Giving Peace a Real Chance:

Rethinking U.S. Policy Toward Northern Uganda

I. Introduction

After more than twenty-one years of war, peace may finally be on the horizon for
the people of northern Uganda. The ongoing Juba negotiations, which started in
August of 2006 between the Government of Uganda and rebel Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA), continue to provide real hope for a permanent end to the war. The
negotiations have brought relative calm for the first time in years, allowing many
northern Ugandans to leave displacement camps and begin returning to their
homes.

“A resumption of military action

is the greatest threat to this
historic opportunity for peace.”
_________________________

If given a sufficient chance to succeed, the Juba peace talks offer the most viable
opportunity to end decades of insecurity and to lay the groundwork for
addressing the root causes of the war. However, to consolidate gains that have
been made and ensure lasting peace is realized, international leaders –
particularly in the U.S. government – must remain committed to the process and
take advantage of existing improvements in the security situation to expedite the
return of displaced people.
A resumption of military action is the greatest threat to this historic opportunity for
peace. Growing impatience with the duration of the negotiations has led
Ugandan and U.S. leaders to discuss the possibility of imposing a deadline on
the talks, after which military operations against the LRA would presumably
occur. However, such action would not be likely to succeed, and would have
catastrophic humanitarian consequences for the region.

Resolve Uganda’s research brief, “Giving Peace a Real Chance: Rethinking U.S.
Policy toward Northern Uganda,” explores how U.S. officials can best take
advantage of the opportunities provided by the Juba process to advance
sustainable peace. Doing so will require that the U.S. employ a four-part strategy
involving sustained investment in the negotiations, facilitation of the IDP return
process, attention to root social and political issues contributing to instability, and
engagement of deteriorating situations in South Sudan and eastern Congo.

II. Methodology

Resolve Uganda’s policy briefs are the result of field research and secondary-
source analysis. This brief is informed by interviews in northern Uganda with civil
society actors, diplomats, government officials, journalists, and war survivors.
Resolve Uganda’s ongoing interviews with policymakers, government officials,
and non-governmental advocates in New York and Washington, D.C. also
provide information. In addition, daily monitoring and assessment of media
coverage on northern Uganda offers insights into trends and patterns emerging
in the region. Finally, this brief relies heavily on the perspectives of local
organizations in Uganda, namely Refugee Law Project and Human Rights Focus.
This approach is rooted in the belief that local, independent researchers are best
equipped to understand the priorities and perspectives of war-affected
communities.

III. The Current Situation

The ongoing Juba peace negotiations between the Ugandan government and the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) provide real hope for a permanent end to the war
in northern Uganda. For the two decades before the Juba process began, all
attempts to end the conflict failed, leaving war-affected communities to suffer the
devastating consequences of widespread displacement, abduction, and death.
Not limited to northern Uganda, the violence has also destabilized neighboring
areas of southern Sudan and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Yet today,
a sustainable resolution to Africa’s longest running war is within reach.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 2

Though the progress has been slow, the Juba negotiations have led to dramatic
improvements in the conditions on the ground. The Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement brokered through the negotiations in August of 2006 brought relative
calm for the first time in years. Since that agreement was signed, there have
been virtually no attacks or abductions in northern Uganda. The phenomenon of
child “night commuting” has largely ended, and freedom of movement has been
expanded, allowing many northern Ugandans to access their land.1

Still, the vast majority of northerners have not moved back to their original
homes. Over 1.3 million people remain displaced in camps or newly developed
transition sites,2 where they lack access to basic health, water, and education
services. Reports suggest that displaced people are eager to leave the squalor of
camps, but many will wait for a final agreement from Juba before doing so.3 Any
conflagration of violence could lead to an immediate deterioration of all
improvements made.

A final peace agreement is unlikely to be reached until at least the spring of

2008. The Juba process is currently in the middle of discussions around the third
of five agenda items, addressing issues of accountability and reconciliation.4 As
part of this agenda item, the LRA and Government of Uganda have been
mandated to hold “consultations” to allow the input of affected communities and
local civil society into the process. The government has concluded eleven such
consultations in the war-affected region and Kampala. The LRA’s consultative
meetings have been delayed because of funding issues, but are expected to take
place in November.

Official negotiations are then predicted to resume in late November or December.

