BENIGNO AQUINO, JR. VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
62 SCRA 275 Political Law De Jure vs De Facto Government
Marcos as a De Jure President Under the 1973 Constitution
In January 1975, a petition for prohibition was filed to seek the
nullification of some Presidential Decrees issued by then President
Ferdinand Marcos. It was alleged that Marcos does not hold any legal
office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935
Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to
issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Marcos government is a lawful
government.
HELD: Yes. First of, this is actually a quo warranto proceedings and
Benigno Aquino, Jr. et al, have no legal personality to sue because
they have no claim to the office of the president. Only the Solicitor
General or the person who asserts title to the same office can legally
file such a quo warranto petition.
On the issue at bar, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of Martial
Law Proclamation No. 1081 issued on September 22, 1972 by
President Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance
of said proclamation pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; that the
factual bases (the circumstances of lawlessness then present) had
not disappeared but had even been exacerbated; that the question as
to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has been foreclosed by
Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.
Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires; can
continue in office beyond 1973. While his term of office under the
1935 Constitution should have terminated on December 30, 1973, by
the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people
expressly authorized him to continue in office even beyond 1973
under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on January 17,
1973 by the sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he
initiated under Martial Law; and as aforestated, as this was the
decision of the people, in whom sovereignty resides . . . and all
government authority emanates . . ., it is therefore beyond the scope
of judicial inquiry. The logical consequence therefore is that President
Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic of the Philippines.
BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D.
HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA,
TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER
CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of
Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the rightto privacy,
which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men."
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz :(1)it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We
grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308
was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January
22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed
the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torresand the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, arecharged
with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued
a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.
Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O.
No. 308
Ruling: YES
Rationale: As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the
threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of thepetitioner and
the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver
that petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner
Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner
is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue
that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.
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4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service
InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of
the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSISfunds to
implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition
at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of
A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O.
No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not
premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal
defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early
as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS)
caused the publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the
National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary
Torres has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and
the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national
identificationsystem.All signals from the respondents show their
unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait
forthe formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In
this light, the dissenters insistence that wetighten the rule on standing
is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an
importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right.
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate
approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee
submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep.
Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum.
But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for
the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The
Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared:
There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair
and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already
been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill
was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed
in violation of the rules of the House
Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in
character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
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Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily
judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those
of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of
the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is
not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already
been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum.
The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when
the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., PETITIONER,VS. THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic corporation,
primarily engaged in themanufacture of wheat flour, and produces
pollard (darak) and bran (ipa) in the process of milling.
During the period from December, 1963 to July, 1964, inclusive,
petitioner exported Pollardand/or bran which was loaded from lighters
alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade whileanchored near the
breakwater
The respondent assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues
on the said exportations in thesum of P7,948.00, which assessment
was paid by petitioner under protest.
According to the petitioner,products of the Philippines found in
Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, excludes bran (ipa) and
pollard (darak) because they are merely waste from theproduction of
flour.
The main contention before respondent Court of petitioner was "that
in as much as nogovernment or private wharves or government
facilities were utilized in exporting the pollardand/or bran, the
collection of wharfage dues is contrary to law.
Respondent Commissioner of Customs said that petitioner was
liable for wharfage dues uponreceipt or discharge of the exported
goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of thenon-use
of government-owned or private wharves.
ISSUE: Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in
accordance with law.
RULING: The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit:
"There shall be levied, collected andpaid on all articles imported or
brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines
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exceptcoal, lumber, creosoted and other pressure treated materials as
well as other minor forest products,cement, guano natural rock
asphalt, the minerals and ores of base metals (e.g., copper, lead,
zinc, iron,chromite manganese, magnesite and steel), and sugar
molasses exported from the Philippines, a chargeof two pesos per
gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage xxx"One category refers to
what is imported. The other mentions products of the Philippines that
areexported. Even without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite
obvious that as long as the goods areproduced in the country, they fall
within the terms of the above section.The first and fundamental duty
of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction
andinterpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequatewithout them. The law is clear;
it must be obeyed.The objective of the act must be carried out. Even if
there be doubt as to the meaning of thelanguage employed, the
interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained.
If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same
desire to be excluded from theoperation of the Tariff and Customs
Code would likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It
isdesirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue restriction of
the coverage of the Act be kept closed.Otherwise, the end result
would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative mandate.
The decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27,
1967 is affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
PESIGAN VS. ANGELES
FACTS: Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao
dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 carabaos
and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health
certificate, permit to transport, and certificate of inspection issued to
them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial commander and
constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were
negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were
confiscated by private respondents, Police Station Commander Lt.
Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation
was based on Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of
carabaos from one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr
Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners
filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages, against private
respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in Daet and later
transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause
of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in
the Official Gazette.
HELD: Said executive order should not be enforced against the
Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal
regulation published more than two months later in the Official
Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes
circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
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ARTURO TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law.
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate
from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article
6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197
and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not
complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate
passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred
that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out
its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill
remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text
(only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino
and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge,
holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the
Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version
originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according
to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note
also that there were several instances before where Senate passed
its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue
and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by
substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino
concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would
make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what
has been done.
TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS:Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines,
Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association) seek
reconsideration of the Courts previous ruling dismissing the petitions
filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Petitioners contend that the R.A. did
not originate exclusively in the HoR as required by Article 6, Section
24 of the Constitution. The Senate allegedly did not pass it onsecond
and third readings, instead passing its own version. Petitioners
contend that it shouldhave amended the House bill by striking out the
text of the bill and substituting it with the textof its own bill, so as to
conform with the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the R.A. is unconstitutional for having originated from
the Senate, and not the HoR.
HELD: Petition is unmeritorious. The enactment of the Senate bill has
not been the first instance where the Senate, in the exercise of its
power to propose amendments to bills (required to originate in the
House), passed its own version. An amendment by substitution
(striking out the text and substituting it), as urged by petitioners,
concerns a mere matter of form, and considering the petitioner has
not shown what substantial difference it would make if Senate applied
such substitution in the case, it cannot be applied to the case at bar.
While the aforementioned Constitutional provision states that bills
must originate exclusively in the HoR, it also adds, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments. The Senate may then
propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. Petitioners erred
in assuming the Senate version to be an independent and distinct bill.
Without the House bill, Senate could not have enacted the Senate bill,
as the latter was a mere amendment of the former. As such, it did not
have to pass the Senate on second and third readings. Petitioners
question the signing of the President on both bills, to support their
contention that such are separate and distinct. The President certified
the bills separately only because the certification had to be made of
the version of the same revenue bill which AT THE MOMENT was
being considered. Petitioners question the power of the Conference
Committee to insert new provisions. The jurisdiction of the conference
committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate
and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision, given that
such are germane to the subject of the conference, and that the
respective houses of Congress subsequently approve its report.
Petitioner PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the
withdrawal of its exemption from VAT is not expressed in the title of
the law, thereby violating the Constitution. The Court believes that the
title of the R.A. satisfies the Constitutional Requirement.
5
MIRASOL VS CA
Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine
National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture
FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols
signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops,
and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage
empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply
the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing
Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated
for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The
decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be
remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more
than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an
accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to
avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from
their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their
due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to
PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid
amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds,
insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their
outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that
under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said
law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the
National Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific
performance, and damages against PNB.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a
statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where
the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the
Trial Court.
(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are
unconstitutional.
(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential
decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial
Courts.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to
enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention
in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To
deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to
depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to
petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to
actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule
itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just
actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the
words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all
actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree,
order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances
are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition
against the taking of private property without just compensation.
Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise
of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before
the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging
the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.
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MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS
Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant
to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September
1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as
the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS
dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers
check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to
accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of
the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.
Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII
Section 10, are self-executing.
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.
Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of
its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional
provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the
rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The
omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was
not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily
mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions
have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly
upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments,
and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one
more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words
the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
7
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the
cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence
in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has
become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it
was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the
granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially
on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be
made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the
latter shall be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation,
the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share
of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of
Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the
necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
HERMINIO ASTORGA VS ANTONIO VILLEGAS
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to
the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as
well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act
No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall
five members of the city police force who had been assigned to then
Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then
filed a petition for Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas
et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the
provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas
denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights
and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said
law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said
law passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No.
9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on
Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then
Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill
was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such
deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which
were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent
back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter.
The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA
4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the
Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the
President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version
that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended
by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact,
the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew
and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the
withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the
statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding
officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
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HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress both houses. Constitution does not even provide that the presiding
is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that officer should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President
the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this
case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill
No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both
Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of
this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked
to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the
Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC
also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was
never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would
be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body. The lawmaking
process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses
and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any
defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the
approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers
that is essential. Because the attestation of the presiding officers of
Congress is not conclusive proof of a bills due enactment. The
Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the President and the
Senate Presidents' signatures from RA 4065 or House Bill 9266
,therefore it did not become a law. Senate President declared that his
signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification
that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the Senate. This declaration should be
accorded greater respect than the attestation that it invalidated.
Certification that was made by the presiding officer is merely a mode
of authentication. The essential thing is the approval of congress and
not the signature of the presiding officers. Function of attestation is
not approval because a bill is considered approved after it has passed

