FAJARDO VS PEOPLE

FACTS:

Members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG) were

instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt.
Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang and
Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that
armed men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were indiscriminately firing
guns.
Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the elements of the
PISOG proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons
scampered and ran in different directions. The responding team saw Valerio holding two .
45 caliber pistols. He fired shots at the policemen before entering the house of petitioner.
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the
waistband of her shorts, after which, she entered the house and locked the main door.
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering petitioner's
house but, in order to deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the
perimeter of the house as they waited for further instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A
few minutes later, petitioner went out of the house and negotiated for the pull-out of the
police troops. No agreement materialized.
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2
Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw
Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw something. The discarded objects
landed near the wall of petitioner's house and inside the compound of a neighboring
residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega),
radio announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded objects,
which turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US,
with serial number (SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial
number. The recovered items were then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1
Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for and obtaining a search
warrant.
The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with a barangay
captain,barangay kagawad, and members of the media, as witnesses, the police team
proceeded to search petitioner's house. The team found and was able to confiscate the
following:
1. Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;
2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.
Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority
to possess the confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal
information for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294,
was filed against them.
 PETITIONERs CONTENTION:

For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search
warrant was defective because the allegation contained in the application filed and signed
by SPO1 Tan was not based on his personal knowledge. They quoted this pertinent
portion of the application
That this application was founded on confidential information received by the
Provincial Director, Police Supt. Edgardo Mendoza.
They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was infirm since
petitioner, who was inside the house at the time of the search, was not asked to
accompany the policemen as they explored the place, but was instead ordered to remain
in the living room
Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt
prepared by the raiding team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito
Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when the
raiding team arrived. She averred that such situation was implausible because she was
wearing garterized shorts and a spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse.

PEOPLEs CONTENTION:

Police NAVA saw Valerio before going inside petitioners house firing several shots
and appearing at the roof top of petitioners house several house disposing guns and it
was recovered by witnesses, SPO1 Neron and Vega. The guns used by SPO1 Tan to
obtain a warrant of arrest. Petitioner and Valerio were estopped from assailing the legality
of their arrest since they participated in the trial by presenting evidence for their defense.
Likewise, by applying for bail, they have effectively waived such irregularities and
defects.

RTC: GUILTY FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FEIREARMS

CA:CONCURRED BUT MODIFIED.

At the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did not have
personal knowledge of the fact that appellants had no license to possess firearms as
required by law. For one, he failed to make a categorical statement on that point during
the application. Also, he failed to attach to the application a certification to that effect
from the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. x x x, this
certification is the best evidence obtainable to prove that appellant indeed has no license
or permit to possess a firearm.

ll firearms and explosives seized inside petitioner's residence were declared

inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside
the house of petitioner before the warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant
to the plain view doctrine.

ISSUE:
 WON the discovery of the two (2) receivers does not come within the purview of the
plain view doctrine

SC RULING:

The receivers were seized in plain view, hence, admissible.

General RULE.: No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution

EXC: There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule.
Thus, evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible
under any of the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2)
search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures

MAIN RULING:

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who
has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence
in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.Tested against
these standards, we find that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol
outside petitioner's house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside petitioner's house
falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law
enforcers around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were
earlier seen respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure
and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and
Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to
believe that a crime was being committed. There was thus sufficient probable cause for
the policemen to cordon off the house as they waited for daybreak to apply for a search
warrant.
Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different
instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects.
Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had
reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband items, or
evidence of the offense they were then suspected of committing. Indeed, when
subsequently recovered, they turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.

We find that petitioner is not liable for illegal possession of part of a firearm.
illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed when
the holder thereof: chanrob1esvirtwallawlibrary
(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof
(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.24cralawredlaw
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the
subject receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on
top of the house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner
holding the receivers, before or during their disposal.
At the very least, petitioner's possession of the receivers was merely incidental
because Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of
petitioner's house. Absent any evidence pointing to petitioner's participation, knowledge
or consent in Valerio's actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the
receivers.
Petitioner's apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only
proceed from the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen
tucked in the waistband of her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution
failed to convert such assumption into concrete evidence.

The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm.

In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same
does not have the corresponding license for it.26cralawredlaw
By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a firearm
must yield these requisites: chanrob1esvirtwallawlibrary
(a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and
(b) the accused who possessed the same does not have the license for the firearm to
which the seized part/component corresponds.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of
the crime. The subject receivers - one with the markings "United States Property" and the
other bearing Serial No. 763025 - were duly presented to the court as Exhibits E and E-1,
respectively. They were also identified by SPO2 Nava as the firearm parts he retrieved af
ter Valerio discarded them.27cralaw His testimony was corroborated by DYKR radio
announcer Vega, who witnessed the recovery of the receivers.28cralawredlaw
 DISPOSITORY PART:

WHEREFORE , premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court
of Appeals is herebyREVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo y Castro, who
is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
SO ORDERED .

