YOLANDA ROSELLO-BENTIR, SAMUEL PORMIDA and
CHARITO PORMIDA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE MATEO
M. LEANDA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC,
Tacloban City, Branch 8, and LEYTE GULF TRADERS,
INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. 128991. April 12, 2000]
Facts:
Leyte Gulf Traders, Inc. (herein referred to as respondent
corporation) filed a complaint for reformation of instrument,
specific performance, annulment of conditional sale and
damages with prayer for writ of injunction against petitioners.
Respondent corporation alleged that it entered into a contract
of lease of a parcel of land with petitioner Bentir for a period of
twenty (20) years starting May 5, 1968. According to
respondent corporation, the lease was extended for another
four (4) years or until May 31, 1992. On May 5, 1989, petitioner
Bentir sold the leased premises to petitioner spouses.
Respondent corporation questioned the sale alleging that it
had a right of first refusal.
TC: through Judge Pedro S. Espina issued an order dismissing
the complaint premised on its finding that the action for
reformation had already prescribed.
The defendant Bentir denies that she bound herself to give the
plaintiff the right of first refusal in case she sells the property.
But assuming for the sake of argument that such right of first
refusal was made, it is now contended that plaintiffs cause of
action to reform the contract to reflect such right of first refusal,
has already prescribed after 10 years, counted from May 5,
1988 when the contract of lease incepted.
CA: Presided by herein respondent judge Mateo M.
Leanda.respondent judge issued an order reversing the order
of dismissal on the grounds that the action for reformation had
not yet prescribed and the dismissal was "premature and
precipitate", denying respondent corporation of its right to
procedural due process.
To the mind of this Court, the dismissal order adverted to
above, was obviously premature and precipitate, thus resulting
denial upon the right of plaintiff that procedural due process.
The other remaining four (4) causes of action of the complaint
must have been deliberated upon before that court acted
hastily in dismissing this case.
Issue:
The issue in this case is whether or not the complaint for
reformation filed by respondent Leyte Gulf Traders, Inc. has
prescribed and in the negative, whether or not it is entitled to
the remedy of reformation sought.
Held:
Yes. The prescriptive period for actions based upon a written
contract and for reformation of an instrument is ten (10) years
under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Prescription is intended to
suppress stale and fraudulent claims arising from transactions
like the one at bar which facts had become so obscure from
the lapse of time or defective memory. In the case at bar,
respondent corporation had ten (10) years from 1968, the time
when the contract of lease was executed, to file an action for
reformation. Sadly, it did so only on May 15, 1992 or twenty-
four (24) years after the cause of action accrued, hence, its
cause of action has become stale, hence, time-barred.
CONCEPCION R. AINZA, substituted by her legal heirs,
DR. NATIVIDAD A. TULIAO, CORAZON A. JALECO and
LILIA A. OLAYON, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ANTONIO
PADUA and EUGENIA PADUA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 165420. June 30, 2005]
Facts:
Meeting of the Minds in a Contract of Sale This is a case
involving family members. In April 1987, Ainza and her
daughter Eugenia orally agreed that Ainza pay P100k in
exchange for half of the portion of Eugenias undivided
conjugal property (a lot located in QC). No Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed. There was physical delivery of the land
through Concepcions other daughter (Natividad) acting as
atty-in-fact. Concepcion thereafter allowed Natividad and her
husband occupy the purchased portion of the land. In 1994,
Antonio caused the division of the lot into three (two were
occupied by the spouses), necessarily displacing Natividad. He
also had each subdivision titled. Antonio requested Natividad
to vacate the premises. Antonio averred that his wife only
admitted of selling 1/3 of the property to Concepcion for which
a receipt was issued signed by Concepcion. The RTC ruled in
favor of Concepcion. The CA reversed the RTC ruling. CA
explained that the property is conjugal hence the sale should
have been with Antonios consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the contract of sale between Ainza and
Eugenia is valid.
Held:
Yes it is valid until annulled (voidable). There was a perfected
contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion. The
records show that Eugenia offered to sell a portion of the
property to Concepcion, who accepted the offer and agreed to
pay P100,000.00 as consideration. The contract of sale was
consummated when both parties fully complied with their
respective obligations. Eugenia delivered the property to
Concepcion, who in turn, paid Eugenia the price of
P100,000.00, as evidenced by the receipt. Since the land was
undivided when it was sold, Concepcion is entitled to have half
of it. Antonio cannot, however, attack the validity of the sale b/n
his wife and his mom-in-law, either under the Family Code or
the Old Civil Code due to prescription. The sale came to his
knowledge in 1987. He only filed the case in 1999. His right
prescribed in 1993 (under the FC [5 years]) and 1997 (under
OCC [10 years])
BALOS and SALAZAR, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE
TORIO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 175444. December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 540]
Facts:
On July 24, 1996, herein respondents filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Damages. Respondents
contended that: they are the children and heirs of one Vicente
Torio (Vicente) who died intestate on September 11, 1973; at
the time of the death of Vicente, he left behind a parcel of land.
During the lifetime of Vicente and through his tolerance, Jaime
and the Spouses Salazar were allowed to stay build their
respective houses on the subject parcel of land; even after the
death of Vicente, herein respondents allowed Jaime and the
Spouses Salazar to remain on the disputed lot; however, in
1985, respondents asked Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to
vacate the subject lot, but they refused to heed the demand of
respondents forcing respondents to file the complaint.
MTC: Court adjudged the case in favor of the plaintiffs (Heirs of
Vicente Torio) and against the defendants and defendants-
intervenors (Abalos and Salazar) are ordered to turn over the
land in question to the plaintiffs.
RTC: ruled in favor of Jaime and the Spouses Salazar, holding
that they have acquired the subject property through
prescription.
CA: Reinstated the Decision of the MTC
Issue:
WON the CA erred in not appreciating that the petitioners
herein are now the absolute and exclusive owners of the land
in question by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Held:
No. Petitioners failed to present competent evidence to prove
their alleged good faith in neither possessing the subject lot nor
their adverse claim thereon. Petitioners claim that they have
