PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
1. Hilario v Salvador; G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005.
[G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005]
CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR,
LINA and PRESCILLA, all surnamed HILARIO, petitioners, vs. ALLAN T.
SALVADOR, respondent.
HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR
and VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM, respondents-intervenors.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737
as well as its Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of the
said decision.
The Antecedents
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla,
all surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against private respondent Allan T. Salvador.
They alleged therein, inter alia, as follows:
2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo
Salvador of a parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at
Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the hereditary
share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single,
and which adjudication was known by the plaintiffs[] fathers co-heirs;
3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed
materials on the property of the plaintiffs father without the knowledge of the
herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest;
4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises
but the latter manifested that he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their
grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;
5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the
matter to the Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the
CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached as ANNEX B;
6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has
caused the plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety
and sleepless nights;
7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to
engage the services of a lawyer.[3]
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in
their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic),
an order be issued for the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the
plaintiffs the occupied property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:
a. actual damages, as follows:
a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the
case amounting to P1,500.00 and for the subsequent attendance to the
hearing of this case at P1,500.00 each schedule;
a.2. attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and P500.00 for every court
appearance;
b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the
Honorable Court to determine; and
c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.[4]
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7691.[5] He averred that
(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;
(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of
land referred to as the subject-matter of this action;
both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the
Court where the case is filed. In this case, however, the assessed value of the
land in question is totally absent in the allegations of the complaint and there
is nothing in the relief prayed for which can be picked-up for determining the
Courts jurisdiction as provided by law.
In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading
between the lines, that the assessed value of the land in question cannot
exceed P20,000.00 and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Court of Romblon and should have been filed before said Court rather
than before the RTC. [6]
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
The petitioners opposed the motion.[7] They contended that the RTC had
jurisdiction over the action since the court can take judicial notice of the market
value of the property in question, which was P200.00 per square meter and
considering that the property was 14,797 square meters, more or less, the total
value thereof is P3,500,000.00. Besides, according to the petitioners, the
motion to dismiss was premature and the proper time to interpose it is when
the [petitioners] introduced evidence that the land is of such value.
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8] denying the motion to
dismiss, holding that the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and
therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended.
After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his
answer with counterclaim.[9] Traversing the material allegations of the
complaint, he contended that the petitioners had no cause of action against
him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his
grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-
Salvador.
On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-
Intervention[10] making common cause with the private respondent. On her
own motion, however, Virginia Salvador was dropped as intervenor.[11]
During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A
showing that in 1991 the property had an assessed value of P5,950.00.[12]
On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the
petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:
Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the
occupied property; and
Dismissing defendants counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor
Salvador appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on May
23, 2003 reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for want
of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and
the case DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refilling in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of
ownership and possession of real property. Absent any allegation in the
complaint of the assessed value of the property, the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the action, conformably to Section 33[15]
of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which
the appellate court denied.[16] Hence, they filed the instant petition, with the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE, ACCION
REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON, AND
NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE REFILING OF THE CASE IN THE
[PROPER] COURT, INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS
BASED ON THE COMPLETE RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE SAID
APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT.[17]
The Ruling of the Court
The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the
action of the petitioners, the plaintiffs in the RTC, against the private
respondent, who was the defendant therein.
The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an
accion reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus,
regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction
falls within the said court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in their
opposition to respondents motion to dismiss, they made mention of the
increase in the assessed value of the land in question in the amount of P3.5
million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that their action is also one for
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
damages exceeding P20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691.
The petition has no merit.
It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations
of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect
when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
some or all of the claims asserted therein.[18] The caption of the complaint is
not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the
court depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties or
to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA
that the action of the petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. We
find and so rule that the action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or
one for the recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof.
An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of
possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership
and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion
publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is
also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after
the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty.[19]
The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a
claim of ownership over the property. They allege that they are co-owners
thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that the private
respondent, who was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989
without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands
for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate the property
and restore possession thereof to them.
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No.
7691 was already in effect. Section 33(3) of the law provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value
of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value
of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.
Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of
land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the
market value thereof. The assessed value of real property is the fair market
value of the real property multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous
to taxable value.[20] The fair market value is the price at which a property may
be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who
is not compelled to buy.
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an
allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of the
complaint.[21] The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market
value of lands.[22] Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed
value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the
MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax
Declaration No. 8590-A, showing that the assessed value of the property in
1991 was P5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in
evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property
when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed
value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not
the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case
involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less
than P20,000.00.[23]
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CAs disquisition:
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA
7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For properties
in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds
P20,000, and the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value
can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property
is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the
most recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees
is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5
million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is
irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount
in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and
as appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which
has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the
court a quo.[24]
It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the
property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the
proper government agency.[25]
Unavailing also is the petitioners argumentation that since the complaint,
likewise, seeks the recovery of damages exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC
had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination of the
jurisdictional amount the demand for interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs. This Court issued Administrative
Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No.
7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes
of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.
Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended, which states:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of
the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00).
The said provision is applicable only to all other cases other than an action
involving title to, or possession of real property in which the assessed value is
the controlling factor in determining the courts jurisdiction. The said damages
are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for
recovery of possession of real property.[26]
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the
proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The
complaint should perforce be dismissed.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
2. Sampayang v CA; G.R. No. 156360; January 14, 2005.
[G.R. No. 156360. January 14, 2005]
CESAR SAMPAYAN, petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, CRISPULO VASQUEZ and FLORENCIA VASQUEZ GILSANO,
respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this verified petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner Cesar Sampayan seeks the annulment and setting aside of
the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43557, to
wit:
1. Decision dated May 16, 2002, denying his petition for review and affirming
an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Agusan del Sur, Branch VII,
which in turn reversed on appeal a favorable judgment of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur in a forcible entry
case thereat commenced against him by herein private respondents, the
brother-and-sister Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano; and
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
2. Resolution dated November 7, 2002, which denied his motion for
reconsideration.
From the pleadings and memoranda respectively filed by the parties, the Court
gathers the following factual antecedents:
On July 8, 1992, in the MCTC of Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, the
siblings Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed complaint for
forcible entry against Cesar Sampayan for allegedly having entered and
occupied a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1959, PLS-225, and built a
house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority, the entry having
been supposedly effected through strategy and stealth.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs (now private respondents), substantially
alleged that their mother Cristita Quita was the owner and actual possessor of
Lot No. 1959; that after their mothers death on January 11, 1984, they became
co-owners pro-indiviso and lawful possessors of the same lot; that on June 1,
1992, while they were temporarily absent from the lot in question, defendant
Cesar Sampayan, through strategy and stealth, entered the lot and built a
house thereon, to their exclusion; and that, despite their repeated demands for
Sampayan to vacate the lot and surrender the possession thereof to them, the
latter failed and refused to do so.
In his answer, defendant Sampayan denied the material allegations of the
complaint and averred that neither the plaintiffs nor their mother have ever
been in possession of Lot No. 1959 and that he does not even know plaintiffs
identities or their places of residence. He claimed that he did not enter the
subject lot by stealth or strategy because he asked and was given permission
therefor by Maria Ybaez, the overseer of the lots true owners, Mr. and Mrs.
Anastacio Terrado who were then temporarily residing in Cebu City for
business purposes. In the same answer, Sampayan alleged that the plaintiffs
claim has long prescribed for the reason that the lot in dispute had been
possessed and declared for taxation purposes by the spouses Felicisimo Oriol
and Concordia Balida-Oriol in 1960, and that in 1978, the Oriol spouses sold
one-half (1/2) of the lot to the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado, while
the other half, to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida in
1979. Both vendees, so Sampayan averred, have actually possessed the
respective portions purchased by them up to the present. He thus prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint.
In the ensuing proceedings following the joinder of issues, the plaintiffs, to
prove that they have been in actual possession of Lot No. 1959 when
defendant Sampayan effected his entry thereto, submitted in evidence the
following documents:
1. Tax Declaration No. 3180 in the name of Cristita Quita;
2. Certificate of Death showing the date of death of Cristita Quita on January
11, 1984;
3. Certificate issued by Fermina R. Labonete, Land Management Officer-III of
CENRO X-3-E, DENR-X-3-9, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur showing that Lot 1959,
PLS-225 is covered by a Miscellaneous Sales Application of Cristita Quita;
4. Affidavit of one Emiliano G. Gatillo to the effect that he was the one who
gave the lot in question to Cristita Quita sometime in 1957 and that since then
the latter had been occupying the lot;
Plaintiffs also filed a Supplemental Position Paper dated July 13, 1994 for the
purpose of showing that Cristita Quita is one of the oppositors in Cadastral
Case No. 149. Together with said position paper, they submitted a copy of the
Answer/Opposition earlier filed in Cadastral Case No. 149. In said cadastral
case, Cristita Quita was claiming Lot 1959, thus her name appeared in the list
of oppositors therein.
5. The decision in the said Cadastral Case No. 149 showing that the then Court
of First Instance of Agusan del Sur declared Lot No. 1959 as one of the lots
subject of the same cadastral case.
For his part, defendant Sampayan, to prove the allegations in his answer,
offered in evidence the following:
1. Tax Declaration No. A-11698 in the name of Felicisimo Oriol, which cancels
Tax Declaration 8103;
2. Tax Declaration No. GRB-01-930 in the name of Felicisimo Oriol which
cancels Tax Declaration No. A-11698;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land, dated April 30, 1979, executed by
Jesus Oriol for and in behalf of the spouses Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia
Balida-Oriol, conveying the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 1959 to the couple
Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida who possessed the one-half
(1/2) portion and introduced improvements thereon, such as coconut and
caimito trees;
4. Deed of Relinquishment of Rights of Portion of Land, executed by the
spouses Oriol in favor of the same couple Manolito Occida and Juliana
Sambale-Occida, to further strengthen the transfer of possession and
whatever possessory rights the Oriols had in the lot in question;
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
5. Deed of Absolute Sale of Land executed by Concordia Balida-Oriol with the
conformity of Teodosio Mosquito (another claimant), to prove that the other
half of Lot No. 1959 was sold in 1978 to Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado whose
overseer allowed Sampayan to enter and occupy the premises;
6. Protest filed with the CENRO, Agusan del Sur by the vendee Juliana
Sambale-Occida against the Miscellaneous Sales Application of Cristita Quita;
7. Affidavit of Dionesia Noynay attesting to the fact that she is residing in Lot
No. 1957, a lot adjacent to the lot in question, since 1960 up to the present. In
the same affidavit, Dionisia claimed that neither Cristita Quita, much less the
plaintiffs, had ever possessed Lot No. 1959. She claimed that it was the Occida
couple who possessed said lot and introduced improvements thereon; and
8. Affidavit of Juliana Occida and Maria Ybaez to show the impossibility of
plaintiffs possession of the same lot.
Meanwhile, on March 21, 1996, while the case was pending with the MCTC,
the presiding judge thereof personally conducted an ocular inspection of the
contested lot in the presence of the parties and/or their counsels. Among those
found in the area during the inspection are: the house of defendant Sampayan;
the dilapidated house of a certain Peter Siscon; and a portion of the house of
Macario Noynay, husband of Dionisia Noynay, one of Sampayans witnesses.
Based on his ocular findings, the judge concluded that the improvements he
saw in the premises could never have been introduced by the plaintiffs nor by
their mother Cristita Quita but by the vendees of the same lot. Reproduced by
petitioner Jose Sampayan in the instant petition as well as in the Memorandum
he subsequently filed with this Court, the MCTC judges findings and
observations during the ocular inspection, about which the herein private
respondents took no exception whatsoever, are hereunder quoted, as follows:
Noted inside the land are the house of the defendant, Cesar Sampayan, of
Peter Siscon, which appears to be dilapidated, and part of the house of
Macario Noynay which encroached to the land in question. Planted on the land
are five (5) coconut trees, fruit bearing, three (3) not fruit bearing coconut trees,
and three (3) star apple or caimito trees. Defendant Sampayan admitted that
he started occupying the land since 1992. It is admitted by the parties during
the ocular inspection that one-half (1/2) portion of the land was bought by a
certain Occida from certain Mr. and Mrs. Felicisimo Oriol.
The findings in the ocular inspection have confirmed the allegation of the
defendant that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by
planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in question.
Nothing can be seen on the land that plaintiffs had once upon a time been in
possession of the land. The allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-
interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since 1957,
openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is
a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence.
Clearly, from the appearance of the improvements introduced by the
predecessors-in-interest of the defendant, it is showed that they have been in
possession of the land for more than one (1) year. Hence, the action of the
plaintiffs, if any, is accion publiciana or plenaria de possession[1] (Emphasis
supplied).
In time, the MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the compliant for lack of
merit.
Therefrom, the plaintiffs appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Agusan
del Sur, which appeal was raffled to Branch VII thereof. In a decision dated
December 5, 1996, said court reversed that of the MCTC, taking note of the
fact that Cristita Quita was among the oppositors in Cadastral Case No. 149
and that she filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot. On the basis
of such finding, the RTC concluded that it was Cristita Quita, predecessor-in-
interest of the herein private respondents, who was in actual prior physical
possession of Lot No. 1959.
Unable to accept the RTC judgment, Sampayan went to the Court of Appeals
on a petition for review, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43557.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in the herein assailed
Decision dated May 16, 2002,[2] denied Sampayans petition. His motion for
reconsideration having been similarly denied by that court in its Resolution of
November 7, 2002,[3] Sampayan is now with us via the present recourse, it
being his submissions -
I.
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF BAYUGAN, AGUSAN DEL SUR,
HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, CONSIDERING THAT DURING THE
HEARING THEREOF IT WAS FOUND OUT BY THE SAID MUNICIPAL
COURT THAT ACCION PUBLICIANA OR PLENARIA DE POSESION, AND
NOT FORCIBLE ENTRY, IS THE PROPER ACTION;
II.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN PRIOR ACTUAL
POSSESSION IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND
CONSIDERING THAT THE POSSESSION TO BE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT,
CONSIST (SIC) IN THE EXERCISE OF DOMINIUM OVER IT, SUCH AS
FENCING, CULTIVATING OR OTHER UNMISTAKABLE ACTS OF
EXCLUSIVE CUSTODY AND CONTROL FACTS WHICH THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE NEVER DONE - IS CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
In the main, petitioner maintains that based on the pieces of evidence on
record, he had sufficiently proven his prior physical possession of the subject
lot. Upon this premise, he argues that private respondents complaint for
forcible entry has no leg to stand on, adding that the proper remedy available
to the latter is accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion which falls under the
original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and not of Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.
As we see it, the arguments put forward by the petitioner crystallize to one
pivotal question: will the complaint for forcible entry in this case prosper? To
resolve this, however, we must first determine as to who between the herein
parties was in prior actual physical possession of the subject lot at the time the
complaint was filed in the MCTC. For, as we have said in Gaza vs. Lim[5],
xxx In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior
possession of the land or building and that he was deprived thereof by means
of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. xxx
We emphasize, absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a
forcible entry case warrants the dismissal of his complaint.
Undoubtedly, the issue of prior physical possession is one of fact, and settled
is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark
on a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the parties during trial. Of
course, the rule admits of exceptions. So it is that in Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. vs. CA,[6] we wrote:
[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review,
the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties' during the
trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive
and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several
exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.
To our mind, exceptions (5) and (11) are present in this case.
However, before delving into the question of who as between the petitioner
and private respondents had prior physical possession of the subject lot, we
deem it best to first resolve the issue of whether or not the MCTC had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed in this case, an issue also raised by the
petitioner.
Relying on the conclusion of the MCTC that private respondents proper
remedy is accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion, and not forcible entry,
petitioner would deny the MCTCs jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner is in error.
In Sarmiento vs. CA[7], we held:
[t]o give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such
a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must
appear on the face of the complaint. x x x
Clear it is from the above that for the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a
forcible entry case, it is enough that the complaint avers the jurisdictional facts,
i.e. that the plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was deprived
thereof by the defendant through force, intimidation, threats, strategy and
stealth.[8] The complaint in this case makes such an averment. Hence, the
irrelevant circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing
rendered improper an action for forcible entry is of no moment and cannot
deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the case. The MCTC continues to
have that jurisdiction.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
We shall now address the more decisive question of prior physical possession.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence at hand, we find for the petitioner.
To begin with, we are at once confronted by the uncontested findings of the
MCTC judge himself during his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute
that what he saw thereat confirmed the allegations of the defendant [now
petitioner Sampayan] that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced
improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land
in question, adding that [N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had
once upon a time been in possession of the land, and categorically stating that
[T]he allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs
had been in possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively,
continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim,
unsupported by any evidence.
Then, too, there is the sworn affidavit of Dionesia Noynay to the effect that she
had been residing since 1960 onward on Lot No. 1957, the lot adjacent to Lot
No. 1959, and that neither the private respondents nor their mother had ever
possessed Lot No. 1959. Coming as it does from an immediate neighbor,
Dionesias statement commands great weight and respect. Incidentally, the
MCTC judge himself found during the ocular inspection that a portion of the
house of Macario Noynay, husband of Dionesia, protruded on Lot No. 1959.
We note that in the herein assailed decision, the Court of Appeals attached
much significance to the fact that private respondents mother Cristita Quita
was an oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149. We rule and so hold that the
mothers being an oppositor in said cadastral case does not, by itself, establish
prior physical possession because not all oppositors in cadastral cases are
actual possessors of the lots or lands subject thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Decision and
Resolution, respectively dated May 16, 2002 and November 7, 2002, of the
Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
3. Santos v Ayon; G.R. No. 137013; May 6, 2005.
[G.R. No. 137013. May 6, 2005]
RUBEN SANTOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES TONY AYON and MERCY
AYON, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 5, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No.
4735 and its Resolution[2] dated December 11, 1998 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The petition alleges that on November 6, 1996, Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed
with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City a
complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon,
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 3506-B-96.
In his complaint, petitioner averred that he is the registered owner of three lots
situated at Lanzona Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 108174, 108175, and 108176. Respondent
spouses are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-247792. The previous occupant of this property built a building
which straddled both the lots of the herein parties. Respondents have been
using the building as a warehouse.
Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, when he bought the
three lots, he informed respondents that the building occupies a portion of his
land. However, he allowed them to continue using the building. But in 1996,
he needed the entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that respondents
demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his property and turn
over to him their possession. But they refused. Instead, they continued
occupying the contested portion and even made improvements on the building.
The dispute was then referred to the barangay lupon, but the parties failed to
reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, on March 27, 1996, a certification
to file action was issued.
In their answer, respondents sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that
the court has no jurisdiction over it since there is no lessor-lessee relationship
between the parties. Respondents denied they were occupying petitioners
property by mere tolerance, claiming they own the contested portion and have
been occupying the same long before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985.
On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the latter, their successors-in-interest and other persons
acting in their behalf to vacate the portion of the subject properties and
peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff as well as
dismantle/remove the structures found thereon.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
Defendants are further ordered to pay reasonable value for the use and
occupation of the encroached area in the amount of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) a month beginning September 1996 and the subsequent months
thereafter until premises are vacated; to pay attorneys fees of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00); and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Davao City, in its
Decision dated February 12, 1998 in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirmed in
toto the MTCC judgment.[4] The RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that
respondents occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance.
Hence, when petitioner needed the same, he has the right to eject them
through court action.
Respondents then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition
for review. In its Decision dated October 5, 1988 now being challenged by
petitioner, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners proper remedy should
have been an accion publiciana before the RTC, not an action for unlawful
detainer, thus:
In this case, petitioners were already in possession of the premises in question
at the time private respondent bought three (3) lots at the Lanzona Subdivision
in 1985, a portion of which is occupied by a building being used by the former
as a bodega. Apart from private respondents bare claim, no evidence was
alluded to show that petitioners possession was tolerated by (his)
predecessor-in-interest. The fact that respondent might have tolerated
petitioners possession is not decisive. What matters for purposes of
determining the proper cause of action is the nature of petitioners possession
from its inception. And in this regard, the Court notes that the complaint itself
merely alleges that defendants-petitioners have been occupying a portion of
the above properties of the plaintiff for the past several years by virtue of the
tolerance of the plaintiff. Nowhere is it alleged that his predecessor likewise
tolerated petitioners possession of the premises. x x x.
Consequently, x x x, respondent should present his claim before the Regional
Trial Court in an accion publiciana and not before the Municipal Trial Court in
a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for unlawful detainer is ordered
DISMISSED.[5]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Appellate
Court in its Resolution dated December 11, 1998.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari ascribing to the Court of
Appeals the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN
DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER
SHOULD PRESENT HIS CLAIM BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA.
II
THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN
CONSONANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.
The sole issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error of law in holding that petitioners complaint is within the competence of
the RTC, not the MTCC.
Petitioner contends that it is not necessary that he has prior physical
possession of the questioned property before he could file an action for
unlawful detainer. He stresses that he tolerated respondents occupancy of the
portion in controversy until he needed it. After his demand that they vacate,
their continued possession became illegal. Hence, his action for unlawful
detainer before the MTCC is proper.
Respondents, in their comment, insisted that they have been in possession of
the disputed property even before petitioner purchased the same on April 10,
1985. Hence, he cannot claim that they were occupying the property by mere
tolerance because they were ahead in time in physical possession.
We sustain the petition.
It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter
is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the
defendant.[6] This rule is no different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer.[7] All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with
the proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall include not only the plea for
restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising
therefrom.[8] The said courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such cases
even if the defendants therein raises the question of ownership over the
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
litigated property in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.[9]
Section 1, Rule 70 on forcible entry and unlawful detainer of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, reads:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions
of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person
may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution
of such possession, together with damages and costs.
Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes
of action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover
possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is
illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an
action for recovery of possession from defendant whose possession of the
property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with
the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the
termination of his right thereunder.[10]
Petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96 is
properly within the competence of the MTCC. His pertinent allegations in the
complaint read:
4. That defendants (spouses) have constructed an extension of their
residential house as well as other structures and have been occupying a
portion of the above PROPERTIES of the plaintiff for the past several years by
virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff since at the time he has no need of the
property;
5. That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of 1996 and made
demands to the defendants to vacate and turn over the premises as well as
the removal (of) their structures found inside the PROPERTIES of plaintiff; that
without any justifiable reasons, defendants refused to vacate the portion of the
PROPERTIES occupied by them to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.
6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain of
Matina Crossing 74-A, Davao City for a possible settlement sometime in the
latter part of February 1996. The barangay case reached the Pangkat but no
settlement was had. Thereafter, a Certification To File Action dated March 27,
1996 was issued x x x;
x x x.[11] (underscoring ours)
Verily, petitioners allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an
unlawful detainer. We find no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over
petitioners complaint. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges
that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful
without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.[12] Here, there is an
allegation in petitioners complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion
of his property is by virtue of his tolerance. Petitioners cause of action for
unlawful detainer springs from respondents failure to vacate the questioned
premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom,
or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.
It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession
becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon
demand made by the owner. Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals[13] is
applicable in this case: A person who occupies the land of another at the latters
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47435 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 12, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97,
affirming the Decision dated July 31, 1997 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 2, Davao City in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
4. Ganila v CA; G.R. No. 150755; June 28, 2005.
[G.R. No. 150755. June 28, 2005]
RENE GANILA,* EDUARDO DUMADA-OG, SR., RAFAEL GANILA, JOSE
PASTRANA, LOURDES GANILA, FLORENTINO GANILA, SERAFIN
GANILA, LORETO ARELLANO, CONRADO GANILA, VIVENCIO ALVIOR,
EDUARDO GANTALA, AMPARO VILLANUEVA, ELEUTERIO SILVA,
ADELINA GANILA, FELIZARDO GANILA, SR., ENRIQUE GANILA,
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
ABRAHAM TANONG, EMILIO ALFARAS, JR., BAPTIST CHRISTIAN
LEARNING CENTER, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
VIOLETA C. HERRERA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated March 30, 2001 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58191, and its Resolution[2] dated October 18,
2001 denying the motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision denied the
petition to set aside the Resolution[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras, Branch 65, affirming the Order of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) for the 19 petitioners to vacate the contested parcel
of land.
The facts are as follows:
On March 19, 1997, private respondent Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment
Complaints[4] before the 16th MCTC, Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Valencia,
Jordan, Guimaras. Private respondent alleged that she owns Lot 1227 of the
Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras, with an area of 43,210 square meters;
that she inherited the lot from her parents; and that she only tolerated
petitioners to construct residential houses or other improvements on certain
portions of the lot without rental. Sometime in September or October 1996,
private respondent demanded that the petitioners vacate the lot and remove
their houses and other improvements thereon. Petitioners refused, despite
offer of money by way of assistance to them. After the barangay conciliation
failed, private respondent filed the complaints.
In their Answers,[5] eight[6] of the petitioners claimed that Lot 1227 was
formerly a shoreline which they developed when they constructed their
respective houses. Another eight[7] maintained that their houses stood on Lot
1229 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras. The other three[8] asserted
that Lot 1227 is a social forest area.
At the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to designate two geodetic
engineers as commissioners of the MCTC to conduct a relocation survey of
Lot 1227 and to identify who among the petitioners have houses within the
lot.[9]
The commissioners reported that: (1) the house of Henry Gabasa, defendant
in Civil Case No. 288-J, is almost outside Lot 1227; (2) the house of Ludovico
Amatorio, defendant in Civil Case No. 289-J, diagonally traversed the
boundary; and (3) the houses of the 19 petitioners are inside Lot 1227.[10]
Eight months after herein petitioners failure to comment on the manifestation
of private respondent to terminate the preliminary conference, the MCTC
terminated the preliminary conference.[11] Thereafter, petitioners counsel
Atty. Nelia Jesusa L. Gonzales failed to file her clients position papers and
affidavits, even after they sought a 30-day extension to file the same.[12]
Consequently, the MCTC decided the cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff whereby each of the twenty-one (21) defendants are hereby
ordered:
1. To vacate Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras;
2. To pay Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) per month from October, 1996 as
compensation for the use of the property until the same is vacated; and
3. To pay Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Petitioners appealed to the RTC, Branch 65, at Jordan, Guimaras, which
decided as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision in Civil Cases Nos. 0270-J,
0272-J, 0273-J, 0274-J, 0275-J, 0276-J, 0277-J, 0278-J, 0279-J, 0280-J,
0281-J, 0282-J, 0283-J, 0284-J, 0285-J, 0286-J, 0287-J, 0291-J and 0292-J
are hereby affirmed.
The decision of the court below in Civil Cases Nos. 0288-J and 0289-J are set
aside. Civil Cases Nos. 0288-J and 0289-J are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The RTC ruled that the evidence showed the better right of private respondent
to possess Lot 1227. Private respondents position paper, affidavit and tax
declaration supported her allegations. In addition, the commissioners report
and sketch plan showed that indeed petitioners occupy Lot 1227. On the other
hand, according to the RTC, the petitioners failed to present evidence which
would show that they are entitled to possess the lot.
Based on the sketch plan, the RTC dismissed the cases against Gabasa and
Amatorio since their houses occupy only a small area of Lot 1227. It declared
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
that Gabasa and Amatorio believed in good faith that the whole area they
occupied was part of the seashore.
The 19 petitioners, who were ordered to vacate the lot, filed a joint petition for
review with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied the petition.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration and filed an amended petition. The
Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the factual findings and conclusions
arrived at by the trial courts and denied the amended petition for lack of
merit.[15] It also denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners are now before us, on a petition for review, alleging that:
The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect and deference, committed
a reversible error in the interpretation/application of the law in the instant case
and in the appreciation of the facts and evidence presented. The Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it denied and dismissed the
petition filed by the petitioners.[16]
After considering the parties submissions, we find three basic issues: (1) Did
the MCTC err in taking jurisdiction over and deciding the cases? (2) Did the
RTC err in sustaining the MCTCs judgment? (3) Did the CA err in denying the
petition for review filed by the 19 petitioners ordered to be ejected?
Petitioners insist that private respondent should have filed an action to recover
possession de jure, not a mere complaint for ejectment, for two reasons. One,
they possessed Lot 1227 in good faith for more than 30 years in the concept
of owners. And two, there was no withholding of possession since private
respondent was not in prior possession of the lot.
Private respondent states in her Comment before us that the allegations in her
Complaints make out a clear case of unlawful detainer which is cognizable by
the MCTC. We are in agreement with her stance. There was no error in the
choice of the complainants remedy, a matter left to her determination as the
suitor. And the complaint itself is defined by the allegations therein, not the
allegations of the defendants.
At the outset, we note that petitioners question the MCTCs jurisdiction yet they
admit in their preliminary statement that the Complaints filed are indeed for
unlawful detainer, and that the only issue to be determined is mere physical
possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de
jure), much less ownership.[17]
While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation of possession,
they confuse the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful
detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not
necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual,
prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in
forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily
in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually
becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess.[18]
Thus, the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not
automatically entitle them to remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful
possession by the defendants does not arise at all in a suit for unlawful
detainer, simply because prior lawful possession by virtue of contract or other
reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in forcible entry where defendants, by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the prior
physical possessor of possession. Here there is no evidence to show that
petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts.
If only to stress the fundamental principles related to present controversy,
jurisdiction over unlawful detainer suits is vested in municipal trial courts.[19]
And in ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
allegations of the complaint.[20]
In this case for ejectment, private respondents allegations sufficiently present
a case of unlawful detainer. She alleged that (1) she owns Lot 1227; (2) she
tolerated petitioners to construct their houses thereon; (3) she withdrew her
tolerance; and (4) petitioners refused to heed her demand to vacate the lot.
The Complaints were also filed within one year from the date of her demand.
The cause of action for unlawful detainer between the parties springs from the
failure of petitioners to vacate the lot upon lawful demand of the private
respondent. When they refused to vacate the lot after her demand, petitioners
continued possession became unlawful. Her complaint for ejectment against
respondent, to put it simply, is not without sufficient basis.
Petitioners contention that private respondent should have filed an action to
recover possession de jure with the RTC is not supported by law or
jurisprudence. The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a
plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is
settled in our jurisprudence.
What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory
action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion
reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto.
An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the
two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real
property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the
plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or
the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make
up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.[21]
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
It is not up to defendants, now petitioners herein, to dictate upon plaintiff, now
the private respondent, what her initial recourse should be. Her choice of an
action for ejectment against so-called squatters is well within her rights.
Petitioners cite the case of Bayubay v. Court of Appeals,[22] and argue that
the MCTCs decision was without jurisdictional or legal basis because the
MCTC did not issue a preliminary conference order. They assert that the 10-
day period to file position papers and affidavits only starts after the parties had
received a preliminary conference order. They insist they were denied due
process when the MCTC decided the cases based merely on private
respondents Complaints and affidavit, without considering their Answers.
For her part, private respondent maintains that there was substantial
compliance with the rules in the MCTCs conduct of the preliminary conference,
hence there was no violation of due process nor disregard of its proper
jurisdiction.
Petitioners present contention was first raised only in their appeal to the RTC.
Raising it before the appellate tribunal is barred by estoppel.[23] They should
have raised it in the proceedings before the MCTC. In our view, this issue is a
mere afterthought, when the MCTC decided against them. Basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process require that as a rule an issue cannot be raised
by the petitioners for the first time on appeal.[24]
Besides, petitioners did not question initially the MCTCs Order dated February
19, 1999, when they moved for an extension of time to file their position papers
and affidavits. They wanted another 30 days on top of the 30 days set by the
MCTC, which strictly should have been 10 days only. In this regard, petitioners
could not claim that they were denied sufficient time to file their position papers
and affidavits before the trial court. Further, they cannot validly invoke our
ruling[25] in Bayubay, for in that case there was no order at all terminating the
preliminary conference and requiring the parties to submit position papers and
affidavits.
We note with dismay petitioners insistence that we order the MCTC to conduct
the requisite preliminary conference. The summary character of ejectment
suits will be disregarded if we allow petitioners to further delay this case by
allowing a second preliminary conference. Ejectment by way of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings, designed to provide
an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to
possession over the property involved. It is a timely procedure designed to
remedy the delay in the resolution of such cases.[26]
Lastly, petitioners aver that private respondent failed to prove her allegation of
ownership of Lot 1227 as it is only based on a tax declaration which is not an
evidence of ownership. They also claim that their possession of the lot was not
and could not be by mere tolerance. However, this is a factual matter best left
to the trial courts.
What we have now is sufficient evidence showing that private respondent has
a better right to possess Lot 1227. The commissioners report and sketch plan
show that the 19 petitioners occupy the lot, which corroborate private
respondents allegation and disprove petitioners defense that Lot 1227 is a
shoreline; or that Lot 1227 is a social forest area. While not a conclusive
evidence of ownership, private respondents tax declaration constitutes proof
that she has a claim of title over the lot. It has been held that:
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in
the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property
and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.[27]
The lower courts did not err in adjudicating the issue of possession. Mere
absence of title over the lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from
the parties in an ejectment case. Plainly stated, the trial court has validly
exercised its jurisdiction over the ejectment cases below. The policy behind
ejectment suits is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder, and
to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to
obtain what she claims is hers. The party deprived of possession must not take
the law into his or her own hands.[28] For their part, herein petitioners could
not be barred from defending themselves before the court adequately, as a
matter of law and right.
However, petitioners in their defense should show that they are entitled to
possess Lot 1227. If they had any evidence to prove their defenses, they
should have presented it to the MCTC with their position papers and affidavits.
But they ignored the courts order and missed the given opportunity to have
their defenses heard, the very essence of due process.[29] Their allegations
were not only unsubstantiated but were also disproved by the plaintiffs
evidence.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

In sum, we find no reversible error much less any grave abuse of discretion
committed by the Court of Appeals. A person who occupies the land of another
at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him.[30] His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of
lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.
In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession
is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.[31]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 2001 and its Resolution dated October
18, 2001 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
In a Decision[1] dated 6 January 1998, the Former First Division of the Court
of Appeals overturned the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the MTC
had no jurisdiction over the subject complaint for unlawful detainer. This
petition for review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid Court of Appeals
Decision.
The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 2376, before the MTC of Mandaue
City, Branch I. In the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership
of three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners likewise acknowledged respondent
Elizabeth Ongs ownership of the lots previous to theirs. On 26 January 1995,
Atty. Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote
respondents informing them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to
vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But respondents refused
to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners
alleged.