PEOPLE VS DEQUINA

FACTS:

On September 27, 1999, while [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] were

tending to their fish stall in Iloilo Public Market, [Dequina], their friend,
came and invited them to meet her, for a still undisclosed reason, at the
ground floor of the Gaisano Mall, early in the morning of the following
day, September 28, 1999. As agreed upon, they met at the designated
place and time. Not long thereafter, Sally joined them. They knew Sally
to be [Dequinas] supplier of RTWs and other merchandise. For a while,
[Dequina] and Sally excused themselves and proceeded to the first floor of
the mall where they talked privately. Soon after Sally left, [Jingabo] and
[Jundoc] asked [Dequina] what they talked about. Instead of answering,
[Dequina] asked if they are willing to go with her to Manila in order to get
something. While a little bit surprised, [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] readily
agreed as they had never been in the city before. [Dequina] handed to
them their plane tickets. They were told that the same were given by
Sally. However, they noticed that the plane tickets were not in their names
but in the names of other persons. When they called the attention of
[Dequina] about it, the latter simply replied Anyway that is free.
[Jingabo] noticed anxiety got the better of Nelida at that time.
Nevertheless, the three of them enplaned for Manila at around 7:45 a.m. of
September 28, 1999.

From the Ninoy Aquino Domestic Airport, they proceeded to

the house of [Dequinas] aunt in Guadalupe, Makati City. In the
afternoon, their host noticed the presence of unfamiliar vehicles. Some of
these vehicles were even parked right in front of the house. Unmindful
about it, they left Guadalupe at around 6:00 p.m. and proceeded to a
Philippine Rabbit Bus Terminal. Thereat, two male persons approached
[Dequina] and handed to her bus tickets. They were pointed to the
particular vehicle where they were to board.

They reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga between 12:30 and

1:00 a.m. of September 29, 1999. While they were having their snacks, a
couple approached [Dequina] and they had a talk. Thereafter, the couple
motioned them to three male persons, each carrying a bag, at the opposite
side of the road. Upon [Dequinas] instruction, they took the bags from
the three men. Then, they waited for their ride back to Manila.

As they boarded the bus, the conductor loaded their bags

inside the compartment. They alighted at SM EDSA at around 6:00 a.m.
of September 29, 1999. They boarded a waiting tricycle. When they
reached a certain store, the trike driver bought carton boxes where they
loaded two of the three bags. Thereafter, the tricycle driver pointed
[Dequina] to a waiting taxi where they boarded along with their baggages.

As they entered the pier premises, a police officer on board a

mobile patrol car ordered them to stop. They were ordered to alight and
the police officers ordered the driver to open the taxis compartment. One
of the police officers took a knife from his pocket and slashed one of the
bags. Then, the policemen told them that what they had in their bags were
marijuana. The police officers ordered them to board the mobile car while
the bags were loaded inside the compartment of the same car.

They were brought to a sari-sari store where a certain Chief

Sapitula, whom they later knew to be the police officers superior, was
waiting. Sapitula interrogated [Dequina] and at one point, he slapped her.
Sapitula summoned press people who took their photographs. Thereafter,
they were brought to the Hospital ng Bayan and finally, to the police
precinct were they were charged accordingly.
 ACCUSED-APPELLANTs CONTENTION:

Accused-appellants assail their conviction, asserting that their arrests

were illegal. They were not doing anything illegal that would have
justified their warrantless arrest, much less a warrantless search of their
persons and belongings. A search made without a warrant cannot be
justified as an incident of arrest unless the arrest itself was lawful.
Accused-appellants insist that the description of the persons who were
transporting marijuana relayed by the Chief of Police to the apprehending
officers, PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco, was so general that it could
not be sufficient ground for the apprehension of accused-appellants.

PEOPLEs CONTENTION:

The People counters that accused-appellants arrests were lawful as they were
then actually committing a crime. Since accused-appellants were lawfully arrested, the
resulting warrantless search of their persons and belongings was also valid. In addition,
accused-appellants did not refute that they were indeed transporting prohibited drugs
when they were arrested and, instead, alleged as defenses that Dequina acted under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear, and Jundoc and Jingabo were merely accommodating a
trusted childhood friend.

RTC: GUILTY for ILLEGAL TRANSPORT OF MARIJUANA

CA: AFFRIRMED RTC DECISION

SC RULING:

There is no question that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants and the warrantless
seizure of the marijuana were valid and legal.

Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.[13] It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said
right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and

seizures admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a
moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk;
and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances

Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean to

carry or convey from one place to another.[16] The evidence in this case shows
that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were caught in flagrante
carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3
Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even open Dequinas traveling bag to
determine its content because when the latter noticed the police officers presence,
she walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag,
causing the zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since
a crime was then actually being committed by the accused-appellants, their
warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following warrantless search of
their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest

DISPOSITORY PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated August

16, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01431, which affirmed the
Decision dated October 30, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in
Criminal Case No. 99-177383, finding accused-appellants GUILTY of the crime of
illegal transport of marijuana and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua, and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00 each, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE VS MARTI

FACTS:

The appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the
"Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress
and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up
the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the
date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ,
Mattacketr II, Zurich, Switzerland

"Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellants
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4)
packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box.

"Before delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellants box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he
pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof

"Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper

"He brought the letter and a sample of appellants shipment to the Narcotics Section of
NBI. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI
that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents,
and a photographer, went to the Reyes office et Ermita, Manila

"Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellants packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out
the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to
have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers

"The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The
package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that
dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars.

"The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects

Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant, while
claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the
attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of
the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory
examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified
by the forensic chemist

An Information was filed against appellant for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.

APPELLANTs CONTENTION:

Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure
and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues
that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
 PEOPLEs CONTENTION:

The Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure cannot be invoked
in this case for the government did not interfere with the object of the case but it was
though private individual who had sought only the help of the NBI agents. The
Government did not in any way intervened since it was originally a search by private
entity

SC RULING:

We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties

guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies
as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as
to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked
against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign
authority.Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected
through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-
governmental as it is, of appellants constitutional rights to privacy and communication.

DISPOSITORY PART:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FLOR VS PEOPLE

FACTS:

An information for libel was filed before the RTC Naga City, against the
petitioner and Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent,
respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol
Region.
That on or about the 18th day up to the 24th day of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region
comprised by the Provinces of Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate, Camarines Sur,
and Camarines Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the accused who are the news correspondent and the
managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without justifiable motive and with malicious
intent of impeaching, discrediting and destroying the honor, integrity, good name and
reputation of the complainant as Minister of the Presidential Commission on Government
Reorganization and concurrently Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, and to
expose him to public hatred, ridicule and contempt, write, edit, publish and circulate an
issue of the local weekly newspaper BICOL FORUM throughout the Bicol Region,
The information was later amended to include Jose Burgos, Jr., who was at that
time the publisher-editor of the Bicol Forum. The trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person as he did not surrender nor was he ever arrested by the
authorities.
It appears from the records that prior to the filing of the criminal complaint, the
private complainant had already instituted a separate civil action for damages arising
out of the questioned news article before the Naga City. Due to this, the criminal suit
for libel was ordered consolidated

PRIVATE COMPLAINANT (GOV) CONTENTION:

The private complainant contends that after he clarified over the radio that he never
went to Japan, the issue was never discussed again until the matter was included in the
questioned news item. As for the cash advances, the private complainant stated that the
Provincial Auditor and the Budget Officer had already made a statement to the effect
that he had no pending cash advances. Further, the private complainant clarified that he
made his trip to Israel in his capacity as a cabinet member of former President Corazon C.
Aquino and that he spent his own money for the said official trip thereby debunking Bicol
Forums report that his travel to Israel was purely a junket.The private complainant also
complained that no one from the Bicol Forum made any attempt to get his side of the
story nor was he aware of any effort exerted by the representatives of said publication to
confirm the veracity of the contents of the subject news article from any source at the
provincial capitol. Finally, the private complainant took exception to the banner headline
which states Villafuertes Denial Convinces No One. According to him, the Bicol
Forum seemed to be making a mockery of his previous explanations regarding the cash
advances and his trips abroad and such a sweeping statement subjected him to public
ridicule and humiliation

PETITIONERs CONTENTION: (RAMOS)

Ramos alleged that prior to writing the subject news article, he went to his
source to ask some clarificatory questions and was told that he would be given
authenticated records of the cash advances. Later, he was given a copy of the
Schedule of Cash Advances of Disbursing Officers and Other Officers (as of June 30
1987).[17] Among the provincial government officials listed therein were the private
respondent who had a 1986 balance of P25,000.00 incurred for cultural activities;
Atty. Jose Maceda who also had a 1986 balance of P130,084.00 for sports
development, Operation Smile, NAMCYA Festival, and prisoners subsistence; and
Eulogio Panes, Jr., who had beside his name a 1986 balance of P250,000 for the
purpose of sports development. Ramos also claimed that when he went to the
Provincial Treasurers Office to conduct his investigation, he was shown some
vouchers and was told that many of the members of the baseball delegation to Japan
were not elected provincial officials and, in fact, some mayors and private
individuals were sent as part of the Philippine group.
During his turn at the witness stand, the petitioner admitted that the headline was
written by him in his capacity as the managing editor in accordance with the policy
of their paper to print as headlines matters dealing with public concerns and public
officials.[20] According to him, the banner headline and the sub-headline truthfully
reflect the substance of the story prepared by Ramos.

