000, with interest at 9 percent per annum from November 4, 1920.

ISSUE: Whether or not this is error in the judgment of the court.

HELD: Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower court took into consideration the documents
attached to the complaint as a part thereof, without having been expressly introduced in evidence. This was no error. In
the answer of the defendants there was no denial under oath of the authenticity of these documents. Under section 103 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the authenticity be deemed admitted. The effect of this to relieve the plaintiff from the duty of
expressly presenting such documents as evidence. The court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should
consider, without the introduction of evidence, the facts admitted by the parties. The judgment appealed from is affirmed
with costs against the appellant.

145. PELTAN DEVELOPMENT VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The respondents were applying for a free patent to a certain parcel of land which they have been occupying,
cultivating, planting, staying, and introducing improvements thereon and neither one of petitioners was in possession
thereof. They had the land surveyed but the processing and approval of their application were held in abeyance despite
the absence of any opposition on grounds that there allegedly existing certificates of title on said land in the name of
Peltan Development. Peltan allegedly obtained their title from spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Carlos, however the
respondents assail that the title was spurious and fictitious. Prior to their application for a free patent, the improvements
they introduced to the land were bulldozed by one of the petitioners. They filed a complaint that by virtue of the spurious
title produced by the petitioners and the illegal destruction of the respondents plants and dwellings, their rights for a free
patent to the land were substantially prejudiced by petitioners and hold them liable to pay for actual and compensatory
damages. Peltan filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defense on grounds that the respondents have no
cause of action against them and they are not the real party of interest in the action they sought to assert as they have no
subsisting title to present over the disputed property. Their contention was based on a former jurisprudence that the
government thru the Solicitor General should be the real party of interest to file a motion for cancellation of the certificate
of title. In answer, the respondents re-asserted their cause of action to their complaint and showed their rights, interest
and claims to have been violated thereby placing them to a status of real party of interest.

The lower court dismissed the complaint ruling that the respondents were not a real party of interest. This decision was
reversed by the court of appeals ruling that the lower court should have treated the action as accion publiciana to determine
which party has the right to possession. The petitioners now file a petition for review and pray for the cancellation of the
notation of lis pendens on their certificate of title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are the real party of interest in their action against the petitioners?

HELD: The SC reversed the decision of the appellate court. It is a well-settled rule that the cause of action is determined
by the allegations in the complaint and to resolve the motion to dismiss based on failure to state cause of action, only the
facts in the complaint must be considered. The court held that the CA failed to appreciate the fact that the title of the
petitioners were validly upheld by the court in a court proceeding (G.R. No. 109490 and in G.R. No. 112038). Every court
should take mandatory judicial notice to court decisions when resolving motion to dismiss as required by Rule 129, section
1 of the Rules of Court. The CA erred in recognizing the rights of the respondents as one based on their actual possession
of the land and their pending application for a free patent thereof. It also committed a reversible error to treat the issue as
one of accion publiciana since the decision has already been rendered by the court before upholding the title of the
petitioners as valid and genuine. Therefore, it is no longer an option to treat the case as one.

The respondents are held not as real party of interest since although they were not praying for the reversion of the land to
the government such complaint would still result to the same under the Regalian doctrine. The respondents have no right
over the land as they admit that neither they nor their predecessors owned the land which is construed that the land in
dispute remains to be a property of public domain. If there is any person with real interest to the land it should be the
government. The SC reversed and set aside the decision of the CA and cancelled the annotation of lis pendens to the
petitioners title.

151. Legaspi-Santos v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

In April 1958, Civil Case No. 1692-M, was filed with the CFI of Bulacan, for partition of properties left by their deceased
parents, Fidel Legaspi and Gregoria Cristobal. During the pendency of the case, Josefa Legaspi-Santos, filed a complaint
in intervention claiming a share in the properties involved, as daughter of Fidel Legaspi before his marriage to Gregoria
Cristobal.

In June 1980, after more than twenty (20) years, said Civil Case No. 1692-M, was decided by the trial court, dividing all the
properties left by Don Fidel Legaspi involving more than 50 parcels of land among plaintiffs and defendants (as children of
the second marriage), and dismissing for lack of merit the intervention of herein petitioner Josefa Legaspi-Santos (only child
of his first marriage)

On August 14, 1980, intervenor Josefa Legaspi-Santos filed a motion for extension of time. within which to appeal the
aforesaid decision. The trial court gave her 30 days. On September 15, 1980, Josefa Legaspi-Santos again moved for
another extension of 20 days within which to perfect her appeal. The motion was granted by the court. On October 8, 1980,
Josefa Legaspi-Santos filed another motion for extension of 20 days within which to perfect her appeal but, this time, the
lower court, in its Order of October 13, 1980, denied it on the ground that the period for perfecting her appeal had expired
on October 7, 1980, in which case there was no more period to extend and the court had already lost jurisdiction to act on
the motion.

Issue:

WON not the appeal interposed by Josefa Legaspi-Santos from the decision of the trial court, dated June 18, 1980, was
perfected on time

Rulings:

It is not denied that the period for appeal expired on October 7, 1980 and that the third motion to extend the time to perfect
petitioner's appeal was filed one (1) day late.

In Galima, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 16 SCRA 140, the rule was laid down that the motion for extension of the period for
filing the record on appeal must be filed before the expiration of the 30-day period. "The miscomputation by counsel of the
appeal period will not arrest the course of the same, nor prevent the finality of the judgment. Otherwise, the definitive and
executory character of the judgment would be left to the whim of the losing party, when it is to the interest of everyone that
the date when judgments become final should remain fixed and ascertainable."

In the case at bar, our attention is invited by the private respondents that petitioner has not even filed the notice of appeal
and her appeal bond within the period of 30 days from receipt of the decision. "The petitioner made a motion for extension
of time to perfect her appeal without filing the necessary notice of appeal and appeal bond and it was only as late as January
16, 1981 or one hundred twenty-one (121) days after her deadline to perfect appeal when she filed them.
152. Mangali v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

On August 23, 1974, there is no dispute that Lot No. 2 (one of the nine lots included in O.C.T. No. 12192 of the Bulacan
Registry of Property) was sold a retro on October 8, 1929 by the registered owner Arcadio Mendoza in favor of one Gregorio
dela Cruz for P500.00; that Arcadio Mendoza on May 2, 1935, subsequently, in a deed of absolute sale, sold his 'right to
redeem' to Liberate Mangali for P500.00; and that Liberate Mangali, thru a deed of reconveyance executed by Gregorio
dela Cruz on May 6, 1935, redeemed the property also for the sum of P500.00. These transactions are not only registered
or annotated on the Original Certificate of Title No. 12192.

Court holds that the testimony thereon is vague, uncertain, biased, self-serving and unbelievable. Besides, why was not a
written document executed when after all, the other transactions were all written and registered.

After this decision was promulgated, it appears that within the reglementary period for appeal private respondents filed their
notice of appeal bond and record on appeal but due to objections on the part of petitioners, the trial court issued on January
29, 1976 the disputed order.

Purportedly in complaince with the foregoing order, respondents filed on March 1, 1976 their amended record on appeal.
This was Windy 19 days after their having received the said order. In consequence, on March 15, 1976, petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal for having been filed out of time allegedly in violation of Section 7 of Rule 41.

Issue:

WON Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Br. VII, can give due course to their appeal.

Rulings:

Court has repeatedly held that while the rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods
are strictly applied as they are deemed indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and necessary to the orderly
and speedy discharge of judicial business.
We reiterated the same ruling in Macabingkil vs. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, thus: These provisions of
the Rules of Court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done or certain proceedings taken, are considered
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly discharge of judicial business (Alvero vs.
de la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428). The time can be extended only if a motion for extension is filed within the time or period provided
therefor. In the case at bar, no motion for extension was ever filed by petitioner Macabingkil before March 23, 1968, and,
as such, the said decision of March 1, 1968 has already become final and executory. To reiterate, perfection of an appeal
in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal
as required by the Rules has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.

153. Valdez v. Ocumen

Facts:

On March 9, 1957, the justice of the peace court, after due hearing rendered a decision in case No. 224 ordering the
defendants to restore to the plaintiff the possession of the questioned Lot No. 3005, to vacate its premises, and to pay the
costs. Notice of said decision was sent to the parties on April 30, 1957, defendants receiving their copy on May 24, 1957.
On May 29, 1957, defendants filed with said court a notice of appeal and an appeal bond of P25.00 without, however, paying
the appellate court docket fee of P16.00, as required under Section 2, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court. Acting upon said
notice of appeal, the court, on the same date, issued an order forwarding the records of the case to the CFI of Isabela but
stating therein "without however the docket fee for appeal". The Clerk of Court of First Instance received the records on July
25, 1957, at 3:30 P.M. Defendants paid the appellate court docket fee of P16.00 only on the following day, July 26, 1957.

Resolving plaintiff's motion filed on July 29, 1957, to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the
reglementary period (15 days from notice of the judgment) provided in the Rules of Court, and defendant's opposition
thereto, the Court of First Instance on August 28, 1957, issued an order dismissing the appeal.

Defendant's motion for reconsideration of said order on the ground of its alleged illegality having been denied, defendants
instituted this present appeal.

Issue:

WON the trial judge correctly and properly dismissed said appeal.

Rulings:

Section 2, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court, provides: Appeal, how perfected.An appeal shall be perfected within fifteen
days after notification to the of the party judgment complained of, (a) by filing with the justice of the peace or municipal judge
a notice of appeal; (b) by delivering a certificate of the municipal treasure were showing that the appellant has deposited
the appellate court docket fee or in charactered cities, a certificate of the clerk of such court showing receipt of the said fee;
and (c) by giving a bond.

Under this provision of the Rules of Court, in order to perfect an appeal from the judgment of the Justice of the Peace or
Municipal Court, an appellant must, within 15 days from notice of the judgment, (1) file with the justice of the peace or
municipal judge a notice of appeal, (2) deliver a certificate of the municipal treasurer or of the clerk of Court of First Instance
in chartered cities, showing that he has deposited the appellate court docket fee, and (3) give a bond.

In the case under the consideration, while defendants did file with the Justice of Peace of Roxas, their fee of P16.00. It was
only on July 26, 1957, that is, 61 days after filing their notice of appeal evidently, beyond the reglementary period of 15 days
from notice of judgment as provided under the aforequoted section of the Rules of Court, that they elected the payment of
the same. Their appeal, therefore, was never perfected in the Court of First Instance of Isabela, and the trial judge correctly
and properly dismissed said appeal, as it acquired no jurisdiction thereon.

154. Alvero v. De La Rosa

Facts:

On June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a complaint, in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila,
against petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes of action.

On July 7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said complaint, expressly admitting having sold said land to Alvero,
for P100,000, in December, 1944. On July 13, 1945, Alvero, in answering said complaint, denied the allegations made
therein, and claimed exclusive ownership of the land. On July 21, 1945, Victoriano filed an answer to said counterclaim,
denying Alvero's alleged ownership.

Judge of the CFI of the City of Manila rendered judgment in favor of Victoriano.

On November 28, 1945, Alvero filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied; On January 8, 1946,
Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-appeal bond.
On January 14, 1946, Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, and at the same time, asked for the execution of the
judgment.
On January 15, 1946, Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss, alleging that on the very same day, said appeal
bond for P60 had been actually filed, and allege as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond, in due time, the illness of
his lawyer's wife, who died on January 10, 1946, and buried the following day.

On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the dismissal of the appeal, declaring
that, although the notice of appeal and record on appeal had been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.
On January 23, 1946, Alvero filed a petition for the reconsideration of the said order dated January 17, 1946, dismissing his
appeal; and said petition for reconsideration was denied on January 29, 1946. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:

WON the petition for certiorari filed in this case, should be dismissed.

Rulings:

Yes. Motions of that kind have been considered as motions pro forma intended merely to delay the proceeding, and, as
such, they cannot and will not interrupt or suspend the period of time for the perfection of the appeal. Hence, the period for
perfecting herein petitioner's appeal commenced from November 28, 1945, when he was notified of the judgment rendered
in the case, and expired on December 28, 1945; and, therefore, his notice of appeal and record on appeal filed on January
8, 1946, were filed out of time, and much more so his appeal bond, which was only filed on January 15, 1946.

The attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero could have asked for an extension of time, within which to file and perfect
his appeal, in the court below; but he had failed to do so, and he must bear the consequences of his act. A strict observance
of the rules of court, which have been considered indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and
speedy dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative necessity.

155. FJR Garments Industries v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

The city court of Pasay City on March 11, 1978 rendered a decision ordering Kapisanang Magkakapitbahay Damayan at
Abuluyan, Inc. to vacate the lots and to restore the owner, FJR Garments Industries, to the possession thereof and to pay
the accumulated back rentals.

The decision was served on Kapisanan on July 6, 1978. Nine days thereafter, or on July 15, 1978, Kapisanan filed a notice
of a appeal but it did not pay the docket fee of P20 and the appeal bond of P50 and post the supersedeas bond of P107,860,
as required by sections 2 and 3, Rule 40 in relation to section 8, Rule 70 and section 5 (12), Rule 141, Rules of Court.

The city court "disapproved" Kapisanan's appeal. Without filing any motion for reconsideration, Kapisanan filed
the next day in the CFI of Pasay City a petition for relief from judgment on the ground of mistake and excusable negligence
consisting of the alleged misinterpretation made by a member of Kapisanan in paying only the postage stamps for the notice
mailed to adverse counsel instead of the docket fee and appeal bond. However, the lower court dismissed the petition for
relief because of its finding that Kapisanan's failure to appeal was due to its inexcusable neglect.

Kapisanan filed on August 28, 1978 a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to annul the lower court's order.

Issue:

WON the lessee should be allowed to pay the docket fee and file an appeal bond after the 15-day period.

Rulings:

We hold that the failure of Kapisanan to perfect its appeal was not a pardonable oversight. It is not entitled to relief from
judgment because there was no fraud or excusable neglect which prevented it from seasonably appealing to the CFI.
Moreover, its petition had no affidavit of merits. Furthermore, its failure to file a supersedeas bond rendered the city court's
judgment immediately executory.

The fact that even before the expiration of the 15-day period the city court declared Kapisanan's appeal "moot and
academic" is of no moment since the fact is that during that period the lessee did not attempt to pay the docket fee and
appeal bond.

Rules of court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict
compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative.
156. G.R. No. 129718 SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, petitioner vs. CESAR ANTONIO Y. SURLA and
EVANGELINE SURLA, respondents. August 17, 1998
FACTS:
Respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Santo Tomas University Hospital with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City predicated on an allegation by the spouses that their son, Emmanuel Cesar Surla, while
confined at the said hospital for having been born prematurely, had accidentally fallen from his incubator possibly causing
serious harm on the child. Petitioner hospital filed a complaint which was soon dismissed by the trial court. Petitioner also
filed before the same court an Omnibus motion seeking for clarification as why the trial court denied his Reply and
Counterclaim. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner which was denied by the trial court. Petitioner forthwith
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari under rule 65. Said petition was
dismissed by the Curt of Appeals. Hence, this instant case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be dismissed on the ground of a failure to
accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping.

RULING: The petitioner is entitled to partial relief. A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of
action against the plaintiff in a case x x x, only this time it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands on
the same footing and is tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action.
In the case at bar, an appeal from the dismissal of the counterclaim, although not totally unavailable, could have well
been ineffective, if not futile, as far as petitioner is concerned since no single piece of evidence has yet been presented by
it, the opportunity having been foreclosed by the trial court, on the dismissed counterclaim which could form part of the
records to be reviewed by the appellate court. The object of procedural law is not to cause an undue protraction of the
litigation, but to facilitate the adjudication of conflicting claims and to serve, rather than to defeat, the ends of justice.

157. G.R. No. L-26768 FAUSTINO GOJO, petitioner-appellant, vs. SEGUNDO GOYALA and ANTONINA
ALMOGUERA, respondents-appellees. October 30, 1970

FACTS:
Appellee Goyala together with his now deceased wife Almoguera sold to appellant by a "Deed of Pacto de
Retro Sale" a certain parcel of agricultural land having an area of approximately two and one-half hectares for P750.00, the
repurchase to be made, according to the deed, within one year. About ten (10) years after the execution of the said
document, the vendee filed with the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon the present case against the vendors by way of a
petition for consolidation of ownership of the land described and involved in the "Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale." The
complaint was dismissed for failure to submit amended complaint. Apellant was then declared in default with respect to the
appellee. After he presentation of evidences, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the deed of Pacto de Retro Sale
an equitable mortgage and ordered the delivery and restoration of the land. Dissatisfied with the decision, appellant
appealed the Court of Appeals which certified the case to the Supreme Court for resolution since said appeal involves a
purely question of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in: (a) declaring the plaintiff in default; (b) deputizing or commissioning the clerk
of court to receive the evidence of the defendant; and (c) rendering judgment in favour of the respondents.

RULING: YES. The thrust of appellant's argument in respect of the first assignment of error is to the effect that there is no
occasion for the trial court to declare him in default in respect of appellee's counterclaim in this case, for the reasons that:
(a) the said counterclaim "falls within the category of compulsory counterclaim" which does not call for an independent
answer as the complaint already denies its material allegations; and (b) the dismissal of the complaint in this case without
prejudice carried with it the dismissal of the said counterclaim.