5. Ross Rica Sales Center v Sps Ong; G.R. No. 132197; August 16, Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had
2005. acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made
on 23 March 1995. In turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had
SECOND DIVISION acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale
ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, G.R. No. 132197 dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title
INC. and JUANITO KING & consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by
SONS, INC., Present: respondents in a complaint filed on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue
Petitioners, RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty.[2] Per record, this case is still
PUNO, J., pending resolution.
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment case on 24 April 1996, with the
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., decision ordering respondents to vacate the premises in question and to
TINGA, and peacefully turn over possession thereof to petitioners.
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
SPOUSES GERRY ONG and On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March 1997 a judgment affirming the MTCs
ELIZABETH ONG, Promulgated: decision in its entirety.
Respondents.
August 16, 2005 On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal. However, on the
following day, they filed a motion for reconsideration.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently gave due
course to respondents notice of appeal filed on 8 May 1997; denied their
DECISION motion for reconsideration dated 9 May 1997,[3] and granted petitioners
motion for immediate execution pending appeal.
TINGA, J.:
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and
treated as a Petition for Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had no
jurisdiction over said case as there was no contract between the parties,
express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful detainer.
Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside.
Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The principal issues raised before this Court are: (i) whether
the RTC decision has already become final and executory at the time the
petition for review was filed; (ii) whether the allegations in the complaint
constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC; and,
(iii) whether petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the possession of
the subject premises.
We resolve the first argument to be without merit.
The following sequence of events is undisputed:
(1) On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned
decision affirming the judgment of the MTC.
(2) On 28 April 1997, respondents received a copy of
the aforementioned decision.
(3) On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of
Appeal with the RTC.
(4) On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise with
the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned 1 March 1997
decision.
(5) On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue issued an
Order denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
(6) On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of
the aforementioned 23 June 1997 Order.
(7) On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court
of Appeals their motion for an additional period of ten (10) days within which
to file their Petition for Review.
(8) On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court
of Appeals their Petition for Review.
Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-
day period for appeal. They theorize that the period started running on 28 April
1995, the date of receipt of the RTC decision, and ended on 13 May 1997.
According to them, this reglementary period could not have been interrupted
by the filing on 9 May 1997 of the Motion for Reconsideration because of the
filing one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal. This Notice of Appeal dated 8
May 1997, albeit the wrong mode of appeal, expressly manifested their
intention to file a petition for review to either the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court.[4]
Petitioners further argue that respondents, after having filed the Notice of
Appeal which was given due course by the RTC, cannot take an inconsistent
stand such as filing a Motion for Reconsideration. Such filing, therefore, did
not toll the fifteen (15)-day period which started running from the date of receipt
of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on 13 May 1997.
Respondents, in their Comment,[5] submit that the filing of the Notice of Appeal
dated 8 May 1997 was improper, and as such did not produce any legal effect.
Therefore, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration immediately on the
following day cured this defect. The RTC refused to subscribe respondents
position. It justified the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground
that the respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal. The Order dated 23
June 1997 stated:
On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari filed by Defendants on May 8,
1997.
Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for Reconsideration.
Considering the Notice of Appeal filed earlier which the court hereby approves,
the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal being meritorious, is
GRANTED.[6] (Emphasis in the original.)
Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point
when it took cognizance of respondents position and reversed the RTC. But
does this necessarily mean that the RTC was correct when it declared that the
Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of Appeal, no
matter how erroneous the latter mode was?
Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. -- A party desiring to appeal from
a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may
file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees,
depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial
Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be
filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to
be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit
for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the
RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this
to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration
on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the
withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the
appellees brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective
Notice of Appeal.
Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration
and started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise
filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for
additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on
time.
Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz[7] that once a notice of
appeal is filed, it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for
reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the two cases are different.
De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule
122 of the Rules of Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a
decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected
upon filing of the notice of appeal.
In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is the proper
mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of
appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
Now on the second and more important issue raised by petitioners: whether
the Complaint satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful
detainer properly cognizable by the MTC.
The MTC considered itself as having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint
and disposed of the same in favor of petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by
the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts and found the
complaint to be one not for unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds,
namely: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of
possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is
no contract, express or implied, between the parties as would qualify the case
as one of unlawful detainer.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals.
The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material
allegations:
....
3. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T.
No. 36466 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is
covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City and
Lot No. 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the Register of Deeds
of Mandaue City, all situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of said Transfer
Certificate of Titles are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, and C respectively
and made an integral part hereof;
4. That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said
lots;
5. That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant Elizabeth
Ong and her husband and co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in the
house constructed on said lots;
6. That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel, wrote
defendants a letter informing them or their intent to use said lots and
demanded of them to vacate said lots within 30 days from receipt of said letter.
Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex D and made an integral part
thereof;
7. That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still
refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots
from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;
8. That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the
plaintiffs, plaintiffs have suffered damages in the form of unearned rentals in
the amount of P10,000.00 a month
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
. . . .[8]
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.[9]
Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners
possession was originally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration
of the right to possess by virtue of any express or implied contract.
The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract
as a requisite to qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the
various jurisprudence dealing on the matter.
In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals,[10] it was held that the allegation in the
complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to
make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for
unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily
employing the terminology of the law.[11]
Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession
on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other
source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right
and is being withheld by defendant.[12] In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of
Appeals,[13] we held that a simple allegation
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is
sufficient.
Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that:
. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse
to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from
plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;[14]
is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.
In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners
of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied
tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the former owners of the properties,
to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to respondents
asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents refused, thereby
depriving petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint
establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient
for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of
Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis.[15] But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec.
1, Rule 70[16] of the Rules of Court. The case doesid not provide for rigid
standards in the drafting of the ejectment complaint. The case of Co Tiamco
v. Diaz[17] justifies a more liberal approach, thus:
. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy.
Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve
perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible
and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully
avoided.[18]
Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case
involving the annulment of deed of sale and title over said property. Petitioners
know better than to question this in an ejectment proceeding, which brings us
to the nature of the action in this case.
Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the
action, it being an accion reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground that
petitioners were constantly claiming ownership over the lands in the guise of
filing an action for ejectment. In their Comment,[19] respondents maintain that
they occupy the subject lots as the legal owners. Petitioners, on the other hand,
are seeking recovery of possession under a claim of ownership which is
tantamount to recovery of possession based on alleged title to the lands, and
therefore is within the original jurisdiction of the RTC, so respondents
conclude.
This contention is not tenable.
The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real
property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right
of possession or possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is
material possession or possession de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer,
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
the question of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is
generally unessential.[20]
Neither the allegation in petitioners complaint for ejectment nor the defenses
thereto raised by respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion
reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners
did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming or obtaining
ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in their pleadings of the fact
of prior ownership by respondents does not constitute a recognition of
respondents present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the
necessary elements for a case of unlawful detainer, specifically the unlawful
withholding of possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to
recover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they
claim ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of
jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for
ejectment, the conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of ownership
by the defendant in an ejectment case will not therefore oust the municipal
court of its summary jurisdiction.[21] This Court in Ganadin
v. Ramos[22] stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of
possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party.
Therefore, the pending actions for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and
Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356
will not abate the ejectment case.
In Drilon v. Gaurana,[23] this Court ruled that the filing of an action for
reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of the deed of
sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible
entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while there
may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the
suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the
relief prayed for are not the same.[24]
In Oronce v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court held that the fact that respondents
had previously filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute
sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same
Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy
of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff. Consequently, an adjudication
made in an ejectment proceeding regarding the issue of ownership should be
regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing
doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or
material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and
not possession de jure.
The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez[26] when it ruled:
We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of
ownership over the lot in dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of
possession, although the issue of ownership is inseparably linked thereto. As
such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is
merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well,
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title
to the property, if and when such action is brought seasonably before the
proper forum.
The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a
collateral attack.
In Apostol v. Court of Appeals,[27] this Court had the occasion to clarify this:
. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled,
except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The
issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have
the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court
a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.[28]
With the conclusion of the second issue in favor of petitioners, there is no need
to discuss the third assignment of error which is related to the second issue.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 6 January 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
Decision dated 24
April 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
6. Peralta-Labrador v Bugarin; G.R. No. 165177; August 25, 2005.
On January 18, 1996, petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, docketed as Civil Case No. 328, with
the MTC of San Felipe, Zambales. She alleged that she is the owner of
Cadastral Lot No. 2650, with an area of 400 sq. m. located at Sitio Caarosipan,
Barangay Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales, having purchased the same in
1976 from spouses Artemio and Angela Pronto. In 1977, she was issued Tax
Declaration No. 10462 and paid the taxes due thereon.[6]
In 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways constructed a road
which traversed Cadastral Lot No. 2650 thereby separating 108 sq. m. from
the rest of petitioners lot, for which she was issued Tax Declaration No. 02-
2460R in 1991.[7]

FIRST DIVISION Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the
108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of petitioner.
Hence, on January 18, 1996, she instituted a complaint for recovery of
LILIA V. PERALTA-LABRADOR, G.R. No. 165177 possession and ownership against respondent.
Petitioner,
Present: In his Answer with Counterclaims,[8] respondent contended that the area
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473 square meter lot, covered by the
- versus - Quisumbing, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13011; and that he has been in
Ynares-Santiago, continuous possession and occupation thereof since 1955. In his Amended
Carpio, and Answer with Counterclaim,[9] however, respondent failed to allege that the
Azcuna, JJ. questioned lot is covered by the OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that
SILVERIO BUGARIN, he planted fruit bearing trees in the property. Respondent further pleaded the
substituted by his widow, Promulgated: defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription.
CONSOLACION BUGARIN,[1]
Respondent. August 25, 2005 On May 16, 1999, the court a quo ruled in favor of respondent declaring him
as the owner of the controverted lot on the basis of the OCT No. P-13011. The
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x complaint was dismissed for failure of petitioner to prove prior physical
possession and ownership thereof. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
DECISION
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered and for failure on the
part of the plaintiff to establish the preponderance of evidence of prior actual
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: physical possession and present title over the lot in her favor, let the instant
case be ordered DISMISSED, and the defendant be awarded the rightful
possession and ownership of the same and the plaintiff is hereby ordered to
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the March 12, 2004 pay FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS as reasonable Attorneys fee
decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57475, which affirmed and FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as appearance fee plus costs.
with modification the January 26, 2000 judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court SO ORDERED.[10]
(RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. RTC-1590-I, which in
turn affirmed the decision[4] dated May 16, 1999 of the Municipal Trial Court The RTC affirmed the assailed decision,[11] hence petitioner filed a petition for
(MTC) of San Felipe, Zambales, in Civil Case No. 328, and its September 6, review before the Court of Appeals which was however denied for insufficiency
2004 resolution[5] denying reconsideration thereof. of evidence to prove ownership or prior actual physical possession. The
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
appellate court deleted the monetary awards in favor of respondent as well as
the declaration of the MTC that respondent is the owner of the questioned lot
on the ground that the OCT No. P-13011, relied upon by said court was not
formally offered in evidence, hence, cannot be considered by the court. The
decretal portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing discussion, the instant petition is
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated January 26,
2000, in Civil Case No. RTC 1590 I of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
71, Iba, Zambales, and Decision dated May 16, 1999, in Civil Case No. 328 of
the Municipal Trial Court of San Felipe, Zambales are MODIFIED by deleting
the declaration of ownership as to the disputed 108 square meters and the
monetary award in favor of respondent Silverio Bugarin. However, the
dismissal of the complaint is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied. Hence the
instant petition.
Pertinent portion of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth, may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation
or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution
of such possession, together with the damages and costs. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Lopez v. David Jr.,[13] it was held that an action for forcible entry is a
quieting process and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in pursuance of
the summary nature of the action. Thus, we have nullified proceedings in the
MTCs when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded one year. After the
lapse of the one year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an
accion publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary
civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration
of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty independently of title. Likewise, the
case may be instituted before the same court as an accion reivindicatoria,
which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.[14]
Corrollarily, jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the
complaint. Thus, in ascertaining whether or not the action falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and
the character of the relief sought are to be examined.[15]
In the instant case, petitioners complaint alleges that:
2. That plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of land denominated as Cadastral lot
No. 2650, San Felipe Cadastre, situated at sitio Caarosipan, Barangay
Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales which she bought in 1976 from Spouses
Artemio Pronto and Angela Merano when she was still a widow, with the
following boundaries: North, Alipio Abad, East, Antonio Cueva, South, Juan
Borja, and West, Old Provincial Road, containing an area of 108 square
meters, declared under Tax Declaration No. 002-1860R and assessed at
P1,120.00;
3. That plaintiff has been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse as well
as notorious possession of the said lot and in the concept of an owner since
she [acquired] it in 1976 until the time when defendant took possession
forcibly, two years ago;
4. That in or before 1990 the land was traversed by a new National Highway
and the land was segregated from a bigger portion of the land, the western
portion is now the land in question and since the new provincial road which
traversed the whole land of the plaintiff, the old highway which is west of Lot
2650 shall belong to the plaintiff in compensation of the portion of her lot
traversed by the new highway, said old highway is also taken by defendant
unlawfully;[16]
It is clear that petitioners averment make out a case for forcible entry because
she alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and
the forcible entry thereon by respondent. Considering her allegation that the
unlawful possession of respondent occurred two years[17] prior to the filing of
the complaint on January 18, 1996, the cause of action for forcible entry has
prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. Petitioners
complaint therefore should have been filed with the proper RTC.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the
parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent.[18]
Hence, the failure of respondent to insist on the defenses of lack of cause of
action and prescription stated in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim will
not vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the case.
On this point, the Court held in Bongato v. Malvar[19] that:
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

In the same vein, ownership of the lot in question cannot be awarded to

It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the respondent considering that OCT No. P-13011,[23] and the Survey Plan[24]
restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such were not formally offered in evidence. While the issue of ownership may be
process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible passed upon in ejectment cases for the sole purpose of determining the nature
entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, of possession,[25] no evidence conclusively show that the lot in question is
when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from covered by said OCT No. P-13011 or any other title of respondent.
the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period,
the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, WHEREFORE, the May 16, 1999 decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San
which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or an accion Felipe, Zambales, the January 26, 2000 decision of the Regional Trial Court,
reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession. Branch 71, Iba, Zambales, and the March 12, 2004 decision of the Court of
Appeals, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction. The
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible complaint in Civil Case No. 328 is DISMISSED.
entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed the
Complaint for ejectment on July 10, 1992. Hence, even if Severo Malvar may SO ORDERED.
be the owner of the land, possession thereof cannot be wrested through a
summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who had been occupying it for more 7. Serina v Caballero; G.R. No. 127382; August 17, 2004.
than one (1) year. Respondents should have presented their suit before the
RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC SECOND DIVISION
in summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their cause of action for forcible
entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear
and decide it. DR. JESUS SERIA and G.R. No. 127382
ENRIQUETA SERIA
... (deceased), represented by
DR. JESUS SERIA, JR.,
Further, a courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived ANTONIO SERIA, VIOLETA Present:
by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. SERIA TAN, REYNALDO
A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of SERIA and EMMANUEL
the proceedings and even on appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of SERIA, PUNO, J., Chairman,
a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has Petitioners, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
been belatedly filed we likewise held in Bayog v. Natino[.] CALLEJO, SR.,
- versus - TINGA, and
Moreover, even if the MTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
complaint should still be dismissed because petitioner failed to prove that the VICTOR CABALLERO,
controverted 108 sq. m. lot is part of Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Petitioner TEODORO DONELA, OLIVER Promulgated:
admitted that she has never seen the Cadastral Map of San Felipe, Zambales, DONELA, COURT OF APPEALS,
and relied only on the Survey Notification Card[20] from the Bureau of and THE HONORABLE REGIONAL
Lands,[21] with a sketch of Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Said card, however, does TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20,
not reflect the 108 sq. m. lot subject of this case. Neither did petitioner cause MISAMIS ORIENTAL, August 17, 2004
the survey of Cadastral Lot No. 2650 after the construction of a new road to Respondents.
prove that the segregated portion on the western side is part thereof. Ei x--------------------------------------------------x
incumbit probotio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove.[22] Failing to discharge this burden, the dismissal of the complaint DECISION
is proper.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated August 23, 1996, affirming the dismissal of the complaint
for quieting of title, recovery of possession, and damages by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, in Civil Case No. 8716.
The Antecedents
On August 11, 1982, Dr. Jesus Seria and his wife, Enriqueta Seria filed a
Complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession, and damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents Victor
Caballero and his tenants, Teodoro Donela and Oliver Donela. When Dr. Seria
died on August 6, 1983, he was substituted by his children, petitioners Jesus,
Jr., Antonio, Violeta, Reynaldo and Emmanuel.[2]
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are the absolute owners
and have been in actual and constructive possession for thirty-five (35) years
of a parcel of land described as follows:
Lot No. 3533-A, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre
Tax Declaration No. 02161
Location - Mantadiao, Opol,
Misamis Oriental
Area - 2.5000 has.
Boundaries:
North - Alejo Seria
South - T. Sabornido
East - A. Seria & T. Sabornido
West - F. Caballero[3]
The petitioners averred that sometime in March 1982, they discovered that
respondent Caballero was claiming ownership over the said land and offering
it for sale or mortgage to third parties. They also discovered that the
respondents Donelas were occupying the land as tenants and caretakers of
the land. [4]
The petitioners claimed that their father, Dr. Seria, bought the land from Lucia
Vda. de Marbella who inherited it from her father, Ramon Neri.[5] They
presented a Deed of Sale[6] dated August 23, 1947 showing that Dr. Seria
bought 5 hectares of ricefield, bounded on the North by Raymundo Seria, on
the East by Teofilo Saburnido, on the South by Obdelio Caballero, on the West
by Obdullo Caballero, from Lucia Vda. de Marbella. Dr. Seria was issued Tax
Declaration No. 4029 allegedly for the said property. As indicated in the tax
declaration and subsequent tax declarations issued in the name of Dr. Seria,
they were issued for Cadastral Lot No. 3533 and covered a 2.5-hectare
ricefield with the same boundary owners as those in the complaint.[7] The
petitioners also averred that they regularly paid taxes thereon since 1947 up
to the present.[8]
In his answer, respondent Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner, and
had been in actual physical possession of the disputed land since time
immemorial. He averred that the disputed land is part of Cadastral Lot No.
3533, C-7 of the Cagayan Cadastre and originally owned by his grandfather,
Eustaquio Caballero.[9]
The respondents averred that Eustaquio Caballero declared the entire parcel
of land for tax purposes even before the war. Tax Declaration No. 2442 was
issued in lieu of the records that were destroyed during the war.
This tax declaration indicated that the 119,490 square-meter parcel of land
was located at Pontacon, Iponan, Cagayan de Oro City, bounded on North by
Rustico Dablio, on the East by J. Seria and T. Saburnido, on the South by
Victor Obsioma, and on the West by Victorino Caballero.[10]
Emiliana Ibarat, respondent Caballeros sister, testified that when Eustaquio
Caballero died in 1944, the land was divided among his three children, Vicenta,
Benita and Victorino, the father of respondent Caballero. Lot A, with an area
of 39,625 square meters, was given to Victorino, which was later inherited by
the respondent. Lot B, with an area of 71, 450 square meters, was given to
Benita; and Lot C, with only 7,938 square meters was given to Vicenta. Lots B
and C were, thereafter, sold to one Gaga Yasay. Because of the trouble
between the petitioners and the respondents, Yasay agreed to buy only a
portion of Lot A.[11]
The land was surveyed during the trial and it was determined that it now
consisted of only 23,373 square meters,[12] and not 25,000 square meters as
claimed by the petitioners. Gliceria Legaspi, respondent Caballeros other
sister, also testified that the disputed land was now bounded on the North by
Seria and Nangcas, on the East by Teofilo Saburnido, on the South by Gaga
Yasay, and on the West by Nangcas.[13]
The RTC rendered judgment[14] on January 21, 1992, dismissing the
complaint, and upholding the right of the respondents over the land. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant Victor
Caballero and against the plaintiffs herein, to wit:
1. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint with costs.
2. Ordering the defendant Victor Caballero as the absolute and
lawful owner and possessor of the land in question.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
3. Ordering the plaintiffs, their heirs, lawyers, servants or privies not
to disturb or molest the possession and ownership of Victor Caballero over the
land in question.
4. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay to defendant Victor Caballero, jointly
and severally the sum of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) pesos for expenses
of litigation, and THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) pesos for and as attorney's
fees having been compelled to retain the services of counsel to protect his
interest herein.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The trial court ruled that it was not clearly shown that the land bought by Dr.
Seria from Lucia Vda. de Marbella was the same land owned by Victor
Caballero, and that the petitioners failed to show that Lucia Vda. de Marbella
bought the land from Eustaquio Caballero, the original owner and cadastral
claimant of the land. It also noted that the deed of sale between Lucia Vda. de
Marbella and Dr. Seria showed that the land had an area of 5 hectares,
whereas, the petitioners only claimed 2.5 hectares. Furthermore, the
boundaries of the land stated in the complaint did not coincide with what was
stated in the Deed of Sale, or in Tax Declaration No. 2442 in the name of
Eustaquio Caballero. The trial court ruled that the petitioners failed to explain
these discrepancies, and that there was no showing that Tax
Declaration No. 2442 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 4029 in the name
of Dr. Seria. The trial court interpreted this to mean that Eustaquio Caballero's
right as owner of the land remained.
Dissatisfied, the petitioners appealed the case to the CA, which rendered a
Decision[16] affirming in toto the decision of the RTC. The petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on September 30, 1996.[17] The CA denied the
motion.[18]
Hence, the instant petition.
The petitioners assign the following errors:
1. THAT IT IS ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO
UPHOLD THE HONORABLE RTC ON THE ISSUE THAT THE ALLEGED
IDENTITY OF THE LAND IN LITIGATION IS UNESTABLISHED BETWEEN
THE PARTIES-LITIGANTS.
2. THAT IT IS ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO
FAIL TO APPRECIATE THE 35-YEAR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IN
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS.[19]
The issues in this petition are, therefore, the following: (1) whether the
petitioners were able to establish the identity of the land being claimed by
them; and (2) whether acquisitive prescription should be appreciated in favor
of the petitioners.
The Ruling of the Court
The first issue deals clearly with a question of fact which is beyond the province
of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. Well-entrenched is the rule
that the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to reviewing or
revising errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. Factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not
reviewable by this Courtand they carry even more weight when the Court of
Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court.[20] The exceptions to this
rule are the following:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[21]
We find no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the CA. None of the
aforementioned exceptions is present in this case. The CA was correct in
concluding that the petitioners failed to establish that the parcel of land in the
possession of the respondents is the same as that subject of their complaint.
The CA noted that the land subject of the complaint has boundaries different
from the land in possession of the respondents. In fact, the land described in
the complaint appears to be different from the land described in the Deed of
Sale which the petitioners invoke as the basis of their ownership.
First. The petitioners alleged in their complaint that the boundaries of their
property are as follows:
North - Alejo Seria
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

South - T. Sabornido Moreover, Tax Declaration No. 2442 covers an area of 119,490 square
East - A. Seria & T. Sabornido meters[30] while Tax Declaration No. 4029 covers only 25,000 square meters
West - F. Caballero[22] or 2.5 hectares.[31]

On the other hand, the Deed of Sale provides that the property sold to them The petitioners argue that the Deed of Sale and Tax Declaration No. 4029
has the following boundaries: should not be compared to Tax Declaration No. 2442 and the Technical
North - Raymundo Seria Description of Cadastral Lot No. 3533 because the former refers only to a
South - Obdullo Caballero portion of the area referred to by the latter.[32] While the petitioners
East - Teofilo Saburnido are correct on this point, such mistake would still not justify a different
West - Obdullo Caballero[23] conclusion. The fact remains that the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by the petitioners did not prove the identity of the land being
claimed. The petitioners did not present evidence to prove that the land
Second. The complaint[24] of the petitioners states that the property they are registered in the name of Eustaquio Caballero was sold to Lucia Vda. de
claiming has an area of 2.5 hectares. On the other hand, the Deed of Sale[25] Marbella or her predecessor-in-interest from whom they purchased the land
provides that the subject property has an area of 5 hectares. subject of their complaint.

