Chapter 4 Sept.
21 2015
1. MANEBO v. ACOSTA
October 28, 2009
G.R. No. 169554
FACTS:
On May 4, 2000 at 6:30pm at Barangay San Mariano, Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecjia, Bernadette M. Dimatulac and Flordeliza V. Bagasan
were seated beside each other on a papag watching television inside
the church of the Kaibigan Foundation Inc. Suddenly, a man later
identified as SP01 Acosta, with an unidentified male companion,
both with short firearms, entered the church premises. Acosta
approached Dimatulac and Bagasan and at arms length distance,
Acosta shot Dimatulac several times on the head and body causing
her instant death.
Sardia, who was standing in front of his house heard several
gunshots and saw two men run out of the Chapel. The two men
immediately boarded an owner-type jeep without a plate number
parked along Maharlika Highway and proceeded to the direction
going to San Leonardo town. While the driver of the jeep was
backing up his vehicle, Sardia recognized the driver as Numerciano
Sapiandante, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Tagumpay.
A complaint for murder was filed by Nieva Manebo, the sister of
Dimatulac against Acosta and Sapiandante before the Special Action
Unit (SAU) of the NBI. The findings of the SAU recommended the
filing of a murder case and it was reffered to the Office of the Chief
State Prosecutor, Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary
investigation. Acosta and Sapiandante filed directly with the DOJ. A
counter-charge of perjury, offering false witness and violation of PD.
1829 was charged against Manebo, Bagaasan and Sardia.
On January 22, 2001, State Prosecutor Melvin J. Abad issued a Joint
Resolution, approved by the Chief State Prosecutor, recommending
the filing of the case in court and that the counter-charge for perjury
be dismissed. On the same day, an information for murder was filed
with the RTC. Acosta and Sapiandante filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. They then filed their appeal with
the DOJ Secretary. The murder case filed in the RTC of Cabanatuan
was transferred to RTC of Manila and warrants of arrest were issued.
On June 27, the DOJ Secretary issued his resolution, reversing the
appealed resolution and directing to move for the withdrawal of the
information filed against Acosta and Sapiandate on the following
grounds:
In the investigation, it was gathered that the victim was shot while
watching television in the company of one Liza Gaagasan.
Garagasan was not available to provide any information as regards
the incident.
Instead, a certain Flordeliza Bagasan who executed an affidavit,
more than 4 months later, alleging that she was seated beside the
victim and witnessed the actual shooting. Bagasan gave a description
of the assailant which did not fit the physical attributes of Acosta.
Manebo could only ascribe the variance by insinuating that Acosta
may have gotten plastic surgery or altered his image to avoid being
recognized. This is rather too strenuous to be believed. Bagasans
delayed testimony coupled with an erroneous description casts a
thick cloud of doubt on her credibility.
The same is true with the testimony of witness Sardia. Sardia was not
among those mentioned in the police report and his testimony was
likewise belatedly executed. His testimony may not also be given
credence since he did not witness the actual shooting.
Undoubtedly, the denial and alibis are inherently weak for they can
be easily fabricated. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of an accused. The prosecution is not relived of the
required quantum of proof simply because the defense invoked is
alibi. Where questionable, alibi assumes strength and significance
which is the situation in the present case. All told, the evidence
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 1
 Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015

lacked the required quantum of proof sufficient to indict them for the DOJ on September 1, 2000. Acosta and Sapiandante filed ther
offense charged. petition on March 23, 2001. On August 20, 2001 they filed with the
RTC of Cabanatuan, a Motion to Suspend Proceedings pending a
Pursuant to the resolution of the DOJ, the prosecutor filed a Motion final determination of the merits of their petition by the DOJ
to Withdraw the Information. Manebo filed an appeal with the Office Secretary. On August 27, 2001, they filed with the DOJ a compliance
of the President (OP), but it was dismissed and affirmed in toto the where they submitted the motion to suspend proceedings filed in the
resolution of the DOJ Secretary. Motion for reconsideration was RTC. This was only filed with the RTC after they have already filed
denied by the OP so it they subsequently filed s petition with the CA. their petition for review with the DOJ which explains why the
petition was not accompanied by a motion to suspend proceedings.
Meanwhile, RTC of Manila resolved to suspend the resolution on the Immediately after the motion to suspend proceeding was filed with
motion to withdraw the information. RTC likewise ruled for the RTC, respondents submitted a copy of such motion with the
suspension of the implementation of the warrants of arrest until after DOJ.
the resolution of the petition filed before the CA. The CA
subsequently dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal. YES. THE DOJ COMMITTED A MANIFEST ERROR IN
FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE.

ISSUE: Probable Cause- existence of such facts and circumstances as would

W/N the Secretary of Justice may disregard the provisions of lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest
Department Circular No. 70, particularly Sections 5 and 6 and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime
W/N the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the Office of the subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion and
President, which adopted the finding of the DOJ Secretary that there reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. It implies
was no probable cause probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less
than evidence to justify a conviction.
HELD:
WE HOLD THAT THERE WAS SUBTANTIAL COMPLIANCE To determine the existence of probable cause, there is need to
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS. conduct a preliminary investigation which determines whether (a) a
crime has been committed and (b) there is probable cause to believe
Manebo claims that the appeal filed by Acosta and Sapiandante with that the accused is guilty. It is executive in nature. This court may
the Secretary of Justice should have been denied for their failure to not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the
comply with Sections 5 and 61 of Dept. Circular 70. Issued by the
































































































































































































1
Section 5. Contents of the Petition. Section 6. Effect of failure to comply with requirements- The failure of the
xxx petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall constitute
Information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
copy of the motion to defer proceedings filed in court must also accompany
the petition.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 2



public prosecutors function (determination of probable cause), unless
there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion in his findings and
when necessary for orderly administration of justice. It must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act all in
contemplation of law.
The court is not persuaded by the findings of the DOJ Secretary. The
initial police report stated that the name of the person who was
seated beside the victim was Liza Gragasan, such report would not
conclusively establish that Liza could not have been Floredliza
Bagasan. Fordelizas nickname is Liza and her surname Bagasan
sounds similar to Gragasan. Under the rule of idem sonans, two
names are said to be idem sonantes if the attentive ear finds
difficulty in distinguishing them when pronounced. When read, the
names sound similar thus the presence of Bagasan at the scene can be
established. The execution of the affidavit 4 months after is within
the bounds of expected human behavior. It is a natural reaction of a
person who had yet to fully comprehend a shocking and traumatic
event. This does not affect a wtiness credibility. The DOJ
Secretarys finding that the description did not fit the physical
attributes is not persuasive, since Bagasan was able to positively
identify Acosta when a sketch was shown to her and identify him
among 3 pictures of men. This was corroborated by Sardia who saw
Acosta, and Sardia was familiar with his face since he was a witness
in a case of frustrated murder against Sapiandante. The DOJ also said
that Sardia was not credible because he was not among those
mentioned as witness in the police report. The failure of the police
report to mention Sardias name as witness would not detract from
what he saw. Entries in a police blotter are not conclusive proof of
the truth of such entries and should not be given undue significance
or probative value for they are usually incomplete or inaccurate. The
declaration of a witness is best done by the trial court. The fact that
Sardias affidavit was belatedly executed does not make it less
credible. Again, witnesses are usually reluctant to volunteer
information for a variety of valid reasons. Fear of reprisal and natural
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
reluctance are sufficient explanations for the delay in reporting a
crime.
In preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines
whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
Considering the foregoing, the court finds that the CA erred in
affirming the DOJs finding of the absence of probable cause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83300 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Secretary of Justice is hereby ORDERED to direct the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila to withdraw the Motion to Withdraw
the Information for Murder already filed in the trial court.
2. Burgos v. CA
G.R. No. 169711; February 8, 2010
Chapter 4: Preliminary Investigation
Matters on a) Bail, b) Hearing, c) OSG intervention
FACTS:
1. A number of assailants attacked the household of Sarah
Marie Palma Burgos while all were asleep, killing Sarah
Burgos and her uncle Erasmo Palma. Another uncle, Victor
Palma, and a friend, Benigno Oquendo survived the attack.
2. Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresencio
Aman and Romeo Martin who executed confessions,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 3

