Supreme Court Rules on Filing Separate Income Tax Declarations for Married Couples

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31088 December 3, 1929
MIGUEL J. OSSORIO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee.
Antonio Sanz for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This action is for the recovery from the defendant of the sum of P56,246 which he, according to the
complaint, collected from the plaintiff in excess of what he should have collected by way of income
tax, in accordance with the declaration presented for that purpose.
PROCEEDINGS
To the complaint filed with the trial court on July 9, 1928, the defendant interposed his answer which
was subsequently amended, denying generally and specifically the allegations of the complaint,
setting up a special defense and praying that he be absolved from the complaint.
On September 13, 1928, the parties presented a stipulation of facts upon which they submitted the
case to the court for decision, which was decided and the defendant absolved from the complaint
with costs against the plaintiff.
The latter appealed from said judgment, and the case is before us upon the respective briefs of both
parties.
FACTS
The facts are stated in the following stipulations:
I. That the facts alleged in paragraphs I, II, III, V, VI and VII of the complaint in the case are
admitted as true.
II. That the plaintiff and his wife Paz Yangco de Ossorio were married in this country on
February 10, 1910, pursuant to the law governing conjugal partnership.
III. That on April 5, 1910, Paz Yangco de Ossorio executed a power of attorney in favor of
her husband, the herein plaintiff, appearing in Exhibit A of the plaintiff, attached to the
complaint in this case; and that on December 14, 1918, said plaintiff, in turn, executed a
power of attorney in favor of his brother Jesus J. Ossorio, appointing the latter as his
substitute, copy of which document is the aforesaid Exhibit A of the plaintiff.
IV. That Exhibits 1 and 2, accompanying the present stipulations of facts as an integral part
thereof, are certified copies of the income tax declarations corresponding to the year 1927,
presented by the plaintiff and his wife; and that integral part thereof, is a certified copy of
assessment notice No. 3211 to which paragraph VI of the complaint in this case refers.
V. That on June 9, 1928, the attorney for the plaintiff and his wife addressed a letter to the
defendant, copy of which, marked Exhibit C of the plaintiff, is attached to the complaint in this
case; and that the defendant answered said letter on the 11th day of said month and year,
copy of which answer, marked Exhibit D, is also attached to the complaint in this case.
VI. That on June 15, 1928, the plaintiff, thru his attorney, paid to the treasurer of the City of
Manila the sum of P59,928.29, by way of income tax assessed in Exhibit 3, having made
said payment under protest, as shown by the letter dated June 15, 1928, sent by said
attorney to the treasurer of the city, copy of which, marked Exhibit E, is attached to the
complaint herein, and by another letter of the same date sent by the treasurer of the city to
said attorney, copy which, marked Exhibit F, is also attached to the complaint in this case.
VII. That the official receipt No. 95813, issued by the treasurer of the City of Manila, for the
payment under protest of the taxes mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, contains the
following heading:
"INCOME TAX RECEIPT
"ASSESSMENT NO. 3211
"DON MIGUEL J. OSSORIO

Taxpayer's name.
"Tax due as per return ................................................................... P59,928.29

"Paid under protest letter dated June 15, 1928."
VIII. That on June 20, 1928, the plaintiff, thru his attorney, sent a letter to the defendant, copy
of which, marked Exhibit G, is attached to the complaint herein.
IX. That the protest made by the plaintiff was overruled by the defendant, by his letters,
copies of which marked Exhibits H and I, are attached to the complaint in this case.
X. That Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 accompanying this stipulation, as
an integral part thereof, are certified copies of the income tax declarations presented by the
plaintiff and his wife Paz Yangco de Ossorio, for the years 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923, 192 and
1926; that Exhibit 16, also attached to this stipulation as an integral part thereof, is a certified
copy of the assessment notice corresponding to Exhibits 14 and 15; that the tax declarations
of the plaintiff and his wife mentioned in this paragraph were combined yearly by the Internal
Revenue Office for the purpose of assessment and collection of the additional assessment or
tax established by the Income Tax Law, in accordance with the practice followed by said
office; and that the taxes owing by virtue of said tax declarations were paid without protest.
XI. That the taxes owing the Government on the combined tax declarations of the plaintiff
and his wife, Exhibits 1 and 2, amount to P59,928.29, as shown by assessment notice No.
3211, Exhibit 3; but if said two tax declarations of the plaintiff and his wife are assessed and
computed separately, it would show that the taxes owing from the plaintiff on his own tax
declaration, Exhibit 1, is P3,724, and the taxes owing from his wife Paz Yangco de Ossorio,
on her own tax declaration Exhibit 2 would be P45,505.65.
It is understood, agreed and stipulated that the agreement as to the truth of the facts stated
in paragraphs X and XI of this stipulation shall not prevent the plaintiff from objecting, as he
hereby objects, that Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16, as well as the
taxes owing from Paz Yangco de Ossorio, according to her income tax declaration Exhibit 2,
are impertinent, irrelevant and immaterial in this action, and the said plaintiff makes known
his exception in the event the court overrules this objection; nor would it prevent the
defendant from excepting, as he hereby excepts, in the event the court sustains the plaintiff's
objection.
Upon the foregoing stipulations, the parties respectfully submit the case to the decision of the
court. (Pages 34 to 40 of the Bill of Exceptions.)
The allegations admitted in paragraph I of this stipulation of facts are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of age and lives with his wife Paz Yangco de Ossorio in the city of
Manila, where they have their conjugal domicile.
II. That the defendant is and has been at all times stated in the complaint, the Collector of
Internal Revenue of the Government of the Philippine Islands, to which office he is duly
appointed, qualified and in the full exercise of his functions.
III. That the wife of this plaintiff, Paz Yangco de Ossorio, has her own paraphernal properties
inherited from her father Don Luis R. Yangco, which were adjudicated to her as a testate
inheritance in a partition approved by a judicial order dated March 12, 1909, entered in the
estate proceedings No. 5853 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which partition appears
not only in the aforesaid estate proceeding but also in the register of deeds for the City of
Manila, where a certified copy thereof was filed a few days after order approving the same
was entered.
IV. That before March 1, 1926, while plaintiff and his wife were absent on vacation, Mr. Jesus
J. Ossorio, who is also attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff by virtue of another letter, presented
upon printed official forms supplied by the defendant's office, two separate and individual tax
declaration for the year 1927; one for the plaintiff, showing a net taxable amount of
P128,631.35, and the other for his wife, for the income of her paraphernal property, showing
a net taxable amount of P598,686.70.
V. That the defendant, as Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands, combined
the two separate and independent declarations of plaintiff and his wife, and assessed the
amount of P59,928.29 against the plaintiff alone, according to assessment notice No. 3211,
a copy of which is attached to this complaint as Exhibit B and forms an integral part thereof.
VI. That in the foregoing assessment notice, Exhibit B, of this complaint, the defendant
assessed the plaintiff alone the additional tax upon the sum total of the income accruing to
the plaintiff and his wife, according to the declarations referred to in paragraph V of this
complaint. (Pages 48 to 49, Bill of Exceptions.)
QUESTIONS RAISED
The basic point of discussion between the parties is whether the paraphernal property of the
plaintiff's wife constitutes her "separate estate" within the scope and meaning of this phrase for the
purpose of the additional income tax, so that she is entitled to file a separate declaration, and to
have the additional tax on the income from her paraphernal property separately assessed.
There is no dispute between the parties as to whether the property in question is paraphernal
property. In fact it is paraphernal, because the plaintiff's wife acquired it by inheritance. (Art. 1381,
Civil Code; Alvaran vs. Marquez, 11 Phil., 263.)
As the rules governing the income tax in the Philippines are derived from North America, it is
necessary to determine whether or not the "paraphernal property" under our Civil Code is the so-
called "separate estate" of North American law and jurisprudence.
In our opinion the paraphernal constitute the property designated in the United States law and
jurisprudence, "statutory separate estate" as distinguished from the "equitable separate estate"
which is a creation of the English Common Law, not in force in the Philippines, because our law on
the matter has been derived from Spain, and through Spain from the Roman Law. This is one
definition of the wife's separate estate":
"A wife's separate estate is that from which the dominion and control of the husband is excluded,
and from which he is to derive no benefit by reason of the marital relation. It may be equitable or
statutory, according to the mode of its creation," and notes (30 Corpus Juris, 795).
We are convinced that what we consider "paraphernal property" is equivalent to the "statutory
separate estate" of North American law, of which one definition is made in the decision appealed
from and cited in the brief of the Attorney-General, to wit:
Both in England and in this country statutes have been enacted which usually provide that
the real and personal property of any married woman which she may have at the time of
marriage, or which she may thereafter acquire, shall not be subject to the disposal of her
husband, nor liable for his debt, but shall continue her sole and separate property as if she
were a feme sole. (13 R. C. L., 1147, sec. 170.) (Pages 7 and 8, Attorney-General's brief.)
According to the Civil Code in force in the Philippines, by paraphernal property is meant that which
the wife brings to the marriage without including it in the dowry, and that which she later acquires
without adding it thereto. The wife retains the ownership over such property; the husband cannot
exercise any action of any sort with respect to such property without the intervention or consent of
his wife, who has the management of said property, unless she has made it over to him before a
notary in order that he may administer it, in which case the husband is bound to give a mortgage for
the value of the personal property received by him, or to give security therefor in the manner
provided for in dowered estate. The husband's personal obligation shall not be collected from the
income of the paraphernal property, unless it be proved that they have been for the benefit of the
family. (Arts. 1381, 1382, 1384, and 1386 of the Civil Code.)
It should be noted that both with respect to the "paraphernal property," and to the "statutory separate
estate," the ownership thereof belongs to the wife exclusively, and the income is not at the
husband's disposal, nor is she responsible for his personal obligations.
The following citation from Ruling Case Law is invoked in support of the contention that "separate
estate" is not the same as paraphernal property:
Under the several statutory and constitutional provisions the rents, profits, increase and
income of the wife's separate property are generally her separate property as fully as the
corpus of the property itself, and it is not material that such profits are produced by the skill
and labor of the woman in the use and management of her separate property, while living
with her husband. (13 R.C.L., 1151, sec. 175.) (Page 8, Attorney-General's brief), to show
that the "separate estate" differs from the "paraphernal property" are a part of the conjugal
property (art. 1385).
But it must be observed that the citation from the Ruling Case Law quoted above start out by saying:
"Under the several statutory and constitutional provisions," and it does not state that such is the
prevailing rule in all of the North American States. The truth is, as everybody knows, that some of
the North American States are governed by laws of Roman origin, brought thither through Spanish
and French legislation. Thus the conjugal property system prevails in Texas, Arizona, California,
Washington, Louisiana, and New Mexico (T. D. 3071, "Cumulative Bulletin" No. 3, page 221).
The fact that under the law the income from the paraphernal property passes to the conjugal
property does not prevent it from being income derived from the wife's separate estate, and taxable
as such. It must not be lost sight of that the income tax shall be collected at the source, "collection at
the source." (Income Tax, Black, 4th edition, pages 245 et seq.)
When the wife's income passes to the marriage property, it is not added as income from the conjugal
property, but as a part of the funds or capital of said property. The income tax cannot be assessed
against it as though it were conjugal property income, because it is not; neither can it be assessed
as a tax on the husband's income, because it is not his income. If the income from the paraphernal
property is to be taxed as income of any other person or entity. Otherwise, the income from the
paraphernal property could not be subject to the income tax; such a tax could not be assessed
against the wife because it forms a part of the conjugal property; and it could not be assessed
against the conjugal partnership because it is not the income of said partnership.
The court being of the opinion that the paraphernal property is the equivalent of the North American
so-called "wife's separate estate," and that the income therefrom is taxable as the wife's income, and
not as a part of thefunds (not income) of the conjugal partnership, we see no reason for not applying
to the instant case the resolution of the Unites States Department of the Treasury passed upon a
case that originated in the Philippines, and therefore, arrived at after a consideration of our laws on
conjugal property and those on separate property of husband and wife, quoted with approval in the
case of Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion (38 Phil., 414), as follows:
The only occasion for a wife making a return is where she has income from a sole and
separate estate in excess of $3,000, or where the husband and wife neither separately have
an income of $3,000, but together they have an income in excess of $4,000, in which latter
event either the husband or wife may make the return but not both. In all instances the
income of husband and wife whether from separate estates or not, is taken as a whole for
the purpose of the normal tax. Where the wife has income from a separate estate and makes
return thereof, or where her income is separately shown in the return made by her husband,
while the income are added together for the purpose of the normal tax they are taken
separately for the purpose of the additional
tax. . . .
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is ordered that the defendant make two
separate assessment of the additional income tax, one against the plaintiff, and the other against his
wife on her paraphernal property, returning the sum of P56,203.59 to said plaintiff, without prejudice
to his levying against and collecting from said plaintiff's wife upon her own separate individual
declaration, in accordance with law, the additional income tax for the income from her paraphernal
property.
Judgment without express award of costs.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
THIRD DIVISION
FRANCISCO MUOZ, JR., G.R. No. 156125

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
ERLINDA RAMIREZ and August 25, 2010
ELISEO CARLOS,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner

Francisco Muoz, Jr. (petitioner) to challenge the decision[2] and the resolution[3]of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57126.[4] The CA decision set aside
the decision[5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 166, Pasig City, in Civil
Case No. 63665. The CA resolution denied the petitioners subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized
below.
Subject of the present case is a seventy-seven (77)-square meter residential

house and lot located at 170 A. Bonifacio Street, Mandaluyong City (subject
property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7650 of the Registry
of Deeds of Mandaluyong City in the name of the petitioner.[6]
The residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT
No. 1427, in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos
(respondents).[7]
On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee,

mortgaged TCT No. 1427, with Erlindas consent, to the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within
twenty (20) years, through monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66.[8] The
respondents then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-story residential
house on the lot.
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed by
Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration
of P602,000.00.[9]
On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for
the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but
only a mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the
petitioners name were falsified.
The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner granted them
a P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the
petitioner gave Erlinda a P200,000.00[10] advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage,
and made her sign a document purporting to be the mortgage contract; the
petitioner promised to give the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda surrenders TCT
No. 1427 with the GSIS mortgage cancelled, and submits an affidavit signed by
Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights to the subject property; with
the P200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27[11] to cancel the GSIS
mortgage on TCT No. 1427;[12] in May 1992, Erlinda surrendered to the petitioner
the clean TCT No. 1427, but returned Eliseos affidavit, unsigned; since Eliseos
affidavit was unsigned, the petitioner refused to give the P402,000.00 balance and
to cancel the mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda return the P200,000.00
advance; since Erlinda could not return the P200,000.00 advance because it had
been used to pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept the title; and in 1993, they
discovered that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the petitioners name, cancelling
TCT No.1427 in their name.
The petitioner countered that there was a valid contract of sale. He alleged
that the respondents sold the subject property to him after he refused their offer to
mortgage the subject property because they lacked paying capacity and were
unwilling to pay the incidental charges; the sale was with the implied promise to
repurchase within one year,[13] during which period (from May 1, 1992 to April 30,
1993), the respondents would lease the subject property for a monthly rental
of P500.00;[14] when the respondents failed to repurchase the subject property
within the one-year period despite notice, he caused the transfer of title in his name
on July 14, 1993;[15] when the respondents failed to pay the monthly rentals despite
demand, he filed an ejectment case[16] against them with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, on September 8, 1993, or sixteen
days before the filing of the RTC case for annulment of the deed of absolute sale.
During the pendency of the RTC case, or on March 29, 1995, the MeTC
decided the ejectment case. It ordered Erlinda and her family to vacate the subject
property, to surrender its possession to the petitioner, and to pay the overdue
rentals.[17]
In the RTC, the respondents presented the results of the scientific

examination[18] conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation of Eliseos
purported signatures in the Special Power of Attorney[19] dated April 29, 1992 and
the Affidavit of waiver of rights dated April 29, 1992,[20] showing that they were
forgeries.
The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced evidence on the paraphernal

nature of the subject property since it was registered in Erlindas name; the
residential lot was part of a large parcel of land owned by Pedro Ramirez and
Fructuosa Urcla, Erlindas parents; it was the subject of Civil Case No. 50141, a
complaint for annulment of sale, before the RTC, Branch 158, Pasig City, filed by
the surviving heirs of Pedro against another heir, Amado Ramirez, Erlindas
brother; and, as a result of a compromise agreement, Amado agreed to transfer to
the other compulsory heirs of Pedro, including Erlinda, their rightful shares of the
land.[21]
THE RTC RULING

In a Decision dated January 23, 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. It
found that the subject property was Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property that
was inherited from her father. It also upheld the sale to the petitioner, even without
Eliseos consent as the deed of absolute sale bore the genuine signatures of Erlinda
and the petitioner as vendor and vendee, respectively. It concluded that the NBI
finding that Eliseos signatures in the special power of attorney and in the affidavit
were forgeries was immaterial because Eliseos consent to the sale was not
necessary.[22]
The respondents elevated the case to the CA via an ordinary appeal under
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
THE CA RULING
The CA decided the appeal on June 25, 2002. Applying the second
paragraph of Article 158[23] of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon.
Fortun,[24]the CA held that the subject property, originally Erlindas exclusive
paraphernal property, became conjugal property when it was used as collateral for
a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds Eliseos monthly salary
deductions; the subject property, therefore, cannot be validly sold or mortgaged
without Eliseos consent, pursuant to Article 124[25] of the Family Code. Thus, the
CA declared void the deed of absolute sale, and set aside the RTC decision.
When the CA denied[26] the subsequent motion for reconsideration,[27] the

petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA misapplied the second paragraph of Article
158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas[28] because the respondents admitted
in the complaint that it was the petitioner who gave the money used to cancel the
GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427; Article 120[29] of the Family Code is the
applicable rule, and since the value of the house is less than the value of the lot,
then Erlinda retained ownership of the subject property. He also argues that the
contract between the parties was a sale, not a mortgage, because (a) Erlinda did not
deny her signature in the document;[30] (b) Erlinda agreed to sign a contract of lease
over the subject property;[31] and, (c) Erlinda executed a letter, dated April 30,
1992, confirming the conversion of the loan application to a deed of sale.[32]
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS
The respondents submit that it is unnecessary to compare the respective

values of the house and of the lot to determine ownership of the subject property; it
was acquired during their marriage and, therefore, considered conjugal property.
They also submit that the transaction between the parties was not a sale, but an
equitable mortgage because (a) they remained in possession of the subject property
even after the execution of the deed of absolute sale, (b) they paid the 1993 real
property taxes due on the subject property, and (c) they received P200,000.00 only
of the total stated price of P602,000.00.
THE ISSUE
The issues in the present case boil down to (1) whether the subject property
is paraphernal or conjugal; and, (2) whether the contract between the parties was a
sale or an equitable mortgage.
OUR RULING
We deny the present Petition but for reasons other than those advanced
by the CA.
This Court is not a trier of facts. However, if the inference, drawn by the
CA, from the facts is manifestly mistaken, as in the present case, we can review the
evidence to allow us to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the
record.[33]
First Issue:
Paraphernal or Conjugal?
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one
or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.[34]
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot
from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership.[35]Pursuant to Articles 92[36] and 109[37] of the Family Code, properties
acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded
from the community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. [38] The
residential lot, therefore, is Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property.
The CA, however, held that the residential lot became conjugal when the
house was built thereon through conjugal funds, applying the second paragraph
ofArticle 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas.[39] Under the second
paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, a land that originally belonged to one
spouse becomes conjugal upon the construction of improvements thereon at the
expense of the partnership. We applied this provision in Calimlim-
Canullas,[40] where we held that when the conjugal house is constructed on land
belonging exclusively to the husband, the land ipso facto becomes conjugal, but
the husband is entitled to reimbursement of the value of the land at the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership.
The CA misapplied Article 158 of the

Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas
We cannot subscribe to the CAs misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the

Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas.
As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its
provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have
governed their property relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code
on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains,
including Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the Family Code
(Articles 105 to 133). Article 105 of the Family Code states:
xxxx
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall
also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256.
Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the provisions
of the Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except with respect to rights then
already vested.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil
Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that
are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership
or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this provision, when
the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of
the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of
the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.[41]
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan
through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989[42] to April 30,
1992,[43]Eliseo paid about P60,755.76,[44] not the entire amount of the GSIS
housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the P176,445.27[45] paid
by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of
the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the
residential lot is considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo
through monthly salary deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of

Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo
to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseos signatures in the
special power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.
Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA apparently failed to consider the real
nature of the contract between the parties.
Second Issue:
Sale or Equitable Mortgage?

Jurisprudence has defined an equitable mortgage "as one which although
lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a
statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as
security for a debt, there being no impossibility nor anything contrary to law in this
intent."[46]
Article 1602 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when a contract,
regardless of its nomenclature, may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage: (a)
when the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (b) when
the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (c) when upon or after
the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed; (d) when the purchaser retains
for himself a part of the purchase price; (e) when the vendor binds himself to
pay the taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in any other case where it may be
fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall
secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
These instances apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale.[47]
For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Article 1602 of

the Civil Code, two (2) requisites must concur: (a) that the parties entered into a
contract denominated as a contract of sale; and, (b) that their intention was to
secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage. Any of the circumstances laid out in
Article 1602 of the Civil Code, not the concurrence nor an overwhelming number
of the enumerated circumstances, is sufficient to support the conclusion that a
contract of sale is in fact an equitable mortgage.[48]
Contract is an equitable mortgage

In the present case, there are four (4) telling circumstances pointing to the
existence of an equitable mortgage.
First, the respondents remained in possession as lessees of the subject

property; the parties, in fact, executed a one-year contract of lease, effective May
1, 1992 to April 30, 1993.[49]
Second, the petitioner retained part of the purchase price, the petitioner gave
a P200,000.00 advance to settle the GSIS housing loan, but refused to give
the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda failed to submit Eliseos signed affidavit of
waiver of rights.
Third, respondents paid the real property taxes on July 8, 1993, despite the
alleged sale on April 30, 1992;[50] payment of real property taxes is a usual burden
attaching to ownership and when, as here, such payment is coupled with
continuous possession of the property, it constitutes evidence of great weight that
the person under whose name the realty taxes were declared has a valid and
rightful claim over the land.[51]
Fourth, Erlinda secured the payment of the principal debt owed to the
petitioner with the subject property. The records show that the petitioner, in fact,
sent Erlinda a Statement of Account showing that as of February 20, 1993, she
owed P384,660.00, and the daily interest, starting February 21, 1993,
was P641.10.[52]Thus, the parties clearly intended an equitable mortgage and not a
contract of sale.
That the petitioner advanced the sum of P200,000.00 to Erlinda is

undisputed. This advance, in fact, prompted the latter to transfer the subject
property to the petitioner. Thus, before the respondents can recover the subject
property, they must first return the amount of P200,000.00 to the petitioner, plus
legal interest of 12% per annum, computed from April 30, 1992.
We cannot sustain the ballooned obligation of P384,660.00, claimed in the

Statement of Account sent by the petitioner,[53] sans any evidence of how this
amount was arrived at. Additionally, a daily interest of P641.10 or P19,233.00 per
month for a P200,000.00 loan is patently unconscionable. While parties are free to
stipulate on the interest to be imposed on monetary obligations, we can step in to
temper the interest rates if they are unconscionable.[54]
In Lustan v. CA,[55] where we established the reciprocal obligations of the

parties under an equitable mortgage, we ordered the reconveyance of the property
to the rightful owner therein upon the payment of the loan within ninety (90) days
from the finality of the decision.[56]
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby DENY the present

petition. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 57126 are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 30, 1992 is hereby declared an
equitable mortgage; and
2. The petitioner is obligated to RECONVEY to the respondents the

property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7650 of the Register of Deeds
of Mandaluyong City, UPON THE PAYMENT OF P200,000.00, with 12% legal
interest from April 30, 1992, by respondents within NINETY DAYS FROM THE
FINALITY OF THIS DECISION.
Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
aboveDecision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 11-16.
[2]
Dated June 25, 2002, penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court); id. at 21-28.
[3]
Dated November 13, 2002; id. at 31.
[4]
Entitled Erlinda Ramirez and Eliseo Carlos v. Francisco E. Muoz, Jr.
[5]
Dated January 23, 1997; Original Records, pp. 296-299.
[6]
Id. at 71-72.
[7]
Id. at 68-69.
[8]
Folder of Plaintiffs Formal Offer of Additional Evidence, pp. 6-8.
[9]
Original Records, pp. 76-77.
[10]
TSN dated September 19, 1994, Testimony of Erlinda Ramirez, p. 4.
[11]
Id. at 80-81.
[12]
Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 1427; id. at 69.
[13]
TSN dated July 14, 1995, Testimony of Francisco Muoz, Sr., pp. 7-8.
[14]
Original Records, p. 152.
[15]
Id. at 71-72.
[16]
Civil Case No. 14271, entitled Francisco Muoz, Jr., rep. by his attorney-in-fact, Francisco Muoz, v. Sps. Eliseo
& Erlinda Ramirez; id. at 153-155.
[17]
Id. at 156-162.
[18]
Folder of Plaintiffs Formal Offer of Additional Evidence.
[19]
[20]
Id. at 74.
[21]
Id. at 163-169 and 170-172.
[22]
Supra note 5.
[23]
Art. 158. x x x
Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the
spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the
same.
[24]
214 Phil. 593 (1984).
[25]
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
[26]
Resolution of November 13, 2002; supra note 3.
[27]
Rollo, pp. 131-136.
[28]
Supra note 24.
[29]
Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the
spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the
conjugal partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in
value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be
made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
[30]
TSN dated September 19, 1994, Testimony of Erlinda Ramirez, p. 14.
[31]
[32]
Id. at 151.
[33]
Hi-Cement Corporation v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, G.R. Nos. 132403 & 132419, September 28, 2007,
534 SCRA 269; Heirs of Flores Restar v. Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon, G.R. No. 161720, November 22, 2005, 475
SCRA 731, 739; Casol v. Purefoods Corporation, G.R. No. 166550, September 22, 2005, 470 SCRA 585, 589.
[34]
FAMILY CODE, Art. 116.
[35]
Supra note 21.
[36]
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse[.]
[37]
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxxx
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title[.]
[38]
Previously Articles 148 and 201 of the Civil Code.
[39]
Supra note 24.
[40]
Ibid.
[41]
Ferrer v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 166496, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 570, 581.
[42]
Date GSIS granted the loan; supra note 8.
[43]
Date Erlinda settled the loan; supra note 11.
[44]
P1,687.66 x 36 months salary deductions (May 1989 to April 1992) = P60,755.76.
[45]
Supra note 11.
[46]
Rockville Excel International Exim Corporation v. Culla, G.R. No. 155716, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 128,
136.
[47]
CIVIL CODE, Article 1604.
[48]
Bacungan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170282, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 642, 648-649; Sps. Salonga v.
Sps. Concepcion, 507 Phil. 287, 303 (2005); Sps. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 393 Phil. 479, 490 (2000).
[49]
Supra note 14.
[50]
[51]
Lumayag v. Heirs of Jacinto Nemeo, G.R. No. 162112, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 315, 327-328; Go v. Bacaron,
G.R. No. 159048, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 339, 352.
[52]
[53]
Ibid.
[54]
Toring v. Ganzon-Olan, G.R. No. 168782, October 10, 2008, 568 SCRA 376, 383.
[55]
334 Phil. 609 (1997).
[56]
Id. at 620. See also Bacungan v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47, at 650.