Regarding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint, the Court also ruled, that the trial court committed reversible error
in ordering the same. It is true that under Section 3 of Rule 17, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to prosecute if the
plaintiff fails to comply with an order of the court, but it is obvious that the said provision cannot apply when the order
supposedly ignored is a void one, as in this case. Here, the trial court ordered petitioner to amend the complaint only
because it was informed that one of the defendants had died, the court directing that the plaintiff should name the heirs of
the deceased as defendants in lieu of said deceased.

Besides, in line with the principle underlying Sec. 2 of Rule 17, it is not proper to dismiss a complaint when a
compulsory counterclaim has been pleaded by defendant. The reason is obvious. Under the cited provision, the right of the
plaintiff to move for the dismissal of an action after the defendant has filed his answer is qualified by the clause providing
that: "If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss,
the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court." With this limitation, the power of the court to dismiss the complaint upon motion of
plaintiff, which is usually without prejudice, is not purely discretionary. The purpose is to avoid multiplicity of suits over the
same matter which would necessarily entail unnecessary expense and, what is worse, possibility of conflict and
inconsistency in the resolution of the same questions. The same considerations would obtain, if the defendant were the one
to ask for dismissal. The best interests of justice require that conflicting claims regarding the same matter should be decided
in one single proceeding. Dismissing the complaint without prejudice, as the trial court has done in this case, albeit upon
motion of the defendant, will not prevent the undesirable multiplication of suits and reventilation of the same issues in the
subsequent action that may be filed by virtue of the reservation made in the disputed order of dismissal.
158. G.R. No. L-11647 FLORENTINO NAVARRO and BEATRIZ VINOYA, petitioners, vs. HON. ELOY BELLO, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, JUAN CABUANG, FLORENTINA BAUTISTA, FLORENCIO GALICIA and
CONSOLACION BAUTISTA, respondents. January 31, 1958

FACTS:

Petitioners-plaintiffs filed a complaint with the CFI of Pangasinan praying for the annulment of transfer certificates
of title Nos. 15967 and 15968 and the corresponding deeds of sale executed by respondents Florencio Galicia and
Consolacion Bautista in favor of respondents Juan Cabuang and Florentino Bautista over lots Nos. 20774 and 32540, of
the San Carlos Cadastre, claiming ownership of said parcels of land, and alleging actual possession. Soon after, the court
rendered decision adjudicating the defendant's counterclaim for damages, declaring the respondents owners of the disputed
parcels of land, and dismissing the complaint. As a result, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the trial court. Another motion for reconsideration was filed but was also denied by the trial court. A notice of appeal was
also filed by the petitioners but it was also denied. Thereafter, a petition for certiorari and mandamus with injunction seeking
the annulment of a decision of the CFI of Pangasinan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint

RULING: The writ of certiorari is granted, and the decision of July 30, 1956 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in
its case No. 13099 is hereby set aside, and said court is directed to proceed with the trial of the entire case on the merits.

But in any event, whether or not plaintiffs have answered defendants' counterclaim, they have the right to prove the
averments of their complaint, including their claim that it was by court order that they secured possession of the parcels in
question from defendants. And if plaintiffs are able to prove such allegations, then the court must dismiss defendants'
counterclaim for damages, since the illegal usurpation of defendants' possession allegedly committed by plaintiffs, which is
the basis of the counterclaim, would not have been proved. In short, the issues of the counterclaim partakes of the nature
of a special defense which, even if not specifically challenged by plaintiffs in a reply, is deemed controverted (Rule 11, sec.
1, Rules of Court; Rosario vs. J. Martinez, 92 Phil., 1064; Luna vs. Apacible, 79 Phil.,8). There was, therefore, no occasion
for plaintiffs' default on defendants' counterclaim, and the order of the court below declaring them in default, as well as the
judgment by default, is improper and void.

Since the ownership of the disputed land was put in issued by the allegations of the complaint and the special defenses in
the answer, the correct procedure, assuming that the declaration of default was properly entered, should have been for the
trial court to set the complaint and answer for the hearing. The lower court, even in the case of a true default on the counter
claim, could not deny the petitioners-palintiffs the right to be heard and produce evidence in support of their complaint, as
that pleading was valid and had not been stricken from the records. Their having defaulted on the counterclaim, if they did
so at all, did not operate to deprive the plaintiffs from any standing or remedy in court in connection with their complaint.

159. G.R. No. L-1387 MENA LAMA, petitioner, vs. CONSOLACION N. VDA. DE APACIBLE, and EUGENIO ANGELES,
Judge of First Instance of Batangas, respondents. August 27, 1947

FACTS:
Petitioner seeks the writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in his petition dated March 24, 1947, praying
judgment: (a) revoking the appointment of the receiver in civil case No. 3932 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, with
declaration of nullity of the orders issued by respondent Judge Angeles on January 14, 17, and 21, 1947, as having been
issued without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion; (b) declaring null and void the proceedings had
before the same judge on March 13, 1947, and issuing a writ of prohibition commanding him to desist from further
proceeding with the case until further orders of this Court; (c) declaring null and void the order of the same respondent judge
made in open court denying petitioner's motion to declare respondent Apacible in default in that case, and issuing writ
of mandamus directing said judge to enter another order declaring respondent Apacible in default for failure to answer
petitioner's counterclaim and allowing petitioner to present his evidence in support of said counterclaim; and (d) for general
relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion.

RULING: NO. The respondent judge committed no abuse of discretion in proceeding, as he did, commencing the hearing
on the merits and postponing its continuation until further assignment as prayed by the therein defendant himself. In the
same way, the court find absolutely no showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the judge in reserving until after the
presentation of evidence on the merits the resolution of the appointment of receiver. As to the appointment of receivers, it
is a well settled principle that the determination thereof must primarily start from the fundamental and well-settled principle
that the matter of the appointment of a receiver is largely within the discretion of the court to which the petition is addressed,
provided that court is one of those to which the law of the rules grant the request power. However, the receiver should be
made to file a bond pursuant to Rule 61, section 5.

160. G.R. No. L-25889 HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VIII, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, JAIME E. LAICO and LUZ LOS BANOS-
LAICO, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE CHIVI and ANGELINA CHIVI as representative
of the deceased MARTA B. CHIVI, respondents-appellees. Ernesto J. Seva for petitioners-appellants. January 17, 1973

FACTS:

Spouses Isidro Sierra and Antonia Magtaas sold a parcel of land to Marta B. Chivi, representing to her that the land
was not registered either under the Land Registration Act or under the Spanish Mortgage Law and assuring her that although
the land was covered by a pre-war free patent application, the application had not been approved and no patent had been
issued. At the instance of the Sierras, Chivi filed an application for registration of the land in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. While the application was pending, Chivi sold her rights and interests in the land to the herein petitioners-spouses
Jaime Laico and Luz Los Banos for P25,647.00.Soon, the Laicos discovered that a free patent title was issued to Sierra.

The Sierras filed a complaint against Marta B. Chivi, assisted by her husband, and the Laicos in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 6184, praying that they (plaintiffs) be allowed to repurchase the land under
the provisions of the Public Land Act. Soon after, the Sierras and the Laicos, without knowledge to the Chivis, entered into
a compromise to amicably settle Civil Case No. 6184 between themselves. Said agreement was approved by the trial court
resulting for the dismissal of the case. In this regard, the Chivis filed with the Court of Appeal a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction. Upon giving due course to the petition the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, restraining the therein respondents from proceedings with the execution and with the sale at public auction until
further order. The CA rendered a decision declaring all the proceedings, as well as the orders, decisions and processes null
and void. Hence, the instant appeal by certiorari brought by the Laicos.

Issue:

Whether or not the cross-claim in this particular action can stand after the complaint in the same action was
dismissed with prejudice.

RULING:

NO. The cross-claim in this case was purely defensive in nature. It arose entirely out of the complaint and could
prosper only if the plaintiffs succeeded. Hence, under the principle above enunciated, it could not be the subject of
independent adjudication once it lost the nexus upon which its life depended.

Under the circumstances above set forth the dismissal of the cross-claim should have followed the dismissal of the complaint
as a matter of course, without further proceeding; and in setting the said cross-claim for pre-trial and receiving evidence
thereon and then rendering judgment against the cross-defendants the court committed such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.

166. MACARAEG vs. CA (January 20, 1989; 169 SCRA 259)

FACTS:

A case involving an agricultural land was filed over the Court of Agrarian Relations.

The judgement of the Court of Agrarian Relations went in favor of the plaintiffs.

On appeal, the CA (respondent court) affirmed the agrarian court's judgment basing its decision ground that there
is an alleged procedural defect at the pretrial stage that was not raised by the petitioners, hence, deemed waived.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in not applying the principle of res judicata.

RULING:

The appellate court found that there is no Identity of the parties and the subject matter as between the present
case and a former case docketed as CAR Case No. 2582-T '73. Such identity is an indispensable requisite of the doctrine
of res judicata. The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's findings with respect to the non-applicability of the said
doctrine in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary.

The Supreme Court held that the findings of fact of the court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court provided they are based on substantial evidence.

Petition is DISMISSED.
167. LUCENTA vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BUKIDNON (June 20, 1988; 162 SCRA 197)

FACTS:

This petition originated from an action for recovery of possession instituted by the petitioner in the Court of First
Instance of Bukidnon against the private respondent. At the pretrial, the issue was reduced to whether or not the property
given by the petitioner in exchange for the private respondent's house consisted of only around 600 square meters or the
whole of the petitioner's lot. Both parties admitted that they entered into an oral contract of barter. Both also belong to a
cultural minority group. Initially, the petitioner insisted that only 600 square meters of his lot was offered in the barter
agreement. After trial, the petitioner filed a memorandum adopting a different theory of his case. He attacked the legality
of the barter itself on the ground that the same was not made in accordance with Sections 145 and 146 of the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu. The trial court did not pass upon the issue of the legality of. the barter as the
same was not raised in the pleadings, at the pre-trial and during the trial. Instead, it upheld the oral contract of barter and
ruled that based on the preponderance of evidence presented in court, what was bartered by the petitioner was his whole
lot. Hence, this petition.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, he filed this petition for
certiorari asking us to set aside the decision of the trial court. He contends that the latter court should have decided and
passed upon the validity and legality of the verbal agreement on the following grounds: (a) the fact that the petitioner and
private respondent are members of the cultural minority and that the exchange made between them involving a parcel of
land was not in writing, are both specifically alleged in the pleadings and therefore, the trial court should have taken
cognizance of the same; and (b) although petitioner did not specifically pray for the annulment of the verbal agreement of
exchange, there was a general prayer in his complaint upon which the respondent court may grant or decide such issue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for Certiorari is meritorious.

RULING:

Petition is DENIED for lack of merit

When the petitioner filed his complaint, it was for the recovery of possession of the remaining area of his lot
outside of the 600 square meters which he claimed was the only subject-matter of the barter. Although he alleged that he
and the private respondent are both members of the cultural minority (in fact, they are brothers), he filed suit not for the
purpose of impugning the validity or legality of the verbal contract, but rather, to give strength to the same as it is more
common for members of cultural Minorities to practice barter as a means of trade and commerce than for those who are
not. Furthermore, during the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the only issue to be litigated upon is whether the verbal
agreement pertains to the exchange of the house of the private respondent for the entire land of the petitioner or for only
six hundred (600) square meters thereof. The petitioner is bound by what was agreed upon in the pre-trial.

168. SON vs. SON (December 29, 1995; 251 SCRA 556)

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

169. SESE vs. IAC (July 31 1997; 152 SCRA 585)

FACTS:

Another case involving a land dispute.

In this petition for review, by way of appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as supplemented
by, and in conjunction with, Republic Act No. 5440, the petitioner, Amancio Sese, impugns the Decision of the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution, denying his Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed. The questioned decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate Appellate Court), set aside and reversed the decision of the trial
court.

The Resolution of the appellate court, curtly denied Sese's motion for reconsideration saying: "A second review of
the records does not yield any cause or reason for a finding favorable to the defendant-appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in their decision to not affirm the decision of the RTC.
RULING:

There is, indeed, merit to the petitioner's contention that the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court
of Appeals) erred in holding that the land in question was fully identified by the private respondents herein; In holding that
the private respondents have successfully proven their title to the land in question; In not holding that the petitioner herein
is the true and absolute owner of the land he bought from his predecessor-in-interest; In not affirming the decision of the
trial court.

The first assignment of error involves the question of the Identity of the land while the second and third focus on
the issue of ownership. The resolution of the issue of ownership is dependent upon the determination of the Identity of the
land. We thus endeavored to resolve first the latter.

As a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal,
provided, they are borne out by the record or are based on substantive evidence. However, this rule admits of certain
exceptions.

The rule may be that admissions made by the parties during a pre-trial conference and incorporated in pre-trial
order are binding but this rule is not without exceptions. In order to prevent manifest injustice, the admissions made by the
parties during the pre-trial were disregarded by the lower court, as in this case, the SC did not hold otherwise. It would be
contrary to the objective of the law if the SC were to constrain to rule that the land subject of this controversy were the
same land being occupied by the petitioner if the evidence negates such claim. To so hold would unduly prejudice the
substantial rights of the petitioner who stands to lose his property if only because of mere technicality, inaccuracy of
language, or plain carelessness.

Thus in order to maintain an action to recover ownership of real property, the person who claims that he has a
better right to the property must prove not only his ownership of the same, but first, he must satisfactorily prove the
identity thereof. In this case, failing to fix the identity of the real property they claim, the respondents action must fail. And
this, in fact, was what the trial court has decided. And for such failure, the issue of ownership need no longer be passed
upon by us.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution are set asideand the judgment of the trial court is hereby
REINSTATED.

170. VELASCO vs. APOSTOL (May 9 1989; 173 SCRA 228)

FACTS:

Originally sued as defendants were Dominador Santos, Alice Artuz, and Norberto Santos, with plaintiffs claiming
actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees. After an answer was filed by said defendants, private
respondent Maharlika Insurance Co., Inc. was impleaded as a defendant in an amended complaint filed by the petitioner
with an allegation that the N/S taxicab involved was insured against third party liability with private respondent at the time
of the accident.

In its answer to the amended complaint, respondent Maharlika Insurance Co., Inc. claimed that there was no
cause of action against it because at the time of the accident, the alleged insurance policy was not in force due to non-
payment of the premium thereon. It further averred that even if the taxicab had been insured, the complaint would still be
premature since the policy provides that the insurer would be liable only when the insured becomes legally liable.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff finding that the evidence on the negligence of defendant
Dominador Santos was uncontroverted and the proximate cause of the accident was his negligence.

Maharlika Insurance Co. was exonerated on the ground that the policy was not in force for failure of the therein
defendants to pay the initial premium and for their concealment of a material fact.

From the decision of the court a quo, petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court by a petition for review
on certiorari, with the averment that only questions of law are involved.

Petitioners fault the respondent-judge for considering private respondent's defense of late payment of premium
when, according to them, "the same was waived at the pre-trial" hence private respondent's evidence of late payment
should be disregarded supposedly because, as We understand petitioners' argument, private respondent had thereby
admitted that such fact was not in issue. They theorize that what was stipulated in the pre-trial order "does not include the
issue on whether defendant Maharlika Insurance Co., Inc. is liable under the insurance policy, even as the premium was
paid after the accident in question."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition is meritorious.

RULING:

Petitioners' position is bereft of merit.

When the pre-trial order but was examined the Court found no discernment of any intimation or semblance of a
waiver or an admission on the part of Maharlika Insurance Co., Inc. Although there is no express statement as to the fact
of late payment, this is necessarily deemed included in or ineluctably inferred from the issue of whether the company is
liable under the insurance policy it had allegedly issued for the vehicle involved and on which petitioners seek to recover.

A pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to be or may be taken up
during the trial. Issues that are impliedly included therein or may be inferable therefrom by necessary implication are as
much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those that are expressly stipulated.

It would be absurd and inexplicable for the respondent company to knowingly disregard or deliberately abandon
the issue of non-payment of the premium on the policy considering that it is the very core of its defense. Correspondingly,
the court also cannot but perceive here an undesirable resort to technicalities to evade an issue determinative of a
defense duly averred.

Furthermore, as private respondent correctly points out, evidence to prove such late payment was introduced
without any objection by the adverse party. This lack of objection amounts to an implied consent conferring jurisdiction on
the court to try said issue.

In the petitioners reply to respondents' comment, they categorically stated that respondents' point regarding the
lack of objection to the evidence is well taken, hence they do not insist on this ground to review respondent court's
decision. However, in their amended reply, they reverted to their original position that it was a mistake for the trial court to
have considered the defense of lack of payment of premium.

The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

171. YU V. MAPAYO

FACTS:

Facts:

Appellant filed a complaint in the City Court of Davao to recover from defendant Mapayo the sum of P2, 800,
which represented an unpaid balance of the purchase price of an engine (Gray Marine), sold to defendant. The defendant
admitted the said transaction in his answer but he alleged that the engine had hidden defects causing him to spend the
same amount for the repairs and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due on the price of the engine
and counterclaimed for damages and attorneys' fees.

The Court disallowed the defenses and ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff P2, 500.00 and costs. Defendant
Mapayo appealed to CFI and filed an answer that was a virtual reproduction of his original defenses in the City Court.