RTC: Ramos, FLor and Burgos Jr. GUILTY OF LIBEL

(CRIMINAL ASPECT)

Ramos, FLor and Burgos Jr. Ordered to pay damages jointly and severally
(CIVIL ASPECT)

CA: AFFIRMED THE RTC RULING

ISSUE: whether or not the questioned news item is libelous

 SC:
Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. [27] Any of these imputations is
defamatory and under the general rule stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious. [28] The presumption
of malice, however, does not exist in the following instances:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of
any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

We hold that the prosecution failed to meet the criterion of reckless disregard.
As the records reveal, the issue of cash advances against the coffers of the provincial
government of Camarines Sur was a major political topic in said locality at that time.
Even the private respondent himself admitted during his direct testimony that he
went on radio in order to address the matter. It was clearly a legitimate topic to be
discussed not only by the members of the media but by the public as what was
involved was the dispensation of taxpayers money.
Further, it bears emphasis that in this case, the petitioner and Ramos had in their
possession information relating to the cash advances and the private respondents
travels abroad. The information was provided by one who worked in the provincial
treasurers office and had access to the pertinent financial records of the provincial
government. Their informant was familiar with the procedure with regard to the
approval of cash advances. The inference they drew from the note given by their
source that the private respondent prodded some of the provincial government
officials to take out cash advances may have been false but the same does not warrant
a conviction for libel nor support a claim for damages
Finally, the private respondent claims that the banner headline ridiculed him
before the public does not merit consideration as the rule in this jurisdiction is that
[t]he headline of a newspaper story or publication claimed to be libelous must be
read and construed in connection with the language that follows.[53] A perusal of the
entire news story accompanying the headline in this case readily establishes the fact
that the questioned article dealt with refutations by the private respondents critics of
 his explanation over the radio with regard to the issues mentioned therein. The
wording of the headline may have contained an exaggeration but the same
nevertheless represents a fair index of the contents of the news story accompanying
it.[54]

DISPOSITORY PART:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals of 10 December 1996 which affirmed the Joint Decision dated 18 March
1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Pili, Camarines Sur, and its Resolution
of 19 August 1999 denying reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

SWS VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-

profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including
economics, politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter processing,
analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation, which features newsworthy items of information including
election surveys.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from enforcing 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before
an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days
before an election.

SWS and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORP. CONTENTION :

Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the
period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media
the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election
survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.
 Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear
and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters
conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998
elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing
confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence
to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the
voting process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is
imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast
media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day
of the election. Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters
to be denied access to the results of election surveys which are relatively objective.

COMELECs CONTENTION:

COMELEC justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent
the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous
surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of
election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to
the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process
resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is
narrowly tailored to meet the evils sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of
freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the
last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in
scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.
Respondent claims that in National Press Club v. COMELEC,[1] a total ban on political
advertisements, with candidates being merely allocated broadcast time during the so-
called COMELEC space or COMELEC hour, was upheld by this Court. In contrast,
according to respondent, it states that the prohibition in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 is much
more limited.

ISSUE: WON 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 is constitutional

SC RULING:

What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of

5.4? The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in
United States v. OBrien:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
[of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.[8]
 This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from
content-neutral regulations and is said to have become canonical in the review of
such laws.[9] It is noteworthy that theOBrien test has been applied by this Court in
at least two cases.[10]
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the
suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the
restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the
governmental purpose in question.

Our inquiry should accordingly focus on these two considerations as applied to

5.4.
First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the OBrien test because the causal
connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest
not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. By prohibiting the publication
of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might
undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of
expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject
matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and
other opinion makers. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if
not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression means that the government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.[11] The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the expression falls
within one of the few unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,
contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by 5.4 cannot
be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The
prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is
direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech
and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately
before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local election.

Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the

suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental,
5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the OBrien test, namely, that the restriction
be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated,
5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon
effect, junking of weak or losing candidates, and resort to the form of election
cheating called dagdag-bawas. Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be,
they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such
aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech
because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils.
 To summarize then, we hold that S 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category
of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.

DISPOSITORY PART:

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is GRANTED and 5.4 of R.A. No.
9006 and 24(h) of COMELEC Resolution 3636, dated March 1, 2001, are declared
unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.