Supreme Court
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID G.R. No. 188921
AMANDO C. ROMERO,
Petitioners, Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson

- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
AURORA C. ROMERO and Promulgated:
VITTORIO C. ROMERO,
Respondents. April 18, 2012
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
praying for the reversal of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated 14 April
2009 and the subsequent Resolution[2] dated 21 July 2009.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by
petitioners which alleged grave abuse of discretion in the Resolutions dated 14
December 2007 and 29 January 2008 issued by Judge Maria Susana T. Baua in
her capacity as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen,
Pangasinan. The said
Resolutions dismissed petitioners complaint against private respondents Aurora
C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
Petitioners allege that upon their fathers death on 18 October 1974, their mother,
respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who held several real
and personal properties in trust for her children.[3] Since that year until the present,
she continues to be the administrator of the properties, businesses, and investments
comprising the estate of her late husband.
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several Deeds of
Sale were registered over parcels of land that are purportedly conjugal properties
of their parents. These included the following real and personal properties:
1. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-G of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995

situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
area of one thousand square meters under Declaration of Real Property No.
16142 and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 290013 in the name of
Vittorio C. Romero. A warehouse stands on the lot, covered by Declaration
of Real Property No. 16142.
2. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-D of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995

405, and TCT No. 77223 in the name of Spouses Dante Y. Romero and
Aurora Cruz-Romero.
3. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-E of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995

area of one thousand square meters under Declaration of
Real Property No. 407 and TCT No. 77224 in the names of Spouses Dante
Y. Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.
4. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-H of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995

406, and TCT No. 77225 in the name of Spouses Dante Y. Romero and
Aurora Cruz-Romero.
5. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3815-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-227224

area of four hundred ninety-four square meters under TCT No. 113514 in the
name of Aurora Cruz vda. de Romero.
6. A parcel of land located in Barangay Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,
containing an area of more or less three hundred seventy-nine square meters
under Declaration of Real Property No. 16136. It is not yet registered under
Act 496 or the Old Spanish Mortgage Law, but registrable under Act 3344
as amended. The improvement thereon, a building classified as a warehouse,
is covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 16136 A.
7. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,

containing an area of more or less two hundred four square meters under
Declaration of Real Property No. 16139. It is not yet registered under Act
496 or Act 3344 as amended. The improvement thereon is covered by
Declaration of Real Property No. 16140.
8. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,

containing an area of more or less eleven thousand six hundred forty-six
square meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 724 and TCT No.
284241 in the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero.
9. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,

containing an area of more or less one thousand two hundred fifty-six square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 725 and TCT No. 284242 in
the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero.[4]
Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio

through fraud, misrepresentation and duress succeeded in registering the above-
mentioned properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale executed by their
mother, Aurora.[5] Vittorio allegedly employed force and threat upon her, and even
administered drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable. Thus, Aurora signed the
Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their contents.
On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale,

Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title (Amended)[6] against private
respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero. Respondents filed their
Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long after the death
of their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered
conjugal. They allege that the lots covered by TCT Nos. 290010, 290011, 113514,
and Tax Declaration Nos. 16136 and 11639 were paraphernal properties of Aurora
which she had mortgaged. Vittorio purportedly had to shell out substantial amounts
in order to redeem them. The lots covered by TCT Nos. 77223, 77224, and 77225
were sold by Aurora herself as attorney-in-fact of her children on 23 November
2006, since her authority to do so had never been revoked or modified.
On 14 December 2007, the RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing

petitioners complaint, stating thus:
xxx(T)he case under Special Proceedings No. 5185 remains pending in

that no distribution of the assets of the estate of the late Dante Y. Romero, nor a
partition, has been effected among his compulsory heirs. Thus, the contending
claims of plaintiffs and defendants in this case could not be adjudicated nor
passed upon by this Court without first getting a definitive pronouncement
from the intestate court as to the share of each of the heirs of the late Dante
Y. Romero in his estate.
Even the claim of defendant Aurora C. Romero that some of the properties
being claimed by plaintiffs in this case are her own, the same being paraphernal,
is an issue which must be taken up and established in the intestate
proceedings.[7] (Emphasis supplied.)
The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration, citing Section 3, Rule 87
of the Rules of Court which bars an heir or a devisee from maintaining an action to
recover the title or possession of lands until such lands have actually been
assigned. The court ruled that plaintiffs must first cause the termination of Special
Proceedings No. 5185 to its logical conclusion before this case could be
entertained by the Court.[8]
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in rendering
the said Resolutions, petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. On
14 April 2009, the CA rendered the assailed judgment dismissing the Petition,
ruling that the properties involved in this case are part of the estate left to the heirs
of Judge Romero, the partition of which is already subject of an intestate
proceeding filed on 6 January 1976 in the then Court of First Instance (CFI).[9] The
CA based its judgment on the findings of the RTC that the inventory of the estate
of Judge Romero submitted to the CFI included the same parties, properties, rights
and interests as in the case before it.
Petitioners now come to us on a Rule 45 Petition, arguing that the probate

court may rule on issues pertaining to title over property only in a provisional
capacity. They assert that the CA erred in dismissing their appeal, just because the
intestate proceeding has not yet terminated. Petitioners, as heirs, are purportedly
allowed to exercise their option of filing a separate civil action in order to protect
their interests.
Thus, the singular issue in the case at bar is whether or not petitioners in this
case may file a separate civil action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of
title, despite the pendency of the settlement proceedings for the estate of the late
Judge Dante Y. Romero.
Ruling of the Court
The probate court has jurisdiction to

determine the issues in the present case
Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or intestate
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons or the appointment of executors, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. [10] They
cite Ongsingco v. Tan,[11] Baybayan v. Aquino[12] and several cases which state that
when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of
a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate, the intestate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
these questions. Petitioners conclude that the issue of ownership of the properties
enumerated in their Petition and included in the inventory submitted by respondent
Aurora Romero to the intestate court, must be determined in a separate civil action
to resolve title.[13]
The rulings in Ongsingco and Baybayan are wholly inapplicable, as they both
arose out of facts different from those in the case at bar. Baybayan involved a
summary settlement for the estate of the decedent, in which a parcel of land
representing the share of decedents nephews and nieces was already covered by a
TCT under the name of a third party. To defeat the writ of partition issued by the
probate court, the third party, petitioners Baybayan et al., had to file a separate
civil action for quieting of their title and for damages. The issue before the Court
then devolved upon the propriety of the probate courts order to amend the
Complaint for quieting of title before the regular court. More
importantly, Baybayan pertained to a civil action involving third parties who were
not heirs, and not privy to the intestate proceedings in the probate court. The
present action was instituted precisely by heirs of Judge Romero, against their
brother, who is also an heir, and their mother, who is the administrator of the
estate.
In Coca v. Borromeo,[14] this Court allowed the probate court to provisionally pass
upon the issue of title, precisely because the only interested parties are all heirs to
the estate, subject of the proceeding, viz:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved

by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its
limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it
is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed

upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a
separate action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by
expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or

testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of
a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate
action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or

ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general
rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of
the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion
for its exclusion from (the) inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs
who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.[15] (Citations omitted.)
While it is true that a probate courts determination of ownership over properties

which may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature, this rule is
applicable only as between the representatives of the estate and strangers thereto.
Indeed, as early as Bacquial v. Amihan,[16] the court stated thus:
xxx The rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons
not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so protect
the same, but not for a decision on their action. In the case of In re Estate of the
deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, Teresa Garcia vs. Luisa Garcia, et al.,
67 Phil., 353, this court held:
A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate

proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or
not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom
belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a determination
is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right
of interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question on the
ownership or existence of the right or credit.
To this same effect are rulings in various states of the United States.
* * * That the probate court is without jurisdiction to try the

title to property as between the representatives of an estate and
strangers thereto is too well established by the authorities to
require argument.
There is also authority abroad that where the court is without jurisdiction
to determine questions of title, as for example, as between the estate and persons
claiming adversely, its orders and judgments relating to the sale do not render the
issue of title res judicata.[17] (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)
In any case, there is no merit to petitioners claim that the issues raised in the case
at bar pertain to title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated in a
separate civil action. The issue before the court is not really one of title or
ownership, but the determination of which particular properties should be included
in the inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has listed the
properties alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties of their parents
and, therefore, part of the estate that was illegally sold to the respondent. Some of
these real properties identified seem to be the same real properties that form part of
the inventory of the estate in the intestate proceedings.[18]
Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory heirs, they also
seek to be the owners, pro indiviso, of the said properties. To anchor their claim,
they argue that the properties are conjugal in nature and hence form part of their
inheritance. For his defense, Vittorio contends that the lots are the paraphernal
properties of Aurora that she had mortgaged, and that Vittorio subsequently
redeemed.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Supreme Court declared that the

determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of
inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the probate court:
xxx (T)he jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased

person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has
been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of
an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the
residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the
assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. Thereafter,
distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled
to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which
each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has
in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties
may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the
heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the
complete settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are
affected.
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of
ownership of certain of the properties involved whether they belong to the
conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly
within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate
the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent
which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings.[20] xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the
allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part of their share in the estate.
To date, there has been no final inventory of the estate or final order adjudicating
the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can competently rule on
whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the
probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to
the heirs, after the debts of the estate have been paid.
Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from

filing the present action
Petitioners next contend that even if the probate court has the power to rule
on their Complaint, the submission of the issues in this case to the probate court is
merely optional, and not mandatory upon them. Hence, they argue, they still have
the right to bring these issues in a separate civil action, if they so choose. They
argue further that Section 3, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court is not
applicable to the present case.
The said provision states that:
Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. When an executor or
administrator is appointed and assumes the trust, no action to recover the title or
possession of lands or for damages done to such lands shall be maintained against
him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the court assigning such lands
to such heir or devisee or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.
Petitioners believe that the above rule is subject to certain exceptions. They
invoke the doctrine that while heirs have no standing in court to sue for the
recovery of property of the estate represented by an administrator, these heirs may
maintain such action if the administrator is unwilling to bring the suit, or has
allegedly participated in the act complained of.
On this contention, petitioners theory must again fail. There is nothing on
the record that would prove that Aurora defied the orders of the probate court or
entered into sale agreements in violation of her trust. In fact, petitioners are really
accusing a co-heir, their brother Vittorio, of having acquired certain properties
which they allege to be properties of their parents.
Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate,
Aurora Romeros acts as the administrator of the estate are subject to the sole
jurisdiction of the probate court. In Acebedo v. Abesamis,[21] the Court stated:
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a

pronouncement that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the
sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final
adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed out in a
separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not
specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of
a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the
court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court.[22]
Again, petitioners do not pose issues pertaining to title or ownership. They

are, in effect, questioning the validity of the sales made by the administrator, an
issue that can only be properly threshed out by the probate court. Paragraph 13 of
petitioners Complaint alleges as follows:
13. The purported transfers and sales executed by Defendant Aurora C.

Romero to and in favor of Defendant Vittorio C. Romero are nullities since all
were simulated, entered into without the intent and volition of Defendant Aurora
C. Romero, attended by force, intimidation, duress and fraud and not supported
with any valid or sufficient consideration and with the sole depraved intentions of
depriving the other
compulsory heirs of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero of their rightful share in the
estate.[23] (Emphasis omitted.)
Indeed, implicit in the requirement for judicial approval of sales of property

under administration is the recognition that the probate court has the power to
rescind or nullify the disposition of a property under administration that was
effected without its authority.[24] That petitioners have the prerogative of choosing
where to file their action for nullification whether with the probate court or the
regular court is erroneous. As held in Marcos, II v. Court of Appeals:
xxx (T)he authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with limited
jurisdiction, as a probate court over the estate of deceased individual, is not a
trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective, cannot
be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity by the very
parties invoking its authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication; to determine who are the heirs of the
decedent; the recognition of a natural child; the status of a woman claiming to be
the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the
testator; and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary
rights.[25] (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by

petitioners co-heir, Vittorio, can only be determined by the probate court, because it
is the probate court which is empowered to identify the nature of the property, and
that has jurisdiction over Auroras actions and dispositions as administrator.
In Peaverde v. Peaverde,[26] the Court even adjudged the petitioners guilty of forum-
shopping for filing a separate civil action despite the pendency of the said petitioners
own case seeking that letters of administration be granted to them. Similar to the
case at bar, the petitioners in Peaverde also sought the annulment of titles in the
name of their co-heir:
The two cases filed by petitioners are: (1) Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, which
seeks letters of administration for the estate of Mariano Peaverde; and (2) Civil
Case No. Q-95-24711, which seeks the annulment of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Mariano Peaverde and the annulment of titles in his name
as well as the reopening of the distribution of his estate.
Evidently, in filing Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, petitioners sought to share in
the estate of Mariano, specifically the subject land previously owned in common by
Mariano and his wife, Victorina.This is also what they hoped to obtain in filing
Civil Case No. Q-95-24711.
Indeed, a petition for letters of administration has for its object the ultimate
distribution and partition of a decedent's estate. This is also manifestly sought in
Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which precisely calls for the "Reopening of
Distribution of Estate" of Mariano Peaverde. In both cases, petitioners would have
to prove their right to inherit from the estate of Mariano Peaverde, albeit indirectly,
as heirs of Mariano's wife, Victorina.
Under the circumstances, petitioners are indeed guilty of forum-shopping.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the parties to Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-
19471 and Civil Case No. Q-95-24711 are identical. There is also no question that
the rights asserted by petitioners in both cases are identical, i.e., the right of
succession to the estate of their aunt, Victorina, wife of Mariano. Likewise, the
reliefs prayed for --- to obtain their share in the estate of Mariano --- are the same,
such relief being founded on the same facts ---their relationship to Mariano's
deceased wife, Victorina.[27]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties herein are

already subject of an intestate proceeding filed on 6 January 1976, the 14 April 2009
judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104025 finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
In CA-G.R. SP No. 104025, penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao, and Ramon R. Garcia, SC rollo, pp. 25-33.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 116-117.
[3]
Amended Complaint, CA rollo, p. 31.
[4]
Id. at CA rollo, pp. 27-30.
[5]
Id. at 31.
[6]
Amended Complaint, CA rollo, pp. 26-30.
[7]
CA rollo, p. 20.
[8]
RTC Resolution, 29 January 2008, CA rollo, p. 60.
[9]
CA Decision, p. 7; CA rollo, p. 95.
[10]
Petition for Review, SC rollo, pp. 9-20.
[11]
97 Phil. 330 (1955).
[12]
232 Phil. 191 (1987).
[13]
Supra note 9, at 16.
[14]
171 Phil. 246 (1978).
[15]
Id. at 251-252.
[16]
92 Phil 501 (1953).
[17]
Id. at 503-504.
[18]
CA rollo, p. 16.
[19]
117 Phil. 385 (1963).
[20]
Id. at 390-391.
[21]
G.R. No. 102380, 18 January 1993, 217 SCRA 186.
[22]
Id. at 193.
[23]
Amended Complaint, CA rollo, p. 33.
[24]
Spouses Lebin v. Mirasol, G.R. No. 164255, 7 September 2011.
[25]
393 Phil. 253, 265(1997).
[26]
397 Phil. 925 (2000).
[27]
Id. at 930-932.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005]

