3. Republic v Nolasco 457 S 400
In said motion, Nolasco is askig the RTC to order DPWH to award the bid to
FACTS:
The root of the dispute is a public works project, the Agno River Flood Control
Project (Project), the undertaking of which has been unfortunately delayed due
to the present petition.
A Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) was constituted by the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) for the purpose of conducting international
competitive bidding for the procurement of the contract for Package IIthe Guide
Channel to Bayambang under Phase II of the Project.
Six (6) pre-qualified contractors submitted their bids for the project, among them
the present intervenors Daewoo Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd.
(Daewoo), and China International Water and Electric Corp. (China International).
However, even before the BAC could come out with its recommendations, a legal
challenge had already been posed to preempt the awarding of the contract to
Daewoo.
On 19 February 2002, Emiliano R. Nolasco, a self-identified taxpayer and
newspaper publisher/editor-in-chief, filed a Petition, seeking a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, with the RTC of Manila, naming
the DPWH and the members of the BAC as respondents. He alleged having
obtained copies of Confidential Reports from an Unnamed DPWH Consultant,
which he attached to his petition. Nolasco argued that based on the confidential
reports it was apparent that Daewoos bid was unacceptable and the putative
award to Daewoo, illegal, immoral, and prejudicial to the government and the
Filipino taxpayers. Invoking his right as a taxpayer, Nolasco prayed that the
DPWH and BAC be restrained from awarding the contract to Daewoo and
Daewoo disqualified as a bidder.
The RTC issued a TRO for a period of 20 days.
Upon learning of the TRO, the DPWH and the BAC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition with Motion for
Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order. While noting the impropriety of a
twenty (20)-day TRO without prior notice or hearing, they pointed out that
Republic Act No. 8975 precisely prohibited the issuance by any court, save the
Supreme Court, of a TRO or preliminary injunction which restrains or prohibits
the bidding for or awarding of a contract/project of the national government.
Accordingly, they prayed that the petition be dismissed and the TRO dissolved.
This new motion was set for hearing on 21 March 2002, and thereupon the
parties were afforded the opportunity to argue their case. Then, on 27 March
2002, the RTC issued an order dismissing Nolascos petition. The RTC held that
it was a suit against the government without its consent. RTC judge, realizing his
mistake, recalled the said TRO in accordance with RA No. 8975.
Nolasco filed a Motion to Issue Partial Judgment and Motion to Dismiss Petition.
CHINA, instead of DAEWOO.
ISSUE/S:
WON the RTC erred in its September 6, 2002 decision with regard to Nolascos
Motion to Issue Partial Judgment and Motion to Dismiss Petition.
WON the mere opinion (that the DPWH should consider awarding China for the
project) of the RTC judge has binding effect.
WON Sec. 5 Rule 36 (separate judgments) may be applied with regard to the reliefs
sought by Nolasco.
HELD:
NO. The RTC did not err in its ruling with regard to the said motion.
NO. It does not have a binding effect.
NO. Separate Judgments is not applicable.
RATIO:
Nolascos petition had been correctly dismissed by the RTC on two grounds: that
Nolascos general interest as a taxpayer was not sufficient to establish any direct
injury to him should the Project be awarded to Daewoo; and that the petition was
a suit against the State, which may not prosper without its consent.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Order correctly limited itself to the denial of
Nolascos motion for reconsideration without allowing any other relief that
Nolasco prayed for in his Motion for Partial Judgment and to Dismiss Petition.
Had the respondent judge instead opted to grant partial judgment and direct the
award of the Project to China International, the Court would not hesitate to strike
down such award. Yet the respondent judge did not act so unequivocally, and
merely advised that the DPWH Secretary should consider such an option.
o Sec. 5. Separate judgments. When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, the court, at any stage, upon a
determination of the issues material to a particular claim and
all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence
which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate
judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall
terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of
and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. . . .
On paper, Nolascos petition prays for two reliefs, that the petitioner be restrained
from awarding the Project to Daewoo, and that Daewoo be disqualified as a
bidder and its bid be rejected. Yet these reliefs are obviously intertwined for the
allowance of one would necessarily lead to the grant of the other. The multiple
reliefs referred to in the provision refer to those sufficiently segregate from each
other that the allowance of one at a preliminary stage will not preclude litigation
on the merits of the others.
 More importantly, the rule is explicit that partial judgment with regards one of the
reliefs is warranted only after a determination of the issues material to a
particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence
which is the subject matter of the claim.