When the parties return to the negotiating table, they will first have to finalize the
implementation annex to their agreement on agenda item three.5 This agreement
will detail the specific mechanisms to be established for dealing with past crimes.

1
For more background to the Juba peace talks, see Uganda Conflict Action Network (26 April 2007),
“Seizing the Second Chance: Peace on the Horizon for Northern Uganda?” and Uganda Conflict Action
Network (July 2006), “2006 Peace Talks in Juba: A Historic Opportunity.”
2
In September 2007 the Inter Agency Standing Committee in Uganda estimated that 29% of IDPs (526,300
people) had returned to their homes of origin, with 49% (901,000 people) remaining in mother camps and
22% (409,000 people) in “decongestion” or “satellite” sites. Most full returns have been limited to the
Lango and Teso sub-regions, where displacement has not existed for as long as it has in the Acholi sub-
region.
3
Refugee Law Project (June 2007), “Rapid Assessment of Population Movement in Gulu and Pader,”
Kampala: Faculty of Law, Makerere University.
4
The five agenda items for the Juba peace process are as agreed upon by both parties are: (1) cessation of
hostilities, (2) comprehensive solutions to the war, (3) accountability and reconciliation, (4) disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and (5) final ceasefire.
5
International Crisis Group (14 September 2007), “Northern Uganda Peace Process: The Need to Maintain
Momentum,” Kampala/Nairobi/Brussels: Africa Briefing No. 46.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 3

The agreement is intended to provide a viable alternative to outstanding
International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants for the top four rebel
commanders, as well as a process to deal with the bulk of remaining LRA
fighters. The Ugandan government has said it will appeal to the ICC for
withdrawal of indictments, but only after a comprehensive peace agreement has
been signed and an alternative national justice framework more firmly
established. Some observers still believe that third country exile for indicted LRA
may be a more practical solution, though LRA leaders would need to be
convinced that they would not be apprehended years later, as was the case with
former Liberian President and warlord Charles Taylor.6

After the justice and reconciliation implementation annex, the Juba negotiations
then have two remaining agenda items: demobilization, disarmament and
reintegration (DDR) of the LRA, and a final ceasefire. The former may prove
complicated because it includes security considerations for the LRA leadership,
and will have to balance the needs of returnees with the needs of receiving
communities. Still, most observers believe that the technical details of DDR will
be dealt with after a framework is established in Juba. The final agenda item
should then be resolved quickly.

President Museveni has shown an interest in expediting a final agreement to

demonstrate his exemplary leadership to world leaders who will participate in the
November Commonwealth Head of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) in Uganda.7
Such a timeline will not be met, as deficits of trust and transparency are likely to
continue to cause delays in the negotiations. Still, CHOGM can provide an
important venue to reaffirm international support for the peace process.

Increased international attention has been a major contributor to the gains made
in the process thus far. The U.N., African Union, and donor countries have all
provided crucial technical, diplomatic, and financial support to the Juba talks. The
neglect of world leaders toward northern Uganda, a trademark of the conflict for
more than twenty years, is starting to become a thing of the past. Today, world
leaders from Washington to London to Brussels are speaking about the urgency
of resolving the conflict.

Yet prioritization does not guarantee prudent policymaking. Some Western

officials fail to appreciate the need for sustained investment in the negotiations,
and have issued threats of resumed military operations against the LRA. Such
talk of a regional “military solution” has sparked fears of resumed violence, and
could undermine the opportunity to secure the durable peace provided by the
Juba process. Overcoming mistrust toward the signing of a successful peace

6
Resolve Uganda interviews, Kampala and Washington D.C., October 2007.
7
Resolve Uganda interview with diplomat, Washington D.C., October 2007.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 4

agreement will take time and sustained investment in the process from all
stakeholders.

III. The U.S. Role in Lasting Peace

As a strong ally of the Ugandan government and an actor with significant

leverage in regional politics, the United States can play a major role in advancing
the prospects for an end to the war. To do so, the U.S. should employ a four-part
strategy involving sustained investment in the negotiations, facilitation of the IDP
return process, attention to root social and political issues contributing to
instability, and engagement of deteriorating situations in South Sudan and
eastern Congo.