The defendant, as well as his counsel, failed to appear and the court scheduled the case for hearing ex parte on the
same day. The Court ordered plaintiff to present his evidence but it failed to do so. The plaintiff's counsel refused to
comply and instead of calling his witnesses, he moved the Court to present them after the defendant had presented their
evidence. The court asked said counsel twice whether he would present his evidence for the plaintiff, but said counsel
refused to do so and sticked to his demand that he would introduce his witnesses only in rebuttal.This prompted the court
to dismiss the case on ground of failure of the plaintiff to prosecute, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N the CFI validly dismissed the case on ground of plaintiff's failure to prosecute

HELD:

NO. The court held that the dismissal in untenable and contrary to law. The defendant was not able to support his special
defenses. The answer admitted defendant's obligation as stated in the complaint, and pleaded special defenses hence
the plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for the defendant to come forward with evidence in support of his special
defenses. Judicial admissions do not require proof.

172. LOPES V. LIBORO

FACTS:
In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed unsuccessfully the probate of what purports to be the last
will and testament (Exhibit A) of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, 1947,
almost six months after the document in question was executed.

Allegedly, the trial court communicated an abuse of discretion in allowing the appellant to offer evidence to prove
knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the language in which the will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and
after the opponent had moved for dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not committed grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:

The do not share the opinion that the trial court communicated an abuse of discretion in allowing the appellant to offer
evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the language in which the will is drawn, after the petitioner had
rested his case and after the opponent had moved for dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the party offering the evidence has
rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused. (64 C. J., 160.) More, it is within
the sound discretion of the court whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the further introduction of
evidence after a motion or request for a nonsuit, or a demurrer to the evidence, and the case may be reopened after the
court has announced its intention as to its ruling on the request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the
same, or after the motion has been granted, if the order has not been written, or entered upon the minutes or signed. (64
C. J., 164.)

In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are
allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice,
may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where
no abuse of discretion appears.

173. MENESES V. Secretary of agrarian reform

FACTS:

Records show that the complaint for just compensation was first filed in the RTC, but this was dismissed in the Order dated
June 22, 1994, for the reason that the determination of just compensation must first be filed with the DAR.36 Conformably
with said ruling, petitioners filed the complaint with the DAR, which dismissed the same on the ground that it has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide valuation cases covered by P.D. No. 27.37 Because of said dismissal, petitioners went back
to the RTC for the re-opening of the case. Petitioners' case was obviously thrown back and forth between the two venues,
and with the RTC's second dismissal, they were left hanging and without any recourse, which, of course, is iniquitous
considering that their property has already long been expropriated by the government and its fruits enjoyed by the farmer-
beneficiaries.

On the propriety of the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings by the LBP and adopted by the DAR Secretary the
Court finds that the CA erred in sustaining its propriety.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining its propriety.

HELD: Rule 34, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,28 provides that a judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer
fails to render an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. The essential question
is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. A judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant,
who is the party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to obtain a declaratory relief.29

In this case, the separate Answers filed by the respondents definitely tendered issues, as it made specific denials of the
material allegations in the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses, which would bar recovery by petitioners. Moreover,
it was erroneous for the RTC to require the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings and for the LBP and the DAR
Secretary to file the same since in the first place, the latter are neither plaintiffs in the case nor counter-claimants or cross-
claimants.

What the RTC obviously meant to be filed was a motion for summary judgment, a procedural device designed for the prompt
disposition of actions, which may be rendered if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file
show that, after a summary hearing, there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact, except as to the amount of
damages, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and which may be applied for by either a
claimant or a defending party.

174. Sps. Hontiveros V. Regional trial court of ilo-ilo

FACTS:

On 03 December 1990, petitioners, spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Petitioner alleged that they
are the owners of a parcel of land and also alleged that they were deprived of income from the said lands consisting of
rentals from tenants of the land and that private respondents withheld possession of the land in bad faith.

In their answer, private respondent Hontiveros denied the allegations and invoked that he and respondent Ayson were
not married. On the contrary, they alleged that the possession of the subject property had already been transferred to
petitioners since 1985 by virtue of writ of possession.

Moreover, considering the foregoing facts, respondents assert petitioners were receiving rentals from the lands, hence,
the complaint has no cause of action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made,
considering that petitioner Augusto and respondent Gregorio are brothers. On 16 May 1991 petitioners filed an Amended
Complaint to insert the allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made between the parties but the
same were unsuccessful. Respondents answered the Amended Complaint and denied the same.

On 19 July 1995, petitioners moved for a judgment of pleadings on the ground that respondents did not tender an issue.

On 23 November 1995, the Regional Trial Court denied the petitioners motion and at the same time dismissed the case
on the ground of unverified complaint pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code and therefore, it did not believe that earnest
efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this present case.

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath that earnest efforts
toward a compromise were made prior to the filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code?

RULING:

Yes, the Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that verified complaint of earnest efforts to a compromise
only because the trial court could not believe the veracity of the allegation.

The Court emphasized that the absence of the verification required in Article 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the
Court over the subject matter of the complaint. Such verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct.

Under Article 151 of the Family Code, No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

Petitioners contention that Article 151 of the FC does not apply to the case is correct since the suit is not exclusively
among the family members. Under the subject provision, the phrase members of the same family refers to the husband
and wife; parents and children; ascendants and descendants; and brothers and sisters.

Respondent Ayson and Petitioner Hontiveros (Maria) are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of
Art. 151, therefore, they are not members of the family. In several jurisprudence, the Court already decided that whenever
a stranger is a party in the case involving the family members, the requisite showing the earnest efforts to compromise is
no longer mandatory.

175. RIVERA V. SOLIDBANK

FACTS:

Rivera applied for retirement under the Special Retirement Program. Solid bank approved the application and Rivera
was entitled to receive the net amount of P963,619.28. However in 1995 Solidbank discovered that Equitable Bank
employed Rivera as Manager of its Credit Investigation and Appraisal Division of its Consumers Banking Group.
Solidbank then informed Rivera that he had violated the Undertaking and demanded the return of all the monetary benefits
he received. When Rivera refused to return the amount demanded within the given period, Solidbank filed a complaint for
recovery of sum of money. 963,619.28. He signed an undated Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, which was notarized on
March 1, 1995. Rivera acknowledged receipt of the net proceeds of his separation and retirement benefits and
promised that "[he] would not, at any time, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly engage in any unlawful
activity prejudicial to the interest of Solidbank, its parent, affiliate or subsidiary companies, their stockholders, officers,
directors, agents or employees, and their successors-in-interest and will not disclose any information concerning
the business of Solidbank, its manner or operation, its plans, processes, or data of any kind.
ISSUE: whether the parties raised a genuine issue in their pleadings, affidavits, and documents, that is, whether the
employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking which petitioner executed upon his retirement is unreasonable,
oppressive, hence, contrary to public policy.

HELD:

The petition is meritorious.

A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is a
sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim. The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings,
admissions, documents, affidavits or counter affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded appear
uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary judgment called
for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary
judgment cannot take the place of a trial.[29] The evidence on record must be viewed in light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the
evidence.

176. Bitanga vs.Pyramid Construction Engineering

FACTS: Pyramid filed with the RTC a Complaint for specific performance and damages with application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment against the petitioner and wife Marilyn. Respondent alleged in its Complaint that, it entered
into an agreement with Macrogen Realty, of which Bitanga is the President, to construct for the latter the Shoppers Gold
Building located in Paraaque City. Respondent commenced civil, structural, and architectural works on the construction
project. However, Macrogen failed to settle respondents progress billings. Petitioner, through his representatives and
agents, assured respondent that the outstanding account of Macrogen would be paid and relying on the assurances made
by petitioner, respondent continued the construction project. Later, respondent suspended work on the construction project
since the conditions that it imposed for the continuation thereof, including payment of unsettled accounts, had not been
complied with by Macrogen. Respondent instituted with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a case for
arbitration against Macrogen Realty seeking payment by the latter of its unpaid billings and project costs. Before the
arbitration case could be set for trial, Pyramid and Macrogen entered into a Compromise Agreement, with petitioner acting
as signatory for and in behalf of Macrogen Realty. Under the Compromise Agreement, Macrogen Realty agreed to pay
respondent the total amount of P6,000,000.00 by installments. Petitioner guaranteed the obligations of Macrogen Realty
under the Compromise Agreement by executing a Contract of Guaranty in favor of respondent, by virtue of which he
irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed the full and complete payment of the principal amount of liability of Macrogen.
Upon joint motion of respondent and Macrogen Realty, the CIAC approved the Compromise Agreement. Macrogen Realty
failed and refused to pay all the monthly installments agreed upon in the Compromise Agreement. Hence respondent moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution against Macrogen, which CIAC granted. The sheriff filed a return stating that he was
unable to locate any property of Macrogen Realty, except its bank deposit of P20,242.33, with the Planters Bank, Buendia
Branch. Respondent then made, a written demand on petitioner, as guarantor of Macrogen to pay the liability or to point out
available properties of the Macrogen within the Philippines sufficient to cover the obligation guaranteed. It also made verbal
demands on petitioner. Yet, respondents demands were left unheeded. Petitioner filed with the RTC his Answer to
respondents Complaint. As a special and affirmative defense, petitioner argued that the benefit of excussion was still
available to him as a guarantor since he had set it up prior to any judgment against him. According to petitioner, respondent
failed to exhaust all legal remedies to collect from Macrogen the amount due under the Compromise Agreement, considering
that Macrogen Realty still had uncollected credits which were more than enough to pay for the same. Given these premise,
petitioner could not be held liable as guarantor.

ISSUE: WON petitioner cam avail of the benefit of excussion

HELD: No. Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal
debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. The guarantor who pays for a debtor, in turn, must be indemnified by the latter.
However, the guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the
debtor and resorted to all the legal remedies against the debtor. This is what is otherwise known as the benefit of excussion.

Art. 2060. In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up against the creditor
upon the latters demand for payment from him, and point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within
Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt.

It must be stressed that despite having been served a demand letter at his office, petitioner still failed to point out to the
respondent properties of Macrogen Realty sufficient to cover its debt as required under Article 2060 of the Civil Code. Such
failure on petitioners part forecloses his right to set up the defense of excussion.

177. Ontimare vs. Elep

FACTS:
178. Pineda vs. Heirs of Guevara

FACTS: The Guevara Heirs filed an action for the nullification of the certificates of title of a parcel of land in Marikina.
Defendants were the estate of the late Pedro Gonzales, Virginia Perez, Crisanta Perez,Jose Perez, Roy Guadalupe, Lino
Bucad and Florentino Pineda. According to the Guevara heirs, the defendants illegally claimed ownership and possession
over a certain portion of the property. Defendant Pineda filed an answer with counterclaim, raising the defenses of lack of
cause of action, prescription, laches and estoppel. He averred that he was a buyer in good faith and had been in actual
possession of the land since 1970 initially as a lessor and subsequently as an owner. Defendants Virginia, Crisanta, and
Jose, all surnamed Perez, filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim and averred that their father, Marcos Perez,
purchased the property from the late Pedro Gonzales and had it declared in Perezs name for taxation purposes. The rest
of the defendants, including the estate of Pedro Gonzales, also filed an answerwith counterclaim, raising the same defenses
of laches and prescription and res judicata. The late Pedro Gonzales allegedly bought the property from the Municipality of
Marikinain a public bidding on 25 April 1966 and had allowed defendants to occupy the property.They asserted that the
Guevara heirs never actually occupied the property. On 4 December 1995, the RTC set the case for hearing as if a motion
to dismiss had been filed. During the hearing, the parties presented oral arguments and were directed to file their
memoranda. After submission of memoranda, the RTC issued an Order dated 7 May 1996, dismissing the action on the
ground of laches. The Guevara heirs appealed the order of dismissal, claiming the denial of their right to due process. CA
set aside the RTCs decision reinstating the action. The appellate court ruled that a complaint cannot be dismissed under
Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court based on laches since laches is not one of the grounds enumerated under said
provision. Although the RTC order of dismissal did not rule on the other affirmative defenses raised by petitioners in the
answer, such as lack of causeof action, prescription and res judicata, the Court of Appeals discussed them and ruled that
none of these affirmative defenses raised were present to warrant the dismissal of the action.

ISSUES: (I) Whether or not the appeal of the heirs of Guevara was improperly elevated to the Court of Appeals since,
according to them, it raised a pure question of law; and
(II) Whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed the action on the ground of laches without conducting trial on the merits.

RULING: On the first issue, Petitioner Pineda had ample opportunity to raise before the Court of Appeals the objection on
the improper mode of appeal taken by the heirs ofGuevara. This, he failed to do. The issue of improper appeal was raised
only in Pinedasmotion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision. Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time
on appeal, pass upon this issue. For an issue cannot be raised forthe first time on appeal.

On the second issue, in reversing the RTCs order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals held that "laches could not be a ground
to dismiss the complaint as it is not enumerated under Rule 16, Section 1." This is not entirely correct.

Under paragraph (h) thereof, where a claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned,
or otherwise extinguished, the same may be raised in a motion to dismiss.

The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
Whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual determination by the trial court.

179. Manufacturers Hanover Trust vs. Guerrero

FACTS: On May 17, 1994, Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against Hanover and/or Chemical Bank (Bank) with the
RTC of Manila. Guerrero sought payment of damages for:
a.Illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank
b.A returned check worth $18,000 due to signature verification problems
c.Unauthorized conversion of his account
The Bank answered that by stipulation, Guerreros account is governed by New York law, and such law does not permit any
of Guerreros claims except actual damages. The Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (PSJ), contending that
the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages only. The Walden Affidavit was presented by the Bank to support
its Motion for PSJ. The RTC and CA denied the Banks Motion for PSJ, stating that the Walden Affidavit does not serve as
proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its Motion.

ISSUE: Whether the Walden Affidavit was sufficient proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied upon by the Bank
in its Motion for PSJ.

HELD: NO. The Walden Affidavit failed to prove New York law and jurisprudence. The SC denied the Banks petition for
lack of merit. The CA considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in Rule 132 Sec 19 and
24 of the Rules of Evidence, which should be followed in proving foreign law.

SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may
be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office.

180. Evadel and Development vs. Soriano

FACTS: Respondent-spouses as sellers, entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner as buyer over a parcel of land which
is part of a huge tract of land known as the Imus Estate. Upon payment of the first installment, the petitioners introduced
improvements thereon and fenced off the property with concrete walls. Thereafter, the respondents discovered that the area
fenced off by the petitioners exceeded the area subject of the contract by 2,450 square meters. A complaint for accion
reinvindicatoria was filed by respondents against petitioner. The trial court, by way of a summary judgment, ruled in favor
of respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue regarding petitioners good faith or bad faith as a builder should have been peremptorily
disposed of by the trial court.

HELD: The petitioner admitted in its Amended Answer that the lot in dispute is covered by the TCT of respondents. With
this admission, petitioner can no longer claim that it was a builder in good faith. Moreover petitioner, as a real estate
developer is presumed to be experienced in business and ought to have sufficient technical expertise to correctly determine
the metes and bounds of the land it acquires.

181. Estrada vs. Consolacion (June 29, 1976; 71 SCRA 523)

182. RIVERA VS SOLIDBANK

FACTS: Rivera applied for retirement under the Special Retirement Program. Solidbank approved the application and
Rivera was entitled to receive the net amount of P 963, 619. 28. He signed an undated Release, Waiver and Quitclaim,
which was notarized on March 1, 1995. Rivera acknowledged receipt of the net proceeds of his separation and retirement
benefits and promised that he would not anytime, in a manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly engage in any unlawful
activity prejudicial to the interest of Solidbank, its parent, affiliate or subsidiary companies, their stockholders, officers,
directors, agents or employees, and their successors- in interest and will not disclose any information concerning the
business of Solidbank, its manner or operation, its plan, processes, or data of any kind.

However in 1995 Solidbank discovered that Equitable Bank employed Rivera as Manager of its Credit Investigation and
Appraisal Division of its Consumers Banking Group. Solidbank then informed Rivera that he had violated the Undertaking
and demanded the return of all the monetary benefits he received. When Rivera refused to return the amount demanded
within the given period, Solidbank filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money.

ISSUE: whether the employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking which petitioner executed upon his retirement is
unreasonable, oppressive, hence, contrary to public policy

HELD: In determining whether the contract is reasonable or not, the trial court should consider the following factors: (a)
whether the covenant protects a legitimate business interest of the employer; (b) whether the covenant creates an undue
burden on the employee; (c) whether the covenant is injurious to the public welfare; (d) whether the time and territorial
limitations contained in the covenant are reasonable; and (e) whether the restraint is reasonable from the standpoint of
public policy. At first glance, the post-retirement competitive employment ban is unreasonable because it has no
geographical limits; respondent is barred from accepting any kind of employment in any competitive bank within the
proscribed period. Although the period of one year may appear reasonable, the matter of whether the restriction is
reasonable or unreasonable cannot be ascertained with finality solely from the terms and conditions of the Undertaking, or
even in tandem with the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. However, a distinction must be made between restrictive
covenants barring an employee to accept a post-employment competitive employment (restraint on trade) and restraints
on post-retirement competitive employment in pension and retirement plans. A restriction in the contract which does not
preclude the employee from engaging in competitive activity, but simply provides for the loss of rights or privileges if he
does so is not in restraint of trade. The strong weight of authority is that forfeitures for engaging in subsequent competitive
employment included in pension and retirement plans are valid even though unrestricted in time or geography. The
reasoning behind this conclusion is that the forfeiture, unlike the restraint included in the employment contract, is not a
prohibition on the employees engaging in competitive work but is merely a denial of the right to participate in the
retirement plan if he does so engage. A post-retirement competitive employment restriction is designed to protect the
employer against competition by former employees who may retire and obtain retirement or pension benefits and, at the
same time, engage in competitive employment. Moreover, the Undertaking and the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim do not
provide for the automatic forfeiture of the benefits petitioner received under the SRP upon his breach of said deeds. Thus,
the post-retirement competitive employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking of respondent does not, on its face,
appear to be unreasonable. The terms of the Undertaking merely states that any breach by petitioner of his promise would
entitle respondent to a cause of action for protection in the courts of law.