Herein, the partial judgment was sought even before the respondents had the
chance to file their answer to the petition. Moreover, it was prayed for at a point
when, at even such a preliminary stage, the claimant was actually somehow able
to already present evidence in support of his claim, but before the respondents
had the chance to rebut this claim or support countervailing evidence.

At bare minimum, the allowance of a partial judgment at this stage would

constitute a denial of constitutional due process. It would condemn before
hearing, and render judgment before trial. Had indeed partial judgment been
granted in the assailed Order, it would have been rendered before the Petitioner
were afforded the opportunity to rebut the evidence of Nolasco, or to present their
own countervailing evidence.

While the allowance of partial judgments may expedite the litigation of claims, it
cannot be sanctioned at a stage when the trial judge has not had the opportunity
to hear all sides to the claim. In fact, it was highly imprudent for the respondent
judge to have concluded, as he did in his Order, that it was an admitted fact that
the BAC had strayed from fairly applying the Bidding Laws, Guidelines, Rules,
and Regulations, and Bid Tender Documents, considering that the Petitioner had
not even filed an answer or been allowed the opportunity to present any evidence
on its behalf.
4. Briones-Vasquez v CA GR 144882 february 4, 2005
NATURE
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39025, dated June 9, 2000,
which denied petitioners motion for clarificatory judgment and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated August 3, 2000, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
Under an agreement denominated as a pacto de retro sale, Maria Mendoza Vda.
De Ocampo acquired a parcel of land from Luisa Briones. The latter thereunder
reserved the right to repurchase the parcel of land up to December 31, 1970.
Maria Mendoza Vda. De Ocampo passed away on May 27, 1979. On June 14,
1990, Hipolita Ocampo Paulite and Eusebio Mendoza Ocampo, the heirs of
Maria Mendoza Vda. De Ocampo, filed a PETITION FOR CONSOLIDATION OF
OWNERSHIP, alleging that the seller was not able to exercise her privilege to
redeem the property on or before December 31, 1970.
(RTC) January 30, 1992: exh. A is a true pacto de retro sale and that the
defendant can still redeem the property within 30 days from the finality of this
judgment, subject to the provisions of Art. 1616 of the New Civil Code;
CA (June 29, 1995): set aside the decision; and declaring the 1970 sale with right
of repurchase, Exhibit A, as one of an equitable mortgage.
Respondents HEIRS OF VDA. DE OCAMPO filed a MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION which the Court of Appeals denied through a Resolution,[9]
dated December 15, 1995. The Court of Appeals Decision became final and
executory and entry of judgment was made on July 17, 1996.[
Subsequently, at the RTC, both Petitioner BRIONES-VASQUEZ and
Respondents HEIRS OF VDA. DE OCAMPO filed their respective motions for a
writ of execution. The RTC issued a writ of execution. However, the writ was
returned unserved
Petitioner BRIONES-VASQUEZ thereafter filed a motion for an alias writ of
execution. This was granted by the RTC. The Sheriff was unable to effect the
satisfaction of the alias writ as stated in the sheriffs report.
Unable to effect the execution of the Court of Appeals decision, Petitioner
BRIONES-VASQUEZ filed with the RTC an OMNIBUS MOTION, dated May 25,
1999, praying that the DECLARATION OF EQUITABLE MORTGAGE, Exhibit A,
be discharged; directing the issuance of a Writ of Possession against the
plaintiffs for the delivery of possession of the land in question to the defendant.
The RTC denied the omnibus motion in an Order dated November 16, 1999,
considering that the decision of the Court of Appeals has become final and
executory, hence, it can no longer alter, modify or add anything thereto, the
prayers set forth in the omnibus motion.
Petitioner BRIONES-VASQUEZ filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated February 23, 2000.
Petitioner BRIONES-VASQUEZ then filed a MOTION FOR CLARIFICATORY
JUDGMENT, dated April 5, 2000, with the Court of Appeals. The motion was
denied in a Resolution, dated June 9, 2000 since to the mind of the court there
was nothing more to clarify.
Petitioner BRIONES-VASQUEZ filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of
the above Resolution. The Court of Appeals denied the same in a Resolution
dated August 3, 2000.
ISSUE
WON the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in refusing to grant Petitioner BRIONES-VASQUEZs motion for
clarificatory judgment.
HELD : NO
RULE 39, GEN PRINCIPLE: FINAL JUDGMENT ONCE EXECUTORY
BECOMES IMMUTABLE
The Decision of the Court of Appeals had already become final and executory at
the time that the motion for clarificatory judgment was filed. With regards to final
judgments, this Court has pronounced in NUNAL VS. CA (1993) citing Manning
Intl Corp vs. NLRC (1991) that:
nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes
executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by
the highest Court of the land.
In the said case, the Court held that the general rule is that final and executory
judgments are immutable and unalterable except under the three exceptions
named above:
clerical errors;
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; and
void judgments.
NUN PRO TUNC JUDGMENTS AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE
Petitioner BRIONES-VASQUEZ claims the second exception, i.e., that her motion
for clarificatory judgment is for the purpose of obtaining a nunc pro tunc
amendment of the final and executory Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Nunc pro tunc judgments have been defined and characterized by this Court in
the following manner:
o The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to RECORD SOME ACT
OF THE COURT DONE AT A FORMER TIME WHICH WAS NOT
THEN CARRIED INTO THE RECORD, AND THE POWER OF A
COURT TO MAKE SUCH ENTRIES IS RESTRICTED TO
 PLACING UPON THE RECORD EVIDENCE OF JUDICIAL Appeals, dated June 29, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 39025, that the contract in
ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN ACTUALLY TAKEN. question was an equitable mortgage and not a sale.