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR
AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-
PACIOLES, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-
CHING, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he
leaves behind. For in death, a persons estate remains, providing a fertile ground for
discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another case that illustrates such
reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious
dispute over the estate of their loved one.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein
petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, assailing the Court of
Appeals Decision[1] dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution[2] dated January 27, 1997
in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.[3] The Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioners
motion for partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles;
and his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an
estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits
amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by
her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
petition[4] for the settlement of Miguelitas estate. He prayed that (a) letters of
administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be
divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition,
specifically to petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the
grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an
administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed
of paraphernal properties. Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be
issued to her instead.[5] Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as
special administratrix.[6]
Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter has no
direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he,
being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator
under the law.[7]
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of
them would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the
capacity of business partners.[8]
In her omnibus motion[9] dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her
son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and
Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate. [10] Both were issued letters of
administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila
Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed against
the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas
estate.[11] Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children
as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.[12]
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus
motion[13] praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of
estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs;
and 3) payment of attorneys fees.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the partition and
distribution of the estate is premature and precipitate, considering that there is yet no
determination whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal,
paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.[14] Respondent claimed that she owns the
bulk of Miguelitas estate as an heir and co-owner. Thus, she prayed that a hearing
be scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes
and attorneys fees but denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the
estate, holding that it is indeed premature. The intestate court ratiocinated as follows:
On the partition and distribution of the deceaseds properties, among the declared
heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a
hearing on oppositors claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is
necessary to determine whether the properties listed in the amended complaint
filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the
deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their
partnership venture.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution
dated May 7, 1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to
annul and set aside the intestate courts Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution
dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the
estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve
respondents claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the
challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:
Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining private respondents unsupported claim of ownership against
the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court has already made a
finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of
collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed
upon in the course of the proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative
to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondents claim, is
being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not
tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error:
I
RESPONDENT COURTS DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE

COURTS ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE
PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE

INTESTATE COURTS ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS
OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE

COURTS ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
RESPONDENT CHINGS OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING,
FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate
court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be
part of the decedents estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a
probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and
probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.[15] The patent rationale for
this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.[16]
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate
court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine
whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the
adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals,[17]we held:
x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate

court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action to resolve title.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondents claim. Such
reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the
purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of
ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in
the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the
intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and
Opposition[18] dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the inventory
prepared by petitioner, thus:
6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended

Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on November 4, 1994 not
October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor,
however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties and
reserves her right to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each.
Respondent could have opposed petitioners inventory and sought the exclusion
of the specific properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead
of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low
valuation placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the settlement of
Miguelitas estate, did not submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is
to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or
knowledge.[19] He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those
properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not
endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioners inventory.
Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a
ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted
something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her
claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate. The
intestate court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its
Resolution[20] dated May 7, 1996, thus:
On petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita
Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a claim against the
subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not possibly be
implemented as there is still a need for appropriate proceedings to determine the
propriety of oppositors claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor
owns the bulk of the properties, which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of
the deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest
in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court.
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by
the intestate court was actually to determine the propriety of oppositors
(respondents) claim. According to the intestate court, if it is true that the oppositor
(respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas) properties, then it means that she has
amaterial and direct interest in the estate and, hence, she should be given her day
in court. The intended day in court or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety
of respondents contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondents ingenious attempt to secure a
proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelitas estate.
Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the accuracy of
petitioners inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her
real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its
proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-
settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that
when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of
the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue
of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased
and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or
probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.[21] Jurisprudence teaches
us that:
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate

cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so. [22]
Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general

jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her
adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional
or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still respondents claim cannot
prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelitas estate, as stated in petitioners
inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered
either in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered
the owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action. We find this Courts pronouncement in Bolisay vs.
Alcid[23] relevant, thus:
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support

her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their
favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set
aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include,
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property

covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title
should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is
in the persons named in the title. x x x
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, The Property Registration

Decree, proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,

modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present

convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We quote her
testimony, thus:
Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn
statement of yours which I quote: In accordance with the Chinese tradition and
culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to give only a
token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with
the undertaking that being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of the
family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you recall having stated that in
your sworn statement?
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?
A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the
other half was given to Emmanuel.
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also , is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more
the amount.
xxxxxx
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share
of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you,
Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of your late husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po.[24]
She further testified as follows:
Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks,
investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and abroad, interests
and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and
various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should
these properties be partitioned or what should be done with these
properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of
the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in
Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte
and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na partihan o
hatian ninyo ni Emil?
A: Kung ano ang sa akin
xxxxxx
Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay

Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir.[25]
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in
petitioners inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any document to prove
her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her claim did nothing to
improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed
of paraphernal properties.[26] Sensing that such assertion could not strengthen her claim
of ownership, she opted to change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita
were business partners and that she gave to the latter most of her properties to be used
in a joint business venture.[27] Respondent must have realized early on that if the
properties listed in petitioners inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the
absolute title and ownership over them and upon her death, such properties would be
vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two minor children.[28]
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or
deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or considers to be
rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be
part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction.[29]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
[1]
Rollo at 9-14.
[2]
Id. at 16-17.
[3]
Entitled Emilio B. Paciolis, Jr. versus The Honorable Judge Felix De Guzman, as Presiding Judge of
RTC Quezon City, Branch 99 and Miguela Ching.
[4]
Records at 1-9. The case was filed and docketed as SP No. Q-92-131555.
[5]
See Opposition, Records at 27-29.
[6]
See Motion for the Appointment of Oppositor as Special Administratrix, Records at 30-32.
[7]
See Motion to Strike-Out Opposition, Records at 91-99.
[8]
See Opposition to Petitioners Motion to Strike-Out Opposition dated December 21, 1992, Records at
101-106.
[9]
Records at 137-140.
[10]
The order, insofar as Emmanuel Ching is concerned as co-administrator, is the subject of an appeal
before the 10th Division of the Court of Appeals docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 46763.
[11]
Records at 337-346. Amended Inventory at 347-353.
[12]
May 17, 1995, Records at 360.
[13]
Records at 366-371.
[14]
See Manifestation/Opposition to Omnibus Motion dated July 20, 1995, Records at 383-387.
[15]
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 647; Ramos vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42108, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 635.
In Jimenez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75773, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA
367, the Court ruled: It is hornbook doctrine that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will,
the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot pass upon with
finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding x
x x.
[16]
Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 139587, November 22, 2000, 345 SCRA 541; Jimenez
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, ibid.
[17]
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 885.
[18]
Records at 383-387.
[19]
Section 1, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
[20]
Records at 437-440.
[21]
Baybayan vs. Aquino, No. L-42678, April 9, 1987, 149 SCRA 186.
[22]
Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Morales vs. Court of First Instance of Cavite, G.R. No. L-47125,
December 29, 1986; 146 SCRA 373; Cuizon vs. Ramolete, L-51291, May 29, 1984, 129 SCRA
495.
[23]
L-45494, August 31, 1978, 85 SCRA 213.
[24]
TSN, February 26, 1993.
[25]
TSN, May 20, 1993.
[26]
Respondents Opposition dated October 28, 1992 reads:
b) the bulk of the estate of the deceased consists of paraphernal property of the
deceased most of which were donations coming from the herein Oppositor, and therefore, the
herein Oppositor has a better right to its administration. (Records at 27-29)
[27]
Opposition to Petitioners Motion to Strike-Out Opposition dated January 5, 1993, reads:
3. That, the Petitioner cannot deny the fact that majority of the estate left by the decedent came from the
Oppositor by way of donation, and this was brought about by the fact that when the father of the
decedent died, the latter did not receive any kind of inheritance, as Chinese custom and tradition
dictate that female children inherit nothing from their deceased parents and the only heirs entitled
to inherit are the surviving spouse and the male children, which happens to be the herein
Oppositor and the only brother of the decedent in the person of Emmanuel Ching. But the herein
Oppositor, in the exercise of her liberality and sound direction, and with the end in view of giving
the decedent a share of the estate of her deceased husband, gave half of her inherited
property to the decedent, with an undertaking that the latter herein Oppositor and they will
undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business
partners. (Records at101-106)
[28]
Pisuea vs. Heirs of Petra Unating, G.R. No. 132803, August 31, 1999, 313 SCRA 384; Bongalon vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142441, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 553.
[29]
Baybayan vs. Aquino, supra.

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
TIRSO D. MONTEROSO, G.R. No. 105608

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
COURT OF APPEALS, SOLEDAD TINGA,
MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG, VELASCO, JR., and
REYGULA MONTEROSO-BAYAN, BRION, JJ.
PERFECTO L. CAGAMPANG, SR.,
SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE
MONTEROSO, FLORENDA
MONTEROSO, ALBERTO
MONTEROSO, HEIRS OF FABIAN
MONTEROSO, JR., REYNATO
MONTEROSO, RUBY MONTEROSO,
MARLENE MONTEROSO-POSPOS,
ADELITA MONTEROSO-BERENGUEL,
and HENRIETO MONTEROSO,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE G.R. No. 113199
MONTEROSO, SOLEDAD
MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG,
PERFECTO L. CAGAMPANG, SR.,
REYGULA MONTEROSO-BAYAN,
FLORENDA MONTEROSO,
ALBERTO MONTEROSO, RUBY
MONTEROSO, MARLENE
MONTEROSO-POSPOS, HENRIETO
MONTEROSO, ADELITA
MONTEROSO-BERENGUEL, and
REYNATO MONTEROSO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
COURT OF APPEALS and TIRSO Promulgated:

D. MONTEROSO,
Respondents. April 30, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are two petitions for review under Rule 45, the first docketed
as G.R. No. 105608, and the second docketed as G.R. No. 113199, both assailing
the Decision[1] dated March 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 15805 which modified the June 9, 1987 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4 in Butuan City in Civil Case Nos. 1292 and 1332.
The Facts
It is not unusual. Acrimonious litigation between and among siblings and

immediate relatives over inheritance does occur. It is unfortunate when the
decedent had, while still alive, taken steps to precisely avoid a bruising squabble
over inheritance.
In a sense, Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., a former justice of the peace and
municipal mayor of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, started it all. During his
lifetime, Don Fabian married twice and sired eight children, four from each union.
In 1906, Don Fabian married Soledad Doldol. Out of this marriage were
born Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin, and Tirso. On April 8, 1927, Soledad Doldol
Monteroso passed away.
A little over a year later, Don Fabian contracted a second marriage with
Sofia Pendejito. From this union were born Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and
Fabian, Jr.
After the death of his first wife, but during the early part of his second
marriage, Don Fabian filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Agusan an
intestate proceeding for the estate of his deceased first wife, Soledad D.
Monteroso, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 309, apparently to obviate
any dispute over the inheritance of his children from his first
marriage. Subsequently, the CFI receivedand later approved per
[3] [4]
an Orden (Order) dated March 11, 1936a Proyecto de Particion (Project of
Partition) dated February 21, 1935.
The partition in SP No. 309 covered Parcels F-1 to F-5, and adjudicated to
Don Fabian the whole of Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and one-half of Parcel F-5,
while the intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso comprised the whole of Parcel
F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5. The intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso was
partitioned and distributed to her four children in equal shares.
Subsequently, a Mocion[5] (Motion) was filed for the delivery to Soledad D.

Monterosos four children, her legal heirs, their respective shares in her intestate
estate, as adjudicated among them under the duly CFI-approved Project of
Partition.
In the meantime, the children of Don Fabian from his first marriage married
accordingly: The eldest, Soledad to Atty. Perfecto Cagampang, Sr.; Reygula to
Jose Bayan; Benjamin to Mauricia Nakila; and Tirso to Melecia Taa. Benjamin
died on February 1, 1947 leaving behind four children with wife Nakila,
namely: Ruby, Marlene, Adelita, and Henrieto. A year and a half later, or
on October 26, 1948, Don Fabian also passed away.
Before and shortly after Don Fabians demise, conveyances involving certain
of parcels thus mentioned were purportedly made.
The following is an illustration of the lineal relation of the parties or the

family tree of the direct descendants of Don Fabian from his two marriages:
This brings us to the objects of the squabble: the conjugal patrimonies of
Don Fabian from his two successive marriages.
During the lifetime of Don Fabian, the following properties were

acquired, viz:
PARCEL F-ONE
A parcel of coconut plantation on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan

described as follows: North by the property of Telesforo Ago and Gregorio
Cupay; East by Miguel Y Climaco Cabonce, Isidro Maamo and Buenaventura
Sandigan and Pandanon River, and West by Gregorio Axamin, Alex Fores and
Ventura Sandigan with a superficial extension of 10 has. 62 ares and 42 centares.
PARCEL F-TWO
A parcel of coconut land situated on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan,

with a superficial extension of 6 hectares, 50 ares bearing Tax No. 14801 of the
Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan, x x x.
PARCEL F-THREE
A parcel of coconut land under Tax No. 17167 situated on sitio Calibunan,
Cabadbaran, Agusan with superficial extension of 8 hectares and 34 centares x x
x.
PARCEL F-FOUR
A parcel of coconut land under Tax No. 14600 situated on sitio Pandanon,
Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a superficial extension of 27 hectares, 96 ares and 28
centares x x x.
PARCEL F-FIVE
A parcel of residential lot under Tax No. 18477 situated within the
Poblacion of the Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a house of strong
materials found on the same lot with a superficial extension of 660 square meters
x x x.
PARCEL F-SIX
A parcel of residential lot under Tax No. 5374 situated within the
Poblacion of the Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a superficial
extension of 3,890 square meters x x x.
PARCEL F-SEVEN
A parcel of coconut and corn land under Tax No. 1769 situated at
Ambahan, Tubay, Agusan, with a superficial extension of 8 hectares x x x.
PARCEL F-EIGHT
A parcel of coconut land situated at Ambahan, Tubay, Agusan, under Tax

No. 2944, with a superficial extension of 7 hectares, 59 ares and 96 centares x x
x.[6]
PARCEL S-ONE
A parcel of land situated at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran, Agusan under

Tax Dec. No. 5396 with an area of 24 hectares more or less x x x.
PARCEL S-TWO
A parcel of coconut land situated at Dal-as, Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, Agusan

under Tax No. 69 with an area of 24 hectares more or less x x x.
PARCEL S-THREE
A parcel of coconut land situated at Pandanon, Mabini, Cabadbaran,

Agusan, under Tax No. 21639 with an area of 1.4080 hectares more or less x x x.
PARCEL S-FOUR
A parcel of land situated at Mabini, Cabadbaran, Agusan under Tax No.