183. BITANGA VS PYRAMID CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING

FACTS: Pyramid filed with the RTC a Complaint for specific performance and damages with application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment against the petitioner and wife Marilyn. Respondent alleged in its Complaint that, it entered
into an agreement with Macrogen Realty, of which Bitanga is the President, to construct for the latter the Shoppers Gold
Building located in Paraaque City. Respondent commenced civil, structural, and architectural works on the construction
project. However, Macrogen failed to settle respondents progress billings. Petitioner, through his representatives and
agents, assured respondent that the outstanding account of Macrogen would be paid and relying on the assurances made
by petitioner, respondent continued the construction project. Later, respondent suspended work on the construction project
since the conditions that it imposed for the continuation thereof, including payment of unsettled accounts, had not been
complied with by Macrogen. Respondent instituted with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a case for
arbitration against Macrogen Realty seeking payment by the latter of its unpaid billings and project costs. Before the
arbitration case could be set for trial, Pyramid and Macrogen entered into a Compromise Agreement, with petitioner acting
as signatory for and in behalf of Macrogen Realty. Under the Compromise Agreement, Macrogen Realty agreed to pay
respondent the total amount of P6,000,000.00 by installments. Petitioner guaranteed the obligations of Macrogen Realty
under the Compromise Agreement by executing a Contract of Guaranty in favor of respondent, by virtue of which he
irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed the full and complete payment of the principal amount of liability of Macrogen.
Upon joint motion of respondent and Macrogen Realty, the CIAC approved the Compromise Agreement. Macrogen Realty
failed and refused to pay all the monthly installments agreed upon in the Compromise Agreement. Hence respondent moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution against Macrogen, which CIAC granted. The sheriff filed a return stating that he was
unable to locate any property of Macrogen Realty, except its bank deposit of P20,242.33, with the Planters Bank, Buendia
Branch. Respondent then made, a written demand on petitioner, as guarantor of Macrogen to pay the liability or to point out
available properties of the Macrogen within the Philippines sufficient to cover the obligation guaranteed. It also made verbal
demands on petitioner. Yet, respondents demands were left unheeded. Petitioner filed with the RTC his Answer to
respondents Complaint. As a special and affirmative defense, petitioner argued that the benefit of excussion was still
available to him as a guarantor since he had set it up prior to any judgment against him. According to petitioner, respondent
failed to exhaust all legal remedies to collect from Macrogen the amount due under the Compromise Agreement, considering
that Macrogen Realty still had uncollected credits which were more than enough to pay for the same. Given these premise,
petitioner could not be held liable as guarantor.

ISSUE: WON petitioner cam avail of the benefit of excussion

HELD: No. Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal
debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. The guarantor who pays for a debtor, in turn, must be indemnified by the latter.
However, the guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the
debtor and resorted to all the legal remedies against the debtor. This is what is otherwise known as the benefit of excussion.

Art. 2060. In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up against the creditor
upon the latters demand for payment from him, and point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within
Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt.

It must be stressed that despite having been served a demand letter at his office, petitioner still failed to point out to the
respondent properties of Macrogen Realty sufficient to cover its debt as required under Article 2060 of the Civil Code. Such
failure on petitioners part forecloses his right to set up the defense of excussion.

184. JUGADOR VS DE VERA

FACTS: On December 13, 1949, the plaintiff Federico T. Jugador filed a complaint against the defendant Zacarias de
Vera in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging that in October, 1948, the plaintiff agreed to construct a residential
house at No. 33 Bulosan St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, for the defendant who undertook to pay to the plaintiff the
total sum of P18,500 which he fully received to his complete satisfaction on December 1948 but he failed to pay in full the
construction price.

On April 22, 1949, the defendant executed in favor of the plaintiff a certificate of indebtedness and promised to pay to
Jugador Construction the sum of P3,500 as liquidated unpaid balance of the contract price, P500 on or before May 15,
1949, and to make all sincere and serious effort to pay P2,000 so as to leave in June, 1949, only a balance of P1,000
payable monthly at P100 beginning August 1, 1949. Notwithstanding the repeated demands, the defendant only made a
partial payment of 900, leaving P2,600 as his balance.

The petitioner filed a complaint and the court issued a writ of attachment to the defendants property. The defendant
averred in his answers that the petitioner did not complete the house in accordance with the prescribed plans and
specifications. As an answer, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, supported by an affidavit of the plaintiff. The CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is no legal basis for the rendition of the summary judgment.
HELD: Under section 3 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, and admission on file, together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as to a matter of law."

In the case at bar the court in effect held, as a matter of law, that there was no basis for the counterclaim for damages,
considering the facts appearing in the pleadings and plaintifff's affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment,
unopposed by any counter-affidavit which the defendant had the right to present.

185. WARNER, BARNES AND CO VS LUZON SURETY

FACTS: On September 17, 1952, the plaintiffs, Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd., filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental against the defendant, Luzon Surety Co., Inc., of the recovery of the sum of P6,000, plus
the costs and P1,500 for attorney's fees. The basis of the complaint was a bond in the sum of P6,000 filed by Agueda
Gonzaga as administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Agueda Gonzaga. As an administratix, he violated the conditions of
her bond "(a) by failing to file an inventory of the assets and funds of the estate that had come into her hands, more
particularly, the sum of P67,861.22 that she had received form the United States Philippine War Damage Commission; (b)
by failing to pay or discharge the approved claim of the plaintiff; (c) by failing to render a true and just account of her
administration in general, and of the said war damage payments in particular.

The defendant filed an answer setting up the special defenses that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The
plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that "the special defenses relied upon by the defendant in her
Answer raise only questions of law, and the plaintiff believes that said defendant cannot produce counter-affidavits that
would raise any 'genuine issues as to any material facts.'

The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered a summary judgment sentencing the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P6,000, P900 for attorney's fees, plus the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the erred in sentencing the defendant.

HELD: The contention is tenable. Under section 3 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may be
rendered upon proper motion except as to the amount of damages.1wphl.nt

There being no proof regarding the amount of attorney's fees claimed by the plaintiff, no judgment thereon may be
rendered herein. It is, however, argued by the counsel for appellee that said fees are in pursuance of article 2208 of the
Civil Code, providing that attorney's fees cannot be recovered except "where the defendant acted in gross and evident
bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim"; and it alleged in the complaint that
the appellant had so acted in this case. While the provision cited authorizes the collection of attorney's fees under the
situation contemplated herein, it does not dispense with the effect of section 3 of Rule 36.

191. People v. Derpo

Facts:

Rhodora Hara was in her fourth grade, accused-appellant offered to shoulder the expenses of her education. Rhodora's
father accepted the offer. She enrolled in Casiguran High School, for which reason, Rhodora had to stay in the house of the
accused, also upon the latter's invitation. On July 16, 1971 she was awakened by the kisses of appellant. Appellant left the
room frustrated and with a warning not to tell anybody what happened and threatened to kill her. Rhodora kept silent about
the incident.

On August 22, 1971, at about midnight, appellant went to her room under the pretext that he would give a tablet to relieve
the pain of a toothache Rhodora was then suffering from. However, after taking the tablet, Rhodora started to feel drowsy
until she fell asleep. When she woke up, appellant was lying on top of her. Before he left, appellant threatened to kill
Rhodora if she would report the incident to anybody. The incident was repeated on September 30, 1971 and October 3,
1971. Finally, also at about midnight of November 27, 1971.

Accused was then charged with rape in four separate criminal complaints in Court of First Instance of Sorsogon (now
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon). The four cases were tried jointly. Thereafter, a joint judgment of conviction was rendered
by the lower court. Hence, this appeal seeking the reversal of the conviction.

Issue:

WON the lower court erred in denying the accused appellants motion for New Trial.

Rulings:

The lower court did not commit an error in denying the appellant's motion for new trial based on "newly discovered evidence"
for failure to meet the following conditions, namely, (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that such evidence
could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, (c) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted.

192. People v. Molina

Facts:

This case arose from the killing of Pedro T. Ong. He succumbed almost instantly to seven bullet wounds found later to have
been caused by a single shot from a 30-centimeter firearm. In due time, Rosalito Molina was arrested and charged in the
Regional Trial Court of Aurora with the murder of Ong. After trial, the accused was found guilty.

The prosecution relied principally on the testimony of two eyewitnesses, namely, Felicidad B. Poblete and Rosalinda Libed.
Two other witnesses swore to having seen Molina near the scene of the crime shortly before it was committed. The rest of
the witnesses for the prosecution testified only on events that transpired after the killing except that the victim's wife also
suggested the motive for the crime.

For his part, the accused-appellant offered the defense of alibi and claimed he was in Manila at the time of the commission
of the crime.

The trial court rejected the alibi, describing it as fabricated, and refused to believe the defense witnesses on the ground
that, as relatives of the accused or employees of his cousin who exercised much influence over them, they had testified
only to help Molina. His documentary evidence was dismissed as "unverifiable."

Issue:

WON accused-appellant was guilty.

Rulings:

The Court is not prepared to affirm the decision not because it is long and convoluted but because the prosecution has
failed to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The inherent incredibility of witnesses Poblete
and Libed has sown the seeds of suspicion that the evidence against Molina has been fabricated, and rather awkwardly at
that. The convergence of events in this case is, plainly, too coincidental to deserve belief and the other improbable
declarations of the government witnesses have added to that disbelief. The defense of alibi may be weak, and perhaps it
was really Molina who killed Ong, but the prosecution has failed to prove the accused-appellant's guilt and so he must go
free.

193. People v. Escober

Facts:

Juan Escober, together with four unidentified people was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the RTC
of Quezon City in an Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a plea of "Not Guilty" with the assistance of counsel
Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon arraignment on March 2, 1983.

On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. as one of the
accused therein. He, too, pleaded "Not Guilty" during the arraignment on April 22, 1983, assisted by court-appointed
counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at that time had replaced Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as counsel de parte for Juan
Escober.

A joint trial of the accused ensued. Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to testify in his
defense, as well as Macario Punzalan, Jr.

On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On February 8, 1984, despite his manifestation in open
court immediately after the promulgation of the decision that he was appealing the same to this Court, Atty. Mariano filed a
motion for reconsideration. This was opposed by the prosecution.

Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his appearance on August 7, 1984 as counsel for accused
Escober, and on August 20, 1984, he filed another motion for reconsideration for the said accused, which was likewise
opposed by the prosecution. After an exchange of pleadings between Atty. Dacanay and the prosecution, the trial court
issued an Order dated November 21, 1984 denying the motions. Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic
review.

Issue:

WON respondent judge erred in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of January 10, 1984 decision.

Rulings:
We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984 consists of 1-1/2 pages, typed single-space, with a
number of handwritten notations and insertions. The decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily
from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such
conclusions are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the Amended Information were the facts
without specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-
appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing out what these contradictions consist
of or what "vital details" Escober should have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to have been attended
by the aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among others," but did not
particularly state the factual bases for such findings.

With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to the requirements of Section 9, Article X of the
1973 Constitution, the case should have been remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new judgment. However,
since the records of the case, including all evidence necessary for a determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused-
appellants are now before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment in this case in order to accord the accused-appellants
their right to a speedy disposition of their cases.

194. National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), owner of Lot 20-A, Block E-74, filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against Gavino Mendiola, alleging that without its knowledge and consent Mendiola had unlawfully
occupied the said lot and on December 23, 1959, constructed a house thereon, and had refused to vacate the premises
and to remove the improvements despite demands to do so.

In answer, Mendiola admits the ownership of PHHC over the lot in question and the receipt of notice to vacate, but denied
that he is unlawfully occupying the same, claiming that PHHC had caused the transfer of his house to the lot and approved
the sale of Lot 20-A, Block E-74 to him; and that thereafter PHHC without justification sold the lot to Antonio Ilustre who is
not qualified to buy it. He likewise counterclaimed for damages.

At the pre-trial, the PHHC presented its evidence, all documentary exhibits (A, B, C, D, & E). Defendant Mendiola likewise
marked his evidence (Exhibits "1-5"). Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, the Trial Court appointed a commissioner
to receive the evidence for the defendant.

On March 1, 1968, the Trial Court rendered judgment against PHHC. On appeal by PHHC, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the Trial Court's decision. Hence, this petition for review filed by the National Housing Authority, succeeding to the powers
and functions of the now defunct PHHC, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757 (1975).

Issue:

WON PHHC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding Lot 20-A to Antonio Ilustre.

Rulings:

Although, ordinarily, the action of an administrative agency would not be disturbed by the judicial department, later
developments in this case show that on March 23, 1964, even before the present suit was instituted on November 13, 1964,
Antonio Ilustre, an Army Officer, had transferred his rights to a third party and that Ilustre has since died. Obviously, Ilustre
Himself had no real need for the property. On the other hand, Mendiola, a recognized squatter, has continuously and
uninterruptedly occupied the property since 1959.

Under the circumstances, we hold that the justice and equity of the situation are with Mendiola. As opined by Inspector
Alfredo T. Baguio, in his undated Memorandum to the PHHC General Manager, "the award to Antonio Ilustre by raffle was
not satisfactorily explained and hardly bears justification." He then recommended that "Antonio Ilustre should be awarded
another lot outside Block E-74" ( ' Exhibit "5"). Indeed, pursuant to Resolution No. 531 of the PHHC Board (Exhibit "A"), the
subdivision of Block E-74 (Malaya Avenue Subdivision) was intended for "squatters in the Central Bank Subdivision and
Mahabang Gubat area, totalling 72". Mendiola was included in that original group. Antonio Ilustre, a Major, was not. He was
an "outsider". Specially so, with his transferee. Moreover, the same PHHC Board Resolution "provided further that in case
of transfer priority shall be given to the co-owner under equal circumstances."

195. Leo v. To-Chip

CASE 201

G.R. NO. 114323. JULY 23, 1998

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION VS COURT OF APPEALS AND PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC.
FACTS: This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun,
India in favor of the petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION and against the private respondent, PACIFIC
CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. Petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of
India while private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.

They entered into a contract on February 26, 1983 whereby the private respondent undertook to supply the petitioner FOUR
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration therefor, the petitioner bound itself
to pay the private respondent the amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S.
DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by opening an irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter. The oil well
cement was loaded on board the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery at Bombay
and Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute between the shipowner and the private respondent, the cargo was held up
in Bangkok and did not reach its point of destination. Notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent had already
received payment and despite several demands made by the petitioner, the private respondent failed to deliver the oil well
cement. Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and they agreed that the private respondent will replace the
entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class G cement cost free at the petitioners designated port. However, upon
inspection, the Class G cement did not conform to the petitioners specifications. The petitioner then informed the private
respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he
venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.

The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner setting forth the arbitral award.
To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun.
India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent
but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice
sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the
private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the
aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not
have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties; thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award.
The petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent
under Clause 16 of the contract.

HELD: The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt
by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in
the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the
judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory
upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign
court simply because our rules provide otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial
court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City
is REVERSED.

CASE 202

G.R. NO. 81006. MAY 12, 1989

VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO VS. WINAI PERMSKUL AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: An important constitutional question has been injected in this case which started out as an ordinary complaint for
a sum of money. The question squarely presented to the Court is the validity of the memorandum decision authorized under
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.

On May 21, 1984, Victorino C. Francisco (petitioner) leased his apartment in Makati to Winai Permskul (respondent) for a
period of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent
deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises
except when caused by reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the property. He
thereafter requested the refund of his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten
days of his occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the lessee still owed
him for other charges, including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the leased premises
to restore them to their original condition.
Winai Permskul sued in the MTC of Makati. The MTC rendered a summary judgment in favor of Permskul which was
affirmed by the RTC of Makati. Defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review was denied on September
29, 1987, as so too was his motion for reconsideration, on December 1, 1987. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court violates Article VIII Section 14 of the Constitution in sustaining the memorandum decision
of the RTC.

HELD:

This provision reads as follows:

Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.

Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present charter, Section 14 has been in force since the
Constitution of 1935. The provision was recast in affirmative terms in the 1973 Constitution but has been virtually restored
to its original form in the Constitution of 1987, to apply to all courts, including the municipal courts. The purpose has always
been the same, viz., to inform the person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the
court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws.

Decisions and resolutions of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law on which they are based. Such findings may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or
adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision, order or resolution appealed from. This provision of BP 129
authorizes a memorandum decision. This kind of decision is one rendered by an appellate court and incorporates by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision or under review. The reason for allowing the
incorporation by reference is to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court in the decision of the
higher court. It is also to avoid repeating the findings or conclusions of the lower court, which are being adopted or approved.
To be valid however, such decision must not simply incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of a lower
court by remote reference. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts
and the law being adopted, which must be contained in statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex
attached to it and made an indispensable part of the decision.