o It may be used to make the record speak the truth, but not to make
it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken. If the court
has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered,
or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no
power to remedy these errors or omissions by ordering the entry
nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. (15 R. C. L., pp. 622-623.)

WILMERDING VS. CORBIN BANKING CO., 28 SOUTH., 640, 641; 126 ALA.,
268:
o The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is NOT THE RENDERING
OF A NEW JUDGMENT AND THE ASCERTAINMENT AND
DETERMINATION OF NEW RIGHTS, BUT IS ONE PLACING IN
PROPER FORM ON THE RECORD, THE JUDGMENT THAT HAD
BEEN PREVIOUSLY RENDERED, TO MAKE IT SPEAK THE
TRUTH, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was,
not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which
the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did
erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however
erroneous the judgment may have been.

PERKINS VS. HAYWOOD, 31 N. E., 670, 672.A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is
an entry made now of something which was actually previously done, to have
effect as of the former date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the court,
BUT TO SUPPLY AN OMISSION IN THE RECORD OF ACTION REALLY HAD,
BUT OMITTED THROUGH INADVERTENCE OR MISTAKE.

From the above characterization of a nunc pro tunc judgment it is clear that the
judgment Petitioner BRIONES-VASQUEZ sought through the motion for
clarificatory judgment is outside its scope. Petitioners did not allege that the
Court of Appeals actually took judicial action and that such action was not
included in the Court of Appeals Decision by inadvertence. A nunc pro tunc
judgment cannot correct judicial error nor supply nonaction by the court.