acquired ownership over the disputed lot through ordinary
acquisitive prescription.
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may
be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10)
years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription
can only be extraordinary in character which requires
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty (30) years.
Shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the
year 1984 wherein it contains a statement admitting that
Jaime's house was built on the land of Vicente, respondents'
immediate predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners never disputed
such an acknowledgment. Possession, to constitute the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de
dueo, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that
possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no
matter how long, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.
Moreover, the CA correctly held that even if the
character of petitioners' possession of the subject
property had become adverse, as evidenced by their
declaration of the same for tax purposes under the
names of their predecessors-in-interest, their
possession still falls short of the required period of
thirty (30) years in cases of extraordinary acquisitive
prescription. Records show that the earliest Tax
Declaration in the name of petitioners was in 1974.
Reckoned from such date, the thirty-year period was
completed in 2004. However, herein respondents'
complaint was filed in 1996, effectively interrupting
petitioners' possession upon service of summons on
them.
Mercado, petitioners, vs. Espinocilla, respondents.
[G.R. No. 184109. February 1, 2012, 664 SCRA 724]
Facts:
Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552, with
an area of 570 sq. m. After he died, his five children, Salvacion,
Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia divided Lot No. 552
equally among themselves. Later, Dionisia died without issue
ahead of her four siblings, and Macario took possession of
Dionisias share. In an affidavit of transfer of real property dated
November 1, 1948, Macario claimed that Dionisia had donated
her share to him in May 1945.
Thereafter, on August 9, 1977, Macario sold 225 sq. m. to his
son Roger Espinocilla, husband of respondent Belen
Espinocilla and father of respondent Ferdinand Espinocilla. On
March 8, 1985, Roger Espinocilla sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad
Atienza. Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the
land they occupy by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
RTC: ruled in favor of petitioner, The RTC found that petitioner
inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his mother Salvacion and bought
28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren. The RTC computed that
Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel and Macario each inherited 142.5 sq.
m. of Lot No. 552. Each inherited 114 sq. m. from Doroteo and
28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia. The RTC further ruled that Macario
was not entitled to 228 sq. m. Thus, respondents must return
39 sq. m. to petitioner who occupies only 132 sq. m. There
being no public document to prove Dionisias donation, the
RTC also held that Macarios 1948 affidavit is void and is an
invalid repudiation of the shares.
CA: reversed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground that extraordinary acquisitive
prescription has already set in in favor of respondents. since
petitioners complaint was filed only on July 13, 2000, the CA
concluded that prescription has set in.
Issue:
WON petitioners action to recover the subject portion is barred
by prescription.
Held:
Yes. Affirm the CA ruling dismissing petitioners complaint on
the ground of prescription.
Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real
rights over immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time
in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely,
that the possession should be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. Acquisitive
prescription of real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years. In
extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted
adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of
good faith.
Respondents uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of
109 sq. m. of Lot No. 552 was established. Macarios
possession of Dionisias share was public and adverse since
his other co-owners, his three other sisters, also occupied
portions of Lot No. 552. In 1985, Roger also exercised an act
of ownership when he sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. It
was only in the year 2000, upon receipt of the summons to
answer petitioners complaint, that respondents peaceful
possession of the remaining portion (109 sq. m.) was
interrupted. By then, however, extraordinary acquisitive
prescription has already set in in favor of respondents.
SIMEON B. MIGUEL, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. FLORENDO CATALINO, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L23072, November 29, 1968
FACTS:
On January 22, 1962, appellants Simeon, Emilia and
Marcelina Miguel, and appellant Grace Ventura brought
suitagainst FlorendoCatalino for the recovery of possession of
a parcel of land, situated in the Mountain Province and
contains an area of 39,446 square meters, originally registered
under the name of their father, Bacaquio, a long-deceased
illiterate resident of Mountain Province. Bacaquio, who died in
1943, sold the parcel of land to the father of defendant in 1928.
No formal deed of sale was executed, but since the sale in
1928, or for more than 30 years, defendant FlorendoCatalino
and his father, had been in possession of the land, in the
concept of owner, paying the taxes thereon and introducing
improvements.
Plaintiffs claimed to be the children and heirs
ofBacaquio, the original registered owner, and averred that
defendant, without their knowledge or consent, had unlawfully
taken possession of the land, gathered its produce and
unlawfully excluded plaintiffs therefrom. Defendant answered
pleading ownership and adverse possession for 30 years. After
trial, the court dismissed the complaint, declared defendant to
be the rightful owner, and ordered the Register of Deeds to
issue a transfer certificate in lieu of the original. Plaintiffs
appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assailing the trial
court's findings of fact and law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court was right in declaring
defendant Catalino as the true and rightful owner of the
contested parcel of land.
HELD:
Yes. Supreme Court sustained the decision of the trial
court. For despite the invalidity of Bacaquios sale to the
vendee father of defendant-appellee Catalino, the vendor
Bacaquio suffered the vendee to enter, possess and enjoy
theland in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943, when
the seller died. The appellants, in turn, while succeeding the
deceased, also remained inactive, without taking any step to
repossess the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the present suit
was commenced in court.Their passivity and inaction for more
than 34 years justifies Catalinoin setting up the equitable
defense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of