3367 with an area of 1,000 sq. m. bounded x x x.[7]
The F designation signified that the covered properties were acquired during
the first marriage, to distinguish them from those acquired during the second
marriage which are designated as S properties.
On July 28, 1969, the children of the late Benjamin D. Monteroso, namely:
Ruby Monteroso, Marlene M. Pospos, Henrieto Monteroso, and Adelita
Monteroso-Berenguel, filed with the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Property
with Damages against their uncle, Tirso D. Monteroso. Docketed as Civil Case
No. 1292, and later raffled to Branch 4 of the court, the complaint involved a
portion of Parcel F-4, described in the Project of Partition, as follows:
(1) One parcel of coconut land with the improvements thereon existing, Tax No.
14600 with a superficial extension of 6 hectares, 99 ares and 32 centares, bounded
as follows: on the North, Regula Monteroso; on the East by the Provincial Road
Butuan-Cabadbaran; on the Sourth Tirso Monteroso and on the West Diego
Calo.[8]
As the heirs of Benjamin alleged in their complaint, their uncle, Tirso, was
entrusted with the above-described one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of the
share from the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso allotted to their father per SP No.
309. However, their uncle refused to surrender and deliver the same when they
demanded such delivery upon their reaching the majority age.
Tirso countered that the portion pertaining to Benjamin was never entrusted
to him; it was in the possession of their sister, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang,
who was not entitled to any share in Parcel F-4, having previously opted to
exchange her share in said property for another parcel of land, i.e., Parcel F-7, then
being occupied by her.
On April 14, 1970, Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and
Damages with Receivership docketed as Civil Case No. 1332, involving 12 parcels
of land (i.e., Parcels F-1 to F-8 and Parcels S-1 to S-4, mentioned above) against
his stepmother, Pendejito, and all his full and half-siblings and/or their
representatives. The complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 was subsequently amended
to include Perfecto, as co-defendant, and Pendejito, as guardian ad litem for the
minor children of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr., who died in 1970 after the filing of the
complaint.
In Civil Case No. 1332, Tirso, inter alia, alleged the following: (1) the
aforementioned 12 parcels of land belong to the conjugal partnerships of the first
and second marriages contracted by Don Fabian; (2) SP No. 309, which
purportedly judicially settled the intestate estate of his mother, is null and void for
the reason that the project of partition failed to comprehend the entire estate of the
decedent as Parcels F-6, F-7, and F-8 were excluded, thereby depriving Tirso of his
one-fourth share or legitime over the said three parcels of land; and (3) Parcels S-1
to S-4, having been acquired during the second marriage of Don Fabian, are not
paraphernal properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso.
Answering, the defendants in Civil Case No. 1332 contended that Don
Fabian acquired Parcel F-6 during the second marriage, while Parcels F-7 and F-8
were Don Fabians exclusive properties having been acquired through a donation
from the heirs of one Benito Tinosa. They further maintained the validity of the
judicial partition under SP No. 309 which operates as res judicata insofar as
Parcels F-1 to F-5 are concerned. In particular, they asserted that Parcels F-1, F-2,
F-3, and one-half of F-5 were adjudicated to Don Fabian as his share in the
conjugal partnership of the first marriage, while Parcel F-4 and the other half of
Parcel F-5 were equally divided among the four children of the first marriage; that
during his lifetime, Don Fabian sold Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 to Soledad
Monteroso-Cagampang; that Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirso D. Monteroso,
and Mauricia Nakila Vda. de Benjamin Monteroso donated Parcel F-6 to Reygula
Monteroso-Bayan; and that Parcels S-1 to S-4 are truly paraphernal properties of
Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso as Parcel S-1 was acquired by her through a
homestead patent, Parcel S-2 through adverse possession, and Parcels S-3 and S-4
by purchase.
The Initial Ruling of the RTC
Involving practically the same properties and parties, Civil Case Nos. 1292
and 1332 were consolidated and jointly heard. After a long drawn-out trial
spanning almost 15 years, with six different judges successively hearing the case,
the RTC, presided by Judge Miguel Rallos, rendered on July 22, 1985 a
Decision,[9]dismissing Civil Case No. 1292 on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action, but finding, in Civil Case No. 1332, for Tirso.
What appears to be a victory for Tirso was, however, short-lived. Acting on

four separate motions for reconsideration duly filed by the various defendants in
Civil Case No. 1332, a new judge, who took over the case from Judge Rallos who
inhibited himself from the case, rendered a new decision.
The Subsequent Ruling of the RTC
Dated June 9, 1987, the new Decision set aside the July 22,
1985 RTC Decision of Judge Rallos and gave due course to both Civil Case Nos.
1292 and 1332. In full, the fallo of the new decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, both complaints in Civil Cases No.
1292 and 1332 are hereby given due course and judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring, confirming and ordering that Lot 380, Pls-736 located at

Pandanon, Cabadbaran, belongs to the children of first marriage and partitioned as
per subdivision survey map made by Geodetic Engineer Antonio Libarios, Exh. 7,
page 72 of the records as follows:
(a.) Lot 380-A, Share of Soledad Monteroso Cagampang with an

area of 5.3376 hectares, with technical description therein;
(b.) Lot 380-B, Share of Reygula Monteroso Bayan with an area of

5.3376 hectares, with technical description therein;
(c.) Lot 380-C, Share of the Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso with

an area of 5.3376 hectares with technical description
therein;
(d.) Lot 380-D, Share of Tirso D. Monteroso with an area of

5.3376 hectares and Lot 351, Pls-736 with an area of 6,099
sq. meters, with both technical description therein;
2. It is hereby ordered that Tirso D. Monteroso must deliver, return,

relinquish, cede, waive and/or quit claim immediately the area of 3.7815 hectares
being portion of Lot380-C, Pls-736 indicated in the subdivision survey plan by
Engr. Libarios, page 72, Records, Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2, Exh. V, to the
Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso who are absolute owners of Lot 380-C, Pls-736
and to pay, return and deliver immediately to the said Heirs of Benjamin D.
Monteroso the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, the total sum of Two
Hundred Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Four and 70/100 (P260,844.70)
Pesos with interest of 12% per annum compounded annually from January 1,
1984 up to the present and until fully paid;
3. It is hereby ordered that Reygula Monteroso Bayan must deliver, return,

relinquish, cede, waive and/or quit claim immediately the area of 1.6128 hectares
which is part of Lot 380-C, Pls-736, indicated in the subdivision survey plan by
Engr. Libarios, page 72, Records (Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2), Exh. V, to the
Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso who are the absolute owners of Lot 380-C, Pls-
736 and to pay, return and deliver immediately to the said Heirs of Benjamin D.
Monteroso the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983 the total sum of One
Hundred Six Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty and 40/100 (P106,960.40) Pesos with
interest of 12% per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to the
present and until fully paid;
4. It is hereby ordered that Soledad Monteroso Cagampang must deliver,
return, relinquish, cede, waive and/or quit claim immediately the area of 1.0929
hectares being portion of Lot 380-C, Pls-736, indicated in the subdivision survey
plan by Engr. Libarios, page 72, Records (Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2), Exh. V,
to her sister Reygula Monteroso Bayan who is the absolute owner of Lot 380-C,
Pls-736 and to pay, return and deliver immediately to the said Reygula Monteroso
Bayan the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, the total sum of Seventy
Seven Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Five and 96/100 (P77,625.96) Pesos with
interest of 12% per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to the
present and until fully paid, subject to deduction of whatever cash advances, if
any, was ever received by Reygula M. Bayan.
5. The three alleged Absolute Sale, Exh. C, D and E with all its
submarkings are declared fictitious, simulated and no consideration. It can never
be considered a donation because aside from being inofficious and impairing the
legitime of other heirs, the vendee had not signed therein which could be
considered acceptance and above all, these documents were prepared and
acknowledged by Notary Public squarely disqualified and highly
prohibited. Therefore, all are declared null and void and of no legal effect.
So, parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-6, F-7 and F-8 [remain] as part of the intestate
estate of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr.
6. The Register of Deeds and the Provincial Assessor, both in the Province
of Agusan del Norte are hereby ordered to cancel as the same are cancelled and
nullified, all transfer of certificates and tax declarations now in the name of
Soledad Monteroso de Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. which
parcels of land originally were registered and declared in the name of Don Fabian
B. Monteroso, Sr., and to register and declare again in the name of Heirs of Don
Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., more particularly the following:
(a.) [TCT No. RT-203] (420) for Lot 432, Cad. 121, with an area
of 10.0242 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-018-0224,
Series of 1980, PIN-02-019-05-050 known as Parcel F-1;
(b.) TCT No. RT-205 (424) for Lot 100, Cad. 121, with an area of
1.9083 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-019-0488, Series of
1980, PIN-02-019-08-002 known as F-2;
(c.) TCT No. RT-204 (423) for Lot 103, Cad. 121, with an area of
2.8438 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 02-019-0335,
Series of 1980, PIN-02-019-08-017 known as F-2;
(d.) Parcel of coconut land located at Poblacion, Cabadbaran,

known as F-3 with area of 6.3100 hectares under Tax Dec.
No. 02-001-1810, Series of 1980 and PIN-02-001-30-027;
(e.) Residential Lot, known as F-5 located at Poblacion,
Cabadbaran under Tax Dec. No. 18447 then under Tax
Dec. No. 1922, containing an area of 660 sq. meters
bounded on the North by Washington Street; on the East by
Progresso Street; on the South by Rizal Street; and on the
West by Ramon Cabrera.
(f.) Residential Lot known as F-6 located at Poblacion under Tax

Dec. No. 5374, Series of 1949 and Tax Dec. No. 499,
Series of 1954, consisting of 3,890 sq. meters bounded as
follows:
North Andres Atega

South Rill
East Luis Jamboy now Celestino Udarbe,
Sixto Ferrer and New Road
West Atega Street;
(g.) Coconut land known as F-7, located at Ambajan, Tubay,

Agusan del Norte under Tax Dec. No. 1769, Series of 1955
and Tax Dec. No. 10-03-0273, Series of 1980 with an area
of [8.000] hectares;
(h.) Parcel of coconut land known as F-8, located at Ambajan,

Tubay, Agusan del Norte with an area of 7.5996 hectares
under Tax Dec. No. 2944 and Tax Dec. No. 10-03-0273,
Series of 1980;
(i.) Parcel of S-1, located at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran under Tax

Dec. No. 11506, Series of 1963 with an area of 24 hectares
in the name of Sofia Vda. de Monteroso;
(j.) Parcel of S-2, located at Dal-as, Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, under

Tax Dec. No. 1888, Series of 1948, Tax Dec. No. 669,
Series of 1952, and subsequently transferred in fraud of
other heirs, in the name of Florenda P. Monteroso under
Tax Dec. No. 11507, Series of 1964, Tax Dec. No. 3381,
Series of 1972, Tax Dec. No. 5036, Series of 1974, Tax
Dec. No. 02-006-0047, Series of 1980;
(k.) Parcel of S-3, located at Pandanon, Mabini, Cabadbaran, under

Tax Dec. No. 5373, Series of 1949 with an area of 1.4080
hectares and bounded as follows:
North Pandanon River

South Crisanto Dolleroso
East Pandanon River
West Pandanon River and Peregrino
Aznar;
(l.) Parcel S-4, located at Mabini, Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No.
3367 with an area of 1.6500 hectares and bounded as
follows:
North Hrs. of G. Corvera

South C. Vda. de Alburo
East Ellodoro Delleroso
West A. Ventura
7. It is hereby declared that upon the death of Don Fabian B. Monteroso,

Sr. on March 26, 1948, the following are the properties belonging to his intestate
estate:
(a.) Whole parcel Lot 432, F-1;

(b.) Whole parcels Lot 100 and 103, F-2;
(c.) Whole parcel cocoland, Calibunan, F-3;
(d.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-5;
(e.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-6;
(f.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-7;
(g.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-8;
(h.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-1;
(i.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-2;
(j.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-3;
(k.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-4.
8. It is hereby ordered that Lot 432 under TCT [No.] RT-203 (420) with an
area of 10.0242 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-018-0224 (1980) is hereby
divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8) children of Don Fabian B.
Monteroso and the one-ninth (1/9) share be held in usufruct by the widow Sofia
Pendejito Monteroso during her lifetime.
Sofia Pendejito Monteroso being in possession and enjoying the fruits or

income of F-1 is hereby ordered to pay and deliver immediately to the following
heirs the corresponding amount of net income of F-1, Lot 432, from 1948 to 1983:
(a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang P78,521.32

(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P78,521.32
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P78,521.32
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso P78,521.32
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso P78,521.32
(f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso P78,521.32
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso P78,521.32
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. P78,521.32
The above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deduction for

whatever cash advance any heir may have received. Then the net balance of said
[amounts] shall be subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid.
9. It is hereby ordered that Lot 100 under [TCT No. RT-205] (424) with an
area of 1.9083 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-019-0488, Series of 1980 and Lot
No. 103 under [TCT No. RT-204] (423) with an area of 2.8438 hectares and
under Tax Dec. No. 02-019-0335, Series of 1980, [both known as Parcel F-2,]
shall be divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8) children of Fabian B.
Monteroso, Sr. and one-ninth (1/9) share shall be held in usufruct by the widow,
Sofia P. Monteroso, during her lifetime.
Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. are

ordered to deliver to [their] co-heirs their shares in these parcels of land, F-2, free
from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever, and to pay each of them the net
income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, namely:
(a.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P34,976.85

(b.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P34,976.85
(c.) To Tirso D. Monteroso P34,976.85
(d.) To Florenda P. Monteroso P34,976.85
(e.) To Reynato P. Monteroso P34,976.85
(f.) To Alberto P. Monteroso P34,976.85
(g.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. P34,976.85
(h.) To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) P34,976.85
The above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subjected to deduction of

whatever amount any heir may have received by way of cash advances.
The net amount shall be subjected to an interest at the rate of twelve

percent (12%) per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the
present or until fully paid.
10. Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr.

being in possession and enjoying the fruits and income of Parcel F-3, are hereby
ordered to pay to the following heirs, the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983:
(a.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P49,727.35

(b.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P49,727.35
(c.) To Tirso D. Monteroso P49,727.35
(d.) To Florenda P. Monteroso P49,727.35
(e.) To Reynato P. Monteroso P49,727.35
(f.) To Alberto P. Monteroso P49,727.35
(g.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. P49,727.35
(h.) To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) P49,727.35
The above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deduction for

whatever cash advance, if any, such heir may have received. Then the net
[amounts] shall be subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid.
Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. are

both ordered to deliver to the above-mentioned co-heirs their respective shares
free from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever.
11. Parcels F-5, F-6, F-7 and F-8 are declared real properties belonging to
the first marriage. Hence one-half (1/2) of each of these four parcels shall equally
be divided by the four (4) children of the first marriage and the other half must be
divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8) children of Fabian B.
Monteroso, Sr., and one-ninth (1/9) shall be held in usufruct by the widow, Sofia
Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that F-6 is divided as follows:
(a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang - - - - 702 sq. m.