Third. The complaint alleged that the property is located in Mantadiao, Opol,
Misamis Oriental,[26] while the Deed of Sale shows that the property
purchased is located in Puntakon, Igpit, Cagayan Or. Misamis.[27]
We agree with the CA that there was no showing that Tax Declaration No.
2442 in the name of Eustaquio Caballero was cancelled. Absent any specific
statement therein to that effect, it cannot be presumed that Tax Declaration
No. 4029 in the name of Dr. Seria cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2442.
Moreover, the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2442 is different from that
covered by Tax Declaration No. 4029 for the following reasons:
The boundary owners of the land as indicated in Tax Declaration No. 2442
differ from those stated in Tax Declaration No. 4029. The boundary owners as
indicated in Tax Declaration No. 2442 are as follows:
North - Rustico Dablio
South -Victor Obsioma
East - J. Seria & T. Saburnido
West - Victorino Caballero[28]
Under Tax Declaration No. 4029, on the other hand, the boundary owners are
as follows:
North - Alejo Seria
South - Teofilo Saburnido
East - A. Seria [and] T. Saburnido
West - Eustaquio Caballero[29]
The failure to establish the identity of the land is obviously fatal to the
petitioners case. In Beo vs. Court of Appeals,[33] a case which also involves
an action for possession and quieting of title, the Court had the occasion to
state:
[B]ecause petitioners failed to explain the discrepancy or present other
evidence to prove with certainty the location and area of the land they seek to
recover, respondent court correctly applied the invariable rule that a person
who claims ownership of real property is duty-bound to clearly identify the land
being claimed, in accordance with the title on which he anchors his right of
ownership. When the record does not show that the land subject matter of the
action for recovery of possession has been exactly determined, such action
cannot prosper, as in the case of petitioners. In sum, proof of ownership
coupled with identity of the land is the basic rule.
Corollarily, the rule is likewise well-settled that in order that an action for
recovery of possession may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the
action fully proves not only his ownership but also the identity of the property
claimed, by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. As the
appellate court succinctly stated, he who
claims to have a better right to the property must clearly show that the land
possessed by the other party is the very land that belongs to him.[34]
On the second issue, the CA ruled that inasmuch as the petitioners failed to
establish that the parcel of land in possession of the respondents is the same
as the subject of their complaint, their claim of acquisitive prescription is clearly
untenable.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
The petitioners argue that they would not have regularly paid taxes on the land
since 1947 had they not believed that they owned the same.[35] The
respondents, for their part, aver that the petitioners were only able to prove
seven (7) years of actual possession of the land through cultivation by their
tenants. They argue that such seven-year period of cultivation cannot be
considered in the petitioners favor, since the witness who testified on this fact
did not personally know the boundaries of the land cultivated, or whether it was
the same land bought by Dr. Seria. The respondents contend that acquisitive
prescription applies only when there is no dispute as to the identity of the
property.[36]
We agree with the respondents. Since the property has not been clearly
identified by the petitioners, their claim of acquisitive prescription
cannot be considered. Insufficient identification of the portion of land claimed
in absolute ownership cannot ripen into ownership. Possession as a
means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere
fiction.[37]
Assuming, however, that the disputed land has been clearly identified,
acquisitive prescription will still not lie in favor of the petitioners because they
were not able to prove that they have been in possession of the property
for the requisite number of years. Prescription requires public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an
owner for ten years, in case the possession is in good faith and with just
title.[38]
Aside from the testimony of Leonardo Vacalares that certain tenants of the
petitioners cultivated the land for a total of seven years, the petitioners did not
present any other evidence to show that they have been in actual possession
of the property for at least ten years.
The petitioners argument that the payment of taxes on the property since May
31, 1948 constitutes proof of their possession of the subject land for thirty-five
years is untenable. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership of
the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual, public
and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not
prove ownership.[39]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
8. Perez v Mendoza; G.R. No. L-22006; July 28, 1975.
G.R. No. L-22006 July 28, 1975
BASILIO PEREZ and PETRA MONTALBO, petitioners,
vs.
NICOLAS MENDOZA, MARGARITA MACALALAD and the HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Pedro T. Panganiban for petitioners.
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for respondents.
MUNOZ PALMA, J.:
Civil Case 689 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas was an action to quiet
title over a piece of land filed on March 20, 1959, by spouses Basilio Perez
and Petra Montalbo with spouses Nicolas Mendoza and Margarita Macalalad
as defendants. According to the complaint, the land in controversy is located
in barrio Dagatan, municipality of Taysan, Batangas, with an area of
approximately 4,765 sq. meters, declared for taxation purposes in the name of
the "Heirs of Estanislao Montalbo", and is "bounded on the north by a school
site, on the east by Calixto Flores, on the south by a creek, and on the west by
a creek and the land of Gregorio Mendoza." On the basis of evidence adduced
by the parties, the trial court then presided by Hon. Lorenzo Relova rendered
judgment on February 19, 1962, dismissing the complaint and declaring the
spouses Mendoza "to have a better right to the property in question."1
Spouses Perez elevated the Relova decision to the Court of Appeals which,
however, affirmed in toto the findings of the court a quo, and declared that
"upon the evidence it has been shown by a great preponderance that the land
in question belongs to the defendants."2
The case is now before Us on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Perez.
The findings of fact both of the trial court and the Court of Appeals may be
briefly summarized as follows:
The litigated parcel of land was originally part of a bigger tract owned by
Estanislao Montalbo. When Estanislao died in 1918, his properties passed on
to his children Petra, Felisa, and Pedro all surnamed Montalbo, and because
Pedro died single the two women remained as the only heirs. By mutual
agreement Petra and Felisa divided between themselves the lands of their
father and the parcel of which the litigated land was a part was assigned to
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
Felisa. Sometime in 1922 Felisa exchanged the above-mentioned parcel with
a land belonging to her aunt. Andrea Montalbo, a sister of her father. The
reason for the exchange was that Andrea wanted to donate a piece of land to
the municipality for use as a school site and the land of Felisa was what the
municipality preferred as it was adjacent to other properties of the municipality.
(Exh. 5 for defendants Mendoza) Upon her acquisition of Felisa's
aforementioned land, Andrea donated to the municipality the northern portion
thereof which constituted almost one-half of the entire parcel, and since then
that portion was declared for taxation purposes by the municipality together
with its adjoining properties (Exhs. 6, 6-A, 6-B).1wph1.t In 1927 the 1.
remainder of the lot was given by Andrea Montalbo to her daughter Margarita
Macalalad on the occasion of her marriage to Nicolas Mendoza, and from the
time of their marriage the couple possessed the said property. That donation
was confirmed subsequently in a public instrument dated August 15, 1951
(Exh. 2 for the Mendozas). Nicolas Mendoza sought to transfer the tax
declaration of the property to his name and of his wife and for that purpose he
submitted a deed of exchange of property dated January 14, 1922, allegedly
executed by Felisa Montalbo and Andrea Montalbo in the presence of the
municipal secretary Rafael Manahan (Exh. 5). When Basilio Perez came to
know about the supposed deed of exchange, he had it investigated and upon
discovering that the signature of Rafael Manahan appearing on the document
was forged, he filed a criminal complaint before the Fiscal's office which led to
an accusation for falsification of private document against Andrea Montalbo
and Nicolas Mendoza. Only Nicolas Mendoza was arraigned and tried and was
convicted by the Court of First Instance of Batangas, but on appeal he was
acquitted by the Court of Appeals for insufficiency of evidence to show that he
participated in affixing the signature of Rafael Manahan or that he was aware
of the falsity of the document in question when he presented it to the tax
assessor's office.3 Notwithstanding the forged signature of Rafael Manahan
on the document Exhibit 5, there is sufficient evidence to prove that an
exchange of property did in fact occur in 1922 between Andrea and Felisa
Montalbo, and that Felisa's land passed on to Andrea who in turn gave part of
it to the municipality and part to her daughter, Margarita; hence, the decision
in favor of the spouses Mendoza.
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the disputed property was inherited
by Petra and Felisa Montalbo from their father Estanislao who died in 1918
and since that date the two sisters were in possession of said land. In 1934 a
deed of partition of the various properties of Estanislao was executed between
Petra and the heirs of Felisa, and the land in question was divided equally,
between them; among those who signed as witnesses to that agreement was
Andrea Montalbo(Exh. D for petitioners). In 1952 Felisa's husband, Jose
Ortega, and children sold their one-half share to spouses Petra Montalbo and
Basilio Perez, now petitioners, but the deed of sale was lost a year after.
Sometime in 1946 petitioners leased the property to the Mendozas and when
the lease expired in 1951 they demanded for the return of the land but the
Mendozas refused and so petitioners had to file an ejectment suit before the
justice of the peace court of Taysan which was still pending at the time of the
trial of the civil case in 1960. (tsn. witness Basilio Perez, December 15, 1960,
pp. 16-34)
For not giving credit to the foregoing evidence, petitioners now assail the
adverse decision of respondent court on four assigned errors.
Petitioners contend that respondent court erred in considering the
criminal case for falsification res adjudicata on the matter of ownership of the
land in litigation when the "question of ownership was not actually and directly
in issue in the criminal case and the latter was not the proper vehicle for the
determination of the ownership of the land." (p. 9, petitioners brief) Petitioners
refer to portions in the decision of respondent court, viz:
The land in question, together with that portion that was acquired by the
municipality of Taysan, the identity of which is admitted by the parties,
belonged to Felisa Montalbo, as held in the decision of the Court of Appeals,
thus "The said parcel of land previously belonged to Felisa Montalbo
(married to Jose Ortega), who inherited it from her deceased father, the
aforecited Estanislao Montalbo;", and the land in question was donated propter
nuptias by Andrea Montalbo to Margarita Macalalad and Nicolas Mendoza, the
defendants, (Margarita Macalalad is the daughter of Andrea Montalbo) on the
occasion of their marriage on February 27, 1927, as found and held in the
decision of the Court of Appeals, thus "and this land was acquired by the
donor (Andrea Montalbo) by means of a barter with her own parcel of land
planted with bamboos and mango trees"
Upon the basis of the findings of fact and conclusion arrived at in the decision
of the Court of Appeals, it clearly appears that although the document of
exchange of the lands was found to be falsified, nevertheless the Court found
upon the facts as demonstrated by the evidence that the land in question
"previously belonged to Felisa Montalbo (married to Jose Ortega), who
inherited it from her deceased father, the aforesaid Estanislao Montalbo ...";
that said land was donated propter nuptias by Andrea Montalbo to the
defendants on the occasion of their marriage on February 27, 1927; and that
"this land was acquired by the donor by means of a barter with her own parcel
of land planted with bamboos and mango trees". From the context of the
decision the natural and logical inference is that factually the exchange of the
lands had been consummated.... (pp. 6-7, CA decision at pp. 20-21, rollo;
emphasis supplied to indicate disputed statements)
Undoubtedly, there is merit to the contention of petitioners that the
pronouncements or findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals in the
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
criminal case concerning the possession and ownership of the land now in
litigation in the civil case, do not constitute the law on the matter and cannot
be taken or adopted as a basis for deciding the question of ownership of said
land in this civil case. Since there is no identity of parties in the two cases
the petitioners here not being parties in the criminal case and the object or
subject matter in the criminal prosecution is different, the latter being
concerned with the guilt or innocence of accused Nicolas Mendoza for
falsification of private document, it follows that the judgment in the criminal
action cannot be used as evidence in the civil case where the issue is
ownership of a piece of land. It is the rule that the plea of res judicata generally
cannot be interposed except where the parties, facts, and questions are the
same,4 hence, the judgment in a criminal case cannot be pleaded as res
judicata in a civil action.5
But whatever error was committed by respondent court in this regard, the same
is not sufficient to nullify the appealed decision.
Analyzing the decision of respondent court. We see that the latter made its
own appraisal and evaluation of the evidence existing in the record relative to
the possession and ownership of the land in question. Thus it said that the
conclusions arrived at by the Court of Appeals in the criminal case to wit(1)
that there was an exchange of lands consummated between Andrea and
Felisa and (2) that the exchanged land was later donated by Andrea to her
daughter Margarita in 1927, "can hardly be doubted if we take account of the
undisputed fact that the defendants have been in possession of the land since
1927, and the plaintiffs (meaning spouses Perez) have not attempted to disturb
defendants' possession of the land until 1952 when said plaintiffs filed an
action of unlawful detainer against the defendants." (p. 7 of appealed decision
at p. 21, SC rollo; emphasis supplied) Continuing, respondent court
expounded:
Contrary to the allegation in the complaint "That plaintiffs were in
possession of the land prior and up to January, 1946, when the same was
leased to the defendants ...", and the testimony of Basilio Perez to the same
tenor, the evidence has conclusively shown that the defendants have been in
continuous possession of the land since 1927 to the present time, and they
have built a house on the land in 1928 where they have resided and lived to
the present, as testified to by the defendant Mendoza, ....
The plaintiffs have contended, however, with the support of the testimony of
Basilio Perez, that the possession of the defendants since 1946 was that of a
mere lessee of the land. On this matter, the trial court said, "the records do not
show any documentary evidence to support such contention. Nor is any
document, say receipts of payment of rentals presented to bolster their theory.
On the contrary their averment has been strongly denied by the defendants
and the records show that it was only in 1952 that a civil action was instituted
by the plaintiffs against the defendants in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Taysan, Batangas, for detainer and damages", and said allegation of
possession of the defendants as lessees of the land "is not supported by
positive and convincing evidence". We find no reason to disagree with the
foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of the trial court because the same is
supported by the preponderance of evidence, and the plaintiffs have not
pointed to us any fact of significance or influence which have been disregarded
by the court, other than the testimony of Basilio Perez who testified about the
supposed contract of lease. (pp. 21-22, 23, ibid.; emphasis supplied)
Digging further into the evidence of herein petitioners, respondent court found
for itself that the agreement of partition dated May 27, 1934, Exhibit D, is not
incontrovertible proof that in 1934 the litigated property belonged in common
to Petra and the heirs of Felisa Montalbo both of whom may have been guided
by the fact that the property was still declared for taxation purposes in the name
of Estanislao Montalbo, and that the document of partition "did not overcome
the evidence on record that Andrea Montalbo became the owner of the land,
and that since 1927 the defendants have been in continuous possession of the
land, openly, adversely and in the concept of owners thereby acquiring
ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription." (p. 10 of CA decision
at p. 24, SC rollo)
Independently therefore of the pronouncements of the Court of Appeals in the
criminal case, respondent court examined the evidence in this civil case and
made its own findings of fact on the basis of which it affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
We could have stopped here and resolved this petition under well-entrenched
precepts in Philippine jurisprudence that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are as a rule conclusive and binding upon this Court;6 nonetheless, to set our
mind at rest that the conclusions of respondent court were not grounded on
speculation, surmises or conjectures,7 We went over the evidence before Us.
Certain salient facts strongly support the claim of respondents Mendoza over
the property in dispute:
First, the northern boundary of the land in controversy is undisputably a school
site which originally was part of a bigger tract belonging to Estanislao
Montalbo. This is admitted by petitioner Basilio Perez who to a question
propounded by his counsel, Atty. Panganiban, declared:
Mr. Panganiban: (Counsel of petitioners)
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
Q. According to these tax declarations which you said covers the land in
question, the boundaries on the north, school site; on the east, land of Calixto
Flores; on the south, estero; and on the west, estero and Gregoria Mendoza,
why is it that there is a discrepancy?
A. Because from the whole parcel of land a portion was taken for the
school site, and that which remains now is the land in question, sir. (tsn
December 15, 1960, pp. 22-23)
No explanation however was offered by Perez as to how that portion became
a school site. On the other hand, there is evidence of respondent Mendoza
that because Andrea Montalbo wanted to donate a piece of land to be used as
a school site and the municipality preferred the location of the land inherited
by Felisa from her father, the two women exchanged lands after which Andrea
gave one-half of the property to the municipality while the remaining portion
which is the land now in litigation was donated propter nuptias to her daughter
Margarita way back in 1927. (tsn October 24, 1961, pp. 14-18) This donation
of Andrea was not disproved by any evidence of petitioners. On the part of
respondents Mendoza, their documentary evidence, Exhibits 6, 6-A and 6-B,
show that the municipality of Taysan declared the donated property in its name
as early as July, 1925, which supports respondents' claim that the exchange
of properties between Andrea and Felisa Montalbo took place sometime in
1922.
Second, the provincial authorities authorities dealt with the Mendozas for the
widening of the provincial road which traverses the land in question. Nicolas
Mendoza testified that the land covered by the complaint actually consists of
two lots which he described in his sketch, Exhibit 1, with letters "A" and "B"
respectively, separated by a provincial road leading to the municipality of Lobo;
that lot "A" which is the bigger parcel is the one donated to his wife, Margarita,
by Andrea Montalbo on the occasion of their marriage in 1927 (Exh. 2); while
lot "B" was bought from Donata Mendoza in 1951 as shown by the deed of
sale, Exhibit 7; that sometime in 1937-38, the province widened the provincial
road traversing the two lots, and he and his wife were approached by the
provincial authorities more particularly, Engineer Ramirez, for them to give
without compensation from lot "A" a stretch of land of one meter in width to
widen said road, and they agreed. At that time Donata Mendoza still owned lot
"B" and she was also asked to give part of her land for the road but she was
paid for the value of the plants destroyed in the process.(tsn October 24, 1961,
pp. 32-34) For his part, petitioner Perez admitted during the cross-examination
conducted by the opposite counsel, Atty. Julio Enriquez, that the provincial
authorities did not deal with him at all during the widening of that particular
road. (tsn September 25, 1961, p. 34) This is of marked significance, because
if it were true as claimed by petitioners that they were in possession of the
property since the death of Estanislao Montalbo in 1918 or even after the deed
of partition in 1934, they would have been the persons approached by the
authorities for the widening of the road. The fact that the Mendozas were the
ones who gave away part of the land for the widening of the Lobo road shows
that they were in possession of the property and were living there at the time.
Third, respondents Mendoza have been in possession of the property since
1927 in concept of owners thereof. We have the testimony of respondent
Nicolas Mendoza that after the land was donated to his wife in 1927 they built
a house on it and lived there continuously, witness referring particularly to what
he described as lot "A" in his sketch Exhibit 1. (tsn October 24, 1961, pp. 7,
.30-31) Respondent's testimony was found both by the trial and appellate
courts credible because (1) petitioner Basilio Perez himself admitted during
cross-examination that even before the last world war the Mendozas had
constructed a house on the land in litigation (tsn September 25, 1971, pp. 37-
39; see Exh. E-3) which admission disproves the allegation in the complaint
and Perez' testimony that it was only in 1946 when the Mendozas occupied
the property as lessees; (2) the testimony of Nicolas Mendoza was
corroborated by witness Adriano Gonzales, a retired justice of the peace of
Taysan, Batangas, who declared that he knew the Mendozas since 1937 and
he saw them living on the land in question and they have not changed
residence at all since he had known them (tsn December 6, 1961, pp. 5-6);
and (3) the respondents Mendoza were the ones who were living on the
property and not the petitioners at the time the provincial government in 1937
widened the Lobo road which crosses said land.
The court a quo and the respondent appellate court did not err when they
upheld the claim of ownership of the Mendozas principally on the ground that
the latter were in actual possession of the property since 1927 and were sought
to be dispossessed by petitioners herein only in 1952 when an ejectment suit
was filed against them.
Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the
possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of
ownership.8 Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that "(A)ctual possession
under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The
true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property." In
Chan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, this
Court upheld the finding of the Court of Appeals that the litigated property
belonged to the private respondents therein based on their possession of the
property, not only because such findings of fact of the appellate court are
conclusive and binding on this Court but because the conclusion is in
accordance with Articles 433 and 531 of the Civil Code. 9
As we have here conflicting claims of possession by the parties over the land
in controversy and because the fact of possession cannot be recognized at the
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
same time in two different personalities except in cases of co-possession, the
present possessor is to be preferred pursuant to Article 538 of the Civil Code
which We quote:
Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise
regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if
there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these
conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings." 10
The pretension of petitioners that the possession of the Mendozas is that of a
mere lessee was not believed by the trial judge and the appellate court not
only because of the absence of any written or oral evidence on the matter other
than the bare testimony of petitioner Basilio Perez, but also due to the
circumstances present in the case which We indicated and enumerated at
pages 7 to 9 of this decision. In fine, it is a fact that the Mendozas are presently
in possession of the property and the presumption of ownership in their favor
has not been successfully rebutted by evidence that they are mere lessees of
the land in their possession as claimed by petitioners.
2. In their second assigned error, petitioners contend that respondent
court should not have given weight to the evidence of respondent Mendoza
because the latter's Exhibit 5 was proven to be a falsified document.
To recall, Exhibit 5 is the alleged deed of exchange or barter of lands between
Andrea and Felisa Montalbo dated January 14, 1922. On this point, petitioners
overlook the fact that Exhibit 5 was made the basis of a criminal accusation of
falsification of private document solely on the allegation that the signature of
Rafael Manahan, the person before whom the parties to the document
allegedly appeared, was not his. There was no finding in that criminal case as
per decision rendered therein that the barter or exchange of lands between
Andrea and Felisa Montalbo did not in effect take place. On the contrary, what
appears in said decision offered by petitioners as their Exhibit J are the
following findings of the Court of Appeals, viz: that the land donated by Andrea
Montalbo to her daughter Margarita Macalalad "was acquired by the donor by
means of a barter with her own parcel of land planted with bamboos and
mango trees"; that while it is true that because of this presentation of the
falsified document appellant (now respondent Nicolas Mendoza) was able to
secure the declaration of the property donated in his name, no criminal liability
should be imposed upon him in the absence of any evidence that he presented
said exhibit with the knowledge that it was forged "especially if we take into
consideration the fact that he and his wife were and are still in possession of
the land donated since 1927"; that in fact, the color and appearance of the
document in question show that it is not a new document but an old one thus
confirming Mendoza's theory that it was executed in or about the year 1922 as
appearing in the document or five years before his marriage. (pp. 1, 5, 6 of
Exh. J, folder of exhibits) Thus, if the document Exhibit 5 was held to be forged,
it was simply because the municipal secretary, Rafael Manahan, did not sign
it and not for any other reason. What is material and relevant to the civil case
is that both the trial court and respondent appellate court found for a fact that
there was an exchange of lands between Andrea and Felisa Montalbo on the
basis of evidence other than the disputed Exhibit 5. As to what the evidence
is, has been discussed above.
Petitioners cite Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil. 728 where this Court stated
inter alia that the introduction of a forged instrument by a witness renders the
testimony of the latter practically worthless. That statement however is not
applicable to the situation before Us because in Gonzalez the particular
document or receipt referred to was found to be entirely false as to its contents,
handwriting, and signature, whereas here all that was found to be false is the
signature of a witnessing official.
3. The last argument of petitioners is the object of the third assigned
error. It is contended that the appellate court erred in not giving effect to the
deed of partition, Exhibit D, notwithstanding the fact that the name of Andrea
Montalbo appears in the document as one of the witnesses thereto.
Exhibit D appears to be a document dated May 27, 1934, wherein certain
properties allegedly belonging to Estanislao Montalbo were divided between
Petra Montalbo and Jose Ortega, husband of deceased Felisa Montalbo.
Petitioner Basilio Perez declared that one of the parcels of land mentioned in
the document is the land now in litigation which is particularly marked as
Exhibit D-1. He also testified that Exhibit D was signed by him and his wife,
Petra Montalbo, by Jose Ortega, husband of deceased Felisa Montalbo, and
thumbmarked by the latter's children all in his presence. (tsn December
15,1960, pp. 19-24) Surprisingly, however, Basilio Perez did not at all mention
during the course of his testimony that the old woman, Andrea Montalbo,
signed the deed of partition as a witness. We have gone over the transcript of
Basilio Perez' declaration on direct and cross-examination (tsn December 15,
1960, pp. 15-34; September 25, 1961, pp. 3-40) and at no instance did he ever
state that Andrea Montalbo was present during the preparation of the
document, that she read or knew the contents thereof which by the way
consists of six handwritten pages, and that she signed her name on the
document. It was incumbent upon petitioners to identify the signature of
Andrea Montalbo on the document if her signature was truly there. As a matter
of fact, examining the document Exhibit D We entertain doubts whether the
name referred to by petitioners is "Andrea Montalbo", for, as written, it also can
read "Maria Montalbo". At any rate, whatever is the import of said deed of
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
partition, the same binds only the parties thereto but does not affect third
persons such as Andrea Montalbo or the herein Mendozas in the absence of
proof that they participated in one way or another in the preparation and
execution of thedocument. As it is, Andrea Montalbo was a stranger to that
deed of partition and any recital therein concerning the property under litigation
cannot be used as evidence to prejudice her and her successors-in-interest or
place her in estoppel as to her claims over the property. Res inter alios acta
alteri nocere non debet. A transaction between two parties ought not to operate
to the prejudice of a third person or stranger. 11
4. In the fourth assignment of error, petitioners claim that the appellate
court should have rendered a decision in their favor. That both the trial court
and respondent appellate court have correctly evaluated the evidence, has
been clearly demonstrated by Us.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find no reversible
error in the decision under review and We AFFIRM the same with costs against
petitioners.
So Ordered.
9. Dizon v CA; G.R. No. 101929; January 6, 1993.
G.R. No. 101929 January 6, 1993
BENJAMIN DIZON, ZACARIAS DIZON, AFRICA DIZON, PERFECTO DIZON,
CARMEN DIZON (Heirs of Paula Galang), JULIA GALANG, CONSOLACION
TABORA, ABELARDO TABORA, CECILIA TABORA, AVELINA TABORA,
TRINIDAD TABORA, REMEDIOS TABORA, VIRGINIA TABORA, DELFIN
TABORA, PENINA TABORA, FRANCISCO TABORA, CIPRIANA GALANG,
RUFINO DELOS SANTOS, PEPITO DELOS SANTOS (Heirs of Donata
Vergara), ARNEO VERGARA, BENIGNO VERGARA, JOSE VERGARA,
SCION VERGARA, DEMETRIA VERGARA (all heirs of Dionisio Galang),
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUREO REYES, AURELIO SAMIA, ALFONSO
SAMIA, POTENCIANO GALANG, LEONCIA GARCIA, BIENVENIDO
TAPNIO, LYDIA BALINGIT VDA. DE GARCIA, BENEDICTO GARCIA,
ROMULADO GARCIA, AMY GARCIA, ALEXANDER GARCIA, LUDIVINA
GARCIA, MONTANO GUEVARRA, CORAZON LAMPA, RUDY LAMPA,
EDUARDO LAMPA, ILLUMINADA GUEVARRA, CARMELITA MASANQUE
VDA. DE GARCIA, MA. CONCEPCION AQUINO VDA. DE GUEVARRA,
HONZAI GUEVARRA, RODA REBECCA GUEVARRA, RUTH GUEVARRA,
minors represented by their mother Ma. Concepcion Vda. de Guevarra,
PRIMITIVA GUEVARRA, JOSIAS N. GARCIA, LUCITA M. GARCIA, VICTOR
M. GARCIA, LUTERO M. GARCIA, SAMSON M. GARCIA, FELIXBERTO M.
GARCIA, JR., HERMENIGILDA GARCIA, CONSTANCIO GARCIA,
REYNALDO GARCIA, AGAPITA GARCIA, ERNESTO GARCIA, NORICO
GARCIA, PACIFICO GARCIA, NORMANDO GARCIA, ARTURO GARCIA,
ESTELLA GARCIA, DIOSDADO GARCIA (representing LEONCIA GARCIA),
GREGORIA MENDOZA, ELEUTERIA BAUTISTA, PEDRO ATIENZA,
BENITA SAMANIEGO, NENE SAMANIEGO (representing FLAVIANA
GALANG), LETICIA REYES, MANUEL REYES (representing MARCIANA
GALANG), CARMEN ROQUE VDA. DE DIMABUYU, PORFIRIO R.
DIMABUYU, CARMEN R. DIMABUYU, CARIDAD R. DIMABUYU, PEDRO R.
DIMABUYU, MARCOS DIMABUYU (representing GERTRUDES GALANG),
respondents.
Heminio Z. Canlas for petitioners.
Lagunzad, Juan, Rubin & Cabaron Law Office for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to nullify the decision **
of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 April 1991, in CA-G.R. CV. No. 14312, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby REVERSED; and the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased Dionisio Galang
(Exh. "D"), in so far as it relates to Lots 3548 and 3562 the Bacolor Cadastre,
and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 182670-R and 182671-R issued by
virtue thereof are hereby declared null and void.
Conformably, the Register of Deeds concerned is hereby ordered to cancel
the said titles; and subject Lots 3548 and 3562 are hereby adjudicated to the
heirs of the deceased co-owners to be partitioned among them as follows:
a. one-sixth to the Heirs of Marciana Galang;
b. one-sixth to the Heirs of Dionisio Galang;
c. one-sixth to the Heirs of Flaviana Galang;
d. one-sixth to the Heirs of Gertrudes Galang;
e. one-sixth to the Heirs of Potenciana Galang;
f. one-sixth to the Heirs of Leoncia Galang.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
Costs against defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED. 1
It appears that on 21 August 1984, Aureo Reyes, et al. (hereafter
"respondents") filed an amended complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No. 6752, for the
annulment of a deed of extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate of
Dionisio Galang, claiming to have been deprived thereby of their shares, as
co-owners, in Lot Nos. 3548 and 3562 Bacolor cadastre, and that OCT Nos.
9010 and 9102, issued in the name of Dionisio Galang, covering said lots, are
fraudulent and should therefore be annulled and cancelled.
The facts of the case, as culled from the Court of Appeals decision, are as
follows:
The spouses Hilario Galang and Martina Laxamana owned two (2) lots located
in San Agustin, Potrero, Municipality of Bacolor, Province of Pampanga. They
had six (6) children, namely, Dionisio, Marciana, Potenciana, Flaviana,
Leonora and Gertrudes.
The spouses (Hilario and Martina) mortgaged the aforesaid lots to Camilo
Angeles. It is alleged by the respondents that Dionisio Galang redeemed these
lots in his own name, despite the fact that part of the funds used for the
redemption came from his sisters.2 A cadastral survey involving the two (2)
lots was conducted, and on 19 May 1919, the Court of First Instance ordered
the issuance in Cadastral Case No. 14, of OCT Nos. 9010 (for lot 3548) and
9102 (for lot 3562) in the name solely of Dionisio Galang ( hereafter Galang).
Respondents, who are heirs of Galang's sisters, claim that Galang and his five
(5) sisters had partitioned the subject lots on 27 June 1920, as embodied in an
unnotarized affidavit executed by Galang (Exh. "C"). As a consequence
thereof, Galang's sisters constructed their houses on Lot 3548. The structures
passed on from generation to generation, with each of Galang's sisters and
their descendants enjoying the benefits therefrom. No one questioned or
disturbed them until the petitioners (heirs of Galang), informed them that the
lots in question were titled in Galang's name and had been partitioned, on the
basis of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition (Exh. "D"), into three (3) equal parts
corresponding to his (Galang's) three (3) children; that petitioners had
succeeded in subdividing the lots and in obtaining titles thereto in their name
(TCT Nos. 182670-R and 182671-R) despite their (respondents') earlier
demands for an extrajudicial settlement of their dispute.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the cadastral case which
culminated in the issuance of the original certificates of title over the subject
lots in the sole name of Galang, was a proceeding in rem, thus binding on the
whole world; that when original certificates of title (OCT Nos. 9010 and 9102)
were issued on 9 January 1922 to Galang, respondents did not raise any
objection until March 1983 when they filed the complaint in Civil Case No.
6752, or after a lapse of sixty-one (61) years.
The trial court3 upheld Galang's titles over the lots which, as aforestated, had
been issued as early as 1922 in his name. The trial court further held that
respondents' action had long prescribed, having been filed only on 24 March
1983, or after a lapse of sixty-one (61) long years from the issuance of said
titles. The court also noted respondents' failure to establish their relationship
to Galang's five (5) sisters, premising their claim solely on an unsubstantiated
assertion that they are descendants of the deceased Galang sisters.4 The
presence or construction of the houses on Lot No. 3548 was also not
considered as evidence in respondents' favor, since no proof was submitted
establishing respondents' right to occupy the place. The documentary
evidence (Exh. "C" and "C-1") allegedly showing co-ownership among Dionisio
and his co-heirs, was likewise ignored by the trial court as this did not
specifically refer to the disputed Lots 3548 and 3562.
On appeal by the respondents, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court by upholding respondents' rights. It focused on two (2) issues.
Thus
Are the properties in question owned in common by the predecessors-in-
interest of appellants and appellees? And has appellants' present action for
partition prescribed?5
The appellate court declared that co-ownership existed between respondents'
predecessors-in-interest and those of petitioners, on the basis of Galang's
affidavit which, although unnotarized, was nonetheless an ancient document,
pursuant to Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, since it was executed on
27 June 1920. As such, proof of its due execution and authentication could be
dispensed with, according to the appellate court.
Hence, this recourse in turn by the petitioners.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
It is a fact that Dionisio Galang's ownership over the disputed lots (3548 and
3562) had been judicially confirmed on 19 May 1919 in Cadastral Case No.
14, G.L.R.O. No. 51, which is a proceeding in rem and hence binding "on the
whole world." OCT No. 1056 (9010) and OCT No. 1057 (9102) were, as a
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
consequence, issued on 9 January 1922. None of Galang's co-heirs objected
to or protested their issuance. These titles became indefeasible and
incontrovertible. Then it was only after sixty-one (61) years or on 24 March
1983 that the descendants of Galang's co-heirs asserted co-ownership claims
over the subject lots.
It is true that Galang executed an affidavit, unnotarized at that, on 27 June
1920 which states in part as follows (per English translation [Exh.
"C-1"]):6
That on this date, I have received from all my sisters and nephews who are
my co-heirs, namely Potenciana Galang, Flaviana Galang, Gertrudes Galang,
who are my sisters, and Silverio Garcia and Hilarion Samia, in their own names
and for their brothers and sisters who are also co-heirs, the sum of ONE
HUNDRED AND SIX PESOS (P106.00), Philippine Currency, as complete
payment for the discharge of the land we co-inherited, which is the one we
partitioned this date also, which was mortgaged to the Angeles family.7
However, as can be gleaned from the foregoing, there is no reference to Lot
Nos. 3548 and 3562. Said affidavit is not therefore a sufficient basis or support
for what is alleged by respondents as a partition among Dionisio and his now
deceased sisters. It does not, as correctly stated by the trial court, amount to
anything insofar as the two (2) lots involved in this case are concerned:
Even their presentation of the document purportedly executed by Dionisio
Galang on June 27, 1910 (Exh. "C" and "C-1") where the latter acknowledges
that he and his co-heirs named therein as co-owners of a certain property
which they had mortgaged to a certain family surnamed Angeles does not
amount to anything for nothing in this document shows that it pertains to the
two lots involved herein. It merely referred to a certain "land" which Dionisio
Galang and his co-heirs "co-inherited" and partitioned without any indication
as to which property is being referred
to.8
We likewise agree with the trial court that in the absence of definite proof
establishing respondents' link/relationship to their alleged predecessors-in-
interest, i.e., the Galang sisters, they do not have any cause of action, and the
suit for partition must necessarily fall. The trial court aptly observed:
. . . the plaintiffs thru their witnesses Bienvenido Tapnio, Marcos Dimabuyu,
Pedro Atienza, and Carmelita Galang, tried to prove that all the plaintiffs herein
are heirs and direct descendants, respectively, of Marciana Galang,
Potenciana Galang, Flaviana Galang, Leoncia Galang and Gertrudes Galang
who, in their lifetime, together with their late brother Dionisio Galang, are the
co-owners of these two lots, namely, Lots Nos. 3548 and 3562. Lamentably,
all that was proved in the process by the plaintiffs thru these witnesses despite
several proddings and suggestions made by the court toward this end was that
each of these plaintiffs are just related to one another in varying degrees of
relationship. They failed to establish their connection or relationship with any
of these five sisters save for their unfounded averment that they are indeed
descendants and heirs of these deceased individuals.9
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court dated 3
October 1986 in Civil Case No. 6752 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
10. Alim v CA; G.R. No. 93213; August 9, 1991.
G.R. No. 93213 August 9, 1991
LUCIO TAN ALIM, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PACIFIC COAST TIMBER PRODUCTS,
INC., respondents.
Celestino R. Calauit for petitioner.
Jose S. Santos, Jr. for private respondent
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the February 27, 1990 decision * of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 10603 entitled "PACIFIC COAST
TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. vs. LUCIO TAN ALIM", affirming the decision ** of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch LXXXIX in Civil Case No. Q-
24970 which dismissed private respondent's complaint, but allowed the
petitioner to exercise his option to buy the tractor in question, which decision
was later amended in its Order, dated September 19, 1985, partially granting
petitioner's motion for reconsideration but denying his plea therein to grant
damages for unrealized income in his logging business due to the alleged
irregular and illegal seizure of the said equipment leased to him.
The case arose out of a Lease Contract with Option To Buy, dated January 5,
1977, which was entered into by and between respondent PACIFIC COAST
TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., as lessor, and petitioner LUCIO TAN ALIM, as
lessee, for a term of fifteen months over a unit of tractor at a monthly rental of
P10,000.00 subject to the stipulation, among others, that after payment of five
months, the lessee is given an option to purchase the equipment at the price
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
of P150,000.00, in which event the rental paid shall be considered as part
payment of the consideration and that the subject equipment has to remain at
the lessee's jobsite at PARCEL III-R between Dianawan Creek and Bazal, San
Joaquin, Baler (Original Record, p. 7; Exhibit "I" and Exhibit "A").
However, upon its delivery on January 15, 1977, the tractor was discovered to
be defective. Consequently, petitioner Alim informed the private respondent's
manager at San Luis, Quezon of such fact in his letter dated January 25, 1977,
relaying likewise the need for the tractor's reconditioning or replacement with
another unit in good running condition and the immediate repair thereof as may
be arranged by him with the Manila Office (Ibid., p. 96, Exhibit "2"). The
Logging Manager of the respondent corporation, Luis O. Barredo, issued a
certification on June 11, 1977 that a defective tractor was delivered to the
petitioner (Ibid., p. 98, Exhibit "5"). The amount of P5,000.00 for the repair of
the tractor was then paid by the private respondent to petitioner Alim on
January 29, 1977 (Ibid., p. 97, Exhibit "4"). Petitioner Alim expended the
amount of P36,130.60 for its repair and reconditioning, as specifically
contained in his letter to respondent corporation of June 25, 1977 (Ibid., p. 99,
Exhibit "3").
On July 1, 1977, the parties amended the lease contract with petitioner's
obligation to execute a Deed of Chattel Mortgage for his three motor vehicles
in favor of the respondent to guarantee his undertaking in the amended lease
contract (Ibid., pp. 101-102; Rollo, pp. 12-13). Respondent corporation's
counsel, Lino M. Patajo, formally informed Alim in a letter dated March 16,
1978 that under the amended contract wherein payment of rentals
commenced in August, 1977, the latter failed to pay rentals for seven months,
from September, 1977 to February, 1978 in the amount of P70,000.00, for
which reason the contract of lease as well as the option to buy, are
automatically terminated. The same counsel likewise sent a notice of default
in obligation secured by the Chattel Mortgage (Ibid., Exhibit "C"; p. 11, Exhibit
"D"; Original Records, p. 12). However, the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
thereon was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied (Ibid., p. 12). Thereafter, a
complaint for recovery of possession with replevin of a unit of tractor (Ibid., pp.
13-15-A; Rollo, pp. 15-18), was filed by private respondent before the then
Court of First Instance of Quezon City due to petitioner's refusal to pay the
arrears and to deliver the subject equipment.
Upon the filing of a bond by Pacific Coast Timber Products, Inc., furnished by
Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation in the sum of P300,000.00 (Ibid., p.
26), the trial court issued a writ of replevin for the seizure and delivery of the
property in question on April 13, 1978 (Ibid., p. 36; Rollo, p. 20). On April 16,
1978, Deputy Sheriff Reynaldo P. Lopez of the then Court of First Instance of
Aurora Sub-province at Baler, Quezon, seized the tractor from the petitioner
and turned it over to the respondent corporation on April 26, 1978 (Ibid p. 45,
Sheriff's Return of Service).
In his answer (Ibid., pp. 38-43), the petitioner denied having defaulted in the
payment of rentals and claimed to have sustained damages for unrealized
income in his logging business as a result of the wrongful seizure of the tractor
(Rollo, p. 21).
Both parties having failed to reach an agreement at the pretrial, the case was
tried on the merits.
In the order of the trial court dated December 17, 1980, respondent
corporation's motion to recall or lift the Order of Seizure and to cancel the
replevin bond the same having already served their purposes, (Ibid., pp. 142-
143), which was opposed by petitioner Alim (Ibid., pp. 144-146), was denied
for lack of merit since the case was still pending in court (Ibid., p. 149).
On the scheduled hearing of July 14, 1981, both parties failed to attend.
Hence, the dismissal of the case (Ibid., p. 158). However, the order of dismissal
was reconsidered upon explanation of the parties (Ibid., p. 159). The case was
finally resolved in favor of petitioner Alim on July 31, 1985 by the trial court
(RTC, Quezon City), the dispositive portion of which states:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the plaintiffs
complaint, and allowing the defendant within fifteen days from and after this
judgment becomes final and executory, to exercise his option under the Lease
Contract with Option to Buy, as amended, to buy the tractor, in question, by
paying to the plaintiff the balance of P90,000.00 after deducting from the
purchase price of P150,000.00, in rentals, already paid by him, and ordering
the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the amount of P36,130.60 as
reimbursement for the expenses for repairs made by the defendant on the
tractor which may be offsetted from the remaining purchase price of
P90,000.00 if the defendant exercises his option to buy, plus reasonable
attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00, with costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 32-33)
The said decision was, however, partially modified upon motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner, dated August 19, 1985 (Original Record, pp.
259-261), in its Order dated September 19, 1985, in this wise:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint, and allowing the defendant, within fifteen (15) days from and after
(sic) this judgment becomes final and executory, to exercise his option under
the Lease Contract with Option To Buy, as amended, to buy the tractor, in
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
question by paying to the plaintiff the balance of P80,000.00 after deducting
from the purchase price of P150,000.00, the amount of P70,000.00 in rentals,
already paid by him, and ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the
amount of P36,130.60 as reimbursement for the expenses for repairs made by
the defendant on the tractor, which may be off-setted (sic) from the remaining
purchase price of P80,000.00, if the defendant exercises his option to buy, plus
reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00, with costs against the
plaintiff. (Rollo, pp. 37-A-38).
Not satisfied with the modified decision, petitioner Alim appealed, claiming
damages because of the wrongful seizure of the tractor, but the same was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals which denied said petitioner's claim for
compensation and concurred with the following findings of the trial court:
However, since the fifteen (15) month lease period provided in the contract
had already expired ... the plaintiff may not be judicially compelled to deliver
the tractor to defendant since after the expiration of the lease period, it is legally
entitled to its possession, as the owner thereof. (Rollo, P. 62)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its resolution dated April 30, 1990 (Rollo, p. 65). Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this case are: (1) whether or not the fifteen (15) month
lease period had commenced from August 1977 and expired in October 1978;
(2) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to collect/recover damages as
prayed for in the complaint; and (3) whether or not petitioner is entitled to
recover the sum of P300,000.00 from the replevin bond, all of which may be
synthesized in one pivotal issue, the interpretation of the "Amendment to
Contract of Lease" (Exhibit "6", Original Records, p. 9) in relation to the
"Original Lease Contract with Option to Buy (Exhibit "1". Original Records, p.
7).
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are of the view that there is no
amendment as to the duration of the Contract of Lease; that the contract
expired as originally stipulated on April 5, 1978 and that when the tractor was
seized by virtue of a writ of replevin on August 16, 1978, the contract of lease
had expired and the lessee Alim was consequently not entitled to damages.
A careful review of the records shows that in the original contract, it was
expressly stipulated that the lease shall be for a period of fifteen (15) months
(Exhibit "1". par. 2) and that the lessee is given an option to purchase the
equipment for ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS,
after Alim has completed and religiously paid the 5-month rentals which shall
be considered as part payment of the consideration (Ibid., par. 4).
On the other hand, there is no provision in the amended contract as to the
period of the lease. Instead, it provides that "All provisions of the original lease
contract not amended by the foregoing provisions shall remain in full force and
effect." (Exhibit "6", par. 5). The alteration is evidently focused on the period
for the right to exercise the option to buy. Originally, the period was five (5)
months of regular payment but under the amended contract, the period was
changed to fifteen (15) months, unquestionably including the period from the
commencement of the original contract on January 7, 1977, as specifically
provided in paragraph 4 thereof, which states:
4. The monthly rentals of the equipment which on the date of the
execution of this amendment to the original lease contract have not been paid
shall be considered as paid obligation of LESSEE to LESSOR, the payment of
which will be the subject of negotiation between LESSOR and LESSEE.
The letter of Atty. Lino M. Patajo, counsel of respondent corporation, on which
Alim heavily relied in his arguments in his favor, unmistakably confirms the fact
of non-extension of the lease agreement when he spoke of the
commencement of the payment of the rentals, not on the commencement of
the new period of lease (Exhibit "C", Original Records, p. 11). Inevitably, the
courts cannot go beyond what appears in the documents submitted by the
parties.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the terms of written contract are
binding on the parties thereto. In the interpretation of the provisions of a written
contract, the courts should follow the literal meaning of the stipulation.
Otherwise, the evident intention of the parties must prevail (Art. 1370, Civil
Code) (Spouses Roberto E. Fermin and Maylinda Ferraren v. Hon. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. 95146, May 6, 1991).
There is therefore no merit in the petitioner's allegation that the seizure was
wrongful for which he must be compensated.1wphi1 The ownership or right
of possession over the subject equipment belonged to the Pacific Coast
Timber Products, Inc. at the time it was seized. The seizure of the equipment
was ordered by the trial court for its restoration by means established in the
laws of procedure. Thus, the requisites for the issuance of the writ of replevin
(Sec. 2, Rule 60) have been satisfied.
The writ is a provisional remedy in replevin suits. It is in the "nature of a
possessory action and the applicant who seeks the immediate possession of
the property need not be the holder of the legal title to the property." It is
sufficient that at the time he applied for a writ of replevin he is found to be
"entitled to a possession thereof as stated in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules
of Court (Yang v. Valdez, 177 SCRA 141 [1989]).
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

The Appellate Court correctly observed that the trial court was right in holding SO ORDERED.
that "the plaintiff may not anymore be judicially compelled to deliver the tractor
to the defendant since after the expiration of the lease period, it is legally LIMITATIONS ON REAL RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP
entitled to its possession, as the owner thereof (p 5, RTC decision; Rollo, p.
31)". It is very clear therefore, that Alim is not entitled to any award of damages 11. Churchill & Tait v Rafferty; G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915.
based on the foregoing facts and evidence presented. Neither can he claim
moral and exemplary damages. The records show that the petitioner was not
able to adduce any evidence before the trial court to prove facts upon which G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915
the award for such damages may be predicated. In fact, even in the petition
and memorandum for the petitioner, there was no discussion of the evidence
upon which Alim relies for his claim.

Moral damages have to do with injury personal to the awardee such a physical FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT, plaintiffs-appellees,
sufferings and the like, while exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good (Makabili v. Court of Appeals, 157 vs.
SCRA 253 [1988]).
JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Indisputably, moral damages cannot generally be awarded in the absence of
bad faith (De Aparico v. Paraguya, 150 SCRA 279 [1987]). Otherwise stated,
moral damages can be awarded if they are the proximate results of a wrongful
act or omission (Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Mendez, 152 SCRA 593
Attorney-General Avancea for appellant.
[1987]), while exemplary damages are not awarded if the defendant had not
acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner (Zenith Insurance
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 398 [1990]), neither can claim for Aitken and DeSelms for appellees.
exemplary damages be granted in the absence of gross or reckless negligence
(De los Santos, et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 51165, June 21, 1990), which
misfeasance is not true in the case at bar.

A replevin bond is simply intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss
that he may suffer by being compelled to surrender the possession of the
disputed property pending the trial of the action. He cannot recover on the
bond as for a reconversion when he has failed to have the judgment entered
for the return of the property. Nor is the surety liable for payment of the
judgment for damages rendered against the plaintiff on a counterclaim or
punitive damages for fraudulent or wrongful acts committed by the plaintiffs
and unconnected with the defendant's deprivation of possession by the
plaintiff. Even where the judgment was that the defendant was entitled to the
property, but no order was made requiring the plaintiff to return it or assessing
damages in default of a return, it was declared that until judgment was entered
that the property should be restored, there could be no liability on the part of
the sureties Sapugay v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 464 [1990]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the
assailed decision is AFFIRMED.
TRENT, J.:
The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits
the defendant and his deputies from collecting and enforcing against the
plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and described in
subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from
destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the
plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may
be, offensive to the sight; and decrees the cancellation of the bond given by
the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the preliminary injunction granted soon
after the commencement of this action.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
This case divides itself into two parts and gives rise to two main questions; (1)
that relating to the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of
the tax complained of, and (2) that relating to the validity of those provisions of
subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, conferring power upon the
Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon
the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
The first question is one of the jurisdiction and is of vital importance to the
Government. The sections of Act No. 2339, which bear directly upon the
subject, are 139 and 140. The first expressly forbids the use of an injunction
to stay the collection of any internal revenue tax; the second provides a remedy
for any wrong in connection with such taxes, and this remedy was intended to
be exclusive, thereby precluding the remedy by injunction, which remedy is
claimed to be constitutional. The two sections, then, involve the right of a
dissatisfied taxpayers to use an exceptional remedy to test the validity of any
tax or to determine any other question connected therewith, and the question
whether the remedy by injunction is exceptional.
Preventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary and are not the usual
remedies. The origin and history of the writ of injunction show that it has always
been regarded as an extraordinary, preventive remedy, as distinguished from
the common course of the law to redress evils after they have been
consummated. No injunction issues as of course, but is granted only upon the
oath of a party and when there is no adequate remedy at law. The Government
does, by section 139 and 140, take away the preventive remedy of injunction,
if it ever existed, and leaves the taxpayer, in a contest with it, the same ordinary
remedial actions which prevail between citizen and citizen. The Attorney-
General, on behalf of the defendant, contends that there is no provisions of the
paramount law which prohibits such a course. While, on the other hand,
counsel for plaintiffs urge that the two sections are unconstitutional because
(a) they attempt to deprive aggrieved taxpayers of all substantial remedy for
the protection of their property, thereby, in effect, depriving them of their
property without due process of law, and (b) they attempt to diminish the
jurisdiction of the courts, as conferred upon them by Acts Nos. 136 and 190,
which jurisdiction was ratified and confirmed by the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902.
In the first place, it has been suggested that section 139 does not apply to the
tax in question because the section, in speaking of a "tax," means only legal
taxes; and that an illegal tax (the one complained of) is not a tax, and,
therefore, does not fall within the inhibition of the section, and may be
restrained by injunction. There is no force in this suggestion. The inhibition
applies to all internal revenue taxes imposes, or authorized to be imposed, by
Act No. 2339. (Snyder vs. Marks, 109 U.S., 189.) And, furthermore, the mere
fact that a tax is illegal, or that the law, by virtue of which it is imposed, is
unconstitutional, does not authorize a court of equity to restrain its collection
by injunction. There must be a further showing that there are special
circumstances which bring the case under some well recognized head of
equity jurisprudence, such as that irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits, or a
cloud upon title to real estate will result, and also that there is, as we have
indicated, no adequate remedy at law. This is the settled law in the United
States, even in the absence of statutory enactments such as sections 139 and
140. (Hannewinkle vs. Mayor, etc., of Georgetown, 82 U.S., 547; Indiana Mfg.
Co. vs. Koehne, 188 U.S., 681; Ohio Tax cases, 232 U. S., 576, 587;
Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R. Co. vs. Board of Public Works, 172 U. S., 32;
Shelton vs. Plat, 139 U.S., 591; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S., 575.)
Therefore, this branch of the case must be controlled by sections 139 and 140,
unless the same be held unconstitutional, and consequently, null and void.
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the
legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid has always
been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts
invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the
interpretation and application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional
questions with great deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the
greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare
a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable
doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a
provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution of the
United States, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict
of the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a
decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative
body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the
contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case
will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution.
To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its
validity. (6 Ruling Case Law, secs. 71, 72, and 73, and cases cited therein.)
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
It is also the settled law in the United States that "due process of law" does not
always require, in respect to the Government, the same process that is
required between citizens, though it generally implies and includes regular
allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some well settled
course of judicial proceedings. The case with which we are dealing is in point.
A citizen's property, both real and personal, may be taken, and usually is taken,
by the government in payment of its taxes without any judicial proceedings
whatever. In this country, as well as in the United States, the officer charged
with the collection of taxes is authorized to seize and sell the property of
delinquent taxpayers without applying to the courts for assistance, and the
constitutionality of the law authorizing this procedure never has been seriously
questioned. (City of Philadelphia vs. [Diehl] The Collector, 5 Wall., 720; Nicholl
vs. U.S., 7 Wall., 122, and cases cited.) This must necessarily be the course,
because it is upon taxation that the Government chiefly relies to obtain the
means to carry on its operations, and it is of the utmost importance that the
modes adopted to enforce the collection of the taxes levied should be
summary and interfered with as little as possible. No government could exist if
every litigious man were permitted to delay the collection of its taxes. This
principle of public policy must be constantly borne in mind in determining cases
such as the one under consideration.
With these principles to guide us, we will proceed to inquire whether there is
any merit in the two propositions insisted upon by counsel for the plaintiffs.
Section 5 of the Philippine Bill provides: "That no law shall be enacted in said
Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the law."
The origin and history of these provisions are well-known. They are found in
substance in the Constitution of the United States and in that of ever state in
the Union.
Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, effective since
1867, provides that: "No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court."
Section 139, with which we have been dealing, reads: "No court shall have
authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any internal-revenue
tax."
A comparison of these two sections show that they are essentially the same.
Both expressly prohibit the restraining of taxes by injunction. If the Supreme
Court of the United States has clearly and definitely held that the provisions of
section 3224 do not violate the "due process of law" and "equal protection of
the law" clauses in the Constitution, we would be going too far to hold that
section 139 violates those same provisions in the Philippine Bill. That the
Supreme Court of the United States has so held, cannot be doubted.
In Cheatham vs. United States (92 U.S., 85,89) which involved the validity of
an income tax levied by an act of Congress prior to the one in issue in the case
of Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (157 U.S., 429) the court, through Mr.
Justice Miller, said: "If there existed in the courts, state or National, any general
power of impeding or controlling the collection of taxes, or relieving the
hardship incident to taxation, the very existence of the government might be
placed in the power of a hostile judiciary. (Dows vs. The City of Chicago, 11
Wall., 108.) While a free course of remonstrance and appeal is allowed within
the departments before the money is finally exacted, the General Government
has wisely made the payment of the tax claimed, whether of customs or of
internal revenue, a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by the party
against whom the tax is assessed. In the internal revenue branch it has further
prescribed that no such suit shall be brought until the remedy by appeal has
been tried; and, if brought after this, it must be within six months after the
decision on the appeal. We regard this as a condition on which alone the
government consents to litigate the lawfulness of the original tax. It is not a
hard condition. Few governments have conceded such a right on any
condition. If the compliance with this condition requires the party aggrieved to
pay the money, he must do it."
Again, in State Railroad Tax Cases (92 U.S., 575, 613), the court said: "That
there might be no misunderstanding of the universality of this principle, it was
expressly enacted, in 1867, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court." (Rev,
Stat., sec. 3224.) And though this was intended to apply alone to taxes levied
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
by the United States, it shows the sense of Congress of the evils to be feared
if courts of justice could, in any case, interfere with the process of collecting
taxes on which the government depends for its continued existence. It is a wise
policy. It is founded in the simple philosophy derived from the experience of
ages, that the payment of taxes has to be enforced by summary and stringent
means against a reluctant and often adverse sentiment; and to do this
successfully, other instrumentalities and other modes of procedure are
necessary, than those which belong to courts of justice."
And again, in Snyder vs. Marks (109 U.S., 189), the court said: "The remedy
of a suit to recover back the tax after it is paid is provided by statute, and a suit
to restrain its collection is forbidden. The remedy so given is exclusive, and no
other remedy can be substituted for it. Such has been the current of decisions
in the Circuit Courts of the United States, and we are satisfied it is a correct
view of the law."itc-a1f
In the consideration of the plaintiffs' second proposition, we will attempt to
show (1) that the Philippine courts never have had, since the American
occupation, the power to restrain by injunction the collection of any tax
imposed by the Insular Government for its own purpose and benefit, and (2)
that assuming that our courts had or have such power, this power has not been
diminished or curtailed by sections 139 and 140.
We will first review briefly the former and present systems of taxation. Upon
the American occupation of the Philippine, there was found a fairly complete
system of taxation. This system was continued in force by the military
authorities, with but few changes, until the Civil Government assumed charge
of the subject. The principal sources of revenue under the Spanish regime
were derived from customs receipts, the so-called industrial taxes, the urbana
taxes, the stamp tax, the personal cedula tax, and the sale of the public
domain. The industrial and urbana taxes constituted practically an income tax
of some 5 per cent on the net income of persons engaged in industrial and
commercial pursuits and on the income of owners of improved city property.
The sale of stamped paper and adhesive stamp tax. The cedula tax was a
graduated tax, ranging from nothing up to P37.50. The revenue derived from
the sale of the public domain was not considered a tax. The American
authorities at once abolished the cedula tax, but later restored it in a modified
form, charging for each cedula twenty centavos, an amount which was
supposed to be just sufficient to cover the cost of issuance. The urbana tax
was abolished by Act No. 223, effective September 6, 1901.
The "Municipal Code" (Act No. 82) and the Provincial Government Act (No.
83), both enacted in 1901, authorize municipal councils and provincial boards
to impose an ad valorem tax on real estate. The Municipal Code did not apply
to the city of Manila. This city was given a special charter (Act No. 183),
effective August 30, 1901; Under this charter the Municipal Board of Manila is
authorized and empowered to impose taxes upon real estate and, like
municipal councils, to license and regulate certain occupations. Customs
matters were completely reorganized by Act No. 355, effective at the port of
Manila on February 7, 1902, and at other ports in the Philippine Islands the
day after the receipt of a certified copy of the Act. The Internal Revenue Law
of 1904 (Act No. 1189), repealed all existing laws, ordinances, etc., imposing
taxes upon the persons, objects, or occupations taxed under that act, and all
industrial taxes and stamp taxes imposed under the Spanish regime were
eliminated, but the industrial tax was continued in force until January 1, 1905.
This Internal Revenue Law did not take away from municipal councils,
provincial boards, and the Municipal Board of the city of Manila the power to
impose taxes upon real estate. This Act (No. 1189), with its amendments, was
repealed by Act No. 2339, an act "revising and consolidating the laws relative
to internal revenue."
Section 84 of Act No. 82 provides that "No court shall entertain any suit
assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this act until the taxpayer shall
have paid, under protest, the taxes assessed against him, . . . ."
This inhibition was inserted in section 17 of Act No. 83 and applies to taxes
imposed by provincial boards. The inhibition was not inserted in the Manila
Charter until the passage of Act No. 1793, effective October 12, 1907. Act No.
355 expressly makes the payment of the exactions claimed a condition
precedent to a resort to the courts by dissatisfied importers. Section 52 of Act
No. 1189 provides "That no courts shall have authority to grant an injunction
restraining the collection of any taxes imposed by virtue of the provisions of
this Act, but the remedy of the taxpayer who claims that he is unjustly assessed
or taxed shall be by payment under protest of the sum claimed from him by the
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
Collector of Internal Revenue and by action to recover back the sum claimed
to have been illegally collected."
Sections 139 and 140 of Act No. 2339 contain, as we have indicated, the same
prohibition and remedy. The result is that the courts have been expressly
forbidden, in every act creating or imposing taxes or imposts enacted by the
legislative body of the Philippines since the American occupation, to entertain
any suit assailing the validity of any tax or impost thus imposed until the tax
shall have been paid under protest. The only taxes which have not been
brought within the express inhibition were those included in that part of the old
Spanish system which completely disappeared on or before January 1, 1905,
and possibly the old customs duties which disappeared in February, 1902.
Section 56 of the Organic Act (No. 136), effective June 16, 1901, provides that
"Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
2. In all civil actions which involve the ... legality of any tax, impost, or
assessment, . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
7. Said courts and their judges, or any of them, shall have power to issue
writs of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus in their respective provinces and districts, in the manner
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), effective October
1, 1901, which deals with the subject of injunctions, are sections 162 to 172,
inclusive. Injunctions, as here defined, are of two kinds; preliminary and final.
The former may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action
and before final judgment, and the latter at the termination of the trial as the
relief or part of the relief prayed for (sec. 162). Any judge of the Supreme Court
may grant a preliminary injunction in any action pending in that court or in any
Court of First Instance. A preliminary injunction may also be granted by a judge
of the Court of First Instance in actions pending in his district in which he has
original jurisdiction (sec. 163). But such injunctions may be granted only when
the complaint shows facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded (sec.
166), and before a final or permanent injunction can be granted, it must appear
upon the trial of the action that the plaintiff is entitled to have commission or
continuance of the acts complained of perpetually restrained (sec. 171). These
provisions authorize the institution in Courts of First Instance of what are
known as "injunction suits," the sole object of which is to obtain the issuance
of a final injunction. They also authorize the granting of injunctions as aiders
in ordinary civil actions. We have defined in Davesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil. Rep.,
273), an injunction to be "A "special remedy" adopted in that code (Act 190)
from American practice, and originally borrowed from English legal procedure,
which was there issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of equity,
and limited, as in other cases where equitable relief is sought, to those cases
where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law,"which will not
be granted while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in
extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done,"which
cannot be compensated in damages . . .
By paragraph 2 of section 56 of Act No. 136, supra, and the provisions of the
various subsequent Acts heretofore mentioned, the Insular Government has
consented to litigate with aggrieved persons the validity of any original tax or
impost imposed by it on condition that this be done in ordinary civil actions
after the taxes or exactions shall have been paid. But it is said that paragraph
2 confers original jurisdiction upon Courts of First Instance to hear and
determine "all civil actions" which involve the validity of any tax, impost or
assessment, and that if the all-inclusive words "all" and "any" be given their
natural and unrestricted meaning, no action wherein that question is involved
can arise over which such courts do not have jurisdiction. (Barrameda vs. Moir,
25 Phil. Rep., 44.) This is true. But the term "civil actions" had its well defined
meaning at the time the paragraph was enacted. The same legislative body
which enacted paragraph 2 on June 16, 1901, had, just a few months prior to
that time, defined the only kind of action in which the legality of any tax imposed
by it might be assailed. (Sec. 84, Act 82, enacted January 31, 1901, and sec.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

17, Act No. 83, enacted February 6, 1901.) That kind of action being payment
of the tax under protest and an ordinary suit to recover and no other, there can
be no doubt that Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over all such actions.
The subsequent legislation on the same subject shows clearly that the
Commission, in enacting paragraph 2, supra, did not intend to change or
modify in any way section 84 of Act No. 82 and section 17 of Act No. 83, but,
on the contrary, it was intended that "civil actions," mentioned in said
paragraph, should be understood to mean, in so far as testing the legality of
taxes were concerned, only those of the kind and character provided for in the
two sections above mentioned. It is also urged that the power to restrain by
injunction the collection of taxes or imposts is conferred upon Courts of First
Instance by paragraph 7 of section 56, supra. This paragraph does empower
those courts to grant injunctions, both preliminary and final, in any civil action
pending in their districts, provided always, that the complaint shows facts
entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded. Injunction suits, such as the one
at bar, are "civil actions," but of a special or extraordinary character. It cannot
be said that the Commission intended to give a broader or different meaning
to the word "action," used in Chapter 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in
connection with injunctions, than it gave to the same word found in paragraph
2 of section 56 of the Organic Act. The Insular Government, in exercising the
power conferred upon it by the Congress of the United States, has declared
that the citizens and residents of this country shall pay certain specified taxes
and imposts. The power to tax necessarily carries with it the power to collect
the taxes. This being true, the weight of authority supports the proposition that
the Government may fix the conditions upon which it will consent to litigate the
validity of its original taxes. (Tennessee vs. Sneed, 96 U.S., 69.)
We must, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 and 7 of section 56 of Act No.
136, construed in the light of the prior and subsequent legislation to which we
have referred, and the legislative and judicial history of the same subject in the
United States with which the Commission was familiar, do not empower Courts
of firs Instance to interfere by injunction with the collection of the taxes in
question in this case.1awphil.net
such circumstances. Legislation forbidding the issuing of injunctions in such
cases is unnecessary. So the only question to be here determined is whether
the remedy provided for in section 140 of Act No. 2339 is adequate. If it is, the
writs which form the basis of this appeal should not have been issued. If this
is the correct view, the authority to issue injunctions will not have been taken
away by section 139, but rendered inoperative only by reason of an adequate
remedy having been made available.
The legislative body of the Philippine Islands has declared from the beginning
(Act No. 82) that payment under protest and suit to recover is an adequate
remedy to test the legality of any tax or impost, and that this remedy is
exclusive. Can we say that the remedy is not adequate or that it is not
exclusive, or both? The plaintiffs in the case at bar are the first, in so far as we
are aware, to question either the adequacy or exclusiveness of this remedy.
We will refer to a few cases in the United States where statutes similar to
sections 139 and 140 have been construed and applied.
In May, 1874, one Bloomstein presented a petition to the circuit court sitting in
Nashville, Tennessee, stating that his real and personal property had been
assessed for state taxes in the year 1872 to the amount of $132.60; that he
tendered to the collector this amount in "funds receivable by law for such
purposes;" and that the collector refused to receive the same. He prayed for
an alternative writ of mandamus to compel the collector to receive the bills in
payment for such taxes, or to show cause to the contrary. To this petition the
collector, in his answer, set up the defense that the petitioner's suit was
expressly prohibited by the Act of the General Assembly of the State of
Tennessee, passed in 1873. The petition was dismissed and the relief prayed
for refused. An appeal to the supreme court of the State resulted in the
affirmance of the judgment of the lower court. The case was then carried to
the Supreme Court of the United States (Tennessee vs. Sneed, 96 U. S., 69),
where the judgment was again affirmed.

If we are in error as to the scope of paragraph 2 and 7, supra, and the

The two sections of the Act of [March 21,] 1873, drawn in question in that
Commission did intend to confer the power upon the courts to restrain the
cases, read as follows:
collection of taxes, it does not necessarily follow that this power or jurisdiction
has been taken away by section 139 of Act No. 2339, for the reason that all
agree that an injunction will not issue in any case if there is an adequate
remedy at law. The very nature of the writ itself prevents its issuance under
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

1. That in all cases in which an officer, charged by law with the collection harsh in this. It is a wise and reasonable precaution for the security of the
of revenue due the State, shall institute any proceeding, or take any steps for Government."
the collection of the same, alleged or claimed to be due by said officer from
any citizen, the party against whom the proceeding or step is taken shall, if he
conceives the same to be unjust or illegal, or against any statute or clause of
the Constitution of the State, pay the same under protest; and, upon his making
Thomas C. Platt commenced an action in the Circuit Court of the United States
said payment, the officer or collector shall pay such revenue into the State
for the Eastern District of Tennessee to restrain the collection of a license tax
Treasury, giving notice at the time of payment to the Comptroller that the same
from the company which he represented. The defense was that sections 1 and
was paid under protest; and the party paying said revenue may, at any time
2 of the Act of 1873, supra, prohibited the bringing of that suit. This case also
within thirty days after making said payment, and not longer thereafter, sue the
reached the Supreme Court of the United States. (Shelton vs. Platt, 139 U.
said officer having collected said sum, for the recovery thereof. And the same
591.) In speaking of the inhibitory provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the Act of
may be tried in any court having the jurisdiction of the amount and parties; and, 1873, the court said: "This Act has been sanctioned and applied by the Courts
if it be determined that the same was wrongfully collected, as not being due of Tennessee. (Nashville vs. Smith, 86 Tenn., 213; Louisville & N. R. Co. vs.
from said party to the State, for any reason going to the merits of the same,
State, 8 Heisk., 663, 804.) It is, as counsel observe, similar to the Act of
then the court trying the case may certify of record that the same was
Congress forbidding suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
wrongfully paid and ought to be refunded; and thereupon the Comptroller shall
collection of taxes under the Internal Revenue Laws, in respect to which this
issue his warrant for the same, which shall be paid in preference to other
court held that the remedy by suit to recover back the tax after payment,
claims on the Treasury. provided for by the Statute, was exclusive. (Snyder vs. Marks, of this character
has been called for by the embarrassments resulting from the improvident
employment of the writ of injunction in arresting the collection of the public
revenue; and, even in its absence, the strong arm of the court of chancery
2. That there shall be no other remedy, in any case of the collection of ought not to be interposed in that direction except where resort to that court is
revenue, or attempt to collect revenue illegally, or attempt to collect revenue in grounded upon the settled principles which govern its jurisdiction."
funds only receivable by said officer under the law, the same being other or
different funds than such as the tax payer may tender, or claim the right to pay,
than that above provided; and no writ for the prevention of the collection of any
revenue claimed, or to hinder or delay the collection of the same, shall in
In Louisville & N.R. Co. vs. State (8 Heisk. [64 Tenn.], 663, 804), cited by the
anywise issue, either injunction, supersedeas, prohibition, or any other writ or
Supreme Court of the United States in Shelton vs. Platt, supra, the court said:
process whatever; but in all cases in which, for any reason, any person shall
"It was urged that this statute (sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1873, supra) is
claim that the tax so collected was wrongfully or illegally collected, the remedy
unconstitutional and void, as it deprives the citizen of the remedy by certiorari,
for said party shall be as above provided, and in no other manner."
guaranteed by the organic law."

In discussing the adequacy of the remedy provided by the Tennessee

By the 10th section of the sixth article of the Constitution, [Tennessee] it is
Legislature, as above set forth, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
provided that: "The judges or justices of inferior courts of law and equity shall
case just cited, said: "This remedy is simple and effective. A suit at law to
have power in all civil cases to issue writs of certiorari, to remove any cause,
recover money unlawfully exacted is as speedy, as easily tried, and less
or the transcript of the record thereof, from any inferior jurisdiction into such
complicated than a proceeding by mandamus. ... In revenue cases, whether
court of law, on sufficient cause, supported by oath or affirmation."
arising upon its (United States) Internal Revenue Laws or those providing for
the collection of duties upon foreign imports, it (United States) adopts the rule
prescribed by the State of Tennessee. It requires the contestant to pay the
amount as fixed by the Government, and gives him power to sue the collector,
and in such suit to test the legality of the tax. There is nothing illegal or even
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
The court held the act valid as not being in conflict with these provisions of the
State constitution.
In Eddy vs. The Township of Lee (73 Mich., 123), the complainants sought to
enjoin the collection of certain taxes for the year 1886. The defendants, in
support of their demurrer, insisted that the remedy by injunction had been
taken away by section 107 of the Act of 1885, which section reads as follows:
"No injunction shall issue to stay proceedings for the assessment or collection
of taxes under this Act."
It was claimed by the complainants that the above quoted provisions of the Act
of 1885 were unconstitutional and void as being in conflict with article 6, sec.
8, of the Constitution, which provides that: "The circuit courts shall have
original jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, not excepted in this
Constitution, and not prohibited by law. ... They shall also have power to issue
writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and
other writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees."
Mr. Justice Champlin, speaking for the court, said: "I have no doubt that the
Legislature has the constitutional authority, where it has provided a plain,
adequate, and complete remedy at law to recover back taxes illegally
assessed and collected, to take away the remedy by injunction to restrain their
collection."
Section 9 of the Philippine Bill reads in part as follows: "That the Supreme
Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess
and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction
as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to
the power of said Government to change the practice and method of
procedure."
It will be seen that this section has not taken away from the Philippine
Government the power to change the practice and method of procedure. If
sections 139 and 140, considered together, and this must always be done, are
nothing more than a mode of procedure, then it would seem that the
Legislature did not exceed its constitutional authority in enacting them.
Conceding for the moment that the duly authorized procedure for the
determination of the validity of any tax, impost, or assessment was by
injunction suits and that this method was available to aggrieved taxpayers prior
to the passage of Act No. 2339, may the Legislature change this method of
procedure? That the Legislature has the power to do this, there can be no
doubt, provided some other adequate remedy is substituted in lieu thereof. In
speaking of the modes of enforcing rights created by contracts, the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Tennessee vs. Sneed, supra, said: "The rule
seems to be that in modes of proceedings and of forms to enforce the contract
the Legislature has the control, and may enlarge, limit or alter them, provided
that it does not deny a remedy, or so embarrass it with conditions and
restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the right."
In that case the petitioner urged that the Acts of 1873 were laws impairing the
obligation of the contract contained in the charter of the Bank of Tennessee,
which contract was entered into with the State in 1838. It was claimed that this
was done by placing such impediments and obstructions in the way of its
enforcement, thereby so impairing the remedies as practically to render the
obligation of no value. In disposing of this contention, the court said: "If we
assume that prior to 1873 the relator had authority to prosecute his claim
against the State by mandamus, and that by the statutes of that year the further
use of that form was prohibited to him, the question remains. whether an
effectual remedy was left to him or provided for him. We think the regulation of
the statute gave him an abundant means of enforcing such right as he
possessed. It provided that he might pay his claim to the collector under
protest, giving notice thereof to the Comptroller of the Treasury; that at any
time within thirty days thereafter he might sue the officer making the collection;
that the case should be tried by any court having jurisdiction and, if found in
favor of the plaintiff on the merits, the court should certify that the same was
wrongfully paid and ought to be refunded and the Comptroller should
thereupon issue his warrant therefor, which should be paid in preference to
other claim on the Treasury."
But great stress is laid upon the fact that the plaintiffs in the case under
consideration are unable to pay the taxes assessed against them and that if
the law is enforced, they will be compelled to suspend business. This point
may be best answered by quoting from the case of Youngblood vs. Sexton (32
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
Mich., 406), wherein Judge Cooley, speaking for the court, said: "But if this
consideration is sufficient to justify the transfer of a controversy from a court of
law to a court of equity, then every controversy where money is demanded
may be made the subject of equitable cognizance. To enforce against a dealer
a promissory note may in some cases as effectually break up his business as
to collect from him a tax of equal amount. This is not what is known to the law
as irreparable injury. The courts have never recognized the consequences of
the mere enforcement of a money demand as falling within that category."
Certain specified sections of Act No. 2339 were amended by Act No. 2432,
enacted December 23, 1914, effective January 1, 1915, by imposing increased
and additional taxes. Act No. 2432 was amended, were ratified by the
Congress of the United States on March 4, 1915. The opposition manifested
against the taxes imposed by Acts Nos. 2339 and 2432 is a matter of local
history. A great many business men thought the taxes thus imposed were too
high. If the collection of the new taxes on signs, signboards, and billboards
may be restrained, we see no well-founded reason why injunctions cannot be
granted restraining the collection of all or at least a number of the other
increased taxes. The fact that this may be done, shows the wisdom of the
Legislature in denying the use of the writ of injunction to restrain the collection
of any tax imposed by the Acts. When this was done, an equitable remedy was
made available to all dissatisfied taxpayers.
The question now arises whether, the case being one of which the court below
had no jurisdiction, this court, on appeal, shall proceed to express an opinion
upon the validity of provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339,
imposing the taxes complained of. As a general rule, an opinion on the merits
of a controversy ought to be declined when the court is powerless to give the
relief demanded. But it is claimed that this case is, in many particulars,
exceptional. It is true that it has been argued on the merits, and there is no
reason for any suggestion or suspicion that it is not a bona fide controversy.
The legal points involved in the merits have been presented with force,
clearness, and great ability by the learned counsel of both sides. If the law
assailed were still in force, we would feel that an opinion on its validity would
be justifiable, but, as the amendment became effective on January 1, 1915,
we think it advisable to proceed no further with this branch of the case.
The next question arises in connection with the supplementary complaint, the
object of which is to enjoin the Collector of Internal Revenue from removing
certain billboards, the property of the plaintiffs located upon private lands in
the Province of Rizal. The plaintiffs allege that the billboards here in question
"in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health,
morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons." The
defendant denies these allegations in his answer and claims that after due
investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls,
he "decided that the billboard complained of was and still is offensive to the
sight, and is otherwise a nuisance." The plaintiffs proved by Mr. Churchill that
the "billboards were quite a distance from the road and that they were strongly
built, not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no advertising
matter which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the community."
The defendant presented no testimony upon this point. In the agreed
statement of facts submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs "admit that the
billboards mentioned were and still are offensive to the sight."
The pertinent provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339 read:
"If after due investigation the Collector of Internal Revenue shall decide that
any sign, signboard, or billboard displayed or exposed to public view is
offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance, he may by summary order
direct the removal of such sign, signboard, or billboard, and if same is not
removed within ten days after he has issued such order he my himself cause
its removal, and the sign, signboard, or billboard shall thereupon be forfeited
to the Government, and the owner thereof charged with the expenses of the
removal so effected. When the sign, signboard, or billboard ordered to be
removed as herein provided shall not comply with the provisions of the general
regulations of the Collector of Internal Revenue, no rebate or refund shall be
allowed for any portion of a year for which the tax may have been paid.
Otherwise, the Collector of Internal Revenue may in his discretion make a
proportionate refund of the tax for the portion of the year remaining for which
the taxes were paid. An appeal may be had from the order of the Collector of
Internal Revenue to the Secretary of Finance and Justice whose decision
thereon shall be final."
The Attorney-General, on behalf of the defendant, says: "The question which
the case presents under this head for determination, resolves itself into this
inquiry: Is the suppression of advertising signs displayed or exposed to public
view, which are admittedly offensive to the sight, conducive to the public
interest?"
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
And cunsel for the plaintiffs states the question thus: "We contend that that
portion of section 100 of Act No. 2339, empowering the Collector of Internal
Revenue to remove billboards as nuisances, if objectionable to the sight, is
unconstitutional, as constituting a deprivation of property without due process
of law."
From the position taken by counsel for both sides, it is clear that our inquiry is
limited to the question whether the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a
legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government; for all property is
held subject to that power.
As a consequence of the foregoing, all discussion and authorities cited, which
go to the power of the state to authorize administrative officers to find, as a
fact, that legitimate trades, callings, and businesses are, under certain
circumstances, statutory nuisances, and whether the procedure prescribed for
this purpose is due process of law, are foreign to the issue here presented.
There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine
Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by
the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the
foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature
which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police
power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without
doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper
consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not
be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute their own views for
what is proper in the premises for those of the Legislature. In Munn vs. Illinois
(94 U.S., 113), the United States Supreme Court states the rule thus: "If no
state of circumstances could exist to justify such statute, then we may declare
this one void because in excess of the legislative power of this state; but if it
could, we must presume it did. Of the propriety of legislative interference,
within the scope of the legislative power, a legislature is the exclusive judge."
This rule very fully discussed and declared in Powell vs. Pennsylvania (127
U.S., 678) "oleo-margarine" case. (See also Crowley vs. Christensen, 137
U.S., 86, 87; Camfield vs. U.S., 167 U.S., 518.) While the state may interfere
wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion
is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interest
of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of
such interests; yet, its determination in these matters is not final or conclusive,
but is subject to the supervision of the courts. (Lawton vs. Steele, 152 U.S.,
133.) Can it be said judicially that signs, signboards, and billboards, which are
admittedly offensive to the sight, are not with the category of things which
interfere with the public safety, welfare, and comfort, and therefore beyond the
reach of the police power of the Philippine Government?
The numerous attempts which have been made to limit by definition the scope
of the police power are only interesting as illustrating its rapid extension within
comparatively recent years to points heretofore deemed entirely within the field
of private liberty and property rights. Blackstone's definition of the police power
was as follows: "The due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom,
whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well governed family,
are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good
neigborhood, and good manners, to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in
their respective stations." (Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 162.)
Chanceller Kent considered the police power the authority of the state "to
regulate unwholesome trades, slaughter houses, operations offensive to the
senses." Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts defined it as follows: "The
power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
of the subjects of the same." (Com. vs. Alger, 7 Cush., 53.)
In the case of Butchers' Union Slaughter-house, etc. Co. vs. Crescent City Live
Stock Landing, etc. Co. (111 U.S., 746), it was suggested that the public health
and public morals are matters of legislative concern of which the legislature
cannot divest itself. (See State vs. Mountain Timber Co. [1913], 75 Wash.,
581, where these definitions are collated.)
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
In Champer vs. Greencastle (138 Ind., 339), it was said: "The police power of
the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said,
however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe
regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience
and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of
the organic law." (Quoted with approval in Hopkins vs. Richmond [Va., 1915],
86 S.E., 139.)
In Com. vs. Plymouth Coal Co. ([1911] 232 Pa., 141), it was said: "The police
power of the state is difficult of definition, but it has been held by the courts to
be the right to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health,
protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which does not
encroach on a like power vested in congress or state legislatures by the federal
constitution, or does not violate the provisions of the organic law; and it has
been expressly held that the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution
was not designed to interfere with the exercise of that power by the state."
In People vs. Brazee ([Mich., 1914], 149 N.W., 1053), it was said: "It [the police
power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned
affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he
greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely
declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of
this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social
conditions demand correction."
In 8 Cyc., 863, it is said: "Police power is the name given to that inherent
sovereignty which it is the right and duty of the government or its agents to
exercise whenever public policy, in a broad sense, demands, for the benefit of
society at large, regulations to guard its morals, safety, health, order or to
insure in any respect such economic conditions as an advancing civilization of
a high complex character requires." (As quoted with approval in Stettler vs.
O'Hara [1914], 69 Ore, 519.)
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States has said in Noble State Bank
vs. Haskell (219 U.S. [1911], 575: "It may be said in a general way that the
police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of
what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and
preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public
welfare."
This statement, recent as it is, has been quoted with approval by several
courts. (Cunningham vs. Northwestern Imp. Co. [1911], 44 Mont., 180; State
vs. Mountain Timber Co. [1913], 75 Wash., 581; McDavid vs. Bank of Bay
Minette [Ala., 1915], 69 Sou., 452; Hopkins vs. City of Richmond [Va., 1915],
86 S.E., 139; State vs. Philipps [Miss. 1915], 67 Sou., 651.)
It was said in Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 85), per Shaw, C.J., that: "It is much
easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power
than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise." In Stone vs.
Mississippi (101 U.S., 814), it was said: "Many attempts have been made in
this court and elsewhere to define the police power, but never with entire
success. It is always easier to determine whether a particular case comes
within the general scope of the power, than to give an abstract definition of the
power itself, which will be in all respects accurate."
Other courts have held the same vow of efforts to evolve a satisfactory
definition of the police power. Manifestly, definitions which fail to anticipate
cases properly within the scope of the police power are deficient. It is
necessary, therefore, to confine our discussion to the principle involved and
determine whether the cases as they come up are within that principle. The
basic idea of civil polity in the United States is that government should interfere
with individual effort only to the extent necessary to preserve a healthy social
and economic condition of the country. State interference with the use of
private property may be exercised in three ways. First, through the power of
taxation, second, through the power of eminent domain, and third, through the
police power. Buy the first method it is assumed that the individual receives
the equivalent of the tax in the form of protection and benefit he receives from
the government as such. By the second method he receives the market value
of the property taken from him. But under the third method the benefits he
derived are only such as may arise from the maintenance of a healthy
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

economic standard of society and is often referred to as damnum absque employer by controlling the prices of his product may shift the burden to the
injuria. (Com. vs. Plymouth Coal Co. 232 Pa., 141; Bemis vs. Guirl Drainage community. Laws requiring state banks to join in establishing a depositors'
Co., 182 Ind., 36.) There was a time when state interference with the use of guarantee fund have also been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court in Noble
private property under the guise of the police power was practically confined State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U. S., 104), and Assaria State Bank vs. Dolley
to the suppression of common nuisances. At the present day, however, (219 U.S., 121).
industry is organized along lines which make it possible for large combinations
of capital to profit at the expense of the socio-economic progress of the nation
by controlling prices and dictating to industrial workers wages and conditions
of labor. Not only this but the universal use of mechanical contrivances by
Offensive noises and smells have been for a long time considered susceptible
producers and common carriers has enormously increased the toll of human
of suppression in thickly populated districts. Barring livery stables from such
life and limb in the production and distribution of consumption goods. To the
locations was approved of in Reinman vs. Little Rock (U.S. Sup. Ct. [Apr. 5,
extent that these businesses affect not only the public health, safety, and 1915], U.S. Adv. Opns., p. 511). And a municipal ordinance was recently
morals, but also the general social and economic life of the nation, it has been upheld (People vs. Ericsson, 263 Ill., 368), which prohibited the location of
and will continue to be necessary for the state to interfere by regulation. By so
garages within two hundred feet of any hospital, church, or school, or in any
doing, it is true that the enjoyment of private property is interfered with in no
block used exclusively for residential purposes, unless the consent of the
small degree and in ways that would have been considered entirely
majority of the property owners be obtained. Such statutes as these are usually
unnecessary in years gone by. The regulation of rates charged by common
upheld on the theory of safeguarding the public health. But we apprehend that
carriers, for instance, or the limitation of hours of work in industrial
in point of fact they have little bearing upon the health of the normal person,
establishments have only a very indirect bearing upon the public health, safety,
but a great deal to do with his physical comfort and convenience and not a little
and morals, but do bear directly upon social and economic conditions. To
to do with his peace of mind. Without entering into the realm of psychology,
permit each individual unit of society to feel that his industry will bring a fair
we think it quite demonstrable that sight is as valuable to a human being as
return; to see that his work shall be done under conditions that will not either
any of his other senses, and that the proper ministration to this sense conduces
immediately or eventually ruin his health; to prevent the artificial inflation of as much to his contentment as the care bestowed upon the senses of hearing
prices of the things which are necessary for his physical well being are matters or smell, and probably as much as both together. Objects may be offensive to
which the individual is no longer capable of attending to himself. It is within the
the eye as well as to the nose or ear. Man's esthetic feelings are constantly
province of the police power to render assistance to the people to the extent
being appealed to through his sense of sight. Large investments have been
that may be necessary to safeguard these rights. Hence, laws providing for the
made in theaters and other forms of amusement, in paintings and spectacular
regulation of wages and hours of labor of coal miners (Rail & River Coal Co.
displays, the success of which depends in great part upon the appeal made
vs. Taylor, 234 U.S., 224); requiring payment of employees of railroads and
through the sense of sight. Moving picture shows could not possible without
other industrial concerns in legal tender and requiring salaries to be paid
the sense of sight. Governments have spent millions on parks and boulevards
semimonthly (Erie R.R. Co. vs. Williams, 233 U.S., 685); providing a maximum
and other forms of civic beauty, the first aim of which is to appeal to the sense
number of hours of labor for women (Miller vs. Wilson, U.S. Sup. Ct. [Feb. 23,
of sight. Why, then, should the Government not interpose to protect from
1915], Adv. Opns., p. 342); prohibiting child labor (Sturges & Burn vs.
annoyance this most valuable of man's senses as readily as to protect him
Beauchamp, 231 U.S., 320); restricting the hours of labor in public laundries
from offensive noises and smells?
(In re Wong Wing, 167 Cal., 109); limiting hours of labor in industrial
establishment generally (State vs. Bunting, 71 Ore., 259); Sunday Closing
Laws (State vs. Nicholls [Ore., 1915], 151 Pac., 473; People vs. C. Klinck
Packing Co. [N.Y., 1915], 108 N. E., 278; Hiller vs. State [Md., 1914], 92 Atl.,
842; State vs. Penny, 42 Mont., 118; City of Springfield vs. Richter, 257 Ill., The advertising industry is a legitimate one. It is at the same time a cause and
578, 580; State vs. Hondros [S.C., 1915], 84 S.E., 781); have all been upheld an effect of the great industrial age through which the world is now passing.
as a valid exercise of the police power. Again, workmen's compensation laws Millions are spent each year in this manner to guide the consumer to the
have been quite generally upheld. These statutes discard the common law articles which he needs. The sense of sight is the primary essential to
theory that employers are not liable for industrial accidents and make them advertising success. Billboard advertising, as it is now conducted, is a
responsible for all accidents resulting from trade risks, it being considered that comparatively recent form of advertising. It is conducted out of doors and along
such accidents are a legitimate charge against production and that the the arteries of travel, and compels attention by the strategic locations of the
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
boards, which obstruct the range of vision at points where travelers are most
likely to direct their eyes. Beautiful landscapes are marred or may not be seen
at all by the traveler because of the gaudy array of posters announcing a
particular kind of breakfast food, or underwear, the coming of a circus, an
incomparable soap, nostrums or medicines for the curing of all the ills to which
the flesh is heir, etc. It is quite natural for people to protest against this
indiscriminate and wholesale use of the landscape by advertisers and the
intrusion of tradesmen upon their hours of leisure and relaxation from work.
Outdoor life must lose much of its charm and pleasure if this form of advertising
is permitted to continue unhampered until it converts the streets and highways
into veritable canyons through which the world must travel in going to work or
in search of outdoor pleasure.
The success of billboard advertising depends not so much upon the use of
private property as it does upon the use of the channels of travel used by the
general public. Suppose that the owner of private property, who so vigorously
objects to the restriction of this form of advertising, should require the
advertiser to paste his posters upon the billboards so that they would face the
interior of the property instead of the exterior. Billboard advertising would die
a natural death if this were done, and its real dependency not upon the
unrestricted use of private property but upon the unrestricted use of the public
highways is at once apparent. Ostensibly located on private property, the real
and sole value of the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares.
Hence, we conceive that the regulation of billboards and their restriction is not
so much a regulation of private property as it is a regulation of the use of the
streets and other public thoroughfares.
We would not be understood as saying that billboard advertising is not a
legitimate business any more than we would say that a livery stable or an
automobile garage is not. Even a billboard is more sightly than piles of rubbish
or an open sewer. But all these businesses are offensive to the senses under
certain conditions.
It has been urged against ministering to the sense of sight that tastes are so
diversified that there is no safe standard of legislation in this direction. We
answer in the language of the Supreme Court in Noble State Bank vs. Haskell
(219 U.S., 104), and which has already been adopted by several state courts
(see supra), that "the prevailing morality or strong and preponderating opinion"
demands such legislation. The agitation against the unrestrained development
of the billboard business has produced results in nearly all the countries of
Europe. (Ency. Britannica, vol. 1, pp. 237-240.) Many drastic ordinances and
state laws have been passed in the United States seeking to make the
business amenable to regulation. But their regulation in the United states is
hampered by what we conceive an unwarranted restriction upon the scope of
the police power by the courts. If the police power may be exercised to
encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the
comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects,
everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police
power. A source of annoyance and irritation to the public does not minister to
the comfort and convenience of the public. And we are of the opinion that the
prevailing sentiment is manifestly against the erection of billboards which are
offensive to the sight.
We do not consider that we are in conflict with the decision in Eubank vs.
Richmond (226 U.S., 137), where a municipal ordinance establishing a
building line to which property owners must conform was held unconstitutional.
As we have pointed out, billboard advertising is not so much a use of private
property as it is a use of the public thoroughfares. It derives its value to the
power solely because the posters are exposed to the public gaze. It may well
be that the state may not require private property owners to conform to a
building line, but may prescribe the conditions under which they shall make
use of the adjoining streets and highways. Nor is the law in question to be held
invalid as denying equal protection of the laws. In Keokee Coke Co. vs. Taylor
(234 U.S., 224), it was said: "It is more pressed that the act discriminates
unconstitutionally against certain classes. But while there are differences of
opinion as to the degree and kind of discrimination permitted by the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is established by repeated decisions that a statute aimed at
what is deemed an evil, and hitting it presumably where experience shows it
to be most felt, is not to be upset by thinking up and enumerating other
instances to which it might have been applied equally well, so far as the court
can see. That is for the legislature to judge unless the case is very clear."
But we have not overlooked the fact that we are not in harmony with the highest
courts of a number of the states in the American Union upon this point. Those
courts being of the opinion that statutes which are prompted and inspired by
esthetic considerations merely, having for their sole purpose the promotion
and gratification of the esthetic sense, and not the promotion or protection of
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

the public safety, the public peace and good order of society, must be held MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
invalid and contrary to constitutional provisions holding inviolate the rights of
private property. Or, in other words, the police power cannot interfere with
private property rights for purely esthetic purposes. The courts, taking this
view, rest their decisions upon the proposition that the esthetic sense is
This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary
disassociated entirely from any relation to the public health, morals, comfort,
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of
or general welfare and is, therefore, beyond the police power of the state. But
Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to
we are of the opinion, as above indicated, that unsightly advertisements or
declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10,
signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not
1977, of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated
disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a
August 15, 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.
new principle, but carrying a well recognized principle to further application.
(Fruend on Police Power, p. 166.)

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and
the action dismissed upon the merits, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates
of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any
other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace
Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of
TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public
convenience.

12. Taxicab Operators v Board of Transportation; G.R. No. L-59234;

September 30, 1982.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:

G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO

and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners,
Old and Dilapidated Taxis
vs.

THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE

BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION, respondents.
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and
comfortable units are used as public conveyances;
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again,
complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and
dilapidated taxis;
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort,
convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis
should be adopted;
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation,
the latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only
covered the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his
investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that
no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the
same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations:
1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are
ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be
registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only
taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for
operation;
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered
withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and
operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973
and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and
every year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:
1980 Model 1974
1981 Model 1975, etc.
All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered
withdrawn from public service as of the last day of registration of each
particular year and their respective plates shall be surrendered directly to the
Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation
Commission.
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein
shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside
Metro- Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented
in Metro-Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 1
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15,
1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel
of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and
formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted
for registration as public conveyances. To quote said Circular:
Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over
six (6) years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro
Manila. As such the units involved should be considered as automatically
dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further dropping
order from the BOT.
Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models
over 6 years old shall be refused registration. The following schedule of phase-
out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of all concerned:
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

Year Model 1977

Automatic Phase-Out Year

etc.

1980 etc.

1974 Strict compliance here is desired. 2

1981 In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration

year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and
those of model 1974, in 1981.

1975

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as
Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its
implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and
1982
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models
which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation.

1976

On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and
Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was
1983 heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and
documentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested that they would
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

submit additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March (2) Substantive due process; and
27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation,
Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for
Resolution." 3
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and
standard?

On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a

"Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying
that the case be resolved or decided not later than December 10, 1981 to
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have
under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs
are phased-out on January 1, 1982.

Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power

Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the

case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located.
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations,
practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and
followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the
following queries were posed for consideration by this Court:

Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to

A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars
in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby
safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the
implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars
violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
follow in the exercise of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers granted in the
preceding section, the Board shag proceed promptly along the method of
legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may
require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the
Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support
agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able
to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any
policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position
papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons
that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other
suitable means of inquiry.
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process,
petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to submit their position
papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the
issuance of the questioned BOT Circular.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded
the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information
or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory
that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers
or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being
only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary
authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were
deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that
public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing
the challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances are not the only
primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither
violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel
and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):
Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally
required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty,
when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has
to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general
rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons
or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is
arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends
upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and,
therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at
the time of registration. As public contend, however, it is impractical to subject
every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that
it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion,
and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to
apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years
supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by
that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on
investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for
safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are
in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight
hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of
arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
On Equal Protection of the Law:
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal
protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only
and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be
pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein
shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside
Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented
in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 4
In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars
in Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process of
conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby
dismissed. No costs.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that
taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to
heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge.
Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial SO ORDERED.
distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly
be successfully claimed. 13. Republic v Castellvi; G.R. No. L-20620; August 15, 1974.

G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974

As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the
overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things
hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property
rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities vs.
imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority
to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
interests are disregarded". 7

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation
services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause
does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies
to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification C.A. Mendoza & A. V. Raquiza and Alberto Cacnio & Associates for defendant-
of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based appellees.
on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must
apply equally to each member of the class. 8 What is required under the equal
protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons
under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment
both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged
Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from
any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil
of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. 10 Case No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as
the Republic) filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against
defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the
estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over
a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga,
described as follows:
A parcel of land, Lot No. 199-B Bureau of Lands Plan Swo 23666. Bounded
on the NE by Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun; on the SE by national road; on the
SW by AFP reservation, and on the NW by AFP reservation. Containing an
area of 759,299 square meters, more or less, and registered in the name of
Alfonso Castellvi under TCT No. 13631 of the Register of Pampanga ...;
and against defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun (hereinafter
referred to as Toledo-Gozun over two parcels of land described as follows:
A parcel of land (Portion Lot Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd, 26254. Bounded
on the NE by Lot 3, on the SE by Lot 3; on the SW by Lot 1-B, Blk. 2 (equivalent
to Lot 199-B Swo 23666; on the NW by AFP military reservation. Containing
an area of 450,273 square meters, more or less and registered in the name of
Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun under TCT No. 8708 of the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga. ..., and
A parcel of land (Portion of lot 3, Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd 26254.
Bounded on the NE by Lot No. 3, on the SE by school lot and national road,
on the SW by Lot 1-B Blk 2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo 23666), on the NW
by Lot 1-B, Blk-1. Containing an area of 88,772 square meters, more or less,
and registered in the name of Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun under TCT No. 8708
of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, ....
In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market
value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal
for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a
total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of
the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take
immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the
Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints three
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for
the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a
final order of condemnation.
On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of
the lands at P259,669.10.
In her "motion to dismiss" filed on July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged, among other
things, that the land under her administration, being a residential land, had a
fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market value of
P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been, despite repeated
demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby
preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by
way of unrealized profits. This defendant prayed that the complaint be
dismissed, or that the Republic be ordered to pay her P15.00 per square meter,
or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereon at 6% per annum from July
1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered to pay her P5,000,000.00 as unrealized
profits, and the costs of the suit.
By order of the trial court, dated August, 1959, Amparo C. Diaz, Dolores G.
viuda de Gil, Paloma Castellvi, Carmen Castellvi, Rafael Castellvi, Luis
Castellvi, Natividad Castellvi de Raquiza, Jose Castellvi and Consuelo
Castellvi were allowed to intervene as parties defendants. Subsequently,
Joaquin V. Gozun, Jr., husband of defendant Nieves Toledo Gozun, was also
allowed by the court to intervene as a party defendant.
After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga
the amount of P259,669.10, the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed
in possession of the lands. The Republic was actually placed in possession of
the lands on August 10,
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
1959.1
In her "motion to dismiss", dated October 22, 1959, Toledo-Gozun alleged,
among other things, that her two parcels of land were residential lands, in fact
a portion with an area of 343,303 square meters had already been subdivided
into different lots for sale to the general public, and the remaining portion had
already been set aside for expansion sites of the already completed
subdivisions; that the fair market value of said lands was P15.00 per square
meter, so they had a total market value of P8,085,675.00; and she prayed that
the complaint be dismissed, or that she be paid the amount of P8,085,675.00,
plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from October 13, 1959, and
attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
Intervenors Jose Castellvi and Consuelo Castellvi in their answer, filed on
February 11, 1960, and also intervenor Joaquin Gozun, Jr., husband of
defendant Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun, in his motion to dismiss, dated May
27, 1960, all alleged that the value of the lands sought to be expropriated was
at the rate of P15.00 per square meter.
On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as
provisional value of her lands.2 On May 16, 1960 the trial Court authorized the
Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Castellvi the amount of
P151,859.80 as provisional value of the land under her administration, and
ordered said defendant to deposit the amount with the Philippine National
Bank under the supervision of the Deputy Clerk of Court. In another order of
May 16, 1960 the trial Court entered an order of condemnation.3
The trial Court appointed three commissioners: Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, Clerk of
Court, as commissioner for the court; Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan,
counsel of the Philippine National Bank Branch at Floridablanca, for the
plaintiff; and Atty. Leonardo F. Lansangan, Filipino legal counsel at Clark Air
Base, for the defendants. The Commissioners, after having qualified
themselves, proceeded to the performance of their duties.
On March 15,1961 the Commissioners submitted their report and
recommendation, wherein, after having determined that the lands sought to be
expropriated were residential lands, they recommended unanimously that the
lowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the
lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun; that an additional P5,000.00 be paid to
Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land; that legal interest on the
compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the
amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be
awarded.4 The Commissioners' report was objected to by all the parties in the
case by defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, who insisted that the fair
market value of their lands should be fixed at P15.00 per square meter; and
by the Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the lands should
be fixed at P0.20 per square meter.5
After the parties-defendants and intervenors had filed their respective
memoranda, and the Republic, after several extensions of time, had adopted
as its memorandum its objections to the report of the Commissioners, the trial
court, on May 26, 1961, rendered its decision6 the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, taking into account all the foregoing circumstances, and that
the lands are titled, ... the rising trend of land values ..., and the lowered
purchasing power of the Philippine peso, the court finds that the unanimous
recommendation of the commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter
for the three lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair and just.
xxx xxx xxx
The plaintiff will pay 6% interest per annum on the total value of the lands of
defendant Toledo-Gozun since (sic) the amount deposited as provisional value
from August 10, 1959 until full payment is made to said defendant or deposit
therefor is made in court.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
In respect to the defendant Castellvi, interest at 6% per annum will also be
paid by the plaintiff to defendant Castellvi from July 1, 1956 when plaintiff
commenced its illegal possession of the Castellvi land when the instant action
had not yet been commenced to July 10, 1959 when the provisional value
thereof was actually deposited in court, on the total value of the said (Castellvi)
land as herein adjudged. The same rate of interest shall be paid from July 11,
1959 on the total value of the land herein adjudged minus the amount
deposited as provisional value, or P151,859.80, such interest to run until full
payment is made to said defendant or deposit therefor is made in court. All the
intervenors having failed to produce evidence in support of their respective
interventions, said interventions are ordered dismissed.
The costs shall be charged to the plaintiff.
On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or
reconsideration, upon the grounds of newly-discovered evidence, that the
decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the decision was against
the law, against which motion defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed
their respective oppositions. On July 8, 1961 when the motion of the Republic
for new trial and/or reconsideration was called for hearing, the Republic filed a
supplemental motion for new trial upon the ground of additional newly-
discovered evidence. This motion for new trial and/or reconsideration was
denied by the court on July 12, 1961.
On July 17, 1961 the Republic gave notice of its intention to appeal from the
decision of May 26, 1961 and the order of July 12, 1961. Defendant Castellvi
also filed, on July 17, 1961, her notice of appeal from the decision of the trial
court.
The Republic filed various ex-parte motions for extension of time within which
to file its record on appeal. The Republic's record on appeal was finally
submitted on December 6, 1961.
Defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed not only a joint opposition to the
approval of the Republic's record on appeal, but also a joint memorandum in
support of their opposition. The Republic also filed a memorandum in support
of its prayer for the approval of its record on appeal. On December 27, 1961
the trial court issued an order declaring both the record on appeal filed by the
Republic, and the record on appeal filed by defendant Castellvi as having been
filed out of time, thereby dismissing both appeals.
On January 11, 1962 the Republic filed a "motion to strike out the order of
December 27, 1961 and for reconsideration", and subsequently an amended
record on appeal, against which motion the defendants Castellvi and Toledo-
Gozun filed their opposition. On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an order,
stating that "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly
and finally determined by the Supreme Court," and at the same time it ordered
the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal containing copies of orders
and pleadings specified therein. In an order dated November 19, 1962, the trial
court approved the Republic's record on appeal as amended.
Defendant Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Defendant Toledo-Gozun did
not appeal.
The motion to dismiss the Republic's appeal was reiterated by appellees
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun before this Court, but this Court denied the
motion.
In her motion of August 11, 1964, appellee Castellvi sought to increase the
provisional value of her land. The Republic, in its comment on Castellvi's
motion, opposed the same. This Court denied Castellvi's motion in a resolution
dated October 2,1964.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
The motion of appellees, Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, dated October 6, 1969,
praying that they be authorized to mortgage the lands subject of expropriation,
was denied by this Court or October 14, 1969.
On February 14, 1972, Attys. Alberto Cacnio, and Associates, counsel for the
estate of the late Don Alfonso de Castellvi in the expropriation proceedings,
filed a notice of attorney's lien, stating that as per agreement with the
administrator of the estate of Don Alfonso de Castellvi they shall receive by
way of attorney's fees, "the sum equivalent to ten per centum of whatever the
court may finally decide as the expropriated price of the property subject matter
of the case."
---------
Before this Court, the Republic contends that the lower court erred:
1. In finding the price of P10 per square meter of the lands subject of the
instant proceedings as just compensation;
2. In holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation
commenced with the filing of this action;
3. In ordering plaintiff-appellant to pay 6% interest on the adjudged value
of the Castellvi property to start from July of 1956;
4. In denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.
In its brief, the Republic discusses the second error assigned as the first issue
to be considered. We shall follow the sequence of the Republic's discussion.
1. In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in holding
that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the
filing of the complaint in this case, the Republic argues that the "taking" should
be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement
between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right
and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease,
and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value
should be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements
amounting to more that half a million pesos constructed during a period of
twelve years on the land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed
pattern of permanency and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force
in the interest of national Security.7
Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property
under the power of eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1)
entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more
than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such
a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. This appellee argues that in the instant case the first element is
wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to
year; that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was
paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract
of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the
premises "at the value at the time of occupancy."8
Appellee Toledo-Gozun did not comment on the Republic's argument in
support of the second error assigned, because as far as she was concerned
the Republic had not taken possession of her lands prior to August 10, 1959.9
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
In order to better comprehend the issues raised in the appeal, in so far as the
Castellvi property is concerned, it should be noted that the Castellvi property
had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of
lease, typified by the contract marked Exh. 4-Castellvi, the pertinent portions
of which read:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
This AGREEMENT OF LEASE MADE AND ENTERED into by and between
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ALFONSO DE CASTELLVI, represented by
CARMEN M. DE CASTELLVI, Judicial Administratrix ... hereinafter called the
LESSOR and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by MAJ.
GEN. CALIXTO DUQUE, Chief of Staff of the ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, hereinafter called the LESSEE,
WITNESSETH:
1. For and in consideration of the rentals hereinafter reserved and the
mutual terms, covenants and conditions of the parties, the LESSOR has, and
by these presents does, lease and let unto the LESSEE the following
described land together with the improvements thereon and appurtenances
thereof, viz:
Un Terreno, Lote No. 27 del Plano de subdivision Psu 34752, parte de la
hacienda de Campauit, situado en el Barrio de San Jose, Municipio de
Floridablanca Pampanga. ... midiendo una extension superficial de cuatro
milliones once mil cuatro cientos trienta y cinco (4,001,435) [sic] metros
cuadrados, mas o menos.
Out of the above described property, 75.93 hectares thereof are actually
occupied and covered by this contract. .
Above lot is more particularly described in TCT No. 1016, province of
Pampanga ...
of which premises, the LESSOR warrants that he/she/they/is/are the
registered owner(s) and with full authority to execute a contract of this nature.
2. The term of this lease shall be for the period beginning July 1, 1952
the date the premises were occupied by the PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE, AFP
until June 30, 1953, subject to renewal for another year at the option of the
LESSEE or unless sooner terminated by the LESSEE as hereinafter provided.
3. The LESSOR hereby warrants that the LESSEE shall have quiet,
peaceful and undisturbed possession of the demised premises throughout the
full term or period of this lease and the LESSOR undertakes without cost to
the LESSEE to eject all trespassers, but should the LESSOR fail to do so, the
LESSEE at its option may proceed to do so at the expense of the LESSOR.
The LESSOR further agrees that should he/she/they sell or encumber all or
any part of the herein described premises during the period of this lease, any
conveyance will be conditioned on the right of the LESSEE hereunder.
4. The LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR as monthly rentals under this
lease the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS & 58/100 (P455.58)
...
5. The LESSEE may, at any time prior to the termination of this lease,
use the property for any purpose or purposes and, at its own costs and
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
expense make alteration, install facilities and fixtures and errect additions ...
which facilities or fixtures ... so placed in, upon or attached to the said premises
shall be and remain property of the LESSEE and may be removed therefrom
by the LESSEE prior to the termination of this lease. The LESSEE shall
surrender possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of this
lease and if so required by the LESSOR, shall return the premises in
substantially the same condition as that existing at the time same were first
occupied by the AFP, reasonable and ordinary wear and tear and damages by
the elements or by circumstances over which the LESSEE has no control
excepted: PROVIDED, that if the LESSOR so requires the return of the
premises in such condition, the LESSOR shall give written notice thereof to
the LESSEE at least twenty (20) days before the termination of the lease and
provided, further, that should the LESSOR give notice within the time specified
above, the LESSEE shall have the right and privilege to compensate the
LESSOR at the fair value or the equivalent, in lieu of performance of its
obligation, if any, to restore the premises. Fair value is to be determined as the
value at the time of occupancy less fair wear and tear and depreciation during
the period of this lease.
6. The LESSEE may terminate this lease at any time during the term
hereof by giving written notice to the LESSOR at least thirty (30) days in
advance ...
7. The LESSEE should not be responsible, except under special
legislation for any damages to the premises by reason of combat operations,
acts of GOD, the elements or other acts and deeds not due to the negligence
on the part of the LESSEE.
8. This LEASE AGREEMENT supersedes and voids any and all
agreements and undertakings, oral or written, previously entered into between
the parties covering the property herein leased, the same having been merged
herein. This AGREEMENT may not be modified or altered except by
instrument in writing only duly signed by the parties. 10
It was stipulated by the parties, that "the foregoing contract of lease (Exh. 4,
Castellvi) is 'similar in terms and conditions, including the date', with the annual
contracts entered into from year to year between defendant Castellvi and the
Republic of the Philippines (p. 17, t.s.n., Vol. III)". 11 It is undisputed, therefore,
that the Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by virtue of the
above-mentioned contract, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year
to June 30 of the succeeding year) under the terms and conditions therein
stated.
Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic
sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to
vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract, on July 11,
1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the
heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in
question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the
general public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from
receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned in substantially the same
condition as before occupancy (Exh. 5 Castellvi). A follow-up letter was sent
on January 12, 1957, demanding the delivery and return of the property within
one month from said date (Exh. 6 Castellvi). On January 30, 1957, Lieutenant
General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi,
saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the
permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that
were erected and already established on the property, and that, there being
no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation
proceedings would be recommended to the President (Exhibit "7" Castellvi).
Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 1458, to eject the Philippine Air Force from the
land. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted these
expropriation proceedings, and, as stated earlier in this opinion, the Republic
was placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959, On November 21,
1959, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, dismissed Civil Case No. 1458,
upon petition of the parties, in an order which, in part, reads as follows:
1. Plaintiff has agreed, as a matter of fact has already signed an
agreement with defendants, whereby she has agreed to receive the rent of the
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
lands, subject matter of the instant case from June 30, 1966 up to 1959 when
the Philippine Air Force was placed in possession by virtue of an order of the
Court upon depositing the provisional amount as fixed by the Provincial
Appraisal Committee with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga;
2. That because of the above-cited agreement wherein the administratrix
decided to get the rent corresponding to the rent from 1956 up to 1959 and
considering that this action is one of illegal detainer and/or to recover the
possession of said land by virtue of non-payment of rents, the instant case now
has become moot and academic and/or by virtue of the agreement signed by
plaintiff, she has waived her cause of action in the above-entitled case. 12
The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's property should be deemed
as of the year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement. In American
Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on the subject of "Eminent
Domain, we read the definition of "taking" (in eminent domain) as follows:
Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as
entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under
the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. 13
Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be
present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is
present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the
Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's
duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); "lasting a very
short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring at every
moment" (Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The word
"momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property
should be construed to mean "a limited period" not indefinite or permanent.
The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from
year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and
considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed
some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry
into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from
year to year by consent of 'The owner of the land. By express provision of the
lease agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in
substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied
by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land
permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent
improvements. But this "intention" cannot prevail over the clear and express
terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the language
employed by the parties, and the terms 'of the contract, when unambiguous,
as in the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of
mistake or fraud the question being not what the intention was, but what is
expressed in the language used. (City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53 Phil.
515, 525); Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Myrick, 71 Phil. 344, 348). Moreover, in
order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous
and subsequent acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If
the intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently
Castellvi's property, why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year
basis? Why was the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not
the Republic expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the
Republic itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the
same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a jet
air base? 14 It might really have been the intention of the Republic to
expropriate the lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere notice
- much less an implied notice of such intention on the part of the Republic
to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not, bind the landowner,
nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually commenced in court
(Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461, 484).
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
the instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as
lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance
of the property being devoted to public use is present because the property
was used by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In
the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization
of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease
contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby
the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was
terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of
the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying,
Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint
for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the
Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit
in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of
property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance
and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite
period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted
from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the
Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract between
the parties was one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in reality a more
or less permanent right to occupy the premises under the guise of lease with
the 'right and privilege' to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate
the lease," and "the right to buy the property is merged as an integral part of
the lease relationship ... so much so that the fair market value has been agreed
upon, not, as of the time of purchase, but as of the time of occupancy" 15 We
cannot accept the Republic's contention that a lease on a year to year basis
can give rise to a permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision
a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land in the
instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Article
1669, Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may
be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated (Rule 67,
Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it be accepted that the Republic would
enter into a contract of lease where its real intention was to buy, or why the
Republic should enter into a simulated contract of lease ("under the guise of
lease", as expressed by counsel for the Republic) when all the time the
Republic had the right of eminent domain, and could expropriate Castellvi's
land if it wanted to without resorting to any guise whatsoever. Neither can we
see how a right to buy could be merged in a contract of lease in the absence
of any agreement between the parties to that effect. To sustain the contention
of the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby in order to secure a low price
for a land which the government intends to expropriate (or would eventually
expropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of the land to lease the land
(for say ten or twenty years) then expropriate the same when the lease is about
to terminate, then claim that the "taking" of the property for the purposes of the
expropriation be reckoned as of the date when the Government started to
occupy the property under the lease, and then assert that the value of the
property being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the lease, in spite
of the fact that the value of the property, for many good reasons, had in the
meantime increased during the period of the lease. This would be sanctioning
what obviously is a deceptive scheme, which would have the effect of depriving
the owner of the property of its true and fair market value at the time when the
expropriation proceedings were actually instituted in court. The Republic's
claim that it had the "right and privilege" to buy the property at the value that it
had at the time when it first occupied the property as lessee nowhere appears
in the lease contract. What was agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of the
lease agreement was that, should the lessor require the lessee to return the
premises in the same condition as at the time the same was first occupied by
the AFP, the lessee would have the "right and privilege" (or option) of paying
the lessor what it would fairly cost to put the premises in the same condition
as it was at the commencement of the lease, in lieu of the lessee's
performance of the undertaking to put the land in said condition. The "fair
value" at the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease agreement, does not
refer to the value of the property if bought by the lessee, but refers to the cost
of restoring the property in the same condition as of the time when the lessee
took possession of the property. Such fair value cannot refer to the purchase
price, for purchase was never intended by the parties to the lease contract. It
is a rule in the interpretation of contracts that "However general the terms of a
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended
to agree" (Art. 1372, Civil Code).
We hold, therefore, that the "taking" of the Castellvi property should not be
reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same
pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for
the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of
the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it
held that the "taking" of the property under expropriation commenced with the
filing of the complaint in this case.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation"
is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has
ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1
SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic
was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court,
on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of
determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as
of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
Regarding the two parcels of land of Toledo-Gozun, also sought to be
expropriated, which had never been under lease to the Republic, the Republic
was placed in possession of said lands, also by authority of the court, on
August 10, 1959, The taking of those lands, therefore, must also be reckoned
as of June 26, 1959, the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain.
2. Regarding the first assigned error discussed as the second issue
the Republic maintains that, even assuming that the value of the
expropriated lands is to be determined as of June 26, 1959, the price of P10.00
per square meter fixed by the lower court "is not only exhorbitant but also
unconscionable, and almost fantastic". On the other hand, both Castellvi and
Toledo-Gozun maintain that their lands are residential lands with a fair market
value of not less than P15.00 per square meter.
The lower court found, and declared, that the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-
Gozun are residential lands. The finding of the lower court is in consonance
with the unanimous opinion of the three commissioners who, in their report to
the court, declared that the lands are residential lands.
The Republic assails the finding that the lands are residential, contending that
the plans of the appellees to convert the lands into subdivision for residential
purposes were only on paper, there being no overt acts on the part of the
appellees which indicated that the subdivision project had been commenced,
so that any compensation to be awarded on the basis of the plans would be
speculative. The Republic's contention is not well taken. We find evidence
showing that the lands in question had ceased to be devoted to the production
of agricultural crops, that they had become adaptable for residential purposes,
and that the appellees had actually taken steps to convert their lands into
residential subdivisions even before the Republic filed the complaint for
eminent domain. In the case of City of Manila vs. Corrales (32 Phil. 82, 98) this
Court laid down basic guidelines in determining the value of the property
expropriated for public purposes. This Court said:
In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same
consideration are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private
parties. The inquiry, in such cases, must be what is the property worth in the
market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time
applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted, that is to
say, What is it worth from its availability for valuable uses?
So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into account in
determining the value of property condemned for public purposes, that it is
practically impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all
cases. Exceptional circumstances will modify the most carefully guarded rule,
but, as a general thing, we should say that the compensation of the owner is
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
to be estimated by reference to the use for which the property is suitable,
having regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as
may be reasonably expected in the immediate future. (Miss. and Rum River
Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U.S., 403).
In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the right to
its value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market. 17 The
owner may thus show every advantage that his property possesses, present
and prospective, in order that the price it could be sold for in the market may
be satisfactorily determined. 18 The owner may also show that the property is
suitable for division into village or town lots. 19
The trial court, therefore, correctly considered, among other circumstances,
the proposed subdivision plans of the lands sought to be expropriated in
finding that those lands are residential lots. This finding of the lower court is
supported not only by the unanimous opinion of the commissioners, as
embodied in their report, but also by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of the
province of Pampanga composed of the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial
Auditor and the District Engineer. In the minutes of the meeting of the
Provincial Appraisal Committee, held on May 14, 1959 (Exh. 13-Castellvi) We
read in its Resolution No. 10 the following:
3. Since 1957 the land has been classified as residential in view of its
proximity to the air base and due to the fact that it was not being devoted to
agriculture. In fact, there is a plan to convert it into a subdivision for residential
purposes. The taxes due on the property have been paid based on its
classification as residential land;
The evidence shows that Castellvi broached the idea of subdividing her land
into residential lots as early as July 11, 1956 in her letter to the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. (Exh. 5-Castellvi) As a matter of fact,
the layout of the subdivision plan was tentatively approved by the National
Planning Commission on September 7, 1956. (Exh. 8-Castellvi). The land of
Castellvi had not been devoted to agriculture since 1947 when it was leased
to the Philippine Army. In 1957 said land was classified as residential, and
taxes based on its classification as residential had been paid since then (Exh.
13-Castellvi). The location of the Castellvi land justifies its suitability for a
residential subdivision. As found by the trial court, "It is at the left side of the
entrance of the Basa Air Base and bounded on two sides by roads (Exh. 13-
Castellvi), paragraphs 1 and 2, Exh. 12-Castellvi), the poblacion, (of
Floridablanca) the municipal building, and the Pampanga Sugar Mills are
closed by. The barrio schoolhouse and chapel are also near (T.S.N. November
23,1960, p. 68)." 20
The lands of Toledo-Gozun (Lot 1-B and Lot 3) are practically of the same
condition as the land of Castellvi. The lands of Toledo-Gozun adjoin the land
of Castellvi. They are also contiguous to the Basa Air Base, and are along the
road. These lands are near the barrio schoolhouse, the barrio chapel, the
Pampanga Sugar Mills, and the poblacion of Floridablanca (Exhs. 1, 3 and 4-
Toledo-Gozun). As a matter of fact, regarding lot 1-B it had already been
surveyed and subdivided, and its conversion into a residential subdivision was
tentatively approved by the National Planning Commission on July 8, 1959
(Exhs. 5 and 6 Toledo-Gozun). As early as June, 1958, no less than 32 man
connected with the Philippine Air Force among them commissioned officers,
non-commission officers, and enlisted men had requested Mr. and Mrs.
Joaquin D. Gozun to open a subdivision on their lands in question (Exhs. 8, 8-
A to 8-ZZ-Toledo-Gozun). 21
We agree with the findings, and the conclusions, of the lower court that the
lands that are the subject of expropriation in the present case, as of August
10, 1959 when the same were taken possession of by the Republic, were
residential lands and were adaptable for use as residential subdivisions.
Indeed, the owners of these lands have the right to their value for the use for
which they would bring the most in the market at the time the same were taken
from them. The most important issue to be resolved in the present case relates
to the question of what is the just compensation that should be paid to the
appellees.
The Republic asserts that the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is
P.20 per square meter. The Republic cites the case of Republic vs. Narciso,
et al., L-6594, which this Court decided on May 18, 1956. The Narciso case
involved lands that belonged to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, and to one
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
Donata Montemayor, which were expropriated by the Republic in 1949 and
which are now the site of the Basa Air Base. In the Narciso case this Court
fixed the fair market value at P.20 per square meter. The lands that are sought
to be expropriated in the present case being contiguous to the lands involved
in the Narciso case, it is the stand of the Republic that the price that should be
fixed for the lands now in question should also be at P.20 per square meter.
We can not sustain the stand of the Republic. We find that the price of P.20
per square meter, as fixed by this Court in the Narciso case, was based on the
allegation of the defendants (owners) in their answer to the complaint for
eminent domain in that case that the price of their lands was P2,000.00 per
hectare and that was the price that they asked the court to pay them. This
Court said, then, that the owners of the land could not be given more than what
they had asked, notwithstanding the recommendation of the majority of the
Commission on Appraisal which was adopted by the trial court that the
fair market value of the lands was P3,000.00 per hectare. We also find that the
price of P.20 per square meter in the Narciso case was considered the fair
market value of the lands as of the year 1949 when the expropriation
proceedings were instituted, and at that time the lands were classified as sugar
lands, and assessed for taxation purposes at around P400.00 per hectare, or
P.04 per square meter. 22 While the lands involved in the present case, like
the lands involved in the Narciso case, might have a fair market value of P.20
per square meter in 1949, it can not be denied that ten years later, in 1959,
when the present proceedings were instituted, the value of those lands had
increased considerably. The evidence shows that since 1949 those lands were
no longer cultivated as sugar lands, and in 1959 those lands were already
classified, and assessed for taxation purposes, as residential lands. In 1959
the land of Castellvi was assessed at P1.00 per square meter. 23
The Republic also points out that the Provincial Appraisal Committee of
Pampanga, in its resolution No. 5 of February 15, 1957 (Exhibit D),
recommended the sum of P.20 per square meter as the fair valuation of the
Castellvi property. We find that this resolution was made by the Republic the
basis in asking the court to fix the provisional value of the lands sought to be
expropriated at P259,669.10, which was approved by the court. 24 It must be
considered, however, that the amount fixed as the provisional value of the
lands that are being expropriated does not necessarily represent the true and
correct value of the land. The value is only "provisional" or "tentative", to serve
as the basis for the immediate occupancy of the property being expropriated
by the condemnor. The records show that this resolution No. 5 was repealed
by the same Provincial Committee on Appraisal in its resolution No. 10 of May
14, 1959 (Exhibit 13-Castellvi). In that resolution No. 10, the appraisal
committee stated that "The Committee has observed that the value of the land
in this locality has increased since 1957 ...", and recommended the price of
P1.50 per square meter. It follows, therefore, that, contrary to the stand of the
Republic, that resolution No. 5 of the Provincial Appraisal Committee can not
be made the basis for fixing the fair market value of the lands of Castellvi and
Toledo-Gozun.
The Republic further relied on the certification of the Acting Assistant Provincial
Assessor of Pampanga, dated February 8, 1961 (Exhibit K), to the effect that
in 1950 the lands of Toledo-Gozun were classified partly as sugar land and
partly as urban land, and that the sugar land was assessed at P.40 per square
meter, while part of the urban land was assessed at P.40 per square meter
and part at P.20 per square meter; and that in 1956 the Castellvi land was
classified as sugar land and was assessed at P450.00 per hectare, or P.045
per square meter. We can not also consider this certification of the Acting
Assistant Provincial Assessor as a basis for fixing the fair market value of the
lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun because, as the evidence shows, the
lands in question, in 1957, were already classified and assessed for taxation
purposes as residential lands. The certification of the assessor refers to the
year 1950 as far as the lands of Toledo-Gozun are concerned, and to the year
1956 as far as the land of Castellvi is concerned. Moreover, this Court has held
that the valuation fixed for the purposes of the assessment of the land for
taxation purposes can not bind the landowner where the latter did not intervene
in fixing it. 25
On the other hand, the Commissioners, appointed by the court to appraise the
lands that were being expropriated, recommended to the court that the price
of P10.00 per square meter would be the fair market value of the lands. The
commissioners made their recommendation on the basis of their observation
after several ocular inspections of the lands, of their own personal knowledge
of land values in the province of Pampanga, of the testimonies of the owners
of the land, and other witnesses, and of documentary evidence presented by
the appellees. Both Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun testified that the fair market
value of their respective land was at P15.00 per square meter. The
documentary evidence considered by the commissioners consisted of deeds
of sale of residential lands in the town of San Fernando and in Angeles City,
in the province of Pampanga, which were sold at prices ranging from P8.00 to
P20.00 per square meter (Exhibits 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23-Castellvi).
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
The commissioners also considered the decision in Civil Case No. 1531 of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, entitled Republic vs. Sabina Tablante,
which was expropriation case filed on January 13, 1959, involving a parcel of
land adjacent to the Clark Air Base in Angeles City, where the court fixed the
price at P18.00 per square meter (Exhibit 14-Castellvi). In their report, the
commissioners, among other things, said:
... This expropriation case is specially pointed out, because the circumstances
and factors involved therein are similar in many respects to the defendants'
lands in this case. The land in Civil Case No. 1531 of this Court and the lands
in the present case (Civil Case No. 1623) are both near the air bases, the Clark
Air Base and the Basa Air Base respectively. There is a national road fronting
them and are situated in a first-class municipality. As added advantage it may
be said that the Basa Air Base land is very near the sugar mill at Del Carmen,
Floridablanca, Pampanga, owned by the Pampanga Sugar Mills. Also just
stone's throw away from the same lands is a beautiful vacation spot at Palacol,
a sitio of the town of Floridablanca, which counts with a natural swimming pool
for vacationists on weekends. These advantages are not found in the case of
the Clark Air Base. The defendants' lands are nearer to the poblacion of
Floridablanca then Clark Air Base is nearer (sic) to the poblacion of Angeles,
Pampanga.
The deeds of absolute sale, according to the undersigned commissioners, as
well as the land in Civil Case No. 1531 are competent evidence, because they
were executed during the year 1959 and before August 10 of the same year.
More specifically so the land at Clark Air Base which coincidentally is the
subject matter in the complaint in said Civil Case No. 1531, it having been filed
on January 13, 1959 and the taking of the land involved therein was ordered
by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on January 15, 1959, several
months before the lands in this case were taken by the plaintiffs ....
From the above and considering further that the lowest as well as the highest
price per square meter obtainable in the market of Pampanga relative to
subdivision lots within its jurisdiction in the year 1959 is very well known by the
Commissioners, the Commission finds that the lowest price that can be
awarded to the lands in question is P10.00 per square meter. 26
The lower court did not altogether accept the findings of the Commissioners
based on the documentary evidence, but it considered the documentary
evidence as basis for comparison in determining land values. The lower court
arrived at the conclusion that "the unanimous recommendation of the
commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter for the three lots of the
defendants subject of this action is fair and just". 27 In arriving at its conclusion,
the lower court took into consideration, among other circumstances, that the
lands are titled, that there is a rising trend of land values, and the lowered
purchasing power of the Philippine peso.
In the case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326, 328, this Court
said:
A court of first instance or, on appeal, the Supreme Court, may change or
modify the report of the commissioners by increasing or reducing the amount
of the award if the facts of the case so justify. While great weight is attached
to the report of the commissioners, yet a court may substitute therefor its
estimate of the value of the property as gathered from the record in certain
cases, as, where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them, or where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either palpably
inadequate or excessive. 28
The report of the commissioners of appraisal in condemnation proceedings
are not binding, but merely advisory in character, as far as the court is
concerned. 29 In our analysis of the report of the commissioners, We find
points that merit serious consideration in the determination of the just
compensation that should be paid to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun for their
lands. It should be noted that the commissioners had made ocular inspections
of the lands and had considered the nature and similarities of said lands in
relation to the lands in other places in the province of Pampanga, like San
Fernando and Angeles City. We cannot disregard the observations of the
commissioners regarding the circumstances that make the lands in question
suited for residential purposes their location near the Basa Air Base, just
like the lands in Angeles City that are near the Clark Air Base, and the facilities
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
that obtain because of their nearness to the big sugar central of the Pampanga
Sugar mills, and to the flourishing first class town of Floridablanca. It is true
that the lands in question are not in the territory of San Fernando and Angeles
City, but, considering the facilities of modern communications, the town of
Floridablanca may be considered practically adjacent to San Fernando and
Angeles City. It is not out of place, therefore, to compare the land values in
Floridablanca to the land values in San Fernando and Angeles City, and form
an idea of the value of the lands in Floridablanca with reference to the land
values in those two other communities.
The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the owner is awarded
the just compensation for his property. We have carefully studied the record,
and the evidence, in this case, and after considering the circumstances
attending the lands in question We have arrived at the conclusion that the price
of P10.00 per square meter, as recommended by the commissioners and
adopted by the lower court, is quite high. It is Our considered view that the
price of P5.00 per square meter would be a fair valuation of the lands in
question and would constitute a just compensation to the owners thereof. In
arriving at this conclusion We have particularly taken into consideration the
resolution of the Provincial Committee on Appraisal of the province of
Pampanga informing, among others, that in the year 1959 the land of Castellvi
could be sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per square meter, while the land of
Toledo-Gozun could be sold for from P2.50 to P3.00 per square meter. The
Court has weighed all the circumstances relating to this expropriations
proceedings, and in fixing the price of the lands that are being expropriated the
Court arrived at a happy medium between the price as recommended by the
commissioners and approved by the court, and the price advocated by the
Republic. This Court has also taken judicial notice of the fact that the value of
the Philippine peso has considerably gone down since the year 1959. 30
Considering that the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are adjoining each
other, and are of the same nature, the Court has deemed it proper to fix the
same price for all these lands.
3. The third issue raised by the Republic relates to the payment of
interest. The Republic maintains that the lower court erred when it ordered the
Republic to pay Castellvi interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the total
amount adjudged as the value of the land of Castellvi, from July 1, 1956 to July
10, 1959. We find merit in this assignment of error.
In ordering the Republic to pay 6% interest on the total value of the land of
Castellvi from July 1, 1956 to July 10, 1959, the lower court held that the
Republic had illegally possessed the land of Castellvi from July 1, 1956, after
its lease of the land had expired on June 30, 1956, until August 10, 1959 when
the Republic was placed in possession of the land pursuant to the writ of
possession issued by the court. What really happened was that the Republic
continued to occupy the land of Castellvi after the expiration of its lease on
June 30, 1956, so much so that Castellvi filed an ejectment case against the
Republic in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. 31 However, while that
ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed the complaint for eminent
domain in the present case and was placed in possession of the land on
August 10, 1959, and because of the institution of the expropriation
proceedings the ejectment case was later dismissed. In the order dismissing
the ejectment case, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga said:
Plaintiff has agreed, as a matter of fact has already signed an agreement with
defendants, whereby she had agreed to receive the rent of the lands, subject
matter of the instant case from June 30, 1956 up to 1959 when the Philippine
Air Force was placed in possession by virtue of an order of the Court upon
depositing the provisional amount as fixed by the Provincial Appraisal
Committee with the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga; ...
If Castellvi had agreed to receive the rentals from June 30, 1956 to August 10,
1959, she should be considered as having allowed her land to be leased to the
Republic until August 10, 1959, and she could not at the same time be entitled
to the payment of interest during the same period on the amount awarded her
as the just compensation of her land. The Republic, therefore, should pay
Castellvi interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the value of her land, minus
the provisional value that was deposited, only from July 10, 1959 when it
deposited in court the provisional value of the land.
4. The fourth error assigned by the Republic relates to the denial by the
lower court of its motion for a new trial based on nearly discovered evidence.
We do not find merit in this assignment of error.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
After the lower court had decided this case on May 26, 1961, the Republic filed
a motion for a new trial, supplemented by another motion, both based upon
the ground of newly discovered evidence. The alleged newly discovered
evidence in the motion filed on June 21, 1961 was a deed of absolute sale-
executed on January 25, 1961, showing that a certain Serafin Francisco had
sold to Pablo L. Narciso a parcel of sugar land having an area of 100,000
square meters with a sugar quota of 100 piculs, covered by P.A. No. 1701,
situated in Barrio Fortuna, Floridablanca, for P14,000, or P.14 per square
meter.
In the supplemental motion, the alleged newly discovered evidence were: (1)
a deed of sale of some 35,000 square meters of land situated at Floridablanca
for P7,500.00 (or about P.21 per square meter) executed in July, 1959, by the
spouses Evelyn D. Laird and Cornelio G. Laird in favor of spouses Bienvenido
S. Aguas and Josefina Q. Aguas; and (2) a deed of absolute sale of a parcel
of land having an area of 4,120,101 square meters, including the sugar quota
covered by Plantation Audit No. 161 1345, situated at Floridablanca,
Pampanga, for P860.00 per hectare (a little less than P.09 per square meter)
executed on October 22, 1957 by Jesus Toledo y Mendoza in favor of the Land
Tenure Administration.
We find that the lower court acted correctly when it denied the motions for a
new trial.
To warrant the granting of a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, it must appear that the evidence was discovered after the trial; that
even with the exercise of due diligence, the evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial; and that the evidence is of such a nature
as to alter the result of the case if admitted. 32 The lower court correctly ruled
that these requisites were not complied with.
The lower court, in a well-reasoned order, found that the sales made by Serafin
Francisco to Pablo Narciso and that made by Jesus Toledo to the Land Tenure
Administration were immaterial and irrelevant, because those sales covered
sugarlands with sugar quotas, while the lands sought to be expropriated in the
instant case are residential lands. The lower court also concluded that the land
sold by the spouses Laird to the spouses Aguas was a sugar land.
We agree with the trial court. In eminent domain proceedings, in order that
evidence as to the sale price of other lands may be admitted in evidence to
prove the fair market value of the land sought to be expropriated, the lands
must, among other things, be shown to be similar.
But even assuming, gratia argumenti, that the lands mentioned in those deeds
of sale were residential, the evidence would still not warrant the grant of a new
trial, for said evidence could have been discovered and produced at the trial,
and they cannot be considered newly discovered evidence as contemplated in
Section 1(b) of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Regarding this point, the trial
court said:
The Court will now show that there was no reasonable diligence employed.
The land described in the deed of sale executed by Serafin Francisco, copy of
which is attached to the original motion, is covered by a Certificate of Title
issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. There is no
question in the mind of the court but this document passed through the Office
of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the title or annotating
the sale on the certificate of title. It is true that Fiscal Lagman went to the Office
of the Register of Deeds to check conveyances which may be presented in the
evidence in this case as it is now sought to be done by virtue of the motions at
bar, Fiscal Lagman, one of the lawyers of the plaintiff, did not exercise
reasonable diligence as required by the rules. The assertion that he only went
to the office of the Register of Deeds 'now and then' to check the records in
that office only shows the half-hazard [sic] manner by which the plaintiff looked
for evidence to be presented during the hearing before the Commissioners, if
it is at all true that Fiscal Lagman did what he is supposed to have done
according to Solicitor Padua. It would have been the easiest matter for plaintiff
to move for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directing the Register of
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
Deeds of Pampanga to come to testify and to bring with him all documents
found in his office pertaining to sales of land in Floridablanca adjacent to or
near the lands in question executed or recorded from 1958 to the present.
Even this elementary precaution was not done by plaintiff's numerous
attorneys.
The same can be said of the deeds of sale attached to the supplementary
motion. They refer to lands covered by certificate of title issued by the Register
of Deeds of Pampanga. For the same reason they could have been easily
discovered if reasonable diligence has been exerted by the numerous lawyers
of the plaintiff in this case. It is noteworthy that all these deeds of sale could
be found in several government offices, namely, in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Pampanga, the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Pampanga,
the Office of the Clerk of Court as a part of notarial reports of notaries public
that acknowledged these documents, or in the archives of the National Library.
In respect to Annex 'B' of the supplementary motion copy of the document
could also be found in the Office of the Land Tenure Administration, another
government entity. Any lawyer with a modicum of ability handling this
expropriation case would have right away though [sic] of digging up documents
diligently showing conveyances of lands near or around the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated in this case in the offices that would have naturally
come to his mind such as the offices mentioned above, and had counsel for
the movant really exercised the reasonable diligence required by the Rule'
undoubtedly they would have been able to find these documents and/or
caused the issuance of subpoena duces tecum. ...
It is also recalled that during the hearing before the Court of the Report and
Recommendation of the Commissioners and objection thereto, Solicitor Padua
made the observation:
I understand, Your Honor, that there was a sale that took place in this place of
land recently where the land was sold for P0.20 which is contiguous to this
land.
The Court gave him permission to submit said document subject to the
approval of the Court. ... This was before the decision was rendered, and later
promulgated on May 26, 1961 or more than one month after Solicitor Padua
made the above observation. He could have, therefore, checked up the alleged
sale and moved for a reopening to adduce further evidence. He did not do so.
He forgot to present the evidence at a more propitious time. Now, he seeks to
introduce said evidence under the guise of newly-discovered evidence.
Unfortunately the Court cannot classify it as newly-discovered evidence,
because tinder the circumstances, the correct qualification that can be given
is 'forgotten evidence'. Forgotten however, is not newly-discovered
evidence. 33
The granting or denial of a motion for new trial is, as a general rule,
discretionary with the trial court, whose judgment should not be disturbed
unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. 34 We do not see any
abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court when it denied the motions
for a new trial.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows:
(a) the lands of appellees Carmen Vda. de Castellvi and Maria Nieves
Toledo-Gozun, as described in the complaint, are declared expropriated for
public use;
(b) the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is fixed at P5.00 per
square meter;
(c) the Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the sum of P3,796,495.00 as
just compensation for her one parcel of land that has an area of 759,299
square meters, minus the sum of P151,859.80 that she withdrew out of the
amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of the land, with
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

interest at the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full
payment is made or deposited in court;
Manuel Villaruel, Jr. and Feliciano Tumale for respondents.

(d) the Republic must pay appellee Toledo-Gozun the sum of

P2,695,225.00 as the just compensation for her two parcels of land that have
a total area of 539,045 square meters, minus the sum of P107,809.00 that she
withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
of her lands, with interest at the rate of 6%, per annum from July 10, 1959 until
the day full payment is made or deposited in court; (e) the attorney's lien of
Atty. Alberto Cacnio is enforced; and

This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance
No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void.
(f) the costs should be paid by appellant Republic of the Philippines, as
provided in Section 12, Rule 67, and in Section 13, Rule 141, of the Rules of
Court.

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING

THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE
MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE
VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
14. City Govt of Quezon City v Ericta; G.R. No. L-34915; June 24, 1983.

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to
be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six
CITY, petitioners, months from the date of approval of the application.

vs.

HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents. by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the
Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:

City Fiscal for petitioners.

PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby
request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof
have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
would be enforced
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002)
seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent
alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter,
the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal both
petitioners and respondent agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the
pleadings. The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and
City Council filed the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use
as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the
Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local
police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant
to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper
to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the
taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance
permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property.
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available
as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers
to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is
deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property
is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed
in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a
nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a
conflagration.
We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the
respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with approval the lower court's
ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance:
The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the
police power?
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not
reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the
provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under
the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such
other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in
the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537).
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs.
Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12,
1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to regulate does not
include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates
but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under
Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable
with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to
operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The
confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating
a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the ordinance in question be justified
under sub- section "t", Section 12 of Republic Act 537 which authorizes the
City Council to-
'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and
provide for their burial in such proper place and in such manner as the council
may determine, subject to the provisions of the general law regulating burial
grounds and cemeteries and governing funerals and disposal of the dead.'
(Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537).
There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as
euphemistically termed by the respondents, 'donation'
We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in
question is a valid exercise of police power. The police power of Quezon City
is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows:
(00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide
for the health and safety, promote, the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with
such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the
provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that 'no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law'
(Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which
the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2)
eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the
Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted
in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is usually exerted in
order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he
is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to
destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner
does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the most essential
of government powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least
limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660;
Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power embraces the whole
system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme
Court has said that police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost
become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very
existence of the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its
scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it is the
most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential
insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under the modern democratic
framework where the demands of society and nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of police power have become
almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have
become almost all embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since
the Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and
welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
by which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest
and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).
The police power being the most active power of the government and the due
process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict
between this power of government and the due process clause of the
Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually
exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or
property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking
or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and
firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of
Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It
deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even
without compensation.
In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not unmindful of the
heavy burden shouldered by whoever challenges the validity of duly enacted
legislation whether national or local As early as 1913, this Court ruled in Case
v. Board of Health (24 PhiL 250) that the courts resolve every presumption in
favor of validity and, more so, where the ma corporation asserts that the
ordinance was enacted to promote the common good and general welfare.
In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association
Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849) the Court speaking through the
then Associate Justice and now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando stated
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the a of any evidence
to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a statute or ordinance. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm 'The presumption is all in
favor of validity. ... The action of the elected representatives of the people
cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things,
be familiar with the necessities of their particular ... municipality and with all
the facts and lances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The
local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that
the regulations are essential to the well-being of the people. ... The Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. (U.S. v.
Salaveria (1918], 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the
presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading
Salaveria decision in Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85 Phil. 369.)
We have likewise considered the principles earlier stated in Case v. Board of
Health supra :
... Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general
welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to
the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the
municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-
ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may
be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. An
property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are
necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like
all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and
to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police
power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the
general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not
contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such
power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the
courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6)
percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or
the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is
not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of
Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead
within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a
proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds
and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for
the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law
or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or
to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This
has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners
of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and
other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The
necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said
requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities
with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to home-owners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or
on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision
of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always
received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this
particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and
permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the
cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged
by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence
operations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of
the respondent court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
15. Republic v PLDT; G.R. No. L-18841; January 27, 1969.
G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendant-
appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General
Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for plaintiff-appellant.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeals, upon a joint record on appeal, by both the plaintiff and the
defendant from the dismissal, after hearing, by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, in its Civil Case No. 35805, of their respective complaint and
counterclaims, but making permanent a preliminary mandatory injunction
theretofore issued against the defendant on the interconnection of telephone
facilities owned and operated by said parties.
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising
governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which
is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was created on 1 July 1947,
under Executive Order No. 94, with the following powers and duties, in addition
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
to certain powers and duties formerly vested in the Director of Posts:
1awphil.t
SEC. 79. The Bureau of Telecommunications shall exercise the following
powers and duties:
(a) To operate and maintain existing wire-telegraph and radio-telegraph
offices, stations, and facilities, and those to be established to restore the pre-
war telecommunication service under the Bureau of Posts, as well as such
additional offices or stations as may hereafter be established to provide
telecommunication service in places requiring such service;
(b) To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire-
telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout the
Philippines by utilizing such existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces as
may be found feasible and under such terms and conditions or arrangements
with the present owners or operators thereof as may be agreed upon to the
satisfaction of all concerned;
(c) To prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head, equitable rates
of charges for messages handled by the system and/or for time calls and other
services that may be rendered by said system;
(d) To establish and maintain coastal stations to serve ships at sea or aircrafts
and, when public interest so requires, to engage in the international
telecommunication service in agreement with other countries desiring to
establish such service with the Republic of the Philippines; and
(e) To abide by all existing rules and regulations prescribed by the International
Telecommunication Convention relative to the accounting, disposition and
exchange of messages handled in the international service, and those that
may hereafter be promulgated by said convention and adhered to by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 1
The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for
short), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise, Act 3426,
as amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to install, operate and maintain a
telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of
electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the
Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries. 2 The RCA
Communications, Inc., (which is not a party to the present case but has
contractual relations with the parties) is an American corporation authorized to
transact business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a
legislative franchise to operate a domestic station for the reception and
transmission of long distance wireless messages (Act 2178) and to operate
broadcasting and radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic communications
services (Act 3180). 3
Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc.,
entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the
United States and received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be
transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT
for transmission from the Philippines to the United States. The contracting
parties agreed to divide the tolls, as follows: 25% to PLDT and 75% to RCA.
The sharing was amended in 1941 to 30% for PLDT and 70% for RCA, and
again amended in 1947 to a 50-50 basis. The arrangement was later extended
to radio-telephone messages to and from European and Asiatic countries.
Their contract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it on a
24-month notice to the other. 4 On 2 February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA
to terminate their contract on 2 February 1958. 5
Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its
own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and
equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices
to call private parties. 6 Its application for the use of these trunk lines was in
the usual form of applications for telephone service, containing a statement,
above the signature of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules and
regulations of the PLDT which are on file with the Public Service Commission.
7 One of the many rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished the
telephone subscriber for his private use. 8 The Bureau has extended its
services to the general public since 1948, 9 using the same trunk lines owned
by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule
of rates. 10 Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System
(GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that
the latter could make a call to the former.
On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications,
entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint
overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-
telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents.
11 Actually, they inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February 1958, under a
"provisional" agreement. 12
On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau
was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX)
is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines,
for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government
offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition
with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone
connections. 13 When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk
lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. 14 The result
was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the
world, except the United States. 15
At that time, the Bureau was maintaining 5,000 telephones and had 5,000
pending applications for telephone connection. 16 The PLDT was also
maintaining 60,000 telephones and had also 20,000 pending applications. 17
Through the years, neither of them has been able to fill up the demand for
telephone service.
The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January
1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government
paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting
facilities from the Government Telephone System to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT
replied that it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas telephone
service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the Bureau would submit
to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission and in
consideration of 37 1/2% of the gross revenues. 19 In its memorandum in lieu
of oral argument in this Court dated 9 February 1964, on page 8, the defendant
reduced its offer to 33 1/3 % (1/3) as its share in the overseas telephone
service. The proposals were not accepted by either party.
On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant,
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, in the Court of First Instance
of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in its complaint for judgment
commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau,
for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the
Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider
reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant
company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections
and/or restore those severed.
Acting on the application of the plaintiff, and on the ground that the severance
of telephone connections by the defendant company would isolate the
Philippines from other countries, the court a quo, on 14 April 1958, issued an
order for the defendant:
(1) to forthwith reconnect and restore the seventy-eight (78) trunk lines that it
has disconnected between the facilities of the Government Telephone System,
including its overseas telephone services, and the facilities of defendant; (2)
to refrain from carrying into effect its threat to sever the existing telephone
communication between the Bureau of Telecommunications and defendant,
and not to make connection over its telephone system of telephone calls
coming to the Philippines from foreign countries through the said Bureau's
telephone facilities and the radio facilities of RCA Communications, Inc.; and
(3) to accept and connect through its telephone system all such telephone calls
coming to the Philippines from foreign countries until further order of this
Court.
On 28 April 1958, the defendant company filed its answer, with
counterclaims.
It denied any obligation on its part to execute a contrary of services with the
Bureau of Telecommunications; contested the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance to compel it to enter into interconnecting agreements, and averred
that it was justified to disconnect the trunk lines heretofore leased to the
Bureau of Telecommunications under the existing agreement because its
facilities were being used in fraud of its rights. PLDT further claimed that the
Bureau was engaging in commercial telephone operations in excess of
authority, in competition with, and to the prejudice of, the PLDT, using
defendants own telephone poles, without proper accounting of revenues.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the
PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were
not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of
Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing government
offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since
the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the
Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was neither
guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of
serious public prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk
lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed
both the complaint and the counterclaims.
Both parties appealed.
Taking up first the appeal of the Republic, the latter complains of the action
of the trial court in dismissing the part of its complaint seeking to compel the
defendant to enter into an interconnecting contract with it, because the parties
could not agree on the terms and conditions of the interconnection, and of its
refusal to fix the terms and conditions therefor.
We agree with the court below that parties can not be coerced to enter into a
contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms
and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions
is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the
statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue
influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines). But the
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel
the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of
the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to
permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the
PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Nominally, of
course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of
title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason
appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden
upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It
is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected
to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to
allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not much
different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use
and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may,
in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not
require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just
compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the
interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that
the condemnation would be for public use.
The Bureau of Telecommunications, under section 78 (b) of Executive Order
No. 94, may operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone
communications throughout the Philippines by utilizing existing facilities in
cities, towns, and provinces under such terms and conditions or arrangement
with present owners or operators as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of
all concerned; but there is nothing in this section that would exclude resort to
condemnation proceedings where unreasonable or unjust terms and
conditions are exacted, to the extent of crippling or seriously hampering the
operations of said Bureau.
A perusal of the complaint shows that the Republic's cause of action is
predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the Bureau's facilities from
the outside world if the severance of interconnection were to be carried out by
the PLDT, thereby preventing the Bureau of Telecommunications from
properly discharging its functions, to the prejudice of the general public. Save
for the prayer to compel the PLDT to enter into a contract (and the prayer is
no essential part of the pleading), the averments make out a case for
compulsory rendering of inter-connecting services by the telephone company
upon such terms and conditions as the court may determine to be just. And
since the lower court found that both parties "are practically at one that
defendant (PLDT) is entitled to reasonable compensation from plaintiff for the
reasonable use of the former's telephone facilities" (Decision, Record on
Appeal, page 224), the lower court should have proceeded to treat the case
as one of condemnation of such services independently of contract and
proceeded to determine the just and reasonable compensation for the same,
instead of dismissing the petition.
This view we have taken of the true nature of the Republic's petition
necessarily results in overruling the plea of defendant-appellant PLDT that the
court of first instance had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and that the
proper forum for the action was the Public Service Commission. That body,
under the law, has no authority to pass upon actions for the taking of private
property under the sovereign right of eminent domain. Furthermore, while the
defendant telephone company is a public utility corporation whose franchise,
equipment and other properties are under the jurisdiction, supervision and
control of the Public Service Commission (Sec. 13, Public Service Act), yet the
plaintiff's telecommunications network is a public service owned by the
Republic and operated by an instrumentality of the National Government,
hence exempt, under Section 14 of the Public Service Act, from such
jurisdiction, supervision and control. The Bureau of Telecommunications was
created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government offices
to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and
independent Government of the Republic of the Philippines, and for the
purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in its operation
(Section 1, Republic Act No. 51)
and the determination of state policy is not vested in the Commission (Utilities
Com. vs. Bartonville Bus Line, 290 Ill. 574; 124 N.E. 373).
Defendant PLDT, as appellant, contends that the court below was in error in
not holding that the Bureau of Telecommunications was not empowered to
engage in commercial telephone business, and in ruling that said defendant
was not justified in disconnecting the telephone trunk lines it had previously
leased to the Bureau. We find that the court a quo ruled correctly in rejecting
both assertions.
Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947, reorganizing the Bureau of
Telecommunications, expressly empowered the latter in its Section 79,
subsection (b), to "negotiate for, operate and maintain wire telephone or radio
telephone communication service throughout the Philippines", and, in
subsection (c), "to prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head,
equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system and/or for time
calls and other services that may be rendered by the system". Nothing in these
provisions limits the Bureau to non-commercial activities or prevents it from
serving the general public. It may be that in its original prospectuses the
Bureau officials had stated that the service would be limited to government
offices: but such limitations could not block future expansion of the system, as
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
authorized by the terms of the Executive Order, nor could the officials of the
Bureau bind the Government not to engage in services that are authorized by
law. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the
law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute
(PLDT vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 676), and that the
Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents
(Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724).
The theses that the Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair
competition, and that the Bureau was guilty of fraud and abuse under its
contract, are, likewise, untenable.
First, the competition is merely hypothetical, the demand for telephone
service being very much more than the supposed competitors can supply. As
previously noted, the PLDT had 20,000 pending applications at the time, and
the Bureau had another 5,000. The telephone company's inability to meet the
demands for service are notorious even now. Second, the charter of the
defendant expressly provides:
SEC. 14. The rights herein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and
power to grant to any corporation, association or person other than the grantee
franchise for the telephone or electrical transmission of message or signals
shall not be impaired or affected by the granting of this franchise: (Act 3436)
And third, as the trial court correctly stated, "when the Bureau of
Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should
have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all
embracing in nature, that is, throughout the Philippines, if not abroad"
(Decision, Record on Appeal, page 216).
The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its
knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to
commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies assent by the
defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained
for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their
interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to
claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the
physical connection of the trunk lines.
..., but there is high authority for the position that, when such physical
connection has been voluntarily made, under a fair and workable arrangement
and guaranteed by contract and the continuous line has come to be patronized
and established as a great public convenience, such connection shall not in
breach of the agreement be severed by one of the parties. In that case, the
public is held to have such an interest in the arrangement that its rights must
receive due consideration. This position finds approval in State ex rel. vs.
Cadwaller, 172 Ind. 619, 636, 87 N.E. 650, and is stated in the elaborate and
learned opinion of Chief Justice Myers as follows: "Such physical connection
cannot be required as of right, but if such connection is voluntarily made by
contract, as is here alleged to be the case, so that the public acquires an
interest in its continuance, the act of the parties in making such connection is
equivalent to a declaration of a purpose to waive the primary right of
independence, and it imposes upon the property such a public status that it
may not be disregarded" citing Mahan v. Mich. Tel. Co., 132 Mich. 242, 93
N.W. 629, and the reasons upon which it is in part made to rest are referred to
in the same opinion, as follows: "Where private property is by the consent of
the owner invested with a public interest or privilege for the benefit of the
public, the owner can no longer deal with it as private property only, but must
hold it subject to the right of the public in the exercise of that public interest or
privilege conferred for their benefit." Allnut v. Inglis (1810) 12 East, 527. The
doctrine of this early case is the acknowledged law. (Clinton-Dunn Tel. Co. v.
Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 74 S.E. 636, 638).
It is clear that the main reason for the objection of the PLDT lies in the fact
that said appellant did not expect that the Bureau's telephone system would
expand with such rapidity as it has done; but this expansion is no ground for
the discontinuance of the service agreed upon.
The last issue urged by the PLDT as appellant is its right to compensation for
the use of its poles for bearing telephone wires of the Bureau of
Telecommunications. Admitting that section 19 of the PLDT charter reserves
to the Government
the privilege without compensation of using the poles of the grantee to attach
one ten-pin cross-arm, and to install, maintain and operate wires of its
telegraph system thereon; Provided, however, That the Bureau of Posts shall
have the right to place additional cross-arms and wires on the poles of the
grantee by paying a compensation, the rate of which is to be agreed upon by
the Director of Posts and the grantee;
the defendant counterclaimed for P8,772.00 for the use of its poles by the
plaintiff, contending that what was allowed free use, under the aforequoted
provision, was one ten-pin cross-arm attachment and only for plaintiff's
telegraph system, not for its telephone system; that said section could not refer
to the plaintiff's telephone system, because it did not have such telephone
system when defendant acquired its franchise. The implication of the argument
is that plaintiff has to pay for the use of defendant's poles if such use is for
plaintiff's telephone system and has to pay also if it attaches more than one
(1) ten-pin cross-arm for telegraphic purposes.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
As there is no proof that the telephone wires strain the poles of the PLDT
more than the telegraph wires, nor that they cause more damage than the
wires of the telegraph system, or that the Government has attached to the
poles more than one ten-pin cross-arm as permitted by the PLDT charter, we
see no point in this assignment of error. So long as the burden to be borne by
the PLDT poles is not increased, we see no reason why the reservation in
favor of the telegraph wires of the government should not be extended to its
telephone lines, any time that the government decided to engage also in this
kind of communication.
In the ultimate analysis, the true objection of the PLDT to continue the link
between its network and that of the Government is that the latter competes
"parasitically" (sic) with its own telephone services. Considering, however, that
the PLDT franchise is non-exclusive; that it is well-known that defendant PLDT
is unable to adequately cope with the current demands for telephone service,
as shown by the number of pending applications therefor; and that the PLDT's
right to just compensation for the services rendered to the Government
telephone system and its users is herein recognized and preserved, the
objections of defendant-appellant are without merit. To uphold the PLDT's
contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public to the right of the
PLDT to derive profit from the future expansion of its services under its non-
exclusive franchise.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal,
is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of the
Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company to
continue servicing the Government telephone system upon such terms, and
for a compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just, including the
period elapsed from the filing of the original complaint or petition. And for this
purpose, the records are ordered returned to the court of origin for further
hearings and other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando,
Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
16. U.S. v Causby; 328 U.S. 256; May 27,1946.
328 U.S. 256
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CLAIMS
Syllabus
Respondents owned a dwelling and a chicken farm near a municipal airport.
The safe path of glide to one of the runways of the airport passed directly over
respondents' property at 83 feet, which was 67 feet above the house, 63 feet
above the barn and 18 feet above the highest tree. It was used 4% of the time
in taking off and 7% of the time in landing. The Government leased the use of
the airport for a term of one month commencing June 1, 1942, with a provision
for renewals until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national
emergency, whichever was earlier. Various military aircraft of the United States
used the airport. They frequently came so close to respondents' property that
they barely missed the tops of trees, the noise was startling, and the glare from
their landing lights lighted the place up brightly at night. This destroyed the use
of the property as a chicken farm and caused loss of sleep, nervousness, and
fright on the part of respondents. They sued in the Court of Claims to recover
for an alleged taking of their property and for damages to their poultry
business. The Court of Claims found that the Government had taken an
easement over respondents' property, and that the value of the property
destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000; but it made no finding as to
the precise nature or duration of the easement.
Held:
1. A servitude has been imposed upon the land for which respondents are
entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 328 U. S. 260-267.
(a) The common law doctrine that ownership of land extends to the periphery
of the universe has no place in the modern world. Pp. 328 U. S. 260-261.
(b) The air above the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed by the Civil
Aeronautics Authority is a public highway and part of the public domain, as
declared by Congress in the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Pp. 328 U. S. 260-261, 328 U. S. 266.
(c) Flights below that altitude are not within the navigable air space which
Congress placed within the public domain, even though they are within the
path of glide approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Pp. 328 U. S. 263-
264.
Page 328 U. S. 257
(d) Flights of aircraft over private land which are so low and frequent as to be
a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land are
as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry
upon it. Pp. 328 U. S. 261-262, 328 U. S. 264-267.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
2. Since there was a taking of private property for public use, the claim was
"founded upon the Constitution," within the meaning of 141(1) of the Judicial
Code, and the Court of Claims had jurisdiction to hear and determine it. P. 328
U. S. 267.
3. Since the court's findings of fact contain no precise description of the nature
or duration of the easement taken, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is
remanded to the Court of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings.
Pp. 328 U. S. 267-268.
(a) An accurate description of the easement taken is essential, since that
interest vests in the United States. P. 328 U. S. 267.
(b) Findings of fact on every "material issue" are a statutory requirement, and
a deficiency in the findings cannot be rectified by statements in the opinion.
Pp. 328 U. S. 267-268.
(c) A conjecture in lieu of a conclusion from evidence would not be a proper
foundation for liability of the United States. P. 328 U. S. 268.
104 Ct.Cls. 342, 60 F.Supp. 751, reversed and remanded.
The Court of Claims granted respondents a judgment for the value of property
destroyed and damage to their property resulting from the taking of an
easement over their property by low-flying military aircraft of the United States,
but failed to include in its findings of fact a specific description of the nature or
duration of the easement. 104 Ct.Cls. 342, 60 F.Supp. 751. This Court granted
certiorari. 327 U.S. 775. Reversed and remanded, p. 328 U. S. 268.
Page 328 U. S. 258
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a case of first impression. The problem presented is whether
respondents' property was taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment
by frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft over respondents' land
at low altitudes. The Court of Claims held that there was a taking, and entered
judgment for respondent, one judge dissenting. 60 F.Supp. 751. The case is
here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the
importance of the question presented.
Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North
Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, and also various outbuildings which
were mainly used for raising chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-
southeast runway is 2,220 feet from respondents' barn and 2,275 feet from
their house. The path of glide to this runway passes directly over the property
-- which is 100 feet wide and 1,200 feet long. The 30 to 1 safe glide angle
[Footnote 1] approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority [Footnote 2] passes
over this property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above
the barn and 18 feet above the highest tree. [Footnote 3] The use by the United
States of this airport is pursuant to a lease executed in May, 1942, for a term
commencing June 1, 1942 and ending June 30, 1942, with a provision for
renewals until June 30, 1967, or six
Page 328 U. S. 259
months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is the earlier.
Various aircraft of the United States use this airport -- bombers, transports,
and fighters. The direction of the prevailing wind determines when a particular
runway is used. The northwest-southeast runway in question is used about
four percent of the time in taking off and about seven percent of the time in
landing. Since the United States began operations in May, 1942, its four-
motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its fighter
planes have frequently passed over respondents' land buildings in
considerable numbers and rather close together. They come close enough at
times to appear barely to miss the tops of the trees, and at times so close to
the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is startling. And,
at night, the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the
noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business. As many as six to
ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the walls from fright.
The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Production also fell off.
The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial
chicken farm. Respondents are frequently deprived of their sleep, and the
family has become nervous and frightened. Although there have been no
airplane accidents on respondents' property, there have been several
accidents near the airport and close to respondents' place. These are the
essential facts found by the Court of Claims. On the basis of these facts, it
found that respondents' property had depreciated in value. It held that the
United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and
that the value of the property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000.
Page 328 U. S. 260
I. The United States relies on the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, 49
U.S.C. 171 et seq., as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52
Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. 401 et seq. Under those statutes, the United States has
"complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space" over this
country. 49 U.S.C. 176(a). They grant any citizen of the United States "a
public right of freedom of transit in air commerce [Footnote 4] through the
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
navigable air space of the United States." 49 U.S.C. 403. And "navigable air
space" is defined as "airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight
prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority." 49 U.S.C. 180. And it is
provided that "such navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right of
freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation." Id. It is therefore argued that,
since these flights were within the minimum safe altitudes of flight which had
been prescribed, they were an exercise of the declared right of travel through
the airspace. The United States concludes that, when flights are made within
the navigable airspace without any physical invasion of the property of the
landowners, there has been no taking of property. It says that, at most, there
was merely incidental damage occurring as a consequence of authorized air
navigation. It also argues that the landowner does not own superadjacent
airspace which he has not subjected to possession by the erection of
structures or other occupancy. Moreover, it is argued that, even if the United
States took airspace owned by respondents, no compensable damage was
shown. Any damages are said to be merely consequential for which no
compensation may be obtained under the Fifth Amendment.
It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to the
periphery of the universe -- cujus
Page 328 U. S. 261
est solum ejus est usque and coelum. [Footnote 5] But that doctrine has no
place in the modern world. The air is a public highway, as Congress has
declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the
operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To
recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
seriously interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and
transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.
But that general principle does not control the present case. For the United
States conceded on oral argument that, if the flights over respondents' property
rendered it uninhabitable, there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth
Amendment. It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure
of the value of the property taken. United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369. Market
value fairly determined is the normal measure of the recovery. Id. And that
value may reflect the use to which the land could readily be converted, as well
as the existing use. United States v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 319 U. S. 275,
and cases cited. If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights,
respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be
complete. [Footnote 6] It would be as complete as if the United States had
entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it.
We agree that, in those circumstances, there would be a taking. Though it
would be only an easement of flight
Page 328 U. S. 262
which was taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary,
normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It would be a definite
exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of the land. The
fact that the planes never touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the
absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate.
The owner's right to possess and exploit the land -- that is to say, his beneficial
ownership of it -- would be destroyed. It would not be a case of incidental
damages arising from a legalized nuisance, such as was involved in Richards
v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546. In that case, property owners
whose lands adjoined a railroad line were denied recovery for damages
resulting from the noise, vibrations, smoke, and the like, incidental to the
operations of the trains. In the supposed case, the line of flight is over the land.
And the land is appropriated as directly and completely as if it were used for
the runways themselves.
There is no material difference between the supposed case and the present
one, except that, here, enjoyment and use of the land are not completely
destroyed. But that does not seem to us to be controlling. The path of glide for
airplanes might reduce a valuable factory site to grazing land, an orchard to a
vegetable patch, a residential section to a wheat field. Some value would
remain. But the use of the airspace immediately above the land would limit the
utility of the land and cause a diminution in its value. [Footnote 7] That was the
philosophy of Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.
Page 328 U. S. 263
United States, 260 U. S. 327. In that case, the petition alleged that the United
States erected a fort on nearby land, established a battery and a fire control
station there, and fired guns over petitioner's land. The Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Holmes, reversed the Court of Claims which dismissed the
petition on a demurrer, holding that "the specific facts set forth would warrant
a finding that a servitude has been imposed." [Footnote 8] 260 U.S. at 260 U.
S. 330. And see Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245. Cf.
United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, 55 F.Supp. 461.
The fact that the path of glide taken by the planes was that approved by the
Civil Aeronautics Authority does not change the result. The navigable airspace
which Congress has placed in the public domain is "airspace above the
minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority."
49 U.S.C. 180. If that agency prescribed 83 feet as the minimum safe
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
altitude, then we would have presented the question of the validity of the
regulation. But nothing of the sort has been done. The path of glide governs
the method of operating -- of landing or taking off. The altitude required for that
operation is not the minimum safe altitude of flight which is the downward reach
of the navigable airspace. The minimum prescribed by the authority is 500 feet
during the day and 1000 feet at night for air carriers (Civil Air Regulations, Pt.
61, 61.7400, 61.7401, Code Fed.Reg.Cum.Supp., Tit. 14, ch. 1) and from
300 to 1000 feet for
Page 328 U. S. 264
other aircraft depending on the type of plane and the character of the terrain.
Id., Pt. 60, 60.350-60.3505, Fed.Reg.Cum.Supp., supra. Hence, the flights
in question were not within the navigable airspace which Congress placed
within the public domain. If any airspace needed for landing or taking off were
included, flights which were so close to the land as to render it uninhabitable
would be immune. But the United States concedes, as we have said, that, in
that event, there would be a taking. Thus, it is apparent that the path of glide
is not the minimum safe altitude of flight within the meaning of the statute. The
Civil Aeronautics Authority has, of course, the power to prescribe air traffic
rules. But Congress has defined navigable airspace only in terms of one of
them -- the minimum safe altitudes of flight.
We have said that the airspace is a public highway. Yet it is obvious that, if the
landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control
of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings
could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and even fences could not
be run. The principle is recognized when the law gives a remedy in case
overhanging structures are erected on adjoining land. [Footnote 9] The
landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as the can
occupy or use in connection with the land. See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport,
84 F.2d 755. The fact that he does not occupy it in a physical sense -- by the
erection of buildings and the like -- is not material. As we have said, the flight
of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much an
appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it. We
would not doubt that, if the United States erected
Page 328 U. S. 265
an elevated railway over respondents' land at the precise altitude where its
planes now fly, there would be a partial taking, even though none of the
supports of the structure rested on the land. [Footnote 10] The reason is that
there would be an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract from the
owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation of it. While
the owner does not in any physical manner occupy that stratum of airspace or
make use of it in the conventional sense, he does use it in somewhat the same
sense that space left between buildings for the purpose of light and air is used.
The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that
continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We
think that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it, and
that invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of the surface.
[Footnote 11]
In this case, as in Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, supra,
the damages were not merely consequential. They were the product of a direct
invasion of respondents' domain.
Page 328 U. S. 266
As stated in United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 243 U. S. 328,
". . . it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from
it, so long as the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether
it is a taking."
We said in United States v. Powelson, supra, p. 319 U. S. 279, that, while the
meaning of "property" as used in the Fifth Amendment was a federal question,
"it will normally obtain its content by reference to local law." If we look to North
Carolina law, we reach the same result. Sovereignty in the airspace rests in
the State "except where granted to and assumed by the United States."
Gen.Stats.1943, 63-11. The flight of aircraft is lawful
"unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to which
the land or water, or the space over the land or water, is put by the owner, or
unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or property
lawfully on the land or water beneath."
Id., 63-13. Subject to that right of flight, "ownership of the space above the
lands and waters of this State is declared to be vested in the several owners
of the surface beneath." Id., 63-12. Our holding that there was an invasion
of respondents' property is thus not inconsistent with the local law governing a
landowner's claim to the immediate reaches of the superadjacent airspace.
The airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the inconveniences
which it causes are normally not compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the
public domain. We need not determine at this time what those precise limits
are. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
use of the land. We need not speculate on that phase of the present case. For
the findings of the Court
Page 328 U. S. 267
of Claims plainly establish that there was a diminution in value of the property,
and that the frequent, low-level flights were the direct and immediate cause.
We agree with the Court of Claims that a servitude has been imposed upon
the land.
II. By 145(1) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 250(1), the Court of Claims
has jurisdiction to hear and determine
"All claims (except for pensions) founded upon the Constitution of the United
States or . . . upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government of
the United States."
We need not decide whether repeated trespasses might give rise to an implied
contract. Cf. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, supra. If
there is a taking, the claim is "founded upon the Constitution," and within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine. See Hollister v.
Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 59, 113 U. S. 67; Hurley v. Kincaid,
285 U. S. 95, 285 U. S. 104; Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.
S. 18, 309 U. S. 21. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in this case is
clear.
III. The Court of Claims held, as we have noted, that an easement was taken.
But the findings of fact contain no precise description as to its nature. It is not
described in terms of frequency of flight, permissible altitude, or type of
airplane. Nor is there a finding as to whether the easement taken was
temporary or permanent. Yet an accurate description of the property taken is
essential, since that interest vests in the United States. United States v. Cress,
supra, 243 U. S. 328-329, and cases cited. It is true that the Court of Claims
stated in its opinion that the easement taken was permanent. But the
deficiency in findings cannot be rectified by statements in the opinion. United
States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U. S. 201, 299 U. S. 205-206; United States v.
Seminole Nation, 299 U. S. 417, 299 U. S. 422. Findings of fact on every
"material issue" are a statutory
Page 328 U. S. 268
requirement. 53 Stat. 752, 28 U.S.C. 288. The importance of findings of fact
based on evidence is emphasized here by the Court of Claims' treatment of
the nature of the easement. It stated in its opinion that the easement was
permanent because the United States "no doubt intended to make some sort
of arrangement whereby it could use the airport for its military planes whenever
it had occasion to do so." That sounds more like conjecture, rather than a
conclusion from evidence, and if so, it would not be a proper foundation for
liability of the United States. We do not stop to examine the evidence to
determine whether it would support such a finding, if made. For that is not our
function. United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, supra, p. 299 U. S. 206.
Since on this record it is not clear whether the easement taken is a permanent
or a temporary one, it would be premature for us to consider whether the
amount of the award made by the Court of Claims was proper.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Claims
so that it may make the necessary findings in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed.
17. Lunod v Meneses; G.R. No. 4223; August 19, 1908.
G.R. No. 4223 August 19, 1908
NICOLAS LUNOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
HIGINO MENESES, defendant-appellant.
T. Icasiano, for appellant.
R. Salinas, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod, Juan de la Vega, Evaristo
Rodriguez, Fernando Marcelo, Esteban Villena, Benito Litao, Ventura
Hernandez, and Casimiro Pantanilla, residents of the town of Bulacan,
province of the same name, filed a written complaint against Higino Meneses,
alleging that they each owned and possessed farm lands, situated in the
places known as Maytunas and Balot, near a small lake named Calalaran; that
the defendant is the owner of a fish-pond and a strip of land situated in
Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on one side, and the River Taliptip on the
other; that from time immemorial, and consequently for more than twenty years
before 1901, there existed and still exists in favor of the rice fields of the
plaintiffs a statutory easement permitting the flow of water over the said land
in Paraanan, which easement the said plaintiffs enjoyed until the year 1901
and consisted in that the water collected upon their lands and in the Calalaran
Lake flow through Paraanan into the Taliptip River. From that year however,
the defendant, without any right or reason, converted the land in Paraanan into
a fishpond and by means of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented the free
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)
passage of the water through said place into the Taliptip River, that in
consequence the lands of the plaintiff became flooded and damaged by the
stagnant waters, there being no outlet except through the land in Paraanan;
that their plantation were destroyed, causing the loss and damages to the
extent of about P1,000, which loss and damage will continue if the obstructions
to the flow of the water are allowed to remain, preventing its passage through
said land and injuring the rice plantations of the plaintiffs. They therefore asked
that judgment be entered against the defendant, declaring that the said tract
of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement permitting the flow of
water from the property of the plaintiffs, and that, without prejudice to the
issuing of a preliminary injunction, the defendant be ordered to remove and
destroy the obstructions that impede the passage of the waters through
Paraanan, and that in future, and forever, he abstain from closing in any
manner the aforesaid tract of land; that, upon judgment being entered, the said
injunction be declared to be final and that the defendant be sentenced to pay
to the plaintiffs an indemnity of P1,000, and the costs in the proceedings; that
they be granted any other and further equitable or proper remedy in
accordance with the facts alleged and proven.
In view of the demurrer interposed by the plaintiffs to the answer of the
defendant, the latter, on the 29th of August, 1904, filed an amended answer,
denying each and everyone of the allegations of the complaint, and alleged
that no statutory easement existed nor could exist in favor of the lands
described in the complaint, permitting the waters to flow over the fish pond that
he, together with his brothers, owned in the sitio of Bambang, the area and
boundaries of which were stated by him, and which he and his brothers had
inherited from their deceased mother.
Apolinara de Leon; that the same had been surveyed by a land surveyor in
September, 1881, he also denied that he had occupied or converted any land
in the barrio of Bambang into a fishpond; therefore, and to sentence the
plaintiffs to pay the costs and corresponding damages.
Upon the evidence adduced by both parties to the suit, the court, on the 13th
of March, 1907, entered judgment declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to
a decision in their favor, and sentenced the defendant to remove the dam
placed on the east of the Paraanan passage on the side of the Taliptip River
opposite the old dam in the barrio of Bambang, as well as to remove and
destroy the obstacles to the free passage of the waters through the strip of
land in Paraanan; to abstain in future, and forever, from obstructing or closing
in any manner the course of the waters through the said strip of land. The
request that the defendant be sentenced to pay an indemnity was denied, and
no ruling was made as to costs.
The defendant excepted to the above judgment and furthermore asked for a
new trial which was denied and also excepted to, and, upon approval of the
bill of exceptions, the question was submitted to this court.
Notwithstanding the defendant's denial in his amended answer, it appears to
have been clearly proven in this case that the lands owned by the plaintiffs in
the aforesaid barrio, as well as the small adjoining lake, named Calalaran, are
located in places relatively higher than the sitio called Paraanan where the
land and fish pond of the defendant are situated, and which border on the
Taliptip River; that during the rainy season the rain water which falls on he land
of the plaintiffs, and which flows toward the small Calalaran Lake at flood time,
has no outlet to the Taliptip River other than through the low land of Paraanan:
that the border line between Calalaran and Paraanan there has existed from
time immemorial a dam, constructed by the community for the purpose of
preventing the salt waters from the Taliptip River, at high tide, from flooding
the land in Calalaran, passing through the lowlands of Paraanan; but when
rainfall was abundant, one of the residents was designated in his turn by the
lieutenant or justice of the barrio to open the sluice gate in order to let out the
water that flooded the rice fields, through the land of Paraanan to the above-
mentioned river, that since 1901, the defendant constructed another dam
along the boundary of this fishpond in Paraanan, thereby impeding the outlet
of the waters that flood the fields of Calalaran, to the serious detriment of the
growing crops.
According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an easement is charge imposed
upon one estate for the benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner,
and the realty in favor of which the easement is established is called the
dominant estate, and the one charged with it the servient estate.
The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the easement of
receiving and giving passage to the waters proceeding from the higher lands
and the lake of Calalaran; this easement was not constituted by agreement
between the interested parties; it is of a statutory nature, and the law had
imposed it for the common public utility in view of the difference in the altitude
of the lands in the barrio Bambang.
Article 552 of the Civil code provides:
Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or
earth which they carry with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower estates construct works preventing this
easement, nor the one of the higher estate works increasing the burden.
PROPERTY 3 (Outline 2 Cases)

Article 563 of the said code reads also:
The establishment, extent, form, and conditions of the easements of waters to
which this section refers shall be governed by the special law relating thereto
in everything not provided for in this code.
can not prevent the defendant from protecting his lands against the influx of
salt water; but the defendant could never be permitted to obstruct the flow of
the waters through his lands to the Taliptip River during the heavy rains, when
the high lands in Calalaran and the lake in said place are flooded, thereby
impairing the right of the owners of the dominant estates.

The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, article 111 of
which, treating of natural easements relating to waters, provides:
Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive the waters that flow
naturally, without the work of man, from the higher lands together with the
stone or earth which they carry with them.
Hence, the owner of the lower lands can not erect works that will impede or
prevent such an easement or charge, constituted and imposed by the law upon
his estate for the benefit of the higher lands belonging to different owners;
neither can the latter do anything to increase or extend the easement.
According to the provisions of law above referred to, the defendant, Meneses,
had no right to construct the works, nor the dam which blocks the passage,
through his lands and the outlet to the Taliptip River, of the waters which flood
the higher lands of the plaintiffs; and having done so, to the detriment of the
easement charged on his estate, he has violated the law which protects and
guarantees the respective rights and regulates the duties of the owners of the
fields in Calalaran and Paraanan.
For the above reasons, and accepting the findings of the court below in the
judgment appealed from in so far as they agree with the terms of this decision,
we must and do hereby declare that the defendant, Higino Meneses, as the
owner of the servient estate, is obliged to give passage to and allow the flow
of the waters descending from the Calalaran Lake and from the land of the
plaintiffs through his lands in Paraanan for their discharge into the Taliptip
River; and he is hereby ordered to remove any obstacle that may obstruct the
free passage of the waters whenever there may be either a small or large
volume of running water through his lands in the sitio of Paraanan for their
discharge into the Taliptip River; and in future to abstain from impeding, in any
manner, the flow of the waters coming from the higher lands. The judgment
appealed from is affirmed, in so far as it agrees with decision, and reversed in
other respects, with the costs of this instance against the appellants. So
ordered.
Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

It is true that article 388 of said code authorizes every owner to enclose his
estate by means of walls, ditches fences or any other device, but his right is
limited by the easement imposed upon his estate.

The defendant Meneses might have constructed the works necessary to make
and maintain a fish pond within his own land, but he was always under the
strict and necessary obligation to respect the statutory easement of waters
charged upon his property, and had no right to close the passage and outlet
of the waters flowing from the lands of the plaintiffs and the lake of Calalaran
into the Taliptip River. He could not lawfully injure the owners of the dominant
estates by obstructing the outlet to the Taliptip River of the waters flooding the
upper lands belonging to the plaintiffs.

It is perhaps useful and advantageous to the plaintiffs and other owners of high
lands in Calalaran, in addition to the old dike between the lake of said place
and the low lands in Paraanan, to have another made by the defendant at the
border of Paraanan adjoining the said river, for the purpose of preventing the
salt waters of the Taliptip River flooding, at high tide, not only the lowlands in
Paraanan but also the higher ones of Calalaran and its lake, since the plaintiffs