CASE 203

G.R. No. L-59606. JANUARY 8, 1987

EDMUNDO ROMERO, FELIZA F. ROMERO, JOSE ADORABLE AND GERONIMO CASAES

VS

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS AND TIMOTEO IBARRA

FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari of the decision promulgated on January 26, 1982 by the Ninth Division of
respondent Court of Appeals affirming in full the decision rendered on August 31, 1981 by Branch II of respondent Court of
Agrarian Relations, Tenth Regional District, Naga City, petitioners allege violation of their constitutional rights to due process
and the equal protection of the laws.

On March 8, 1979, Timoteo Ibarra (private respondent) filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations an action for reinstatement
with damages against Edmundo Romore, Feliza F. Romero, Jose Adorable and Geronimo Casaes (petitioners).

The agrarian court found and the parties agree that the main issue raised in said case was factual in character whether
or not private respondent was the bona-fide agricultural tenant- farmer (now agricultural lessee) on the two parcels of
agricultural land subject-matter of the complaint. As a matter of fact, this is the crucial issue because the resolution of all
the other issues depends upon its resolution.

The Court of Agrarian Relations ruled in favor of private respondents that he is the bona-fide tenant-farmer, now agricultural
lessee of the two (2) parcels of land in question. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and said Court affirmed
the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

No notice of the receipt of the records from the Court of Agrarian Relations was issued by respondent Court of Appeals.
Neither was any notice issued by respondent Court of Appeals that it was dispensing "with the usual practice of requiring
the parties to submit to Us their memoranda in lieu of briefs."

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether not there is violation of petitioners constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of laws.

HELD: In addition to alleging violation of their constitutional rights to due process and to equal protection of the laws,
petitioners contend that the findings of fact in the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, as affirmed in toto by
respondent Court of Appeals, are not supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions stated therein are clearly
against the law. Petitioners claim that had respondent Court of Appeals not dispensed with the usual practice of requiring
the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in the of appeal briefs they could have pointed out to respondent Court of
Appeals which findings of fact in the decision of the lower court are not supported by substantial evidence and which
conclusions stated therein are clearly against the law.

In the case at bar, petitioners had the right to appeal from the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations to the Court of
Appeals. And since Section 18 of P.D. No. 946 provides, following the general rule, that "the decisions or orders of the Court
of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari only on questions of law," petitioners
should be given the opportunity to correct errors in the findings of fact made by the trial court. And this is particularly
necessary in agrarian cases where no motion for rehearing or reconsideration is allowed in the Court of Appeals (Section
18, Ibid.)

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as important as the intrinsic validity of a decision is the perception by the
parties-litigants that they have been accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate before j
judgment is rendered. It is this perception, coupled with a clear conscience, which enables the members of the judiciary to
dispassionately charge the awesome responsibility of sitting in judgment on their fellowmen.

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals affirming in full the decision of the Court of
Agrarian Relations is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to enable the parties to file simultaneous
memoranda within a non-extendible period of fifteen days from notice, after which respondent Court shall render a decision
upon the points raised and discussed in said memoranda that were not touched upon in the decision of the agrarian court
which was adopted by the appellate court as basis for its original judgment of affirmance.

CASE 204

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2075. OCTOBER 9, 2007

ATTY. UBALDINO A. LACUROM VS JUDGE JUANITA C. TIENZO

FACTS: On the second charge relating to Civil Case No. 4884, complainant alleges that respondent judge rendered a
decision in violation of the Constitutional mandate to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
and Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court echoing the same requisite.

Complainant further charges that respondent judge issued an order written in English language, and in fashion that does
not benefit an RTC Judge which thereby demonstrates her incompetence and lack of diligence. However, complainant
discloses that the inclusion of the foregoing matter in his administrative complaint was merely at the behest of his former
colleague, Feliciano Buenaventura, a retired judge of RTC, Branch 27, Cabanatuan City.

In this case, respondent judge ruled in this wise, to wit: After a cursory study of this appealed case of Unlawful Detainer,
this Court finds that the procedural due process has been complied with under the Summary Procedure. The Decision of
the Lower Court cannot be disturbed by this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge rendered decision in violation of the constitutional mandate to state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

HELD: YES.
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court likewise reflects the foregoing mandate, thus:

SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case
shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.

Although we have sustained the validity of memorandum decisions on several occasions, we laid down specific
requirements for the proper utility thereof:

The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law
of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and
immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference
to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be
contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions
of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower
court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and law on which
it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has
been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with,
comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
 The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it
become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for its validity that this kind of
decision may be resorted only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily
determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended
discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only,
such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than
the time needed to dismiss it.

It is obvious that the decision rendered by respondent judge failed to conform to this requirement. The cryptic decision
simply referenced the appealed decision of the MTCC and forthwith found the same as compliant with procedural due
process under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Nowhere in the decision does respondent judge make a statement of the
facts, which led to the filing of the appeal. More importantly, the decision does not contain respondent judges factual
findings, albeit affirming those of the MTCC, from which she based her conclusions of law. Ineluctably, respondent judge
transgressed the constitutional directive.

CASE 205

G.R. NO. 81006. MAY 12, 1989

VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO VS. WINAI PERMSKUL AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

**CASE REPEATED

CASE 206

G.R. No. 154037. April 30, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENJAMIN VERGARA, JONA SARVIDA,
MILAGROS MAJOREMOS, MAJORIE JALALON, MAY JOY MENDOZA (@ May Joy Sandi), and JOY SABALLA (@
Josephine Saballa),
MABELYN B. VERGARA, RIO SARVIDA, FRANCISCO MAJOREMOS, in their respective behalves and in behalf of
ROY JALALON, ROMMEL MENDOZA and DELFIN SABALLA, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR.,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ormoc, Branch 12; SPO3ANGELO S. LLENOS and the CITY JAIL
WARDEN OF ORMOC; and ELEUTERIA P. BOLAO

FACTS: Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property located in Dr. A. Santos Ave., Paraaque City. On
December 24, 2001, they were arrested by Ormoc City policemen by authority of a Warrant of Arrest dated November 19,
2001 issued by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0 for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Distribution
and Partition pending before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 12).
The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria P. Bolao, as Special Administratrix of the
estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, praying that petitioners be held guilty of indirect contempt for not complying with the
probate courts order dated October 9, 1999 directing them to pay their monthly rentals to respondent Bolao.
It appears that pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Allers, respondent Bolao included the property
leased by Taripe to petitioners in the inventory of the estate. The probate court issued the assailed Order dated October 5,
1999, portions of which read as follows:

7. Further, the lessees above-cited and listed in the Inventory are directed to pay their respective monthly rental
regularly starting the month of August, 1999, including arrears if any, to the duly appointed Special Administratrix
Mrs. Eleuteria P. Bolao, until further notice.

Five months later, on motion of respondent Bolao, as Special Administratrix, the probate court issued a writ of execution
on March 3, 2000 to enforce the aforesaid order dated October 5, 1999. The Sheriff submitted a return dated August 10,
2000 stating that on June 5, 2000, he met with petitioners but failed to collect the rentals due on the property as Taripe had
already collected from them three months advance rentals.
On August 4, 2000, respondent Bolao filed a motion to require petitioners to explain why they should not be cited in
indirect contempt for disobeying the October 5, 1999 order of the probate court. It was granted. Petitioners were cite in
contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each and to undergo imprisonment until they comply with the
probate courts order for them to pay rentals. They stated that their failure to attend the May 11, 2001 hearing was due to
financial constraints, most of them working on construction sites, receiving minimum wages, and repeated that the reason
why they are freezing the monthly rentals is that they are uncertain as to whom to remit it.

Upon motion of respondent Bolao, the probate court, per its Order dated November 16, 2001, issued a warrant of arrest
on November 19, 2001. On December 24, 2001, petitioners were arrested.
On December 26, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. On
January 3, 2002, the appellate court ordered the temporary release of petitioners. After due proceedings, the appellate court
rendered its decision on March 26, 2002 denying the petition for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in not holding that the motion for indirect contempt of court filed by respondent
Eleuteria P. Bolao against the lessees is not the proper remedy and that the order of the court a quo granting said motion
and declaring that the lessees are guilty of indirect contempt is a reversible error.

HELD: YES.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court to wit:

SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet
in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it. (7a)
because herein subject order is not a special judgment enforceable, under Section 11, Rule 39, which provides:

SEC. 11. Execution of special judgment. When a judgment requires the performance of any act other than those mention
in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by
the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law to obey
the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.

Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of judgments for money, thus:

SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. (a) Immediate payment on demand. The officer shall enforce
an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount
stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to
the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper
receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees
shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the same day to
the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ.

If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the judgment obligor shall
deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession
within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said
amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial court of the locality.

The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the account of the court that issued
the writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver said payment to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The
excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment obligor while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for
disposition as provided by law. In no case shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be made payable
to him.

(b) Satisfaction by levy. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or
other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor
of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving
the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any,
and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.

The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been
levied upon.

When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must
sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.

Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal
property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.

(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. The officer may levy on debts due the judgment obligor and other credits,
including bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and other personal property not capable of manual
delivery in the possession or control of third parties. Levy shall be made by serving notice upon the person owing such
debts or having in his possession or control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment shall
cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.

The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days from service of the notice of garnishment
stating whether or not the judgment obligor has sufficient funds or credits to satisfy the amount of the judgment. If not, the
report shall state how much funds or credits the garnishee holds for the judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash,
or certified bank check issued in the name of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to the judgment obligee within
ten (10) working days from service of notice on said garnishee requiring such delivery, except the lawful fees which shall
be paid directly to the court.

In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits sufficient to satisfy the judgment, the judgment
obligor, if available, shall have the right to indicate the garnishee or garnishees who shall be required to deliver the amount
due; otherwise, the choice shall be made by the judgment obligee.

The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph (a) with respect to delivery of payment to the
judgment obligee. (8a, 15a) while Section 10 of the same Rule refers to execution of judgments for specific acts such as
conveyance, delivery of deeds or other specific acts vesting title; sale of real or personal property, delivery or restitution of
real property, removal of improvements on property subject of execution and delivery of personal property.

The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section 9 as quoted above. Until and unless all
the means provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted to and failed, imprisonment for contempt as a means
of coercion for civil purposes cannot be resorted to by the courts. In Sura vs. Martin, Sr., we held that:

Where an order for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of court (for failure to satisfy a judgment for
support on ground of insolvency) would, in effect, violate the Constitution.

Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their continued refusal to comply with the probate
courts order to pay rentals to the administratrix nor could they be held guilty of contempt for disobeying the writ of execution
issued by the probate court, which directs therein the Sheriff, thus:

Should lessees fail to pay the aforementioned amounts on rentals, then of the goods and chattels of said lessees you may
cause to be made the sum sufficient to cover the aforestated amounts, but if no sufficient personal properties are found
thereof to satisfy this execution, then of the real properties you make the sums of money in the manner required by law and
make return of your proceeding under this writ within the reglementary period.

It was the sheriffs duty to enforce the writ.

Under Section 9(b), Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, in cases when the execution calls for payment of money and the
obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode or payment acceptable to the
judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever
which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately
choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does
not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the
personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal
or real property of the judgment obligor, which has been levied upon. When there is more property of the judgment obligor
than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property,
or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of
attachment.

The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its sheriff to collect from petitioners the rentals
due from the property, and should they fail to pay, from petitioners personal/real properties sufficient to cover the amounts
sought to be collected. It was not addressed to petitioners. It pertained to the sheriff to whom the law entrusts the execution
of judgments, and it was due to the latters failure that the writ was not duly enforced.

In fine, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the Decision dated November 16, 2001 of the
trial court.

CASE 207

G.R. Nos. L-32450-51 June 10, 1971

HONORABLE ARMANDO B. CLEDERA in his capacity as Provincial Governor of Camarines Sur, MARIANO S.
TRINIDAD, in his capacity as Provincial Vice Governor of Camarines Sur, EMILIO C. TIBLE JR., HILARIO R.
ABONAL and NICANOR A. ORINO in their capacities as Members of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur; The
PROVINCIAL ENGINEER of Camarines Sur; the PROVINCIAL ENGINEER of Camarines Sur, and the PROVINCE
OF CAMARINES SUR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE ULPIANO SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Camarines Sur, and PLUTARCO CAMANO, et al., respondents

FACTS: This case is about the order issued by the respondent judge giving due course to and granting the motion for
reconsideration, allegedly defective for want of notice of hearing filed by private respondents herein as Petitioners. The
private respondents herein were employees of the provincial government of Camarines Sur and paid under the plantilla of
personnel of the road and bridge fund budget. The provincial board of province of Camarines Sur passed a resolution which
approved the road and bridge fund budget of the province for the fiscal year 1968-1969 and abolished the positions of herein
private residents, who as a consequence filed Civil Cases before the respondent judge sitting at Naga for prohibition and/or
mandamus with damages seeking their reinstatement and payment of back salaries as well as the restoration of their
respective positions previously occupied by them in the plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge fund budget. After the
pre-trial, the parties were given five (5) days from July 14, 1969 or until July 19, 1969 to submit their respective memoranda,
after which the two cases would be deemed submitted for decision Private respondents filed a motion to re-open the cases
and to allow them to present additional evidence consisting of the budget and plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge
fund for the fiscal year 1969-70 to which on July 25, 1969 herein petitioners filed an opposition dated July 24 1969.
Respondent Judge denied the said motion of herein private respondents seeking to reopen the two cases. Private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order dated September 10, 1969, which motion does not
contain any notice at all setting the time, date and place of hearing. Private respondents filed a request addressed to the
clerk of court to set for hearing on November 24, 1969, Respondent Judge issued an order requiring herein petitioners to
submit within five (5) days from receipt their opposition to herein private respondents' motion for reconsideration of the order
dated September 10, 1969, but Assistant Provincial Fiscal Enrique Amador did not file any opposition to the aforesaid
motion for reconsideration.

Respondent judge issued its order, reopened the two cases and allowed them to present their evidences. The respondent
judge rendered a decision in favor of the respondents declaring the resolution null and void. The Provincial Fiscal as counsel
for herein petitioners received a copy of the aforesaid decision of April 27, 1970. The petitioners, through Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Enrique A. Amador, filed a 15 page motion dated June 6, 1970 for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision together
with a notice of hearing address to the clerk of court. Private respondents filed a motion for execution on the ground that
the decision had already become final since no appeal therefrom had been interposed and perfected by herein petitioners
within thirty (30) days from their receipt on May 12, 1970 of the aforesaid decision. Petitioner filed their opposition on the
ground that they had complied with Sec. 2 of Rule 37 in connection with Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Respondent Judge granted herein private respondents motion for execution, relying on the cases of Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Bath Construction, Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Co.,Magno vs. Ortiz, in Re Disciplinary
Action vs. Atty. Vicente Raul AImacen in L-27654, Cal ero vs. Yaptinchay, and Sebastian vs. Cabal, et al., where this High
Tribunal repeatedly enunciated that the requirements of Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory
in relation to See. 2 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the
said order which granted the motion for execution. The branch clerk issued a writ of execution. The petitioner filed a
supplement to their urgent motion. The respondent judge denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed
a petition for certiorari contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in considering the subject motion
for reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, and that "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard" citing Borja vs. Tan, Duran Embate vs. Penolio and Sun, Un
Giok vs. Matusa.

ISSUE: Whether the notice accompanying the motion dated June 6, 1970 and filed on June 8, 1970 for the reconsideration
of the decision dated April 27, 1970, complies with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 in relation to Sections 4, 5 and
6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.

HELD: NO, but the deficiency of the notice of hearing in the case was cured when the clerk of court set the motion for
hearing and the court took cognizance of the motion on the date set for hearing thereof by the clerk of court.

In the 1960 Canonoy case, counsel for the defendants received a copy of the order of dismissal on October 7, 1955, and
on October 31, they moved to reconsider the said Order. The motion for reconsideration did not contain a notice of hearing,
but on December 6, 1956, a motion was presented asking the clerk of court to set the motion for reconsideration for hearing
on December 22. The motion was opposed on the ground that it contained no notice of hearing and therefore should be
considered as a mere scrap of paper, which did not toll the running of the period for the judgment to become final.
Nevertheless, the court reconsidered and set aside its order of dismissal. It is patent in the Canonoy case that the failure
on the part of counsel to set the date of hearing of his motion was not due to neglect or negligence on his part but because
he could not do so as he did not know the date or the month when the next yearly section of the court in Pagadlian would
take place as there was no showing that at the time he filed his motion the court had already fixed the date for the next term.
It is evident therefore that the circumstances which compelled the court to regard the notice of hearing in the Matusa case;
as having been remedied or which justified the failure inability of the counsel in the Canonoy case to fix a date for the
hearing of his motion, dip not obtain in the instant case. Here, the clerk of court did not set the motion of herein petitioners
for reconsideration of the decision for hearing on a definite date, much less did the respondent Judge take cognizance of
the said motion for reconsideration. And the respondent Judge holds hearing every business day throughout the year in
Naga City, unlike the Judge in the Canonoy case. Neither did herein private respondents file an opposition to the
aforementioned motion of herein petitioners for the reconsideration of the decision, so as to bring the case at bar within the
purview of the doctrine in the case of Macasero vs. Saguin; 23 much less were the merits of the said motion for
reconsideration of the decision argued. The hearing and argument were limited to the motion for the reconsideration of the
order granting the motion for execution.
To emphasize once more, the directives in Section 2 of Rule 37 and Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of
Court are as mandatory as they are clear and simple; and non compliance therewith is fatal to the cause of the movant,
because the mere filing of the motion for reconsideration, without the requisite notice of hearing, does not toll the running
of the period for appeal. Unless the movant has the time and place of hearing in the notice and serves the adverse party
with the same, the court would have no way to determine whether the party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he
objects to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which to file his reply or
opposition. The rules commanding the movant to serve of the adverse party a written notice of the motion (Section 2, Rule
37) and that the notice of hearing "shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall estate the time and place for the
hearing of the motion" (Section 5, Rule 15), do not provide for any qualifications, much less exceptions. To deviate from the
peremptory principle thus uniformly reaffirmed in the cases aforecited in, and to exempt from the rigor of the operation of
said principle, the case at bar would be one step in the emasculation of the revised rules and would be subversive of the
stability of the rules and jurisprudence thereon all to the consternation of the Bench and Bar and other interested persons
as well as the general public who would thereby be subjected to such an irritating uncertainty as to when to render obedience
to the rule and when their requirements may be ignored. We had to draw a line where and did when we promulgated on
January 1, 1964 the Revised Rules of court wherein WE delineated in a language matchless in simplicity and clarity the
essential requirements for a valid notice of hearing on any motion, to eliminate all possibilities of equivocation or
misunderstanding.