plaintiffs must be considered barred and the trial court correctly
so held. Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their
silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend
time, effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes
and making improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to
spring from ambush and claim title when the possessor's
efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make
easy profit at his expense.
JESUS VIRTUCIO vs. JOSE ALEGARBES
G.R. No. 187451, August 29, 2012
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Jose Alegarbes was granted a 24-hectare
Homestead Patent in 1952. However, as a consequence of a
public land subdivision, the land was subdivided into three (3)
lots Lot Nos. 138,139 and 140. Lot 139 was allocated to
Ulpiano Custodio, and Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner
Jesus Virtucio based on their respective approved Homestead
Application. Alegarbes filed a protest opposing the approved
homesteads of Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his
approved application covered the whole area, including Lot
Nos. 139 and 140, but was denied by the Director of Lands.
Thereafter, he appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and later to the Office of the President
which dismissed his appeal and denied his motion for
reconsideration. He was then ordered to vacate subject lot but
he refused. In 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint for
"Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary
Injunction" before the RTC. Alegarbes, claimed that his
possession of Lot Nos. 138, 139 and 140 had been open,
continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted in the concept of an
owner for more than 30 years and had acquired such lots by
acquisitive prescription. The RTC, in 2001, ruled in favor of
Virtucio and ordered Alegarbes to vacate Lot No. 140.
Alegarbes appealed to the CA which reverse and set aside the
decision of the RTC and ruled that Alegarbes became ipso jure
owner of Lot 140 and, therefore, entitled to retain possession
of it. Aggrieved, Virtucio filed a petition to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alegarbes acquired ownership over the subject
property by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
HELD:
Yes. Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to its Article
712, provides that prescription is a mode of acquiring
ownership through the lapse of time in the manner and under
the conditions laid down by law. Under the same law, it states
that acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith and with just title for a
period of ten years, while extraordinary acquisitive
prescription requires uninterrupted adverse possession of
thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. In this case,
Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his
homestead application interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of
acquisitive prescription. The law, as well as jurisprudence,
however, dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively
toll the said period. Only in cases filed before the courts may
judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt posession. In
the same vein, protest filed before an administrative agency
and even the decision resulting from it cannot effectively toll
the running of the period of acquisitive prescription. In such an
instance, no civil interruption can take place. In the case of
Heirs of Gamos v. Heirs of Frando, the Court ruled that the
mere application for a patent, coupled with the fact of
exclusive, open, continuous and notorious possession for the
required period, is sufficient to vest in the applicant the grant
applied for. It likewise cited the cases of Susi v. Razon and
Pineda v. CA, where the Court ruled that the possession of a
parcel of agricultural land of the public domain for the
prescribed period of 30 years ipso jure converts the lot into
private property.
Alegarbes had applied for homestead patent as early as 1949.
He had been in exclusive, open, continuous and notorious
possession of Lot 140 for at least 30 years. By the time the
DENR issued its order of execution in 1989, Alegarbes had Lot
140 in his possession for more than 30 years. Even more so
when Virtucio filed the complaint before the RTC in 1997,
Alegarbes was already in possession of the subject property
for forty-eight (48) years. Thus, Alegarbes became ipso jure
owner of Lot 140 entitling him to retain possession of it by
virtue of acquisitive prescription.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO ESPINOSA
G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012
REYES, J.
FACTS:
March 3, 1999, Domingo Espinosa filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land (5,525sqm) in
Consolacion, Cebu alleging that:(a) property is alienable
and disposable; (b) he purchased the property from
his mother, Isabel Espinosa, on July 4, 1970; and (c) he and
his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the
property in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30)
years. As evidence, he submitted the blueprint of Advanced
Survey Plan, 2 tax declarations for the years 1965 and 1974 in
Isabels name, Certification issued by the Office of the
Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and 3 tax declarations for the
years 1978, 1980 and 1985. Petitioner opposed Espinosas
application, claiming that: (a) Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 otherwise known as the "Public Land Act" (PLA)
had not been complied with as Espinosas predecessor-in-
interest possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and
(b) the tax declarations do not prove that his possession and
that of his predecessor-in-interest are in the character and for
the length of time required by law. MTC and CA granted
Espinosas petition since he was able to establish ownership
and possession over the subject lot which is within the area
considered by DENR as alienable and disposable and that
he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous,
adverse, public and undisturbed possession of said land in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years before the filing of
the application. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this
was denied by the CA. Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse
and set aside the CAs assailed decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over
the subject property that is worthy of confirmation and
registration.
Held:
NO. The lower courts failed to apprise themselves of the
changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent over the
years. On June 22, 1957, RA 1942 amended Sec
48(b) of the PLA by providing a 30-year prescriptive
period for Judicial Confirmation of imperfect title. On Jan 25,
1977, PD 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for
possession and occupation for a period of 30 years to
possessiona and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Thereafter, PD 1073, in effect, repealed RA 1942 such that
applications under Sec 48(b) of PLA filed after the
promulgation of PD 1073 should alleged and prove possession
and occupation that dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. For