9
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., VS. SOCIAL SECURITY that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication
COMMISSION, in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. Whereas if it renders an
opinion or a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law.
Facts: The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on Administrative interpretation of law is at best merely advisory for it is
October 15, 1958 requiring all employers in computing premiums to the courts that finally determine what the law means.
include employees remuneration all bonuses and overtime time pay,
as well as the cash value of other media remuneration. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
The petitioner (Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest against the
circular as it is contrary to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7,
1957. Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the
computation of the employers and the employees respective monthly
premium contributions. The counsel questioned the validity of the
circular Social Security Commission overruled the objections Victorias
Miller Company Inc. comes to court on appeal

Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as

contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the
Social Security Commission to adopt, amend and repeal subject to
the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act

Held: Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines

compensation as: All remuneration for employment include the cash
value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash.
Except: that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received
during the month; bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and
dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make,
although not legally required to do so.

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of compensation to: (f)
Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash
value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except
that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the
month.

Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the employers and employees

concerned with the interpretation of the law as amended which was
Social Security Commissions duty to enforce. The Commission
simply stated their opinion as to how the law should be construed and

10
ENRIQUE MORALES VS ABELARDO SUBIDO
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a
city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelors degree.
Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police
Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his
career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present
position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief, Morales was
designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time,
given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of
Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved
the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his
appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil
service eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead, Subido
certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked
Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency.
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he
holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of learning
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city
with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or
any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed
Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has
served the police department of a city can be qualified for said
office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being
deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he
holds a bachelors degree and has served either in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate
who has served the police department of a city or who has served as
officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was
actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the
conference committee the only change made in the provision was the
insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record. Morales went on to support his case by producing
copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which
according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill
division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill
being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill,
thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the
matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of
the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it
is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of
Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what
really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of
their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what
actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent
impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases
the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain
matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on
the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative
act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the
journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not
currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not
now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not
expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill
prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
11
RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of
Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to
remove their residence from their native habitat and to established
themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro,
and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped.
Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that
end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The
Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of
very low culture.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan,
solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for
habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of
the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found
is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are
being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the
doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine
whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is
optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as
circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the
provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed
the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be
given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was
intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it
was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical
area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being
reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where
they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated
among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen
is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of
due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a
law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of
a class.
12