CASE 208

G.R. No. L-35858 August 21, 1979

LIBRADA N. FIRME and FLORENCIO FIRME, petitioners,
vs.
ARSENIO REYES, HON. SIMEON M. GOPENGCO, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXV of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, G. A. MACHINERIES, INC., SHERIFF OF MANILA and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, respondents.

FACTS: The procedural issue in this case, which had already been resolved by the Court of Appeals in a decision from
which the petitioners did not appeal, is whether the petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the lower court's adverse
judgment against them was a mere scrap of paper because it had no notice of hearing and, hence, the said judgment had
become executory.

In Civil Case No. 62906 the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision dated March 1, 1971, declaring Arsenio
Reyes the owner of a 165-square-meter lot and the house standing thereon located at 2371 Del Pan Street, Sta. Ana,
Manila and ordering the spouses, Librada N. Firme and Doctor Florencio Firme, to pay Reyes rentals for the use and
occupation of the house plus P1,000 as attorney's fees.

The Firme spouses received on March 27, 1971 a copy of that decision. On April 13, they filed a motion for reconsideration,
which did not contain any notice of hearing. Copies of that motion were furnished the adverse parties.

Reyes, the winning party, filed a motion dated May 3, 1971, praying that the decision be declared executory and that a writ
of execution be issued. He contended that the motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper because it was not set
for hearing. The Firme spouses opposed the motion for execution but the Trial Court denied it on August 30, 1971. Hence,
the lower courts judgment was regarded as executory and a writ of execution was issued on October 7, 1972.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration filed by the Firme spouses be given merit.

HELD: NO.

Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for new trial or reconsideration should contain "a written
notice" which should be served on the adverse party. "Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties
concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof." The notice shall state the time and place for the hearing of
the motion. "No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof, except when the
court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected. " (Secs. 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15, Rules of Court).

In the leading case of Manakil and Tison vs. Revilla and Tuano, 42 Phil. 81, 84, it was held that a motion for new trial, sans
notice of hearing, did not merit any consideration. "It was nothing but a piece of paper filed with the court. It presented no
question which the court could decide. The court had no right to consider it, nor had the clerk any right to receive it without
a compliance" with Rule 15. "It was not, in fact, a motion. It did not comply with the rules of the court." (See Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Unisan, 44 Phil. 866 and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117).

The written notice referred to in section 2 of Rule 37 is that prescribed in sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The provision in
section 6 of Rule 15 that no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service of such notice is intended to
enable the court to find out whether or not the adverse party is in conformity with the motion and, if he objects to it, to give
him an opportunity to file his opposition (Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-24263, November 18, 1967,
21 SCRA 974, 982-983).
The trial court may properly decline to act on a motion for the reconsideration of its decision when such motion lacks the
notice of the time and place of hearing (Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., 121 Phil. 1221).

Without such a notice of hearing, the motion to set aside the judgment does not suspend the running of the period within
which to perfect an appeal (Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, L-31869, August 8, 1973, 52 SCRA 246,
257-8)

CASE 209
G.R. No. 70895 May 30, 1986
HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. and PEDRO HABALUYAS, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPSON, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 36; SHUGO NODA & CO., LTD., and SHUYA
NODA, respondents.

FACTS: Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Second Division of the Court
promulgated on August 5, 1985 which granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition and set aside the order of respondent
Judge granting private respondents' motion for new trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or
ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be extended.

HELD: Section 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reduced the period for appeal from final
orders or judgments of the Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) from thirty (30) to fifteen (15) days and
provides a uniform period of fifteen days for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court counted from notice thereof, except in habeas corpus cases where the period for appeal remains at forty- eight (48)
hours. To expedite appeals, only a notice of appeal is required and a record on appeal is no longer required except in
appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed. Section 19 of the Interim Rules provides that in these exceptional cases, the period for appeal is thirty (30) days
since a record on appeal is required. Moreover Section 18 of the Interim Rules provides that no appeal bond shall be
required for an appeal, and Section 4 thereof disallows a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.

All these amendments are designed, as the decision sought to be reconsidered rightly states, to avoid the procedural delays
which plagued the administration of justice under the Rules of Court which are intended to assist the parties in obtaining a
just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice.

However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.

After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners and respondents, the Court resolved that the interest of
justice would be better served if the ruling in the original decision were applied prospectively from the time herein stated.
The reason is that it would be unfair to deprive parties of their right to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a
procedure which was not expressly prohibited or allowed by the law or the Rules. On the other hand, a motion for new trial
or reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an appeal, a petition for review or a petition for review on certiorari, and since the
purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite the final disposition of cases, a strict but prospective application
of the said ruling is in order.

The Court restates and clarifies the rules on this point, as follows:

1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts,
the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.

2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed, a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal may be filed within the reglementary period of thirty (30)
days. (Moya vs. Barton, 76 Phil. 831; Heirs of Nantes vs. Court of Appeals, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 753.) If the court
denies the motion for extension, the appeal must be taken within the original period (Bello vs. Fernando, January 30, 1962,
4 SCRA 135), inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for appeal (Reyes vs. Sta. Maria, November 20,
1972, 48 SCRA 1). The trial court may grant said motion after the expiration of the period for appeal provided it was filed
within the original period. (Valero vs. Court of Appeals, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 467; Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals,
September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228).

All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the merits.

CASE 210
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
 DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ, FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND
DOMINGO
VS
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES

FACTS: Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of
dismissal and, on the 15th day thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another
order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27,
1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. The court a quo denied the notice of
appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners
claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion
for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well
within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day
period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to allow a fresh period to file an appeal in lieu of dismissal of the Motion for
Reconsideraiton.

HELD: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule
shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution. The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules, which states that the appeal shall be taken within
15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.

Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice
of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP
129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of
15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner,
the trial court that rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts
become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

**Additional Info only reading purposes**

The Neypes Rule

STATEMENT OF THE RULE

The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the Fresh Period Rule, states that a party litigant may either file his notice
of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order
(the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. (Domingo Neypes versus Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005)

PURPOSE OF THE RULE

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. (supra)

The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted
by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting
the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-
Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)
THE RULE PRIOR TO NEYPES
Before the Supreme Court promulgated Neypes, the rules mandate that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts
the running of the period to appeal; and that an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. While the period to file an appeal is counted from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the
appellant does not have the full fifteen (15) days. The appellant only has the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to
file the notice of appeal. Thus, some rules on appeals are:

Sec. 39. [B.P. 129] Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight
hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x

SEC. 3. [Rule 41] Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and
a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time
to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

SEC. 6. [Rule 122] When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the
time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon
the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.

IN WHAT CASES APPLICABLE

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. (Neypes, supra)

Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. (Neypes, supra)

The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review
the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch
and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. (Neypes,
supra)

APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should
equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the
periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal
from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction. 17

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between
the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or
reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal
cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided
by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

xxxx

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in
civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil
cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to
appeal than an accused in a criminal case a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates
against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property
interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double
and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that
what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in
lege.18 (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

RETROACTIVE EFFECT
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where
the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be
answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. 17 Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate
in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. 18

Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the quested retroactive effect,
to wit:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able
to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against
the retroactive operation of statues they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there
are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made
in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural
laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject
notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment
and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of
judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of
the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.19

Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August 2000, at the same month as the relevant incidents
at bar. There is no reason to adopt herein a rule that is divergent from that in Sps. De los Santos. (Fil-Estate Properties,
Inc. versus Hon. Marietta Homena J. Valencia, G.R. No. 173942, 25 June 2008)

NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RULES OF COURT

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken
within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15
days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to
the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. (Neypes, supra)

NEYPES RULE NOT APPLIED

Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to
1 year, a period which is considered as a correctional penalty. Under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, light felonies are
those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor (one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a
fine not exceeding two hundred pesos (P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light felony or offense
contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore mandatory for petitioner to be present at the promulgation of the
judgment.

To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when the MTCC promulgated its judgment on 25 August 2009. Pursuant to
Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the accused is convicted of a light offense that a promulgation may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. In case the accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation
despite notice, and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose all the remedies available in
the Rules against the judgment. One such remedy was the Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of the MTCC filed
by petitioner on 28 August 2009. Absent a motion for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment, the MTCC should
not have entertained petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from 25 August 2009 or until
9 September 2009 to file his Motion for Probation. The MTCC thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it entertained
the motion instead of immediately denying it. xxx

Petitioner, however, did not file a motion for leave to avail himself of the remedies prior to filing his Motion for
Reconsideration. The hearing on the motion for leave would have been the proper opportunity for the parties to allege and
contest whatever cause prevented petitioner from appearing on 25 August 2009, and whether that cause was indeed
justifiable. If granted, petitioner would have been allowed to avail himself of other remedies under the Rules of Court,
including a motion for reconsideration. xxx

As a final point, while we held in Yu v. Samson-Tatad that the rule in Neypes is also applicable to criminal cases regarding
appeals from convictions in criminal cases under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, nevertheless, the doctrine is not applicable
to this case, considering that petitioners Motion for Probation was filed out of time. (Anselmo de Leon Cuyo versus People
of the Phils., G.R. No. 192164 October 12, 2011)

CASE 211
G.R. No. L-28486 September 10, 1981
FRANCISCO MAGNO, ESPERANZA MAGNO, EULOGIO MAGNO, AMELIA MAGNO VASQUEZ, ULPIANO
VASQUEZ, JOSE O. MAGNO, NICANOR P. MAGNO, FELECITAS O. MAGNO, and LOURDES O.
MAGNO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE MARIANO BENEDICTO of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and
DONATO M. VERGARA, respondents

FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals promulgated on December 2, 1967.

Before the Bulacan Court of First Instance, in Civil Case No. 3198- M (Bulacan Case), which was an action between
members of the same family for partition of war damage payments received from the United States Government, judgment
by default was rendered on September 9, 1966 in favor of petitioners herein, as the plaintiffs in the said case, and against
private respondent Donato M. Vergara and his father-in-law, Meliton Magno, jointly and severally, as defendants therein.
Judgment having become final, the corresponding Writ of Execution was issued and the properties of private respondent
were levied upon and scheduled for sale at public auction.

Private respondent resorted to an action for annulment of judgment and of Writ of Execution before the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No. 275 (Annulment Suit) against petitioners and the Nueva Ecija Provincial Sheriff,
as defendants, upon the main contention that judgment in the Bulacan Case was procured by means of extrinsic fraud
committed by petitioner Francisco Magno against private respondent. Essentially, the extrinsic fraud allegedly consisted in
assurances made by Francisco Magno to private respondent during a confrontation between them that it was never the
intention of petitioners to involve private respondent in the suit and that he would be excluded therefrom. Convinced, private
respondent was lured into inaction only to discover later that judgment was rendered against him and execution against his
properties ordered. Private respondent also prayed for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to restrain the enforcement of the
judgment and of the Writ of Execution pending the determination of the Annulment Suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations in the Complaint filed before the Nueva Ecija Court constitute extrinsic fraud as to
justify said Court in exercising its jurisdiction to interfere with and set aside the judgment of the Bulacan Court and to enjoin
the execution thereof.

HELD:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing allegations contain ultimate facts which, if substantiated, could
constitute extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud is one which prevents the losing party from defending the action brought against
him.

We think it sufficiently appears from the testimony of Baker that he was misled by the statement of Judge Walker, who was
the attorney of Craddock and Stotts He had a right to assume from his version of their conversation that the case would not
be taken up without notifying him. It appears that he thought that the court had no jurisdiction because an attempt was made
to foreclose in the same action a mortgage on real estate which was situated in another district in the same county. He says
it was understood that he should be notifed when the case was to be taken up, and did not appear at the adjourned term
because no depositions had been taken by either party, and he relied upon his understanding that the case would not be
taken up without notice to him. He stated that Craddock was only present during a part of the conversation that he had with
Judge Walker. Judge Walker was not a witness in the case, and there is nothing to contradict the testimony of Baker. It is
true Craddock contradicted his testimony in regard to some other matters which occurred during the conversation, but we
do not think there is any contradiction of Baker's testimony with regard to the postponement of the trial. There was no
negligence on his part in placing reliance upon the statements made to him, and, while we do not think that any fraud was
intended to be practiced upon Montague, the result was that Montague was deprived of his right to appear and defend the
action and this constituted a fraud in law. This principle has been recognized in the case of Lawson v. Bettison 12 Ark. 401.
Relief against fraud in judgment and decrees has also ' been recognized as a ground for equitable jurisdiction Where by
mistake or fraud a party has gained an unfair advantage in proceedings in a court which must operate to make that court
an instrument of injustice, courts of equi ty will interfere and restrain him from reaping fruits of the advantage thus improperly
gained In the application of the principle an injunction will be granted against ajudgment taken in violation of an agreement
to continue the case, where there is a good defense to the action. Beams v. Denham 2 Scam. (111) 58; Sanderson v.
Voelcker 51 Mo. App. 328; Brooks v. Twitchell 182 Mass. 443, 65 N.E. 843, 94 Am St. Rep. 662.

CASE 212
G.R. No. L-22822 August 30, 1968
GREGORIA PALANCA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE AMERICAN FOOD MANUFACTURING COMPANY and TIBURCIO EVALLE, in his capacity as Director of
Patents, respondents-appellees.

FACTS: On May 14, 1958, petitioner-appellant Gregoria Palanca filed with the Philippine Patent Office, Department of
Commerce and Industry, an application to register the trademark, "LION and the representation of a lion's head," alleging
that she had been using the trademark since January 5, 1958 on bechin (food seasoning). The application was opposed by
herein respondent-appelee. The American Food Manufacturing Company, on the ground that petitioner's trademark was
similar to its (respondent's) trademark "LION and representation of a lion" previously adopted and used by it on the same
type of product since August 3, 1953.

After hearing, the Director of Patents, on June 14, 1961, rendered a decision in favor of American Food Manufacturing
Corporation due to prior use. The record shows the petitioner's counsel was furnished with copy of the decision on June 16,
1961.3 No appeal was taken from the decision of the Director of Patents within the reglementary period from June 16, 1961.

On December 14, 1961, however, herein petitioner-appellant filed with the Patent Office a petition to set aside the
aforementioned judgment of June 14, 1961, invoking section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, alleging fraud and/or
negligence committed by her former counsel, Atty. Bienvenido Medel, in that the latter failed to file a memorandum before
the case was submitted for decision; that she had been fraudulently kept in total ignorance of the proceedings in the case;
that her counsel had not informed her of the decision thus preventing her from resorting to all the legal remedies available
to her; that she came to known of the decision only about the latter part of October, 1961, through her friend, Mr. Domingo
Adevoso; that she had evidence to disprove the claim of opposer The American Food Manufacturing Company that it had
been using the same trademark even before 1958; and that she had evidence to show that the bechin that the opposer sold
prior to 1958 were not of the "Lion" brand but of the "Lion-Tiger" brand, another trademark of opposer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Director of Patents erred in denying the petition to set aside judgment and resolving that there was
no fraud perpetrated against petitioner-appellant, as contemplated under section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: NO.

Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or order entered against a party through fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence may be set aside upon proper petition to that effect. Not every kind of fraud, however, is
sufficient ground to set aside a judgment. This Court has held that only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic,
fraud is a ground for annulling a judgment.7 Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation
which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby
said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers
to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments on perjured testimony, which did not
affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case.

The acts complained of by petitioner-appellant, even if assumed to be true and fraudulent, were all committed by her own
counsel, and not by the successful party or opponent in the case. Hence, petitioner-appellant had not shown extrinsic fraud
that would warrant the setting aside of the decision.

CASE 213
G.R. No. L-8222. June 25, 1956

GREGORIO TARCA and RODOLFO TARCA CASTRO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. ANGELES CASON VDA. DE
CARRETERO, Defendant-Appellee.

FACTS: Plaintiffs filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action seeking to annul the judgment rendered in a
registration case (G.L.R.O. Record No. 54794) which was jointly heard with another case concerning recovery of two of the
lots that were the subject of registration (Civil Case No. 8853), on the ground that said judgment was obtained through
fraud. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss which, as amended, disputed the sufficiency of the complaint on three
grounds; (a) that the court had no jurisdiction of the person of Defendant; (b) that the cause of action was barred by a prior
judgment; and (c) that the complaint states no cause of action.
After Plaintiffs had filed their objection to said motion and Defendant had replied, the court found the motion to dismiss well
taken on the ground that the alleged fraud on which the cause of action of Plaintiffs is predicated, even if committed, is not
extrinsic or collateral to the issues involved in the former case, but intrinsic or one which should have been raised therein
because it was part and parcel of the defense that the Plaintiffs had set up to protect their interest. Accordingly, the court
dismissed the case.
The facts which, according to the complaint, constitute the alleged fraud on which Plaintiffs base their cause of action to
annul the judgment rendered in the former case, are: (1) the concealment by Defendant of the true traces of an old sugar
mill and of the house of their predecessors-in-interest by indicating some big stones within the perimeter of lot No. 8 is the
ocular inspection conducted by the court, because the truth is that said traces are on the western side of lot 8, located in
another property belonging to Defendant; (2) the refusal of the trial judge to conduct an ocular inspection of the other side
of Cabatuan creek to see for himself the location of the true traces of said sugar mill and house without any justifiable
reason; (3) the mysterious disappearance of the record of the proceedings concerning the ocular inspection made by the
trial judge as above adverted to.
But it appears on the very face of the complaint that those facts, which allegedly constitute the fraud on which the action
of Plaintiffs is predicated, are matters which have transpired in the course of the ocular inspection made by the trial judge
in the former case and which said trial judge had already considered and passed upon in his decision. It even appears that
when the ocular inspection was made, both parties were present with their counsel, and the objection of Plaintiffs to the
indication of the traces or remains of the old sugar mill and house determinative of Defendants possession has been duly
noted by the trial judge only that the same was not given due consideration by him. And it likewise appears that these
matters have also been taken up by Plaintiffs in connection with their appeal to the Court of Appeals but that said court did
not decide them in their favor but instead affirmed the findings of the trial court. It is therefore evident that the alleged fraud
now advanced by Plaintiffs predicated on those facts is not extrinsic or collateral but intrinsic in the sense that they have
not only been raised but were the subject of adjudication by both the former court and the Court of Appeals and as such it
cannot be considered as sufficient basis for annulling the judgment rendered in the former case.
ISSUE: Whether or not fraud indicated by complainant are sufficient to annul judgment rendered in the former case.
HELD: Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic to the litigations. Were not these the rule there would
be no end to litigation, perjury being of such common occurrence in trials. In fact, under the opposite rule, the losing party
could attack the judgment at any time by attributing imaginary falsehood to his adversarys proofs. But the settled law is that
judicial determination however erroneous of matters brought within the courts jurisdiction cannot be invalidated in another
proceeding. It is the business of a party to meet and repel his opponents perjured evidence. (Almeda vs. Cruz, 47 Off.
Gaz., No. 3, 1179, 1180.)
It is true, as Plaintiffs claim, that when the former case was appealed to the Court of Appeals they discovered that the record
of the proceedings concerning the ocular inspection made by the trial court has mysteriously disappeared and for that
reason the Court of Appeals could not act properly on the issues raised concerning said ocular inspection, but why did
not Plaintiffs take the necessary steps in order that the record of said ocular inspection may be located or reconstituted as
required by law? It is preposterous to contend that such disappearance is the result of a conspiracy between the trial judge
and the Defendant. In any event, it was the concern of Plaintiffs to have the matters investigated in due time, and this they
failed to do. But this
circumstance alone cannot certainly be the basis of annulment of a judgment duly rendered and affirmed by the appellate
court and which has become final long ago.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Appellants.
 CASE 214
G.R. No. 70443 September 15, 1986
BRAULIO CONDE, RUFINA CONDE, GERARDO CONDE, CONCHITA C. LUNDANG, and ALFREDO
VENTURA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. CESAR C. PERALEJO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch LXVI, Third Judicial Region, Capas, Tarlac, and MARCELO GUTIERREZ, respondents.

FACTS: On January 16, 1984, the petitioners filed an action to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated September
23, 1981, which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and ordered the petitioners and/or their successors-in-
interest to deliver immediately the ownership and possession of the property in question to the then plaintiff-appellant
Marcelo Gutierrez. In their complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, the petitioners alleged that
through fraud, Gutierrez was able to make it appear that he was the son of Esteban Gutierrez and Fermina Ramos and as
a necessary consequence of such filiation, was the absolute owner by succession of the property in question.

On February 27, 1984, the trial court dismissed the petitioners' complaint on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to annul
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari, mandamus and a writ of injunction before the appellate court. The said court in turn, dismissed the petition and a
subsequent motion for reconsideration on the grounds that a Regional Trial Court is without jurisdiction to annul the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and that only the Supreme Court is empowered to review the judgment of said appellate
court. Hence, the petitioners elevated the case before this Court.

On the merits of the petition, the appellate court ruled that the fraud relied upon by the petitioners is only intrinsic and thus,
even on the assumption that it has jurisdiction to decide the case, still the same has no merit. It dismissed the petition. The
petitioners elevated this decision to us.

On June 5, 1985, we resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition. Notwithstanding proof that a copy of
the petition was served on the respondents' counsel on June 24, 1985, no comment has been filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fraud mentioned is intrinsic in nature.

HELD: Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule 'where it is one of the effect of
which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contests, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates
upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the
litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented from presenting
fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.

The resort to fraud in introducing fabricated evidence is definitely an intrinsic fraud, hence false testimony being a matter of
evidence is definitely intrinsic and not extrinsic. Fraud consisting in acting fictitious cause of false testimony is intrinsic (sic)
(Francisco v. David, 38 CG 714). Intrinsic fraud takes the form of acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as the
use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and
just determination of the case (Libudan v. Palma, [S1, 45 SCRA 17]). Intrinsic fraud is not sufficient to attack a judgment
(Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971).

Petitioners stand that extrinsic fraud was employed by the respondents, is bereft of any factual basis, hence, even on
the assumption that this court has jurisdiction to decide this issue, still the petitioners cause of action must fail.

A careful review of the present petition and of the records of the appellate court on this case shows that even on the
assumption that all the facts alleged in the petition are true, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit because the
fraud allegedly perpetrated by the private respondent in AC-G.R. SP No. 03301 is only intrinsic in nature and not extrinsic.
Fraud is regarded as extrinsic or collateral where it has prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting an of his
case to the court. (Asian Surety and Insurance Co. v. Island Steel, Inc., 118 SCRA 233, 239; citing Amuran v. Aquino, 38
Phil. 29). In the case at bar, the fraud was in the nature of documents allegedly manufactured by Marcelo Gutierrez to make
it appear that he was the rightful heir of the disputed property, Hence, the Intermediate Appellate Court is correct in finding
the fraud to be intrinsic in nature.

CASE 215
G.R. No. 79244 December 10, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MATEO AYLLON SR., (Deceased) ERLINDA S.
AYLLON petitioner- appellant,
vs.
PRIMA A. SEVILLA, PILAR A. SALAZAR, MERCED A. PABELLO MARCOS AYLLON ANGELES A. SALAMEDA and
and VICENTE AYLLON AYLLON ANGELES A. SALAMEDA and VICENTE AYLLON respondents-appellees.

FACTS: A petition for probate of a holographic last will and testament of Mateo Ayllon Sr. was filed on 7 November 1977
by the petitioner with the Court of First Instance (Now Regional Trial Court), Branch VI, of Guiuan Eastern Samar. The case
was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 459. In said will, the testator made disposition of specific properties to the
petitioner, as his surviving spouse with whom he had no children, and to the respondents, as his sons and daughters by a
first marriage. The respondents opposed the probate, and so hearings were held until the case was submitted for decision
at about the end of 1981. .
While the case was awaiting the court's decision, the Petitioner, without the aid of a lawyer, entered into a verbal amicable
settlement with the respondents. Relying on the verbal settlement and believing that she will be given one-half (1/2) of the
house and lot situated at Concepcion Street, Guiuan Easter Samar, in return for her abandoning the rest of the properties
willed to her, petitioner wrote her lawyer a letter requesting the latter to file a motion to dismiss the case. Petitioner's lawyer
complied with her request. On 14 March 1984, the case was dismissed. However, the respondents apparently did not
comply with their verbal agreement with the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner filed an affidavit with the court on 22 March
1984, asking for the withdrawal of her motion to dismiss and for revival of the case.

On 7 September 1984, the trial court reconsidered the order of dismissal, and revived the case. But, on 10 September 1985,
the court issued an order recalling the order of 7 September 1984, thereby reviving the order of dismissal of 14 March 1984,
on the grounds that (1) the case was amicably settled, and (2) the petitioner failed to present three (3) witnesses who could
Identify the handwriting of the testator in the disputed holographic will, as provided under Article 811 of the Civil Code.

The petitioner files a motion for reconsideration of order of the trial court dismissing the case but it was denied. Upon
petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter court required the petitioner to file a Record on Appeal within Sixty (60)
days from notice. The counsel of the petitioner received the notice on 11 February 1987, so that the last day to file the
record on appeal was on 12 April 1987. But, instead of preparing and eventually filing the Record on Appeal, the petitioner's
counsel filed an Appeal Brief dated 28 February 1987, but actually filed through the mails on 17 March 1987. Hence, in a
Resolution dated 29 May 1987, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on account of failure of counsel of the petitioner
to filed a record on appeal, which is required in appeals in special proceedings, under Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129, and
Section 29 (b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 29 May 1987. It was denied. Hence,
the present petition for certiorari, with the petitioner praying that her case be revived, and that she be allowed to submit a
record on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sixty-day period within which a party may file an appeal already lapsed.

HELD: YES.

Petitioner's counsel failed to file a record on appeal despite due notice and the period of sixty (60) days given to him to file
said record on appeal. Instead of filing the record on appeal, as required, what the petitioner's counsel did was to file an
Appeal Brief. And even after petitioner's counsel received a copy of the respondents' Motion for the Dismissal of the Appeal
for failure of the petitioner to file a record on appeal, nothing was done by petitioner's counsel to correct or amend the
erroneous procedure he had taken. Thus, it is clear that the failure of the petitioner, through counsel, to file the record on
appeal was not inadvertent. In other words, petitioner's counsel ignored compliance with the requirement of filing a record
on appeal, as provided for by the Rules. Hence, there is no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals, in dismissing
petitioner's appeal.

CASE 216
G.R. No. L-56171 January 31, 1983
NIDA GABA, RODOLFO GABA, NATY A. UY and MARIANO TAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, NILO CABANG, Deputy
Sheriff, and PEDRO F. MARTINEZ. respondents.

FACTS: Pedro F. Martinez sued Nida Gaba, Naty A. Uy and Lilian C. Gabriel and their respective husbands for the recovery
of the sums of P20,000 and P3,000 plus damages.

Nida Gaba and the Uy spouses answered the complaint through lawyer Tirso L. Manguiat. Although duly served with the
summons, the Gabriel spouses did not answer the complaint. They pleaded the defense that they borrowed from Martinez
only one amount of P10,000 and not P20,000 and that all the interests due were deducted in advance.

The trial court set the case for pre-trial and an order was sent to the parties counsels through mail. At the pre-trial on July
16, where only plaintiff Martinez and his counsel appeared, Gaba and the Uy spouses were declared in default for their non-
appearance. Lilian C. Gabriel was declared in default for her failure to answer the complaint. The clerk of court was
commissioned to hear the evidence.

A copy of the decision was received on August 22, 1980 by registered mail by Manguiat's clerk, Alfredo Chico. On
September 8, 1980, Martinez filed a motion for execution with notice to Manguiat by registered mail. On that same date,
September 8, Manguiat filed an urgent motion to set aside the order of default with the advertence that the clerk of court
should submit the motion for the immediate consideration by the trial court and, alternatively, that it be set for hearing with
notice to the parties.

Defendant Manny Tan, husband of Naty A. Uy, verified that motion. He alleged that defendants' failure to appear in court
was due to fraud or excusable neglect since no notice of the trial was sent to them and their counsel. A copy of that motion
was furnished Martinez's counsel by registered mail. The trial court in its order of November 12, 1980 denied the motion for
lack of merit.

Several months later, or on February 11, 1981, the Gaba, Uy and Gabriel spouses filed the herein petition for certiorari
through another lawyer, Camilo R. Flores. Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Manguiat, a resident of 2401 Singalong
Street, Manila (no longer holding office at the City Court Compound). The Gabriel spouses, who are abroad, were later
dropped as petitioners. Manguiat alleged that Alfredo Chico, who received copies of the notice of pre-trial and decision, had
ceased to be his clerk in December, 1979, that his other clerk was Chona M. Seminiano and that Chico did not turn over to
him the said papers. Manguiat did not attach any affidavit of Chona.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioners' claim that the amount due from them was unduly inflated by the trial court.

HELD: Manguiat's claim that he was deceived by his alleged former clerk (Chico) cannot be taken seriously in the light of
the incontestable fact that although his other clerk, Chona Seminiano received on August 1, 1980 a copy of the order of
default, yet it was only on September 8, or thirty-eight days later, when Manguiat filed a motion to set it aside, He was not
conscientious in attending to his clients' interests.

As to petitioners' claim that the amount due from them was unduly inflated by the trial court, it should be observed that
petitioners Mariano Tan and Nida Gaba -in a letter to respondent deputy sheriff dated January 6, 1981 asked for a period
of fifteen days within which to satisfy the judgment (p. 95, Rollo). They did not contest the validity of the judgment and the
levy.

Since the said judgment had long become final and executory when the petitioners filed on February 11, 1981 their petition
for certiorari and as there is no clear showing that they were deprived of due process or that the said judgment was procured
by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud, it can no longer be set aside. The trial court acted within its jurisdiction and did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in rendering and enforcing that judgment.

With reference to the alleged irregularities in the execution of the judgment, particularly with respect to Rodolfo Gaba the
same should be first raised in the trial court. The record does not show that the lower court's attention was called to the
alleged improper implementation of the writ of execution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with cost,-against the petitioners. The writ of preliminary injunction is cancelled.

CASE 217
G.R. No. L-39373 September 30, 1974
FELIXBERTO W. FERRER, as administrator of the INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES ESTEBAN F. FERRER,
SR. and MIGUELA WENCESLAO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
YANG SEPENG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: This case was certified to this Court as involving a pure question of law by resolution of August 2, 1974 of the Court
of Appeals

In the action below for recovery of a sum of money, trial on the merits was set for November 8, 1967. At the hearing, plaintiff-
appellee and counsel appeared while only counsel for defendant-appellant was present. The trial proceeded and plaintiff
introduced his documentary evidence supporting his claim against defendant, all of which were admitted without objection
by defendant's counsel. After plaintiff rested his case, defendant's counsel moved for postponement on the ground that
defendant was not present in court. The trial court denied the motion and declared the case submitted for decision. On the
same day, it rendered judgment against defendant.

Three weeks thereafter on December 2, 1967, defendant filed a motion for new trial allegedly on the ground of "accident,
mistake or excusable neglect" in that defendant "early in the morning of said November 8, 1967 ... had stomach trouble and
consequently I was not able to go to the court for said trial" as per defendant's affidavit annexed to the motion. The trial
court denied the motion on the following grounds:

1. That the alleged stomach "trouble" does not constitute excusable negligence since it is merely one which could not
physically prevent him from appearing in court;

2. That the motion for new trial did not allege any statement of fact constituting the valid defense which the defendant may
prove if given the chance to introduce evidence;

3. Finally, because it is not in dispute that appellant is indebted to the late Esteban Ferrer, Sr. in the amount of P20,750.00
as set forth in Exhibit A which appellant signed and did not deny as shown by the fact that appellant in his Answer did not
deny the same under oath thereby giving rise to the presumption that he is deemed to have admitted it (Section 3, Rule 8,
Rules of Court).
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial.

HELD: NO.

We find it necessary to tarry on this point of division in the appellate court. Defendant-appellant's averment of "stomach
trouble belatedly presented after three weeks, without any specific statement of its nature and gravity was patently
inadequate to show to the trial court's satisfaction the existence of "accident, mistake or excusable neglect" which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against by reason of which his substantial rights have been materially affected, as
required by the Rules of Court.

But even if it were to be conceded that defendant-appellant did in fact suffer from serious stomach trouble which physically
prevented him from appearing and giving his testimony at the scheduled trial, his failure to submit in addition an affidavit of
merits showing the valid defense which he may prove as against plaintiffs case in case a new trial is granted is fatal to his
cause.

The reason is fundamental and elementary. The rule requires that motions for new trial founded on fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence must be accompanied by affidavits of merits, i.e. affidavits showing the facts (not mere conclusions
or opinions) constituting the valid cause of action or defense which the movant may prove in case a new trial is granted,
because a new trial would serve no purpose and would just waste the time of the court as well as the parties if the complaint
is after all groundless or the defense is nil or ineffective.

The decisive undisputed fact is that no affidavit of merits to support his motion for new trial as required by Rule 37, section
2 was submitted by defendant-appellant. Such failure is fatal to his cause and is decisive on the question of law presented
by his sole assignment of error.

CASE 218

G.R. No. L-45885 April 28, 1983

JULIAN MENDOZA, petitioner, vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH III, and
SPOUSES RENATO MACAPAGAL and CORAZON MACAPAGAL, respondents.

FACTS: This is a direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari of an order of the respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, dismissing the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 339-V-76 and of the subsequent
order denying a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal.

In May 1975, the petitioner Julian Mendoza and private respondents, spouses Renato Macapagal and Corazon Macapagal,
entered into a written contract, entitled "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapatayo Ng Tirahang Bahay" whereby for and in consideration
of the sum of P320,000.00, the petitioner undertook to construct a residential house for the private respondents under the
terms and conditions therein provided for. The construction of the house was attended by some misunderstandings between
the parties, with the petitioner claiming that he is entitled to certain amounts which the private respondents refused to pay,
and the latter in turn alleging that the petitioner should pay them damages for having abandoned the job.

Sometime in March 1976, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan against the private
respondents and the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Before any trial was conducted, however, the private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the same does not state a cause of action. The
petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion to dismiss. The Judge granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied.

Realizing, perhaps, the weakness of their position in sustaining the order of the respondent Judge in dismissing the
complaint, the private respondents, in their memorandum, resorted to additional grounds for upholding such dismissal. They
now contend that this petition for certiorari may not be entertained because it is being utilized as a substitute for appeal,
and that it was filed out of time. Neither of these contentions of the private respondents find support in applicable rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant proceeding is a petition for certiorari and whether or not is was filed out of time.

HELD: NO.

The instant proceeding is not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It is an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No. 5440. It is illogical, therefore, to claim that the petitioner is resorting to this
proceeding as a substitute for appeal, it being an appeal in itself.

The contention that the petition was filed out of time is predicated on the claim that the motion for reconsideration was
defective for being pro-forma and for failing to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court regarding such a motion.
We fail to see how the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner may be considered pro-forma, the same having
called the attention of the trial court to a point which the latter totally ignored in the order dismissing the complaint. The
requirement which the petitioner supposedly failed to observe in filing his motion for reconsideration was the failure to attach
an affidavit of merit to the same. Private respondents argue that a motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for
new trial and, under Section 2 of Rule 37, when the motion for new trial is filed, affidavits of merits should be attached to
the motion. Once again, private respondents misinterpreted the rules. While it is true that a motion for reconsideration is
equivalent to a motion for new trial if based on a ground for new trial (2 Moran, 1970 Edition, p. 222), the so-called "motion
for reconsideration" which is not called as such in Rule 37 is the term commonly used to refer to a motion for new trial under
subdivision (c) of Section I of Rule 37. An affidavit of merit is required in a motion for new trial pursuant to Section 2 of Rule
37 if the motion for new trial is based on any of the causes mentioned in subdivision (a) of Section I of Rule 37, to wit, fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. No similar requirement is imposed for a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration under subdivision (c) of the same section.

The timeliness of the filing of this petition may not be validly questioned. The order dismissing the complaint was received
by the petitioner on January 25, 1977. The motion for reconsideration was received on February 1, 1977. The order denying
the motion for reconsideration was received by the petitioner on March 21, 1977. Within fifteen days thereafter or on April
4, 1977, the instant petition was filed before this Court.

CASE 219

205 SCRA 537 JANUARY 27, 1992

VILLANUEVA VS CA

(CANNOT FIND SA NET UNG FULL CASE)

CASE 220

G.R. No. L-57204 March 14, 1988

FORTUNATO BORRE, ARTURO SANTOS, ALEJANDRO MANALANG, JOSE MANALANG, VIRGINIA SANTOS,
VIRGILIO GALLARDO, FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, GLORIA DE LA FUENTE, DIONISIO CASTANEDA, SR., YOLY
ANG ESPINA, JACINTO MOLINA, BENIGNO MONDERO, SALUD VIRAY, DEMETRIO CHICA, CRISANTA
BRILLANTES, MILAGROS GALLARDO, FERNANDO ABES, MODESTA GABEON, AMPARO GARA, RAMON GARA,
RAMESES TAMOAN, FELIMON DORADO, FLORENTINA PERALTA, ADELAIDA ABAYGAR, MARINO ABAYGAR,
FIDEL CAYANAN, ABDON SARMIENTO, ROSARIO SISON, LAURA LUMABI, and RUPERTO
TORREFIEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE ARTEMON D. LUNA, and THE MANOTOK SERVICES,
INCORPORATED, respondents.

FACTS: On August 29, 1979, petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent Manotok Services, Inc. to recover
rentals paid by them alleging that the land leased to them by the company was actually public land, forming part of the
Estero de Sunog-Apo and Estero de Maypajo and did not belong to the company.

On motion of the respondent company, the trial court dismissed the complaint on November 11, 1980 on the ground that
the company's ownership of the property was recognized by the State with the passage of Pres. Dec. No. 1670.

On December 13, 1980, petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that respondent company's titles covered lots which
were portions of the Estero de Sunog-Apo and Estero de Maypajo and therefore should not have been included in those
titles because these portions are public property which cannot be appropriated and titled by private persons like the
respondent company. The trial court denied the motion in its order dated December 22, 1980 which was received by
petitioners on January 12, 1981.

A second motion for reconsideration was filed on January 14, 1981 on the ground that a subsequent survey showed that
the lots occupied by petitioners are not covered by respondent company's titles, and hence, are neither covered by Pres.
Dec. No. 1670. In its order dated January 20, 1981, the trial court denied the second motion. Petitioners received the court
order on January 30, 1981.

The next day, January 31, 1981, the last day for perfecting their appeal from the dismissal of their complaint, petitioners
filed by registered mail a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal. However, they did
not file their appeal bond until February 2, 1981 for which reason the court dismissed their appeal, the thirty-day period for
perfecting appeal having expired.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari but their petition was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the late filing of the appeal bond of the petitioners was due to "excusable negligence".
HELD: NO.

This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a question on the timeliness of filing the appeal bond, a requirement for
perfecting an appeal which had been dispensed with by Section 18 of the Interim Rules of Court. Although this new
procedural rule may be given retroactive effect, the extent of its retroactive application is, however, limited to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of its approval and does not extend to actions which had already become final and executor.

Before the Interim Rules of Court took effect, the 1964 Rules of Court required the filing with the trial court within thirty (30)
days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. In the case at bar,
although the notice of appeal and the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal were filed within the
reglementary period, the appeal bond was filed two days late, or after the period for perfecting an appeal had lapsed.
Inasmuch as the appeal was not perfected on time, the decision of the trial court became final and executory on January
31, 1981. The trial judge committed no error in dismissing the appeal. This is clearly set forth in Section 13, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court:

SEC. 13.Effect of failure to file notice, bond, or record on appeal. Where the notice of appeal, appeal
bond or record on appeal is not filed within the period of time herein provided, the appeal shall be
dismissed.

There is, therefore, no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. This Court has repeatedly held that
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. As
Justice J.B.L. Reyes has pointed out, "The right to appeal is not a natural right nor part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law

Unless there is a showing of excusable negligence justifying the failure to file the appeal bond on time, the period within
which to perfect an appeal cannot be extended to accommodate the appellant. Petitioners' mistake in believing that the
Office of the Clerk of Court would be closed on Saturdays does not constitute "excusable negligence" which would justify a
liberal application of the pertinent rules on the perfection of an appeal. Petitioners' counsel, a practitioner in the Metro Manila
area, should have known or exerted effort to inquire about office hours in courts on Saturdays instead of assuming that
Saturdays are not working days. No abuse of discretion, much less a grave one at that, as alleged, was committed by
respondent Judge in dismissing petitioners' appeal.

CASE 221

G.R. No. 174536 OCTOBER 29, 2008

ROBERTO Y. PONCIANO, JR., Petitioner
VS.
LAGUNA LAKEDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

CASE 222

G.R. No. 168985 JULY 23, 2008

ACCESSORIES SPECIALIST INC., a.k.a. ARTS 21 CORPORATION, and TADAHIKO HASHIMOTO

VS.

ERLINDA B. ALABANZA, for and in behalf of her deceased husband, JONES B. ALABANZA,

FACTS: On September 27, 2002, respondent Alabanza filed a complaint against petitioners Arts 21 and Hashimoto for and
in behalf of her husband for non-payment of salaries, separation pay and 13th month pay.

Respondents husband was the Vice-President, Manager and Director of Arts 21 and had been with the company
from 1975 to 1997. He was compelled by the owner, Hashimoto, to file his involuntary resignation on October 17, 1997 on
the ground that Arts 21 allegedly suffered losses. Respondents husband demanded payment of his money claims upon
resignation but was told that rank and file employees will be paid first and thus waited for his turn. Respondents husband
made several demands but Arts 21 just kept on assuring him that he will be paid his money claims. Respondents husband
died on August 5, 2002 with his claims still unpaid.

Petitioners invoke Art. 291 of the Labor Code and contend that respondents husband voluntarily resigned in
October, 1997, thus the cause of action has already prescribed since the case was filed in 2002 only, beyond the three-
year-period within which money claims should be filed.
 The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay respondent over P4M. Petitioners filed an appeal
along with a motion to reduce bond, attaching receipts for cash bond amounting to P290K and appeal fee for P170.00. The
motion was denied and petitioners were given 10 days within which to file the required bond. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which the NLRC denied ordering the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection thereof due to non-
compliance with the bond requirement. The resolution became final and executory and a writ of execution was issued by
the Labor Arbiter upon motion by respondent. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for
the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. The petition was dismissed.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the cause of action of respondent has already prescribed.

2. Whether or not the posting of the complete amount of the bond in an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter
to the NLRC is an indispensable requirement for the perfection of the appeal despite the filing of a motion to reduce the
amount of the appeal bond.

HELD:

1. NO.

Based on the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter, it was petitioner Arts 21 which was responsible for the delay in the
institution of the complaint. When petitioners husband filed his resignation he immediately asked for the payment of his
money claims. However, the management of Arts 21 promised him that he would be paid immediately after the claim of the
rank-and-file employees had been paid. Jones relied on this representation.

Promissory estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration, if it was intended that the
promise should be relied upon, as in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would virtually sanction the
perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice. The principle of promissory estoppel is a recognized exception to the
three-year prescriptive period enunciated in Article 291 of the Labor Code.

In order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears the burden of establishing the following elements:
(1) a promise was reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance; (2) such promise did, in fact, induce such action or
forbearance; and (3) the party suffered detriment as a result. All the requisites are present in this case. The Court, therefore,
finds ample justification not to follow the prescriptive period imposed under Art. 291 of the Labor Code. Great injustice will
be committed if respondents claims will be brushed aside on a mere technicality, especially when it was petitioners own
action that prevented respondent from interposing the claims within the required period.

2. YES.

Article 223 of the Labor Code mandates that in case of a judgment of the Labor Arbiter involving a monetary award,
an appeal by the employer to the NLRC may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission, in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.

The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.

The filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order
to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and xecutor.
This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in
their favour upon the dismissal of the employers appeal. It is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to
delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their employees just and lawful claims.

The failure of petitioners to comply with the requirement of posting a bond equivalent in amount to the monetary
award is fatal to their appeal. Section 6 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC mandates, among others, that no
motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable
amount in relation to the monetary award. The NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny their motion to reduce the amount
of the appeal bond. The finding of the NLRC that petitioners did not present sufficient justification for the reduction thereof
is generally conclusive upon the Court absent a showing that the denial was tainted with bad faith.

Furthermore, appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Parties who seek to avail themselves
of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it.

CASE 223

G.R. No. L-43252 September 30, 1976

PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
 CORAZON JEREMIAS (REMIAS) and GERINIMO PERECHO, defendants. CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY
COMPANY, INC., movant-appellant.

CASE 224
G.R. No. 98334 May 8, 1992
MANUEL D. MEDIDA, Deputy Sheriff of the Province of Cebu, CITY SAVINGS BANK (formerly Cebu City Savings
and Loan Association, Inc.) and TEOTIMO ABELLANA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ANDRES DOLINO and PASCUALA DOLINO

FACTS: Private respondents, Spouses Dolino, alarmed of losing their right of redemption over the subject parcel of land
from Juan Gandiocho, purchaser of the aforesaid lot at a foreclosure sale of the previous mortgage in favor of Cebu City
Development Bank, went to Teotimo Abellana, President of the City Savings Bank (formerly known as Cebu City Savings
and Loan Association, Inc.), to obtain a loan of P30, 000. Prior thereto, their son Teofredo filed a similar loan application
and the subject lot was offered as security. Subsequently they executed a promissory note in favor of CSB.

The loan became due and demandable without the spouses Dolino paying the same, petitioner association caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The land was sold at a public auction to CSB being the highest bidder. A certificate
of sale was subsequently issued which was also registered. No redemption was being effected by Sps. Dolino, their title to
the property was cancelled and a new title was issued in favor of CSB.

Sps. Dolino then filed a case to annul the sale at public auction and for the cancellation of certificate of sale issued pursuant
thereto, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was in violation of Act 3135, as amended. The trial court sustained
the validity of the loan and the real estate mortgage, but annulled the extrajudicial foreclosure on the ground that it failed to
comply with the notice requirement of Act 3135.

Not satisfied with the ruling of the trial court, Sps. Dolino interposed a partial appeal to the CA, assailing the validity of the
mortgage executed between them and City Savings Bank, among others. The CA ruled in favor of private respondents
declaring the said mortgage as void or the reason that the mortgagor spouses, at the time when the said mortgage was
executed, were no longer the owners of the lot, having supposedly lost the same when the lot was sold to a purchaser in
the foreclosure sale under the prior mortgage. This holding cannot be sustained.

Preliminarily, the issue of ownership of the mortgaged property was never alleged in the complaint nor was the same raised
during the trial, hence that issue should not have been taken cognizance of by the Court of Appeals. An issue which was
neither averred in the complaint nor ventilated during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
as it would be offensive to the basic rule of fair play, justice and due process

ISSUE: Whether or not a mortgage, whose property has been extra judicially foreclosed and sold at a corresponding
foreclosure sale, may validly execute a mortgage contract over the same property in favor of a third party during the period
of redemption.

HELD: It is undisputed that the real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner bank was executed by respondent spouses during
the period of redemption. During the said period it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed
property since the rule up to now is the right of a purchaser of a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of
redemption has expired without the right being exercised. The title to the land sold under mortgage foreclosure remains in
the mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the redemption period and the conveyance of the master deed.

The mortgagor remains as the absolute owner of the property during the redemption period and has the free disposal of his
property, there would be compliance with Article. 2085 of the Civil Code for the constitution of another mortgage on the
property. To hold otherwise would create an inequitable situation wherein the mortgagor would be deprived of the
opportunity, which may be his last recourse, to raise funds to timely redeem his property through another mortgage.

CASE 225
G.R. No. 102128 November 6, 1992
ABUNDIA ESPINA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DEMETRIA VILAS VDA. DE PINILI, ALFONSO ARTUS and AGUSTINA DELA
RIARTE, respondents.

FACTS: This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that the Regional Trial Court
of Dumaguete City which dismissed petitioner's action for reconveyance against private respondents.

The property in dispute is a 744-square meter lot which is a portion of Lot 2723 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, situated at
Taclobo, Dumaguete City, registered on 27 October 1922 in the name of Rufina Lazaga under Original Certificate of Title
No. 66-A. On 16 February 1939, Geronimo Pinili, deceased husband of private respondent Demetria Vilas Vda. de Pinili,
acquired one-half (1/2) of said Lot 2723, which contained a total area of 2,402 square meters, as evidenced by TCT No. T-
5448 issued in his name, 2 while the other half was purchased by a certain Alfonso Artus. The 744-square meter lot in
dispute is part of the portion now owned by private respondents.
Petitioner now seeks the reconveyance of the disputed lot as she alleges that the property is owned by her mother, Maria
Lazaga, who had it declared in her name in 1915 for taxation purposes, and that she and her mother have been in the
peaceful and public possession and enjoyment thereof. She asserts that by means of deceit and fraud, the disputed property
was included and made part of Lot 2723 and subsequently registered in the name of Rufina Lazaga under OCT No. 66-A.
Petitioner claims that she discovered the fraud only sometime in 1985 when private respondents required her tenants to
pay rentals to them.

Private respondents in turn maintain that they are the owners of the land in dispute, which is registered in their names under
TCT No. T-1365, and that petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Maria Lazaga, does not even appear to be a survey claimant
in Lot 2723 in the 1918 cadastral proceedings.

The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and held that the land in dispute was subject of a cadastral
proceeding but Maria Lazaga did not file an answer to claim any interest in the land as required by Act No. 2259, Sec. 9
and the tax declaration presented by petitioner covers a different land.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in considering an issue which was not raised in the briefs of the parties.

HELD: A careful study of the petition reveals that it raises factual issues which this Court could have dismissed outright
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But We brushed aside technicalities and gave due course to the petition if only to be
satisfied that respondent Court of Appeals did not, contrary to the petition, misapprehend the facts.

As regards petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals considered ground other than those touched upon in the decision
of the trial court, it is settled that the appellate court may uphold the judgment of a lower court on grounds other than those
relied upon by the trial court. 7 In fact, even if issues are not formally and specifically raised on appeal, they may nevertheless
be considered as long as they are closely related to the error properly assigned or upon which the determination of the
question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent. 8 The Court of Appeals, in the case before Us, can hardly be
said to have treated issues not brought before the court a quo. What the appellate court merely did was to make a strict
scrutiny of the evidence on record, and that its ruling that petitioner's Exh. "F" pertains to a different land does not mean it
violated the principle that an issue which has not been raised in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Simply put, all that respondent Court of Appeals did was to take into account a ground or issue closely related to or intimately
interwoven with the error properly assigned.

226-275

229-275