(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - - - 702 sq. m.
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - - - 702 sq. m.
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - - 702 sq. m.
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m.
(f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m.
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m.
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. - - - - - - 216 sq. m.
(i.) To Sofia P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m.
12. It is hereby ordered, that Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty.

Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. must deliver to all heirs their respective shares on F-7
and F-8 including usufruct of Sofia P. Monteroso as declared in paragraph five (5)
and in addition, must pay and deliver the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983,
summarized as follows:
(a.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P189,665.88

(b.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - P189,665.88
(c.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P189,665.88
(d.) To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P 58,358.73
(e.) To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P 58,358.73
(f.) To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P 58,358.73
(g.) To Hrs. of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. - - - - P 58,358.73
(h.) To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) - - - - P 58,358.73
all with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded
annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid. However, it is
subject to deduction of whatever cash advances, if ever any heir, may have
received.
13. The Deed of Donation in 1948, Exh. F, over parcel known as F-5, is
declared null and void because the same was prepared and acknowledged before a
Notary Public disqualified and prohibited to do so under Notarial Law (Barretto
vs. Cabreza, 33 Phil. Reports 112). Hence, the transfer of tax declaration is hereby
ordered cancelled and the same must be declared again in the name of the Heirs of
Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. and ordered partitioned in the proportion stated in
paragraph eleven (11) hereof.
14. Parcels of land known as S-1, S-2, S-3 and S-4 are declared conjugal
properties of the second marriage. Hence, one-half (1/2) thereof belongs to Sofia
Pendejito Monteroso and one-half (1/2) shall be equally divided into nine (9)
shares for the eight (8) children of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. where the one-
ninth (1/9) shall be held in usufruct by Sofia P. Monteroso during her lifetime.
15. For the net income in arrears of S-1 located at Tagbongabong,

Cabadbaran, from 1948 to 1983, Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is hereby ordered to
pay and deliver to the following heirs the corresponding share:
(a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang - - P93,998.12

(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P93,998.12
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - P93,998.12
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P93,998.12
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P93,998.12
(f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P93,998.12
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P93,998.12
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. - - P93,998.12
However, all these amounts shall be subject to deduction, if any cash

advance was ever made or received by any heir.
The above-mentioned [amounts are] subject to an interest at the rate of

twelve percent (12%) compounded annually from January 1, 1948 to the present
until fully paid.
16. The alleged Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sofia P. Monteroso in

favor of Florenda P. Monteroso over a coconut land located at Dal-as, Bay-ang,
Cabadbaran, consisting of 24 hectares is hereby declared null and void being in
fraud of other heirs. It is clearly inofficious and impairs the legitime of her
brothers, sisters and nephews and nieces. Therefore, the tax declaration in the
name of Florenda P. Monteroso under Tax Dec. No. 11507, Series of 1964, Tax
Dec. No. 3381, Series of 1972, Tax Dec. No. 5036, Series of 1974 and Tax Dec.
No. 02-006-0047, PIN-02-006-02-002 are hereby ordered cancelled and the said
land shall be declared again in the name of Heirs of Fabian B. Monteroso.
Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is not required to render accounting as to the

income of S-2 because the coconut trees therein were planted by her while being
already a widow.One-half (1/2) of the land where the coconut trees are planted
shall be her share and the other one-half (1/2) shall be divided into nine (9) shares
for the eight (8) children of Fabian B. Monteroso including her 1/9 usufruct
thereon.
17. Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is hereby ordered to pay and deliver

immediately the net income in arrears of parcel S-3 located at Pandanon to the
following heirs with the corresponding amount:

However, [the] above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deductions,

if any cash advance was ever made or received by any heir.
Then the net amount receivable shall be subject to an interest at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present
until fully paid.
18. For the net income in arrears of parcel S-4, located at Mabini,
Cabadbaran, from 1948 to 1983, Sofia P. Monteroso is hereby ordered to pay and
deliver to the following heirs their corresponding shares:

However, all these amounts shall be subject to deductions, if any cash
advance was ever made or received by any heir.
The above-mentioned amount is subject to an interest at the rate of twelve

percent (12%) compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until
fully paid.
Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is ordered to deliver to the above-mentioned

heirs their respective shares free from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever.
19. These cases involved inheritance, hence the Bureau of Internal

Revenue (BIR) of Agusan del Norte at Butuan City is hereby notified for prompt,
proper and appropriate action. Likewise, the Provincial Treasurer of Agusan del
Norte and the Municipal Treasurers of Cabadbaran and Tubay are hereby
informed and reminded for their prompt, proper and appropriate action in the
assessment and collection of real estate taxes including transfers tax.
20. That all the heirs are hereby directed, and ordered to pay all taxes due
in favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines within thirty (30)
days from the finality of judgment hereof, otherwise, upon proper application or
manifestation by appropriate or concerned government agency, a portion of the
intestate estate of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., shall be sold at public auction
for such purpose.
21. Under Civil Case No. 1292, Tirso D. Monteroso or his heirs, assigns
and successors-in-interest, is hereby ordered to pay Ruby Monteroso, Marlene
Monteroso-Pospos, Adelita Monteroso-Berenguel and Henrieto Monteroso the
following sums of money:
(a.) P10,000.00 for moral damages;

(b.) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c.) P3,000.00 for costs of suit; and
(d.) P10,000.00 for attorneys fees.
22. Under Civil Case No. 1292, Soledad Monteroso de Cagampang and
Reygula Monteroso Bayan are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay Ruby
Monteroso, Marlene Monteroso-Pospos, Adelita Monteroso-Berenguel and
Henrieto Monteroso the following sums of money:

23. Under Civil Case No. 1332, Soledad Monteroso Cagampang, Atty.
Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. and Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso or their heirs,
assigns and successors-in-interest, are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally,
unto and in favor of Tirso D. Monteroso or his heirs, assigns and successors-in-
interest, the following sums of money:

24. It is hereby ordered that a judicial administrator of the intestate estate

of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. shall be appointed by this Court upon written
recommendation by all the parties within thirty (30) days from promulgation of
this decision. Should the parties fail to submit unanimously a recommendee, the
Court at its discretion may appoint an administrator, unless none of the parties
appeal this decision and this judgment is complied with by all the parties and/or
so executed in accordance with the provisions of the New Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.[10]
As regards Civil Case No. 1292, the RTC found that the heirs of Benjamin
have indeed been deprived of their inheritance which corresponds to one-fourth
share due their father from the intestate estate of their grandmother, Soledad D.
Monteroso. Thus, the court ordered the equal distribution of Parcel F-
4, i.e., Lot 380, Pls-736 located in Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte,
among the children of the first marriage of Don Fabian, and partitioned it based on
the subdivision survey map prepared by a geodetic engineer.
Turning on the alleged sale of Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 by Don
Fabian to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, the RTC found the covering three deeds
of absolute sale[11] to be null and void for the reason that the alleged conveyances
were fictitious, simulated, and/or without sufficient consideration. Alternatively,
the RTC ruled that the conveyances, even if considered as donation, would be
inofficious for impairing the legitime of the other compulsory heirs, not to mention
the lack of due acceptance of the donation by Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang.
Adding a vitiating element to the conveyances, as the RTC noted, was the fact that
the corresponding documents were prepared by and acknowledged before Perfecto,
who happened to be the husband of the alleged vendee, Soledad Monteroso-
Cagampang.
The RTC also declared as null and void the donation of Parcel F-5 to
Reygula Monteroso-Bayan owing to clear legal infirmities attaching to the
covering deed of donation.[12] For one, the parcel in question, while purportedly
donated free from any liens or encumbrance, was in fact the subject of a deed of
absolute sale between Don Fabian and the Cagampang spouses. For another, one of
the signatory-donors, Mauricia Nakila, Benjamins widow, did not have the right to
effect a donation because she was not a compulsory heir of her husband by
representation. The RTC added that the real owners of the rights and interests of
Benjamin over Parcel F-5 are her children as representative heirs.
Finally, the RTC declared the Order dated March 11, 1936 issued in SP No.
309 approving the Project of Partition to be valid, and that it constitutes res
judicataon the affected properties, i.e., Parcel F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5,
which were equally distributed to the heirs of Soledad D. Monteroso. Pursuing this
point and on the finding that Parcels F-1 to F-8 were acquired during the first
marriage and Parcels S-1 to S-4 during the second, the RTC thus held that Don
Fabians intestate estate consisted of the whole of Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3; and
half of Parcels F-5 to F-8 and half of Parcels S-1 to S-4, to be distributed in
accordance with the law on intestate succession. This means, the RTC concluded,
that the estate shall descend to Don Fabians compulsory heirs and their
representatives, as in the case of the late Benjamin and Fabian, Jr., subject to
accounting of the income or produce of the subject properties for the applicable
period, less advances made or received by any heir, if any.
The Ruling of the CA
From the above June 9, 1987 Decision, Tirso, defendant in Civil Case No.
1292, appealed to the CA, so did the Cagampang spouses, defendants in Civil Case
No. 1332. The other defendants in Civil Case No. 1332, namely: Sofia Pendejito
Vda. de Monteroso, Florenda Monteroso, Alberto Monteroso, Heirs of Fabian
Monteroso, Jr., Reynato Monteroso, and Reygula Monteroso-Bayan, also
interposed their own appeal. The separate appeals were consolidated and docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 15805.
On March 31, 1992, the CA rendered the assailed decision, affirming with
modification the June 9, 1987 RTC Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified, as
follows:
a) In the event that a homestead patent over Parcel S-1 is

issued by the Bureau of Lands pursuant to the patent application of
Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso, said patent shall issue not in
the name of the applicant but in favor of the eight heirs of Fabian
Monteroso, Sr. who thereafter shall be declared absolute owners of
the said parcel of land in the proportion stated in this decision but
who nevertheless shall allow Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso to
exercise during her lifetime usufructuary rights over a portion of
the said parcel of land equivalent to the share therein of each of the
heirs of her deceased husband;
b) The said heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. are hereby

declared absolute owners of Parcel F-6 to the extent of their
respective shares therein as presently individually possessed by
them pursuant to an extrajudicial partition of the said parcel of land
which the Court hereby declares as a valid contract among the said
heirs; and
c) With the exception of those pertaining to Parcel F-4 as

stated in this decision, the parties thus found to have unjustly
misappropriated the fruits of the subject parcels of land are hereby
directed to render an accounting thereof consistent with our
findings in the case at bar.
With the exception of the foregoing modifications, the decision under

review is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The CA summarized into three issues the multifarious assignments of errors

raised by the parties, to wit: first, whether or not the intestate estate of Soledad
Doldol Monteroso was settled in SP No. 309, thus according the Project of
Partition approved therein the effect of res judicata; second, whether or not it was
appropriate to partition Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and half of Parcels F-5, F-6, F-7,
F-8, S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4; and third, whether or not Tirso D. Monteroso is
entitled to damages.
The CA resolved the first issue in the affirmative, SP No. 309 being a valid
and binding proceedings insofar as the properties subject thereof are
concerned, i.e., Parcels F-1 to F-5 of which the whole of Parcel F-4 and one-half of
Parcel F-5, as Soledad D. Monterosos intestate estate, were distributed to her heirs.
This is not to mention that the authenticity and due execution of the documents
filed or issued in relation therewithreferring to the Proyecto de Particion dated
February 12, 1935 which is a carbon copy of the original, the Orden issued by the
CFI on March 11, 1936, and the Mocion dated March 18, 1936having duly been
established. Affirming the RTC, the CA rejected Tirsos claim that SP No. 309 is
void for settling only a part of the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso. The CA held
that partial settlement is not a ground for the nullification of the judicial partition
under either the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or the present Civil Code. The
appellate court added that the proper remedy in such a situation is to ask for the
partition and the subsequent distribution of the property omitted.
The CA likewise disposed of the second issue in the affirmative, dismissing

the opposition of the Cagampang spouses and Reygulo Monteroso-Bayan who all
claimed ownership over some of the parcels of land on the strength of the deeds of
conveyance executed in their favor. The CA upheld the RTCs finding that the three
deeds of absolute sale in which Don Fabian purportedly sold Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3,
F-7, and F-8 to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang were infirm. The CA noted that
even the Cagampang spouses recognized these infirmities, and instead of denying
their existence, they tried to justify the same and seek an exception therefrom.
On the alleged donation of Parcel F-5 by Don Fabian to Reygula Monteroso-