allegedly admitting their part in the attack. They pointed to
two others who helped them: Artemio Pong Bergonia and
Danilo Say. They also named respondent Co as the alleged
mastermind of the whole thing.
3. After 10 years (or on September 5, 2002) respondent Co
surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. The
prosecution charged him with two counts of murder for the
deaths of Sarah and Erasmo and two counts of frustrated
murder committed against Oquendo and Victor. Upon
arraignment, Co pleaded not guilty to the charges.
4. Prosecution presented evidence against respondent Co:
First: Aman and Martins extrajudicial confessions
that pointed to Co as the one who hired them to kill
David and his family
Second: Davids testimony as alleged witness to the
killing of Sarah. Aman supposedly told David later
when they met that it was Co who ordered the
massacre.
Third: Police officer Leopoldo Vasquez said that his
team conducted two operations to take Co into
custody. The first was in a restaurant where they
waited for him but Co got suspicious and when he
saw the police. He immediately left the restaurant,
got into his car, and sped away. The police also tried
to arrest Co at his residence but the police did not
find him there.
Fourth: Co also offered to settle the case.
5. RTC of Manila granted bail for Co on the ground that the
evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong. Among
the reasons:
First: The extrajudicial confessions of Aman and
Martin, apart from having been irregularly executed,
merely proved their participation in the killing.
Neither, however, claimed conspiracy with
respondent Co.
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
Second: Davids narrations were contradictory,
uncorroborated, and self-serving, thus lacking in
evidentiary weight.
Third: Police officer Vasquezs story was likewise
uncorroborated.
Fourth: The prosecution failed to prove that the offer
of settlement came from Co.
6. Petitioner heirs of Sarah Burgos moved for reconsideration,
this was denied.
7. Petitioner heirs of Sarah Burgos then filed for special civil
action of certiorari questioning the RTCs grant of bail to
Co, with prayer for temporary restraining order before the
CA. The CA dismissed this.
CA dismissed the petition because it was filed
without involving the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), in violation of jurisprudence and
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
Administrative Code: Sec. 35. Powers and
Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General
shall (1) Represent the Government in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and
its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions
ISSUE: W/N CA correctly dismissed the special civil action of
certiorari for having been filed in the name of the offended parties
and without the OSGs intervention
HELD: YES.
As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state
lies only in the OSG. Actions essentially involving the interest of
the State, if not initiated by the Solicitor General are, as a rule,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 4

summarily dismissed. In this case, the question of granting bail to Co
is but an aspect of the criminal action. The grant of bail or its denial
has no impact on the civil liability of Co that depends on conviction
by final judgment. Co has already been arraigned. Trial and
judgment, with award for civil liability when warranted, could
proceed even in his absence. In one case cited (Narciso v. Sta.
Romana-Cruz), the SC allowed a party to challenge the trial courts
order granting bail only because the trial court gravely abused its
discretion when it granted bail without conducting any hearing at all.
In this case however, the trial court took time to hear the parade
of witnesses that the prosecution presented before reaching the
conclusion that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not
strong.
WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED and CA decision is
AFFIRMED.
Prepared by Maria Cervero
3. Cruz v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 174599-609
February 12, 2010
Facts:
In 2001, acting on reports of irregularities, respondent
Special Presidential Task Force 156 (Task Force) investigated the
One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Draw
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
back Center (One-Stop Center) of the Department of Finance.The
Task Force found that certain officials of the One-Stop Center had
been issuing tax credit certificates (TCCs) to entities that did not earn
them through tax overpayments.
According to respondent Task Force, the Diamond Knitting
Corporation (DKC), a textile manufacturer, completely shut down its
operations in 1993 yet the DOFs One-Stop Center issued to it TCCs
totaling P131,205,391.00 from 1994 to 1997. DKC in turn sold a
number of these TCCs to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
(Pilipinas Shell) with the approval of the One-Stop Center. Pilipinas
Shell then used these TCCs to pay off its excise tax obligations to the
BIR.
Believing that petitioner Pacifico R. Cruz, the General
Manager of Pilipinas Shells Treasury and Taxation Department, was
a party to the fraud, respondent Task Force included him in its
complaint for plunder against certain officials of DKC and of the
One-Stop Center before respondent Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB). The OMB dismissed the plunder case but caused the filing
of separate informations for multiple violations of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against petitioner Cruz and the
others with him. Before being arraigned, however, Cruz sought the
reinvestigation of the cases, claiming that he had been unable to seek
reconsideration because of the hasty filing of the informations. The
Sandiganbayan granted his motion and ordered the OMB to submit a
report of its reinvestigation within 60 days.
After reinvestigation, respondent Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) submitted a memorandum to the OMB,
recommending the dropping of the charges against Cruz for lack of
evidence that he supplied the false documents used for processing the
transfers to Pilipinas Shell of the subject fraudulently issued
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 5

TCCs. The OSP found that Cruz could not have known that DKC
had long stopped its business operations. The recommendation was
approved by the OMB and it filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan
to drop Cruz from the informations filed. This was not acted on by
the Sandiganbayan.
More than five months later, respondent OSP, acting through
Prosecutor Galisanao, filed another motion with the Sandiganbayan
to hold in abeyance action on the OSPs motion to drop petitioner
Cruz from the charges. At the hearing of the motion on May 15, 203,
when neither Cruz nor his counsel was present, Prosecutor
Monteroso orally moved to withdraw the OSPs motion to drop Cruz
from the informations. The Sandiganbayan promptly granted
Monterosos oral motion and approved the withdrawal. Yet, on May
26, 2003 the OSP still filed a motion to withdraw its motion to drop
Cruz from the informations.
On May 30, 2003 Cruz eventually received the
Sandiganbayans May 15, 2003 order that already allowed the
withdrawal of respondent OSPs dropping of Cruz from the
informations.
On June 16, 2003 petitioner Cruz filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans May 15, 2003 order on the
ground that he had no notice of the hearing set on that date. He also
complained of lack of notice respecting the formal withdrawal
motion set on June 4, 2003. Cruz also challenged Galisanao and
Monterosos authority to countermand the OMBs approval of the
dropping of the charges against him.
On July 17, 2006 the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny
petitioner Cruzs motion for reconsideration. The court held that Cruz
was not entitled to notice since it was the OSPs prerogative to
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
withdraw its earlier motion to drop him from the charges. The
Sandiganbayan also pointed out that Cruz ultimately had the
opportunity to ventilate his objections since he filed a motion for
reconsideration of the courts order granting the withdrawal. With
regard to the authority of the mentioned prosecutors, it was
confirmed by SP Villa Ignacio on behalf of the ombudsman that
Galisanao and Monterosos acted on verbal orders of the OMB.
.Unsatisfied, Cruz filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
Simulatenous with the case, this Court rendered judgment
in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. CIR. The court rules that
Pilipinas Shell was a transferee in good faith and for value and may
thus not be unjustly prejudiced by the transferors fraud committed in
procuring the transfer of those TCCs.
Petitioner Cruz filed a manifestation invoking the Courts
ruling in the above tax case as res judicata with respect to his alleged
criminal liabilities relating to the subject TCCs.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
allowing respondent OSP to withdraw its earlier motion to drop
petitioner Cruz from the criminal informations even after the OMB
had approved such withdrawal on ground of lack of probable cause;
and
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 6

2. Whether or not the findings of the Court in Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue that
Pilipinas Shell was a transferee in good faith and for value of the
TCCs in question bar the prosecution of Cruz in the criminal cases
subject of this petition.
Held:
1) YES, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
allowing OSP to withdraw its earlier motion to drop Cruz.
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that it was respondent OSPs
prerogative, as public prosecutor, to withdraw the earlier motion it
filed for the dropping of the charges against petitioner Cruz. Giving
him notice of such motion, said the Sandiganbayan, was
therefore not indispensable. But respondent OSP did not ask the
Sandiganbayan to drop petitioner Cruz from the charges filed in
court out of pure whim or simply because the OSP changed its
mind regarding his case. On motion of Cruz and upon orders of
the Sandiganbayan, the OSP conducted a reinvestigation of the
case. By its nature, a reinvestigation is nothing more than a
continuation of the OMBs duty to conduct a preliminary
investigation for the purpose of determining probable cause against a
person charged with an offense falling under its jurisdiction.
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan forgot that, in ordering the
reinvestigation of the charges against petitioner Cruz, it effectively
acknowledged that he had not been accorded his full right to a
preliminary investigation. As it happened, the OMB found after
reinvestigation that no probable cause existed against petitioner
Cruz. Under the circumstances, this entitled Cruz to the dismissal of
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
the charges against him. Unfortunately, acting with grave abuse of
discretion, the Sandiganbayan ignored Cruzs right to such a
dismissal. It simply allowed respondent OSP to withdraw its motion
to drop Cruz from those charges even if the OSP made no claim that
the state of evidence had changed after it submitted its memorandum.
2. Yes, res judicata applies.
This Court resolved substantially the same issue in Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.There, the Court categorically found that Pilipinas Shell,
represented in its acquisition of the TCCs in question by petitioner
Cruz, was a transferee in good faith and for value of those
TCCs. This means that neither Pilipinas Shell nor Cruz was a party
to the fraudulent issuance and transfer of the TCCs.
The parties in the tax case and in the criminal cases are
substantially the same. Although it was respondent Task Force that
investigated the irregularities in the issuance and transfers of the
TCCs, the ultimate complainant in the criminal case and the party
that suffered the injury was the government, represented by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is also the CIR who
represented the government in the tax case. In short, the parties in
the tax case and in the criminal cases represent substantially identical
interests. The principle of res judicata through conclusiveness of
judgment applies to bar the criminal actions against Cruz.
4. Chua v. Ang
G.R. No. 156164
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 7

September 4, 2009
By: Maureen Choa
Facts:
On February 11, 1999, the petitioners, Spouses Chua (as
buyers), and FilEstate Properties, Inc. (FEPI, as developers)
executed a Contract To Sell a condominium unit. Despite the lapse of
three (3) years, FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted
condominium unit to the petitioners. As a result, the petitioners filed
on September 3, 2002 a ComplaintAffidavit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasig City accusing the private respondents, as
officers and directors of FEPI, of violating P.D. No. 957 The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree..
The petitioners alleged that the private respondents did not
construct and failed to deliver the contracted condominium unit to
them and did not register the Contract to Sell with the Register of
Deeds. Of the seven (7) private respondents, only private respondent
Alice Odchique Bondoc filed a CounterAffidavit wherein she stated
that the City Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the case since it falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis R. Pastrana and Pasig City
Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang (public respondents), respectively issued
and approved the Resolution dismissing the complaint for being
premature. The Resolution held that it is the HLURB that has
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and
practices.
Issue:
1. WON public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed
petitioner's complaint on the ground that the HLURB, not their
office, has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation.
Held:
1. YES.
In their comment, respondents submit that the petition should
be dismissed outright because the petitioners failed to avail of other
remedies provided by law, such as (a) the filing of a motion for
reconsideration with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, (b) the filing
of a petition for review with the Secretary of the Department of
Justice (DOJ), (c) the filing of a motion for reconsideration of any
judgment rendered by the DOJ, or (d) the filing of an appeal or a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) that even if
certiorari is a proper remedy, the petition was filed in violation of
the hierarchy of courts and that even on the
merits, the petition must fail since the public respondents correctly
dismissed the complaint as a reasonable interpretation of P.D. No.
957 which requires a prior determination by the HLURB that a
corporation violated P.D. No. 957 before criminal charges may be
filed against its corporate officers.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 8

In the present petition for certiorari, we find that there are
four 4 compelling reasons to allow the petitioners invocation of our
jurisdiction in the first instance, even without prior recourse to a
motion for reconsideration or to the exhaustion of administrative
remedies, and even in disregard of the principle of hierarchy of
courts. 1) the petitioners raise a pure question of law; 2) the present
case requires prompt action because public interest and welfare are
involved in subdivision and condominium development; 3)
considering that this case has been pending for nearly 7 years to the
prejudice not only of the parties involved,
but also of the subdivision and condominium regulatory system and
its need for the prompt determination of controversies, the interests
of justice now demand the direct resolution; 4) the petition is
meritorious. The public respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint.
Nothing in PD No. 957 vests the HLURB with
jurisdiction to impose criminal penalties. What the Decree
provides is the authority of the HLURB to impose administrative
fines under Section 38, as implemented by the Rules Implementing
the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree. The
Implementing Rules, for their part, clarify that The implementation
and payment of administrative fines shall not preclude criminal
prosecution of the offender under Section 39 of the Decree. Thus,
the implementing rules themselves expressly acknowledge that two
separate remedies with differing consequences may be sought under
the Decree, specifically, the administrative remedy and criminal
prosecution.
Unless the contrary appears under other provisions of law
(and in this case no such provision applies), the determination of
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
the criminal liability lies within the realm of criminal procedure
as embodied in the Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 112 of these
Rules provide that the prerogative to determine the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause lies with the persons duly authorized
by law as provided in this Rule, they are (a) Provincial or City
Prosecutors and their assistants (b) Judges of the Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (c) National and Regional
State Prosecutors and (d) other officers as may be authorized by law.
In the present case, the petitioners have expressly chosen
to pursue the criminal prosecution as their remedy but the
prosecutor dismissed their complaint. The prosecutors dismissal for
prematurity was apparently on the view that an administrative
finding of violation must first be obtained before recourse can be
made to criminal prosecution. This view is not without its model in
other laws one such law is in the prosecution of unfair labor practice
under the Labor Code where no criminal prosecution for unfair labor
practice can be instituted without a final judgment in a previous
administrative proceeding. The need for a final
administrative determination in unfair labor practice cases, however,
is a matter expressly required by law. Where the law is silent on this
matter, as in this case, the fundamental principle- that administrative
cases are independent from criminal actionsfully applies.
In light of these legal realities, we hold that the public
respondent prosecutors should have made a determination of
probable cause in the complaint before them, instead of simply
dismissing it for prematurity and thus constituted an evasion of a
positive duty and a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 9

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and
accordingly REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated
November 4, 2002 of the City Prosecutor of Pasig. The
complaint is hereby ordered returned to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City for the determination of probable cause and
the filing of the necessary information.
5. DE LA CRUZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 161929
December 8, 2009
Mia Dueas
FACTS:
The City of Tarlac launched a construction and/or renovation
project involving several multi-purpose halls located in barangays
Sapang Tagalog, Sapang Maragul and Dalayap. In connection with
this, certain officials (herein accused) approved and released
P543,800.00 as funds for the project, and proceeded to implement
the construction.
However, upon post-audit, the Provincial Auditor of the
Commission on Audit issued Notices of Disallowance on the ground
that what were actually constructed and/or renovated
were barangay chapels. Such type of project was a violation of
Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 335of the
Local Government Code, which prohibited public expenditure for
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause undue injury to the government and
religious purposes.
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
Thus, on February 6, 1998, Jesus B. David and Ana Alamo
Aguas filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for
violation of Section 3(e)2 of R.A. No. 3019 or The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Such complaint was directed against the
following officials: Gelacio R. Manalang (Mayor); Alfredo D.
Baquing (Engineer); Nathaniel B. Lugtu (Accountant); Lynn Paz T.
Dela Cruz (Assistant Accountant); Fernando L. Serrano (Budget
Officer); and Janet S. Pineda (Planning & Development Officer).
At first, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence and prematurity. However, upon
reconsideration, the Office of the Chief Legal Counsel (whom the
Ombudsman referred the case to) found probable cause to hold the
accused liable, and recommended that an information be filed. Thus,
the Ombudsman issued an order directing the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to file the necessary information with the Sandiganbayan.
The accused moved for reinvestigation, saying that they were
not given an opportunity to be heard when the Ombudsman reversed
his earlier finding of lack of probable cause. This was granted by the
Fourth Division of the Sandiganbyan, which gave the prosecution 20
days to re-evaluate the evidence and submit a report to the court.
The prosecution timely filed a Manifestation that the
reinvestigation resulted in the finding of probable cause; thus, it
prayed that the case be set for arraignment. As such, the
Sandiganbayan set the case for arraignment and pre-trial.
The accused filed motions to quash the information and/or to
dismiss the case, but all were denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
2
give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a specific group of
constituents
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 10

April 24, 2003 resolution. Upholding the validity of the information,
the court said that the information contained sufficient allegations to
charge the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019,
that there existed probable cause to indict the accused and that the
motions raised factual issues that cannot be resolved without an
adversarial proceeding. The subsequent motion for reconsideration
was denied.
After arraignment, wherein the accused entered the plea of not
guilty, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the
accused pendente lite. Meanwhile, the accused filed a certiorari
petition (G.R. No. 158308) with the Supreme Court against the
Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman and the
People of the Philippines, alleging that these parties had committed
grave abuse of discretion. This, however, was dismissed.
The Sandiganbayan ordered the preventive suspension of the
accused for 90 days. According to the said court, since the validity of
the information had been settled in its April 24, 2003 Resolution,
pursuant to Section 13 of RA No. 3019, the preventive suspension
became mandatory. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Only Dela Cruz, Serrano, Lugtu and Pineda sought review
before the Supreme Court. They alleged that there was no basis to
prosecute them for violation of the anti-graft law since they had been
exonerated by the COA En Banc. Moreover, the Ombudsman had
admitted that what were built were multi-purpose halls and not
chapels in his November 16, 1999 Decision, which absolved co-
accused Baquing from administrative liability.
Moreover, they claimed that the information was defective
because of due process violations. The Ombudsman allegedly acted
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
without jurisdiction when he reversed his dismissal of the complaint,
since the resolution containing the initial dismissal had already
became final and executory. Even if the reversal was valid, the
accused were allegedly not furnished with copies of the
complainants motions for reconsideration. Moreover, the alleged
beneficiaries and private purposes were not sufficiently described in
the information.
The Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, said that COAs
power is limited to the determination of the violation of its
accounting and auditing rules and regulations. It is the Ombudsman
who has jurisdiction to determine the criminal liability of petitioners.
Thus, the COA En Bancs exoneration of petitioners only released
them from administrative liability. The dismissal of an administrative
case would not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same
or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative
complaint. The said court further claimed that due process was
followed during the preliminary investigation, as all motions and
notices were filed on time, and any defect in the preliminary
investigation should be deemed cured because
the Sandiganbayan ordered the reinvestigation of this case in its July
17, 2000 Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the preventive suspension of the accused was
proper.
HELD:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 11

YES.
The preventive suspension of the accused under Section 13 of
RA No. 3019 is mandatory upon a finding that the information is
valid. It is not for the court to decide whether it is possible that the
accused may use his office to continue his wrongdoings or frustrate
the prosecution. The presumption is that unless the accused is
suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both.
The guidelines for the exercise of the courts power to suspend
were laid down in Luciano v. Mariano:
1. When an information is filed, the trial court should issue
an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to
show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be
ordered suspended from office. However, if the prosecution files
a motion for an order or suspension or the accused files a
motion to quash or challenges the validity of the information,
such show-cause order is not necessary.
2. However, it is necessary that the trial court conduct a
pre-suspension hearing to determine the validity of the
information and determine whether suspension is proper:
A.) No specific rules are laid down for such pre-suspension
hearing, as long as the accused is given a fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal
proceedings against him.
B.) The issues that may be tackled are limited to whether
or not: (1) the accused had been afforded due preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of the information against
him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
violation of the provisions of RA No. 3019 or of the
provisions of Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or (3)
the information against him can be quashed under any of the
grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
C.) Afterwards, in ruling for or against upholding the
validity of the information, the court should issue the
corresponding order of suspension or withhold it, as the
case may be.
Moreover, such hearing must be speedy, and not drawn out in
order to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act.
The Court, however, felt no need to rule on the issues raised by
the petitioners as to the validity of the information. This was because
the validity of the information had already been tackled and resolved
by the Sandiganbayan and by the Court in G.R. No. 158308.
Petitioners did not inform the Court that this was the second time
they were bringing the issue on appeal.
As the decisions had become final and executory, it cannot be
re-litigated. When a question is passed upon by an appellate court
and the case is subsequently remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings, the question becomes settled upon a subsequent
appeal. Whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling
legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 12

principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
The petition is DISMISSED. The petitioners suspension is
AFFIRMED and the case is REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for
further proceedings.
6. Dio v. Olivarez
7. SORIANO V PEOPLE
FACTS:
Soriano, president of Rural Bank of San Miguel, was charged for
estafa through falsification of commercial documents for allegedly
securing a loan of 48 million in the name of two (2) persons when in
fact these individuals did not make any loan in the bank, nor did the
bank's officers approved or had any information about the said loan.
The state prosecutor conducted a Preliminary Investigation on the
basis of letters sent by the officers of the Office of Special
Investigation (OSI) of BSP together with 5 affidavits, which would
allegedly serve as bases for the filing of criminal charges, and filed
two (2) separate information against Soriano for estafa through
falsification of commercial documents and violation of DORSI law.
Soriano moved to quash these informations on two grounds, one of
which is:
that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged, for the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted
the complaint and thus, was defective for failure to comply with the
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
mandatory requirements of Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
such as statement of address of the petitioner and oath of
subscription and the signatories were not authorized persons to file
the complaint; Soriano argued that the officers of OSI, who were the
signatories to the letter complaint, were not authorized by the BSP
Governor, much less by the Monetary Board, to file the complaint.
Trial court ruled that the affidavits, which were attached to the OSI letter,
comprised the complaint-affidavit in the case. Since these affidavits were
duly subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, there was adequate
compliance with the Rules. Soriano appealed to the CA.
CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court stating: that the BSP letter,
which petitioner characterized to be a fatally infirm complaint, was not
actually a complaint, but a transmittal or cover letter only. This transmittal
letter merely contained a summary of the affidavits which were attached to
it. It did not contain any averment of personal knowledge of the events and
transactions that constitute the elements of the offenses charged. Being a
mere transmittal letter, it need not comply with the requirements of Section
3(a) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
The CA further determined that the five affidavits attached to the transmittal
letter should be considered as the complaint-affidavits that charged
petitioner with violation of Section 83 of RA 337 and for Estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents. These complaint-affidavits
complied with the mandatory requirements set out in the Rules of Court
they were subscribed and sworn to before a notary public and subsequently
certified by State Prosecutor Fonacier, who personally examined the affiants
and was convinced that the affiants fully understood their sworn statements.
ISSUE: WON the complaint filed complied with the requirements of
Section 3(a) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 13

HELD: Yes
The court has ruled in the similar case of Soriano v Hon. Casanova that
after a close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ, that
these were not intended to be the complaint, as envisioned under the
Rules. They did not contain averments of personal knowledge of the events
and transactions constitutive of any offense. The letters merely transmitted
for preliminary investigation the affidavits of people who had personal
knowledge of the acts of petitioner. The court ruled that these affidavits, not
the letters transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since
these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed
them before a notary public, then there was substantial compliance with
Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Since the case before the court and the above case are so similar;
BSP letters were signed by OSI officers of the BSO, they were not
sworn to by said officers, they all contained summaries of their
attached affidavits, and they all requested conduct of preliminary
investigation and the filing of corresponding charges against
petitioner Soriano, the court thus applied the principle of stare
decisis- once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
8. Lee v. KBC Bank
9. VIUDEZ II v CA
Ralph Yu
FACTS:
Honorato Galvez and his driver were fatally shot on June 9,
2000 in Bulacan. On June 26, 2000, a complaint for the alleged
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
murder was filed by the NBI with the provincial prosecutor against
de la Cruz, Chico, Fernando, a certain Ronald, a certain Gerry,
Villanueva, and 3 John Does. On July 14, 2000, a complaint for
murder was filed against Viudez II by Estrella Galvez, the widow of
Honorato Galvez.
On March 31, 2001, a resolution was issued by the
Investigating State Prosecutor finding probably cause to indict the
Viudez and the others for the crime of murder. On September 19,
2001, 2 information for murder was filed with the RTC of Malolos
which then issued warrants of arrests on the same day.
On September 21, 2001, Viudez filed a motion to suspend
proceedings and to suspend the implementation of the warrant of
arrest arguing that all the accused in the case filed a timely petition
for review with the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Department
Circular No. 70 of the DOJ, the implementation of the warrant of
arrest against Viudez should be suspended and/or recalled pending
resolution of the said petition for review.
The RTC denied the motion stating that said warrant had
already been issued for his apprehension. There is also no way for it
to recall the warrant in the absence of any compelling reason, and
that jurisdiction over his person had not yet been acquired by it,
therefore, Viudez has no personality to file any pleading until he was
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 14
 Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015

arrested or voluntarily surrendered himself to the court. Viudez filed The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon
a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. the determination of probable cause is exclusive, and the
implementation of the warrant cannot be deferred pending the
Viudez filed with the CA but the latter court dismissed the
resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to
petition for certiorari for lack of merit and found no
the finding of probable cause.
whimsicality or oppressiveness in the exercise of the respondent
Judge's discretion in issuing the challenged Orders. Hence, this There is also nowhere in the said provision that the court
petition. must hold the proceedings (with regard to the warrant) in abeyance,
therefore, it is the discretion of the court whether or not to suspend
the proceedings or the implementation of the warrant of arrest. Once
ISSUE: a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
Whether or Not a pending resolution of a petition for case as to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of the accused,
review filed with the Secretary of Justice concerning a rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and
finding of probable cause will suspend the proceedings in the
sole judge of what to do with the case before it.
trial court, including the implementation of a warrant of
arrest. NO
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

10. Asetre v. Asetre

HELD:
11. Tamargo v. Awingan
NO. Viudez contention is wrong. Dept. Cir. No. 20 states
that pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are G.R. No. 177727

held in abeyance, Viudez is of the opinion that the suspension of the January 19, 2010
proceedings in court includes the suspension of the implementation
By: Sean Borja
of the warrants issued by the court.
FACTS: (included dates cause theyre important for reference
points)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 15


Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter Gail were
shot and killed at around 5:15pm on August 15, 2003 along Escolta
Street, Binondo, Manila. The police had no leads on the perpetrators
until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit
dated September 13, 2003. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna
informed him that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent
Lloyd Antiporda and that Columna was one of the killers.
After conducting preliminary investigation and on the strength of
Gerons affidavit, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution
finding probable cause against Columna and three John Does. The
corresponding Informations for murder were filed in the RTC of
Manila.
Columna executed an affidavit dated March 8, 2004 where he
admitted his participation as a look out during the shooting, and
implicated respondents Romulo Awingan and Richard Mecate.
Pursuant to this affidavit, Harold Tamargo (Atty. Tamargos brother)
filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office
of the Prosecutor.
On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his first affidavit before the
investigating prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, respondents presented
Columnas unsolicited handwritted letter dated May 3, 2004, sent
from Columnas jail cell. In the letter, Columna disowned the
contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been
tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that
those he implicated really had not participation in the killings.
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
During a hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically
admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter.
Thus, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the
charges, as approved by the city prosecutor.
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to the city
prosecutor dated October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was only
forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the
October 22, 2004 hearing because of death threats inside the jail.
Petitioned filed an appeal to the DOJ, which directed the withdrawal
of the Informations for murder. DOJ Secretary Gonzales declared
that the March 8, 2004 extrajudicial confession of Columna was
inadmissible against the respondents under the res inter alios acta
rule, and that if admissible was not corroborated by other evidence.
As a result, the trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the
Informations.
The RTC Judge denied the withdrawal of the Informations, on the
grounds that there was probable cause. The CA ruled that the RTC
Judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of
her assessment substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully
taken into account in concluding there was no probably cause.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in finding the RTC Judge had committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the
Informations for murder against the respondents.
HELD: NO. It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to
withdraw an Information (on the ground of lack of probable cause
based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the
duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 16

motion. It may either agree or disagree with the recommendation
of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the
Secretary would be an abdication of the trial courts duty to
determine a prima facie case.
In this case, the RTC Judge limited herself only to the following: (1)
Columnas affidated dated March 8, 2004 where he implicated the
respondents in the murder, (2) his letter dated October 29, 2004, and
(3) the May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution upholding the prosecutors
recommendation to file the murder charges.
She completely ignored other relevant evidence: (1) Columnas May
3, 2004 letter narrating the torture he suffered to force him to admit
his participation in the crimes and to implicate the respondents, (2)
his testimony during the October 22, 2004 hearing where he
categorically affirmed his letter.
Had the RTC Judge reviewed the entire records of the investigation,
she would have seen that aside from the piece of evidence she relied
on, there were others which case doubt on them. Moreover, she
failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial confession in his
March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible against respondents
pursuant to the rest inter alios acta rule.
The judge or fiscal should not go on with the prosecution in the
hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial
for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold.
Petition denied.
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
12. PEOPLE V PERALTA
GR No. 145176
March 30, 2004
Chapter IV Preliminary Investigation
Kiel Saez
FACTS:
Before the court is an appeal for the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) that convicted Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin,
Granados, Ulysses Garcia, Miguelito De Leon, Librando Flores, and
Antonio Loyola of Qualified Theft (punctured currency notes due for
shredding amounting to PHP194,190 belonging to the BSP).
The Bank Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Cash Department recovered
notes that were rejected by the BSP Money Counter Machine during
its cash counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different
banks. The notes were then submitted to the Investigation Staff of
the department. As a result of the investigation, it was determined
that said rejected currency bills were actually punctured notes
already due for shredding, which means they are no longer for
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 17

circulation. Before these notes could be shredded, they were stolen
from the BSP from the above-named accused.
Version of the Prosecution
On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita, the
representative of BSP, Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in front of
Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Pias while waiting for a passenger
bus on his way to BSP. While in the custody of the police officers,
Garcia gave three separate statements admitting his guilt and
participation in the crime charged. He also identified the other
named accused as his cohorts and accomplices and narrated the
participation of each and every one of them.
Version of the Defense
Garcia, who served as a driver of the armored car of BSP from 1978
to 1994, was arrested without any warrant for his arrest. The Police
Officer dragged him across the street and forced him to ride a car.
While inside the car, he was blindfolded and somebody from behind
would hit him. He was told that he would be salvaged if he will not
tell the truth. He denied of any knowledge pertaining to the notes
every time he was asked about it. While being dragged out of the
car, he felt somebody frisk his pocket. Garcia decided to
cooperate with the police because he could not bear the torture
anymore. At the police station, where his blindfold and handcuffs
were already removed, SPO4 Coronel supposedly found three
pieces of PHP100 preforated bill from Garcias wallet.
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
During the hearing, Atty. Francisco Sanchez, the Public Attorneys
Office lawyer who that Garcia did not agree to represent him,
manifested in open court that he did not assist Garcia when the
police investigated the accused and he only signed as a witness.
Garcia further alleged that the three sworn statements were signed
due to Coronels warning of torture by water cure.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not three perforated PHP100 currency notes are
admissible as evidence
2.) Whether or not the confessions of Garcia is sufficient admissible
as evidence
HELD:
The assailed decision is reversed and set aside.
The Appellants were acquitted and ordered immediate release.
1.) NO. Garcia was not lawfully arrested. At the time of his arrest,
he had not committed, was committing, or was about to commit
any crime. None of the circumstances justifying an arrest without
a warrant under Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was
present. The perforated PHP100 currency notes were obtained as
a result of search made without a warrant subsequent to an
unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in evidence.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 18

The Constitution proscribes unreasonable search and seizure.
Without judicial warrant, only the following are allowed: (1)
search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain
view, (3) search of a moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search,
(5) stop and frisk situations, and (6) consented search. The
evidence in the case was not obtained through any of the
aforementioned exemptions.
2.) NO. The RTC erred when it admitted as evidence the written
confessions. It is clear from a plain reading of the three
extrajudicial confessions that Atty. Sanchez did not assist Garcia.
He appeared in court and categorically testified that he had not
assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and
that the former had signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness.
The Right to Counsel is written in our Constitution, which
requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and
executed in presence of a counsel. The lawyers role cannot be
reduced to being that of a mere witness to the singing of a pre-
prepared confession, even if it indicate compliance with the
constitutional rights of the accused.
NOTE: (Use at your own risk. Please correct me if Im wrong. <3
Kiel)
Rule 113(Arrest) was mentioned in this case, but Chapter IV is
about Rule 112 (Preliminary Investigation). Sec. 5 of Rule 112
(When Warrant of Arrest May Issue) is the relevant provision
of the Rules of Court. The section provides that within 10 days
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. The judge will then issue a warrant of
arrest if he finds probable cause.
It can be observed from the aforementioned facts that the Police
Officer arrested Garcia on the basis of the complaint filed by
Labitan. The basis of the arrest was neither a Warrant of Arrest
or any of the exceptions provided by (par. a-c) Sec. 5 of Rule
113, but the complain filed by Labita.
13a. People vs Lapitaje
G.R. No. 132042
February 19, 2003
Facts:
Arnold Lapitaje, Mario Reyes, Wendel Arellano and Romy Baluyos
were found guilty of the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide in the RTC of Danao City, and sentenced with reclusion
perpetual to death. They were also ordered to pay jointly and
severally P1,200 representing the unrecovered stolen money.
January 13, 1994- Information filed before RTC against Lapitaje,
Reyes, Arellano and Baluyos for Robbery with Frustrated Homicide.
They all pleaded not guilty.
The victim, Nelson Saavedro, despite timely medical attention died.
Information was thus amended to Robbery with Homicide.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 19

The information alleged:
That on or about Oct 31, 1993, around 7pm in Barangay
Catmondaan, Catmon, Cebu, the accused together with others
unnamed and unknown willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with
intent to gain and means of force, violence, and intimidation enter
into the store of Domingo Colonia, held him at gun point and stole
and carried away P2,000. (Prejudiced only by P1,210 because P790
was recovered), and shot Nelson Saavedra in their escape, inflicting
wounds and despite timely medical attention, caused Saavedra's
death in the Chong Hua Hospital, Cebu on Feb 8, 1994. (treated for
several months)
Accused all pleaded not guilty to the amended information as well.
Version of Facts of Prosecution:
Domingo Colonia was a storeowner and on Oct 31, 1993 at about
7pm three unmasked men came in and robbed the store, holding him
at gunpoint and also his wife. He recognized one of them to be
Arnold Lapitaje, as Lapitaje previously delivered edible oil to
Colonia. They were able to take P2000. When they left gunshots
were heard from outside, and Colonia learned that they had shot one
of his neighbors, Nelson Saavedra. The next day a dead man was
found in Sitio Bakhaw with P790 and a .38 caliber firearm, Colonia
identified him was the man who pointed a gun to his head.
Several witnesses were able to identify the accused as follows:
Rizaline Ales was able to identify the suspects by the tshirts they
were wearing. She recognized Reyes and Lapitaje and also
recognized the guy they found dead. Fred Ares also testified: saw
military men apprehending the accused Baluyos, Arellano and
Lapitaje, apprehended in taxi marked Aaron, which the witnesses say
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
that the men ran towards after the robbery happened. Cesar Roldan
also testified: identified Reyes and Lapitaje and the third man found
dead, also recognized them by their tshirts.
From the testimonies of SPO2 Calixto Nueza, and Lt. Col. Mauro
Oaraga, and Sgt. Rogelio Castro, prosecution says that when the
three men Lapitaje, Arellano (who was in crutches because his leg
had been previously amputated), and Baluyos ran towards the taxi
marked Aaron. A Hi Ace van where inside Philippine Air Force men
of which Lt. Col. Oaraga and Sgt. Rogelio Castro were a part of,
blocked the taxi and came down and apprehended the three men.
They searched the front of the taxi and found a .22 caliber revolver
magnum, and some live ammunition. When SPO2 Calixto Nueza
saw the disturbance, he came over, and Lt. Col. Oaraga handed over
to him, custody of the three men. SPO2 Nueza then brought them to
the station for investigation.
NBI tests confirmed presence of gunpowder in paraffin casts of
Mario Reyes, but none on Arnold Lapitaje. Also, from the ballistics
report, it was found that the shots fired came from the recovered
firearms. (One from the taxi, one from the dead man).
Version of Facts for Defense:
The accused all denied the accusations. From their testimonies, they
said that Romy Baluyos was driving a taxi with his passenger
Wendell Arellano, who had an amputated leg, when the taxi
overheated, and Baluyos got out to refill the water. When he came
back some NPAs came with a wounded person, telling them not to
worry as they were good persons. Then the Hi Ace Van came with
the military men. The NPAs fled, but the men searched the taxi and
found nothing. SPO2 Nueza came and they were brought to the
station and detained. Lapitaje and Mario Reyes were then
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 20

subsequently brought to the station.
Lapitaje denies any liability, saying that he was about to go to
Domingos store on that night to collect payment from the edible oil
that he sold but Domingos store was closed. So he went elsewhere,
when suddenly he heard an explosion, he rushed away. After he was
apprehended by the police and brought to the station. He said that he
was being forced to admit participation in the robbery.
Reyes says that he was on a task with his employer, Bernardino
Sabal, on a jeepney, when some CAFGU and PNP made them get off
the jeepney they were in. He was asked to produce a cedula, and then
brought to the police station.
Trial Court held:
Evidence pointed out that all accused acted in concert in committing
the act. Court is convinced that Lapitaje was the lead man. Reyes and
Lapitaje barged into the house and pointed the gun to Colonia and his
wife. Arellano and Baluyos were watchmen outside, upon fear of
reprisals from neighbours they went hurriedly to the taxi. Then they
were apprehended by Col Oaraga and other Philippine Air Force who
were in their Hi Ace Van.
Court finds that the 4 accused acted in concert to commit robbery
with homicide. RTC found no merit in the alibi of the accused.
Positive identification by prosecution witnesses negates their alibis.
They were thus found guilty with Robbery and Homicide and
imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Accused bring up the following assignment of errors:
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
1. RTC erred in finding Arellano and Baluyos in conspiracy with
Lapitaje and Reyes
2. RTC erred in giving little value to evidence of defense, as against
value given to evidence of prosecution
3. RTC erred in finding that the arrests of the accused were legal, and
subsequent alleged recovery of incriminatory evidence was fruit of
the poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible as evidence.
SolGen recommended dismissal of case for Arellano and Baluyos,
their guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt;
judgment convicting Lapitaje and Reyes be affirmed, with
modification that penalty should be reclusion perpetua, as no
aggravating circumstances were charged.
Issues:
1. Is the evidence sufficient to hold the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt?
2. Were the arrests conducted valid and lawful?
3. Was the search and seizure done in the taxi valid and lawful?
Held:
1. Yes to conviction of Lapitaje and Reyes. No to conviction of
Arellano and Baluyos. SC holds that Arellano and Baluyos
should be absolved from liability, as evidence not sufficient to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. SC said RTC erred in
finding testimony of Lt. Col Oarga to find that Arellano and
Baluyos were standing as lookout. From the testimonies it was
only proven that they were standing outside. Arellano could
not have been running towards the taxi as he was in crutches,
having an amputated leg.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 21

2. No, the arrests were not lawful. SC says that although the
testimonies proved that Lapitaje, Arellano and Baluyos were
arrested by Lt Col Oarga, such arrests were unlawful. Oarga
said that he arrested them because they were running to the
taxi and hence acting suspiciously. Oarga did not further
elaborate on how they were acting suspiciously.
Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful --- A peace
office or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
A) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
B) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
C) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another
None of the circumstances are attendant in the case on hand.
But, since Lapitaje had entered his plea and actively
participated in the case, it cured any defect in his arrest. Thus
court had jurisdiction over him. (Legality of arrest ply affects
the jurisdiction of the court over person of accused)
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
3. No, the search and seizure conducted in the taxi was unlawful
and thus the firearms and ammunition recovered cannot be
presented as evidence. The firearms cannot be considered in
evidence as they were products of illegal search and seizure.
Waiver of illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean
waiver of inadmissibility of evidence seized during the
arrest.
The following are permitted warantless searches: 1) search
of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs
searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a
lawful arrest.
The search cannot be justified under search of moving
vehicle because Oarga and his men had no personal
knowledge of the crime just committed, and therefore no
probable cause to believe that they would find any
instruments or evidence to the crime.
Despite inadmissibility of ammunition and guns, Lapitaje
and Reyes were positivey identified by prosecution
witnesses. At the time of the incident, Domingo instantly
recognized Arnold who pointed a firearm at his wife. He
recognized Arnold although the robbery happened at
nighttime because the place was lit by a fluorescent bulb and
all three men who entered the store were not wearing masks.
Aside from Domingo Colonia, Cesar Roldan positively
identified appellants Lapitaje and Baluyos as two of the three
men, armed with pistols, who he saw fleeing from the store.
Cesar had no motive to testify against appellants. He
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 22

categorically testified that he saw Mario with a pistol in one
hand while running towards the direction of Sitio Bakhaw,
Domingo Colonias place. This is corroborated by the result
of the Chemistry Report conducted on appellant Baluyos
which showed the presence of gunpowder residue on both of
his hands.
However, there is no evidence showing that Baluyos had
shot deceased Nelso Saavedra. They were only seen running
away from the scene with guns. No one saw them shoot
Saavedra. The witnesses merely heard the gunshot. No
evidence to show that the gunshot wound killing Saavedra
came from one of the guns they were holding. Also, the guns
were inadmissible as evidence.
Lapitaje and Reyes found guilty only of the simple crime of
Robbery.
(Evidence, testimony proved that it was committed with the
aid of armed men, generic circumstance. But amended
information did not allege the aggravating circumstance,
although it was mentioned that owner was held at gunpoint,
Court found that that was not substantial compliance, with
Sec 8 & 9 Rule 110, Designation of offence, and Cause of
accusation.
Ruling:
Lapitaje and Reyes are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
simple crime of Robbery.
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
Baluyos and Arellano are acquitted, their guilt not having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
14 People v. Huang Zhen Hua
G.R. No. 139301
September 29, 2004
Rule 112, Section 5 (When warrant of arrest may issue)
Tara Siochi
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution:
Police operatives received word from their confidential informant
that Peter Chan (Chan) and Henry Lao (Lao), and appellants Jogy
Lee (Lee) and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug
trafficking. The policemen also learned that Lee was handling
payments and accounting of the proceeds of the illegal drug
trafficking activities of Lao and Chan. Officer Anciro, Jr. along with
other police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction
Against Crime (PARAC) conducted surveillance operations and
were able to verify that Lao and appellant Lee lived together as
husband and wife. The police operatives were able to secure two
search warrants: one for violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Explosives) and another for violation of
Sections 12, 14, and 16 of R.A. No. 6425 as amended (Dangerous
Drugs Act).
25 October 1996 at 11:00pm, Senior Police Inspector Lucio Margallo
(Margallo) and 7 other members of the PARAC, accompanied by a
Cantonese interpreter (Chang), enforced the warrant for violation of
P.D. No. 1866 at the Cityland Condominium. No persons were found
inside, however, the police found 2 kilos of shabu, paraphernalia for
its production, and machines and tools used for the production of
fake credit cards. Upon receiving information that Lao and Chan
would be delivering shabu at the Furama Laser Karaoke Restaurant
in Manila, police operatives rushed to the area.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 23

26 October 1996 at 2:00am, as Chan and Lao alighted from the
latters Honda Civic, one of the policemen approached them and
introduced himself, but Chan and Lao fired shots, resulting in a
shootout and death of the two suspects. The policemen found in
Laos car 2 plastic bags, each containing one kilo of shabu. On the
same day, the policemen proceeded to Laos residence at No. 19,
Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, to enforce the second search
warrant. When they arrived, they coordinated with Antonio Pangan
(Pangan), the officer in charge of security in the building. Anciro, Jr.
repeatedly knocked on the front door for 5 minutes but no one
responded. Pangan likewise knocked on the door. Lee peeped
through the window beside the front door. The policemen introduced
themselves and allowed Pangan to communicate with Lee through
sign language as she could not speak English. Pangan pointed to the
policemens uniforms to signal that they were policemen. Lee then
opened the door and allowed the policemen, Pangan, and the security
guards into the condominium unit.
The policemen conducted the search warrant in all the rooms within
the unit. Then they brought Lee to the 2nd floor and asked where Lao
slept. Lee pointed to the masters bedroom and the policemen
proceeded to search the premises. The others went to the other room
where Huang Zhen Hua (Zhen Hua) was sleeping; the latter was
surprised to see the police officers. The police found 2 plastic bags, a
feeding bottle, and a plastic canister inside a cabinet in the masters
bedroom, all containing shabu. The substance was also found on the
bed in the same bedroom. Anciro, Jr. also found other articles not
described in the search warrant, such as assorted documents,
pictures, bank passbooks issued by the Allied Banking Corporation,
credit cards, passports, and identification cards of Lao and Lee.
Anciro, Jr. asked Margallo for instructions on what to do with the
things he had found, and the latter told him to keep the same for
future reference, and as evidence against any other suspect for illegal
drug transactions.
Anciro, Jr. asked Lee to bring some of her clothes because they
would bring her to the PARAC headquarters. Lee then took some
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
clothes from the cabinet in the masters bedroom where the shabu
was found. The police then executed an affidavit of arrest, and
Pangan and the 2 security guards signed a certification stating that
nothing was destroyed in the unit, and the search was orderly and
peaceful.
Version of the Defense:
Lee denied the charge. She testified that she met Lao in China, and
he helped her procure a Belgium passport. In the process, they fell in
love and became lovers. Upon Laos invitation, she visited the
Philippines for the first time, and returned a second time. She stated
that all she knew was that Lao was engaged in the garlic business. In
1996, when they were in China, Lee invited her friend Zhen Hua to
visit the Philippines.
On 1 October 1996, Lee returned on a tourist visa and resided in
Laos condominium unit in Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa. On
October 22, Zhen Hua arrived from China and stayed in Laos unit as
well. At 6:00am on October 26, she was sleeping when she heard a
knock on the bedroom door. When she opened it, 3 policemen
barged in the bedroom and in the room where Zhen hua was
sleeping. Lee did not hear the policemen knock on the main door
before they entered. The police were with Chang who informed her
that the policemen were going to search the house. Lee saw a
policeman holding 2 papers, but no search warrant was shown to her.
The policemen placed 2 plastic bags on the bed before they searched
the masters bedroom. Lee when to Zhen Huas room and saw shabu
on the bed. Lee alleges that the policemen took her ring, watch, and
Php 600,000 owned by Lao, along with papers and documents. She
said she had never seen shabu in the room before the incident.
Lee was brought to the PARAC headquarters where Chang informed
her that shabu had been found in the condominium unit, and the
policemen were demanding Php5M for her release. Lee was further
informed that if she did not pay the amount, she would be charged
with drug trafficking, and that the leader of the group who arrested
her would be promoted. Since she could not pay the amount, the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 24

policemen took all the household appliances in the condominium
unit, leaving only the sofa and bed. Zhen Hua also denied having to
do anything with the bags of shabu found in Laos unit. At the time
of his arrest, he had been in the Philippines for barely 4 days. He
emphasizes that the search of his room turned out to be negative
and the raiding team failed to seize or confiscate any prohibited or
regulated drug in his possession.
The RTC convicted both Lee and Zhen Hua for violation of Sec. 16,
Art. III of RA 6425, as amended. The OSG posits that Zhen Hua
should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, but the
conviction of Lee should be affirmed.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the prosecution failed to muster the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove Zhen Huas guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. W/N the implementation of the search warrant was valid and
lawful.
3. W/N the trial court erred in convicting Lee of the crime,
considering that Lao and Chan were the suspects identified in the
warrants and not her. (MAIN CRIMPRO ISSUE!)
HELD/RATIO:
1. YES. The Court agrees with the OSG. the prosecution failed to
prove that the appellant, at any time, had actual or constructive
possession of the regulated drug found in the masters bedroom
where Zhen Hua was sleeping, or that he accessed the room at any
given time, or that he had knowledge of existence of the shabu in
Lees bedroom. The evidence of the prosecution against appellant
SEC.
Zhen Hua falls short of the requisite quantum of evidence to prove
conspiracy between him, appellant Lee and Chan or Lao.
Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015
2. YES. The SC rules that the policemen complied with Section 7,
Rule 1263 before entering the condominium unit. Lee admitted that
the police officers were accompanied by Chang who informed her
that his companions were police officers and had a search warrant for
the premises, and also explained to her that they were going to search
the unit. Lee was sufficiently aware of the authority of the
policemen, to conduct the search and their purpose. Moreover,
Anciro, Jr. told Lee in English, to bring some clothes with her as she
was to be brought to the police headquarters and Lee did as directed.
The evidence on record also shows that the police officers knocked
on the outer door before entering the unit, and Lee opened the door
and allowed them to enter. There was no evidence of forcible entry
into the unit and no breakage of any door.
3. NO. There was probable cause for Lees warrantless arrest
independent of that found by Judge Bayhon when he issued the
search warrants against Lao and Chan for search of the condominium
units at Atlantic Drive and Cityland. Jurisprudence holds that
informations from a reliable informant, corroborated by the police
officers observations as to the accuracy of the description of the
accused, and of his presence at a particular place, is sufficient to
establish probable cause. In this case, the police officers received
reliable information and verified, after surveillance, that appellant
Lee and Lao were living together as husband and wife in the
condominium unit and that appellant Lee handled the accounting of
the payments and proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of
Lao. Such facts and circumstances are sufficient on which to base a
3
7. Right to break door or window to effect search.The officer, if
refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window
of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant
or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully
detained therein.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 25
 Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015

reasonable belief that the appellant had joint possession of the

regulated drugs found in the bedroom along with Lao, her live-in
partner. For the purpose of prosecution for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Law, possession can be constructive and need not
be exclusive, but may be joint.

Huang Zhen Huas appeal is granted. RTC decision convicting him

of the crime is reversed, and set aside. Appellant is ACQUITTED.
Appeal of Jogy Lee is denied. RTC Decision convicting her of
violation of Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED.

In case sir asks

1. Knock-and-announce principle - The police officers were obliged
to give the appellant notice, show to her their authority, and demand
that they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house to execute the search warrant if,
after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the
place of directed search.
2. Lee was not a victim of frame-up because she was present when
the policemen searched the masters bedroom where she was
sleeping and where she kept her clothes, and witnessed the discovery
of the regulated drugs and paraphernalia.

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 Chapter 4 Sept. 21 2015

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - VALLENTE 27