SINCE THE JUDGMENT SOUGHT THROUGH THE MOTION FOR

CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT IS NOT A NUNC PRO TUNC ONE, THE
GENERAL RULE REGARDING FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISIONS
APPLIES. In this case, no motion for reconsideration having been filed after the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision on June 29, 1995 and an entry of
judgment having been made on July 17, 1996, the same became final and
executory and, hence, is no longer susceptible to amendment. It, therefore,
follows that the Court of Appeals did not act arbitrarily nor with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the aforementioned
Resolution denying petitioners motion for clarificatory judgment and the
Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Disposition. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The parties

are directed to proceed upon the basis of the final Decision of the Court of

5. Navarro v Metropolitan Bank GR 165697/166484 August 4, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners Antonio Navarro and Clarita Navarro were married on December 7,
1968. During their union, they acquired three parcels of land in
Alabang,Muntinlupa City on which they built their home.
The TCTs, however, are registered in the name of Antonio N. Navarro
married to Belen B. Navarro.
Sometime in 1998, respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (MBTC)
had caused the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage which Antonio
had earlier constituted on the subject properties as security for a loan he
allegedly obtained from MBTC. In December of that year, the properties were
sold at public auction where MBTC, as the lone bidder, was issued a certificate of
sale.
Clarita brought before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch
256 an action for the declaration of nullity of the real estate mortgage and the
foreclosure sale.
o Clarita alleged that the properties involved belonged to her and
Antonios conjugal partnership property as the same were acquired
during their marriage and that Antonio, with the connivance of a certain
Belen G. Belen, had secured the registration thereof in their names
without her knowledge.
She pointed out that Antonio and Belen then mortgaged the properties to MBTC
in 1993 likewise without her knowledge. She ascribed fault and negligence to
MBTC because it failed to consider that the properties given to it as security
belonged to her and Antonios conjugal partnership property.
MBTC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, of laches.
With the denial of its motion, MBTC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals. CA ruled in favor or Metrobank. The decision had attained finality
without a motion for reconsideration being filed or an appeal being taken
therefrom.
Subsequently, on April 17, 2002, Clarita instituted another action also before the
RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 but this time for the declaration of nullity of
the TCTs covering the same properties and for reconveyance and damages.
o The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-079 and it impleaded
Antonio, Belen, MBTC and the Registers of Deeds of Makati City
and Muntinlupa City as defendants.
MBTC moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was already barred
by the prior judgment in Civil Case No. 99-177, and that Claritas claim had
already been waived, abandoned and extinguished.
RTC denied Metrobanks motion to dismiss. It held that res judicata does not
apply.
Metrobank appealed to the CA. On July 8, 2004, the CA rendered a decision
(assailed decision) in favor of Metrobank. It held that the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 99-177 on the ground of laches should preclude the filing of Civil Case No.
02-079 because the former had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.
o Also, it pointed out that inasmuch as the two cases presented identical
issues and causes of action and prayed for the same relief, the second
complaint must likewise suffer the effect of laches.
Antonio and Clarita are now before this Court assailing the adverse decision of
the Court of Appeals. They believe that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in directing the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 02-
079.
ISSUE/S: WON the petitioners are now barred by laches.
HELD: YES. They are barred by laches.
RATIO:
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780 ordering
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177 had already become final, then the same
should bar the filing of Civil Case No. 02-079 inasmuch as the two cases raised
identical causes of action and issues and prayed for the same relief.
While the Court agrees that an action to declare the nullity of contracts is not
barred by the statute of limitations, the fact that Clarita was barred by laches from
bringing such action at the first instance has already been settled by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780.
o At this point in the proceedings, the Court can no longer rule on the applicability
of the principle of laches vis--vis the imprescriptibility of Claritas cause of action
because the said decision is not the one on appeal before us.
o But more importantly, the Court takes notice that the decision rendered in that
case had already become final without any motion for reconsideration being filed
or an appeal being taken therefrom. Thus, we are left with no other recourse
than to uphold the immutability of the said decision.
No other procedural law principle is indeed more settled than that once a judgment
becomes final, it is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal, except
only for correction of clerical errors, or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is void. The underlying reason for the
rule is two-fold:
1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus make orderly the
discharge of judicial business, and
2) to put judicial controversies to an end, at the risk of occasional errors, inasmuch
as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of
time.
 It needs no elucidation that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by
its appointed organs, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the
question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest.

Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law. For, after all, the very object
for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.