Bayan, the CA likewise agreed with the RTCs finding on the nullity thereof. The
CA pointed out that Reygula Monteroso-Bayan did not controvert the RTCs
finding, except to gratuitously say that the trial courts declaration of nullity was
wrong since nobody questioned the authenticity of the donation in the first place.
Apropos Parcel S-1, a disposable agricultural land of the public domain

which is the subject of a homestead patent application by Don Fabian, the CA, as
opposed to the RTCs disposition, held that a patent, if eventually issued, ought to
be in the name of the legal heirs of Don Fabian, not of his surviving spouse,
Pendejito. This conclusion, so the CA explained, is in line with the provision of
Section 105 of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), as
amended.
As to Parcel S-2, the CA agreed with the RTC that it is a conjugal property
acquired during the second marriage through a deed of sale[14] executed on August
15, 1947 by Marcelo Morancel. Likewise, the CA said that Parcels S-3 and S-4 are
conjugal properties as no evidence was adduced supporting the alleged purchase by
Pendejito of said properties with her own funds.
Anent the RTCs order partitioning Parcel F-6, the CA agreed with the
defendants in Civil Case No. 1332 that Parcel F-6 has long been partitioned
equitably among all the eight children of Don Fabian. Thus, the CA further
modified the RTC on this point.
On the third and last issues, the CA set aside all awards of actual damages
made by the RTC premised on the income generating capacity of the subject
properties, except that of Parcel F-4, as an order of accounting of the fruits of the
other subject properties unjustly appropriated by them would address the issue of
damages.
It bears to stress at this juncture that, save for the grant of damages and the
disposition of Parcels F-6 and S-1, the CA affirmed the questioned RTC Decision
on all other points. On June 15, 1992, Tirso D. Monteroso thereafter filed before
the Court his partial petition for review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No.
105608.
On the other hand, Pendejito, together with the other defendants in Civil
Case No. 1332, first interposed a joint motion for partial reconsideration, which the
CA denied per its equally assailed December 16, 1993 Resolution,[15] before
elevating the case via a petition for review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No.
113199.
G.R. No. 105608 Denied with Finality

Per its Resolution[16] dated June 29, 1992, the Court denied Tirso D.
Monterosos petition under G.R. No. 105608 for late payment of fees and non-
compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court and Circular Nos. 1-88 and
28-91 on the submission of a certified copy of the assailed decision/order and a
certification of non-forum shopping. Another Resolution[17] of August 12,
1992 followed, this time denying with finality Tirso D. Monterosos motion for
reconsideration filed onJuly 29, 1992. On August 31, 1992, an Entry of
Judgment[18] was issued.
In net effect, the March 31, 1992 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 is
final and executory as to Tirso D. Monteroso, and the Court need not pass upon the
issues he raised in his petition under G.R. No. 105608, albeit we shall take stock of
his Comment[19] and Memorandum[20] in G.R. No. 113199.
The Issues
Petitioners in G.R. No. 113199 raise the following issues for our
consideration:
1. Whether the finding that the Deeds of Sale (Exhibits C, D and E) were
not supported by valuable consideration and sham, fictitious and simulated is
supported by the evidence.
2. Whether the finding or conclusion that petitioners Spouses Atty.

Perfecto and Soledad Cagampang did not dispute the finding of the trial Court
that the Deeds of Sale in question are sham, fictitious and simulated is supported
by evidence.
3. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in concluding that, By

invoking the benefits of prescription in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are
deemed to have admitted the existence of a co-ownership.
4. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in upholding partition as

the proper remedy of private respondent Tirso Monteroso to recover the
properties sold by Fabian Monteroso, Sr. to Soledad D. Monteroso de Cagampang
when co-ownership is not pleaded as theory in the Complaint.
5. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in holding that the cause
of action of private respondent Tirso Monteroso is not barred by extinctive
prescription and laches.
6. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in granting reliefs not
prayed for in the Complaint in favor of parties who did not assert or claim such
relief, such as partition and accounting among the parties and the nullification of
the donation in favor of petitioner Reygula Bayan when x x x Tirso Monteroso
and the petitioners herein who are signatories to the Deed of Donation did not
question or ask for the nullification of the donation in favor of Reygula Bayan.
7. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in ordering the partition of

parcels S-1, S-2, S-3 and S-4 which are admitted in the Complaint to be in the
exclusive, adverse possession of petitioners Sofia vda. de Monteroso, Florenda,
Alberto and Reynato and the Heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. since the death of
Fabian Monteroso, Sr. in 1948, appropriating the harvests unto themselves, to the
exclusion of plaintiff (private respondent Tirso Monteroso) who was deprived of
his share continuously up to the present.[21]
The Courts Ruling
After a circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the

parties and in the light of the practically parallel findings of the RTC and CA, we
find the petition under G.R. No. 113199 to be devoid of merit.
It is a rule of long standing that:

[T]he jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the Court of
Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of
law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following
instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.[22]
None of the above exceptions, however, obtains in the instant case.
First and Second Issues: Simulated Sale
In connection with the first two related issues, petitioners maintain that the
CA erred when it affirmed the RTCs conclusion on the fictitious or simulated
nature, for lack or inadequate consideration, of the Deeds of Sale (Exhibits C, D,
and E), noting that Tirso failed to present substantial evidence to support the
alleged infirmity of the underlying sale. The fact that one of the lots sold
under Exhibit C on May 10, 1939 for PhP 2,500 was used as collateral for a PhP
600 loan is not, so petitioners claim, proof that the amount of PhP 600 represents
the maximum loan value of the property or that the sale in question is not
supported by valuable consideration.
Moreover, petitioners belabored to explain that the trial court erred in

concluding that the property conveyed under Exhibit C and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-203 (420) in the name of Soledad Monteroso-
Cagampang, married to Perfecto, was fictitious on the ground that the certificate
did not indicate that it was a conjugal property. Petitioners assert that the
registration of a property only in the name of one of the spouses is not proof that
no consideration was paid therefor. As petitioners would stress, what determines
whether a given property is conjugal or separate is the law itself, not what appears
in the certificate of title.
Lastly, petitioners take exception from the appellate courts posture that the
Cagampang spouses did not dispute the trial courts finding that the deeds of sale
(Exhibits C, D, and E) were simulated and fictitious for lack of consideration.
Petitioners insist that they in fact contested such conclusion of the RTC in their
brief before the CA, adding they only raised the issue of prescription as an
alternative defense without conceding the RTCs findings on contract infirmity.
We are not persuaded.
The antecedent facts, as borne by the records, strongly indicate the simulated
character of the sale covered by the deeds of absolute sale over Parcels F-1
(Exhibit C), F-2 (Exhibit D), F-3, F-5, F-7, and F-8 (Exhibit E). As found below,
Don Fabian never relinquished possession of the covered properties during his
lifetime. The first deed, Exhibit E, was executed on May 1, 1939; the
second, Exhibit C, on May 10, 1939; and the third, Exhibit D, on September 24,
1939. Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, however, only took possession of the
subject properties after Don Fabians death in 1948 or nine years after contract
execution. The gap, unexplained as it were, makes for a strong case that the parties
to the sale never intended to be bound thereby.
The more telling circumstance, however, is the fact that Perfecto had
judicially sought the amendment of the corresponding TCTs so that only the name
of his wife, Soledad, shall be inscribed as real party-in-interest on the
Memorandum of Encumbrances at the back portion of the titles. If only to stress
the point, when the deeds were executed in 1939, Soledad and Perfecto
Cagampang, the notarizing officer, were already married.
A property acquired during the existence of a marriage is presumed

conjugal. This postulate notwithstanding, Perfecto Cagampang went out of his way
to make it appear that the subject parcels of land were effectively his wifes
paraphernal properties. No explanation was given for this unusual move.
Hence, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that the unexplained
situations described above sufficiently show that the purported conveyances were
simulated. We also accord credence to Tirsos allegation that the Cagampang
spouses tricked Don Fabian into believing that his creditors were after the
properties which have to be hidden by means of simulated conveyances to Soledad
Monteroso-Cagampang. The fact that only one of the subject lots was used as
collateral for a PhP 600 loan which the Cagampang spouses took out does not
weaken the conclusion on the simulated character of the contracts, as logically
drawn from the twin circumstances adverted to.
The Court can allow that petitioners indeed attempted to traverse, before the
CA, the RTCs findings on the area of simulated sale and that they only raised the
matter of acquisitive prescription as an alternative defense. However, as we shall
explain shortly, the fact of petitioners having made the attempt aforestated will not
carry the day for them.
Third Issue: Recognition of Co-ownership in Acquisitive Prescription
In its assailed decision, the CA declared, By invoking the benefits of
prescription in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted
the existence of a co-ownership x x x. The petitioners tag this declaration as flawed
since the benefit of prescription may be availed of without necessarily recognizing
co-ownership. Prescription and co-ownership, they maintain, are so diametrically
opposed legal concepts, such that one who invokes prescription is never deemed to
admit the existence of co-ownership.
Petitioners are mistaken; their error flows from compartmentalizing what the
CA wrote. The aforecited portion of the CAs decision should not have been taken
in isolation. It should have been read in the context of the appellate courts
disquisition on the matter of Tirso being a co-owner of the subject undivided
properties whose rights thereto, as a compulsory heir, accrued at the moment of
death of Don Fabian, vis--vis the defense of acquisitive prescription foisted by the
Cagampang spouses. For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portion of the assailed
decision:
Nor do we find any merit in the third. From the allegation in the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 as well as from the arguments advanced by the
parties on the issues raised therein, this Court is convinced that therein plaintiff
Tirso Monterosos principal cause of action is unmistakably one for partition
which by its very nature is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches x x
x. The only exception to the rule on the imprescriptibility of an action for partition
is provided in a case where the co-ownership of the properties sought to be
partitioned had been properly repudiated by a co-owner at which instance the
remedy available to the aggrieved heirs lies not in action for partition but for
reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive prescription. By invoking
the benefits of prescription in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are
deemed to have admitted the existence of a co-ownership among the heirs of
Fabian Monteroso, Sr. over the properties forming the decedents
estate.[23] (Emphasis ours.)
From the foregoing disquisition, what the appellate court tried to convey is
clear and simple: partition is the proper remedy available to Tirso who is a co-
owner of the subject properties by virtue of his being a compulsory heir, like
siblings Soledad, Reygula, and Benjamin, of Don Fabian. The right to seek
partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. Consequently,
acquisitive prescription or laches does not lie in favor of the Cagampang spouses
and against Tirso, the general rule being that prescription does not run against a co-
owner or co-heir. The only exception to the imprescriptibility of an action for
partition against a co-owner is when a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership.
Thus, the appellate court ruled that by invoking extinctive prescription as a
defense, the lone exception against imprescriptibility of action by a co-owner, the
Cagampang spouses are deemed to have contextually recognized the co-ownership
of Tirso and must have repudiated such co-ownership in order for acquisitive
prescription to set in. Taking off from that premise, the appellate court then
proceeded to tackle the issue of repudiation by the Cagampang spouses. Therefore,
we hold that the appellate court did not err in finding that the Cagampang spouses
are effectively barred from invoking prescription, given that the subject properties
are conjugal properties of the decedent, Don Fabian, which cannot be subjected to
acquisitive prescription, the necessary consequence of recognizing the co-
ownership stake of other legal heirs.
Fourth and Fifth Issues: Partition Proper, not Barred by Laches

nor by Acquisitive Prescription
Being inextricably intertwined, we tackle both issues together. Petitioners,

citing Article 494 of the Civil Code[24] and Art. 1965 of the Spanish Civil Code,
aver that the right to ask partition is proper only where co-ownership is recognized.
They also suggest that no co-ownership obtains in this case considering that no less
than Tirso avers in his complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 that from the time of Don
Fabians death in 1948, the lots in question have been in the exclusive, adverse, and
public possession of the Cagampang spouses. Assayed against this perspective,
petitioners submit that partition is not proper, ergo unavailing, but an action for
reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive prescription.
Corollary to the posture above taken, petitioners assert that there being no
co-ownership over the properties sold by Don Fabian to Soledad Monteroso-
Cagampang, Tirsos cause of action, under the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.
190) in relation to Art. 1116 of the Civil Code,[25] had already prescribed, either in
1949, i.e., 10 years after the subject properties were registered in Soledad
Monteroso-Cagampangs name, or in 1958, i.e., 10 years after the cause of action
accrued in 1948 (death of Don Fabian), citing Osorio v. Tan.[26] Tirsos complaint in
Civil Case No. 1332 was commenced in 1970.
Petitioners contend that the evidence adduced clearly demonstrates that

Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang acquired ownership of the subject properties by
virtue of the deeds of sale executed in 1939 by Don Fabian. After the sale, she
registered them under her name and then took exclusive, adverse, and public
possession over them. Thus, they submit that the prescriptive period applicable to
the instant case under Act No. 190 had long expired, adding that the CA erred in
finding that Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang repudiated the co-ownership only in
1961 when she and the other heirs ignored the demand of Tirso for partition.
As a final point, petitioners alleged that the exclusion of Tirso from the
enjoyment of the fruits of the subject properties since after the death of Don Fabian
in 1948 is consistent with Soledad Monteroso-Cagampangs claim of exclusive
ownership and dominion.
We cannot subscribe to petitioners theory.
The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were
excluded from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits
thereof does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership. While Tirso
may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand from, and
act of initiating Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his share
necessarily implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir of the
properties unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses through the
instrumentality of simulated deeds of sale covering some of the hereditary
properties. By asserting his right as a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively
brought into the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses were holding some of
the subject properties in trust and that he is a co-owner of all of them to the extent
of his legal share or legitime thereon.
Consequently, we are one with the trial and appellate courts that partition is
the proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the
inheritance from the decedent. An action for partition is at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the properties involved.[27] Also, Sec. 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
pertinently provides:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person

having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in
this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an
adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining
as defendants all other persons interested in the property. (Emphasis ours.)
Being a compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the right to compel
partition of the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian as a
measure to get his hereditary share. His right as an heir to a share of the inheritance
covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the
moment of his death,[28] i.e., on October 26, 1948. Before partition and eventual
distribution of Don Fabians intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the
compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian. Being a co-
owner of that intestate estate, Tirsos right over a share thereof is
imprescriptible.[29] As a matter of law, acquisitive prescription does not apply nor
set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro-indiviso share or legitime is
concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share.[30] Contrary to petitioners stance,
reconveyance is not the proper remedy available to Tirso. Be it remembered in this
regard that Tirso is not asserting total ownership rights over the subject properties,
but only insofar as his legitime from the intestate estate of his father, Don Fabian,
is concerned.
Acquisitive prescription, however, may still set in in favor of a co-owner,

where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are
apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.[31] In the instant case,
however, no extinctive or acquisitive prescription has set in against Tirso and other
compulsory heirs in favor of the Cagampang spouses because effective repudiation
had not timely been made against the former. As aptly put by the appellate court,
the repudiation which must be clear and open as to amount to an express disavowal
of the co-ownership relation happened not when the deeds of absolute sale were
executed in 1939, as these could not have amounted to a clear notice to the other
heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses refused upon written demand by
Tirso for the partition and distribution of the intestate estate of Don Fabian. Since
then, Tirso was deemed apprised of the repudiation by the Cagampang spouses.
However, considering that the new Civil Code was already then in effect,
Art. 1141 of said Code[32] applies; thus, Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at
the most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court. The records show that
Tirsos cause of action has not prescribed as he instituted an action for partition in
1970 or only nine years after the considered express repudiation. Besides,
acquisitive prescription also does not lie against Tirso even if we consider that a
valid express repudiation was indeed made in 1961 by the Cagampang spouses
since in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary prescription
period[33] of 30 years has not yet lapsed, counted from said considered
repudiation. Such would still be true even if the period is counted from the time of
the death of Don Fabian when the Cagampang spouses took exclusive possession
of the subject properties.
Sixth Issue: Partition Proper for Conjugal Properties

of Second Marriage
On the ground of prescription under Act No. 190, petitioners assert that
Tirso lost the right to seek the partition of Parcels S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4, he having
admitted, as early as 1948, the adverse, exclusive, and public possession thereof by
Pendejito and her children. This type of possession, they maintain, works as a
repudiation by Pendejito and her children of the co-ownership claim of Tirso. They
further argue that Parcel S-1 pertains to Pendejito as her paraphernal property since
the homestead application therefor was under her name.
We are not persuaded.
Tirsos acknowledgment of Pendejito and her childrens possession of Parcels