Close relations between the U.S. and Uganda date back to the mid-1990s,
hinging on economic ties, HIV/AIDS policy and military partnerships increasingly
embedded within the U.S. “war on terror.” Only recently has increasing domestic
and international grassroots pressure succeeded in forcing the U.S. government
to incorporate the crisis in northern Uganda as a serious component in its
bilateral relations with Uganda. Today, the American embassy in Kampala says
that peace in northern Uganda is one of its primary objectives.

Juba is the best chance to end the war

To continue improving prospects for sustainable peace, the U.S. must remain
committed to the Juba process, as it is the most viable means of establishing
security in the region and creating space to address the root causes of the war.
The mediation of the Government of South Sudan, continued commitment of the
Ugandan government and LRA, and support of the African Union, United
Nations, donor countries, and local leaders and civil society are all vital to the
success of the talks.

The negotiations have already given war-affected communities the first reprieve
from hostilities in years, as well as increased freedom of movement. Ugandans
displaced by the war are anxious to see such progress secured by a final
agreement in Juba.8 Toward that end, U.S. policymakers can best help northern
Uganda by making sure the peace talks get a complete chance to succeed.

In the fourteen months since the negotiations began, the U.S. record has been
mixed. Only after strong public and Congressional pressure did the U.S. State
Department finally issue a clear statement of support for the negotiations,9 more
8
Resolve Uganda interviews with IDPs, Gulu, September 2007.
9
U.S. Department of State Press Statement (16 August 2007), “Support for Northern Uganda/LRA Peace
Talks.”

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 5

than a year after they had begun. Now, the U.S. says it is increasing its
commitment to the success of the Juba talks. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Jendayi Frazer has appointed a Special Advisor on Conflict Resolution, Tim
Shortley, to focus on ending the war and helping war-affected communities.

Shortley’s position includes some degree of direct engagement of the

negotiations. His focus on the situation helps Washington to monitor the process
and consider ways to support the talks appropriately. Given his mandate,
Shortley is well positioned to guide more comprehensive and official U.S. support
of the peace process.

However, the degree to which U.S. officials will be willing to utilize their leverage
to move the negotiations forward remains in question. U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer has invoked the philosophy of “African
solutions to African problems,” arguing that Western actors should downplay their
role in the peace process and empower local actors to take the lead.10 This is a
sensible philosophy, but in practice may provide a convenient veneer for the U.S.
to avoid any public responsibility for the achievement of a viable peace
agreement.

U.S. ambivalence toward the possibility of resumed military operations against

the LRA is particularly troublesome. A return to military action is the greatest
threat to this historic opportunity for peace, and all precautions must be taken to
ensure hostilities do not resume. Instead, U.S. officials have joined President
Museveni in making threats against the LRA, which could undermine confidence
in the negotiations and lead to renewed violence. In her visit to Kampala in
September, Assistant Secretary Frazer affirmed U.S. support for the peace
process, but also emphasized that the process should be expedited, warning that
the U.S. would take a public role in supporting regional military action to “mop up
the LRA” if negotiations stall or fail. She also urged imposing a timeline on the
negotiations, evoking a hostile response from the rebels who threatened to
abandon peace talks and resume attacks.11 Furthermore, U.S. officials at the
United Nations have reportedly tried to build support for a military strategy
involving U.N. and regional forces that could be employed against the LRA.12

Such provocations, which are not being echoed by other donor countries,
undermine the peace process and portray the quickness with which U.S. officials
often follow the lead of President Museveni, who has made similar threats and
also called for a timeline for the negotiations. While the close relationship
between the U.S. and Ugandan government gives the U.S. considerable
10
Resolve Uganda meetings with U.S. government officials, Washington D.C., August 2007.
11
Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer (5 September 2007), Media
Conference in Kampala.
12
Resolve Uganda interviews with U.N. staff, New York, October 2007.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 6

leverage to use in advancing peace, the U.S.’ prioritization of maintaining close
ties with the Museveni regime often overshadows U.S. policymaking toward the
crisis.

The first step the U.S. can take toward achieving sustainable peace is to end the
use of military threats that risk derailing the peace process, and to encourage the
Ugandan government to do the same. U.S. officials may believe that threats will
provide additional incentive for the LRA to negotiate, but this belief is not
supported by historical evidence. In the past, the rebels have pulled out of
negotiations when they suspected manipulation by the Ugandan government.
With rising tensions in southern Sudan, the Government of Sudan in Khartoum
may welcome a rekindled relationship with the rebels to destabilize the region.
Both Sudan and eastern DRC remain hospitable environments for insurgent
groups. Threats of military action could provide more aggressive elements in the
LRA the political excuse they seek to withdraw from talks and blame the
Ugandan government.

If the LRA withdraws from negotiations, it is unlikely that military forces in the
region would be able to deliver the arrest of LRA leaders or an end to the war.
The region’s forces have failed in the past to overpower the rebels, who travel in
small numbers, have arms caches buried throughout the region, and possess
superior knowledge of the terrain.13 U.N. forces in DRC (MONUC) are already
overstretched due to flare-ups of violence in the North Kivu region of DRC and
have little capacity to mount an effective counterinsurgency in difficult terrain.14

The recent U.S. military rhetoric is also dangerous because it strengthens

President Museveni’s case for taking aggressive action against the LRA. To date,
Kampala has shown commendable commitment to the peace talks, but many
suspect President Museveni is losing his patience.15

This suspicion has been deepened by the recent signing of the Ngurdoto
Agreement by the governments of Uganda and DRC, stipulating that both
governments shall take action to expel foreign armed groups from their
territories. The dangers of resumed hostilities include not only the breakdown of
negotiations, but also the reigniting of border hostilities between Uganda and
DRC. U.S. threats of support for renewed military action thus provide a
convenient cover for either the Ugandan government or LRA to back out of the
Juba peace talks, shattering the hopes of war-affected communities.

13
See: Bevan, James (2006), “Fuelling Fear: The Lord’s Resistance Army and Small Arms,” in The Small
Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14
Resolve Uganda interviews, Washington D.C. and Gulu, October 2007.
15
Resolve Uganda interviews, Washington D.C. and Kampala, October 2007.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 7

Too many times in the history of the conflict, optimism surrounding negotiations
has been shattered by sudden military provocation. In 1994, with peace talks
ongoing, President Museveni abruptly gave the LRA a seven-day ultimatum to
surrender or face attack.16 The rebels withdrew from talks, accepting offers from
Khartoum for a military alliance. Government efforts to begin talks in 2002 were
shattered by LRA attacks on “peace emissaries.” In 2003, a proposed face-to-
face meeting between the LRA and Presidential Peace Team fell apart after a
government military offensive in the “peace contact area.”17 Meanwhile, with
every proclaimed “military solution,” northern Ugandan families have suffered
more severe abuses and displacement. The outbreak of violence now would be
catastrophic for both northern Uganda and the wider region.

“The first step the U.S. can take

toward achieving sustainable peace
is to end the use of military threats
that risk derailing the peace
process, and to encourage the
Ugandan government to do
the same.”
____________________________
Still, there are definite ways the U.S. can help end the war if it is willing to refrain
from such threats, take its lead from war-affected communities, and invest in the
peace process. The State Department’s new Senior Advisor on Conflict
Resolution can play a key role in dialoguing with a wide range of actors and
monitoring the negotiations. He is well positioned to convey more official and
public support by the U.S. government for the peace talks. Providing assurances
to the LRA that the U.S. would support the terms of a peace agreement could
also help build confidence in the process. When negotiations resume, his
presence in Juba could bring much-needed leverage, especially if he is cognizant
of the sensitivity of U.S. involvement.

Moreover, U.S. officials can provide financial assistance through the U.N.
Department of Political Affairs to make sure U.N. Special Envoy and former
Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano has the resources he needs to assist
16
O’Kadameri, Billie (2002), “LRA/Government negotiations 1993-94,” in Protracted conflict, elusive
peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda, ed. Lucima, Okello, London: Conciliation
Resources.
17
Resolve Uganda interview with former Presidential Peace Team member, Kampala, April 2005.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 8

the negotiations. The U.S. could also provide logistical assistance to the African
Union monitors and other members of the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring
Team. The U.S. government is well poised to invest in making sure negotiations
get a real chance to succeed, but such investment requires political will and
increased commitment to the Juba process.

Ending the war is only the first step

Establishing security in the region through the Juba negotiations is only the first
step toward lasting peace. Fostering lasting peace will also require a viable
transitional justice process that addresses crimes committed by both warring
parties, and commitment from all stakeholders to address the underlying issues
that originally gave rise to the war.

Developing the specifics of a transitional justice process will need to happen both
during and after the conclusion of the Juba negotiations. People in northern
Uganda have clearly communicated their priorities for a comprehensive approach
to transitional justice. In a historic show of unity, nearly one hundred local civil
society organizations recently issued a joint declaration in support of a national
justice framework that would include a Special Tribunal for high-level
perpetrators of crimes, reparations for war-affected communities, and a national
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.18 Quantitative surveys of IDPs have
similarly concluded that northern Ugandans share a strong desire for justice
processes that address atrocities committed by both parties, especially including
a broad truth-telling process and financial reparations.19

Determining how to respond to demands for justice should not just be limited to a
narrow debate in Juba. As much as possible, war survivors should not be
pressured to make decisions before their basic rights to freedom of movement
and return home are met.20 Some analysts have thus advocated a “two-track”
approach to the peace process, to first deal with security issues and then give
war-affected communities the opportunity to address crimes committed during
the war and grievances at the root of this conflict. While strict sequencing may
not be feasible, the aims of such a strategy should be pursued. The negotiations
in Juba should primarily focus on security, with agreements on transitional justice

18
Civil Society representatives from Acholi, Lango, Teso and West Nile regions signed the “Northern
Uganda Civil Society Organizations’ Declaration of Agenda Item 3 of the Juba Peace Talks
(Accountability and Reconciliation)” on 7 September 2007.
19
In recent surveys, 95% of respondents said they wanted a historical record of the war, while 90% said
they would support a truth commission. Meanwhile, over 85% said they had lost income or had property
damaged by the war. See: Berkeley-Tulane Initiative on Vulnerable Populations (August 2007), “New
Population-Based Data on Attitudes about Peace and Justice.”
20
Resolve Uganda interviews with northern Ugandan civil society leaders, Gulu, September and October
2007.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 9

and how to deal with the roots of the war limited to simply initiating longer-term
processes in which northern Ugandans can set the agenda. Such an approach
requires realization that an agreement in Juba is not the end of the peace
process, but effectively the beginning.

The case for initiating longer-term processes that include reconciliation,

compensation and development is strengthened by the recent experience of the
West Nile region of Uganda. There, the rebel Uganda National Rebel Front II
(UNRF II) signed a peace agreement with the Ugandan government in 2002 after
a contentious four years of negotiations. In a format similar to the current Juba
process, the parties agreed to amnesty for all the rebels. The agreement has
survived, but there is now widespread discontent among communities over a
perceived lack of justice and continuing economic marginalization.21 Similarly,
northern Ugandans may become dissatisfied if they are not given opportunities
after the Juba talks to address their grievances and participate in processes of
reconciliation. Commitments to truth telling and reparations must not be
disregarded after an agreement is signed.

The agreement established in Juba on accountability and reconciliation as part of

the third agenda item of the negotiations offers a broad framework for transitional
justice. Its further development and implementation will require strong
international support. The U.S. can first play a decisive role in assisting the
parties to overcome the likely impasse over ICC arrest warrants for the top four
LRA commanders. Though many international actors have weighed in on this
dilemma, it is imperative that war-affected communities and civil society have the
space and time they need to consider their priorities and elicit creative solutions.
One way for the U.S. to facilitate this would be urging the ICC Chief Prosecutor
to seriously consider the “complementarity” of Uganda’s alternative justice
framework. Another would be building support for an Article 16 suspension of
indictments for twelve months through the UN Security Council.

Over the long term, the U.S. can positively support transitional justice by making
sure the political will to respond to the needs of war survivors is sustained even if
the war is officially ended. There is legitimate concern that the Ugandan
government might see a final agreement in Juba as the end of the peace
process,22 when in fact it must be the beginning.

Narrow focus on the LRA obscures the multitude of challenges facing northern
Ugandans, including longstanding economic and political marginalization, abuses
committed by members of the military, gender-based violence, banditry and
21
Refugee Law Project (June 2004), “Negotiating Peace: Resolution of Conflict’s in Uganda’s West Nile
Region,” Kampala: Working Paper No. 12. Also Refugee Law Project (May 2007), “Partial Justice:
Formal and Informal Justice Mechanisms in Post-Conflict West Nile,” Kampala: Working Paper No. 21.
22
Resolve Uganda interviews with NGO officials and traditional elders, Gulu, October 2007.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 10

cattle raiding. Long-term protection of civilians will require national and
international investment in the north’s civilian institutions and rule of law.

Lasting peace will also require ensuring northern Ugandans have the opportunity
to address deeper political and economic grievances that are at the root of
Uganda’s violent history. National and local reconciliation depend on the
development of such processes and the willingness of the national government
to address its own complicity in the violence. The U.S. can offer sustained
commitment and exert leverage to make sure that critical peace building efforts in
northern Uganda remain a priority long after an agreement is signed.

In the meantime, help people return home

Complementary to their desire for peace, northern Ugandans are united in their
desire to return to their pre-displacement homes. In a survey conducted recently
by aid agency Oxfam, 84% of respondents defined ‘peace’ as ‘freedom of
movement’, more than any other definition. Only 70.5% equated ‘peace’ with ‘the
absence of violence’.23 Hence, peace and the freedom of return are inseparable
for war survivors. While the return process is largely dependent on the success
of the Juba peace talks, there are actions the U.S. government should take now
to ensure respect for the rights of IDPs to free and voluntary movement.

At present, there are many obstacles to freedom of movement that can

immediately be addressed. A new study by Human Rights Focus reports that
mixed messages from army and government officials are hindering voluntary
return.24 Northern Ugandans suffer from a chronic lack of information about the
security situation and existing return plans.25 This includes information about
ongoing de-mining activity throughout the war-torn region. Increased
transparency and dissemination of information by both the government and
military is important to restore war-affected communities’ freedom.

As specified under both Uganda’s National IDP Policy and international norms,
all population movement must be completely voluntary. IDP movement can only
be voluntary when it is informed. The U.S., contributing over $100 million in
humanitarian relief to northern Uganda this year, should make sure its
contributions are complementing and upholding these standards.

23
Oxfam International (24 September 2007), “The building blocks of sustainable peace: The views of
internally displaced people in northern Uganda.”
24
Human Rights Focus (September 2007), “Fostering the Transition in Acholiland: From War to Peace,
from Camps to Home,” Gulu.
25
Oxfam International (24 September 2007).

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 11

In addition, there is widespread fear that government proposals for land use will
lead to land dispossession and additional conflict.26 Government officials have
increasingly discussed “transforming” and urbanizing Acholi settlement patterns.
This includes institutionalizing individual land ownership and mechanized
agriculture. President Museveni has also recently called for “industrializing”
northern Uganda by attracting foreign investors.27 In the short-term, these plans
risk weakening the customary land institutions that are accessible to and trusted
by the local population. Local civil society groups, such as the Land and Equality
Movement in Uganda, have called for first allowing people to return to their
homes, to be followed by local initiatives to shape land tenure and
development.28 U.S. officials can work with their Ugandan counterparts to
alleviate local fears and ensure the protection war survivors’ land rights.

Many actors, both domestic and international, have propagated the assumption
that as many as one third of northerners will choose to remain within the area of
existing IDP camps even after a peace agreement is signed.29 Despite defending
such estimates on theoretical assumptions about changed lifestyles, there is a
lack of substantial evidence for this conclusion. In fact, recent interviews and
reports suggest that the overwhelming majority of northerners ultimately plan on
full return to their lands of origin.30 Without the guarantee of security that would
be provided by a peace deal, the most likely outcome is that communities will
maintain a presence near the camps in the short-term as they return home and
get settled.

Human Rights Focus reports that most agencies continue to direct their services
to the original camps or smaller transition sites, instead of areas of full return.31
The government has similarly invested in making the transition sites into ‘viable
communities.’ Such a focus has the effect of keeping people within the camp
apparatus. Even if done with the best of intentions, these strategies are
constraining voluntary movement and return. Assistance should be adapted to
reflect the desires of recipients, not the other way around. While basic services
are still needed in camps to meet emergency-level humanitarian conditions,
USAID and its partners should invest more heavily in preparing sites of final
return.

26
Resolve Uganda interviews with IDPs, Gulu, September and October 2007.
27
“President Museveni vows to industrialize northern Uganda,” (17 October 2007), The Daily Monitor,
Kampala.
28
Land and Equality Movement (June 2007), “Return or transformation? Land and the resettlement of IDPs
in Northern Uganda.”
29
Resolve Uganda interviews with UN officials, Gulu, September 2007.
30
Human Rights Focus (September 2007). Also confirmed by Resolve Uganda interviews with IDPs, Gulu,
October 2007.
31
Ibid.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 12

After years of displacement, there is tremendous need for short- and medium-
term recovery assistance to help people reestablish their livelihoods at return
sites. The U.S. government, through its foreign aid mechanisms, can help meet
that need and give communities the necessary confidence for voluntary return.
With the additional prospects for coordination provided by the appointment of the
new Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution, the State Department has a unique
opportunity to formulate a strategy for supporting recovery efforts. In too many
cases, a lack of commitment to post-conflict recovery has led to the breakdown
of peace agreements.

There is much hope in the three-year $606 million Peace, Recovery and
Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) launched by the Ugandan
government on October 15, 2007. Ensuring the effective and transparent
implementation of the plan, and meeting its full costs will require strong support
from the U.S. and international policymakers.

The U.S. Congress should appropriate increased funds in support of the plan’s
implementation. Governmental corruption is a serious concern, and U.S. officials
should make sure that the PRDP is transparently implemented. There has also
been widespread criticism of the plan due to the lack of adequate consultation
with war-affected communities in its development stages.32 The U.S. can provide
additional leadership toward redevelopment of the region by ensuring that its
assistance to the PRDP is responsive to the needs and desires of the
communities most affected by the war.

With immediate investment to help displaced people return home and

commitment to the long-term redevelopment of northern Uganda, the U.S. is
better poised than ever to make a substantive contribution to sustainable peace
for the people of northern Uganda.

The regional context can’t be ignored

The final component of a comprehensive approach to help resolve Uganda’s

twenty-one year war involves addressing the regional components of the crisis.
Past initiatives that deal with regional conflicts separately have bred failure. U.S.
commitment to peace and return in northern Uganda necessitates concerted
investment and diplomacy to maintain stability in southern Sudan, eastern
Congo, and Uganda’s northeastern region of Karamoja.

The ongoing deterioration of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in

southern Sudan could lead to a resumption of hostilities, which would have
spillover effects in northern Uganda. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement,
32
Resolve Uganda interviews with civil society leaders, Gulu, October 2007.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 13

South Sudan’s main political party, has suspended its involvement in the national
unity government pending implementation of thorny CPA items such as wealth
sharing, border demarcation and troop deployments.33 Southern Sudan remains
deeply impoverished, awash in arms and with little economic development. The
chief mediator of the Juba Process, South Sudanese Vice-President Riek
Machar, will have less time to devote to the peace process if tensions continue to
flare. Moreover, renewed conflict in southern Sudan raises the value of the LRA
to its old patron, the Government of Sudan in Khartoum.

The Bush Administration’s leadership was key to brokering the CPA in 2005 to
end Sudan’s 21-year North-South civil war. Yet, with overwhelming
Congressional focus on Darfur, U.S. resources devoted to ensuring its
implementation have been stretched.34 Congress can play a key role in
advancing sustainable peace in the region by restoring commitment to the
implementation of the CPA. Meanwhile, U.S. regional diplomacy can immediately
work to make sure a relationship between the LRA and Khartoum is not
rekindled.

“Lasting peace in northern Uganda

depends on cultivating a regional
environment that increases both the
benefits of peace and the costs of
violence. The United States, with its
significant leverage in the region, can be
a leader in supporting peace processes
and peacekeeping to make such an
environment possible.”
_______________________________
At the same time, instability in Uganda’s northeastern Karamoja region also
poses a threat to the voluntary return of northern Ugandans. Cattle raids by
Karamojong warriors have exacerbated displacement, especially in the Iteso and
Acholi regions. Recent attempts by the Ugandan government to forcibly disarm
pastoralists in the region have led to increased violence. The U.S. should offer

33
See: International Crisis Group (12 October 2007), “Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock,”
Nairobi/Brussels: Africa Briefing No. 47.
34
Resolve Uganda interviews with State Department officials, Washington D.C., October 2007.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 14

additional resources to address Karamoja’s humanitarian crisis and review the
government’s forced disarmament strategy.

To Uganda’s west, there is continued fighting and lawlessness in eastern

Democratic Republic of Congo, which provides an ideal environment for
insurgent groups. Reports suggest the LRA may be in communication with other
rebel groups in the DRC, and the LRA may view the area as fertile staging
grounds for future attacks. U.S. officials have been increasingly engaging the
situation in eastern Congo. The success of this engagement will depend on
sustained investment in peacekeeping, civilian protection and development.

Lasting peace in northern Uganda depends on cultivating a regional environment

that increases both the benefits of peace and the costs of violence. The United
States, with its significant leverage in the region, can be a leader in supporting
peace processes and peacekeeping to make such an environment possible.

IV. How to do it

Implementing a proactive strategy for peace will require sustained investment

and leadership from all stakeholders. The U.S. has a unique role to play in this
situation.

To the U.S. Administration:

• Refrain from military threats against the LRA and advocacy for a regional
“military solution.”
• Urge President Museveni, especially during his October 30, 2007 visit to
the White House, to maintain patience and commitment to ongoing peace
negotiations.
• Issue high-level statements of support for the negotiations as efforts
continue.
• Send new Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley to be an
observer when negotiations resume in Juba.
• Contribute funds to help cover the costs of the peace process in
coordination with the UN Department of Political Affairs and UN special
envoy Joaquim Chissano.
• Support the establishment of an alternative national accountability
framework that meets both the needs of war-affected communities and
acts as an alternative to the International Criminal Court.
• Encourage the Government of Uganda to fully implement its IDP policy to
facilitate the safe and voluntary return of displaced people, as well as its
new PRDP for the recovery and development of war-affected
communities.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 15

 • Encourage a political solution to address the insecurity in the Karamoja
region of northeastern Uganda while devoting increased humanitarian and
development resources there.
• Authorize an immediate diplomatic initiative to support implementation of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan.

To the U.S. Congress:

• Appropriate $5 million to be immediately used in support of Juba peace
process and implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement.
• Commit increased humanitarian funding to support the PRDP, especially
to facilitate voluntary return and recovery of displaced people.
• Urge the State Department to give the new Senior Advisor for Conflict
Resolution a more explicit mandate to observe and support the Juba
peace process.
• Urge the State Department and Bush Administration to refrain from
military threats against the LRA while peace negotiations are ongoing.
• Increase attention and efforts to re-invest in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan.

V. Conclusion

The last year has brought much hope that an end to the war in northern Uganda
is on the horizon. The peace talks in Juba, though frustratingly slow, have
brought relative calm to the region for the first time in years, while offering a
viable means of ending regional insecurity and addressing deeper grievances.

Public pressure has finally put the crisis on the agenda of the international
community and resulted in tangible momentum toward peace. The U.S. State
Department’s recent appointment of a Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution to
focus on northern Uganda is a welcome development and presents a real
foundation for a comprehensive U.S. strategy that supports the peace process,
while investing in early recovery efforts that promote the voluntary return of war-
affected communities.

Yet, at the same time, some U.S. officials have recently reverted to military
threats against the LRA rebels and advocacy for a regional “military solution,”
adding to fears that both the Ugandan government and LRA are considering the
option of withdrawing from negotiations and resuming hostilities. A return to
military action is the greatest threat to this historic opportunity for peace. Past
“military solutions” have failed and led to more severe violence and the
deterioration of humanitarian conditions. Achieving a peace agreement through
the Juba process must remain the top priority of the United States and all parties.

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 16

The Juba process is not the sole answer for peace, but it can be the start of a
much longer process to rebuild the war-torn area, heal deeper wounds and
reconcile parties across Uganda. How the United States responds to this
moment will demonstrate where its priorities lie. War-affected communities
overwhelmingly desire a robust peace process and the right to return. After
twenty-one years, it’s time they are given a real chance to rebuild their lives.

Resolve Uganda is a U.S. based coalition of humanitarian, faith-based and human rights
organizations advocating for the international leadership necessary to end to the 21-year
crisis in northern Uganda.

Contact information:

Resolve Uganda
211 8th St. NE, Studio - Washington, DC 20002
(202)548-2517
www.resolveuganda.org

Give Peace a Real Chance – Resolve Uganda, October 2007 17