one to invoke Sec 48(b), it must be demonstrated that such
possession and occupation commenced on Jan 24, 1947 and
30-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of PD
1073. There is nothing on record showing that as of Jan 25,
1977 or prior to the effectivity of PD 1073, he or
Isabel had already acquired title by means of
possession and occupation of the property for 30 years. It
is Sec 14(2) of PD 1529 that categorically provides, only
private properties may be acquired thru prescription and
under Articles420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those
properties, which are not for public use, public service or
intended for the development of national wealth, are
considered private.
Espinosa cannot avail the benefits of either Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA or Section
14(2) of P.O. No. 1529 of the PLA, albeit improper, Espinosa
failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property
dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is
alienable and disposable. On the other hand, applying Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to prove that the
property is patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was able to
prove that his possession and occupation and that of Isabel
were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this
issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing
considerations.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMMAN
ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014
Reyes, J.
FACTS:
Remman Enterprises (respondent), Inc. filed an application
with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of
land. The RTC issued the Order finding the respondents
application for registration sufficient in form and substance
and setting it for initial hearing. LLDA filed its opposition to the
respondents application for registration, asserting that such
lots are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), likewise filed its opposition, alleging
that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June
12, 1945 or earlier. Trial on the merits of the respondents
application ensued thereafter. The RTC granted the
respondents application for registration of title to the subject
properties based on its findings that respondent was able to
prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and that the elevations
of the subject properties are very much higher than the
reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the
bed of Laguna Lake. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in granting the
respondents application for registration since the subject
properties do not form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain.
HELD:
Yes. Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land
acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.
Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for
registration of title must sufficiently establish: first, that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain; second, that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The first requirement was not
satisfied in this case. The two certifications from DENR
presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the
subject properties are alienable and disposable. A copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records should be presented. Anent the second and third
requirements, although Cerquena testified that the respondent
and its predecessors-in-interest cultivated the subject
properties, by planting different crops thereon, his testimony is
bereft of any specificity as to the nature of such cultivation as
to warrant the conclusion that they have been indeed in
possession and occupation of the subject properties in the
manner required by law. Having failed to prove that the subject
properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945,
or earlier, the respondent's application for registration should
be denied.
Heirs of Policronio Ureta vs. Heirs of Liberato Ureta
[G.R. No. 165748, 657 SCRA 555, September 14, 2011]
Facts:
In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children
including Policronio and Liberato. Alfonso was financially well-
off during his lifetime. Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso
executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of
land in favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his
common-law wife. The Deed of Sale executed on October 25,
1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which
are the properties in dispute in this case.
When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato acted as the
administrator of his fathers estate, later succeeded by his
sister Prudencia, and then by her daughter. Except for a
portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels transferred to
Policronio were tenanted by the Fernandez Family. These
tenants never turned over the produce of the lands to
Policronio or any of his heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the
administrators of his estate. Policronio died on November 22,
1974. Except for the said portion of parcel 5, neither Policronio
nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands.
On April 19, 1989, Alfonsos heirs executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that were
covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously
executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado,
Policronios eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio,
signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-
heirs.
Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late
father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle the
matter with the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving futile,
the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of
Documents, Partition, and Damages against the Heirs of
Alfonso.
Issue: Whether or not the action for declaring the Deed of Sale
null and void has already prescribe.
Held:
No. From the position that the Deed of Sale is valid and not
void, the Heirs of Policronio argued that any question regarding
its validity should have been initiated through judicial process
within 10 years from its notarization in accordance with Article
1144 of the Civil Code. Since 21 years had already elapsed
when the Heirs of Alfonso assailed the validity of the Deed of
Sale in 1996, prescription had set in. Furthermore, since the
Heirs of Alfonso did not seek to nullify the tax declarations of
Policronio, they had impliedly acquiesced and given due
recognition to the Heirs of Policronio as the rightful inheritors
and should, thus, be barred from laying claim on the land. The
Heirs of Policronio are mistaken. Article 1410 of the Civil Code
provides: Art. 1410. The action for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. This is one of the
most fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent
contracts.
As the Deed of Sale is a void contract, the action for the
declaration of its nullity, even if filed 21 years after its
execution, cannot be barred by prescription for it is
imprescriptible. Furthermore, the right to set up the defense of
inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced.
Therefore, the Heirs of Alfonso cannot be precluded from
setting up the defense of its inexistence.
Brito vs. Dianala

[GR. no. 17171, December 15, 2010]

Facts:

Subject of the present petition is a parcel of land located at

Barrio Sicaba, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The said tract of
land is a portion of Lot No. 1536-B, formerly known as Lot No.
591-B, originally owned by a certain Esteban Dichimo and his
wife, Eufemia Dianala, both of whom are already deceased.

On September 27, 1976, Margarita Dichimo, assisted by her

husband, Ramon Brito, Sr., together with others filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against a
certain Jose Maria Golez.

Petitioner's wife, Margarita, together with Bienvenido and

Francisco, alleged that they are the heirs of a certain Vicente
Dichimo, while Edito, Maria, Herminia, Leonora, Felicito and
Merlinda claimed to be the heirs of one Eusebio Dichimo; that
Vicente and Eusebio are the only heirs of Esteban and
Eufemia; that Esteban and Eufemia died intestate and upon
their death Vicente and Eusebio, as compulsory heirs,
inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that, in turn, Vicente and Eusebio,
and their respective spouses, also died intestate leaving their
pro indiviso shares of Lot No. 1536-B as part of the inheritance
of the complainants in Civil Case No. 12887.

Issue: Whether or not the action for the recovery of

possession of the said property has already prescribe.

Held:

No. Respondents' act of filing their action for reconveyance

within the ten-year prescriptive period does not constitute an
unreasonable delay in asserting their right. The Court has ruled
that, unless reasons of inequitable proportions are adduced, a
delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is
not considered to be a delay that would bar relief. Laches is
recourse in equity. Equity, however, is applied only in the
absence, never in contravention, of statutory law.

Moreover, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an

actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is
not in possession thereof. Otherwise, if the plaintiff is in
possession of the property, prescription does not commence to
run against him. Thus, when an action for reconveyance is
nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting
of title, an action that is imprescriptible. The reason for this is
that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming
to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate
his right, the rationale for the rule being, that his undisturbed
possession provides him a continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title,
which right can be claimed only by the one who is in
possession.

In the present case, there is no dispute that respondents are in

possession of the subject property as evidenced by the fact
that petitioner and his co-heirs filed a separate action against
respondents for recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing to
respondents' possession of the disputed property, it follows
that their complaint for reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible.
As such, with more reason should respondents not be held
guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is one in equity,
cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible
legal right.