S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4 cannot be viewed as the required repudiation to bar Tirso
from pursuing his right to seek partition. Under the law on co-ownership, it
behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership to do
the repudiating. Verily, the records do not show that Pendejito and her children
performed acts clearly indicating an intention to repudiate the co-ownership and
then apprising Tirso and other co-owners or co-compulsory heirs of such intention.
To be sure, Tirso and his siblings from the first marriage have a stake on
Parcels S-2, S-3, and S-4, even if these parcels of land formed part of the conjugal
partnership of gains of the second marriage. There can be no serious dispute that
the children of the first marriage have a hereditary right over the share of Don
Fabian in the partnership assets of the first marriage.
Anent Parcel S-1, we join the CA in its holding that it belongs to the heirs of
Don Fabian under Sec. 105 of CA 141, which pertinently provides:
Sec. 105. If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before the
issuance of the patent or the final grant of the land, or during the life of the lease,
or while the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards the
Government, in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and
obligations with respect to the land applied for or granted or issued under
this Act by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the
patent or final concession if they show that they have complied with the
requirements therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and
obligations for the purposes of this Act. (Emphasis ours.)
It is undisputed that Don Fabian was the homestead patent applicant who
was subrogated to the rights of the original applicants, spouses Simeon Cagaanan
and Severina Naranjo, by purchasing from the latter Parcel S-1 on May 8,
1943. Don Fabian cultivated the applied area and declared it for taxation purposes.
The application, however, would be rejected because death supervened. In 1963,
Pendejito filed her own homestead application for Parcel S-1.
Assayed against the foregoing undisputed facts in the light of the

aforequoted Sec. 105 of CA 141, the heirs of Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-
1. Said Sec. 105 has been interpreted in Soliman v. Icdang[34] as having abrogated
the right of the widow of a deceased homestead applicant to secure under Sec. 3 of
Act No. 926, otherwise known as the Public Land Act of 1903, a patent in her own
name, thus:
[W]e should bear in mind that, although Adolfo Icdang was married to
plaintiff when he filed the homestead application, an applicant may be said to
have acquired a vested right over a homestead only by the presentation of the final
proof and its approval by the Director of Lands. (Ingara vs. Ramelo, 107 Phil.,
498; Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil., 498; Republic vs. Diamon, 97 Phil., 838.) In
the case at bar, the final proof appears to have been presented to, and approved by
the Director of Lands, in 1954, or several years after the death of Adolfo Icdang
and the dissolution of his conjugal partnership with plaintiff herein. Hence, the
land in question could not have formed part of the assets of said partnership. It
belonged to the heirs of Adolfo Icdang, pursuant to section 105 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, reading:
xxxx
It is worthy of notice that, under the Public Land Act of 1903 (Act No.
926, section 3), in the event of the death of an applicant prior to the issuance of a
patent, his widow shall be entitled to have a patent for the land applied for issue to
her upon showing that she has consummated the requirements of law for
homesteading the lands, and that only in case the deceased applicant leaves no
widow shall his interest in the land descend and the patent issue to his legal
heirs. Incorporated substantially in section 103 of the Public Land Act of 1919
(Act No. 2874), this policy was changed by Act No. 3517, pursuant to which the
deceased shall be succeeded no longer by his widow, but by his heirs in law,
who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patentif they show that they
have complied with the requirements therefor. And this is, in effect, the rule
maintained in the above quoted section 105 of Commonwealth Act No.
141.[35] (Emphasis added.)
It appearing that Don Fabian was responsible for meeting the requirements
of law for homesteading Parcel S-1, said property, following Soliman, cannot be
categorized as the paraphernal property of Pendejito. Thus, the homestead patent
thereto, if eventually issued, must be made in the name of the compulsory heirs of
Don Fabian. Over it, Pendejito shall be entitled, pursuant to Art. 834 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889, only to a usufructuary right over the property equal to the
corresponding share of each of Don Fabians compulsory heirs, i.e., his eight
children.
Seventh Issue: Judgment Must not Only be Clear but

Must Also be Complete
Petitioners bemoan the fact that both the trial and appellate courts granted
relief and remedies not prayed for by the parties. As argued, Civil Case No. 1292,
initiated by the heirs of Benjamin against Tirso, basically sought recovery of real
properties; while Civil Case No. 1332, a countersuit filed by Tirso, was for
partition and damages, the main thrust of which is to recover his alleged share from
properties in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of other heirs since the death
of Don Fabian in 1948. Thus, petitioners take issue against both decisions of the
trial and appellate courts which ordered partition not only in favor of Tirso but also
in favor of the other petitioners he sued. What is particularly appalling, according
to them, is the order for accounting which no one requested.
Petitioners lament, while understandable, is specious. Our judicial system

requires courts to apply the law and grant remedies when appropriately called for
by law and justice. In the exercise of this mandate, courts have the discretion to
apply equity in the absence or insufficiency of the law. Equity has been defined as
justice outside law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of
morals than of law. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any
sanction of positive law, for equity finds no room for application where there is
law.[36]
In the instant case, a disposition only ordering partial partition and without
accounting, as petitioners presently urge, would be most impractical and against
what we articulated in Samala v. Court of Appeals.[37] There, we cautioned courts
against being dogmatic in rendering decisions, it being preferable if they take a
complete view of the case and in the process come up with a just and equitable
judgment, eschewing rules tending to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice.
Surely, the assailed path taken by the CA on the grant of relief not
specifically sought is not without precedent. In National Housing Authority v.
Court of Appeals, where the petitioner questioned the competence of the courts a
quo to resolve issues not raised in the pleadings, and to order the disposition of the
subject property when what was raised was the issue of right to possession, this
Court in dismissing the challenge stated that a case should be decided in its totality,
resolving all interlocking issues in order to render justice to all concerned and to
end the litigation once and for all.[38] Verily, courts should always strive to settle
the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the
seed of future litigation.[39]
Eighth Issue: Deed of Donation Null and Void
Finally, as an incidental issue, petitioners asseverate that the deed of

donation (Exhibit F) executed on September 19, 1948, or after the death of Don
Fabian, in favor of Reygula M. Bayan, is valid, particularly so since Tirso and the
heirs of Benjamin, as represented by their mother, Nakila, do not question the
validity of said deed as they in fact signed the same. That the donated property was
the same property described and included in the deed of sale (Exhibit E) in favor of
Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang is not, they contend, an invalidating factor since
what Don Fabian sold under Exhibit E did not extend beyond his conjugal share
thereon.
Just like the issue of the nullity of the three deeds of absolute sale (Exhibits
C, D, and E) heretofore discussed, we agree with the determination of the RTC and
CA as to the invalidity of the donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula M. Bayan. We
need not repeat the reasons for such determination, except the most basic. We refer
to the authority of the person who executed the deed of donation. As it were, the
widow of Benjamin, Nakila, signed the deed of donation. She, however, cannot
give consent to the donation as she has no disposable right thereto. The legal
maxim nemo dat quod non habet[40] applies to this instance as Nakila only has
usufructuary right equal to the share of her children under Art. 834 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889. Besides, Nakila signed the deed of donation in her name and
not in the name of her children who are the heirs in representation of their father,
Benjamin. Lest it be overlooked, the then minor children were not under the legal
guardianship of Nakila, a situation which thus disqualifies her from signing on
their behalf.
The fact that nobody objected to the donation is of little consequence, for as
the CA aptly observed, The circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to
ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid character of such contract. It is
axiomatic that void contracts cannot be the subject of ratification, either express or
implied.[41]
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 113199 is DENIED for lack of

merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution dated March 31, 1992 and December
16, 1993, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 are
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo (G.R. No. 113199), pp. 66-172. Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now a retired member
of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Serafin E. Camilon and Jorge S. Imperial (both retired).
[2]
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 999-1092.
[3]
Exhibit A-9, exhibits folder, p. 16.
[4]
Exhibit A-8, id. at 11-15.
[5]
Exhibit A-10, id. at 17.
[6]
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 2-4.
[7]
Id. at 8-9.
[8]
Id. at 677.
[9]
Id. at 799-826.
[10]
Supra note 2, at 1076-1092.
[11]
Exhibits C, D, and E, exhibits folder, pp. 31, 39, 56-57.
[12]
Exhibit F, id. at 63.
[13]
Supra note 1, at 170-172.
[14]
Exhibit K-1, exhibits folder, p. 137.
[15]
Rollo (G.R. No. 113199), p. 194.
[16]
Rollo (G.R. No. 105608), p. 227.
[17]
Id. at 353.
[18]
Id. at 498.
[19]
Rollo (G.R. No. 113199), pp. 202-267.
[20]
Id. at 311-425.
[21]
Id. at 455-456.
[22]
Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot, G.R. No. 132518, March 28, 2000, 329 SCRA 78, 88-89; citing Sta. Maria v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 27549, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 351 and Medina v. Asistio, Jr., G.R. No. 75450,
November 8, 1990, 191 SCRA 218, 223-224.
[23]
Rollo (G.R. No. 113199), p. 140.
[24]
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years
shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
[25]
Art. 1116. Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws
previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein required from prescription
should elapse, the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former laws a longer period might be
required.
[26]
98 Phil. 55 (1955).
[27]
Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 227, 239.
[28]
Art. 777 of the Civil Code pertinently provides: The rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent.
[29]
See Heirs of Flores Restar v. Heirs of Dolores R. Chichon, G.R. No. 161720, November 22, 2005, 475
SCRA 731.
[30]
Art. 856 of the Civil Code pertinently provides: A voluntary heir who dies before the testator transmits
nothing to his heirs.
A compulsory heir who dies before the testator, a person incapacitated to succeed, and one who renounces
the inheritance, shall transmit no right to his own heirs except in cases expressly provided for in this Code.
(Emphasis ours.)
[31]
Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857, 862 (1920) and Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 121157, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 601, 608.
[32]
Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real
rights by prescription.
[33]
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
[34]
No. L-15924, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 515.
[35]
Id. at 519-520.
[36]
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC, No. L-80609, August 23, 1988, 164 SCRA 671, 681.
[37]
Samala v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128628, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 535.
[38]
National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals, No. L-50877, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 777, 783.
[39]
Latchme Motomull v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 45302, July 24, 1990, 187 SCRA 743, 754; citing Alger
Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34298, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 43 and Gayos v. Gayos, No. L-
27812, September 26, 1975, 67 SCRA 146.
[40]
One cannot give what one does not have.
[41]
Rollo (G.R. No. 113199), pp. 149-150.

Supreme Court Rules on Filing Separate Income Tax Declarations for Married Couples

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Supreme Court Rules on Filing Separate Income Tax Declarations for Married Couples

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-31088 December 3, 1929

MIGUEL J. OSSORIO, plaintiff-appellant,

Antonio Sanz for appellant.

The facts are stated in the following stipulations:

"INCOME TAX RECEIPT

"ASSESSMENT NO. 3211

"DON MIGUEL J. OSSORIO

"Tax due as per return ................................................................... P59,928.29

The allegations admitted in paragraph I of this stipulation of facts are as follows:

Judgment without express award of costs.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FRANCISCO MUOZ, JR., G.R. No. 156125

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner

Subject of the present case is a seventy-seven (77)-square meter residential

On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee,

In the RTC, the respondents presented the results of the scientific

The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced evidence on the paraphernal

THE RTC RULING

When the CA denied[26] the subsequent motion for reconsideration,[27] the

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS

The respondents submit that it is unnecessary to compare the respective

The CA misapplied Article 158 of the

We cannot subscribe to the CAs misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the

Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of

Sale or Equitable Mortgage?

For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Article 1602 of

Contract is an equitable mortgage

First, the respondents remained in possession as lessees of the subject

That the petitioner advanced the sum of P200,000.00 to Erlinda is

We cannot sustain the ballooned obligation of P384,660.00, claimed in the

In Lustan v. CA,[55] where we established the reciprocal obligations of the

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby DENY the present

2. The petitioner is obligated to RECONVEY to the respondents the

Costs against the petitioner.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Republic of the Philippines

CARPIO, J., Chairperson

1. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-G of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995

2. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-D of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995

3. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-E of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995

4. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-H of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995

5. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3815-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-227224

7. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,

8. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,

9. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,

Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio

On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale,

On 14 December 2007, the RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing

xxx(T)he case under Special Proceedings No. 5185 remains pending in

Petitioners now come to us on a Rule 45 Petition, arguing that the probate

Ruling of the Court

The probate court has jurisdiction to

It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved

As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed

Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or

Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or

While it is true that a probate courts determination of ownership over properties

A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate